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To: Force Commander

From: S03 G2

02 Apr 95

SUBJECT: YOUR PIR/IRS

Reference: Our Conversation 011408B Apr 95

1. Last week I had a productive session of HUMINT debriefings. Unfortunately no report could be made to you until now. The time which passed, however, allowed some of the claims and indicators to be verified, especially as they became overcome by events.

2. This memo is a (very) concise synopsis of what I have learned, to date in answer to your Information Requirements of last week. I am prepared to bore you with as much detail as I have on these points. Where I cannot, those will be the directions I still exploit. (The more I learn, the more I find I don't know.) This is why I love my job!

Why does the government not like UNAMIR?

3. Essentially four parts:

- a. our mandate;
- b. pride;
- c. sovereignty; and
- d. suspicion.

4. Mandate We have a force of 6,000 [mostly] armed troops in this country, yet we have said that if FRGF attacks (a possibility, see FRGF below) we would "get out of the way." RPF asks why we do not get out of the way now? Either help, stand aside or go away.

5. Pride: Soldiers on the ground cannot help but feel resentment to us. They fought/died/got blown up in a war where we were seen to be running away and not even stopping to help those being victimized. We seemed to come back, in force, when it was safe. (Prepared for yesterday's conflict?) Yet we look so good to the Rwandan citizen; we have boots, uniforms, vehicles, organization, discipline and everything, while those in charge don't look like it.

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6. Sovereignty: We have 6,000 armed troops in this sovereign nation, almost as a legacy from the previous government. Understandably we could be removed if the government asked, however the government knows that a lot of political will to provide rehabilitative support would be lost without a UN military presence.

7. Suspicion: A large armed force which won't help defend against a very real threat to regional peace. The appearance of aid to FAR (Former Army of Rwanda) with OP TURQUOIS (French, yes, but muzungu, nonetheless), UN/NGO support to the refugee camps and protection of internal security threats posed by IDP camps. France still supports the government in exile (covertly). Is it possible that the West wants their return to power. The UN is (appears to be) powerful, why does it not take action against such seemingly "overt" threats to regional stability, security and peace such as the military training camps in Zaire, Zairan complicity in "banditry", the arming of potential insurgents. All they see is MILOBs who seem to be watching their every move with a microscope, then applying the UN's Western code of morality to this "post revolution" African nation. There is room for doubt as to the good intentions of such a big 1st world force.

8. I use the analogy of: It is as disliking the brick for going through your window. The point is missed that it is the person who threw the brick, not the brick itself. We, as a well disciplined brick, follow the laws of physics of our orders from higher. This is a country (and an army) where decisions are made at local levels as well as from the central government. The idea that "individual soldiers, much as they may want to "do what's right", cannot" is somewhat foreign to the RPA on the ground.

9. What can be done? It is not for intelligence to speak of operations (although we can develop target lists or avenues of exploitation). One such target would be to diminish the probable anti-UNAMIR/UN excitation program which will probably develop 5-7 Apr. However, in neutralizing it, it should be replaced with something to give the people of Rwanda common HOPE. The anti-UNAMIR/UN program may be aimed at uniting the people, controlling them and giving them a "Goldstein" (common "enemy" at odds with the society's cohesion and values) so that they do not go wild during this period of increased excitation/grief and begin to kill their neighbour. We can't just defend ourselves, we have to show we are here to help them. (This is my opinion and why it is not my place to speak of operations.)

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What are the FRGF up to?

10. I have attached a source debrief which seems to encapsulate a lot of what has been found out. Actually, I have editorialized it and added some information from other sources. Remember it is the source's claims (except for my comments) some of which must still be verified. However, overall I think it a pretty good post-reconnaissance report.

11. The FRG are attempting to maintain power with the possibility of regaining old power.

12. Concisely, the FRG (former Rwandan Government) maintain power by operating a nation without territory. Through shuttle government, the Hutu refugees are maintained as a migratory population/power-base (such as Isrealites or Blackfoot). The FRG want to retain (not necessarily immediately regain) power. However, they will lose power if the camps depopulate. Depopulation may well become an inevitability due to diminishing food supplies and OP RETOUR. Depopulation would prompt action by those in power. The current plan by all three factions of the FRG is to create instability within Rwanda (softening it up) then seize and hold a piece of its territory, thereby assuring a seat at negotiations with the possibility of exploiting any opportunity for decisive victory (a la RPA example).

13. To prevent loss of power/depopulation, rumours are maintained to the effect that Hutus returning to Rwanda will be killed/incarcerated, etc. In fact, some murders of returnees have been done by Hutus themselves to "prove" the point. Army morale and discipline is maintained by the hopes and preparations for a military counter-attack. OPSEC is high with the FAR (former Army of Rwanda) although lacking in militia. Banditry raids, although for personal or logistical gain, seem to be military operations. This keeps the soldiers busy, trained and with some personal pride/achievement to show for it. The "militia" raids (mining, grenades and attacks) are also part of the FAR military plan.

What is the threat to UNAMIR?

14. This is a tough one. There are few indicators of a direct threat to UNAMIR, however some speculation on current events (and this is ONLY speculation, assuming popular opinion IS fanned against UN/UNAMIR) brings two options to the fore:

- a. Popular opinion fanned to such a degree during this 6-7 Apr period that UNAMIR may find itself paralyzed by

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demonstrations, etc while the internal security problems of IDP camps and prisoner backlogs are eliminated in "spontaneous local, unilateral and unsanctioned" actions. These actions would be condemned by the government and VP Kagame would take action to stop it, albeit too late.; or

b. The debate and threat of heightened emotions could pressure UN to clarify UNAMIR II mandate, possibly forcing UN to actually assist the current government or get out.

15. Other threats to UN/UNAMIR could be from FAR, although attack on UN could have the effect of cutting their own throats (remove UNAMIR, remove a lot of aid to the camps).

Don't Shoot Me, I Might Be Right

16. The purpose of this memo is to indicate where I am in the intelligence picture. The principle of continuous review means I will always be checking myself to see if its right or not. This document is NOT the decisive answer, but a collection of indicators and the "best guess" they can give me, so far. Intelligence never knows certainty until after the event happens but the principles of intelligence are being followed (Annex A). I am quite hopeful that you will shortly have a very slick apparatus/organization at your disposal (maybe even the basis for a model for future UN ops). You have given me my reins, I am running with them, I don't think you'll be disappointed. This is what I do and I'm happy to be doing it. Thanks.

17. E Tenebris Lux!

B.J. East
Capt
SO3 G2
11254

Attachments:

Annex A - Principles of Intelligence

Annex B - Source Debrief Report #005

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Annex A to
2 Apr 95

PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE

1. I have been successful in strategic analysis and the conduct of a very slick (domestic) intelligence operation (OP MAPLE) because of strict adherence to these eight principles:

- a. Continuous review (am I right/wrong, on the right track?, is the answer still the same or have things changed?);
- b. Timeliness (get this out to you now, rather than wait too late to see if I'm right);
- c. Accuracy, Reliability & Objectivity (trying);
- d. Centralized control & Systematic exploitation (our newly emerging G2/MILOB staff is an exponential step in the right direction)
- e. Source Protection (a difficult one in this HQ)

2. These principles will be imparted and adhered to in the newly established G2/MILOB structure:

- a. G2: Maj Kamenge
- b. G2 Special Projects/Senior Analyst: Me
- c. G2 Estimates & Plans: (MILOB offr) a very important job not as yet done. He will complete the int estimate based on your PIR/IRS and plan collection/exploitation;
- d. G2 Projects/Basic Intelligence: (MILOB Offr)
- e. Collator: Capt Leduc

3. It is my intention to establish within UNAMIR HQ itself a secure link to my national/international sources/agencies. After which I will continue on special projects in pursuit of your PIR/IRS.

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SOURCE DEBRIEF #005

Source #005

Interviewer #002

23 Mar 95 1430-1645B

This debriefing came as a surprise. Source was referred to Interviewer 1400B without introduction or preparation. Interview took form of open discussion. Source volunteering information, interviewer posing questions only where elaboration was required. In conclusion IRs were addressed by interviewer. This report is condensation and collation of information passed.

Source has been visitting the refugee camps in Zaire on a regular basis since August 1994, usually once every two weeks.

CAMPS

Three main areas:

Goma
Bukavu
Uvira

There are numerous camps around each area with names differing from the main city name.

GOMA

Lac Verre is the main military camp. It is obvious in appearance as military (NFI), however the OPSEC of its inhabitants is greatly improved since October 1994. No uniforms are worn and weapons are carefully kept from public view.

In an effort to elicit medical aid at the military camp, FAR has been approaching UNICEF, citing the high level of aids amongst the children. [Comment: the children referred to are in fact young boys joined into the ranks of FAR.]

Source estimates at least 1/3 the population in Goma directly participated in the genocide.

BUKAVU

Panzi (NFI) and Bulonge (80km S/SW of Bukavu) are openly military.

UVIRA

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On the border of Burundi near Bujumbura. Rwandan and Burundian militia train and stage from here for operations into Burundi. Zairan troops do not maintain security at the UVIRA camp. The place was "lousy with French "free-lancers" (mercenaries). [Comment: during the military crack-down in 23-25 March 95, many of the Hutu militia fled back towards UVIRA.]

OPFOR

Opposing forces consist of:

FAR: Former Rwandan Government Forces

Rwandan Militia

Burundian Militia

FAR

During the withdrawal from Rwanda, many FAR came across the border in orderly fashion, with their weapons and heavy equipment. In the early days, FAR were quite open and boastful of a return in force to Rwanda. This was while French (and possibly other) support was still strong. With recognition of the new government, popular opinion against the genocide, and the FAR threat to regional stability, international support had to become less overt. With international attention and media in the camps, the FAR had to hide the appearance of the camps as military support/training bases. OPSEC became more pronounced to the extent that weapons and uniformed soldiers are largely hidden from public view in Goma, although weapons can be seen in Bukavu, and UVIRA is openly military.

FAR has been seriously reorganizing itself in battalions and brigades. New commanders have been appointed. The FAR exhibits formal organization, ranks and discipline. They also have good communications systems between the camps in Zaire and possibly Tanzania. A possible EW intercept site exists in Bukavu to exploit UN comms.

The impression of disarmament by Zairan soldiers is false. Heavy equipment was placed in centralized compounds but source has observed FAR troops performing routine maintenance without obstruction (or presence) of Zairan guards. Furthermore, during disarmament, munitions and arms had been piled in various locations easily accessible to passers-by. These stacks dwindled and disappeared over a short period, possibly taken and cached by FAR. FAR helicopters have been seen in the KINDER (sp?) area, but unknown who controls them.

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RWANDAN MILITIA

Under command of the FAR although they are somewhat independent. Rwandan militia work in the south with Burundian militia in an effort to help destabilize Burundi and establish a base of operations into Rwanda. FAR train the militia with some FAR taking leadership positions within some units.

BURUNDI MILITIA

Stated objective of the Burundi militia is to cause as much havoc as possible until the Burundian army is integrated. The secondary aim (largely the FDD) is protection of the Hutu population. Burundi militia has cash flow problem.

Burundian militia have two major factions:

FDD; and
Pelapahutu (most extreme)

Kamenge A Hutu suburb of Bujumbura is a Burundi militia stronghold, from where Hutu youth gangs operate. [Comment: this suburb was *NOT* cleared by Burundi Armed Forces during the 23-25 March 95 cordon and search operation]

The FAR is in command of all military, although the militia may act unilaterally when it suits them. The FAR commander is based in Goma, with one of his generals at Bukavu. FAR command will conduct coordinating meetings by area. Four high command level officers will travel to an area (Goma/Bukavu/Uvira) to hold these meetings.

Training

Formal training is barely occurring in the North, this is due to:

- a. media/world attention; and
- b. the influence of well-established Tutsis in the area which makes the political/governmental environment difficult for FRGF operations.

In the south, Rwandan and Burundian militias collaborate, for the most part to train and conduct cross-border raids into Burundi. It is the Rwandan militia which trains and arms the Burundians. These troops undergo training in destabilization techniques, such

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as raids and ambushes; primarily under cover of darkness. Source identified similar training techniques in Uvira on two occasions: a patrol of approximately 15 personnel armed with personal weapons, anti-personnel mines and grenades. They would be trained in ambush and how to strip clean a body of all usable items. Grenades and mines are considered as offensive weapons to be used liberally. (Comment: this is consistent with the "OP INSECTICIDE" situation of early March 95, wherein approximately 10 FRGF had entered Kigali, similarly armed and intent upon creating instability within the town market.) In one instance, each member was armed with a firearm, while in another instance, two patrols had a mixture of personal weapons ranging from firearms, slings, bows and spears within its ranks (however, all patrols had a complement of grenades and mines).

Training in fieldcraft, individual field movement, ambush, stripping of bodies and parade drill does occur near the camps.

FAR personnel also undergo formalized training by Zaire and possibly by French Foreign Legion in the Central African Republic. Source quotes a reciprocity agreement with Zaire/UNITA/FAR wherein FAR troops participate in training in Zaire and operations in Angola.

LOGISTICS

Banditry: Banditry is a form of military training and operations. It helps support the FRGF sustainability while keeping the troops cohesive and busy, therefore disciplined.

Caching: Caches very close to the Lac Verre military camp were not well concealed. Source observed small metal boxes (possibly ammunition boxes) which, although once buried, had become exposed or defined by the rains. Source observed that these boxes contained linked ammunition. The ammunition had not been well preserved and rust on the links was evident. Source learned through other sources that there were arms and munitions caches around the area of the Burundi/Tanzania border as well as within the Kigali region itself.

Financing: FRG has "old money", money taken from Rwanda and goods siezed at the port of Mombassa. International aid comes from non-governmental organizations such as:

- a. DCI (Belgium) Democrat Christian Institute (NFI);
- and,

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b. the Association of Great Lakes (NFI).

This is coupled with the income from selling parts of UN/NGO aid, destined for the refugee camps, on the "black market". Control of food aid by FRG also helps to control its exiled population/power base.

Communications: An extensive communications network is reported to be established linking all Zairan camps and possibly the Ngara camps of Tanzania. Electronic means range from walkie-talkies to a sophisticated communications station in Lac Verre (Goma), located in the "big military tent".

PERSONALITIES/GROUPS

Tim Belly: 19 Jul 94, took over Lac Verre area and established the FAR command post.

General Bisimungu: The military commander of "FAR" (Former Army of Rwanda). Appears to be the most moderate of the FRG, which does not mean to say he is not an extremist, merely more moderate than most. He is a conventional military commander.

Colonel Bagasora: Deputy Minister of Defence. See Defence Ministry.

Bugaza: A Burundian extremist Tutsi reportedly doing some acts of violence and blaming them on Hutu militia. Bugaza purportedly controls the extremist Tutsi gangs in Burundi.

Dany Bimbo: SNIP Agent, Zairan ex-military. Supposed to have been involved in some of the arms deals.

GOVERNMENT

[Comment: Essentially the FRG is operating a country in exile. A refugee population/power base controlled by shuttle visits, disinformation and intimidation. For this reason, any depopulation of the refugee camps would be a blow to FRG.]

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The "government in exile" is comprised of three factions:

- a. the Defence Ministry;
- b. the Cameroon group; and
- c. the Nairobi group.

Defence Ministry

The Defence Ministry is a mobile entity which operates mainly out of Goma, but travels to sit in Bukavu, Nairobi and Uvira (the last being only for high ranking officers). The Defence Ministry is extremist. The principal influence is from Colonel Bagasora who is Deputy Defence Minister and at odds with General Bisimungu. Bagasora negotiates most of the FRGF arms deals. Bagasora advocates attacking to seize territory as soon as support can be secured.

Cameroon Group

These are politicians of the former government who have "old money" settled mainly in the south. They are "old money" and not in such a hurry as the other two factions. They would prefer the military do nothing soon. They would go along with "the plan", but appear to be stalling, possibly relying more upon some form negotiations. They want the military to do nothing soon and appear to be the group prepared to wait the longest before launching action. This group is associated with the moderate southern Hutus.

Nairobi Group

Nairobi is the political headquarters for ALL factions of the FRG. Apparently this government sits every Friday at the "6/80 Hotel" (name is uncertain, but similar to this). The Nairobi group also has money, but mostly that stolen during the war. This group wants to stall, not commit. They advocate the plan, but not until ready. This group is associated with the more militant northern Hutus.

"THE PLAN"

The aim of the FRG is to regain/retain power. The plan of action for FRG to accomplish this, although expedited by military means, is a political one. Basically, the plan is to conduct operations somewhat similar to those of the RPA which is a campaign of destabilization to weaken the Rwandan government and

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RPA, followed by an action to seize and hold territory, thus assuring a place at the negotiating table (with the possibility of siezing all of Rwanda if the opportunity presents itself). At one meeting the source attended, the impression was given that the FRG are looking at a 1-3-5 year timeframe before launching a major offensive. That being said, however, the dynamic could be changed to move up this timetable were some accelerator/opportunity present itself, such as:

- a. volcanic eruptions which endangers the camps;
- b. depopulation of the camps (and therefore loss of power base)[Comment: given recent events and food rationing by NGOs, this could become a more imminent eventuality]; or
- c. the Burundi situation goes out of control.

The specific options of terrain acquisition (as per source) are:

- a. cross from Zaire and take Cyangugu to the choke-point formed by the Nyungwe Forest and Lake Kivu;
- b. more likely move from Burundi to take the eastern side of the Nyungwe Forest, then work westwards with the help of sympathetic locals

[Comment: the current security situation in Burundi makes the latter option unviable as sufficient Hutu forces have fled the Ngozi region and the Tutsi dominated army will likely maintain the initiative. The idea of a crossing from Goma cannot be ruled out, although it is conceivable that, should FAR be forced to move at this time, it may attack both in the north and south (with militia attacks from Tanzania (Ngara: militia presence is increasing and Hutu population from Ngozi is fleeing there, many with the expressed purpose to join the Hutu militia in that region.) with reinforcement going to whichever front showed the best possibility for success. FAR do not need to take the whole country, merely seize a piece of terrain and hold, thus guaranteeing a place at a negotiating table.]

ZAIRE

Zaire had assisted the FAR militarily during the war, however they were asked to leave by FRG as their forces were uncontrolled, attacking and looting Hutus as well as Tutsi. FRG did request Zairan military assistance after this, but was declined. Zaire military express a certain arrogance over FAR troops, intimating that "they ran away" in the face of an

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inferior force. This attitude causes some friction in the camps. ^{counted} Zairan military even loots or extorts goods and money from some of the refugee populations.

FAR requires foreign assistance to sustain operations into Rwanda. Zaire is a possibility, however it is unlikely to provide overt military support at this time as:

- a. Mbutu has money coming in (\$15 million US) to have his forces police the camps;
- b. his "securing of the camps" in interests of regional peace deflects international pressure for government reforms; and
- c. his interests in Angola and support to UNITA take precedence. He would not want to threaten them.

Zaire appears profit motivated. For now it will likely continue its show of maintaining control and security, while covertly allowing (if not conducting) military training for FAR. FRG has money to spend and could buy arms through Zaire.

FRANCE

French involvement with the FAR/FRG is current coin within information circles. France has regional interests, with a foothold in Zaire and influence in Burundi, it is a rival for Belgian influence. Due to negative world opinion and presidential elections this month, French support to FRG/FAR is more as an enabler than backer. Source is certain that French interest in the FAR/FRG is not waning. Source also identified a large number of FAR in the Central African Republic (Intrep ___) in BANGUI possibly undergoing training by the French Foreign Legion. France is providing support in the SUDAN and French military advisors were identified in BUKAVU. Source claims that French mercenaries can be seen at the Resident (main hotel in BUKAVU) and that the French military attache' to Zaire (KINSHASA) periodically visits Goma, purpose unknown.

CHINA

Source had no information on Chinese involvement but speculated that China may supply arms to Zaire who in turn would supply some of them (for money) to FAR.

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THREAT TO UN

Source claims that FAR are not specifically intending to target, although FRG propaganda is aimed to get population to despise UN in an effort to discredit/prevent success of OP RETOUR.

THREAT TO RWANDA IDPS

Source claims that there is no threat from FAR/FRG to IDPs as they view them as allies.

THREAT TO REFUGEES

Source claims that Hutus have actually killed their own people when they leave the camps, then blame the Tutsis. This in an effort to prevent camp depopulation. This was the case in Tanzania when some attempted to leave the Benaco (Ngara) camp.