


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Note to the Secretary-General

**OPTIONS FOR ADVANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 1701**

1. Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006, the Secretary-General carried out an extensive mission to the Middle East between 25 August and 7 September. That mission confirmed the cessation of hostilities, accelerated UNIFIL commitments from European and non-European Governments and led to the lifting of the air and sea blockade of Lebanon. The mission also allowed for engagements by the Secretary-General with all of the parties to the conflict as well as with all significant neighbouring states.
2. Since the Secretary General's visit, the Lebanese army has begun an historic deployment of forces to the South, while UNIFIL deployment has also continued apace and has now passed the 5,000 figure. The Israeli Defence Force looks set to undertake a final withdrawal within the next seven days.
3. On the issue of the abducted Israeli soldiers and Lebanese prisoners referred to in 1701, a facilitator has been appointed by the Secretary-General who has undertaken visits to the region and developed strong links with his Lebanese and Israeli interlocutors. It is clear from initial assessments that this work may have to continue for some months before a satisfactory outcome is achieved. Progress on this dossier remains essential for the implementation of 1701. Without it Prime Minister Olmert's government will find it politically difficult to engage on other aspects.
4. Further advancement of the tasks inherent in 1701 may now necessitate the appointment of a Special Envoy or the urgent development of other mechanisms to ensure greater cohesiveness of UN efforts in the region.

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
Appointment of a Special Envoy

- i. The Secretary-General of international stature would allow for direct communication with the Secretary-General and the Special Envoy should include:
  - Work toward a permanent ceasefire on the basis of the elements and principles of paragraph 8 of SCR 1701.
  - To undertake the necessary diplomatic interventions to ensure the implementation of all aspects of SCR 1701, in cooperation with existing envoys and relevant UN bodies.
  - To produce proposals and timelines, in close coordination with the Secretary-General, the parties, and the Special Envoy for SCR 1559 for the implementation of relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and, SCRs 1159 and 1680, the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon,

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UNIFIL  
Middle East

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4. Further advancement of the tasks inherent in 1701 may now necessitate the appointment of a Special Envoy or the urgent development of other mechanisms to ensure greater cohesiveness of UN efforts in the region.

Appointment of a Special Envoy

i. The Secretary-General consider the immediate appointment of a Special Envoy of international stature and preferably with Middle East experience, which would allow for direct continuation of the work initiated by the Secretary-General and his existing envoys. The terms of reference for such an Envoy should include:

- Work toward a permanent ceasefire on the basis of the elements and principles of paragraph 8 of SCR 1701.
- To undertake the necessary diplomatic interventions to ensure the implementation of all aspects of SCR 1701, in cooperation with existing envoys and relevant UN bodies.
- To produce proposals and timelines, in close coordination with the Secretary-General, the parties, and the Special Envoy for SCR 1559 for the implementation of relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and, SCRs 1159 and 1680, the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon,

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including dealing with the Sheba Farms issue, as requested in OP 10 of SCR 1701.

- Assistance, in close coordination with the OPRSG and the Special Envoy for SCR 1559 with the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to implement necessary political reforms to enable the broader political transformation to a strong and fully sovereign state as envisaged in the relevant Security Council resolutions and declared as a goal by the Government of Lebanon.
  - Undertake diplomatic interventions in the wider Middle East and internationally to reinforce support for the implementation of SCR 1701.
- ii. The appointment of a Special Envoy would, at this stage, significantly impact the mandates and missions of your Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559, your Personal Representative for Lebanon, and the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. In particular, para. 10 of 1701 overlaps considerably with 1559. You might therefore wish to consider two alternative options.

*Enhancing the Mandate of the Personal Representative for Lebanon*

5. The mandate of the Personal Representative for Lebanon could be enhanced to ensure that OPRSG follows up on all relevant aspects of the implementation of resolution 1701 on the ground, in close coordination (as this has been the case to date) with the Special Envoy for 1559. Most notably, the area of operations of OPRSG would need to be extended to include Israel insofar as relevant issues are concerned (for discussions of unexploded ordnance, Shab'a Farms and related issues, UNIFIL operations etc.). Doing so might infringe on the mandate of other UN bodies in the area (UNSCO) and would have an impact on OPRSG's standing with Lebanese political entities. The existing division of labour and coordination between OPRSG, UNIFIL and the Special Envoy for 1559 would otherwise be maintained.

6. Implementation of Resolution 1701 also requires careful coordination of UN and donor activities in support of the Government of Lebanon's institutions. You might consider clarifying and enhancing the PRSG's role with respect to the UN country team, donors and other international partners such as the World Bank.

7. OPRSG should be more proactive, particularly in liaising with Israel in the follow-up on the implementation of resolution 1701 and keep all other relevant UN missions informed and consult with them on aspects relevant to their engagements. In this context, OPRSG would take the lead, together with the Special Adviser on the Situation in the Middle East and the Middle East Strategy Group, on regular updates on the implementation of resolution 1701.

Reliance on your Existing Team of Representatives and Envoys

8. The UN already has a number of senior representatives and envoys dealing with particular aspects covered in resolution 1701. The resolution, in fact, touches upon the mandates of most of those.

- A strengthened OPRSG could continue to take the lead on the Lebanese side to follow-up on the relevant aspects of the implementation of resolution 1701. In close coordination with UNIFIL, OPRSG would also provide a direct connection to senior Lebanese officials and thus contribute to expedite clarification of processes and the full implementation of aspects covered under resolution 1701.
- To increase the effectiveness of donor and UN institutional support in strengthening the Lebanese state, the relationship between OPRSG, UNDP, the UN country team, and between the UN, donors and other international partners (such as the World Bank) could be clarified and strengthened, possibly through the creation of new donor coordination structures in Beirut.
- The Special Envoy for SCR 1559 should work intensely to secure full Israeli compliance with SCR 1701 in addition to his existing responsibilities.
- Under this arrangement, the Special Adviser on the Situation in the Middle East and the Middle East Strategy Group could serve as a clearinghouse of information and coordination on your behalf and take the lead in preparing regular updates on the implementation of resolution 1701 based on the inputs and reports of the relevant representatives and envoys.
- Following the Quartet meeting on 20 September, and in relation to OP 18 of Resolution 1701, UNSCO should develop an urgent programme of work for Quartet envoys in October/November. This is already in progress.
- The Special Adviser to develop further proposals to enhance regional and international support for SCR 1701.
- Weekly teleconference to be organized by Special Adviser involving UNSCO, OPRSG, Special Envoy on 1559 and UNIFIL on the model of the Iraq Operations Group (IOG) also chaired by Special Adviser.

9. Draft cost estimates for these three options are attached.



Michael C. Williams  
Special Adviser  
for the Situation in the Middle East  
27 September 2006

cc: Mr. Malloch Brown  
Mr. Gambari  
Ms. Bárcena  
Mr. Guéhenno  
Mr. Larsen  
Mr. Lopes

## OPTIONS FOR ADVANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 1701

### **Draft cost estimate for a three-month period**

This draft cost estimate covers the budgetary requirements for a three-month period. It is based on the personnel, operational, and security requirements related to each of the options. All provided figures are rough estimates, which will require further costing by the relevant offices, including DSS.

#### **Option 1: Appointment of a Special Envoy (Total: \$ 462,675)**

**1. Civilian Personnel Cost: \$ 185,775**

(Salaries are based on the Standard Salary Cost Rates for New York)

- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (USG)
- One Senior Political Affairs Officer (P5)
- One Political Affairs Officer (P3)
- One international administrative support staff (General Service)

**2. Security Personnel: \$ 50,000**

During his visits to the mission area the Special Envoy would be assigned three close protection officers, including two from NYHQ and one from ESCWA

**3. Operational Costs (official travel): \$ 188,400**

The estimated operational cost, which includes airfares and DSA allowances (60 days), covers the official travels of the Special Envoy, his aides and close protection (the Senior Political Affairs Officers and the Political Affairs Officer) to the mission area (3), Europe (3) and Arab and regional countries (3) for discussions with Member States and concerned regional organizations.

**4. Facilities and Infrastructure: \$ 20,000**

Office space, ground transportation, and IT equipment will be drawn from existing resources in New York and Beirut on the basis of an agreed cost recovery framework.

**5. Commercial communications, supplies and other services: \$ 18,500**

The total amount for commercial communications (\$ 12,000) includes charges for leased lines, and fees for local PTT and mobile lines. The provision of \$ 500 is requested to cover subscriptions to Arabic and English newspapers and journals. The provision of \$ 1000 is requested to cover for courier services and required administrative supplies for the Office of the Special Envoy. The provision of \$ 5,000 is requested to cover the costs of recurring miscellaneous services and charges.

**Option 2: Enhancing the mandate of the PRSG for Lebanon (Total \$ 266,436)**

**1. Civilian Personnel Cost: \$ 120,850**

(Salaries are based on the Standard Salary Cost Rates for New York)

- Personal Representative of Secretary-General (USG - SPA)
- One Senior Adviser (D1)
- One Political Affairs Officer (P4)

**2. Security Personnel: \$ 0**

The OPRSG is close protection officers under its ongoing annual budget.

**3. Operational Costs (official travel): \$ 125,586**

The estimated operational cost, which includes airfares and DSA allowances, covers the official travels related to the enhanced responsibilities of the PRSG. The PRSG will be accompanied by his aides (the Senior Adviser and the Political Affairs Officer) and close protection.

**4. Facilities and Infrastructure: \$ 3,000**

Office space, ground transportation, and IT equipment for the Senior Adviser and the Political Affairs Officer will be provided from existing resources on the basis of an agreed cost recovery framework.

**5. Commercial communications and other services: \$ 17,000**

The total amount for commercial communications (\$ 12,000) includes charges for leased lines, and fees for local PTT and mobile lines. The provision of \$ 5000 is requested to cover the costs of recurring miscellaneous services and charges.

**Option 3: Reliance on your existing team of Representatives and Envoys (Total \$ 142,586)**

Resources will be drawn from existing structures.

**1. Operational Costs (official travel): \$ 125,586**

The estimated operational cost, which includes airfares and DSA allowances, covers the official travels related to the enhanced responsibilities of the existing team of Representatives and Envoys.

**2. Commercial communications and other services: \$ 17,000**

The total amount for commercial communications (\$ 12,000) includes charges for leased lines, and fees for local PTT and mobile lines. The provision of \$ 5,000 is requested to cover the costs of recurring miscellaneous services and charges.

There are three sets of issues that require different profiles: 1) issues that require liaison with Israel; 2) issues that require liaison with Iran and Syria; 3) issues that required coordination in Lebanon and liaison with GOL.

### **Option A**

*Given time constraint of JF, a more limited role for new Special Envoy than elsewhere envisaged.*

1. Primary function for Sp Envoy for 1701 would be liaison with Israel relating to Israeli compliance with all aspects of 1701, Israeli complaints about developments in Blue Line to Litani zone, Shaba issue, UXO maps, facilitation for UNIFIL etc.
2. Secondary function would be to deal with Iran and Syria aspects of implementing 1701, such as delineation of Lebanon-Syria border, observing arms embargo etc. (for different reasons, TRL cannot do this, nor can GP)
3. At the same time, OPRSG would be strengthened to coordinate Lebanon reconstruction issues and all liaison with Govt of Lebanon. (Consideration may be given as to whether the PRSG should become SRSG at some point.)

### **Option B**

*If JF cannot do that, rather than creating one more envoy, the proposed functions could be divided as follows:*

1. TRL would take over as main interface with Govt of Israel, relating to Israeli compliance with all aspects of 1701, Israeli complaints about developments in Blue Line to Litani zone, Shaba issue, UXO maps, facilitation for UNIFIL etc. (and after the next 1559 report, would discreetly phase out his 1559 role).
2. An existing senior official (possibly IG or VN) would take over the primary point of contact at senior level with Iran and Syria on issues such as delineation of Lebanon-Syria border, observing arms embargo etc. (for different reasons, TRL cannot do this, nor can GP).
3. At the same time, OPRSG would be strengthened to coordinate Lebanon reconstruction issues and all liaison with Govt of Lebanon. (Consideration may be given as to whether the PRSG should become SRSG at some point.)