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Ordeals of A Peacemaker

JAMES A. WECHSLER

U Thant's rare display of anger at yesterday's UN Assembly session reflected more than exasperation over the distorted, selective public history of his role in the withdrawal of the UN force from Egypt. It must have also expressed a deepening resentment born of knowledge that many recent journalistic attacks on his UNEF action have been inspired by some U. S. officials as a retaliation for his independent course on Vietnam—and especially his urgent pleas for cessation of our bombings of the North.

Beyond any considerations of personal injury, Thant is haunted and tormented by the belief that the Vietnam stalemate is a major impediment to a rational solution in the Middle East. He has repeatedly said in public—and even more vehemently in private—that, in the present state of the world, the UN's strength in any crisis is only as strong as the desire of Washington and Moscow to pursue the path of detente.

Vietnam has been the great roadblock. It still is. It did not escape Thant's attention that his most vitriolic critics in the aftermath of the UNEF episode were advocates of a "hard" U. S. line in Vietnam that has steadily undermined American-Soviet relations.

* * *

Suddenly a close issue of timing and judgment on UNEF became the pretext for an assault on his motivation and integrity. The vision of himself he most deeply cherishes and has so often sustained—that of the man who speaks for mankind rather than any segment thereof—was harshly called into question. There ensued a crude effort by the Vietnam "hawks" to inflame the emotions of millions who felt a warm identification with Israel; Thant became their villain of the Middle East drama. While, in pragmatic terms, the pullout of UNEF ironically paved the way for Nasser's debacle, the anti-Thant drive continued. It was climaxed by the contrived "leak" to The Times this week of a document purporting to show that Thant had violated an alleged Dag Hammarskjold agreement with Nasser requiring the General Assembly's approval for any withdrawal of UNEF.

In fact, Ralph Bunche had fully explored the memorandum with Ernest Gross, former consultant to Hammarskjold, before Thant left for Cairo, and reached the conclusion that it had no legal standing. In commenting on publication of the document, Thant remarked that "to say the least, the release of such a paper at this time would seem to raise some question of ethics and good faith."

Tragedy was compounded when Israel's Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, in the course of his brilliant statement of Israel's case to the UN Assembly Monday, briefly but sharply denounced Thant's "disastrously swift" evacuation of UNEF.

* * *

Nearly two weeks ago there was published here the untold story of that episode—the story of U Thant's secret appeal to Israeli representatives to accept UNEF on their side when it became clear that Nasser's troops had begun to move toward the line and that India and Yugoslavia were planning to pull out their detachments. Bunche was also present at these talks.

As I wrote at the time, Israeli's rejection of U Thant's plea was psychologically and strategically understandable. But his quiet effort was hardly consistent with the widely-published portrait of a Secretary General bowing impetuously and cravenly to Nasser without seeking any alternative safeguard.

Despite the growing abuse to which he was subjected, U Thant remained silent, and the story was not generally pursued at the UN after its publication here. (As far as I know, no major correspondent aired it until Pauline Frederick of NBC did so on Monday of this week.)

Only after Eban concluded his ill-conceived thrust at Thant in his otherwise memorable address did the soft-spoken, usually impassive Secretary General finally answer back. The result was a spate of worldwide headlines depicting a "Thant-Eban clash"—a collision that can only be diversionary. This must have occurred to Eban on reflection; his ensuing remarks at yesterday afternoon's session were felicitous and could be characterized as a graceful retreat—in itself an unusual event in diplomatic debate, and perhaps a special form of tribute to Thant.

* * *

The sadness is that the root of this flare-up, like so many others, can be traced to Vietnam—that wasteland war without end in which we have shown neither the will nor imagination to achieve any glimpse of disengagement. Time and again Thant has been right in decrying a simplistic view of that conflict, and each vindication has more deeply infuriated our confounded policy-makers. And so their hatchet-men, when they thought they had caught Thant on a Middle Eastern limb, tried to shoot him down here for his sins in Southeast Asia. Too many people were beguiled by this exercise.

This is not offered as a testament to Thant's infallibility, or his monopoly on moral virtue. It is designed to suggest anew that his voice deserves the respect of men who care about peace and justice—and not only when they happen to agree with him. It is a call for a cessation of the furtive, often unscrupulous bombardment being directed at him from some privileged sanctuaries in Washington. Whatever happens, Thant has far less reason than most men to fear the verdict of history.

Bunche Defends Thant In Response to Rostow

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Feb. 14 (UPI)—Ralph J. Bunche, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, made public today a letter criticizing Eugene V. Rostow for "willfully misleading" accounts of the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Middle East on the eve of last June's Arab-Israeli war.

Dr. Bunche accused Mr. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, of making "damaging errors of historical fact" in a speech at the University of Mississippi law school Dec. 8.

Mr. Rostow had said that, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded withdrawal of the United Nations troops from Egypt, Mr. Thant "responded at once, without going through the type of consultations his predecessor had indicated he would undertake before withdrawing the troops."

In response, Dr. Bunche wrote:

"Since I worked very closely with U Thant's predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, on both the creation and supervision of U.N.E.F., I feel that I can say with considerable confidence that Mr. Hammarskjöld would have done exactly what U Thant did with regard to the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. and in much the same way."

92

MIDDLE EAST
FOUR POWER TALKS
PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

Because of important consultations on the Middle East taking place among the four Governments, the date of the next meeting of Permanent Representatives will be set at a later time.

In the meantime the Working Group will continue to meet.

Appropriate contacts will be maintained with the parties primarily concerned.

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Note No. 3521
3 April 1969

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

The following statement was made this evening by a United Nations spokesman:

Ambassador Armand Berard of France, Chairman of today's meeting of the four permanent members of the Security Council, saw the Secretary-General this afternoon and informed him of today's discussions. He also left with the Secretary-General the text of the communique.

* *** *

3 Apr '69

RJBunche

3853

OUSGSPA

10101-301

FOREIGN MINISTRY
STOCKHOLM
SWEDEN

IMMEDIATE

NO DISTRIBUTION

PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR GUNNAR JARRING:

QUOTE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY FOUR POWERS LATE AFTERNOON OF
THREE APRIL AT END OF THEIR ALL-DAY MEETING FROM 1030 MORNING THROUGH LUNCH UNTIL
FIVE PPM. TEXT READS: SUBQUOTE (Cable Editor please quote attached
text UNSUBQUOTE

PARA SECGEN UNDERSTANDS THAT ATMOSPHERE WAS CONGENIAL AND FEELS THAT TALKS
GOT OFF TO A GOOD START.

PARA AT URGING OF FOUR POWERS, SECGEN HAS AGREED TO TRANSMIT TO THEM REPLIES
TO THE QUESTIONS ON SUNDAY SIX APRIL INSTEAD OF MONDAY SEVEN APRIL. REPLIES WILL
BE TRANSMITTED TO THREE PARTIES MORNING OF SATURDAY FIVE APRIL. ~~UNQUOTE~~ BUNCHE.

UNQUOTE

BUNCHE
UNITED NATIONS

Ralph J. Bunche

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

April 3, 1969

Following is the text of the communique read to newsmen by Ambassador Armand Berard, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations in the company of Lord Caradon of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Yakov Malik of the USSR and Ambassador Charles W. Yost of the United States at the conclusion of quadrilateral talks at the residence of the French Ambassador, 740 Park Avenue, New York City:

The Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States met on April 3 at the residence of the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to begin consideration of how they can contribute to a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East. They based the approach to this problem on Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) which they fully accept and support. They reaffirmed their support for Ambassador Jarring's mission.

The Four Powers are agreed that the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent and must not be permitted to jeopardize international peace and security. They have straight away entered into a discussion on matters of substance and have started defining areas of agreement. There is a common concern to make urgent progress. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be kept fully informed.

Active consultations will continue. These consultations will be private and confidential. All appropriate contacts with the parties primarily concerned will be maintained.

The next meeting will take place on April 8th.

PL. K. 1. 12/6/69

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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PERSONAL



UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

15 April, 1969.

17/4

My dear Secretary General

--- In sending you the attached letter I think I should say that I do this for your personal information.

The wording used by Ambassador Yost and Ambassador Malik is certainly important but you will understand that I was not authorised by either to report to you except in general terms. So I hope that the record I send you will not be distributed beyond your closest advisers.

Yours ever
Hugh Caradon
(Caradon)

His Excellency
U Thant,
Secretary-General of the United Nations,
New York.

PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL



UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

15 April, 1969.

My dear Secretary General,

With reference to my report to you this morning on the Four Power talks yesterday afternoon, I set out the wording used by the United States and Soviet Ambassadors.

Ambassador Yost said that just and lasting peace must be based on a mutually binding contractual document agreed by the parties. In the U.S. view this should be a single paper signed by all. This binding and reciprocal commitment was equally important to the Arabs. As to the form of document, the U.S. suggested that it should include the following principles, and asked for comments on them at the next meeting:

- (a) The agreement must be comprehensive:
- (b) In the last analysis, it must be arrived at by the parties through Jarring:
- (c) It would be contractually and reciprocally binding:
- (d) It would bind each party directly to the other to discharge the terms of the settlement:
- (e) It would be a single document jointly signed by the parties.

/Ambassador

His Excellency
U Thant,
Secretary-General of the United Nations,
New York.

CONFIDENTIAL



2.

Ambassador Yost added that because of the Arab reluctance to sign peace treaties, the U.S. thought that the analogy of the 1956 document terminating the state of war between the Soviet Union and Japan would be helpful. He asked for more details of the form of the multilateral document mentioned in the Soviet plan.

Ambassador Malik then put forward expanded details of what the Russians had in mind. He said that the Soviet plan envisaged contractual, mutually binding commitments to peace. On the day that Israeli withdrawal began, documents would be lodged with the Security Council by the parties. These separate documents would sum up all the agreements reached, in the form of a package. They would be signed by each of the parties individually: and they would be in identic form. The fact that there was such profound hate between the parties militated against the type of single document bilateral agreement envisaged by the Americans. The documents envisaged by the Russians would be deposited at the U.N. when Israeli withdrawal began and would be irrevocable, i.e. they would bind the parties by juridical commitments to carry out the agreed terms of the resolution. When Israeli withdrawal was fully completed, the documents would come finally into force, perhaps through an additional multi-lateral document. He submitted that the Soviet proposals were more realistic than pressing for bilaterally signed documents which were in practice unobtainable.

Yours ever,
Hugh Caradon
(Caradon)

Confidential
From Raex.
Thanks. 8/5/69

7 May 1969

1. Support for full implementation of resolution 242.
2. No imposition; whatever is agreed upon would be presented to parties through Secretary-General and Jarring;
3. No separate settlement of problems; must all be done in one package.
4. No question of an extension of a cease-fire or another armistice; what is sought is a "just and lasting peace".
5. Affirmation of principle of no acquisition of territory by war.
6. Obligation to act in accordance with Article 2.

Next meeting will be held Tuesday 13 May, a.m.

22 May 1969

Excellency,

In response to your letter of 19 May 1969, may I say that your understanding is correct with regard to the list of questions submitted by Ambassador Jarring to the Governments of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, and that each of these Governments submitted to Ambassador Jarring replies to his questions. It is also correct that, in response to the request of the Four Powers when their current talks on the Middle East began, I made available to each of them on a confidential basis the Jarring questions and the replies to them. As you point out, there was subsequently an unfortunate leak from an unknown source and the contents of these papers were published in a newspaper.

I note your suggestion that this material now be made available to all members of the Security Council. In view, especially, of resolution 242(1967) of 22 November 1967, I recognize the interest of all members of the Council in the Jarring mission.

The questions posed by Ambassador Jarring and the replies of the Governments to them were of a confidential nature. Therefore I have considered it necessary to consult the parties involved in each of the communications about compliance with your request. As a result of these consultations I may inform you that the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic have no objection to their replies

His Excellency
Mr. Agha Shahi
President of the Security Council

being made available to all members of the Security Council. The Government of Israel, however, on the basis of a principle which it considers vital to the procedures and the conduct of the Jarring mission, does not agree that its reply be made available. The Israel statement of principle has been conveyed to me in the following words:

"... we strongly believe that it is necessary to uphold the principle accepted until now that the United Nations does not publish matters that transpire between Jarring and the Governments concerned, at least as long as Jarring's mission is in existence and he will have to renew his contacts with those Governments."

..... In the light of the foregoing, I enclose fifteen copies of the Jarring lists of questions and of the replies to them received by him from Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, respectively, which you may make available to each of the members of the Council.

I wish to emphasize that special circumstances have led to this action and that in no sense is it to be taken as a precedent affecting any other communications between Ambassador Jarring and the parties.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant.

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Council resolution 242 (1967) sets out provisions and principles in accordance with which a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East Question should be achieved. Some of these provisions would impose obligations on both sides, some on one side, and some on the other. It has generally been accepted that they should be regarded as a whole. The following questions designed to elicit the attitude of the parties towards the provisions of the Security Council resolution are based on this assumption and are to be understood in the context that each provision is regarded as part of a "package deal".

1. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) for implementation for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East Question in accordance with the provisions and principles contained in the resolution?
2. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency with Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?
3. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?
4. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept the right of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel) to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force?

/...

5. If so, what is the conception of secure and recognized boundaries held by Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic)?
6. Does Israel agree to withdraw its armed forces from territories occupied by it in the recent conflict?
7. Does the United Arab Republic agree to guarantee freedom of navigation for Israel through international waterways in the area, in particular:
 - (a) through the Straits of Tiran, and
 - (b) through the Suez Canal?
8. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that, if a plan for the just settlement of the refugee problem is worked out and presented to the parties for their consideration, the acceptance in principle of such a plan by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith constitute sufficient implementation of this provision of the Security Council resolution to justify the implementation of the other provisions?
9. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States in the area should be guaranteed:
 - (a) by the establishment of demilitarized zones;
 - (b) through additional measures?
10. Does Israel agree that such demilitarized zones should include areas on its side of its boundaries?

/...

11. Does Jordan agree that a demilitarized zone should be established in Jordanian territory from which Israel armed forces have been withdrawn?

12. Does the United Arab Republic agree that a demilitarized zone should be established:

(a) at Sharm-el-Sheikh;

(b) in other parts of the Sinai peninsula?

13. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that demilitarization of such zones should be supervised and maintained by the United Nations?

14. Would Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept as a final act of agreement on all provisions a mutually signed multilateral document which would incorporate the agreed conditions for a just and lasting peace?

March 23, 1969.

Your Excellency,

Following are the answers of my Government to the questions which you presented to us in Amman , on Saturday , March 8th , 1969 . The answers as numbered , hereunder , correspond to your questions.

These answers explain my Government's position , which position has repeatedly been stated to Your Excellency throughout our past meetings.

May I take this opportunity to express to you my continued sincere wishes for your success in the important mission with which you are entrusted .

Yours Sincerely,



Abdul Monem Rifa'i
Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency,
Ambassador Gunnar Jarring
Special Representative to
The Secretary - General of
The United Nations.

Answer (1)

Jordan , as it has declared before , accepts the Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and is ready to implement it in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles contained in the Resolution .

Answer (2)

Jordan agrees to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency . Such a pledge becomes effective upon withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories which Israel occupied as a result of its aggression of June 5th, 1967.

A pledge by Israel to terminate the state of belligerency would be meaningful only when Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories it occupied since June 5th , 1967.

Answer (3)

On June 5th , 1967 Israel launched its aggression against three Arab States violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity . Agreement to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty , territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area requires the termination by Israel of its occupation and the withdrawal of its forces from all the Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of June 5th

Answer (4)

Jordan accepts the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force , provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories it occupied since June 5th, 1967, and implements the Security Council Resolution of November 22nd, 1967.

Answer (5)

When the question of Palestine was brought before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 181(II) of November 29th, 1947 for the partition of Palestine and defined Israel's boundaries.

Answer (6)

[general question 8]

It has always been our position that the just settlement of the refugees problem is embodied in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 of December 1948 which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by each and every General Assembly session ever since its adoption.

If a plan on the basis of that paragraph is presented for consideration to the parties concerned, its acceptance by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith, with adequate guarantees for its full implementation, would justify the implementation of the other provisions of the resolution.

Answer (7) (8)

[general questions 9 and 11]

We do not believe that the establishment of demilitarized Zones is a necessity. However, Jordan shall not oppose the establishment of such zones if they are astride the boundaries.

Answer (9)

[general question 13]

In case demilitarized zones are established Jordan accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations.

3
Answer (10)

[General question 14]

In view of our past experience with Israel and her denunciation of four agreements signed by her with Arab States, we consider that the instrument to be signed by Jordan engaging her to carry out her obligations, would be addressed to the Security Council. Israel would likewise sign and address to the Security Council an instrument engaging her to carry out her obligations emanating from the Security Council Resolution of November 22nd, 1967. The endorsement by the Security Council of these documents would constitute the final multilateral act of agreement.

LRA

En reponse au questionnaire que votre Excellence m'a adressé en date du 14 mars 1969 j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer, au nom du Gouvernement Libanais, ce qui suit: Dans l'ensemble du conflit Israélo-Arabe, et par là, dans les suites de la guerre declenchée par Israel le cinq juin 1967, le Liban se trouve engagé essentiellement en raison de sa solidarité fraternelle avec les états Arabs et des menaces que Israel ne cesse pas de faire peser sur lui.

Mais le Liban considère, a juste titre, que la convention d'armistice conclue entre lui-même et Israel, le 23 mars 1949, est toujours en vigueur, comme cela resulte de sa dépêche du 10 juin 1967 au président de la commission d'armistice mixte et comme le confirme M. Thant, Secrétaire-Général des Nations-Unies dans son rapport à l'Assemblée-Générale le 19 septembre 1967. Dans ce rapport, M. Thant, se référant au texte même de ladite convention, a dit que celle-ci ne pouvait être révisée ou suspendue dans son application que par un consentement mutuel. Dans les conditions qui ont été et qui demeurent celles du Liban, il est naturel que les lignes de l'armistice n'aient jamais

variées. Elles se correspondent d'ailleurs aux frontières qui ont toujours été internationalement reconnues au Liban, aussi bien dans les documents diplomatiques bilatéraux ou multilatéraux, que par la Société des Nations et par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, à la charte de laquelle le Liban a activement participé et au sein de laquelle il a été admis dans son entité et sa structure actuelle. Ses frontières n'ont subi aucune modification de fait ni de droit par les décisions du cesse-le-feu prises par le Conseil de Sécurité, après le cinq juin 1967.

Il est opportun d'évoquer ces evidences: à toutes fins utiles et notamment afin d'expliquer la nature et la caractère de la seule réponse que nous pouvons faire à l'ensemble du questionnaire qui nous a été adressé par Votre Excellence en date du 14 mars 1969.

Cette réponse, qui reflète d'ailleurs la position que le Liban a prise dans les conférences interarabes, consiste à proclamer qu'ils soutiennent la position des états arabes dont le territoire a été occupé par Israël et qui ont accepté la décision du Conseil de Sécurité du 22 novembre 1967.

En Vous communiquant cette note, qui d'ailleurs correspond à l'esprit des entretiens que Vous avez déjà eus avec les différents responsables libanais, je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer l'assurance de ma très haute considération..

The memorandum handed to you on March 5th, 1969 during your recent visit to Cairo clearly expresses the realities of the present situation. In its items 1 to 7, the memorandum gives a clear restatement of the position of the United Arab Republic which is based on the acceptance of the Security Council Resolution No 242 of November 22nd, 1967 and its readiness to carry out the obligations emanating therefrom.

The memorandum also clearly expounds Israel's persistence in rejecting the Security Council Resolution and its refusal to carry out its obligations emanating from it as well as Israel's plans for annexation of Arab lands through war; a policy not only prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations but also violates the Security Council Resolution which specifically emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It has become obvious that Israel, in its endeavour to realize its expansionist aims, is no longer satisfied with the actual rejection of the Security Council Resolution but actively works against it.

The same memorandum also states Israel's expansion plan as revealed by the quoted statements of Israeli leaders. This plan aims at:

1. Annexation of Jerusalem;
2. Keeping the Syrian Heights under its occupation;
3. Occupation of the West Bank in Jordan and its complete domination, practically terminating Jordan's sovereignty in that part;
4. Economic and administrative integration of the Gaza strip into Israel and the systematic eviction of its inhabitants;
5. Occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh and the Gulf of Aqaba area as well as the continued military presence in eastern part of Sinai;
6. The establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

This Israeli position constitutes a flagrant violation and clear rejection of the Security Council Resolution of November 22nd, 1967 and of the peaceful settlement for which it provides.

In the light of these undeniable facts, I find it incumbent upon me to state categorically, at the outset of the replies to the specific questions you addressed to the U.A.R. on March 5th 1969, that all the answers of the United Arab Republic, which reaffirm its acceptance of the Security Council Resolution and its readiness to carry out the obligations emanating from it require, likewise, that Israel accept the Resolution and carry out all its obligations emanating from it and in particular withdrawal from all Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of June 5th, 1967.

Question(1)

The United Arab Republic, as it has declared before, accepts the Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and is ready to implement it in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles contained therein.

Question(2)

The United Arab Republic agrees to pledge termination of all claims or state of belligerency. Such a pledge becomes effective upon withdrawal of Israel's forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of Israel's aggression of June 5th, 1967.

A declaration by Israel terminating the state of belligerency would be meaningful only when Israel withdraws her forces from all Arab territories it occupied since June 5th, 1967.

Question(3)

On June 5th, 1967, Israel launched its aggression against three Arab States violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Acceptance by the U.A.R. to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area requires the termination by Israel of its occupation and the withdrawal of its forces from all the Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of June 5th, and the full implementation of the Security Council Resolution of 22nd November, 1967.

Question(4)

The U.A.R. accepts the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of its aggression of June 5th, 1967, and implements the Security Council Resolution of November 22nd, 1967.

Question(5)

When the question of Palestine was brought before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 181 of November 29th, 1947 for the partition of Palestine and defined Israel's boundaries.

Question(6) *[General question 7]*

We have declared our readiness to implement all the provisions of the Security Council Resolution covering, inter alia, the freedom of navigation in international waterways in the area; provided that Israel, likewise, implement all provisions of the Security Council Resolution.

Question(7)

[general question 8]

It has always been our position that the just settlement of the refugee problem is embodied in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 of December 1948, which has been unfailingly reaffirmed by each and every General Assembly session ever since its adoption.

If a plan on the basis of that paragraph is presented for consideration to the parties concerned, its acceptance by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith, with adequate guarantees for its full implementation would justify the implementation of the other provisions of the Security Council Resolution.

Questions(8),(9)

[general questions 9 and 12]

We do not believe that the establishment of demilitarized zones is a necessity. However, the United Arab Republic will not oppose the establishment of such zones if they are astride the boundaries.

Question(10)

[general question 13]

In case demilitarized zones are established the United Arab Republic accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations.

Question(11)

[general question 14]

In view of our past experience with Israel and her denunciation of four agreements signed by her with Arab States, we consider that the instrument to be signed by the U.A.R. engaging her to carry out her obligations, should be addressed to the Security Council. Israel should, likewise, sign and address to the Security Council an instrument engaging her to carry out her obligations emanating from the Security Council Resolution of November 22nd, 1967. The endorsement by the Security Council of these documents would constitute the final multilateral document.

Cairo, March 27th, 1969.



PAKISTAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PAKISTAN HOUSE
8 EAST 65TH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N.Y.

No. 498-S/69

May 19, 1969.

Excellency,

I understand that a list of questions was submitted by Ambassador Jarring to the Governments of Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Israel and that each of these Governments responded to the questionnaire. I also understand that the Secretariat has circulated the replies to a limited number of members of the Security Council and that their contents have been published in Boston Globe.

I am writing to suggest that, if at all possible, the replies may be made available to all members of the Security Council because of their direct interest in resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Agha Shahi)
President of the Security Council.

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary-General of the United Nations,
New York.

Handwritten:
19/5/69

Handwritten:
Rafiq

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services

Office of Public Information

United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Note No. 3556
20 September 1969

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

Following is the text of a statement read by a United Nations spokesman tonight following a dinner given by the Secretary-General, U Thant, for the Foreign Ministers of France, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States:

The Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States met with the Secretary-General for a discussion.

They directed their attention to the situation in the Middle East, which they regarded as increasingly serious and urgent.

1. They reaffirmed that resolution 242 of the Security Council dated 22 November 1967 should be supported and carried out.

2. They agreed that durable peace should be established in the Middle East.

3. They reaffirmed that all States in the Middle East have an inalienable right to exist as independent and sovereign states.

4. With the above objectives in mind the conversations and contacts already established will be continued.

* * * * *

249/69

STATEMENT
20 September 1969

The Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States met with the Secretary-General for ^a ~~an informal~~ discussion.

They directed their attention to the situation in the Middle East, which they regarded as increasingly serious and urgent.

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N A T I O N S U N I E S

Service de la presse
Service de l'information
United Nations, N.Y.

(A L'INTENTION DES ORGANES D'INFORMATION - DOCUMENT NON OFFICIEL)

Note No. 3556
22 septembre 1969

NOTE POUR LA PRESSE

Voici le texte de la déclaration qui a été lue par un porte-parole des Nations Unies à l'issue du dîner offert par le Secrétaire général, U Thant, aux Ministres des affaires étrangères des Etats-Unis, de la France, du Royaume-Uni et de l'Union soviétique:

Les Ministres des affaires étrangères des Etats-Unis, de la France, du Royaume-Uni et de l'Union soviétique ont rencontré le Secrétaire général pour un échange de vues.

Ils ont fait porter leur attention sur la situation au Moyen-Orient, qu'ils considèrent comme de plus en plus sérieuse et urgente.

1. Ils ont réaffirmé que la résolution 242 (1967) du Conseil de sécurité, en date du 22 novembre 1967, doit être appuyée et mise en oeuvre.

2. Ils sont convenus qu'une paix durable doit être établie au Moyen-Orient.

3. Ils ont réaffirmé que tous les Etats du Moyen-Orient ont un droit inaliénable à l'existence en tant qu'Etats indépendants et souverains.

4. Avec ces objectifs en vue, les conversations et contacts déjà établis seront poursuivis.

* * * * *



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/9485
21 October 1969

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Note by the Secretary-General

At the request of the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, I am transmitting to the Security Council, for the information of its members, the text of the statement which was released on 20 September 1969 by the Foreign Ministers of the above-mentioned countries.

The statement is as follows:

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States met with the Secretary-General for a discussion.

"They directed their attention to the situation in the Middle East, which they regarded as increasingly serious and urgent.

"1. They reaffirmed that resolution 242 of the Security Council dated 22 November 1967 should be supported and carried out.

"2. They agreed that durable peace should be established in the Middle East.

"3. They reaffirmed that all States in the Middle East have an inalienable right to exist as independent and sovereign States.

"4. With the above objectives in mind the conversations and contacts already established will be continued."

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SG/SM/1358
MEM/64

23 October 1970

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL, U THANT, ON 23 OCTOBER

Following the dinner given by the Secretary-General, U Thant, in honour of the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the following statement was issued:

The four Foreign Ministers had a useful exchange of views with the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring on the situation in the Middle East. They agreed to exert their utmost efforts (1) to enable Ambassador Jarring to resume his mission at the earliest possible date; (2) to search for possibilities through the agreement of the parties directly concerned to extend the observance of the cease-fire for a period to be determined; and (3) to find a peaceful solution on the basis of resolution 242 of the Security Council.

The four Powers would continue their consultations, and their Permanent Representatives in New York will meet again on 28 October.

* *** *

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Note No. 3585
1 December 1969

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

The following statement was issued by a United Nations spokesman today:

In view of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, the Secretary-General welcomes the resumption of the Big Four talks. He very much hopes that they will exert their utmost to contribute to a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem in the framework of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

The Secretary-General is convinced that these talks and the eventual agreement of the Big Four, as Permanent Members of the Security Council, designed as they are to reinforce Ambassador Jarring's Mission, provide the best possible solution to this problem.

* *** *

26 December 1969

Dear Ambassador Yost,

I am taking the liberty of addressing this personal letter in identical form to each of the Permanent Representatives engaged in the Four Power talks on the Middle East. This unusual step is taken out of a sense of the very great and increasing urgency of the conflict situation in that area and because of my conviction that it is of utmost importance that Ambassador Jarring be enabled to resume an active role at the earliest possible date, within the framework of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

In my view, the best way to achieve this end is for the Four Permanent members of the Security Council to reach early agreement on vital aspects of basic issues which could serve as guidelines for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. I would hope most earnestly that such agreement could be reached by the last week or so of January when I will have returned from the journey to African member states on which I am about to depart. If such agreed guidelines in writing could be communicated to me, I would transmit them with dispatch to Ambassador Jarring with confidence that he would find them a suitable basis for prompt resumption of his activities.

I am sure that you will exert every reasonable effort toward the end we all seek.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. Charles W. Yost
Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

26 December 1969

Dear Lord Caradon,

I am taking the liberty of addressing this personal letter in identical form to each of the Permanent Representatives engaged in the Four Power talks on the Middle East. This unusual step is taken out of a sense of the very great and increasing urgency of the conflict situation in that area and because of my conviction that it is of utmost importance that Ambassador Jarring be enabled to resume an active role at the earliest possible date, within the framework of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

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I am sure that you will exert every reasonable effort toward the end we all seek.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Caradon, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations
845 Third Avenue, 10th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10022

26 December 1969

Dear Ambassador Malik,

I am taking the liberty of addressing this personal letter in identical form to each of the Permanent Representatives engaged in the Four Power talks on the Middle East. This unusual step is taken out of a sense of the very great and increasing urgency of the conflict situation in that area and because of my conviction that it is of utmost importance that Ambassador Jarring be enabled to resume an active role at the earliest possible date, within the framework of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

In my view, the best way to achieve this end is for the Four Permanent members of the Security Council to reach early agreement on vital aspects of basic issues which could serve as guidelines for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. I would hope most earnestly that such agreement could be reached by the last week or so of January when I will have returned from the journey to African member states on which I am about to depart. If such agreed guidelines in writing could be communicated to me, I would transmit them with dispatch to Ambassador Jarring with confidence that he would find them a suitable basis for prompt resumption of his activities.

I am sure that you will exert every reasonable effort toward the end we all seek.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik
Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations
136 East 67th Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

26 December 1969

Dear Ambassador Berard,

I am taking the liberty of addressing this personal letter in identical form to each of the Permanent Representatives engaged in the Four Power talks on the Middle East. This unusual step is taken out of a sense of the very great and increasing urgency of the conflict situation in that area and because of my conviction that it is of utmost importance that Ambassador Jarring be enabled to resume an active role at the earliest possible date, within the framework of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

In my view, the best way to achieve this end is for the Four Permanent members of the Security Council to reach early agreement on vital aspects of basic issues which could serve as guidelines for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. I would hope most earnestly that such agreement could be reached by the last week or so of January when I will have returned from the journey to African member states on which I am about to depart. If such agreed guidelines in writing could be communicated to me, I would transmit them with dispatch to Ambassador Jarring with confidence that he would find them a suitable basis for prompt resumption of his activities.

I am sure that you will exert every reasonable effort toward the end we all seek.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

His Excellency
Mr. Armand Berard
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations
4 East 79th Street
New York, N.Y. 10021



Rec'd by hand 29/12/69
11 Dec 69
UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y.

21

27 December, 1969

My dear Secretary General,

I thank you for your letter of
26 December about the Four Power talks
on the Middle East.

I have at once communicated your
message to my Government, and I assure you
that I shall do everything possible in
co-operation with the others to assist
in the endeavour to bring our present
discussions to a satisfactory conclusion.

I fully share your sense of urgency.

Yours ever
Hugh Cudworth
(Caradon)

His Excellency U Thant,
Secretary-General,
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

cc: Dr. Bunche



THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

January 5, 1970

8/11

His Excellency
U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your letter of December 26 concerning Four-Power talks regarding the situation in the Middle East. My Government greatly welcomes your initiative in this regard. The United States shares your sense of concern about the urgency of the situation in that area and your desire to have Ambassador Jarring resume his mission as soon as possible within the framework of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

The United States fully shares your view that it would be useful if the four permanent members of the Security Council dealing with this issue were to reach early agreement on vital aspects of the subject which could serve as guidelines for Ambassador Jarring. As you know, my own Government has advanced specific proposals on a peaceful settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic and Israel and Jordan which we believe offer an equitable and realistic basis for guidance to Ambassador Jarring. In our judgment, such guidelines must take into consideration the vital interests of the parties on both sides of the conflict and should be of a character which offers some realistic hope of promoting agreement among the parties as the Council's resolution calls for.

UN-2184/2348

CC: DR. Bernche

I assure you that the United States will continue to exert its best efforts to achieve agreement among the Four Powers on a set of balanced guidelines which would enable Ambassador Jarring to resume his activities promptly.

Sincerely yours,


Charles W. Xost

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

His Excellency
U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations

NNNN

NOR537 EPD274

1612 :SECOND NIGHTLEAD THANT:

BY MICHAEL LITTLEJOHNS

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, FEB. 26 (REUTERS) -- AFTER A MEETING WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT, CHARLES W. YOST, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TODAY TERMED "NOT VERY GOOD" THE SITUATION IN THE BIG FOUR MIDDLE EAST TALKS.

YOST MADE THE COMMENT AFTER A 30-MINUTE MEETING WITH THANT ON THE EVE OF ANOTHER ROUND OF BIG FOUR TALKS FRIDAY.

SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JACOB A. MALIK, ALSO CALLED IN BY THANT FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS, WOULD ONLY COMMENT AFTERWARD THAT IT WAS "ALWAYS USEFUL" TO TALK TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

FRENCH AMBASSADOR ARMAND M. BERARD ALSO VISITED THANT'S 38TH FLOOR EXECUTIVE SUITE THURSDAY.

LORD CARADON, THE X X X PICKING UP 3RD PARA NOR 508.
REUTERS (AV)JG/TMB

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NOR538

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NOR539 EPD275

1615 :APARTHEID

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, FEB. 26 (REUTERS) -- THE UNITED NATIONS MAY MOVE TO BLOCK THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL-WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN TEAMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPORTS EVENTS AS PART OF A NEW FRONTAL ATTACK ON APARTHEID (RACIAL SEGREGATION), IT WAS LEARNED TODAY.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON APARTHEID "IN THE NEAR FUTURE" WILL HEAR TESTIMONY FROM FOES OF APARTHEID IN THE SPORTS FIELD, THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SAID TOLD REPORTERS THURSDAY.

THE CHAIRMAN, SOMALI AMBASSADOR ABDULRAHIM ABBY FARAH, SAID ARTHUR ASHE, BLACK AMERICAN TENNIS STAR WHO WAS REFUSED A VISA TO PLAY AS AN INDIVIDUAL IN SOUTH AFRICAN TOURNAMENTS, WILL TESTIFY TO THE COMMITTEE.

DENNIS BRUTUS, A SOUTH AFRICAN NOW LIVING ABROAD, AND ORGANIZERS OF DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPRINGBOK RUGBY TEAM DURING ITS RECENT BRITISH TOUR WILL ALSO BE ASKED FOR ADVICE, HE SAID.

FARAH SAID HIS COMMITTEE WOULD "PARTICULARLY CONCERN ITSELF WITH APARTHEID IN SPORTS THIS YEAR." HE SAID THAT PLANS WERE STILL INCOMPLETE BUT HE INDICATED THAT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO INVOLVE THE U.N. IN THE ORGANIZATION OF BOYCOTTS.
REUTERS (NR) SG/TMB

NNNN

NOR540 EPD276

1622 :CRASH-VICTIMS

JERUSALEM, FEB. 26 (REUTERS)-- THE REMAINS OF 24 ISRAELI AND JEWISH PASSENGERS WHO LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE CRASH OF A SWISSAIR AIRLINER IN SWITZERLAND SATURDAY WILL BE BURIED IN JERUSALEM.

ISRAEL'S CHIEF RABBI, ISSER YEHUDA UNTERMAN, TOLD THE PRESS CLUB HERE THURSDAY THAT THE SWISS GOVERNMENT AGREED THAT THE REMAINS BE BROUGHT TO ISRAEL FOR BURIAL.

HE SAID THE FUNERAL WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE MONDAY.

THE REMAINS OF THE SWISS CREW WHO DIED IN THE CRASH WOULD BE BURIED IN SWITZERLAND, THE CHIEF RABBI SAID.
REUTERS (AHD) WM/TMB

NNNN

NOR508 EPG740

1453 : NIGHTLEAD THANT (SCHEDULED):
(520--TWO TAKES)

BY MICHAEL LITTLEJOHNS

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, FEB. 26 (REUTERS)-- IN AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE, SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT TODAY CALLED IN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND FRANCE FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

HE SAW U.S. AMBASSADOR CHARLES YOST AND SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JACOB MALIK IN QUICK SUCCESSION AND ASKED FRENCH AMBASSADOR ARMAND BERARD TO COME IN LATER IN THE DAY.

LORD CARADON, THE CHIEF BRITISH DELEGATE, WHO WAS AWAY IN MIAMI THURSDAY ON A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT, WEDNESDAY NIGHT BRIEFED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE LATEST STATE OF THE BIG FOUR MIDDLE EAST TALKS FROM THE BRITISH STANDPOINT.

THE FOUR DELEGATES ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN FRIDAY AT YOST'S HOME. THANT RETURNED FROM VACATION IN HIS NATIVE BURMA THREE DAYS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE TO CONFER WITH THE BIG FOUR AMBASSADORS BEFORE THE MEETING.

THANT TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE 10 DAYS AGO THAT HE WOULD TAKE NO PERSONAL INITIATIVE AND IT WAS PRIMARILY FOR THE BIG FOUR TO PRODUCE GUIDELINES FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT. BUT HIS SUDDEN RETURN AND HIS CONSULTATIONS GAVE A CONTRARY IMPRESSION.

A U.N. SPOKESMAN SAID IT WAS UNPRECEDENTED FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CALL IN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S., RUSSIA, FRANCE AND BRITAIN ON THE EVE OF ANOTHER ROUND OF THEIR TALKS.

(MORE) (AV) JG:AFF

NNNN

NOR509 EPG741

1457 : 1ST ADD UNITED NATIONS NIGHTLEAD THANT:

X X X TALKS

ONE SOURCE CLOSE TO THE TALKS SAID HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THANT SOON SENT BACK TO THE MIDDLE EAST HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW DR. GUNNAR V. JARRING.

THANT CONFERRED WITH JARRING IN GENEVA A WEEK AGO. THEY AGREED THEN THAT THE TIME WAS NOT YET RIPE FOR THE ENVOY'S RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE HAS BEEN ON THE SIDELINES SINCE OCTOBER, AFTER A YEAR OF FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS.

FRANCE, WITH SOME SOVIET SUPPORT, IT KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN URGING THE FOUR DELEGATES TO CATALOGUE THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AMONG THEM, SO THAT JARRING MIGHT HAVE SOME NEW MATERIAL FOR CONSULTATIONS IN THE AREA.

THE U.S. AND BRITAIN WOULD PREFER THAT THE FOUR SET THEIR SIGHTS HIGHER AND WAIT FOR MORE SUBSTANTIAL ACCORDS.

THANT NOW CONSIDERS THAT THE CEASEFIRE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BROKEN DOWN TOTALLY IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA AND IS INEFFECTIVE ON THE JORDAN-ISRAEL AND SYRIA-ISRAEL FRONTS.

A SPOKESMAN SAID HE WAS ALARMED ALSO BY THE INCIDENTS DURING THE WEEK END IN WHICH ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITY WAS SUSPECTED FOR THE CRASH OF A SWISSAIR JETLINER, WHICH KILLED 47 PERSONS, AND HE NEAR-CRASH OF AN AUSTRIAN AIRLINES PLANE.

THE U.N. DISCLOSED THURSDAY THAT THE HEAD OF THE SWISS CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY WOULD FLY TO MONTREAL EARLY NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH DR. WALTER BENAGHI, THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (I.C.A.O.).

SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA HAVE BOTH ASKED I.C.A.O. TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER WAYS AND MEANS OF COMBATING AERIAL SABOTAGE.

REUTERS ((AV) JG:AFF

U^P -11
I

(MIDEAST)

NEW YORK--U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL THANT HELD PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE BIG FOUR AMBASSADORS ON THE EVE OF THEIR 28TH MEETING TODAY ON THE MIDDLE EAST BUT CAME AWAY WITH NO HOPE FOR A PEACE BREAKTHROUGH.

THE MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADORS OF THE U.S., BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION MARKED THANT'S FIRST ACTIVE ROLE IN THE TALKS.

THANT RETURNED WEDNESDAY TO HIS HEADQUARTERS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, CUTTING SHORT BY THREE DAYS A VISIT TO HIS HOME IN BURMA BECAUSE, AIDES SAID, HE HAD RECEIVED NEW REPORTS ON THE BIG FOUR TALKS. WESTERN SOURCES WHO SAW THE REPORTS SAID THEY CONTAINED NOTHING NEW.

AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST, THE U.S. ENVOY TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TOLD NEWSMEN AFTER HIS SESSION WITH THANT THAT PROSPECTS WERE "NOT VERY GOOD" FOR A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT. SOURCES FROM THE OTHER FOUR NATIONS ECHOED THAT SENTIMENT.

FROM MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO STEP UP THEIR ANTI-ISRAEL PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, RELEASING A SPEECH FROM ONE OF THEIR JEWISH GENERALS CALLING TEL AVIV "THE STRANGLER OF FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLES AND OCCUPIER IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

-O-

TEL AVIV--ARAB GUERRILLAS ATTACKED A CIVILIAN CAR AND AN ISRAELI ARMY VEHICLE WITH HAND GRENADES IN THE OCCUPIED GAZA STRIP TODAY, KILLING AN ARAB YOUTH AND WOUNDING 39 PERSONS, THREE OF THEM ISRAELI SOLDIERS.

THE TWO INCIDENTS A MILE APART WERE THE MOST SERIOUS IN A RECENT SPATE OF GRENADE ATTACKS BY THE GUERRILLAS. HOSPITAL OFFICIALS SAID FIVE OF THE WOUNDED WERE IN SERIOUS CONDITION.

ISRAELI AUTHORITIES SAID THE COSTLIEST ATTACK WAS AGAINST THE CIVILIAN CAR. TWO GRENADES WERE THROWN AT IT, THE FIRST FAILING TO EXPLODE BUT THE SECOND DETONATED KILLING A 13-YEAR-OLD ARAB BOY AND WOUNDING 36 PASSERSBY.

THE ATTACKS FOLLOWED THE HEAVIEST DAY OF MIDDLE EAST AIR ACTION IN WEEKS, WITH ISRAEL STAGING RAIDS NEAR CAIRO AND CLAIMING THREE MIG FIGHTERS SHOT DOWN WHILE EGYPT SENT ITS PLANES AGAINST ISRAELI CAMPS ALONG THE SUEZ.

2/27--GE851A

NNNN

NOR860 EPD427

1341 : NIGHTLEAD MIDEAST--ENVOYS (SCHEDULED):
(550--TWO TAKES)

BY MICHAEL LITTLEJOHNS

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, FEB 27 (REUTERS)--THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BIG FOUR POWERS CONFERRED FOR ABOUT THREE HOURS TODAY IN THEIR CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE FORMULA.

THERE WERE NO IMMEDIATE INDICATIONS OF ANY PROGRESS TOWARD SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT AND IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE GROUP WILL MEET AGAIN NEXT THURSDAY.

THE MEETING AT THE WALFORD TOWERS APARTMENT OF U.S. AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST, WAS THE 28TH SINCE THE FOUR BEGAN THEIR CONSULTATIONS ALMOST A YEAR AGO.

YOST WAS JOINED BY SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JACOB A. MALIK, BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE LORD CARADON AND FRENCH AMBASSADOR ARMAND M. BERARD.

BERARD WILL BE THE HOST FOR THE NEXT ROUND. THE MEETINGS ARE HELD IN TURN AT THE RESIDENCES OF THE FOUR DELEGATES.

SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT, WHO RETURNED HURRIEDLY TO NEW YORK AFTER CUTTING SHORT A SCHEDULED SIX-DAY VACATION IN HIS NATIVE BURMA, CALLED IT ALL FOUR DELEGATES FOR URGANT CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THE MEETING. HIS UNPRECEDENTED INITIATIVE, COUPLED BY A STATEMENT BY HIS SPOKESMAN THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD PERCEIVED "CERTAIN POSITIVE ELEMENTS" IN THE FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS, AROUSED SPECULATION THAT AT LAST A BREAKTHROUGH MIGHT BE AT HAND.

THE ABSENCE OF ANY FORMAL COMMUNIQUE FRIDAY WAS TAKEN AS CONFIRMATION THAT LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE.

KMORE) (AV) CPM/RV

NNNN

NOR861

CK 1345

NOR862 EPD428

1346 : 1ST ADD UNITED NATIONS NIGHTLEAD MIDEAST--ENVOYS:
X X X MADE.

WHAT THE FOUR ARE TRYING TO PRODUCE IS A SET OF GUIDELINES FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH THANT'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, SWEDISH AMBASSADOR GUNNAR V. JARRING MAY THEN PRESENT TO THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL.

BERARD HAS PROPOSED IN THE TALKS THAT THE FOUR "CATALOGUE" THE POINTS ON WHICH THEY ARE ALREADY AGREED, LIMITED THOUGH THEIR ACCORD IS KNOWN TO BE, SO THAT THE JARRING MISSION MAY BE REACTIVATED.

JARRING HASX BEEN ON THE SIDELINES SINCE LAST OCTOBER, BACK AT HIS POST AS AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, AND THANT IS THOUGHT TO BE ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE BIG FOUR PRODUCE A BASIS, EVEN A LIMITED ONE, FOR THE RESUMPTION OF JARRING'S TALKS.

MALIK IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BACKED THE FRENCH POSITION, WHILE YOST AND CARADON WOULD PREFER THAT THE BIG FOUR AIM HIGER AND SEEK THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON MUCH MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS.

NEVERTHELESS, INFORMED SOURCES DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FRENCH PROPOSAL MIGHT BE ACCEPTED. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PRESENCE OF JARRING IN THE AREA MIGHT HAVE A CALMING EFFECT.

BUT THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN WERE ALSO SAID TO BE ALARMED LEST, ARMED WITH THIN MATERIAL FROM THE FOUR POWERS HE ENGAGE IN A NEW ROUND OF FRUITLESS DISCUSSIONS WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE THE PRESTIGE OF HIS MISSION, AND PERHPAS EVEN DESTROY IT.

REUTERS (AV) CPM/RV

FOUR-POWER TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST CALLED FUTILE

Damascus SANA in Arabic 1312 GMT 1 Mar 70 M (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

[Text] Khartoum--An official spokesman of the Revolution Council made a statement here today on the four-power talks regarding the Middle East question. The spokesman said: Sudan and the Arab states consider the current talks among the four big powers as futile. We also do not believe in the usefulness of Jarring's attempts.

The spokesman added: The Arab states are now certain that a peaceful solution has reached a deadlock because of U.S. support to Israel. The only course before the Arab states is that of massing their potentials and of embarking on the decisive battle.

14/3/70

4. 10 Mar 70

I S R A E L

H 1

EBAN REFUTES SCHUMANN VIEW OF BIG FOUR TALKS

Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 0430 GMT 10 Mar 70 M

[Text] Foreign Minister Abba Eban said Israel regards the big four talks as simply a technical means of examining the peace possibilities and said the talks have no other meaning. Eban was refuting French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann's statement that the big four talks have made progress.

Eban's statement was broadcast on Europe No 1 in the form of telephone replies from Jerusalem to listeners' questions.

Eban again called for direct talks with the Arab states. He affirmed that Israel wants a cease-fire agreement, peace, and regional cooperation. He said it never announced that the cease-fire lines should remain fixed borders.

In reply to a question as to whether Israel was ready to negotiate with the Palestinian leaders, he said no decision has been made and that he believed the Arab world leadership is in Cairo. If Abd an-Nasir wants peace with Israel, he will stop the commando attacks, Eban said.

Eban answered a question about Cairo's charge that Israel will move 300,000 refugees from Gaza to the Jordan Valley. He said there has been no such decision but Israel does not object to the movements of inhabitants if they want to do so for economic reasons and if such movements do not endanger security.

The foreign minister expressed hope that France will reconsider and deliver the 50 Mirages.

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SG/SM/1358
MEM/64

23 October 1970

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL, U THANT, ON 23 OCTOBER

Following the dinner given by the Secretary-General, U Thant, in honour of the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the following statement was issued:

The four Foreign Ministers had a useful exchange of views with the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring on the situation in the Middle East. They agreed to exert their utmost efforts (1) to enable Ambassador Jarring to resume his mission at the earliest possible date; (2) to search for possibilities through the agreement of the parties directly concerned to extend the observance of the cease-fire for a period to be determined; and (3) to find a peaceful solution on the basis of resolution 242 of the Security Council.

The four Powers would continue their consultations, and their Permanent Representatives in New York will meet again on 28 October.

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2 March 1971

COMMENTS BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE

Mr. Bush met with correspondents in the Secretariat lobby after seeing the Secretary-General this evening.

He said he would have to be very vague, and could not go into details. It was a very critical time in the negotiations with the cease-fire date coming up fast. It was a time for very quiet diplomacy.

He had discussed the procedural matter with the Secretary-General and advised him how the United States as one of the Big Four saw what action should be taken.

He had told the Secretary-General that the United States saw some hopeful developments and progress in the whole Middle East question.

However, there were some big problems still. But the United States was against doing anything hectic and that was why it had resisted an earlier meeting of the Big Four.

Asked if he thought the Big Four would be able to take action to get the cease-fire extended, Mr. Bush said he certainly expected the subject to come up in the talks on Thursday, but he did not know if it would be possible to reach a unanimous decision at that time. It was too early to say that there could be a communiqué from the Big Four. The United States wanted to get points of agreement before going into the Big Four talks. The United States felt that this was a necessary part of quiet diplomacy. A meeting of the Security Council was not something that was quiet and a meeting of the General Assembly was even less so.

Asked if the United States had offered a draft communiqué to the other three, he said he had discussed some suggestions but would not say that the United States had a single document to which it was wedded. The other three had put forward some counter ideas. He repeated that he could not say that the discussions were far enough along to say that there would be a unanimous communiqué on Thursday.

Mr. Bush was asked if there was American pressure on Israel. He would not say that there was pressure, he stated. Big Powers should not pressure smaller Powers. He said the U.S. was in touch with the Israelis and he would be meeting Ambassador Tekoah tomorrow.

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FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

18 March 1971

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION BRIEFING

Nicholas Fenn, United Kingdom Press Officer, speaking about the Middle East, said that last week the four Powers had met for two hours, continuing their discussion of guarantees, and were meeting at 10:30 a.m. today at the French Mission. Unattributably, he said last week's meeting had been quiet and routine; the exchange on guarantees was continued, and the process of clarification went forward. Also, unattributably, he said he had no reason to expect that today's meeting would be other than one in which there would be continuation of discussion of guarantees and the increasingly detailed examination of ways in which a Middle East settlement could appropriately be guaranteed.

He was asked if the further clarification included the issue of participation by the two super-Powers in any guarantees. For the record, he said that was a question for the two super-Powers. Unattributably, he said in the whole matter of guarantees there were three kinds of questions -- the what, the where and the who. For the most part the discussions had been dealing with "the what".

Asked if he saw any notion of progress, he said the substance of the views of the Four were not widely apart. The views were not unreconcilable. The reconciliation was part of the process of clarification.

He was asked what he meant by "the what". He said the what part concerned the type of peace-keeping, the where was where this should be and the who concerned who would be in it. He was not saying that the Four had exclusively referred to the what or excluded reference to the where and the who, but for the most part consideration had been of the what.

A correspondent said that the what had to be related to the where and the who. He did not see how a peace-keeping force could be discussed without considering who was in it and where it should be. Mr. Fenn said the answer was that it could be done.

He was asked if there had been consideration of contingents for a peace-keeping force or alternatively of weapons systems for observation, and whether any distinctions had been drawn regarding contingents for the force and weapons systems for the force. Mr. Fenn said

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the range of discussion included the intrinsic nature of the force, supplementary legal guarantees and forces on the ground within the force. He was not authorized to say more than he had said on this point.

Asked if there had been discussion in the Four about participation of the super-Powers in a peace-keeping force, and whether this was good or bad, as the Secretary-General had commented, Mr. Fenn said he was not prepared to answer, except obliquely. For the record, he said it was, of course, not for the United Kingdom spokesman to interpret the views of the Secretary-General. Unattributably, he said both the statement by the Secretary-General of 18 January and the statement of Mr. Powell yesterday had been carefully drafted and he advised that close attention be paid to the precise language used. He said he would also give another blinding revelation of the obvious, in pointing out that United States policy was expounded by United States officials, the latest authoritative enunciation being that of Mr. Rogers at his press conference on 16 March.

Asked if the British position was close to that expounded by Mr. Rogers, Mr. Fenn said, for the record, that a Foreign Office spokesman had stated yesterday that the United Kingdom was studying with interest Mr. Rogers's views of 16 March, and the British views were as stated in the General Assembly on 2 November 1970. Unattributably, he said the remarks by Mr. Rogers were welcomed in the British delegation as being useful and timely. Without presuming to endorse every sentence, the main substance of the position put forward by Mr. Rogers had broad British support.

Asked if active participation by the two super-Powers in United Nations peace keeping in the Middle East would help, he said the British view was that it was for the parties to say what form of guarantees they would like and, within the context of guarantees, what form of peace-keeping force would be helpful.

He was asked if this meant the Four were incapable of making any decisions unless the two parties agreed. Mr. Fenn said that once again this was a question of the theology of the Four. He said that the British view was that the Four should, could and ought to agree on guidelines to submit to Mr. Jarring regarding a settlement. However, that was not the unanimous

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view, and therefore only the narrow field of guarantees was being discussed in the Four. However, that did not mean that there was a formal bar to the Four making suggestions. In making these suggestions the views of the parties would be known to the Four.

To a question on what was expected now in the Jarring talks, Mr. Fenn repeated the now-famous question in the OPI briefing of 12 March -- "Is the reply from Israel to the reply to the United Arab Republic in reply to Mr. Jarring regarded as a reply to Mr. Jarring?" He observed there had been no reply at the OPI briefing.

He said the British view was that there must be some modification of the expression of the very strong views of Israel in its communication to Mr. Jarring, if there was to be progress. Subsequently, there had been statements by the parties and the important contribution of Secretary of State Rogers. If one looked for encouragement it could be found in the small print of the statements of the parties. If one did not want to look for encouragement, it would not be found.

A correspondent asked whether Israel, if it modified its position in its response to Mr. Jarring could still maintain the position in the negotiations that there should be an Israeli presence at Sharm-el-Sheik, without physical acquisition of territory. Unattributably, Mr. Fenn said he saw no impediment to Israel's taking that course. (The questioner was Mr. Berlin, New York Post, who has a story in his paper today suggesting that United States officials saw this approach as a possible way of ending the impasse in the Jarring talks.)

Mr. Fenn was asked whether such an approach was compatible with a commitment to withdraw to the lines of the Mandate. Mr. Fenn said the question he had answered was whether Israel could take the course suggested. He was asked if such a course would be legitimate under the ground rules laid down by Mr. Jarring. He said that was a question for Mr. Jarring. Asked whether the United Kingdom would support such a position if it was taken by Israel, Mr. Fenn said that the substance of the British position was in the 2 November statement to the General Assembly.

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A correspondent said that Mr. Jarring wanted withdrawal to the frontiers of the Mandate, but the British had said there could be minor rectifications. Mr. Fenn said the British position, as put forward in November, was that there could be minor rectifications of the frontiers of Israel and Jordan. As far as the frontier between Israel and the United Arab Republic was concerned, the British position was that the international boundary of the Mandate should be the frontier, except for Gaza, where special arrangements might be required. This remained the British position. The United Kingdom did not, however, seek to impose those views on anyone.

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COMMENTS BY US REPRESENTATIVE

12 March 1971

Mr. Bush answered questions in the Secretariat Lobby after meeting with S-G this morning.

He said he had reported on yesterday's meeting of the Big Four on the Middle East, to which the US had been host.

Asked if he was hopeful, he said the meeting had broken up in a friendly manner. There had not been massive agreement, but the meeting had gone well. There was a general sense of relief that there were no hostilities in the Suez area. Everybody last week had been uptight about the possible ending of the cease-fire. The spirit was good yesterday. A few things had been clarified with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Bush said he was somewhat concerned ^{that} ~~with~~ everybody is now commenting regarding the Big Four talks except the US. He was going to discuss with his staff the possibility of changing the rules. The correct position of the US was not being presented, and if everybody else was making comments he thought the US had better do so too.

Asked if he expected ^a ~~the~~ Big Four communique soon, he said he did not.

Mr. Bush was not prepared to go into details of last week's meeting except to say ^{the} ~~the~~ United States was prepared totally to support the S-G's report".

Mike Newlin, Counsellor, Political and Security Affairs, added "in all its parts".

Don
12/3/71

FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

11 March 1971

UNITED KINGDOM PRESS BRIEFING

Nicholas Fenn, United Kingdom delegation press officer, said at his weekly press briefing today that the Permanent Representatives of the Big Four Powers were now in session at the United States Mission. He would not anticipate the outcome, but would be available later to answer questions "with my customary discretion".

On the Middle East, he dealt first with developments last Friday, 5 March. "An unidentified British source" had said, after the Big Four meeting that afternoon at the residence of Sir Colin Crowe, that all four permanent representatives had been present, that they had agreed to meet again on Thursday morning, 11 March, and that it was expected that they would continue their discussion on guarantees. They had agreed to meet before 11 March if there was a desire for an earlier meeting, but no move for such a meeting had been made.

Regarding the question of a communique last week, Mr. Fenn said there had been a wide measure of agreement, but it had not been possible to complete the agreement and no communique had been issued.

Unattributably, he added that the British source had judged it important that the failure to agree on a communique should not be taken to mean that the Big Four were at loggerheads on all matters. There had been substantial agreement on four points: a welcome for the 8 February initiative of Gunnar Jarring, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, which was fully in accord with his mandate; a welcome for the positive reply of the United Arab Republic, an appeal for an equally positive Israeli reply, and a reference to the current Big Four discussion of guarantees for a peace settlement.

In order to make clear that he was not claiming to be briefing correspondents on behalf of all the Four, the British source, he said, had not drawn on the language of the draft communique. He had acknowledged that there were differences of language even on the four points mentioned, but stated that there was general agreement on substance.

A correspondent said this differed from Soviet and French accounts of the meeting. Mr. Fenn said he spoke only for the United Kingdom. The correspondent

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said one delegation claimed that the failure on a communique was due to the unwillingness of another delegation to agree to a public declaration that Israeli forces should be withdrawn from all occupied territories. This, said Mr. Fenn, was "not our understanding". Unattributably, he added that the problem was that one delegation would not agree to "even the most indirect suggestion of approbation", even by taking note, of the Secretary-General's report. This was "true and lamentable".

Asked if he meant that the Four would have been ready to agree on a reference to withdrawal if the communique at least took note of the Secretary-General's report, Mr. Fenn said this was "close to the heart of it", but a hypothetical question.

Would the British support a call for total withdrawal? he was asked. Mr. Fenn said the British view on the substance of the matter was well known. Sir Colin Crowe had stated in the General Assembly on 2 November 1970 that the British view was that the international boundary at the time of the Mandate should be the line except for the Gaza area, for which special arrangements would have to be made.

He then spoke of "this week and the future". As stated earlier on the record, it was expected that the Big Four would continue their discussion of guarantees today. Unattributably, he added, "The cobbler is returning to his last. The special preoccupations of last week are now water under the bridge".

In reply to a question, he said he had no reason to suppose there would be a communique today.

He was then asked about the question of participation of the two super-Powers in a United Nations peace-keeping force. The United Nations spokesman had said the Secretary-General maintained his position against their participation and had given them his views in detail. Why was the Secretary-General "so hotly opposed"? Mr. Fenn said it was not for him to answer that question, and he did not know if "hotly" was the right word. To another question, he said that, as stated previously, was that the United Kingdom would not oppose providing a contingent for such a force, but the main thing was to obtain the agreement of the parties concerned on the sort of force they felt would give them adequate security.

Asked for the United Kingdom view on the present stage of the Jarring talks, he said, unattributably, that it was too soon to tell the substance of the prospects. Naturally, his delegation regretted the setback involved in the Israeli reply, the failure of the Big Four to agree on a communique, and the

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failure to extend the cease-fire formally. However, this was not in any sense the end of the road. If hopes had been set back, they were the hopes of January and February, and when viewed in the context of the problem as a whole, the situation was "much less dramatic".

The way was still open for diplomatic contacts through Mr. Jarring, he said. His delegation hoped the parties would take advantage of the opportunity since, in the present circumstances, it might not last indefinitely. "We will continue to give Mr. Jarring every possible support in his task".

Asked if he thought Mr. Jarring would "call it quits", he said no.

Asked for comment on how the British felt about the cease-fire, Mr. Fenn recalled that he had stated on the record last Friday that the United Kingdom felt that any resumption of the fighting would make more difficult a peaceful solution, and attached importance to continuation of military restraint.

To further questions, he said, unattributably, that the view of the British Government on substance was as stated by Sir Colin Crowe on 2 November 1970, but the United Kingdom would not seek to impose it. Some of the recent Israeli statements had been "remarkably uncompromising" but he welcomed the use of the phrase "without prior conditions" in referring to negotiations.

In his delegation's view, the way forward would have to include some modification of the Israeli position. If anyone was looking for encouragement, it might be in Mrs. Golda Meir's statement on 1 March that what Israel had put forward was "a negotiating position" which it did not expect the United Arab Republic to accept at this time.

Asked for comment on the Israeli position paper made public today, he said he would not be drawn into a discussion on "a hypothetical document, particularly when the Secretary-General casts doubt on its authenticity".

To questions on the recent Israeli reply, he said no one had said the reply was wholly uncompromising. His delegation regretted its "unyielding tone" and the inclusion of certain statements. Asked if this was what he had referred to in speaking of modification of the Israeli position, he said he would "not resist that conclusion".

Asked about a report from Paris suggesting that three-Power discussions might be held without the United States, he said he had not heard of this report. Unattributably, he had stated that the Four could not meet as three.

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Asked if the Four were just continuing meetings and doing nothing, since Israel had already "thrown out" the question of guarantees, he said it was not the view of any of the Four that guarantees were irrelevant to a settlement. They were trying to reach a common mind. They had only devoted three meetings entirely to the question of guarantees. He noted that the deputies had held 35 meetings and had found them not enough for stocktaking on guidelines.

Asked if he felt the cease-fire was limited and how long it might continue, Mr. Fenn said, unattributably, that his delegation hoped very much that quiet would be maintained. An informal maintenance of quiet had the disadvantage of instability but a corresponding advantage in that there were no recurring crises as the deadlines for extension neared. "Non-existent cease-fires don't expire, and we hope this one won't".

Asked what he thought of the idea of a partial settlement, he recalled that he had said earlier that all signs of flexibility were welcome. If the parties thought they could make progress that way, he wished them all success.

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25 March 1971

UNITED KINGDOM PRESS BRIEFING

Nicholas Fenn, United Kingdom Press Officer, speaking on the record, said that Sir Colin Crowe had submitted, on 23 March, to the President of the Security Council, the text of the British White Paper concerning the United Kingdom's legal obligations under the Simonstown agreement.

Off the record he added that this had been done to ensure that the United Kingdom's factual and legal position be properly understood and to "dispel misapprehensions which might have arisen from the Organization of African Unity memorandum".

Continuing on the record, he stated that in the United Kingdom's view, Security Council resolutions regarding South Africa were not mandatory and imposed no legal obligations on the United Kingdom. On the other hand, his country had certain legal obligations under the Simonstown agreement. Those who were asking the United Kingdom to abandon the delivery of helicopters and spare parts were asking it to abandon its legal obligations.

There was no commitment toward South Africa beyond what had been stated by the United Kingdom Government on 23 February, Mr. Fenn continued. Any further action in that respect would be in the framework of what Sir Alex Home had stated, namely the supply of certain arms for maritime defense and for the protection of the sea routes.

Unattributably he said that the decision on deliveries so far was in conformity with the legal opinion of the Crown and that any further supplies could only be within these terms.

Asked whether all this meant that the previous British Government had been prepared to violate its legal obligations (under the Simonstown agreement), Mr. Fenn said that he did not want to go into party political controversy. The purpose of the White Paper now was to dispel all misapprehensions on this score.

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To further questions Mr. Fenn said that there was a clear understanding with South Africa that the arms would be used for external defence only. Any departure from this would bring about a stop in further supplies. In any case, he added, there was no reason why South Africa should use the very special and sophisticated helicopters for internal purposes. It had much more appropriate helicopters for this, supplied "from other sources".

He said that he understood that a new production line would have to be opened for the WASP helicopters and that deliveries could not be expected before 1972. The spare parts involved were those coming under the terms of the sea-routes agreement.

Turning to the Middle East, Mr. Fenn said on the record that the Big Four had met for two hours at the French Mission last Thursday and had continued their discussion on guarantees.

Off the record he continued that they had examined ways to guarantee a Middle East settlement. The press conference by Secretary of State Rogers on 16 March had been discussed; it was welcomed by his Government.

On the record Mr. Fenn said that the Big Four would meet again today at the Soviet Mission to continue the discussion of guarantees.

Mr. Fenn then read extracts from the debate in the House of Commons in which the Foreign Secretary had replied to questions on the Middle East. He then offered to make an "exegesis" of these statements which he summed up in five points "strictly off the record":

(1) There was a note of urgency in what Sir Alec had said; there was reluctance to resign to a long-hand acceptance of the status quo.

(2) The major obstacle to progress was the view held by one party "that security required substantial territorial acquisition"; the way forward would have to include a modification of this view.

(3) Israel's security concern was understandable and legitimate.

(4) Some way other than territorial acquisition must be found to ensure Israel's security. In this context the importance of guarantees -- not substitutes for but complementary to an agreement -- was great; also, agreed guarantees would encourage the parties to accept them.

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(5) There is a need for credible and effective guarantees that can be offered. His Government does not despair of finding them and of "persuading the doubters" that they can be effective. This, Mr. Fenn added, was the task in which the Big Four were now engaged; his Government hoped for early progress; it will play its part for finding guarantees and making them work once they are found.

Asked what kind of guarantees he had in mind, Mr. Fenn observed that he had disclosed this before: they must be freely arrived at and accepted by both parties; they must be jurisprudentially endorsed, best by the Security Council; they must engage the Big Four in a settlement; and they would contain a range of supplementary guarantees such as demilitarized zones, observers, a peace-keeping force, etc.

Unattributably Mr. Fenn said that the atmosphere of the last Big Four meeting was "routine", "not remarkably good or bad".

Asked whether the United Kingdom felt that the impasse continued after Mr. Eban's visit to Washington and as a result of Egyptian statements hinting at military solutions, Mr. Fenn said he would be reluctant to categorize the situation but it seemed to him that the same situation persisted after Mr. Eban's visit. This made it all the more necessary to exert all efforts to overcome the difficulties.

He doubted very much, he said, that a communique would be issued after today's Big Four meeting. But he had been wrong on previous occasions, he observed.

Asked if the United Kingdom's view that one party must modify its position on territorial acquisition meant that use of territory would constitute such a modification, Mr. Fenn said that it was not for the United Kingdom to say what would be a modification; this would be unhelpful.

He was asked how the Big Four could be expected to agree on guarantees when he himself had indicated that it was up to the parties to say what guarantees they wanted. He said that what the Big Four were at was to select such guarantees which in their view would be appropriate. The task was to elaborate potential guarantees, supportive of a settlement and making it easier to arrive at one.

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He said that "my Government is united" when asked whether there was a similar debate in the United Kingdom as in the United States on the advisability of having Soviet troops in an international force in the area. "Unattributably" he said that Soviet troops were already in the area and that the significance of moving them from one part to another should not be exaggerated; they would be incorporated in some form of international structure. The United Kingdom would not want to exclude one party.

Asked whether he discerned, after Eban's visit, any backing away from guarantees, Mr. Fenn said that United Kingdom policy would not be affected by that visit. This was a matter for the Government concerned (the United States).

In reply to other questions Mr. Fenn said that the United Kingdom's view on the precise location of a force was yet undetermined. A four-power force could not be forced on Israel or Egypt, first there must be a political settlement; until then, "nobody knows what we are guaranteeing". But agreement on a Big Four force could play a key part in bringing about a settlement. The attitude of the United Kingdom regarding Israel's demands concerning Sharm el Sheikh was still undefined.

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FOR INFORMATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

22 April 1971

UNITED KINGDOM PRESS BRIEFING

Nicholas Fenn said on the Middle East, for the record, that the Four Powers had met on Tuesday with the United States as host. There had been a continuation of discussions on guarantees. France would be the host at the next meeting, at 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 5 May.

He was asked what had been said at the meeting about the United States role in passing messages between Egypt and Israel regarding the Suez Canal. Mr. Fenn said, unattributably, that the current attempts to reach a partial settlement had been mentioned but there had been no substantive discussion on the matter. The United States role in the discussions on this point had also been mentioned. The British view on the substance remained unchanged. His delegation continued to suspect that a permanent peace had to rest on a comprehensive settlement of all points in contention. But, of course, his delegation would be delighted if the parties were to make progress in exploration of a more limited idea. The United Kingdom could only wish success to any who sought to pursue such an agreement, and it was incumbent on all to do what they could to help in any way they could.

He was asked if the United Kingdom attitude was that the question of the Suez Canal was rightfully a part of Mr. Jarring's mandate. He said Mr. Jarring's mandate was to promote agreement and could very well include the question of the Suez Canal. However, there was nothing in principle that made ineligible the seeking of agreement through other avenues to attain the same objective as Mr. Jarring's mission. There was no suggestion of any British resentment on the manner in which the current negotiations regarding the Suez Canal were being conducted. However, as he had stated previously, the question of an estimate of the success of the negotiations was a different question.

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A correspondent said there appeared to be a long lapse of time between the meetings of the Big Four. Was there a slowing down of the previous momentum? Mr. Fenn said the Four had agreed to the next date for their meeting and there had been no dissent. The correspondent repeated his question about a reduction in momentum. Mr. Fenn said the correspondent was at liberty to draw that inference but he was not at liberty to suggest it.

Asked if Mr. Jarring would be back before the next meeting of the Big Four, he said he had no information one way or the other.

Mr. Fenn was asked for a comment on the recent Israeli suggestion regarding the reopening of the Suez Canal, and he replied that he had no comment. The suggestions had not been addressed to the United Kingdom.

Mr. Fenn was asked if the new proposed Federation of Arab Republics would affect the Middle East situation, and whether it would help towards a solution. Mr. Fenn said he had nothing to say for the record.

Unattributably, he said the declaration regarding the Federation was clearly a statement whose precise text needed careful study. It was for the three signatory States to say precisely what they meant. There had been a tendency to interpret that declaration as a return to the Khartoum doctrine of "no negotiation, no recognition and no peace". The first reaction of the United Kingdom delegation was that this was an exaggeration. He said President Sadat had not said "no negotiation", but had said "no negotiation with Israel". This appeared to reflect the long standing UAR position, which had not excluded negotiations through Mr. Jarring. Regarding the point of "no recognition", he said Mr. Sadat had said nothing on this point at all. The United Kingdom delegation was not clear on the precise intent of the phrase "no peace with Israel", followed immediately by a renewed demand for withdrawal from the occupied

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territories. He did not know if this meant more than the familiar position of the United Arab Republic that there could not be peace without withdrawal. The United Arab Republic had so far given his delegation indication that the reply to Mr. Jarring of 15 February had been superseded. Until that was done, the United Kingdom delegation took leave to assume that that paper was still on the table.

Mr. Fenn was asked if the conclusion could be drawn that the proposed Federation did not alter the situation vis-a-vis the Jarring talks, or a settlement on the Middle East. He said he had no comment on the Federation, which was entirely a decision of three sovereign Governments. As to the implication for a Middle East settlement, he said it was safe to assume that the United Kingdom mission was not able to draw any "significant implication" from the event. "Time will tell", he said.

Mr. Fenn was asked if in London there had been any semi-official contacts with the United Arab Republic on clearance of the Suez Canal. He said he had nothing to say on this point. He had no indications in this regard.

Mr. Fenn was asked about the Secretary-General's statement on the declaration in connexion with the proposed new federation. Unattributably, he said the United Kingdom mission understood the concern that the Secretary-General had expressed in his statement. For some time, the United Kingdom mission had been indicating its own anxiety and the necessity not to resign oneself to a long haul, because the status quo might not remain forever. The declaration in connexion with the Federation was relevant. The situation was undoubtedly serious.

When it was suggested that there might be a contradiction between what he had previously said in analysis of this declaration and the expression now that the situation was serious, Mr. Fenn

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pointed out that the United Kingdom mission shared the concern of the Secretary-General in his statement although the mission itself had not made such a statement. At the same time, in expressing the initial views on the declaration he was attempting to discount some of the more apocalyptic interpretations.

When asked about the ambience of the last Big Four meeting, Mr. Fenn said the United Kingdom had expressed the hope that there would be further clarification regarding guarantees. This was a hope deferred. He hoped further precision would be brought into discussion on this matter at the next meeting. A number of constructive things had been said at yesterday's meeting. But there had been little actual progress. He said attention had been diverted by a prolonged attack on the United States as a proxy for Israel.

When asked if the United States was a proxy for Israel, he said Israel was not present in the Big Four meeting. He said if one wanted to make an attack "one has to shoot as near as one can to one's target". It was suggested that he was speaking on behalf of the representative who had made the attack. He replied that he would never attempt to do that. He was asked if he regarded United States as a proxy for Israel in the talks. "I would not go that far. It is a widely held view."

Mr. Fenn then spoke about Laos. He pointed out that yesterday, in London, the United Kingdom, as one of the Geneva co-Chairmen, had made public a further letter from the Prime Minister of Laos, dated 24 March, protesting North Vietnamese military action, and asking the co-Chairmen to ensure that the North Vietnamese respected the independence and sovereignty of Laos and withdrew their troops from Laos.

The Soviet Union, the other co-Chairman, had declined to have this letter published under a simple covering letter saying it was circulated to all members of the Geneva Conference. The United Kingdom

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had therefore circulated it to all representatives of the Geneva Powers in London, under its own covering note asking those representatives to draw the attention of their Governments to the letter, deploring the flagrant violations of the Geneva accords by the North Vietnamese forces, and calling on all to abide by those accords so that peace could be restored in Laos.

Questions were then asked about the visit to Lisbon of Sir Alec Douglas-Home and whether this was connected with the Beira patrol.

Mr. Fenn said it had been announced on 16 April that the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom and the Foreign Minister of Portugal would meet in Lisbon on 1 and 2 June, before the NATO meeting of 3 and 4 June. Unattributably, he said this was regarded as an opportunity for a joint exchange of views on a wide range of subjects, which would no doubt include questions affecting southern Africa. The British position on southern Africa -- which was not the same as that of Portugal -- would be explained, and the British Foreign Minister would listen to the views of Portugal. He was not aware that the question of the Beira patrol would come up.

On the record, he said it had been repeatedly stated that the United Kingdom was attempting to seek a just solution of the Rhodesia question within the terms of the five principles. In the meantime, sanctions, including the patrol, would continue.

In reply to other questions, he said he expected a report of the Security Council Sanctions Committee quite soon, but he did not know the date and did not know if this could be before the end of the month. He declined to say whether the Security Council resolution regarding the Beira patrol was regarded as mandatory. He said he needed to look that up. The patrol had cost the United Kingdom £2 million since its inception.

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Copies to Ralph
& Mr. Anger.

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From the P.R. of U.S.S.R.

here
24/71

Verbal
Information for the President
of the UN Security Council on the
Middle East Four Power consultations
25 May, 1971

Since last time when you, Mr. President, were informed on the 7-th of May about the work of the Four Power consultations on the Middle East no progress was reached at these consultations. During that period there was one meeting, on the 18-th of May. At the chair was the USSR Representative.

One of the delegations proposed to urgently pay attention to the main task of the four power consultations - the consideration and the agreeing upon a common view point and stand of the Four Powers on the key issues of the settlement - the withdrawal of troops and the conditions of peace including the problem of guarantees. No general agreement was reached on this question. Some delegations were not prepared to discuss the questions of the withdrawal of troops and the conditions of peace. They prefer to consider the question of possible options of guarantees of the Middle East settlement.

All participants stated, that they continue to support the Security Council resolution 242 and Jarring's mission and believe that Jarring's mission should be continued, and that any possible interim decision on any question of the Middle East settlement should be regarded as a first step in the overall settlement through the implementation of the Security Council resolution 242.

One of the delegations proposed to call upon Ambassador Jarring to continue his mission and along with his initiative of February 8, to take up also the settlement of the partial question of the reopening of the Suez canal, as a first step in the implementation of the Security Council resolution 242.

In this connection a proposal was made also on the pullback of Israeli troops from the Suez canal and stationing of the UAR troops on the evacuated territory as well as on the cooperation of the parties with Ambassador Jarring.

However no general agreement was reached on these proposals. Some delegations expressed their doubts as to whether the reactivation of Jarring's mission was timely and whether Jarring should undertake this particular question.

Certain delegations touched upon the visit of the US Secretary of State to the Middle East. An opinion was expressed on the possibility of reaching progress in the question of the reopening of the Suez canal as a first step of the overall Middle East settlement. The participants to the consultations continue to diverge regarding the methods through which the settlement of this particular question should be sought.

Discussing the question of the reopening of the Suez canal opinions were expressed that regardless the evolution of this question the Four Power consultations should continue.

Proposals to renew the meetings at the level of the Deputies of Permanent representatives were introduced. The other point of view was to limit the exchange of opinions on the question of guarantees at the level of experts. On these questions no decision has yet been reached.