



UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title

Page

1

Date

06/07/2006

Time

11:17:43 AM



S-0981-0001-01-00001

Expanded Number **S-0981-0001-01-00001**


Title **Items-in-General files - conference miscellaneous**

Date Created **01/02/1945**


Record Type **Archival Item**

Container **S-0981-0001: United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) subject files**

Print Name of Person Submit Image



Signature of Person Submit



**'Beacon on Road to Peace'**

WDC Post  
3-13-45

## Senate Told Chapultepec Pact Is Guide for San Francisco

By Robert C. Albright.

Chairman Tom Connally (D., Tex.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, backed up by Senator Warren R. Austin (R., Vt.), yesterday described the "Act of Chapultepec" as a "forerunner of what we hope will happen at San Francisco."

Reporting to the Senate on the Mexico City Inter-American accord, Delegate Connally said the agreements reinforced and extended the Monroe doctrine as a "multilateral doctrine." Delegate Austin said Chapultepec "reversed the doctrine of noninterference in the external affairs of another state."

"This is a beacon which shall enable the states at San Francisco to see the roadway to peace," Connally told his colleagues.

Even as they discussed with the Senate for two hours what happened at Mexico City, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, jr., invited members of the American delegation to the San Francisco world conference to an initial

meeting this morning. Later today the entire San Francisco delegation will confer with the President.

### Other developments:

1. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, (R., Mich.), one of the eight delegates to the April 25 meeting, in a letter to Governor Dwight H. Green of Illinois, said he will give "top priority" to suggestions from members of the armed forces on proposals to be laid before the San Francisco conference.

2. Secretary Stettinius told newsmen he would do all he could to keep forthcoming international conferences, both in and outside the United States, as open to the press as possible, after one reporter praised news arrangements in Mexico City as a "new high in press relations."

3. Associated Press dispatches from Bombay reported India will send a three-man delegation to the San Francisco conference, including Sir Ranaswami Mudaliar, See SECURITY, Page 6, Column 1

DC-1 - Misc. Conf - 1

## YALTA AND SAN FRANCISCO

As formal invitations were sent yesterday to the San Francisco conference, at which the representatives of forty-four nations will meet "to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security," the State Department made public the text of the proposed formula, agreed upon at Yalta, which would govern the voting procedure in the Council of the new league. This formula is described as a compromise between the positions taken by our own Government and by that of Soviet Russia during the conference at Dumbarton Oaks last summer. The compromise is a reasonable one, and the success of the Yalta conference in reaching it ought to brighten the prospects for a general agreement at San Francisco.

The practical effect of the compromise is to make a distinction between what Secretary Stettinius calls "the quasi-judicial function of the Council in promoting the pacific settlement of disputes and the political function of the Council in taking action for the maintenance of peace and security." When questions of the first kind are involved—that is, when the issue is whether any particular situation threatening peace should be investigated, or what action (short of recourse to force) shall be taken in order to deal with such a situation—no nation which is a party to the dispute, whether that nation is great or small, will participate in the decisions of the Council, and these decisions shall be made by a majority of seven of its eleven members—the eleven consisting of the five permanent representatives of the Great Powers (Russia, Britain, China, France and the United States) and six representatives of the smaller Powers. However, when the issue goes beyond pacific measures, and when the question is actually one of using force to prevent or restrain aggression, then a different voting procedure will be followed. In this case there must be unanimous agreement among the representatives of the five Great Powers before action can be taken. Each of these Great Powers, therefore, would have the right to veto action against itself.

Objection may be made that this arrangement proposes to put the five Great Powers in a favored position which the smaller Powers would not enjoy, and theoretically this objection is valid. But the reality of the situation must convince us that if a point is ever reached when one of the five Great Powers has to be coerced by force, then peace will have been lost anyway, beyond the possibility of salvage by any voting procedure that can possibly be devised, and a new world war will be in the making. The whole hope of maintaining peace rests, in the last analysis, upon the good faith of the Great Powers and their ability to get along together. If they cannot get along together, then no machinery of voting in the Council, however elaborate or however ingenious on paper, will suffice to keep the peace.

The Yalta compromise recognizes this essential fact. It recognizes that in any use of force to prevent or restrain aggression the five Great Powers must inevitably bear the principal responsibility for action, and that unanimity of opinion among these Powers is therefore indispensable to success. At the same time the Yalta compromise provides that not even the greatest of the Powers shall be above the law: any policies or actions on its part may at any time be questioned by a majority of seven of a Council in whose membership the small nations outnumber the large ones.

It is for these reasons that the Yalta formula seems to us to be reasonable and constructive. It ought not only help greatly to achieve a general agreement at San Francisco; it ought also improve the outlook for the ultimate ratification of this general agreement whole-heartedly by the Senate. For the Yalta formula disposes of the Senate's

bugaboo of a situation in which the United States would have no right to veto any action against itself to which other major Powers might agree. It disposes of that bugaboo by recognizing frankly that the first condition of a lasting peace is continued agreement among the Powers, which, by virtue of their strength, are cast inevitably for the role of the chief guardians of international law and order.

DC-1 - misc. Conf -

2

## THE GREAT DECISION

In his address yesterday before the two Houses of Congress President Roosevelt described the work of the Yalta conference as "a turning point in our history, and therefore in the history of the world." He then said:

It will soon be presented to the Senate and the American people, a great decision which will determine the fate of the United States, and I think therefore of the world, for generations to come. There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

We believe that an overwhelming majority of Americans are wholly in agreement with this proposition. They have seen the almost incredible waste of blood and treasure caused by two great wars. They know that the world is growing smaller. They are convinced that a Third World War would involve us even more quickly and more disastrously than the two world wars which have already been fought within the lifetime of almost the whole adult population of this country. They are therefore determined to do everything within their power to prevent the outbreak of a Third World War, and they are convinced that the most hopeful way of accomplishing this purpose is through association with other powerful nations sharing the same objective. The old faith in American isolation is deadlier than the proverbial dodo. There remains no confidence at all—after Pearl Harbor, after the robot bombs, after war planes that can travel with the speed of sound—in the false security of a geographical position which was once supposed to be impregnable because it was defended by two oceans. We are out in the world now, with all its dangers. No responsible leadership anywhere in the country, no dominant faction of either major political party, no minor party with more than an insignificant following, now opposes the proposition that the best way to safety lies in collaboration, rather than in isolation.

This is the greatest certainty in the whole American political scene today. But if we accept, as we do—almost without dissent—the necessity of collaboration, what do we mean by this word? How, and when, and by what means shall we "collaborate" with other nations?

It is evident that at this point the near-unanimity of opinion ends, and different judgments appear. There are some who would have us collaborate, but only if the collaboration is wholly on our own terms: that is, only if we have our own American way in all of the important decisions to be reached, whether those decisions pertain to a frontier in eastern Europe or to a method of voting in the council of a new league of the United Nations. There are others who would postpone the whole business of collaboration to a later date: they would have us wait to take a look-see at the terms of peace ultimately arrived at, both in Europe and in Asia, and decide then, and only then, whether to go along or whether to return once more to the twice bombed-out cellar of isolation. There are still others who would have us collaborate willingly on the high plane of statesmanship which initiated such undertakings as Dumbarton Oaks, but not collaborate at all in difficult and messy things like border problems and the establishment of interim governments in war-torn countries, even though it is the solutions reached concerning these same difficult and messy questions that will determine in large measure the shape of the forthcoming peace.

In our own judgment the right way to collaborate is the method used at Yalta. That method involved an abandonment by our Government of its previous position that the settlement of all difficult political questions must wait until the war's end. It involved a recognition that some of these questions will breed deep trouble and disunity unless they are settled now. It involved a departure from the "hands off" policy

which we followed in the case of Greece, and the acceptance of an American share of responsibility for decisions which must be made in other similar cases, now and in the future. It involved compromise where compromise could be defended as reasonable and consistent with the broad purpose of international security. It involved constant recognition of the superlative importance of keeping a united political front against two formidable enemies who have not yet been defeated.

It is because we believe that the method of collaboration pursued at Yalta was the right method, and because we believe the results achieved by this method are constructive and in the American interest, that we are certain Mr. Roosevelt was entitled yesterday to appeal for strong American endorsement of the agreements he has made in the name of the United States.

DE-1

Music: Conf - 3

## The News Content of the President's Speech

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, March 1.—The President's personal report to Congress today on the proceedings at Yalta, and notably the fact that he made it so promptly and in such good temper, visibly and favorably impressed his auditors at the joint session. This was evident in their faces, in the volume and placement of their applause and in their public comment that followed. Mr. Roosevelt not only acknowledged Congress as his full partner in government; he also asserted the Senate's prerogative as to treaties and the special rights of the House.

### Asks Congress to Concur

Emphasizing this in the most effective way possible, the President asked Congress to "concur in the decisions reached at Yalta" (not specifying the form of concurrence) and for the "active support" of the national legislature in making these decisions effective. In so doing he followed, in so far as our pattern of government permits, the course Prime Minister Churchill took two days ago in his speech to the Commons. There was much interest in whether he would merely imply or openly seek this approval, for he has never made a report of this nature before. This interest, satisfied on the one point, now turns to whether Congress—through whatever means it may employ to express concurrence—will give to the President a vote of confidence as overwhelming as that Mr. Churchill got from the Commons today.

For these and other reasons the President's address and his personal and prompt appearance made up a notable historical event. But, judging the speech from the news standpoint, the conclusion must be that once again the Allied world has first heard the facts of an international conference from the British Prime Minister, and once again more of these facts than in subsequent releases by Mr. Roosevelt or any members of the United States government. By his report two days ago Mr. Churchill continued to make the British people the best-informed as well as the first-informed among the United Nations.

### A Later Opportunity

When the world security conference of these nations meets in April at San Francisco the President will have the advantages of geography and location as well as the privileges of a host. If the factor of geography is in any way responsible for the order of the reports on Yalta by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, then the latter will for once be in a position to make the first an-

nouncement of important news from San Francisco as well as the first to make at the end of the conference what has been agreed on. It remains to be seen whether he will avail himself of this and thus enable the American people to hear the news when it is fresh from the lips of their own President instead of from Mr. Churchill's. But even in this event, it is not probable that a speech by the head of any state will have the lambent quality that invariably distinguishes the addresses of the Prime Minister.

Very close readers of the newspapers, especially of the Yalta communiqué and the speech in Commons Tuesday, heard little from Mr. Roosevelt that comes within the category of fresh news. He stressed and clarified the fact that "provision has been made for daily exchange of information" between our armies and those of Soviet Russia, and gave the illustration of recent cooperation in the air over Germany. He defined "unconditional surrender" with more detail than he has defined it previously, and stressed that this would not be followed by the "enslavement" of the German people. He frankly conceded that the Polish settlement is a compromise for which he feels no enthusiasm, and he made it very positive that the Polish elections are to be conducted by secret ballot.

### Light News Quantity

But this correspondent was unable to find any other passages or statements which can be classified as news—that is, fresh information—in any usual sense. So far as major information is concerned, Mr. Churchill had another "beat," as press jargon calls it, over his American colleague. He cannot be credited with one over Marshal Stalin because that potentate acknowledges no obligation to acquaint his people of decisions he has reached for them.

And there were several passages in the speech to Congress which increased the darkness in which certain future arrangements are concealed. The President spoke of "plants, and machinery and rolling stock and raw materials" as the "reparations in kind" which will be exacted of Germany. But he made no mention of the enforced, imported German labor which the Russians—and probably other Allies—insist shall be part of those reparations, seeming indeed to question the idea by his pledge against "enslavement" of the German people. It is said this was a point of disagreement at Yalta, but while the President's speech leaves that implication, it does not say so.

### In Summary

Mr. Roosevelt at another point declared that the peace must not be a peace written by the large nations or the small nations; that it must be a peace of all. But a moment later he seemed to assign responsibility for solving the problems of peace to "the major powers of the world" exclusively. Some attentive listeners may find a conflict in those statements.

On the whole, therefore, the President's report was not new, in some respects not clear, but an impressive, important and cooperative narrative.

DC - 1    Misc. Grif.    4



# And Moscow Disposes

By Barnet Nover

WBC Post 9-30-45

## Yalta: Hopes And Realities

IN HIS REPORT to Congress on the Crimea Conference, President Roosevelt made a remark which, in retrospect, is singularly revealing.

After listing some of the great problems of "vital political consequence" that confronted the Big Three at Yalta, the President declared that:

"Days were spent in discussing these momentous matters. We argued freely and frankly across the table. But at the end, on every point, unanimous agreement was reached. And more important, even than the agreement on words, I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together."

### UNITY of thought?

In his satisfaction over the circumstance that differences regarding Poland, Yugoslavia, the liberated and ex-satellite states, voting procedure in the Council of the proposed world organization, methods of consultation among the Big Three, and other problems appeared to have been overcome, the President may have convinced himself that such unity had been achieved.

Yet everything that has happened since Yalta suggests that there never was any real meeting of minds at Yalta on a number of vital questions that were discussed there.

What there was instead was an agreement on paper. There was no agreement as to the terms employed and no agreement as to how the various settlements were to be implemented.

FOR INSTANCE, the Yalta plan authorized the British and American Ambassadors at Moscow, together with the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Mr. Molotov, to act as "a commission to consult . . . with members of the present Provisional (i. e. the Lublin) Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present government."

What did the word reorganization mean? Did it mean merely adding a few outsiders to the Russian-sponsored Lublin regime? Or did it mean establishing a new and truly representative Polish government, one containing individuals drawn from the Lublin group, from the Polish government in London and from Poland?

THIS QUESTION was apparently left hanging in the air. It soon became clear, however, that the Russians regarded this "compromise" as merely a face-saving device to enable Great Britain and the United States to recognize the Lublin regime after its base had theoretically

been broadened through the addition of a few outsiders satisfactory to Lublin.

When this did not turn out to be true, Mr. Molotov made it impossible for the Moscow commission to operate at all by insisting that agreement in every instance had to be unanimous. That meant that no Pole regarded as unsatisfactory by Lublin (i. e. by Moscow) could be made part of the proposed new Polish government.

Obviously there had been no real understanding reached at Yalta as to how the Moscow commission was actually going to operate. But there can be no doubt whatever that the American delegation had assumed that the unanimity rule would not obtain in that body.

In fact, spokesmen for the Administration went all over Washington exulting in the concession allegedly made by Marshal Stalin since, in the Moscow commission, the Russian delegate could be outvoted by the American and British delegates.

Somebody, it is clear, had been sold a pig in a poke, and it was not the Russians.

NOW ON THE EVE of the San Francisco Conference the Russians, with a great show of righteousness, have demanded that Poland be represented at the conference and have argued that the Polish representative be one chosen by the Lublin regime.

There is no doubt that Poland, the first nation to fight Hitler, should be represented at a conference where nations that sat out the war in comfortable neutrality (when not covertly pro-Axis) will be represented. But the method which the Russians have employed to secure that representation for Poland is cynical, to say the least. The prompt rejection of the Russian proposal by Great Britain and the United States was entirely in order.

BUT IF events have proved that there is no unity of thought and action regarding Poland they have also proved that, despite words written down at Yalta, no real agreement was reached regarding Yugoslavia and the treatment of liberated and ex-satellite states, such as Romania, as well.

Mr. Roosevelt should have been forewarned by what happened after Tehran, a love feast whose sequel was in the words of the President, "incidents which . . . disturbed the friends of world-wide cooperation and collaboration." But the impression that marked the meeting at Tehran also characterized the meeting at Yalta as well.

It seems as if still a third meeting is necessary to decide what the second meeting meant.

## URGE COMPROMISE FOR WORLD ACCORD

Peace Conferees Here Back Recommendation of Policy to Session of Nations

Recognition of the need for compromise in reaching an international accord at the San Francisco Conference of nations is urged in a statement issued here yesterday by the National Peace Conference, after six of the twenty-five voting members of the conference had cast ballots on Tuesday against the statement.

The conference, headed by Dr. John Paul Jones, Minister of the Union Church of Bay Ridge, Brooklyn, has approximately forty constituent members, all national organizations whose programs include an interest in international affairs and the post-war world. In issuing the statement on the conference's position, Dr. Jones declared that the six votes cast against it were "in part accounted for by scruples regarding the place of compromise in ethical thought, and represent opposition to the acceptance of the concept of the inevitability of compromise at San Francisco."

The conference also made public a number of recommendations made to the Department of State on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The vote on the recommendations was unanimously favorable. The conference recommended inclusion of arrangements for colonial and under-developed areas, suggesting that present mandated areas and all colonial territories seized from enemy powers shall be maintained by international authority in trusteeship, as a natural advance over the mandate system applied at the close of World War I.

Further strengthening of procedures under which the United Nations may accomplish "the peaceful change of unjust or unfair conditions" is also recommended, as is "earnest consideration of the full text of the Chinese proposals, a partial report of which was published Aug. 29 and on Oct. 30, 1944."

The formal statement, approved by nineteen delegates, advocates, in part, "a sense of world citizenship" and "recognition in advance that agreements at San Francisco will inevitably involve compromise, and that the initial world organization will be imperfect and incomplete."

DC-1 misc. Conf 6

# Text of 'Big 3' Statement On Results of Conference

W DC Post

2-10-45

The text of the document issued yesterday in connection with the "Big Three" conference follows:

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference:

## *The Defeat of Germany*

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

## *The Occupation and Control of Germany*

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central control commission consisting of the supreme commanders of the three powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the control commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German general staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

## *Reparation by Germany*

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

(2104)

## **United Nations Conference**

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The government of China and the provisional government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

## **Declaration on Liberated Europe**

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

## **Poland**

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish provisional government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The provisional government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

*The text of an agreement reached at the conference concerning prisoners liberated by the Allied forces invading Germany follows:*

A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimea conference providing detailed arrangements for the protection, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British commonwealth, Soviet Union and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each Ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to insure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present provisional government of Poland, and the government of the United

Kingdom and the government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

### ***Yugoslavia***

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new government should be formed on the basis of that agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare that:

(1) The anti-Fascist assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and,

(2) Legislative acts passed by the anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

### ***Meetings of Foreign Secretaries***

Throughout the conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organization.

### ***Unity for Peace as for War***

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Signed: WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT  
J. STALIN

February 11, 1945.

WBC Post 2-17-45

## France Seeks More Details On Yalta Plan

By Ben W. Gilbert

France revealed yesterday a determination not to rubber-stamp the "Big Three" decisions at Yalta by asking its ambassadors in Washington, London, and Moscow for clarification of details before indicating whether it is prepared to join with the three and China in sponsoring the United Nations conference at San Francisco.

Ambassador Henri Bonnet here conferred with Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, but insisted that he took up "several routine political matters," rather than the reported message from Paris about the "Big Three" session.

Bonnet said that he had not as yet received any direct word from the French foreign office on the subject.

Meanwhile, it was reported from Cairo that British and American delegates to the Yalta meeting would confer with Gen. Charles de Gaulle before returning to their respective capitals.

The Cairo report said that it was uncertain whether Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt would themselves visit the French leader.

There have been persistent reports that preparations have been made in France to receive President Roosevelt. It was evident that such a presidential visit would be useful in solving wounded French pride as not having been permitted to participate in the "Big Three" sessions.

If the President did not visit De Gaulle, it was considered possible that Harry Hopkins might go to Paris to make a complete report to him. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, jr., was reported rushing back to attend the inter-American conference at Mexico City, and War Mobilization Director James E. Byrnes has already returned to Washington.

The Cairo report said the meeting of British and American officials with De Gaulle would be an "extension of the Yalta conference," with British and American officials of "considerable importance" attending.

The French cabinet withheld action on the Yalta decisions, approving instead messages from Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, to the nation's ambassadors in the other three capitals, instructing them to obtain further information on details not covered in the formal communique.

Simultaneously, the foreign affairs committee of the French Consultative Assembly voted to ask Bidault for a report on the Crimea conference and an outline of French policy toward the "Big Three."

The assembly, an Associated Press dispatch from Paris said, adopted a report by Pierre Lapie, former governor of the Tchad, recommending strict economic control of Germany, particularly the Rhineland, plus the destruction of Nazi war industries under the supervision of the international security organization's economic council.

It was pointed out here that the French might be interested in learning the extent to which they are to participate with other powers in matters affecting liberated areas, whether they will have any voice in problems affecting Poland, and just what portion of Germany has been allocated for French occupation.

DC-1

Misc. Ant -

8



# AMERICAS CALLED PATTERN FOR WORLD

## Davila Tells the Pan-American Society in Boston Peace Lies in Perfecting Plan

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

BOSTON, April 11.—The collective security and international organization of the world for a stable peace will depend to a great extent upon how far nations of other continents are willing to go in accepting, advancing and perfecting the pattern already established in the American Continents, Dr. Carlos G. Davila, former President of Chile, declared here today.

He spoke at a conference on Pan-American affairs sponsored by the Pan-American Society of Massachusetts and Northern New England, Inc., at which leading industrial, business, financial, educational and health leaders urged increased attention to Latin-American countries.

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of American Republic Affairs for the Department of State, spoke tonight at a dinner of the Pan-American Society of Massachusetts and Northern New England at the Hotel Statler in Boston.

### Better Justice Is Urged

Dr. Davila, who was Chilean Ambassador to this country from 1927 to 1931, said the two major weaknesses of the pattern laid down in this continent were lack of a code of international justice and an international court of justice. These considerations, he said, prompted the Latin-American representatives at the recent Mexico City conference to call for a more precise definition of the principles and the aims of an organization resulting from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The Latin-American inquiries are to be brought up at the San Francisco conference, which opens two weeks from today.

He described the good-neighbor policy as a "state of mind like democracy" and said that it was also a good business policy for the United States. He pointed out the United States had increased its purchases during the last three years by 142 per cent and its sales by 20 per cent.

### Quick Profits Opposed

Curtis E. Calder of New York, chairman of the Electric Bond and Share Company, warning that the industrialization of Latin-America would take a long time, declared that our neighbors would not welcome "a new influx of speculative capital in search of quick profits nor a deluge of non-productive Government loans." They know, he said, that these would "only add to their remittance problems in times of economic stress and exchange shortages."

William K. Jackson, vice president of the United Fruit Company and president of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, told a panel discussion on transportation that "under the existing policy of our Government, it has become a serious question whether any United States company can afford to build and operate passenger vessels in the Latin-American service."

This leaves the road open, he said, for the operation of foreign-flag passenger vessels, with all the damage which this will cause to United States-flag cargo vessels and to business interests of the United States in that area.

David E. Grant of New York, general counsel for Pan American Airways, predicted a thorough integration of surface and air carriers, "so that, far from being rivals, the surface and air carriers will be complementary, one to the other."

Mr. Rockefeller told the Pan-American Society:

"There is no conflict in principle or purpose between the Act of Chapultepec and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for a World Security system. The delegates (at Mexico City) all recognized that we must have world peace and security, first of all, if the Americas are to be secure from attack. The inter-American system and the World Organization have exactly the same objectives—world peace and security."

"The American republics at Mexico City held that the aspiration of universality is the ideal toward which world organization should tend. The delegates held that questions of an inter-American character could preferably be solved in accordance with inter-American methods and procedures but in harmony with those of the general international organization."

DC - 1 *miss. Conf.*

**Wiederholung**

## WELLES ENVISIONS AMERICAS' CENTURY

### But Liberal Policy of Economic Cooperation With Neighbors Is Vital, He Warns

A liberal policy of economic cooperation with our American neighbors by the United States Government, supported by private initiative within this country, can make the coming 100 years "the Century of the Americas," Sumner Welles, former Under-Secretary of State, said last night at a meeting in the New York Times Hall, 240 West Forty-fourth Street.

Mr. Welles, Galo Plaza Lasso, Ambassador of Ecuador to the United States, and Guillermo Belt, the Cuban Ambassador, spoke at a meeting on the topic "Chapultepec and After," under the sponsorship of THE NEW YORK TIMES, in cooperation with the National Council of Women. Mrs. Rita Halle Kleeman of the council opened the meeting.

Senor Galo Plaza said that the meeting at Chapultepec had gone far in determining the principles and setting up the structure that should guide the destinies of the countries in the Americas but that the next step would be put those principles to work. He said that there should be more exchange scholarships and exchanges of teachers among the American nations to increase their knowledge of one another.

Senor Belt declared that the entire democratic world profoundly desired that American principles should prevail at the San Francisco Conference. He said that the Act of Chapultepec should be the pattern for the agreement to be reached there to guarantee peace and security for the entire world. He said he was confident that young America would not betray the hopes of the nations of Europe.

#### Welcomes Argentina's Action

Mr. Welles, replying to a question from the floor about Argentina, said that he was very glad indeed that that country was once more back in the fold of the American nations. He attributed that result to the fact that the other Latin-American nations took the leadership effectively into their own hands at the conference in Mexico.

Asserting that Washington's previous policy had seemed to the Argentine people to be an unwarranted interference in their domestic concerns, Mr. Welles said it had served to create a popular backing for a dictatorial government.

Asked what help the United States could provide in developing the economies of the Latin-American countries, Mr. Welles said that the United States Government would have to bear a share in the post-war years. He said that the Export-Import Bank had demonstrated that it was non-political and that its dealings had not resulted in loss. He added that private capital would also have to do its share, but that it should not expect greater profits in Latin America than at home and that it should be associated with Latin-American capital.

Senor Belt said that he felt it was very important that American capital should be associated on an equal basis with Latin-American capital, as the only way of avoiding future misunderstanding and trouble.

Senor Galo Plaza said that the economic resolution adopted at the conference in Mexico offered many Latin-American countries, particularly those on the Pacific coast of South America which had geared their economies almost completely to our war program, their only hope for avoiding an acute depression that would set them back many years. He ex-

plained that it called for the continued buying, in reduced amounts, of materials used by the United States in the war.

Mr. Welles said that implementation of the Good Neighbor policy fell into two general realms, the political and the economic. He said that the American republics already had fashioned a practical system for collective security and an effective mechanism for the pacific adjustment of disputes that might arise between them.

"From the standpoint of the safety and future well-being of the Americas," he said, "it is my earnest hope, when the World Organization is created, that the regional system of the Americas will be one of the cornerstones upon which it is founded, and that it will be determined that this regional system of twenty-one sovereign and independent States shall continue, under the aegis of the International Organization, to preserve the peace and to further the progress of the peoples of the New World."

The opportunity for progress in the economic and financial field is unlimited, Mr. Welles, said, but he warned that little or no true progress would be made until a practical method was afforded for materially increasing the standard of living of the masses of the people of the Americas.

He said that this must depend upon three indispensable requisites: The development of the natural resources of the American republics for the best advantage of the peoples to whom they belong; the creation of ample communications within and between the various American countries, and the rapid industrialization of every one of the other American republics.

### Belt Commands Unity

Senor Belt said that those who believed that the nations of America would present a closed and isolated block at the San Francisco conference, defending their own regional interests with intransigence, were wrong.

"But we can foresee and assume that they will defend as a single and perfectly united spirit the conservation and continuation of a democratic policy, of the generous inter-American system, and the adoption and maintenance of this last within the world organization which will be approved definitely for the defense of the moral and material values of humanity," he said.

He declared that the democratic and liberal manner in which the discussions of the conference of Mexico were conducted should serve as an example to the world, and that the Act of Chapultepec, which now has a temporary character, should be made permanent and serve as the basis for a worldwide agreement. He emphasized that the Act of Chapultepec declared all sovereign states to be juridically equal.

Senor Galo Plaza said that the doctrine of Pan-Americanism was

based on understanding, confidence and the realization that its peoples have a common destiny. But he reminded his hearers that before the various nations could go very far together they must know one another. The only way to achieve this knowledge, he said, was through the slow and fundamental method of education.

Propaganda does not bring lasting results, he said, but the sale of what he described as the greatest commodity this country has to offer, the American way of life, through education, is the only way to bring the various countries of the hemisphere to a greater understanding of one another.

DC-1      mi. Gf -      13

# Security Vote Pact Is Not Final, Says Stettinius

His Faith That Parley  
At San Francisco  
Will Succeed Is Not  
Shaken, He Declares

By Ben M. Gilbert  
Emphasizing that the question of multiple voting by the Soviet Union and the United States in the proposed United Nations assembly was still open as far as the forthcoming San Francisco conference is concerned, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. yesterday assured reporters that developments have not lessened his confidence that a successful world organization will be developed at the parley.

Just returned from a brief vacation, Stettinius faced a barrage of questions from aggrieved newsmen who wanted to know why the Yalta decision of the "Big Three" to request the San Francisco conference to grant three assembly seats to both Russia and the United States had been kept secret for 47 days.

Stettinius had no answer to these questions as reporters read them off but promised to make a fuller statement at a subsequent press conference. He admitted that nothing has transpired to alter the policy of the State Department to give the American people all possible information about American foreign policy.

The manner in which the questions were parried left the impression that other important decisions relating to the Golden Gate conference are still to be disclosed officially.

For instance, Stettinius refused to state what voting arrangements would prevail at the conference. A week ago, in answer to news questions, the State Department provided flat assurances that each nation would have only one vote at the parley, although the kind of majority needed to make decisions was still to be decided.

**Silent on Other Notification**  
Stettinius also declined to state whether other officials of the State Department handling questions affecting the forthcoming parley.

See SECURITY Page 4, Column 6

## Senate Leaders Strive to Avert Yalta Pact Rift

SENATE LEADERS STRIVE TO AVERT YALTA PACT RIFT

See SENATE, Page 6, Column 1

## SENATE

From Page 1

gate, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R., Mich.) slapped again at alleged interference with "the sovereign equality of nations."

**Deal Held "Unthinkable"**

The White House disclosed agreement that Russia and the United States will ask for three votes each in the United Nations assembly brought this three-speech cross-section in the earlier brief flurry of Senate debate:

1. Senator Chapman B. Weaver (R., W. Va.)—"No such plan can be accepted. This Nation today is the strongest in military and naval might . . . And yet it is proposed that an inferior (to Britain's six votes) voting place in a world organization be given to America. Such a plan is unthinkable . . ."

2. Senator Olin D. Johnston (D., S. C.) "2—and 2 believe—other members of the Senate want us to have just as much representation in any world plan as possible, but regardless of how much the representation shall be, I for one intend to vote that the United States enter into some kind of cooperation between the various nations in an attempt to prevent another war."

3. Senator Alexander Wiley (R., Wis.)—"I am sure these differences can be harmonized. It is America's job to bring the world together on some cooperative basis . . . If, at San Francisco, the President's ration, which was apparently agreed upon by Stalin, Churchill and himself, is found to be satisfactory, I can't see any great danger in it."

**Ball Shows Concern**

Other Senators showed no disposition to join in the debate but commented freely off the floor. Senator Joseph H. Ball (R., Minn.), a leader in the B-2 H-2 movement for a strongly democratic world organization, failed to conceal his discouragement.

"I consider it a gratuitous slap at the small nations," said Ball. "It doesn't make very good sense to me for the big Allied powers to be so concerned over voting powers in the assembly."

Senators Barkley and Hill, both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, took the view that voting strength in the assembly shouldn't be magnified as an issue. Said Barkley: "This has no effect on the Security Council, which is the part of the organization which has power to make assembly." Hill also stressed that "the power really lies in the executive council."

Across the Capitol, Chairman Sol Bloom (D., N. Y.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a House delegate to the world conference, termed the dispute "a tempest in a teapot." Bloom contended the multiple-voting plan is "merely a proposal, which may or may not come up at San Francisco, and in no sense a binding agreement."

**Bloom Explains Statement**

Bloom said he had been "misquoted" as saying that if Britain had six votes, the United States ought to have six.

"What I said was that if Soviet Russia get three votes, we ought to have three," he told newsmen. "Whatever Russia gets, I think we should have."

In one informed quarter it was said the multiple-voting decision was explained to the American delegation by the President at a White House conference last week, but Bloom said "I was there and I didn't hear it."

In one quarter it was said Vandenberg during yesterday's delegation conference expressed his objections freely to any change in the "sovereign equality" principle in assembly voting. There was also some discussion of Russia's decision to send Ambassador Gromyko as head of the Soviet delegation to the San Francisco Conference instead of Foreign Commissar Molotov, a lower rank substitution that has caused concern in some Senate quarters.

DC-1 mic. Corp.

14

# Case Against Security Talks Delay

Stettinius Making Public Two Reasons Is Backed  
by Officials in Washington Who Offer Five More

By ARTHUR KROCK

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 3—Two reasons were cited publicly today by the Secretary of State E. R. Stettinius Jr. for proceeding with the San Francisco conference of the United Nations on the date that has been set—April 25. These reasons were: (1) the accelerating tempo of military and political events, instead of suggesting delay in planning post-war security, counsels proceedings on schedule; and (2) no other government has indicated a wish for postponement.

But there are other reasons, not mentioned by Mr. Stettinius, which are being privately advanced against postponement by administration officials and which, if they are not echoes of the President's own views, are also believed to be persuasive with him. These arguments, of course, take into account the fact that, prior to the San Francisco meeting, a further effort will be made by representatives of the chief anti-Axis military nations, assembled in Washington, to reduce to a minimum international differences of opinion of how to deal with at least one subject on the agenda—mandated, enemy and colonial territory. But, even if these anterior conferences achieve no reduction, or—taking up more issues—accentuate the differences, the officials who offer the additional reasons believe they remain effective.

## Views Voiced by Officials

As stated to this correspondent today they are:

1. It was always unlikely that the problems inherent in setting up a post-war system of world security would be resolved for all the United Nations in any charter. And, if the unlikely had been achieved at Dumbarton Oaks, or is accomplished (so far as the larger

nations are concerned) at the Washington meetings prior to San Francisco, it is still possible that sudden new developments of the war may produce other differences.

As was once said of restoring specie payments, "the way to resume is to resume," and the applicable paraphrase is, "the way to begin is to begin." Any effort is progress toward the great objective; any accord is more progress; and to know all the details of the points in dispute is progress, too.

2. The various shifts and new demands of Soviet Russia are disturbing and disappointing. But to make these the basis of postponing the first concerted attempt of the United Nations to write a post-war charter of world security would be a counsel of perfectionism that amounts to defeatism; an act of timidity at the outset of a great enterprise unworthy of the sacrifices and objectives of the two world wars.

New difficulties may arise with Soviet Russia between now and April 25, perhaps at the Washington meetings. It is conceivable that Soviet Russia may withdraw from the San Francisco conference on the ground that the field of constructive expectancy is too limited.

But, even should these depressing developments come, the conference should begin its effort as planned.

3. The civilized world has sought for hundreds of years to eliminate war or make it infrequent by abolishing the causes, cutting them to an irreducible minimum and providing international machinery to accomplish those ends. The last great attempt failed in the first two decades of this century for reasons which are fairly clear and against the repetition of which

every possible provision has been made.

If the goal is not attained in two tries—Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco—that is a tiny period to measure against the long, bloody and fruitless past, and supplies no basis for discouragement. If the United Nations must recess and reassemble several times before they work out a post-war security plan, that is a small price to pay in time for what the world has aspired to for centuries.

## Tie With Britain Stressed

4. The immediate objectives are to obtain as much agreement at San Francisco as can now be obtained, and to build as broad a foundation of concerted views between the United States and Great Britain as can be built.

5. Whatever course Soviet Russia may follow in the immediate future, its national interest requires eventual adhesion to any world security system set up by the other United Nations. This ultimate result may be counted on confidently.

In the meantime, hope, resolve and the clear benefits and necessities of accord provide satisfactory cushions against any recent or interim differences and disappointments.

These five arguments are a composite of statements made to this correspondent by very high officials who have been laboring in the international security field for many years. They undoubtedly are as authoritative as the two reasons against postponement which Mr. Stettinius, handling himself very well in most difficult circumstances, gave against postponement at his press conference today.

DC-1 misc. Conf -

15

# Conference Question

By Barnet Nover

W.P.O. Post 4-5-45

## The Danger Of Postponement

IT MUST be admitted that there is a plausible ring to the arguments that have been advanced in favor of the postponement of the San Francisco Conference.

First, it is evident that the diplomatic preparations for the conference are anything but complete and between now and April 25 there is insufficient time to complete those preparations.

Second, there is an obvious lack of harmony among the Big Three which was deemed essential if the San Francisco meeting was to run smoothly. The two months that have elapsed since Yalta have revealed a shocking and dangerous lack of harmony between Russia, on the one hand, and Great Britain and the United States, on the other. Proof of this is to be found in the arbitrary manner in which, despite the Yalta agreement, the Kremlin has continued to deal with the Polish problem.

Third, there is a very real possibility that the meeting at San Francisco will coincide with the end of the war in Europe. This, it is argued, will demand the presence at their home capitals of Foreign Ministers who have been named to head delegations at the Golden Gate conference.

Fourth, the argument has been advanced that the shabby and stupid Anglo-Russian-American deal on Assembly seats has made real agreement at San Francisco difficult if not impossible.

THESE ARGUMENTS all have their points. They make it clear that there will be no easy sailing at San Francisco.

Nonetheless, the President and the Department of State are entirely justified in their insistence that the conference be held as scheduled and that, in fact, "the rapid tempo of military and political developments, far from requiring postponement of the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, makes it increasingly necessary that the plans for this organization worked out at Dumbarton Oaks be carried on promptly."

THE NEARER we get to the conclusion of the war in Europe, the more passions and differences held in check during the long years when the Allies were fighting a common enemy will tend to come to the fore.

We cannot assume that these differences will automatically disappear once a United Nations organization is set up. But once such an organization is created,

the world will at least be provided with the means by which these differences can be settled peacefully.

Indeed, the very fact that agreement among the Big Three, despite Moscow, Tehran, Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, is far from complete, opens the door to a great opportunity for the San Francisco conferees.

There was a danger that the role of the San Francisco Conference, as envisaged by the Big Three, was to ratify what had already been agreed upon, the duty of the delegates being not to reason why, but to sign on the dotted line.

THE LESSON of Chapultepec is, in this particular, very revealing.

At Mexico City we made no attempt openly or covertly to control the deliberations at the inter-American parley, where the other republics, great and small, were in a position to and did exercise their right to voice their views freely. The net outcome was not disharmony, but agreement; not failure, but success.

By the same token, the freer the San Francisco Conference will be, the more effective are likely to be its results, the more readily will the agreement reached there prove acceptable to the generality of mankind.

IN THE MILITARY sphere, big power domination is inevitable and unavoidable.

In the political sphere the great powers can dominate only if they are united and only if they demonstrate the capacity to exercise moral as well as physical leadership.

That unity and that moral leadership they have thus far failed to manifest. Yalta with its sickening compromises and its secret deals, proves that to the hilt. But to wait until those who have the power to rule learn the art of agreement may mean having to wait too long. Time does not stand still.

The question arises whether, in view of the American about-face on the Assembly vote issue and the Anglo-American rejection of Russia's demand that Lublin be given a seat, Russia may not withdraw from the conference.

In view of the attitude taken by Prayda that the San Francisco meeting is being held "at the right time from every point of view," the possibility of Russian abstention can be discounted. But, in any case, Russian refusal to participate unless all the cards are stacked in her favor is a risk that has to be taken.



## BIDS SENATE LEAD IN PREVENTING WAR

**Fulbright, in First Formal Talk,  
Challenges Body to Use Its  
Power in Foreign Affairs**

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 28—Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat, of Arkansas, in his first formal address to the Senate today challenged it to take a positive position on how to prevent future wars or "if it feels itself inadequate to this task" to let the House share in helping it to make up its mind.

Mr. Fulbright modified what some persons interpreted as an accusation of incompetency against the Senate by denying that it was solely responsible for failure to offer a positive alternative to the League of Nations as a peace-keeping agency after the last war. The American people at that time, he said, not realizing how the world had shrunk, felt generally incompetent to approve any positive plan and the Senate merely reflected that feeling.

Mr. Fulbright argued that the country could not afford to entrust the formulation of foreign policy solely to "a few polished and cultured gentlemen in the dark and dignified recesses of the State Department."

It was natural, he said, for these State Department officials, even with the recent infusion of new blood, "to be conservative and reluctant to commit our people to any change in the status quo or to the assumption of any new responsibilities."

### Cites Mexico City Conference

But the presence of and the positions taken at the recent Mexico City conference by two Senators, Messrs. Connally, Democrat, of Texas, and Austin, Republican, of Vermont, showed, he said, that the Senate could exercise its constitutional powers of advice and consent to the President in treaty-making matters.

In adding "backbone and courage" to the decisions made by American representatives at this conference, he added, these Senators proved that diplomacy "is not merely a game of chess to be played by skillful maneuvers and double talk."

"They knew," he said, "that the very lives of their people are involved and were not afraid to take risks to protect them."

This was one of the few occasions in the country's history, he added, when the constitutional provision for Senate "advise as well as consent" on treaty making

Following the principle, he continued, the Senate should proceed very soon to exercise the same authority in advising the Administration how it feels about "the great decisions" which must soon be made.

### Scores 'Myths' About Americans

Such discussion, he held, should clear up "a common belief, perhaps a myth," that the American people are anti-British, anti-Russian and anti-Jewish, and feel that American statesmen always lose out to superior cleverness of foreigners in any international agreements.

Certain interests and newspapers are continuously promoting these "myths" and "narrow prejudices," he said.

Earlier dissemination of such "myths," he asserted, were largely responsible for the failure of the Senate to approve the League of Nations and for current assertions that the Senate could not be relied upon to support future efforts for world security.

Another "myth," he said, was that "America is being asked to join a world peace-keeping program merely out of charity."

"If there is any reason for doing this," he said, "it is for our national self-interest. We have more to lose from chaos and more to gain from the pursuits of peace than any other people."

**Need red points? Save waste fat.  
It's worth red points when turned  
in to your butcher.**

STAGE

DC -/ Misc. Cont -

# Washington Calling

By Marquis Childs

## Postpone Security Conference

IF IT WERE NOT obvious before, it is now perfectly clear that the San Francisco conference must be postponed. I say that knowing very well how extensive are the preparations already made for that conclave of statesmen.

It would have been difficult under any circumstances to reach an agreement short of weeks of debate.

That debate would probably have occurred just as the war reached its climactic end.

Now with unhappy ineptitude comes the disclosure that Russia and the United States intend to ask for three votes each in the United Nations Assembly. They agreed to that secretly at Yalta.

This decision by Stalin and Roosevelt multiplies all the objections raised against the Dumbarton Oaks proposal by the smaller powers. It seemed that they were being asked merely to ratify the decisions of the Big Four who would control the Security Council. That is what Foreign Minister Elco Van Kleffens of the Dutch government in London said more or less openly in his memorandum on the San Francisco conference.

But with three votes each, Russia and the United States could swing all decisions on drafting committees and on the special commissions to be created. I have talked with several diplomats from the smaller powers who express frank dismay at this latest turn of events.

BEFORE THE disclosure of the secret voting agreement at Yalta, members of delegations from the secondary powers talked of a minimum of six weeks at San Francisco and a maximum of eight weeks or longer. That would almost certainly make the conference coincide with the end of organized resistance in Germany.

What would happen then? Foreign Minister Anthony Eden would have to go back to London. So would Bidault of France, Spaak of Belgium, Van Kleffens of Holland and all the other chairmen of delegations. They simply could not be out of Europe with decisions being taken that will shape the future for decades to come. In fact, they must help to make those decisions.



CHILDS

How long the newest developments might be expected to prolong the debate no one can say. But certainly it will prolong it.

Delegates who will represent the secondary powers at San Francisco have regarded the Dutch memorandum as a rallying point for their own dissatisfaction with the way in which power is concentrated in the Big Four. One of the ambassadors, in an off-the-record talk, put it this way:

"We think the Van Kleffens memorandum went too far. Nevertheless, we intend to stand behind it—to a point. Not, let me say, to a point that would prevent any agreement at all being reached."

That was before the secret voting agreement bombshell was dropped. Today this same ambassador might feel even more strongly about the power tactics of the Big Three.

I have just been in France and I think I know what the secret agreement will mean there. They were deeply offended at not having been asked to participate in the final days of the Yalta Conference when the fate of Germany was discussed. Then, supposedly, they were informed of all the decisions taken at Yalta. Now, according to a dispatch from Paris, Foreign Minister Bidault reads in the newspapers of the secret agreement.

THERE IS STILL another reason for postponement. Russia has announced that her Ambassador to Washington, Andrei Gromyko, will head the Soviet delegation rather than Foreign Minister Molotov or one of the top men around Stalin.

This will almost certainly make for further delay. Whatever one may think of Gromyko's capacities as a diplomat—and his colleagues have high respect for him—he will not be able to say yes or no without consulting Moscow, and that takes time.

A perfectly good reason for postponement is written in the headlines that leap out of every newspaper. You cannot lay out the framework of a new world at the exact moment that the old one is in final collapse.

Put it off until midsummer or even early fall. Then the problems to be confronted will be much clearer. There will not be the same desperate urgency. And perhaps in that interval of time it will be possible to mend the serious damage done to confidence by the news of a secret agreement at Yalta.

# PARLEY TO SUCCEED, STETTINIUS INSISTS

He Tells Press He Has Full  
Confidence as to Result De-  
spite Vote Proposals at Yalta

By **BERTRAM D. HULEN**

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 30—Ed-  
ward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary  
of State, expressed today his com-  
plete confidence in the success of  
the conference of the United Na-  
tions at San Francisco next month  
on world security. This was in  
the face of questions raised by the  
Russian proposal at Yalta to give  
the Soviet Union extra votes in  
the Assembly of the peace organi-  
zation as projected at Dumbarton  
Oaks.

Mr. Stettinius voiced his confi-  
dence at a crowded press confer-  
ence this noon, a few hours after  
he had returned to the State De-  
partment from a brief vacation.

The voting proposal, which led  
to our insistence on an equal num-  
ber of votes, resulted in a bom-  
bardment of questions at the press  
conference and widespread com-  
ment on Capitol Hill. Most of the  
questions went unanswered. While  
Mr. Stettinius refused to discuss  
the voting matter in any detail at  
this time, he stated that the pro-  
posal required adoption by the con-  
ference itself.

He then said nothing had hap-  
pened which had discouraged him  
in any way from believing that  
the San Francisco conference  
would and must be a success.

Asked upon what his confidence  
was based, he replied that it rested  
on his faith that what we went to  
war about was not in vain. Mr.  
Stettinius was asked whether the  
United States was disappointed be-  
cause V. M. Molotoff, Commissar  
for Foreign Affairs, would not  
head the Russian delegation at  
San Francisco. He said in reply  
that this country would welcome  
and work closely with any delega-  
tion from the Soviet Union. Its

Continued on Page 12, Column 5

WDC Post  
3-12-45

**Less Than 20 Opposed**

## Senate Would Approve Treaty On Oaks Plan Now, Poll Finds

By Jack Bell  
Associated Press Staff Writer

A quiet checkup has convinced Administration lieutenants that as of today fewer than 20 votes would be cast in the Senate against a world security treaty patterned on Dumbarton Oaks principles.

Avoiding formal polls, Administration supporters have been busy since the Yalta conference sounding out sentiment, particularly among the newer members. They have known pretty well for some time what most of the veterans think about plans for a world league to keep the peace by forceful means, if that method becomes necessary.

Sources which cannot be identified publicly at present say that as the situation now stands it seems doubtful more than a half-dozen Democrats and twice as many minority members can be counted in opposition to the fundamental doctrine laid down at Dumbarton Oaks.

They concede there may be arguments about details, protests about

methods and criticism of personalities. But it is their contention that there presently is sufficient strength to obtain a two-thirds vote of approval for a treaty.

Senate consideration of such a world-shaping document is likely to end with a roll call in which just about every member of the Senate who isn't physically incapacitated at the time will cast his vote. If all 96 participated, opponents would need 33 votes to defeat it.

It is emphasized, however, that the calculation of a maximum of 20 "no" votes is based on present conditions and on the assumption the Dumbarton Oaks agreement will be carried to fruition at the San Francisco security conference without major changes.

Backers of the peace league proposals have not forgotten that the original Senate opposition which defeated American participation in Woodrow Wilson's league of nations was small. But they argue

See TREATY, Page 4, Column 5

## TREATY

From Page 1

that there is one radical difference this time. The Senate will be considering peace measures while there is fighting going on, at least in the Pacific, and not after hostilities have ended.

Those Senators who don't want the United States to join any international organization that could conceivably infringe on this country's right to decide when it shall fight, frankly expect the San Francisco meeting to develop some controversies which will carry over into Senate treaty consideration.

Perhaps the most potent of these lies in the differences that may arise over the roles of small and large nations in the organization. Foreign-rooted minorities loom large in the voting strength of several States.

The Yalta agreement on council voting procedure apparently was favorably received by the majority in the Senate. But its grant of power to the large nations to veto the use of force against any country is likely to be discussed at length.

### Heed Little Nations, U. S. Told

Rochester, N. Y., March 11 (AP).—America "should listen especially to the suggestions of the smaller nations" in making plans for a postwar international organization, Senator Harold H. Burton (R., Ohio) declared today.

Speaking at First Unitarian Church, Burton, moderator of the American Unitarian Association, asserted America must be the "special champion" of the smaller countries "for America is founded upon the principle of equal justice to every person and to every nation."

DC-1 misc. Conf - 18

# REPUBLICANS ASK PREVIEW OF HELP WE PLAN FOR WORLD

**Vandenberg Says This Country  
Cannot Become 'Permanent  
Almoner' After War**

**CALLS FOR NINE LISTINGS**

**Taft Files Amendment to Assure  
Ending of Lend-Lease With  
End of War Needs**

By **WILLIAM S. WHITE**  
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 9—Republicans, led by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, demanded today that the Roosevelt Administration give to Congress now a full statement of the probable total financial post-war commitments of the United States in nine categories, the demand being put forward as the Senate began debate on the bill to extend the Lend-Lease Act for another year.

In a speech in which he mentioned that he was leaving soon for San Francisco as an American delegate to the security conference, Senator Vandenberg declared that all American expenditures for relief and rehabilitation must be from a budget "wholly separate" from lend-lease and thus subject to the pruning and close scrutiny of Congress itself.

Senator Taft, Republican, of Ohio, asked amendment of the bill as passed by the House to strengthen its provision against post-war use of lend-lease in any way.

**Taft Backs Vandenberg**

In offering the amendment he declared his "100 per cent agreement" with Senator Vandenberg's call for an "over-all" statement from the Government concerning what money this country would be likely to feel obliged to advance in helping to restore the world.

Senator Vandenberg stressed that he suggested "no intimation that we shall not do our full part in helping the United Nations to reconstruct a healthy, happy world. But I do suggest," he added, "that we are neither big enough nor rich enough to become permanent almoner to the whole world."

Saying that it was "only elementary prudence for this government to give to Congress an overall survey and summary of what is presently in contemplation," he asked an Administration statement on these nine points:

What funds would be asked for the operations of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; for relief in the areas which UNRRA might not reach; for the "hang-over" of lend-lease; for the Bretton Woods agreements; for expenditures "in the great name of Pan American cooperation"; for participation in "other international organizations"; for the rehabilitation of the Philippines; for the expanded operations of the Export-Import Bank, and for direct post-war credits to the Allies.

**Points to Our Own Burdens**

Senator Vandenberg stated with emphasis several times that he was raising no question of the post-war international obligations of the United States.

"I am only asserting," he said, "that we, too, have desperately difficult American post-war problems of our own to which our resources must be primarily dedicated, that there are limits to the external post-war burdens which our people can carry."

"I favor another extension of the Lend-Lease Act as an indispensable military factor in the triumph of the United Nations upon every fighting front where their irresistible battle banners have been unfurled."

"I favor rigidly confining lend-lease to its statutory character—namely, an instrumentality of war which ceases to function when hostilities have stopped."

"I favor a completely separated

**Continued on Page 8, Column 4**

"ZOYA"—A name you'll never forget.  
Starts SATURDAY—Stanley Trea.—Advt.

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

## REPUBLICANS ASK WORLD AID PLAN

**Continued From Page 1**

budget to handle our post-war relationships with our external battle comrades of today and our peacetime friends of tomorrow.

"I hope for an overall survey of these prospective obligations lest we over-commit our own resources in a haphazard, piecemeal program; lest we thus unwittingly invite insolvency at home and disillusionment abroad."

Senator Taft argued that the House provision in the Lend-Lease Extension Bill against using lend-lease for post-war relief, rehabilitation or reconstruction was "meaningless" because of the qualifications placed in it.

His amendment would stop lend-lease shipments outright with the end of the war, save for those necessary to fulfill contracts now existing for military goods. The House bill would permit a fulfillment not only of existing contracts but of those which might be made through July, 1946.

Senator Langer, Republican, of North Dakota, also indicated his opposition to the bill in its present form, arguing that the export of farm machinery and locomotives should be prohibited.

At the close of the day, Senator Barkley, the majority leader, obtained an agreement to limit debate and the prospect was that a final vote on the bill would come tomorrow.

**Timken Strike End**

DC -1 Misc. Conf - 20



## PARLEY TO SUCCEED, STETTINIUS INSISTS

Continued From Page 1

delegation is to be headed by Andrei A. Gromyko, Russian Ambassador here.

While Mr. Stettinius would not go into details for the present concerning the proposal to give the Soviet Union and the United States three votes each in the Assembly of the peace organization to match, in part, the six of the United Kingdom and British Dominions, whereas other countries would have only one vote, it was indicated in some circles that there were no other secret agreements at Yalta bearing upon Dumbarton Oaks.

Nor did the fact that the voting proposal had been kept secret for forty-seven days after, Mr. Stettinius said, the State Department's policy of giving the American people as much information as possible on foreign affairs at all times.

The newspaper correspondents submitted more than thirty questions concerning the Yalta understanding on voting in the Assembly of the peace organization, but in refusing to answer them at this time Mr. Stettinius expressed a hope that he would be able to give answers next week.

He would not say what the voting strength of countries would be in the San Francisco conference, stating that this was one of the procedural matters still under consideration by the powers sponsoring the conference, that is, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

### Meets With Three Delegates

One reason for his refusal to answer detailed questions on the subject today, he said, was that he was conferring on many of the points with the American delegates. He met with three of them this morning—Senator Tom Connally, Democrat, of Texas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican, of Michigan, and Representative Sol Bloom, Democrat, of New York, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—and said he would meet with more of them in the next few days.

When Senator Vandenberg was asked whether the opposition which he expressed yesterday to giving more than one vote to any country in the Assembly still stood, he replied:

"If I ever take it back, I'll let you know."

Senator Barkley, the majority leader, said:

"All these matters undoubtedly will be worked out at San Francisco."

Senator Wiley, Republican, of Wisconsin, said the voting understanding "may or may not be important." He believed that differences over voting ratios probably could be harmonized.

In a Senate speech Senator Revercomb, Republican, of West Virginia, said that Americans would not accept any plan which gave to their country less strength than

went to "any other nation or empire."

It was a shock for our people, he declared, when they learned today that the British Empire was to have six votes and Russia and the United States only three votes in the World Assembly.

Senator Johnston, Democrat, of South Carolina, replied that the number of votes was "a small thing" and that he would vote for the United States to enter some kind of organization for world cooperation for peace. To this Senator Revercomb retorted that it was not "a small matter" and that he hoped "for some worth-while plan and one not doomed to failure."

### Questions Asked Stettinius

Among the questions asked of, and taken under consideration by, Mr. Stettinius were these:

"Were there any other secret or as yet unrevealed agreements on any other subjects than Dumbarton Oaks made at Yalta?"

"Why did the United States consider it necessary to keep such an agreement secret?"

"Dispatches from London this morning said British officials were surprised at the White House announcement [yesterday], especially the reference to three votes for the United States. Their understanding was that the Yalta secret agreement concerned only three votes for Russia. Can you explain that difference?"

"Were the members of the United States delegation advised of the secret agreement, and, if so, when?"

"If the United States and the U.S.S.R. are to have three votes, wouldn't France and China be justified in asking for more than one?"

"Wouldn't some of the middle powers, like Brazil, the Netherlands, Mexico, etc., be reasonably expected to ask for more votes than El Salvador, Liberia and Saudi Arabia?"

"Were France and China advised of the secret Yalta agreement?"

"Doesn't the agreement nullify Principle No. 1 in Chapter II of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which says that the 'basis' of the organization shall be the sovereign equality of all nations?"

"One of the main arguments against the charge that the Big Three will dominate the new organization has been the equal position of all nations in the Assembly. What will be the new United States 'line' on this point?"

"Some of the Latin-American countries are unions of States like the United States. Would not the Latin-American countries by the

same token be entitled to three votes in the Assembly?"

"In the discussions between the United States and the Latin-American countries the United States assured them that the organization would be built on the principle of equality and sovereignty of all States. Does not this secret agreement negate those American assurances?"

DC-1 Misc. Conf - 19

# Today and Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann *WBC Oct 14-5-45*

## The Charter And Mr. Welles

BEFORE A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION can be formed, as at San Francisco, a clear view is needed about what should go



LIPPMANN

into the organic charter. Mr. Sumner Welles and I are again at odds, this time over that fundamental question. If we can debate it, without implying that the one or the other of us is a nobler fellow than the other,

it may be useful to debate it.

It happens that our differences have come to a head over the question of what the charter should do about colonial affairs. But this is only an aspect of a much larger question which Mr. Welles states as follows: "But the underlying issue raised by Mr. Lippmann is whether the conference at San Francisco should refuse to try to find remedies for conditions which menace the peace of the world merely because they involve what he calls 'complex and explosive' questions." Mr. Welles says that the international organization must grapple "with vital moral issues." I agree. But what I contend for is that the San Francisco Conference cannot and should not try to find "remedies" for all the conditions which menace peace, nor should it grapple with all the vital moral issues. It should create an international organization which is charged with finding the remedies and doing the grappling.

NO PEOPLE has had more experience than we have with making and operating written constitutions. We have learned from it, I believe, that the best constitutions are those which confine themselves to the framework of government and a grant of powers, and do not presume to legislate or fix policy on particular subjects.

Whenever we have departed from this conception of what is the province of a constitution, as for example in the Prohibition Amendment, or in the State constitutions which contain detailed provisions on innumerable subjects, we have regretted it.

mit, a deep fallacy which can only raise false expectations.

The San Francisco Conference will have done much if it creates international organs of consultation and compacts to agree to decide on common action. If it attempts to do more than that, it will be attempting to incorporate contemporary opinions into a charter that is meant to endure. Then it will be saying that the delegates at San Francisco are better able to decide what will be good for mankind than the delegates who will in the years to come attend the General Assembly and the Security Council that they are creating. I do not believe the San Francisco Conference will have that much prophetic wisdom available in the six or eight weeks after April 24.

MR. WELLES is an ardent spokesman of those who hold that the way to promote international morality is to promulgate international codes of morals to which all governments are then invited, on penalty of being branded immoral, to subscribe. I do not believe that this is the best way to promote international morality. It inflates the moral currency and, therefore, impairs its value, its dignity, and its authority. A modest pledge which can be and will be carried out does more to promote morality than grandiose universal pledges that governments cannot observe literally or will not observe faithfully.

We are writing a contract which, we hope, can be and will be carried out. We are drafting articles of association for over 40 nations who do not have a common culture, a common religion, or a common understanding of general ideas. If we can get them to agree to meet, to confer in an orderly and regular way, and to act together in certain matters, we shall have the first beginnings of an ordered world. But if we try to write into these articles of association the moral code which we, in the United States, believe to be universally right, we shall quickly discover that governments and peoples, who think quite as well of themselves as we do of ourselves, do not regard our ideas as universal, or interpret them universally as we do.

AN ORGANIC LAW determines who shall deal with issues that will arise in the future and what are his powers. It should not attempt to tell him what he must decide about these issues. To argue that the San Francisco Conference should try to find remedies for conditions which menace the peace of the world is tantamount to saying that that particular meeting in San Francisco can and should now do the hardest part of the work which the international organization is intended to do. This is, I sub-

THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE of a universal code of international morality is the end we are seeking to attain. It is not the basis from which we start. If it were, if there were a universal code of international morals which all peoples understand and accept, we should not now be founding an international organization. It would long since have been established. The reason for establishing the organization is to create institutions within which the nations with their diverse moral codes may by continual contact evolve a common code.

# Conference Challenge

By Sumner Welles *WDC Post*  
4-4-45

## Must Assert Moral Responsibility

In his column of March 20, entitled "Pandora's Box," Mr. Walter Lippmann offers us a challenging thesis.

He tells us that the United Nations meeting at San Francisco "should not introduce into the Dumbarton Oaks Charter legislation on colonial affairs, but should regard it strictly as a constitution which grants to the United Nations limited power to create organs of consultation."

He warns us against what he terms "the grandiose ambiguities of the Atlantic Charter."

He gives what, to him, are "compelling reasons" for believing that "the San Francisco conference should not try to settle and solve, or give the world the impression it would like to settle and solve, the colonial questions of this earth."

I doubt that opinion in this country, and especially that of the armed services, will be satisfied with the establishment of an international organization which has no more than "limited power to create organs of consultation." If I estimate public opinion accurately, the majority of men and women in the United States are demanding the creation of a United Nations organization which can act—to enforce peace, and to find the means of achieving economic and social security.

Nor have I any reason to think that the millions of men and women to whom the Atlantic Charter has been the one clear beacon light of international morality during these dark years are going to regard its provisions as "grandiose ambiguities."

BUT THE UNDERLYING issue raised by Mr. Lippmann is whether the conference at San Francisco should refuse to try to find remedies for conditions which menace the peace of the world merely because they involve what he calls "complex and explosive questions."

garded as a colonial dependency of the United States. Its juridical sovereign is the Republic of Panama.

AMONG THE DEPENDENT areas under the jurisdiction of the United States, Puerto Rico presents the only instance where there have been heard some voices asking for independence. Full autonomy has already been granted to the citizens of Puerto Rico. Should a majority of the people of the island actually vote for political and economic independence from the United States, public opinion here would unquestionably insist that that demand be satisfied.

But in the case of the peoples of Hawaii, of Alaska and of the Virgin Islands there has been heard no call for independence.

Mr. Lippmann insists that it would be neither feasible nor wise to make any present colonial power accountable to an international organization. He says, "It is not in the cards to make the Governor of Alaska, or the Governor General of Bermuda, or the Governor of Tunis, legally answerable to an assembly in which Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Liberia, Ethiopia, Dominica, Haiti sit as sovereign judges. It would be a mistake to try."

By Dominica, Mr. Lippmann undoubtedly has in mind the "Dominican Republic," for the island of Dominica is a British colony, and not entitled to a seat in an assembly of sovereign powers.

The majority of these smaller powers mentioned by Mr. Lippmann are inhabited by nationals of the so-called "colored races."

I can see no reason why that fact should make their representatives in a world body any the less eligible to serve as guardians of the interest of dependent peoples.

There has of course been no suggestion from any responsible quarter that the international organization should undertake directly to govern territories now under the jurisdiction of the colonial powers among the United Nations. It has, on the contrary, been proposed that these colonial powers admit responsibility to an international trusteeship for their own administration of these territories. And those same great powers would necessarily be represented in such a trustee-

I have previously made clear my conviction that no international organization will be able to establish world conditions which make for peace, if it does not give dependent peoples who are determined to obtain self-government, and who are found capable of self-government, the assurance that they can obtain that right.

Mr. Lippmann maintains that the United States, in approaching any general solution of the colonial question, should consider its own problems as a colonial power. He declares that the grant of immediate independence to the Philippine Islands cannot serve as a model for such a solution. He feels that the American people have no intention necessarily of using that solution in the case of Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal Zone, or the Virgin Islands. These regions, in his opinion, might perhaps preferably be brought into the Federal Union as new states.

In the case of the Panama Canal Zone, Mr. Lippmann has, of course, forgotten that the United States is not the sovereign of this territory. By the basic treaty between the Republic of Panama and the United States, this country is granted "the use, occupation and control" of the zone, for the construction, operation and protection of the canal, but it is specifically provided that the authority of the United States within the zone shall be the same as that which it could exercise "if it were the sovereign." The Canal Zone consequently cannot properly be re-

ship.

Finally Mr. Lippmann asserts that nothing can intelligently be done with regard to colonial peoples until the major powers negotiate security pacts, and determine what shall be done with regard to security bases.

MR. LIPPMANN seems to me here to confuse two wholly distinct issues.

Bases required for international security purposes will rarely include within their boundaries more than a few thousand inhabitants. The welfare of these inhabitants is a matter that can be regulated with proper regard for their best interests when international security pacts are consummated.

But this very limited aspect of the general problem of international security has no bearing whatever upon the question whether an international organization should, in the interest of world peace and of world stability, assist hundreds of millions of presently "subservient" peoples to enjoy that measure of self-government for which it believes them to be ready.

If the international organization to come refrains from grappling with vital moral issues whenever they appear "complex and explosive," it will not long survive. That is one of the chief reasons why the League of Nations failed. The new organization must surely be more than a pallid consultative board. It must act with the authority which can only spring from justice and right, backed by power. By no other means can it become the "way of salvation."

DC-1

Misc. Cont

21

WASH. POST 12-5-45

# Peace Hinges On Economic Unity, Says Stettinius

## Tells Nation It Must Cooperate in Trade Program or Expect Security Plan to Fail

By Ben W. Gilbert

Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, jr., yesterday told the Nation that the world organization to be set up at San Francisco will not succeed unless this country and the rest of the United Nations couple it with cooperation in a sweeping program of economic reconstruction and expansion now being formulated.

Speaking from Chicago in a broadcast address, Stettinius said that failure to carry through on any sector of this economic "peace front" involving lowered trade barriers, international credit machinery, monetary stabilization, commodity agreements, relief and rehabilitation, control of cartels and other measures would threaten our chance to assure "a secure peace and a decent life for all Americans."

Stettinius declared the American Government "is at this moment engaged in very active efforts to resolve political difficulties which have arisen in connection with the Golden Gate parley."

"I have full confidence," he said, "that we shall resolve these difficulties—and others of this nature that will inevitably arise as we approach the end of the war."

Stettinius said he was not prepared to elaborate on these difficulties, which include Russia's plan to ask for seats in the proposed world organization for the Ukrainian and White Russian Soviet republics, inability to evolve a unified Polish government which can sit at San Francisco, and objections to the Dumbarton Oaks draft for the proposed world organization raised by the provisional government of France, among others.

He then turned to the economic front—perhaps by way of reassurance to the Russians and others who appeared concerned that the United States was placing too much stress on the proposed political organization to be worked out at the conference at the expense of economic measures which may be more important in the long pull.

He asserted that this country will have to export almost 10 billion dollars worth of goods annually if the Administration goal of providing 60 million jobs is to be approached, compared to half that amount in the best prewar years, and suggested that our tariff barriers would have to be lowered to prevent other countries from taking reprisals against our exports.

### World Trade Parley Planned

The United States, he disclosed, will do all in "our power" to convene a conference of the principal trading nations of the world in the next year to deal with expansion of world trade, cartels and other problems.

The proposed conference "would also prepare the way for establishment of a permanent trade organization within the framework of the world organization, to deal with

See SECURITY, Page 4, Column 5

## SECURITY

From Page 1

these problems on a continuing basis," Stettinius said.

"The United States Government," he said, "has a well-rounded and carefully prepared program to achieve the results we seek in our foreign economic relations. We have been working actively on this program right through the war, and developing it step by step in consultation with our Allies, and with the Congress and the people of the United States and preparing to put it into effect."

### Traces Development

He listed these steps in the program: Atlantic Charter, United Nations declaration, Moscow, Tehran and Crimean conferences of the Big Three, Dumbarton Oaks, UNRRA, Hot Springs, food and agriculture conference, Bretton Woods monetary conference, Chicago aviation conference, and the inter-American parley at Mexico City.

"The close cooperation of the United Nations in a program for economic reconstruction and expansion such as I have outlined," he said, "is fundamental to the success of the world organization. Without it, the world will be able neither to recover from the effects of this war nor to prevent the next war."

"There are many pitfalls ahead of us. So closely is each part of the program interlocked with the other parts that if we fail to carry through an important sector of this peace front, the whole program and our over-all objective will be placed in gravest jeopardy."

But he did not minimize the importance of Frisco.

"The United Nations conference at San Francisco later this month will mark a critical turning point in the history of the United States and of the world," he said.

### Plans Going Ahead

Asserting that plans for the conference were going right ahead, he said:

"I ask you to remember: First, that the United Nations have repeatedly overcome other difficul-

ties and dangers far more serious in the past three years; second, that the vital national interests of the United States and of each of our Allies are bound up in maintaining and cementing in the peace our wartime partnership; third, that the extent of our agreement is far wider and more fundamental than the extent of our differences."

For the future, he asserted that "short-sighted economic nationalism" would prevent world recovery and destroy the markets needed to avert unemployment and depression.

On cartels: "The evil effects of international cartels can be prevented only by supplementing national by international action against them, and by taking the other measures which I have outlined to insure that all nations will be able to live better without such practices than with them."

### Canada Stiffly Opposed

#### 'Multiple Vote,' Report

Ottawa, April 4 (U.P.).—Observers said today that Canada had objected strongly to any claim by the United States for multiple voting rights at the San Francisco security conference.

While the Canadian government was said to have sent no formal protest to the United States on her claim to three votes, there was speculation in government circles

today as to how much weight the Canadian objections carried. There was also speculation that Canada might have supported proposals to postpone the conference had not Washington renounced any claim to extra votes.

Government officials were reported elated over President Roosevelt's decision to seek only one vote for the United States, but still critical of Russia's claim to three votes.

### Negotiations on Poland Reported Near Deadlock

By Flora Lewis

Associated Press Staff Writer

Signs appeared last night that the Russian-British-American negotiations at Moscow on the subject of revamping the Polish government are approaching a deadlock which the United States may move to break.

This situation developed even as Secretary of State Stettinius expressed confidence that "a fair solution will be reached."

The three-power talks started almost immediately after the Crimea conference in February. No accomplishment has been reported.

Representatives of the three countries cannot agree on which Poles should come to Moscow to discuss formulation of a new, unified government for Poland.

Diplomats involved are getting

impatient, and the hush-hush talks may break open in a few days.

### Replies to Taft

Stettinius made his statement in a letter to Senator Taft (R., Ohio).

Taft has written the Secretary urging that the U. S. "refuse approval to any provisional government which is predominately under the influence of the Russian government or is not proportionately representative of the Polish people."

He suggested the treatment accorded underground fighters in Poland and Polish troops fighting with the Western Allies as a test of a new government.

"It would be a tragic error for the United States to recognize any government," Taft said, "under whose rule the existing Polish armies would be unable or afraid to return to Poland."

Stettinius said in his reply that "progress (in the Moscow talks) has not been as rapid as we had hoped for but I am still confident that a fair solution will be reached."

# WORLD'S HOPE PUT IN TALKS ON PEACE

Parleys on Future Begun at  
Dumbarton Oaks Mark True  
Democracy, Stettinius Says

## YALTA PROPOSALS HAILED

Acheson and MacLeish, Also  
on Radio, Join in Hopeful  
Prediction of Unity

By BERTRAM D. HULEN  
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 24—The projected world security organization begun at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, now being considered at the Inter-American Conference in Mexico City, and to be completed at the San Francisco Conference in April, was held up as a true world democracy for peace by Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Secretary of State, in a broadcast from Mexico City tonight over the facilities of the National Broadcasting System.

Mr. Stettinius was the first speaker in a program of seven Saturday night broadcasts begun tonight and which is being conducted by the State Department on the problems of "Building the Peace."

The others on the program tonight were Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Congressional Relations and International Conferences, and Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Public and Cultural Relations. They spoke from Washington and discussed in dialogue our foreign policy and the Crimea Conference.

### Speaks With Assurance

Mr. Stettinius spoke with what seemed every assurance of the success of the world project for peace, declaring that America out of her great past was "accustomed to labors without precedent" and knew how "to do what was never done before."

"We have good reason, therefore," he said, "for approaching the greatest labor of human history with such high hopes, with such unshakable determination. We have not listened in the past, and we will not listen in the future, to voices of frustration and defeat which tell us that we cannot do what we believe we must do."

He described the formula on voting procedure for the council proposed in the Dumbarton plan for peace and on other agreements at Yalta bearing on world-organization proposals as "one of the great accomplishments of the Crimea Conference."

### Hails Parleys as Successes

He gave high praise to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference as well as to the Crimea Conference and the meeting now taking place in Mexico City, and said:

"Once the world organization is established and measures for social and economic welfare are undertaken, the true democracy of the organization of the world for peace will become apparent."

Assistant Secretaries Acheson and MacLeish praised the Crimean meeting highly, especially for its program for dealing with Germany and in its "paving the way for democratic governments in Poland, Greece and other liberated countries."

They described our foreign policy as one directed to world organization for the preservation of peace and said one of the fundamental purposes "is to keep the way open for the democratic future in which this nation believes."

### "We Have a Foreign Policy"

To the question asked by Mr. MacLeish, "Have we got a foreign policy?" Mr. Acheson replied in the affirmative, and went on to say that it was a policy based on organized international cooperation. It was to be found, he stated, in a set of general objectives which reflected the basic beliefs of the American people.

The basic objectives, he said, were to achieve peace and security while keeping the way open "for the democratic future."

The United States, Mr. Acheson said, lived "right smack in the middle" of some fifty independent countries, and, "as history has proved, every first-class war sooner or later comes to us."

"We can't keep out of it and be the kind of people we are," he added.

American foreign policy, Mr. Acheson contended, must be directed "either toward organized international cooperation or toward aggressive imperialistic militarism."

"Our choice," he declared, "is to base our foreign policy on organized international cooperation."

"We want a world that is free from bullies going around and beating people up and taking things away from them, or making them do what they want them to do. And we want a world that is open to a busy, energetic life. Our foreign policy is to make that kind of a world."

When Mr. MacLeish asked "How

do we get where we want to go from where we are?" Mr. Acheson replied:

"The great majority of Americans want to join as soon as possible a world organization to preserve the peace."

"We have learned," he said, "that we can't get by with substitutes and devices, such as we tried in the years between the wars."

Both Mr. MacLeish and Mr. Acheson agreed that "foreign policy and domestic policy were the same thing, as far as their relation to public opinion was concerned—that both kinds of policy must reflect the nation's purpose."

In praising the results of the Crimean Conference, Mr. MacLeish asserted that they reflected the desire of Americans for world peace, and Mr. Acheson added that they were "in complete harmony with American opinion."

"The conference declaration showed," Mr. Acheson went on, "that we and our Allies can get together on controversial issues. It showed that if we place unity first, we can reach a compromise with some concessions from each side. And I think there was a great feeling of relief that our plans for post-war world organization will go forward while the war is still on."

Asked by Mr. MacLeish "What was the most important feature of the Yalta agreement?" Mr. Acheson replied:

"From a long-range viewpoint, I should say the completion of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals by agreement on voting procedures in the proposed Security Council and the agreement on the treatment of Germany. These are powerful factors in the building of an enduring peace. But for the immediate future, the decision on the Polish question was a great achievement. It will help a lot in settling this important question."

### Polish Issues Discussed

Reminded by Mr. MacLeish that some writers thought that Poland had been sold down the river, Mr. Acheson said that he did not think that was typical of more than a small minority.

The Crimea conference came to an agreement that the eastern frontier of Poland should be based upon the Curzon Line, he recalled.

"Yes," Mr. MacLeish remarked, "and it was more or less an accident of history that this was not the boundary of Poland after World War I. In 1919, at the Versailles conference, Allied representatives, including American representatives, felt that a Polish frontier based generally on the Curzon Line would be desirable. They found that to the east of this line the population was predominantly Russian and Ukrainian, while to the west of it the population was predominantly Polish."

"That's right," Mr. Acheson rejoined, "and today the Curzon Line generally represents the same division of peoples. Moreover, such variation as there may be from the Curzon Line under the Crimea agreement will favor the Poles."

"The Crimea agreement also provides that the new Polish Government will include Polish patriots outside the country, and this is to be done by a commission in which the Soviet Union will have one representative, Foreign Minister Molotov, and the United States and Britain one each, our Ambassadors to Moscow. Second, the new Provisional Government will hold free elections with a secret ballot and universal suffrage. That also looks like a fair and reasonable arrangement."

Turning to Greece, Mr. Acheson said that issue seemed well on the way to being solved.

"There is no question," he con-

tinued, "about the right of the Greeks to govern themselves and to hold free elections. Under the Yalta agreement, the three major powers will consult, if necessary, and joint action will be taken to guarantee democratic rights to the Greeks. The same applies to every liberated country, for the period of the transition to peace."

Asked about the terms for Germany, Mr. Acheson said:

"The people who are most unhappy about the Crimean conference are the Germans. They don't like the results because their last chance of splitting the Allies away from each other is gone. The game is up. The military leaders of our three countries will coordinate their final offensives more closely than ever, and we have served notice that not only nazism but the whole German military system goes on the scrap heap. There's no misunderstanding that! No wonder the German leaders are worked up about it."

The important thing, Mr. MacLeish remarked, was that at last

"we're going to take our full share of responsibility, in building the peace, everywhere in the world."

"It will be a good guarantee that we are not fighting this war for nothing," Mr. Acheson commented.

To him, Mr. MacLeish said, the most important thing about the Crimea declaration was that we were now at last well on the way to a permanent international organization.

DC-1 Musz. Conf - 23





DC-1

misc. Govt —

24

# WORLD RIGHTS BILL URGED BY BISHOPS

Catholic Welfare Board Says  
Dumbarton Oaks Plan Is Draft  
of Alliance of Big Powers

The statement by Catholic  
Bishops is on Page 7.

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 14—The Archbishops and Bishops of the administrative board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference stress the obligation of this country "to safeguard the freedom of all peoples" in the framing of a world organization at the San Francisco Conference, their statement, adopted prior to President Roosevelt's death, being made public today.

The document describes the Charter framed at Dumbarton Oaks as "rather the draft of an

Continued on Page 7, Column 4

alliance between great, victorious powers for the maintenance of peace and the promotion of international cooperation" than for a juridical world institution.

The declaration criticizes the voting procedure as outlined at the Crimea Conference and the veto accorded the chief powers. It urges an international bill of rights to protect the peoples of all countries from tyrannies, and speaks of justice as an essential in the treatment of enemy peoples. The statement condemns the fate assigned to the Baltic nations, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, and declares that Poland must not become a puppet State under the domination and control of any foreign power.

## Warning Against Isolation

Stress is put on the opportunity for free, open discussion and action at San Francisco, but warns that unless success is attained in providing the basis for permanent peace in the charter, the result for many countries will be isolationism.

"Isolationism," the statement continues, "whether expressed in refusal of a nation to assume its obligations in the international community or masked in the setting up of a sphere of influence in which a great nation surrounds itself with weak puppet states, or disguised in a balance of power policy, is no answer to the world's problems or indeed to the problems of any nation."

# Text of Bishops on World Rights Bill

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 14—The statement issued by the Archbishops and Bishops of the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference was as follows:

## ON ORGANIZING WORLD PEACE

The organization of the community of nations in an international institution to maintain world peace and achieve world cooperation will test the fullness of our victory. This conviction inspired the statement made by the Catholic Bishops of the United States last November. The trend of events since then prompts us to reaffirm and further interpret the principles of that statement.

A sound world organization is not a utopian dream. With honest good-will in all the victors, it will be realized, and a new era in international relations will begin. If any one of them refuses it full support, or insists on introducing into its charter provisions which radically vitiate it, we shall witness the tragedy, so often recorded in history, of a glorious martial victory largely nullified by sheer political expediency.

Experience warns us that unless strong, courageous leaders, with the full support of their peoples, put their hands to this task, there will be no genuine progress in international life. To yield to the fear that this thing cannot be done is defeatism.

In nations, as well as in individuals, we must indeed face the fact of human weakness, but we must face it to conquer it: we must not accept it in a spirit of paralyzing fatalism. An opportunity is here, as in every world crisis, to begin a new era of genuine progress in the community of nations.

## DISILLUSIONMENT BREEDS ISOLATIONISM

Isolationism, whether expressed in the refusal of a nation to assume its obligations in the international community, or masked in the setting up of a sphere of influence in which a great nation surrounds itself with weak puppet states, or disguised in a balance of power policy, is no answer to the world's problems, or indeed to the problems of any nation.

There is, however, the danger present at this time that if in the name of realism an attempt is made to substitute for a juridical world institution what is in effect only an alliance of the great powers, many nations will take refuge in isolationism. Disillusionment in our country will express itself in the isolationism of the abstentionist.

The proposals for an international organization which will be presented to the coming San Francisco Conference have been studied by able and experienced men who, in a spirit of constructive criticism, have brought to

least in time, will become merely its executive committee.

It is imperative, too, that there be lodged in the international organization, and ultimately in the World Court, the authority to make changes in the peace settlements and other treaties which, in view of past mistakes or changed conditions, may be required.

The proposals as they stand outline not the plan for an organization, under law, of the international community, but rather the draft of an alliance between the great victorious powers for the maintenance of world peace and the promotion of international cooperation, in which these powers definitely refuse to submit themselves in every eventuality to the world authority which they propose to invoke in compelling other nations to maintain world peace.

## INTERNATION BILL OF RIGHTS

Sovereign equality among the nations demands that each nation be free in its internal government, and that its juridical personality be recognized in its international relations. It does not mean, however, that a nation is exempt from its obligations in the international community. Even in internal government, sovereignty does not include the authority to violate the inalienable rights of subjects.

In all history, and particularly in modern history, dangers to world peace have come from the unjust treatment of minorities, the denial of civil and religious liberties and other infringements on the inborn rights of men. To remove these dangers, the nations should adopt an International Bill of Rights, in which men and groups everywhere would be guaranteed the full enjoyment of their human rights.

That this is definitely a matter of international concern is evident in the problem now confronting the intergovernmental committee in regard to displaced persons. If they are reluctant to return to their homelands, it is largely because they cannot look forward to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights under the new tyrannies in control.

Active participation in the international organization ought to be conditioned on the acceptance of this Bill of Rights. Will a nation which does not make its own citizens secure in the enjoyment of their human rights work honestly and sincerely for the maintenance of world peace and mutual cooperation in the international community?

## PROPOSALS ON POLAND DISAPPOINTING

The solution of the Polish question agreed upon by the representatives of the three great victorious powers in the Crimea Conference was a disappointment to all who had built their hopes on the Atlantic Charter. Poland, which stood against the Nazi aggressor from the very beginning, was to be divided into two parts, one to be under Russian control and the other under Polish control.

struck by the ominous silence of the three great powers on Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Contrary to the protests of our Government four years ago, and to the assurances of Soviet authorities even before that time, the indications are that they will be absorbed, without their free and unfettered consent, in an alien system of government.

The sympathy of all lovers of freedom goes out to them in their disaster. We hope that when the final peace treaty is framed and approved it will not be recorded that our country condoned the enslavement of these freedom-loving nations.

We hope, too, that our Government will discharge its full responsibility in re-establishing all the liberated nations of Europe under genuine democratic regimes which will accord to all their citizens the full enjoyment of their human rights and open to them an era of prosperity.

In the treatment of the enemy nations, justice must obtain. Justice, indeed, is stern. It is not, however, born of hatred or vengeance, and prevails only when the mind is clear and calm.

Moreover, the common good of the whole world must be kept in mind in dealing with these peoples. They must be freed from tyranny and oppression, and they must be given the opportunity to reconstruct their institutions on the foundations of genuine democracy.

There are things, too, which charity and a right sense of world cooperation urge us to do for them. Only in the unity of human brotherhood will it be possible for them to do their full part in the community of nations.

People living on the near-starvation level, without the means of even beginning the work of reconstruction for themselves, are not clear in their thinking and become easy victims of bad leadership. It is imperative indeed to keep before them the sound principles of genuine democracy, which is a product of our culture and at its base recognizes human rights of individuals and groups.

It is equally imperative to keep them fit rightly to appraise sound principles. The work of relief before us is very great, and it must be done quickly and efficiently if there is to be a sound world peace.

## DEMOCRACY AND MARXISM INCOMPATIBLE

Every day makes more evident the fact that two strong essentially incompatible ways of life will divide the loyalties of men and nations in the political world of tomorrow. They are genuine democracy and Marxian totalitarianism.

Democracy is built on respect for the dignity of the human person with its God-given inviolable rights. It achieves unity and strength in the intelligent cooperation of all citizens for the common good under governments chosen and controlled by the people.

Marine Divisions

But the official information on agreements reached by the three great powers—the United States, Russia and Great Britain—on certain fundamental provisions in the charter gives rise to doubt and fear. We fail to see that the voting procedure in the Security Council agreed upon at Yalta is consistent with the sovereign equality of peace-loving nations recognized as basic in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

#### Danger and Inequity in Veto

Whatever concessions may, under existing conditions, have to be made to certain nations in view of their power and corresponding responsibility, it seems inequitable and dangerous to give any nation in perpetuity a virtual veto on parity of treatment for all. It is a manifest denial of a prime attribute of a juridical institution to extend the veto to the execution of decisions of the World Court, to which, by explicit provision, all justiciable disputes should be referred.

And the concession in question is not even limited to cases directly involving the nation to which it is made. This makes the charter give a preferred status not only to the powerful aggressor, but even to any aggressor with a powerful patron.

While there is reason in setting up a committee or council to act in emergencies, in the proposals the functions of the General Assembly are too restricted and the functions of the Security Council are too broad. It is hoped, then, that the Security Council will be made more responsible to the General Assembly and, at

European front, has been forced by her allies to surrender a very large part of her territory.

In apparent exchange, it was guaranteed at Yalta that in the reconstructed world there will be a strong, independent Poland, with a government chosen in a free election by its own people.

Pending the action of the people of Poland in a free election, agreements were made to set up a provisional regime which will be recognized by the three great powers. This provisional government must not be the creation of a single foreign power but the choice of all parties to the Yalta engagements.

Our President is pledged to see that in the choice of a permanent Polish Government the people of Poland be guaranteed in their right of free secret ballot. No foreign power must be permitted to influence this election in a way which will determine its results. The peace of the world demands a free, independent, democratic Poland. It must not be that Poland become a puppet state under the domination and control of any foreign power.

If Poland is secured in its rights of freedom and independence, it will make great sacrifices and do its full part in the international community. If it is enslaved, and its leadership forced into exile or inhumanly liquidated, the love of freedom will not be crushed in Polish hearts, but the seeds of war will have been sown.

#### THE FATE OF THE BALTIC STATES

In reading official reports on current peace discussions we are

Fascism and Nazism, rampant in their might, sought its destruction. Fascism is gone, we hope, forever. And soon Nazism will be only a horrible historical memory.

However, we have to reckon with the active, cleverly organized and directed opposition of Marxian totalitarianism to genuine democracy. This system herds the masses under dictatorial leadership, insults their intelligence with its propaganda and controlled press, and tyrannically violates innate human rights. Against it, genuine democracy must constantly be on guard, quick to detect and penetrate its camouflage.

Democracy's bulwark is religion and justice is its watchword. We entered this war to defend our democracy. It is our solemn responsibility, in the reconstruction, to use our full influence in safeguarding the freedoms of all peoples. This, we are convinced, is the only way to an enduring peace.

EDWARD MOONEY,

Archbishop of Detroit.

SAMUEL A. STRETCH,

Archbishop of Chicago.

FRANCIS J. SPELLMAN,

Archbishop of New York.

JOHN T. McNICHOLAS,

Archbishop of Cincinnati.

JOHN GREGORY MURRAY,

Archbishop of St. Paul.

JOHN J. MITTY,

Archbishop of San Francisco.

JOSEPH F. RUMMEL,

Archbishop of New Orleans.

JOHN F. NOLL,

Bishop of Fort Wayne.

KARL J. ALTER,

Bishop of Toledo.

JAMES H. RYAN,

Bishop of Omaha.

## THE PROBLEMS OF VICTORY

In the thunderous symphony with which the armies of the United Nations are bringing the war in Europe to a triumphant close, the continued disputes, bickerings and sometimes strident independent tunes of their diplomats provide some strangely cacophonous notes which rouse the anger of the soldiers and spread dismay. That is especially true of the new issues that have arisen around the San Francisco Conference to establish a general international organization to maintain peace and security after the war has been won.

In comparison with the main issue of winning the war, for which the soldiers are still risking their lives, all other issues appear to be of but secondary importance, to be judged on the basis of whether they speed or postpone victory. Since the new disputes cast new reflections on the unity among the United Nations, and thereby provide new ammunition for Nazi propaganda designed to keep the Germans fighting, they would seem to be especially out of place at a moment when their impact on German morale can mean the difference between an early German collapse and continued resistance. Anyone provoking such disputes must take responsibility for the additional lives they may cost.

Fortunately, the disputes are entirely on the diplomatic plane and do not affect the united pressure of the Allied armies which is bringing Germany to her knees. In fact, the armies are achieving this end at such a speed that military events threaten to outdistance diplomatic developments. The San Francisco Conference was called in order to establish an international peace and security organization before the end of the war, and before all the intricate and controversial questions of boundaries, reparations and European reconstruction were discussed at a final peace conference. But if the Allied armies continue to advance at the present pace, it is entirely possible that the European war may end before or during the San Francisco Conference and thus merge the problems of making the peace with the problem of enforcing it. For that reason Foreign Ministers are already reluctant to leave their posts to attend it, and the question of postponing it is now a subject of debate.

But neither postponement of the conference nor the end of the war will solve the disputes. For these disputes are the products of victory itself, on the basis of which all nations, having

escaped the peril of extinction, seek to organize their new life. And it is inevitable that in the flush of victory the various nations should advance claims which conflict with those of other nations sharing in the victory. The hope of the world rests on the assumption that the common sacrifices which all the United Nations have made in this war will provide the basis for mutual accommodation which will resolve all disputes in a peaceful manner and to the satisfaction of all. But it is also true that they will be thus resolved only if all nations are willing to give as well as take, to abide by their agreements in good faith, and to submit all disputes to the final arbitrament of a world opinion based on adequate and objective information regarding the facts in each case. That applies to the new disputes in particular.

There can be no doubt that both the question of the multiple vote for the Big Three in the Assembly of the peace organization and the demand of the present "provisional government" in Warsaw for representation at the conference assume their seemingly sinister aspects mainly because of the secrecy that surrounded the first and the lack of information concerning the second. The problem of the multiple votes will have to be decided by the conference itself. Until there are intimations that individual nations do not propose to abide by the decisions of the conference, there is no reason to get unduly excited about it. Indeed, there would have been considerably less excitement if the secrecy regarding it had not aroused suspicions of further secret deals at Yalta which might be imposed on the conference.

On the other hand, if the Yalta agreements are to remain in force at all, the rejection by the United States and Great Britain of the Warsaw regime was a matter of course. The Yalta agreements specifically provide for a "new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity," which is to be recognized by all Powers, and which alone would thus be eligible to participate in the conference. For that reason the demand of the present regime in Warsaw, which, in Foreign Minister Eden's words, is not representative of Poland at all, is little less than presumptuous, and it is to be regretted that the Russian Government has lent support to it. But it still remains to be explained why, after more than a month and a half of negotiations, the new Government has not yet been formed. And when the reasons for that delay are disclosed, the world will have to assess the responsibility for the consequences.

DC-1      misc. Conf — 26

# Strikes Against San Francisco

By Andre Visson

WDC Post 4-1-45

## United Nations' Inside Front

TWO DEVELOPMENTS, each independent of the other, may seriously affect the success of the San Francisco Conference, it is pointed out in Washington diplomatic quarters.

One—by far the more important of the two—is the possibility of the cessation of hostilities in Europe within the next three weeks. The other, is the possibility that the Big Three may be unable to agree on the constitution of the Polish government which is to send its representatives to San Francisco.

The first development is in the hands of fate and the Allied strategists. The second one is in the hands of the Allied diplomats.

### Germany's Imminent Collapse

Should Germany's imminent collapse take place before the opening of the San Francisco conference, the postwar problems of security would certainly lose nothing of their urgency, but other problems such as the administration of a defeated and disintegrating Germany, would inevitably have priority on the attention of the Soviet, British, French and, probably the Belgian and Dutch statesmen. For European countries, especially those which have the misfortune of being Germany's neighbors, the problems of the administration of Germany and of the demarcation of the zones of occupation, are of immediate importance.

The necessity of considering the possibility of imminent realization of plans for Germany's occupation—however pleasant—would oblige several European ministers of foreign affairs to remain at their desks and would consequently prevent them from being present at San Francisco. Such a consideration, it is hoped in Allied diplomatic circles, may be the main reason for the Soviet decision to have Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to Washington, replace Mr. Viacheslav M. Molotov, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, as head of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference.

American diplomatic quarters have lately been most anxious to make both public opinion in this country, as well as many Allied diplomats, realize that the purpose of the San Francisco Conference is not to solve, or even to discuss, specific problems which may endanger postwar security, but merely to approve the draft, worked out by the Big Three, for the establishment of the machinery for dealing with contingencies that may arise to endanger postwar security.

True, the San Francisco Conference is to deal with the very structure of the most important international set-up ever to have been established, but its deliberations and decisions will be reduced to a strictly technical level. Moreover, the basis of this technical level has already been established by the Big Three at the Dumbarton Oaks and at the Yalta meetings. The decision not to send Mr. Molotov to San Francisco is, therefore, interpreted in Washington as an indication that no basic changes in the Dumbarton Oaks blueprint are to be expected at San Francisco, despite all the amendments which will be presented there by small or medium-sized countries.

### Would "Steal the Show"

Under these circumstances it is obvious that the cessation of hostilities in Europe would definitely "steal the show." And there is, theoretically, at least a danger that European countries, in devoting their immediate attention to the occupation and administration of Germany, may discover in the problems arising from the occupation, sources for additional friction, which may make it still harder for them to agree on international security machinery.

On the other hand, while American diplomatic circles constantly emphasize that the San Francisco conference will deal only with the establishment of machinery for the peaceful solution of potentially dangerous international problems, they recognize that it would be highly desirable for some of those problems to be solved before the conference begins its work. At least one—the Polish problem—should be presented as solved to the delegates of the United Nations, because theoretically it was solved by the Big Three at Yalta.

Most unfortunately, however, the Polish problem still waits for its solution, and very much may depend on whether this solution is found before the San Francisco conference opens.

### Poland's Absence

This conference will no more examine the problem of Poland, than it will that of France or of Yugoslavia. But many consciences, especially among delegates from small and middle-sized countries, may be troubled by the absence of Poland—first victim of Hitler's military aggression. Then, too, Poland's empty chair at San Francisco would be a constant reminder to all delegates of the troubling fact that the Big Three, whose solidarity

is the cornerstone of the security organization, have been unable to establish this solidarity as far as Poland is concerned.

The Lublin-Warsaw government insists that it should constitute the basis of the new Polish cabinet. It, therefore, claims for itself the right to veto any Polish leader suggested for participation in the enlarged and reorganized government. It claims for its representatives the right to be the first to come to Moscow for discussions with the three members of the inter-Allied commission set up for the establishment of the Polish government.

### Psychological Factors

Allied diplomats do not exclude the possibility that the Lublin-Warsaw government, which owes its existence to Moscow, may be more intransigent than its Soviet sponsors. They hope, therefore, that Soviet policy-makers, who must be aware of the importance of psychological factors in the establishment of international cooperation, will realize how important it is to find a solution of the Polish problem which would allow the representatives of the Big Three at San Francisco to prove to the rest of the world that their solidarity, brought about by the necessities of war, can and will be maintained by the necessities of peace. But the last minute Soviet demands to admit the representatives of the Lublin government to San Francisco cannot be considered as an expression of Allied solidarity.

American diplomatic circles recognize, therefore, that the Polish problem has priority over all other diplomatic problems now under discussion with Moscow. It is pointed out that none of the other problems which have been created by Soviet action in Romania, Bulgaria or Turkey, is of a nature to compromise Allied solidarity. They are more or less routine divergencies of viewpoint, such as are practically unavoidable in the relation of great Allied powers each having, besides their common interests, interests of their own.

The coordination of Allied interests is now gradually taking place in Romania (where the Soviet occupation authorities recognized the property rights of American-owned oil corporations) and in Yugoslavia (where the American and British embassies will shortly function). But it is in Poland that the Allies must establish their solidarity if they want to make it the basis of an international security organization.

DC-1 misc Conf -

27

pounds, the general has only a newcomers.

little gray in his ample dark brown

Others are expected to follow

Contrary to reports, there have been no disorders since the civil



# HISTORY'S SHADOWS LOOM OVER PARLEY

Lack of Faith Created by Mistakes of Past to Affect Decisions of Delegates

By JAMES B. RESTON  
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 16—The delegates to the San Francisco security conference concede that certain historical facts, certain past mistakes and present prejudices, minimized but not removed by success in the war, will necessarily limit their attempts to write anything like a perfect world security charter.

Among these limiting historical factors, they list the following:

1. The United States Senate refused to ratify the League of Nations covenant. Major arguments against ratification were that it violated American sovereignty, amounted to an American guarantee of the political independence and the territorial integrity of nearly every nation in the world, and created an organization, which under certain circumstances, might be used against the United States.

2. Britain, France and, to a lesser degree, the United States, intervened in the Russian revolution against the present leader of Soviet Russia. Britain and France divided parts of Soviet Russia into British and French spheres of influence. These three powers opposed for years every attempt of the Soviet leaders to bring the Soviet Union into the family of nations, and the United States refused to recognize the Soviet Government until 1933.

3. On the other hand, Soviet Russia planted Communist cells in the Western countries with the avowed intention, for years, of overthrowing the legitimate governments of those countries, and after rejecting the attempts of Britain and France to reach a military agreement with her in 1939, she made a pact with Germany which contributed to the outbreak of the war.

## Profit by Past Mistakes

There are countless other factors, but these are among those usually mentioned by the delegates in explanation of certain aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks security charter which they do not, particularly like, but which they admit are the result of the lack of faith engendered by past mistakes and which are not likely to be changed at San Francisco.

For example, it is noted that the Dumbarton Oaks charter carefully gives to the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, Soviet Russia, Britain, France and China—the right to veto any proposal to use force against an aggressor. This provision, it is admitted, was put there for reasons which go back to the historical facts listed above.

So long as the United States has the veto, it cannot be argued ef-

fectively in the Senate that she is being asked to give up her sovereignty or that she is being asked to guarantee the boundaries of all the nations of the world, or that the force of the league could be directed against her.

Similarly, with this veto, Soviet Russia is sure that France and Britain cannot gang up on her or vote her out of the new league as they did in 1940. And at the same time, by concentrating the power in the hands of the Security Council of eleven members, and particularly in the hands of the five big permanent members of the council, the Russians feel protected against any attempt by the small powers to organize an anti-Soviet coalition within the new league.

## Would Allow for Changes

Without going into the merits or demerits of these arguments, the delegates of most of the small powers and of some of the large powers concede that these and other similar factors make it impossible to change the Dumbarton Oaks proposals very much at this time, but they argue that the very least the San Francisco Conference should do is to make provision for change, to allow for the possibility of improvement in the hope that time and cooperation will increase the area of faith among the great powers.

Under the Dumbarton Oaks charter, if it is adopted—and the general impression here is that it will be adopted at San Francisco without substantial changes—two actions are necessary before it can be amended:

1. The amendments will have to

be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly.

2. They will then have to be ratified by all five nations holding permanent seats on the security council and by a majority of the other members of the General Assembly, each in accordance with its normal constitutional processes.

## Flexible Charter Advocated

There is a growing tendency among the delegates to at least attempt to do something about this amending clause. The advocates of a flexible charter contend that, especially since such unprecedented powers are being given to the permanent members of the Security Council and since the charter is being drawn in a time of violent change, provision should be made for a periodic constitutional convention to revise the charter in light of changing conditions.

For example, some of the delegates feel that while the United States, Soviet Russia and Great Britain deserve the special authority they get under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and will probably continue to do so; China and France do not have sufficient power to justify the same rights as the other three. In ten years, these critics point out, other powers might be much stronger and would deserve to replace either France or China as permanent members, but under the present amending clause, both France and China would have the right to veto any proposals to remove them from permanent membership in the Council.

Both Commander Stassen and

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

Senator Vandenberg have been supporting provisions to make it easier to change the status quo. Commander Stassen has suggested periodic constitutional conventions. Senator Vandenberg has been arguing that the General Assembly should have the right to recommend the revision of treaties or the reconsideration of any unjust situation that might endanger the peace of the world. Both these points are supported in principle, at least, not only by most of the delegates of the small nations but by the American delegation as well.

*Argument Against Change*

The argument against changing the present Dumbarton Oaks amendment provision is that it is more liberal than the amending clause in the League Covenant, under which all members of the Council and a majority of the members of the General Assembly had to ratify the amendments before they came into effect. Furthermore, the right of the permanent members to veto any amendment was thought to be necessary, since they have the major responsibility for maintaining peace and security and could not be expected to carry out this duty under conditions which they did not approve.

In general, the delegates at the Dumbarton Oaks conference maintained that they were creating a "flexible" organization. But at least some influential delegates to the San Francisco conference maintain that the charter as it now stands is "flexible" for the Big Five and "rigid" for the rest and, even allowing for the limitations imposed by the melancholy history of the past twenty-five years, should at least make a little more provision for future change than it now does.

# DUMBARTON 'GAPS' BIG PARLEY ISSUE

## Conference Will Be Start for a Limited World Security Plan, Some Observers Say

*This is the first of a series of articles on the background and issues of the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco.*

By JAMES B. RESTON

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 15—A series of conversations with some of the leading delegates to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco indicates that the area of agreement at that conference will be wider than the area of disagreement and that the conference will concentrate mainly on "filling in the gaps" in the Dumbarton Oaks Charter.

More than 150 amendments have been proposed by the forty-eight nations the delegates of which are now beginning to arrive for the conference, but most of these are directed toward the "gaps" rather than toward changing the substance of the formula accepted by

Continued on Page 16, Column 5

the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks.

Before getting to the points of disagreement, these delegates are remarkably unanimous on the following points:

1. Agreement among the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, France and China to support even an imperfect security organization is more important than creating at San Francisco a more perfect security charter which might not have the support of one or more of these five countries.

### Suspensions of World Stressed

2. The history of the past twenty-five years has created so many suspicions among the great powers that they are not prepared at this time to participate in a security league which might conceivably be

used against them. This is basically why the Big Five—or some of them—have demanded the right to veto any proposal to take economic or military action against them, and this veto destroys the concept of a league in which the combined force of all peaceful nations is put behind law and ends, for the present, the hope that the new league would have authority to punish any aggressor, large or small.

3. As a result of these two things—the necessity that the Big Five participate in the new league and their agreement to insist on the veto power as the basis of their participation—the work of the conference must be recognized merely as the start of an attempt to create a limited security organization.

### Veto Power Looms Large

The conference can create machinery through which, for the first time in history, the countries which control most of the war-making capacity of the world cooperate for peace, but because of the veto power of the big countries it cannot guarantee the small countries against aggression from one of the Big Five. Therefore the conference is likely to concentrate on creating a limited but flexible charter which can be improved as the faith among the big powers increases.

What disturbs some of the delegates, however, is their impression that the people do not understand the limitations contained in these three points, and are not yet clear about what the Dumbarton Oaks formula means. Consequently, most of the delegates who are arriving here now are emphasizing the limitations listed above and attempting to define the Dumbarton Oaks plan in simple terms, particularly in terms of the old League of Nations.

There follows a summary of their comparisons between the League Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks draft charter:

The League of Nations, the delegates point out, was an organization of "equal nations," each with the right to veto League action against an aggressor. It was like a corporation in which all the stockholders not only had a vote but each had the power to veto—specifically the power to veto any proposal to use force against an aggressor.

### League Unanimity Rare

As a result, the League was never able to get the necessary "unanimity" to take action against Germany, Italy or Japan. Indeed, it managed to get that unanimity against only one major nation: against Soviet Russia when it kicked Russia out of the League after its attack on Finland in 1940.

The delegates at Dumbarton Oaks, therefore, sought to correct this flaw in the League Covenant. They rejected the right of each nation to veto League action. They denied the doctrine that each "stockholder" should have a veto. Instead, they created a Board of Directors (the Security Council) of eleven members and gave them the power to determine when force should be used against an aggressor. Furthermore, the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks gave a special and permanent position on the Security Council to the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, France and China. They said, in effect:

"These nations are majority stockholders; in the event of another war, they would have to put up most of the men, money and matériel to put the aggressor down. Therefore, these nations should have special authority commensurate with this special responsibility. They should be given a permanent place on the Board of Directors, they should be authorized,

along with the other members of the Security Council, to act in behalf of all nations, and whenever a question of using force arises each of them should be given the right to veto using such force, even if one of them was a party to the dispute in question."

### Difference Between the Pacts

This, then, is the first difference between the League Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Charter. In the former, each nation which held stock in the security corporation had the power to veto action by the corporation against an aggressor; in the charter, the power of veto is taken away from the minor stockholders and restricted to the Big Five, and the power of decision is transferred from the stockholders to a board of directors which is authorized to act in their name.

The second difference between the League Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Charter is that the Covenant did not provide the League Council with a specific quota of force to carry out its decisions even if, perchance, it were able to get the necessary "unanimity." All the League could do was "advise" the country to carry out its decisions.

The Dumbarton Oaks Charter seeks to correct this condition. It proposes that in the new League, as in a corporation, the countries, or stockholders, agree to carry out the decisions of the Security Council. Furthermore, it suggests that the stockholders who do have considerable power enter into special agreements under which they would agree to put certain of their forces at the disposal of the Security Council, not all their forces, but a quota, which the Security Council could send against an aggressor as soon as seven of the eleven members of the Council (including all the permanent members, the United States, USSR, Britain, France and China) voted to do so.

### The Third Divergence

The third difference between the League Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Charter is that the Covenant in certain cases allowed war to be made legally and did not ask its members to intervene with force until war had actually started, whereas the Charter would authorize the Security Council to use force even before war has begun if had reason to believe a nation was planning to attack another country.

Thus, under the League of Nations covenant, the members of the League tended to wait until Adolf Hitler attacked Austria, or Benito Mussolini attacked Ethiopia, before "advising" action against them. The Security Council, as proposed, would have been obliged to look into the German and Italian situations when the wars were being prepared and to "instruct"—not "advise"—members of the new League to take action "before" the act of war took place.

A further major distinction between the League Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Charter is that in the Covenant there was a very exact definition of when the nations were "supposed" to break economic and financial relations with a country, whereas under the Charter, decisions of this nature are left to the judgment of the Security Council.

### The Dumbarton Asks Aims

What the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks were seeking was authority for those who had power to use that strength against an aggressor before war broke out, and authority to use their judgment as to when was the proper time to act. Also Mr. Stettinius will formally

DC - 1

Miss. Conf -

29



## OAKS PLAN BACKED IN NEW HAMPSHIRE

First Five Town Meetings to  
Report as 225 Are Polled  
Show Unanimous Votes

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

CONCORD, N. H., March 13—

Unanimous approval of United States participation in a world organization equipped with police power to maintain peace was shown in the first reports today from New Hampshire town meetings engaging in the first popular referendum on the subject in the country.

Reports had come in from four of 225 towns which the Legislature authorized to ballot on the question at their annual meetings. The results will be forwarded to the New Hampshire Congressional delegation.

### Towns Filing Reports

Hancock, having 631 population, had about 200 voters at its meeting. Hopkinton, with a population of more than 1,000, and Jaffrey, with more than 2,000, showed polls of about 200 each. Antrim, with 1,127 population, recorded a vote of about seventy-five. The voting was vocal.

The 225 towns have about 48 per cent of the State's population of about 495,000. The resolution authorizing the town polls was introduced by State Senator Earl S. Hewitt, Enfield Republican and published in a weekly newspaper. No provision was made by the Legislature for a testing of sentiment in the State's eleven cities.

The question at the town meetings was whether the State's citizens "should support United States membership in a general system of international cooperation such as that proposed at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, having police power to maintain the peace of the world."

The resolution also carried a

memorial to Congress to enter such a world organization.

### Swansey Also Unanimous

CONCORD, N. H., March 13 (AP)—At the Swansey town meeting today all 173 voters favored participation in a world organization.

Today's voting in New Hampshire recalled that in 1942 Massachusetts by a vote of 202,603 to 67,691 favored a request to the

## JERSEY ACTIVITY BACKS OAKS PLAN

Griffith Bill Barring All Sales  
of Liquor Between 3 A. M.  
and 6 A. M. Is Adopted

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

TRENTON, N. J., Unanimous approval of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for international organization was voted today by the State Assembly, which also memorialized the United States Senate to support the plan "by voice and vote."

President and Congress to call a convention of representatives of all free peoples to frame a Federal constitution under which they could unite in a democratic world government.

M  
S  
C  
of  
W

DC-1 misc. Conf - 31

# Must Set Up Law Before Peace, Says Stettinius

## War-End Settling Would Require Organization, Secretary Holds

By Ben W. Gilbert

Creation of a world organization in advance of a formal peace conference is necessary to place the organization "above and apart from these settlements and leave it just as free to deal with threats to the peace of the world that may later arise from these settlements as from any other causes," Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, jr., said yesterday.

The statement, made in a broadcast address in New York City before the Council of Foreign Relations, indicated that the world organization will be able to review peace settlements if they threaten the peace. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R., Mich.) and a member of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference, has asked that political settlements growing out of this war be made subject to later review by the international agency.

### Contrary to Reported Views

"It has been said that by joining in the world organization before the peace settlements are made," Stettinius said, "the United States and the other members would be committed in advance to maintaining all these settlements in perpetuity, whether they are good or bad."

"Just the contrary is true," he explained.

"For this reason, as well as for others, the rapid approach of the end of the war in Europe, far from making postponement of the San Francisco Conference advisable, makes it all the more important that the conference be held on schedule and that its work be completed at the earliest possible moment."

Other developments on the world security front in advance of the April 25 parley included:

1. All the members of the United Nations represented at the parley, including the four sponsoring powers, will be free to submit amendments to the draft plans the four nations worked out at Dumbarton Oaks. Stettinius told a press conference here before leaving for New York. This interpretation differed from one presented in the Soviet magazine, War and the Working Class, and reprinted in the Soviet Embassy Bulletin. See SECURITY, Page 5, Column 1.

the effect that the United States, Britain, China and Russia are bound to defend the Oaks plan.

2. Stettinius told the press conference that a seat is being reserved at San Francisco for Poland—to be occupied when a new national government is established in accordance with the Yalta plan. In his New York address, he confessed that he was disappointed with the delay in evolving a new Polish government, but pointed out that the Yalta agreement was made only seven weeks ago in an effort to settle differences of two years standing.

3. Green H. Hackworth, State Department legal advisor, was named American representative to a committee of United Nations jurists, which will begin meetings here Monday to draft a statute for a world court for consideration at San Francisco. Thirty nations have accepted invitations to attend the committee sessions which will be held in the inter-Departmental Auditorium.

4. President Roosevelt appointed Stettinius as temporary chairman of the Golden Gate conference—a traditional diplomatic procedure which permits the host nation to preside. Alger Hiss, State Department specialist on the Dumbarton Oaks plan who attended the Yalta conference, was named permanent secretary-general of the April 25 conference.

5. The American delegation will arrive at San Francisco on April 21 or earlier to be on hand to greet the first foreign delegations to arrive—another traditional diplomatic courtesy. Daily conferences of the eight members of the American delegation, including Comdr. Harold E. Stassen, are scheduled to begin here Monday—to continue until the conference is underway.

6. The French cabinet named Paul Emile Naggiar, former ambassador to Moscow and a San Francisco delegate, to represent the provisional government in pre-San Francisco five-power talks on setting up international trusteeships. The United Press said from Paris that France is opposed to placing League of Nations mandates under trusteeships, but is prepared to grant trade concessions to the United States in her colonies. Return of Italian colonies to Italy under trusteeship will not be opposed, however, it was said.

Stettinius, at his press conference, insists that the San Francisco conference will be a deliberative body with a capital "D." No effort will be made, he said, to rush things through in partly digested form.

In his New York address, he said: "But the danger has not really passed—the danger that we shall fail in rebuilding the world and in preventing what would be the greatest—and perhaps the fatal disaster of our history—another world war."

"What is required above every thing else today is the same steadiness and fixed resolution and clear understanding of our national in-

terest with which we met the tests of war in 1942 and 1943 and 1944. Certainly, we shall never succeed if every road-block or every landmine on the road to peace throws us into a panic and, conversely, if every 100 yards of clear going makes us think we have nothing more to worry about."

Stating that "nothing has happened to shake my belief that the Crimea agreement on Poland will be carried out," Stettinius said that American participation in the pact "reflects the steadfast determination of the United States Government to respect the legitimate rights of small nations."

"The only hope of the small countries, as of the large countries, lies in a world so organized for peace that the industrial and military power of the large nations is used lawfully for the general welfare of all nations. The alternative is a world in anarchy in which lawless power runs riot and small nations are the first trampled underfoot."

Speaking later at an American Labor Party meeting in honor of Representative Sol Bloom (D., N. Y.), Stettinius said that "a major task of the world organization will be the establishment of those economic and social conditions which make for peace."

DC-1

music, Conf -

32



# Text of Stettinius Statement on Security Parley

The statement issued yesterday by Secretary of State Stettinius on the San Francisco conference:

At a press conference on Friday, March 30, correspondents submitted to the Department of State for consideration a number of questions relating to representation in the general assembly of the proposed United Nations organization, a matter that was discussed at the Crimea conference.

The inquiries submitted related to various aspects of several principal questions. Whether unpublished agreements had been made at Yalta; why the American representatives at Yalta agreed to support the Soviet proposals for initial membership of two Soviet republics in the proposed international organization; whether it was agreed that the two Soviet republics would have separate representatives at the San Francisco Conference; why the agreements with reference to the proposal for initial membership of two Soviet republics had not been announced; and whether the agreements on the subject of representation in the general assembly affected the principle of sovereign equality of peace-loving nations expressed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

## Military Matters Secret

I wish to make the following statement in response to these questions:

Both military and political questions were covered at the Crimea conference. The military plans agreed to at Yalta and related matters connected with the defeat of the common enemy can be made known only as they are carried out.

Among the other matters dealt with at the Crimea conference were several open questions left over from the Dumbarton Oaks conversations: The voting procedure in the security council; invitations to the United Nations conference on international organization; the time and place of the conference; initial membership in the international organization; and the possible addition to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of provisions relating to territorial trusteeship.

The decisions taken at Yalta with reference to the time and place of the United Nations conference were made public in the communique issued at the close of the Crimea conference. The voting procedure in the security council was not announced until after consultations on this subject with the government of the Republic of China and the provisional government of the French Republic.

Following these consultations, the voting procedure, together with the text of the invitation and the list of nations to be invited to the San Francisco conference, were made public on March 5, approximately a month after the close of the Crimea conference.

## Tells What Yalta Agreement Was

The only other decisions reached at Yalta and not made public in the Crimea conference communique related to initial membership in the international organization when it meets, and to territorial trusteeship.

The Soviet representatives at Yalta proposed that the White Russia and the Ukraine Republics be initial members of the proposed international organization. This was a question for the United Na-

tions assembled at San Francisco to consider and decide.

In view of the importance which the Soviet government attached to this proposal, the American representatives at Yalta, having the utmost respect for the heroic part played by the people of these republics in their unyielding resistance to the common enemy, and the fortitude with which they have borne great suffering in the prosecution of the war, agreed that the Government of the United States would support such a Soviet proposal at San Francisco, if made. No agreement, however, was made at Yalta on the question of the participation of these republics in the San Francisco conference.

## United States Equality Assured

In the circumstances, the American representatives at Yalta believed it was their duty to reserve the possibility of the United States having three votes in the general assembly. The Soviet and British representatives stated their willingness to support a proposal, if the United States should make it, to accord three votes in the assembly to the United States.

The President has decided that at the San Francisco conference the United States will not request additional votes for the Government of the United States in the general assembly.

Announcement of these proposals was made first to the United States delegation to the San Francisco conference. In order to correct the impression conveyed by partial publication of the facts, public announcement was made prior to a final determination of the course to be followed by the delegation with regard to possible additional representation for the United States.

## Trusteeship Structure

As to territorial trusteeship, it appeared desirable that the governments represented at Yalta, in consultation with the Chinese government and the French provisional government, should endeavor to formulate proposals for submission to the San Francisco conference for a trusteeship structure as a part of the general organization.

This trusteeship structure, it was felt, should be designed to permit the placing under it of the territories mandated after the last war, and such territories taken from the enemy in this war, as might be agreed upon at a later date, and also such other territories as might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship. No discussion was had at Yalta or is contemplated prior to or at San Francisco regarding specific territories.

The basis of the San Francisco conference remains the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It is for the conference to decide whether any proposal affecting voting in the general assembly of the proposed United Nations organization impairs the principle of sovereign equality, just as the conference itself must determine the application and interpretation of any general principles enunciated in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

In other words, the San Francisco conference will doubtless vote on many proposals for the detailed setting up of the United Nations organization, and there is no way of knowing what the proposals will be. The final organization will be passed on by the United Nations in accordance with their customary procedures and it is hoped and be-

lieved that the result will be so clear that this great effort to eliminate future wars will receive practically unanimous approval.

This Government believes that the rapid tempo of military and political developments, far from requiring postponement of the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, makes it increasingly necessary that the plans for this organization worked out at Dumbarton Oaks be carried on promptly.

We have, moreover, received no indication that any government believes that the conference should be postponed.

DC-1 Mexi. Conf -

33

# Text of Stettinius' Statement on Parley Plans

WASHINGTON, April 3 (AP)—Following is the statement issued today by Secretary Stettinius on the San Francisco Conference:

At a press conference on Friday, March 30, correspondents submitted to the Department of State for consideration a number of questions relating to representation in the General Assembly of the proposed United Nations organization, a matter that was discussed at the Crimea Conference.

The inquiries submitted related to various aspects of several principal questions: whether unpublished agreements had been made at Yalta; why the American representatives at Yalta agreed to support the Soviet proposals for initial membership of two Soviet republics in the proposed international organization; whether it was agreed that the two Soviet republics would have separate representatives at the San Francisco Conference; why the agreements with reference to the proposal for initial membership of two Soviet Republics had not been announced; and whether the agreements on the subject of representation in the General Assembly affected the principle of sovereign equality of peace-loving nations expressed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

I wish to make the following statement in response to these questions:

Both military and political questions were covered at the Crimea Conference. The military plans agreed to at Yalta and related matters connected with the defeat of the common enemy can be made known only as they are carried out.

## Other Matters Dealt With

Among the other matters dealt with at the Crimea Conference were several open questions left over from the Dumbarton Oaks conversations: the voting procedure in the Security Council; invitations to the United Nations Conference on International Organization; the time and place of the conference; initial membership in the international organization; and the possible addition to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of provisions relating to territorial trusteeship.

The decisions taken at Yalta with reference to the time and place of the United Nations Conference were made public in the communiqué issued at the close of the Crimea Conference. The voting procedure in the Security Council was not announced until after consultations on this subject with the Government of the Republic of China and the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

Following these consultations, the voting procedure together with the text of the invitation and the list of nations to be invited to the San Francisco Conference were made public on March 5, approximately a month after the close of the Crimea Conference.

The only other decisions reached at Yalta and not made public in the Crimea Conference communiqué related to initial membership in the international organization when it meets, and to territorial trusteeship.

The Soviet representatives at Yalta proposed that the White Russian and the Ukrainian Republics be initial members of the proposed international organization. This was a question for the United Nations assembled at San Francisco to consider and decide.

In view of the importance which the Soviet Government attached to this proposal, the American representatives at

Yalta, having the utmost respect for the heroic part played by the people of these republics in their unyielding resistance to the common enemy and the fortitude with which they have borne great suffering in the prosecution of the war, agreed that the Government of the United States would support such a Soviet proposal at San Francisco if made. No agreement was, however, made at Yalta on the question of the participation of these republics in the San Francisco Conference.

In the circumstances, the American representatives at Yalta believed that it was their duty to reserve the possibility of the United States having three votes in the General Assembly. The Soviet and British representatives stated their willingness to support a proposal, if the United States should make it, to accord three votes in the assembly to the United States.

## Decision of the President

The President has decided that at the San Francisco Conference the United States will not request additional votes for the Government of the United States in the General Assembly.

Announcement of these proposals was made first to the United States delegation to the San

Francisco Conference. In order to correct the impression conveyed by partial publication of the facts, public announcement was made prior to a final determination of the course to be followed by the delegation with regard to possible additional representation for the United States.

As to territorial trusteeship, it appeared desirable that the Governments represented at Yalta, in consultation with the Chinese Government and the French Provisional Government, should endeavor to formulate proposals for submission to the San Francisco Conference for a trusteeship structure as a part of the general organization.

This trusteeship structure, it was felt, should be designed to permit the placing under it of the territories mandated after the last war, and such territories, taken from the enemy in this war, as might be agreed upon at a later date, and also such other territories as might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship. No discussion was had at Yalta or is contemplated prior to, or at, San Francisco regarding specific territories.

The basis of the San Francisco Conference remains the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It is for the conference to decide whether

any proposal affecting voting in the General Assembly of the proposed United Nations organization impairs the principle of sovereign equality, just as the conference itself must determine the application and interpretation of any general principles enunciated in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

In other words, the San Francisco Conference will doubtless vote on many proposals for the detailed setting up of the United Nations organization, and there is no way of knowing what the proposals will be. The final organization will be passed on by the United Nations in accordance with their customary procedures, and it is hoped and believed that the result will be so clear that this great effort to eliminate future wars will receive practically unanimous approval.

This Government believes that the rapid tempo of military and political developments, far from requiring postponement of the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, makes it increasingly necessary that the plans for this organization worked out at Dumbarton Oaks will be carried on promptly.

We have, moreover, received no indication that any Government believes that the conference should be postponed.

DC-1 misc. Conf - 34

# The Text of Stettinius Radio Speech Hailing Peace Talks

By The Associated Press.  
**WASHINGTON, Feb. 24—**The text of the radio talk of Secretary Stettinius tonight from Mexico City was as follows:

It is particularly appropriate that a series of broadcasts on the building of the peace should be opened from a conference of American nations in Mexico City. This conference propitiously follows the meeting in the Crimea which revealed the broad pattern of aims and purposes of the nations associated in the war and precedes the United Nations meeting to be held in San Francisco.

We Americans of all the American republics have lived our lives—have lived our histories—in the discovery and the building of new worlds.

We know that worlds can be discovered such as men in older continents had never imagined. We know that worlds can be built such as men in other ages had never seen. We are not frightened, therefore, or discouraged or dismayed when we are brought face to face with the necessity of creating something new—an effective world organization.

Delegates from the American republics are assembled in this beautiful city of Mexico to strengthen the fraternal ties developed through many decades, and to improve the inter-American system of relations.

They are engaged in the serious business of considering how their friendship and unity of purpose may best contribute to a world organization for peace, security and a better way of life. This meeting affords a forum where the ideas and opinions of the

American republics may be given expression.

## "Past of Bold Explorations"

Already we have offered to the conference resolutions intended to accomplish the more effective cooperation of the American republics with the proposed new world structure.

Our entire American past is a past of bold explorations, of hardy settlement, of arduous construction, of difficult beginnings. We are accustomed to labors without precedent. We are hardened to the seeming impossible. We know how to do what was never done before. We have brought a vast and untamed continent to human order within a space of time which would seem impossible to those who measure what can be done in the future by what has been done before. In the Americas, we have sought to foster a spirit of neighborliness, which is indispensable to a new society of mankind.

We have good reason, therefore, for approaching the greatest labor of human history with such high hopes, with such unshakable determination. We have not listened in the past, and we will not listen in the future, to voices of frustration and defeat which tell us that we cannot do what we believe we must do. There is nothing in our American history that needed doing which did not find the men to do it.

But this labor of the construction of a peaceful world is not a labor to be spoken of in terms of hope and purposes only. Much has already been accomplished. Four nations have agreed among themselves on proposals for the

organization of a peaceful world, and those proposals had been submitted to the people of the earth for their consideration.

## Sovereign Rights Stressed

Never before has a proposal worked out by specialists and experts and agreed upon by representatives of several nations been submitted to such searching examination by the peoples of the world before its submission to a formal conference. At the San Francisco conference, all of the United Nations will take part in setting up the permanent machinery for international security. They will participate as independent sovereign states. Sovereign equality of nations, large and small, is a basic principle underlying the proposals.

Those proposals not only embrace the sovereign equality of nations, but they also intend that the power of all nations shall be used in the interests of world peace, security and freedom. Only on such a foundation may we realize the aspiration of mankind for a new and better world, with greater opportunity and well-being for all people.

The fact that the nations which took part in the primary discussions at Dumbarton Oaks were the nations which now bear, and have borne, the principal burden of the war, makes it natural, and indeed inevitable, that Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and China should have taken primary responsibility for the initiation of these proposals, as they have been obliged to take primary responsibility for the prosecution of the war.

The Dumbarton Oaks pro-

posals, however, were incomplete. They had to be supplemented in several important respects. This was one of the great accomplishments of the Crimea Conference.

The voting procedure agreed upon at the Crimea Conference is a procedure, as I stated to the Inter-American Conference two days ago, which recognizes "the two essential elements of a successful world organization—unity of action by the great powers who alone have the military and industrial strength to prevent aggression; and the equal sovereignty of all nations, large and small, who must act together to create the essential conditions of lasting peace."

## Asks All Facts Be Known

Once the world organization is established and measures for social and economic welfare are undertaken, the true democracy of the organization of the world for peace will become apparent.

It is to put before the people of

the United States the facts about the proposed world organization that the Department of State has undertaken this series of broadcasts. I like to think that our people for the next few weeks will study, discuss and reflect on these proposals which are so significant to the destiny of all mankind.

It is my belief, and the belief of my colleagues in the department, that our duty in this regard is to put the facts before the country and let the facts speak for themselves. This is the democratic method. It is the only method that will be acceptable to our people.

Here in Mexico City we have sought to support that democratic method by offering a resolution which declares the right of peoples to have free access to information. In this way, and only in this way, will truth, the enemy of tyranny, assert itself for the freedom and security of mankind.

DC-1 - misc. Conf - 35

# Text of Stettinius Address on Parley Outlook

Following is the text of the address by Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. before the Council on Foreign Relations as recorded and transcribed by THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Mr. President, Mrs. Pratt, members of the Council on Foreign Relations:

In speaking here in New York this afternoon at the dedication of the building which is henceforth to be the headquarters of the Council on Foreign Relations, I come to bear witness, as has every Secretary of State during the past quarter of a century, to the great services and influence of this organization in spreading knowledge and understanding of the issues of United States foreign policy.

Certainly today—after two world wars in twenty-five years—there can be few Americans, whether they live in the East or the West or the South, who do not understand how directly and personally they are concerned in our relations with other nations.

Ever since Pearl Harbor the hopes and thoughts of the people of this country have been centered increasingly upon creating at last a world organization which could be endowed with the power and the will this time truly to maintain the peace.

And ever since Pearl Harbor intensive studies and preparatory discussions of such an organization have been carried on by this Government—and by other governments. There were many plans and a multitude of variations in viewpoint which had to be weighed and analyzed and adjusted. This process took two years and a half.

By last summer we were ready for discussions with our principal allies—the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China. Out of these discussions, and all the preliminary work that had gone before, evolved the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Since last October these proposals have been before the peoples of the Governments of the United Nations for further discussion and analysis.

Now—seven months later—all the United Nations are about to meet in San Francisco to write the charter of a world organization on the basis of these proposals.

## Winning the Peace a Big Task

I have briefly reviewed this bit of history for a reason.

It has taken three and a half years of the most prodigious and single-minded effort the world has ever seen to bring the fighting forces of the United Nations into the heart of Germany and close to the home islands of Japan.

We can be sure that winning the peace is going to take a good deal longer and that it will be just as difficult and just as challenging a task.

Early in the war, when the United States and other United Nations were in mortal danger from our enemies, we were steady and resolute and we found the means to develop and strengthen that unity of action without which we could not win victory. This is, perhaps, more difficult, now that immediate danger has passed.

But the danger has not really passed—the danger that we shall fail in rebuilding the world and in preventing what would be the greatest—and perhaps the most fatal disaster of our history—another world war.

What is required above every-

thing else today is the same steadiness and fixed resolution and clear understanding of our national interest with which we met the tests of war in 1942 and 1943 and 1944. Certainly we shall never succeed if every road block or every land mine on the road to peace throws us into a panic and, conversely, if every hundred yards of clear going makes us think that we have nothing more to worry about.

## To Prepare a World Center

It is with this point in mind that I wish to talk to you briefly about the San Francisco Conference and about some of the forebodings and difficulties that have arisen concerning it.

First of all, let us keep the San Francisco Conference in its proper perspective. It is not a peace conference. It will not deal with boundaries or reparations or questions concerned with the disarmament and the control of Germany and Japan. Its purpose is to prepare a charter of a world organization to preserve the peace in the future which can be submitted to the member nations for adoption.

It will be a difficult task, a task as difficult as the writing of our own Constitution in 1787, for the conference at San Francisco, like the convention in Philadelphia, will be pioneering a new way. The charter will inevitably be the product of a series of adjustments, just as our own Constitution was the product of a series of compromises between the North and the South, and large States and small, and merchant interests and agrarian interests. And without these adjustments of interest and viewpoint our Constitution could not have been written. Nor could it have been ratified by the thirteen original States.

Probably no charter that can be agreed upon at San Francisco will completely meet the wishes of any one of the United Nations. What we must do there is to create a framework for the world organization that can command the support of the great majority of the peoples of the world, that will be soundly based and that will be open to improvement as we gain experience in the functioning of the organization after it is established.

I am reminded again of our Constitutional Convention. The delegates to that convention clearly foresaw the necessity for later adjustments and amendments and made provision for them. Indeed, the first ten amendments to our Constitution went into effect only four years after it was written.

## For Separate Conferences

I believe that it was a wise decision, indeed an essential one, that the establishment of the world organization should be kept entirely separate and apart from the settlements that will follow this war. It has been said that by joining in the world organization before the peace settlements are made, the United States and other members would be committed in advance to maintaining all these settlements in perpetuity whether they were good or bad.

Just the contrary is true. By creating the world organization first, and separating its functions from the peace settlements, we place it above and apart from those settlements and leave it just as free to deal with threats to the peace of the world that may later arise from these settlements as from any other causes. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, through their provisions for dealing with

any situation that might endanger the peace, provide for the exercise of this responsibility by the world organization.

For this reason, as well as for others, the rapid approach of the end of the war in Europe, far from making postponement of the San Francisco conference advisable, makes it all the more important that the conference be held on schedule and that its work be completed at the earliest possible moment.

## Other Great Tasks Ahead

We have ahead of us many other tremendously difficult tasks with which the San Francisco conference will not be concerned. We shall not be able to accomplish these other tasks in a few weeks or a few months. They will take years. We have to deal with the disarmament and control of Germany and Japan, after they have surrendered, and the tasks of repairing the disastrous damage done by the war to the world's economy, of assisting the liberated peoples to regain freedom and security, and of reaching agreements on many other matters, social and economic, that are necessary to lasting peace.

Concern is expressed over the prospects of the San Francisco conference because of the delays that have arisen over the establishment of a new Polish Provisional Government of national unity, or because of the questions raised by the Soviet Government for separate membership in the Assembly of the world organization of two Soviet Republics, or because any other of the difficulties with which we are inevitably surrounded as we approach the end of the war.

I can assure you that if we based our course of action on that line of reasoning we would never have a conference, or a world organization. New problems of this nature will continue to arise. The coming months and years will be, in fact, a continuous challenge to our good sense and our will to master the difficulties of peace. And I hope that all Americans will keep such temporary difficulties as the delay over the new Polish Provisional Government of national unity in perspective.

## Wants Poland Represented

It is important that this new Government be established in time to make it possible for Poland to be represented at San Francisco. The United States Government is doing all in its power to bring this about. Poland is a United Nation and should be there.

But I ask you to remember that the agreement made at the Crimea Conference about Poland is only seven weeks old and that it was reached after two years of divergent views among the principal allies about the Government of Poland. The delay in carrying out the Crimea decision on Poland has been disappointing, but in this perspective it has not been long.

I ask you also to remember that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States have repeatedly reaffirmed and always agreed in their common determination to see established a strong, independent and democratic Poland after the war.

Nothing has happened to shake my belief that the Crimea agreement on Poland will be carried out. That agreement, you will recall, provides that the new Polish Provisional Government of national unity shall be formed by

reorganizing the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland "on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad"; and that this new Government shall be pledged to holding free elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, with all democratic and anti-Nazi parties having the right to take part.

## For Rights of Small Nations

Our participation in that agreement reflects the steadfast determination of the United States Government to respect the legitimate rights of the small nations. No nation in the world has shown greater interest than the United States in the independence of small countries and in their right to manage their own affairs. This principle is basic in our dealings with all nations. It is basic in our policy for peace, and is basic in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

The freedom, the independence of small nations cannot be maintained, however, unless the large countries unite their power to preserve peace in which the democratic rights of all nations can be upheld.

The only hope of small countries, as of large countries, lies in a world so organized for peace that the industrial and the military power of the large nations is used lawfully for the general welfare of all nations. The alternative is a world in anarchy in which lawless power runs riot and small nations are the first to be trampled underfoot.

The large nations, and all the United Nations, are firmly united in the purpose and in the necessity to create a new world organization for peace, because it is the vital interest of each of them to do so. Let us never forget that this unity of purpose and this community of national interest is paramount to all the lesser differences among us in interests and in history, and language and in customs. Because of that paramount unity of purpose and community of interest these lesser differences can be and will be overcome, as they arise, through the hard and the exacting day-to-day work of consultation, negotiation, and adjustment which are the essence of successful cooperation among free peoples.

## 'World Has Its Chance'

Eight years ago my great predecessor, Cordell Hull, when speaking before the council on foreign relations, called for "a world organized for peace and advancing civilization, rather than for war and degrading savagery."

Now, after the devastating war which he foresaw, the world has its chance. It has taken sacrifice of millions of lives, the outpouring of our wealth and untold destruction and suffering, to bring us to this moment.

The San Francisco Conference will be a decisive juncture in the history of America and of the world. But we are only at the beginning of the long road to a lasting peace.

If we are to complete the journey, surely we will neither fail nor falter now when we have hardly begun upon it. American character and America's achievements have been fashioned by a high vision and good common sense. With that power of vision to keep the goal we seek always before us, and that common sense to guide us, I know that America will not fail either the world or herself.

7



DC-1

music. Conf -

26



## BAR SEEKS LIMITS IN OAKS PROPOSALS

Will Offer to Parley Revisions  
Designed to Safeguard Free  
Enterprise, National Rights

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.  
CHICAGO, April 6—The American Bar Association will offer to the San Francisco conference suggestions for changes and clarifications in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals designed to protect free enterprise and safeguard national rights.

A committee report, adopted today by the association's board of governors, said:

"At least at the start, the powers of any economic and social council, if such is created, should be kept purely advisory, and should not include the power to intervene in the economic or social institutions, or the ways of life of any country."

It suggested that primary emphasis be put on establishing justice, broadening the scope and authority of international law, providing sound and durable bases of representation and devising effective means for preventing aggression rather than on "giving sanctions for ambitious, elaborate plans for re-making the structure of free enterprise society and the industrial and social institutions of the world."

A recommendation adopted by the board outlined a procedure by which each nation, in accordance with its own constitutional processes, could ratify and agree to a statement of the principles of international law to be formulated by an international conference on the law of nations.

This, it was explained, would not only protect the rights of individual nations but would also give the proposed Permanent Court of International Justice a definite and agreed-upon body of principles as the basis for its deliberations.

Another adopted recommendation provided that a constitutional assembly be convened not later than the seventh year after the charter of the international organization became effective, and regularly thereafter at intervals of not more than ten years, to consider amendments.

## Dumbarton Oaks

By Ernest Lindley

### Amendments Will Be Offered

ALTHOUGH THE DUMBAR-  
TON OAKS agreement has, on the whole, weathered critical examination, a number of amendments will be offered at San Francisco and at least a few almost certainly will have to be adopted.

Senator Vandenberg wants to be sure that the world organization will have power to review and revise political settlements made during the present war. Under Dumbarton Oaks, it already has been given that power, and more. According to the agreement, any situation may be brought to the attention of the world organization. Whether the situation in question arose from a political settlement made during this war or from one made earlier would make no difference. But the Senator apparently wants the final charter of the world organization to be more explicit about this.

THE VOTING PROCEDURE agreed upon at Yalta almost certainly will be opposed by some of the smaller nations. But there is little likelihood that it will be altered in any important way. Whether a great power has, or is denied, the right to veto action against itself is a question rather far removed from reality. Either way, a great power cannot be restrained or coerced without a major war, and the other great nations will not restrain or coerce it unless they consider the issue important enough to justify fighting a major war. It would seem honest intellectually to recognize this by permitting a great power to veto action against itself.

Sumner Welles has suggested that the proposed Big Five—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, China and France—be made a Big Six, by giving Brazil a permanent seat on the world security council, with a corresponding increase in the total

size of the council from 11 to 13 members. Some of the other Latin-American nations probably will be less interested in that than in making sure that one or two of the temporary seats on the council are always filled from the Western Hemisphere.

The San Francisco conference clearly will have to go into the question of regional security arrangements more thoroughly than was done at Dumbarton Oaks. Regional arrangements were specifically authorized at Dumbarton Oaks. But the tendency there was to heap the responsibility for keeping the peace on the world organization instead of decentralizing it. Under Dumbarton Oaks, the nations of the Western Hemisphere could not act to preserve the peace within the hemisphere without the prior authorization of the world security council. This discovery came as a shock to many during the discussions at Mexico City which led to the Act of Chapultepec.

REGIONAL AGREEMENTS, and all special alliances, must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the world security organization, as the Act of Chapultepec certainly is. If the close neighbors of a threatening aggressor can deal with him effectively, so much the better. The world organization would want to be sure that they were. In fact, dealing with a threat to the peace and not ganging up on an innocent party. But this safeguard might be established without requiring a prior authorization from the world security organization before a regional group could act. The close neighbors usually know what is going on sooner than more distant observers do. In most cases, what should cause concern to the world organization is not regional action to curb an aggressor, but failure by the regional group to act promptly and effectively.

DC-1

musi. Cont. - 27

# Text of Stettinius' Statement on Parley Plans

WASHINGTON, April 3 (AP)—Following is the statement issued today by Secretary Stettinius on the San Francisco Conference:

At a press conference on Friday, March 30, correspondents submitted to the Department of State for consideration a number of questions relating to representation in the General Assembly of the proposed United Nations organization, a matter that was discussed at the Crimea Conference.

The inquiries submitted related to various aspects of several principal questions: whether unpublished agreements had been made at Yalta; why the American representatives at Yalta agreed to support the Soviet proposals for initial membership of two Soviet republics in the proposed international organization; whether it was agreed that the two Soviet republics would have separate representatives at the San Francisco Conference; why the agreements with reference to the proposal for initial membership of two Soviet Republics had not been announced; and whether the agreements on the subject of representation in the General Assembly affected the principle of sovereign equality of peace-loving nations expressed in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

I wish to make the following statement in response to these questions:

Both military and political questions were covered at the Crimea Conference. The military plans agreed to at Yalta and related matters connected with the defeat of the common enemy can be made known only as they are carried out.

## Other Matters Dealt With

Among the other matters dealt with at the Crimea Conference were several open questions left over from the Dumbarton Oaks conversations: the voting procedure in the Security Council; invitations to the United Nations Conference on International Organization; the time and place of the conference; initial membership in the international organization; and the possible addition to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of provisions relating to territorial trusteeship.

The decisions taken at Yalta with reference to the time and place of the United Nations Conference were made public in the communiqué issued at the close of the Crimea Conference. The voting procedure in the Security Council was not announced until after consultations on this subject with the Government of the Republic of China and the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

Following these consultations, the voting procedure together with the text of the invitation and the list of nations to be invited to the San Francisco Conference were made public on March 5, approximately a month after the close of the Crimea Conference.

The only other decisions reached at Yalta and not made public in the Crimea Conference communiqué related to initial membership in the international organization when it meets, and to territorial trusteeship.

The Soviet representatives at Yalta proposed that the White Russian and the Ukrainian Republics be initial members of the proposed international organization. This was a question for the United Nations assembled at San Francisco to consider and decide.

In view of the importance which the Soviet Government attached to this proposal, the American representatives at

## Case Against Security Talks Delay

*Stettinius Making Public Two Reasons Is Backed by Officials in Washington Who Offer Five More*

By ARTHUR KROCK

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 3—Two reasons were cited publicly today by the Secretary of State E. R. Stettinius Jr. for proceeding with the San Francisco conference of the United Nations on the date that has been set—April 25. These reasons were: (1) the accelerating tempo of military and political events, instead of suggesting delay in planning post-war security, counsels proceedings on schedule; and (2) no other government has indicated a wish for postponement.

But there are other reasons, not mentioned by Mr. Stettinius, which are being privately advanced against postponement by administration officials and which, if they are not echoes of the President's own views, are also believed to be persuasive with him. These arguments, of course, take into account the fact that, prior to the San Francisco meeting, a further effort will be made by representatives of the chief anti-Axis military nations, assembled in Washington, to reduce to a minimum international differences of opinion of how to deal with at least one subject on the agenda—mandated, enemy and colonial territory. But, even if these anterior conferences achieve no reduction, or—taking up more issues—accentuate the differences, the officials who offer the additional reasons believe they remain effective.

## Views Voiced by Officials

As stated to this correspondent today they are:

1. It was always unlikely that the problems inherent in setting up a post-war system of world security would be resolved for all the United Nations in any charter. And, if the unlikely had been achieved at Dumbarton Oaks, or is accomplished (so far as the larger

nations are concerned) at the Washington meetings prior to San Francisco, it is still possible that sudden new developments of the war may produce other differences.

As was once said of restoring specie payments, "the way to resume is to resume," and the applicable paraphrase is, "the way to begin is to begin." Any effort is progress toward the great objective; any accord is more progress; and to know all the details of the points in dispute is progress, too.

2. The various shifts and new demands of Soviet Russia are disturbing and disappointing. But to make these the basis of postponing the first concerted attempt of the United Nations to write a post-war charter of world security would be a counsel of perfectionism that amounts to defeatism; an act of timidity at the outset of a great enterprise unworthy of the sacrifices and objectives of the two world wars.

New difficulties may arise with Soviet Russia between now and April 25, perhaps at the Washington meetings. It is conceivable that Soviet Russia may withdraw from the San Francisco conference on the ground that the field of constructive expectancy is too limited.

But, even should these depressing developments come, the conference should begin its effort as planned.

3. The civilized world has sought for hundreds of years to eliminate war or make it infrequent by abolishing the causes, cutting them to an irreducible minimum and providing international machinery to accomplish those ends. The last great attempt failed in the first two decades of this century for reasons which are fairly clear and against the repetition of which

every possible provision has been made.

If the goal is not attained in two tries—Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco—that is a tiny period to measure against the long, bloody and fruitless past, and supplies no basis for discouragement. If the United Nations must recess and reassemble several times before they work out a post-war security plan, that is a small price to pay in time for what the world has aspired to for centuries.

## Tie With Britain Stressed

4. The immediate objectives are to obtain as much agreement at San Francisco as can now be obtained, and to build as broad a foundation of concerted views between the United States and Great Britain as can be built.

5. Whatever course Soviet Russia may follow in the immediate future, its national interest requires eventual adhesion to any world security system set up by the other United Nations. This ultimate result may be counted on confidently.

In the meantime, hope, resolve and the clear benefits and necessities of accord provide satisfactory cushions against any recent or interim differences and disappointments.

These five arguments are a composite of statements made to this correspondent by very high officials who have been laboring in the international security field for many years. They undoubtedly are as authoritative as the two reasons against postponement which Mr. Stettinius, handling himself very well in most difficult circumstances, gave against postponement at his press conference today.

Yalta, having the utmost respect for the heroic part played by the people of these republics in their unyielding resistance to the common enemy and the fortitude with which they have borne great suffering in the prosecution of the war, agreed that the Government of the United States would support such a Soviet proposal at San Francisco if made. No agreement was, however, made at Yalta on the question of the participation of these republics in the San Francisco Conference.

In the circumstances, the American representatives at Yalta believed that it was their duty to reserve the possibility of the United States having three votes in the General Assembly. The Soviet and British representatives stated their willingness to support a proposal, if the United States should make it, to accord three votes in the assembly to the United States.

## Decision of the President

The President has decided that at the San Francisco Conference the United States will not request additional votes for the Government of the United States in the General Assembly.

Announcement of these proposals was made first to the United States delegation to the San

Francisco Conference. In order to correct the impression conveyed by partial publication of the facts, public announcement was made prior to a final determination of the course to be followed by the delegation with regard to possible additional representation for the United States.

As to territorial trusteeship, it appeared desirable that the Governments represented at Yalta, in consultation with the Chinese Government and the French Provisional Government, should endeavor to formulate proposals for submission to the San Francisco Conference for a trusteeship structure as a part of the general organization.

This trusteeship structure, it was felt, should be designed to permit the placing under it of the territories mandated after the last war, and such territories taken from the enemy in this war, as might be agreed upon at a later date, and also such other territories as might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship. No discussion was had at Yalta or is contemplated prior to, or at, San Francisco regarding specific territories.

The basis of the San Francisco Conference remains the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. It is for the conference to decide whether

any proposal affecting voting in the General Assembly of the proposed United Nations organization impairs the principle of sovereign equality, just as the conference itself must determine the application and interpretation of any general principles enunciated in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

In other words, the San Francisco Conference will doubtless vote on many proposals for the detailed setting up of the United Nations organization, and there is no way of knowing what the proposals will be. The final organization will be passed on by the United Nations in accordance with their customary procedures, and it is hoped and believed that this great effort to eliminate future wars will receive practically unanimous approval.

This Government believes that the rapid tempo of military and political developments, far from requiring postponement of the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, makes it increasingly necessary that the plans for this organization worked out at Dumbarton Oaks will be carried on promptly.

We have, moreover, received no indication that any Government believes that the conference should be postponed.

DC - / muse . G-4 - 38

---

W. B. Post 4-3-45

## Letters To The Editor

Communications must carry writer's name and address, though pen names are permitted at the editor's discretion. Letters should be held to not more than 200 words. They are subject to condensation.

### San Francisco—International Peace

The efforts of President Roosevelt and others to win American participation in an international organization to insure peace by the united action of peace-loving nations against future aggression are being hampered somewhat by those who argue that the plan for an international organization which was drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks and at Yalta is not a perfectly just one.

There is some truth in this argument. But we have an instructive analogy in American history—when Abraham Lincoln was trying to preserve the Union. He took as his first task the preservation of the Union and said he was willing, if that was the necessary price of Union, to have it at least for a time half slave and half free. The preservation of the Union came first; the establishment of justice by ending slavery within the Union came second. Actually, slavery was not ended until after the Civil War was over, for it remained in the slave States which were loyal to the Union for two years after Lincoln's death.

Today we have the problem of creating, not just preserving, a world union. That is our first task, rather than achieving complete justice at the outset in the constitution of such a union before we agree to participate in it.

There will almost certainly be

some injustices both in the world union and in the peace settlement. But those wrongs can be righted very much more easily if we join such a union to preserve the peace than if we remain outside. Most of such injustices are due to the effort of some nation to win security by separate action. If we can assure peace by collective action, the injustices due to the attempts of strong nations to make themselves secure through power politics will become easier to rectify.

ALFRED BAKER LEWIS.  
New York City, March 31.

Of the 46 invited nations, each must be treated as an entity, as a vote primarily interested in its own welfare, at San Francisco.

The dilemma which differing levels of power and influence poses was solved under similar circumstances in 1787 at Philadelphia. The delegates there assembled wanted more than a government for consultative purposes, therefore voting was important. The Great Compromise set up two standards for selecting the legislature, population and State sovereignty or equality, which in practice gave us a bicameral Congress and a Federal system.

Could not some of this same voting technique be used in the assembly?

WILBUR DUNBAR.  
College Park, Md., April 1.

### Difference Not Demolishment

The San Francisco Conference can easily be wrecked by ill-considered and ingenuous attacks on the diplomatic negotiations now going on between the three big powers, Russia, Great Britain and ourselves. Evil, as well as stupid forces are at work to line up the smaller nations against the larger ones. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the Yalta agreement are being attacked as a disguised attempt to form another Holy Alliance.

The excitement created by the fact that a difference exists between the big powers concerning the relative weight of votes in the proposed new world organization may be understandable, but nevertheless, greatly to be deplored.

Any careful observer must have been aware long ago that serious differences have existed in the diplomatic negotiations with Russia. He also must have realized that these differences are not solved by newspaper diatribes or radio fulminations. He surely should know that in wartime nothing should be said or done to destroy unity of action with one's allies.

Personally, I cannot see why

people are so excited concerning this issue of voting power. The League of Nations recognized that every independent country had the right of representation. Canada and other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations could never be denied this right. In view of the natural affinity of the United States with Canada, as well as with others of the Dominions, it seems very strange that any American should object to their voting alongside of us on important issues.

And then, too, there is the great bloc of nations of the Western Hemisphere that must have almost a preponderant influence in any world organization. We certainly should not object. But if Russia should feel concerned because of what she fears to be the undue weight of influence exerted by Great Britain and ourselves, why should anyone get alarmed? Any attempt to forestall an open controversy with Russia at San Francisco by a preliminary concession would not seem so terribly reprehensible. The more so as nothing can be definitely settled by the Big Powers anyway. This thorny question is only one of many such which will have to be dealt with

by the United Nations at San Francisco.

Only friends of the Axis could wish to see this conference break down. But all who wish the conference to succeed should refrain from ill-considered and ungenerous criticism of the attempt of our own Government to smooth out serious differences in advance. Good sense, as well as a sense of fair play, should prevent further public discussion or newspaper inquisitions which might gravely embarrass the relations of the big powers and even wreck the San Francisco Conference before it has assembled.

PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN.  
Washington, D. C., March 31.

30-1

mini

Conf

63


What S. F. ... WDE Post  
3-13-45

# Today and Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

## Before San Francisco

THE STATE DEPARTMENT is making every effort to see to it that before the San Francisco Conference our people are well-informed about the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. But I cannot help thinking that the department is devoting too much attention and emphasis to the objectives, which few are criticizing, and to the mechanics of the organization, which is not of the first importance.



LIPPMANN

The point which is, I believe, least understood and, therefore, most needs careful and sustained explanation, is that the Dumbarton Oaks Charter is not now an instrument for making peace but one for keeping the peace. Though eventually the distinction between these two operations will disappear, we shall confuse everything if we do not hold to it firmly at San Francisco and for some years after the fighting ceases.

WHEN WE LOOK at some of the matters that have to be decided and acted upon, we can best see why the making of this peace is not the business at San Francisco and of the new world organization. There are the new frontiers of Germany, of Japan, and of their satellites. There is the problem of governing Germany in the period which begins with the disintegration of her armies and the dissolution of the German state and will last until the Allies can restore and dare to restore sovereign equality to the German nation. There are the problems of provisional governments in liberated countries, and of how these provisional governments are to become legitimate governments exercising the full international rights of sovereign states. There are the problems of the territories which Germany and Japan are to lose, some temporarily and some permanently, and how they are to be administered. There is the whole complicated task of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and of how the nations are to demobilize and reconvert and how a normal trade is to be established. These and many other similar problems are the substance of

not be made, as so many suppose, at San Francisco, or by the Security Council which will be instituted at San Francisco. These particular treaties and conventions will define the rights and duties of the nations that sign and ratify them, and it is here that most of the immediate practical questions about the small, the middle-sized, and great powers will be answered concretely. It will be, for example, at a signing of the convention to demilitarize Germany, that a country like Canada, the Netherlands, and Brazil will have the opportunity to stipulate how far it is committed, what military or economic force it will contribute to the pacification of Germany.

Commitments as respects Germany, as respects Japan, will not be defined in the Dumbarton Oaks Charter but in specific treaties. Because there will be many specific treaties dealing with most of the concrete situations that need international regulation, it reflects a misunderstanding of Dumbarton Oaks to treat the Charter as if it were the whole scheme of international relationships.

ONE OF THE GREAT unfinished chapters of the Dumbarton Oaks plan is to define the relationship between the world organization and the local, the specific, and regional agreements and institutions which, like Pan-America, already exist, or will have to be created. The American people have had a long experience of this very problem of the relation between a federal constitution and state constitutions, between constitutional and statute and common law. The experience will stand us in good stead if we draw upon it now.

From this experience we can learn also a lesson of the greatest pertinence, namely that the initial text of a constitution does not establish a constitutional order. An order has to be developed by judicial decision, by legislation, and also by usage and custom. Moreover, the way in which a constitutional order works in fact depends upon things which often cannot be described in the constitution, for example in our own case, the two party system. It is not mentioned in the Constitution but the American government, as we know it, is inconceivable without the party system.

peace-making, and they cannot be taken in hand and dealt with by the world organization. For one thing the organization does not as yet exist whereas many of these problems have already had to be dealt with, at least in some measure. For another thing, the world organization, precisely because it covers the world, cannot deal effectively with the particular and regional issues that arise in making peace.

THE PEACE will be made by a series of treaties and conventions embodying concrete decisions on the unsettled issues arising from this war. The peace will

IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS politics is called diplomacy, and we must not imagine that, having created the world organization, diplomacy will disappear. Diplomacy will continue operating through the Security Council and the Assembly but also outside these institutions in direct intercourse among the nations concerned in particular problems.

That is another reason for not over-emphasizing the mechanism of voting and of membership. For diplomatic intercourse will be the real determinant of how the mechanism is to operate.

DC-1 misc. Conf -

40



# Dumbarton Oaks

By Paul Winkler

## Amendment Procedure

MOST OF THE NATIONS which have proposed changes so far in the Dumbarton Oaks plan have paid little attention to a section which may prove in the future to be of much greater importance than it seems now: Chapter XI, dealing with amendments. Two of the most comprehensive memoranda suggesting modifications in the original text, those of the French and the Dutch, make no mention of this clause. Among the Latin-American nations which have already commented on the plan, only Costa Rica and Venezuela have proposed changing the requirements for amending the agreement.

Yet the experience of the League of Nations should serve as a warning on the danger of too great rigidity in the basic structure. Inflexible requirements for amendment do not, as one might thoughtlessly assume at first glance, strengthen the organization, but weaken it. They give to it not cement, but sclerosis.

### Amendments Difficult

Now the fact is that the Dumbarton Oaks chapter on amendments is so stiff as to make modifications virtually impossible on any important point. Any amendments must be adopted in the first place by two-thirds of the General Assembly. This, judging from the experience of the League of Nations, might not be too difficult, but the hitch comes in the next stage. They must then be ratified, according to their regular constitutional processes, by all the permanent members of the Security Council—for instance, United States ratification would demand a two-thirds vote of the Senate—and also by a majority of all the other members of the organization.

Little attention has been paid so far to these provisions. A similar tendency caused the drafters of the Covenant of the League of Nations to include in it a passage on amendments

which not only proved to have a stifling effect upon it, but was even worded in so imprecise a fashion that its interpretation provoked much trouble at Geneva.

It is clear that the Dumbarton Oaks text provides an improvement. However, in practice, it developed at the League that it was not the severe requirement for adopting an amendment in the first place which was the greatest obstacle to change, but the ratification procedure which had been carefully and exactly set down in the Covenant. The clause covering it stated that "amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly."

### Ratification Was Difficult

It was the ratification procedure, not the adoption procedure, in spite of the apparent greater difficulties offered for the latter, which prevented important amendments from being made to the League Covenant. For instance, the weakness of the provisions on sanctions, which was shown up so fatally at the time of the Ethiopian war, might have been rectified by amendments which were adopted, by unanimous vote, in 1921, 1924 and 1925—but none of them were ever ratified.

The amendment deadlock even got in the way of its own undoing. As early as 1921, it became the clear consensus of opinion in the League of Nations that the shortcomings, imprecisions and undue rigidity of Article 26, on amendments, had to be corrected. In October, 1921, an improved clause was voted by the league—but this was never ratified either.

Since all of these amendments which failed of ratification had been adopted by the necessary unanimous vote, it is clear that nations whose representatives had voted in favor of the amendments at league meetings repudiated them when it came to the question of ratifying their action. In the case of the amendment on amendments itself, a decisive majority of Assembly members did ratify it—37 states—but it failed nevertheless because it did not secure the necessary unanimous ratification of Council members.

This is a perfect example of the principle that once a defective clause on amendments is adopted in a constitutional document, it becomes an impediment to the good working of the whole document. It exemplifies the fact also that it is the most important and the most vital

changes which are blocked (since these are naturally the most contested), for while vital changes were failing of ratification at the League, much less important changes to Articles 4, 6, 12, 13 and 15 were adopted, ratified and put into force.

The conclusion is clear. Unless a formula for amendment can be found which allows the necessary flexibility and adaptability, the amendment clause threatens to set up a vicious circle of impotence which will invalidate the entire effort for international cooperation.

DC-1 music. Conf - 41

# THE NATION

## San Francisco Prepares

Preparations for the San Francisco parley were proceeding last week. Secretary Stettinius announced that, despite President Roosevelt's death, the United Nations Conference on International Organization, to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks formula for peace, will open "as scheduled" on April 25. The reaction of Soviet Ambassador Gromyko seemed to sum up the attitude of delegates of forty-seven countries gathering in Washington, preparatory to the parley: "The best tribute to the late President would be to carry on the work of the conference." President Truman, it was reported, will not attend, but will probably address UNCIO by radio.

Earlier in the week the Administration had frankly brought attention to what is perhaps the crucial question facing American delegates to the parley: Shall the United States representative on the Council of the proposed security organization have the power to send American troops against a future aggressor without previous reference to Congress? Spokesman for the Government was Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which has wide authority over treaties. At a Washington gathering, attended by some twenty Ambassadors and Ministers, he said: "It is absolutely essential that our representative have power to act in all cases of emergency. We have learned that aggressor powers can and do act promptly, and unless the [World Security] Council is able to act promptly there would be little use in acting at all. \* \* \* Use of force under the conditions contemplated is not an act of war. It is an act to prevent war."

Whether the Senate—and the American people—will back the idea of vesting in their delegate this exceptional authority is conjectural. The Dumbarton Oaks charter proposes that each member State hold a force available, including "air force contingents" for combined international enforcement action. Under the Constitution only Congress may "declare war" or call "forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union." Senate critics of the proposal fear that the Executive would encroach on sacred legislative ground. Against this, proponents hold up the example of the old League of Nations, which had so frequently failed to take action against the peace-breakers.

## For "Justice"

Last week also Senator Arthur Vandenberg, one of the Republican members of the American delegation, raised a similar question in pre-conference discussions with other members and State Department officials. He offered a series of amendments which recommended that "justice"—the word does not appear in the objectives of the tentative draft—be written into the charter, made the criterion for action by the new league. The delegation voted to ask at San Francisco for a provision establishing "justice" and promotion of "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

At the same time jurists of thirty-eight countries held long, closed meetings to consider the principal judicial agency of the organization—an International Court of Justice. Under the charter, the court will be an integral part of the new organization (in contrast with the World Court of the old League, which was autonomous.) Many jurists, including the American, favor continuation and strengthening of the old court—permitted under the charter—because of the existence of several hundred international League treaties

that contain clauses referring to the Court.

Certain other issues were not clear cut. Whether Poland will be represented was unknown. The United States and Britain have rejected Russia's proposal that the Soviet-backed Provisional Government in Warsaw be admitted; though Allied talks are progressing in Moscow, leading Poles, including the 70-year-old former Prime Minister of Poland—Wincenty Witos—are reported "missing in Russia" by the London Polish government-in-exile. The whole question of mandates and colonial possessions was getting separate study. France will apparently offer amendments to incorporate existing bi-lateral treaties in the security system as a kind of "first line of defense."

## In The Nation

### 'Justice' in Broad Sense as League's Object

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, April 11—The accent on justice for human beings as well as groups and nations which, it is now said, the American delegation to the UNCIO at San Francisco will seek to insert in the draft of Dumbarton Oaks has a long ancestry in the state papers of this nation and of the United Kingdom. Senator Vandenberg, who offered this suggestion in several of his proposed amendments to the draft, pointed out that it is found in the preamble to the American Constitution.

But much more recently the theme, as a basic objective of a world security league was stressed by the Senator and fellow-Republicans. In their party platform of 1944, the emphasis is stronger and definition broader than in the Democratic platform that followed, though there was manifestly no partisan difference of opinion on Mr. Vandenberg's belief that such an "enterprise" as the projected league must depend for acceptance and enduring quality "far more on moral authority than on force." Nevertheless, this point was larger in the minds of the Republican platform writers than in those of their rivals.

## Treaties Should Be Just

Senator Austin, who was the principal draftsman of the foreign policy statements in the Republican platform, carefully put the word "peace" before the word "force" to illustrate the view that the military strength of the international association should be employed primarily to achieve the high ends of "justice." And through his context the same thread runs:

We believe, however, that peace and security do not depend on the sanction of force alone but should prevail by virtue of reciprocal interests and spiritual values recognized in these security agreements. The treaties of peace should be just. \* \* \* The organized cooperation of the nations should promote a world opinion to influence the nations to right conduct [and] develop international law.

The platform also endorsed, as did the Democratic, creation under the league of a world court to render organized, legal justice. But, as the above passage demonstrates, a much broader kind was also in view.

## 'Why Not Say It?'

The Democrats called for a "just" and lasting peace in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms—and the "justice" which the Republicans then and now are emphasizing is implicit in this call, as also in the draft of Dumbarton Oaks. But Mr. Austin made it explicit in the platform planks he wrote at Chicago, and Mr. Vandenberg proposes that the charter of the United Nations shall be equally so.

With this purpose, he would add the following to the defined objectives of the new league: "To establish justice and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." And apparently, accepting his general position that it is better to state than to imply, the American delegation is to go along with him.

"I see no reason," wrote Mr. Vandenberg in support of this amendment, "why the Economic and Social Council [proposed as a subdivision of the league] should be the only branch \* \* \* interested in 'the creation of conditions of stability and well-being.'" And he quoted these comments of the Netherlands Government: The absence of the sentence he would add is "very striking"; embodiment in the text of a pledge that "some standard of justice will always be observed would go a long way toward dissipating anxieties"; and "it appears difficult to see why, if the thing is self-evident, there could be any objection to making such a statement."

## Value of Mere Words

Pursuing his point, he proposed to insert "justice" in three other places where the Dumbarton Oaks conferees omitted it. And his seventh amendment would instruct the Security Council, if it shall find "injustice" in any situation, "to recommend appropriate measures of adjustment which may include revision of treaties and of prior international decisions."

Mr. Vandenberg may have to be content with more restrictive language in the additions that seem likely to be made to the Dumbarton Oaks draft with respect to the emphasis on broad justice for individuals, groups and nations as a primary objective of the league. But the emphasis will surely be there, as Mr. Austin made sure it was in the platform plank he wrote. And, prior and subsequent to these efforts, Mr. Hoover and Hugh Gibson proposed it in their books and articles on the same subject.

#### **Enlightened Self-Interest**

The words are, of course, only words. And if the great nations on which the new league will depend for success do not enter upon the task in the spirit of those words, and nurture that spirit, what Mr. Vandenberg is urging may as well be out of as in the charter. It is also obvious that if this spirit exists and persists, the reiteration of the word "justice" will be in the minor category of effect and not in the major one of cause. In that condition also the words might as well be out as in.

But, as the sound and solid Dutch have pointed out, the specific pledge and the broad definition will "go a long way toward dissipating anxieties" in the minds of those persons and nations whose experience makes it difficult to believe the strong have learned that to dispense justice to the weak is enlightened self-interest.

DC - 1      misc. Conf -      42

20. v  
Global Weekly

WDC Post  
3-6-45

# Today and Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

## Unfinished Business

ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT said that there was 90 per cent agreement at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference last summer

and that "the other 10 per cent was ironed out at Yalta," what this really means is that there is now agreement on the problems which the four powers deemed it most important to discuss. There are other problems, which they have touched on only lightly and vaguely, that will have to be solved before the other nations can confidently accept the charter, before in fact the charter can be made a workable instrument.

By analogy from our own constitutional system, the unsettled problems of Dumbarton Oaks have to do with the relation between the central authority and the local. There is much hard thinking still to be done on this, the fundamental problem in the making of any constitutional system. The problem has been raised but not settled at Mexico City. Here too is the basic reason why France is withholding her unqualified endorsement. Only by solving these problems more clearly than has as yet been done, will it be possible to meet the criticisms which Canada, the Netherlands, and, I believe, Brazil and Mexico, are making. Finally, it can be shown, I think, that the question of how much authority to use armed force the Congress should delegate to the President can be answered properly only after we have clarified the relation between the Dumbarton Charter and other peace-keeping agreements—the Inter-American, the treaties to deal with Germany, with Japan, and in other regions of the world.

AMERICAN THINKING in this field has been retarded because in the State Department the leading expert advisers of Mr. Hull, notably Mr. Leo Pasvolaky, started off initially with the idea that the world organization should have a monopoly in keeping the peace. They looked upon any security arrangement which was not world wide as a regrettable deviation

reason why the Security Council is attacked as being an attempt at a three-power dictatorship over mankind: if all authority to keep the peace could be concentrated there, that is just what it would be. It is also the reason why the "realistic" governments—meaning those which like France and the Soviet Union have been invaded and will now take no chances—are insisting on specific pacts to make sure of their own security.

BUT FOR THIS well-intentioned but over-theoretical desire to make Dumbarton Oaks a global monopoly, the question of how much authority to delegate to the President would have little practical interest. He would be given—as it is going to work out he will be given—specific congressional authority to enforce a German settlement. He will be given specific authority to enforce a Japanese settlement. He will be given specific authority to maintain inter-American security. Other grants of specific authority will no doubt be considered also. After that the general authority needed in the Dumbarton Oaks organization will be so modest that it presents no serious issue.

All the occasions where force might have to be applied to a great power, and might therefore mean war, will have been covered by specific treaties. The use of force against a great power which is a member of it is outside the jurisdiction of the world organization, and, therefore, force will rarely be needed and can never on a large scale be employed, by the world organization. The real task of peace-keeping, of policing, of pacification will be the duty of specific groups of nations operating under specific treaties and agreements—with the world organization acting as a coordinating and mediating institution among them, and as a kind of tribunal of last appeal.


THERE HAS BEEN, therefore, a tendency to exaggerate the unique importance of the Security Council, and so to become too greatly concerned about its membership and its method of voting, and its power to commit nations to use force. In fact, under one name or another there will not be one security council

from the ideal of a universal society pledged to follow universal principles. At the beginning they expected the new league to do all the peace-keeping, to enforce the demilitarization of Germany and of Japan, to manage the pacification of liberated Europe and of liberated Asia, and its charter was to supersede, to eliminate and liquidate not only the military alliance of this war but also all the specific alliances such as the Anglo-Soviet, the Franco-Soviet, or an Anglo-French.

This conception of the Dumbarton Oaks organization as a global monopoly has had gradually to be modified. But any modification has been regarded officially among the State Department's experts as a rather regrettable concession by the children of light to the children of this world. Yet the desire to concentrate the whole power and responsibility for keeping peace in one institution, instead of decentralizing it, is the main cause of most of the serious criticism of Dumbarton Oaks. It is the

but many security councils, much as there are in the United States not merely one legislature and one Constitution but 49 legislatures and 49 constitutions, and innumerable municipal charters as well. There will be a council for Germany, another for Japan, one for the American republics, quite conceivably one for the Middle East, still another in southeast Asia, one or more for Africa, one for the Caribbean, etc., etc.

This is a complicated structure. But this is a complicated world. And as we prepare for San Francisco we ought not to imagine that the plans of the structure are complete. Many of the most difficult parts of any workable plan have still to be worked out. So it is a fair question whether we are sending to San Francisco as strong a team as we shall need. For while our delegation is well-chosen politically, some men distinguished for their grasp of constitutional problems could with great advantage be attached to it as advisers.



LIPPMANN

DC-1

Misc. Conf - 43

# WASHINGTON DRIVES ON FOR NEW WORLD LEAGUE

## Roosevelt Death Does Not Alter Our Will to Gain at San Francisco Start of Peace Organization

### RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA TEST

By EDWIN L. JAMES

President Truman has proclaimed his determination to carry forward with all energy the plans of the late President Roosevelt for the establishment of a world organization to preserve the peace as representing the great gain which the United States wishes to get out of a victory in World War II. It is not without significance that the first declarations of the new President pointed in this direction. With the San Francisco Conference ten days away, the country stands pledged, without any change whatsoever, to the accomplishment of this great end. The White House, now and then, is pledged to it, both houses of Congress are pledged to it, and public opinion of the nation stands now overwhelmingly in favor of righting the wrong we did to ourselves and to the world after the end of the last war.

With Germany being crushed in an east-west pincers and with the war against Japan going favorably, there are very many pressing and immediate problems before President Truman and the other leaders of the United Nations. But over and beyond all those problems, the greater undertaking remains the pledge of the United States and of its associated nations.

Naturally, our enemies as well as our friends are watching with anxious eyes for any deviation from the policies of Mr. Roosevelt. The answer is that our enemies seem due for disappointment and our friends due for encouragement.

#### The Program Unchanged

Without policy in war and in peace unaltered, the first official word from the new President was that there would be no change in the date for the United Nations meeting in California. The new President will not attend, as the dead President had intended doing—that is the only official difference.

There may well be a moral difference: namely, that the nation, still mourning the death of its leader, will focus its attention on San Francisco with a keener rather than a lesser attention. The conference is going to be a difficult one, and everyone knows that. The aftermath of the conference will be difficult, and everyone knows that. The difficulties of making a world organization now are greater than those which met President Wilson a quarter of

far on its way to be changed now and there are oceans of arguments for doing things differently from the way they were done the last time.

#### Some Detailed Hurdles

Now at San Francisco one expects discussion of the veto power of the big powers on the use of military force to keep the peace, but over against that must be put the fact that the nations who have this veto power are the nations who bear the responsibility of using force. There is bound to be an argument over Russia's demand for three votes in the new Assembly which, based on political considerations, will produce no less acrimony. There are to be various other debates. Over against that may be put the record that the six votes of the British Commonwealth in the League never made much difference. With good-will, it is entirely possible that some formula can be found which will satisfy the sensibilities of Marshal Stalin without too much wounding the sensibilities of other nations. Before he died, Mr. Roosevelt said that one vote would do the United States. That ought to reassure nations whose interests and responsibilities in the Assembly will be far less than those of this country.

All in all, what will be needed at San Francisco will be a display of faith in the future and, indeed, the emphasis on that may well be the biggest contribution the Washington delegation can make to the San Francisco debates.

a century ago. But all that being said, the nation, officially and publicly, stands determined to get out of this war the big result which failed to come out of the last holocaust. Nobody in this country wishes a World War III and most people in this country wish to do something now to guarantee there will be no World War III.

Over against the patent difficulties there is the circumstance that the country is much more aware of the situation than it was in 1918. The war has cost us more in lives and in treasure. It has shown the country that we are not isolated, and there is no room for doubt that the people realize now much more the dangers of another war than they realized the last time the perils which would come our way if the peace was not kept.

#### How New Plan Works

As has been pointed out, the League of Nations came out of a peace conference. The Covenant was tied up with the Treaty of Versailles and much of the job of liquidating the war was placed on the new and struggling League. Now it is to be different. The war is to be liquidated by the big powers who win it. San Francisco is no peace conference. It is a meeting to prepare a new world organization, based on the foundations laid at Dumbarton Oaks, which will enter into function when the war has been finished and the peace has been made. It is a fundamental difference.

Of course, there will be complaints from nations who will argue they are being asked to sign something of a blank check in agreeing to take over a world which they do not help to shape. In a sense that will be true, but on the other hand the big victorious powers are to sit on the lid through any period of likely disturbances. The new plan is too

#### Russia's Opportunity

The opportunity is also great for Russia. There is no use trying to hide the circumstance that in the world there is some worry about Moscow's purposes. This fear is greater among other nations than it is with the United States and Britain, which have been most closely associated with Russia in the common war effort.

It has been aptly said that the United States and Britain favor the status quo, whereas Russia has not yet achieved the status she desires. On the other hand, there is ample indication that Stalin is above all a Russian nationalist who wishes a good place for his country in the comity of nations. If Moscow can convince San Francisco that such is the case and that Russia does not plan to install Communist regimes outside of her own borders, it might contribute greatly to the common result.

Therein lies one of President Truman's great tasks—namely, to continue the basis of cooperation among the United States, Britain and Russia to which his predecessor gave such effort. He is, it is understood, to have the benefit of the counsel of Judge Byrnes. The role of Russia in Poland, in Germany and in central Europe is going to have a tremendous bearing on the future. And there the President, the Secretary of State and Judge Byrnes have a big job ahead of them. For the three big powers have got to stick together for success in liquidating the war and in bringing the new world organization into being and in helping it to gain the stature it needs to prevent another world war.

In view of the great role Russia is to play, it would be a great gesture if, for example, Foreign Commissar Molotov were to change his plans and arrange to attend the conference.

DC-1

Miss. Conf -

44



# In The Nation

## Treaty "Reservations" Before Senate Again

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, April 9—The water treaty with Mexico, which the Senate will take up soon in its final stage, is an important compact in many ways. California and Nevada officially, and many Colorado River water-users individually, are opposed. But the advocates have made out a good case both from the factual and diplomatic standpoints. And the States through or beside which the Colorado River and the Rio Grande flow have demonstrated a very large measure of approval.

The treaty is important for another reason, however, and that is because—as in the instance of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919—an effort is to be made to attach reservations which supporters of the compact say would change the terms and amount to rejection. These proposed reservations were originally submitted as amendments by Senator Downey of California, and, in their new form, the test will be whether they have the force of amendments or are merely the Senate's "interpretations" of certain sections of the treaty.

The decision the Senate will make may well serve as a guide to its attitude toward the treaties of peace which will follow the end of World War II. If the Senate accepts what the sponsors call "reservations," but are actually "amendments" that will require renegotiation, efforts to apply the same technique to the peace compacts may be expected from Senators opposed to them, or to any substantial parts of them.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was submitted to the Senate in 1919 as an inseparable portion of the Treaty of Versailles. After much debate over reservations, President Wilson gave his approval to a set offered by Senator Hitchcock, then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, holding them to be interpretative and not amendatory. By the same definition he opposed a set of reservations offered by Senator Lodge. The end of the skirmishing was rejection of the treaty as a whole and the Covenant along with it.

### Barkley's Analysis

This Senate has argued for several days over procedure with a treaty under heavy fire from those who would amend it directly or in the form of reservations. Senator La Follette brought out the fact that all treaty amendments accepted or rejected while the Senate is sitting as "the committee of the whole"—a parliamentary fiction—may be proposed all over again when the "committee of the whole" has dissolved into the Senate it really was all the time. But, after these have been disposed of once more, and a "resolution of ratification" is offered (of the treaty as it was, or as amended), only "reservations" may then be proposed. "In other words," said the Vice President, "a reservation is not an amendment." But, as Senator Barkley pointed out, it can have the effect of one. And he said this will certainly be the case if Senator Downey offers as a reservation his amendment increasing the number of the International Boundary Commissioners from two to six.

We cannot [said Mr. Barkley] change the size of this commission which has been created by the Governments of the United States and Mexico \* \* \* either by amendment or reservation, without going back to Mexico to renegotiate the treaty or to have action on the part of Mexico in order to agree to the change. \* \* \* There is a difference between a reservation merely interpreting a treaty, or an article of a treaty, and a reservation changing the treaty. \* \* \* When we say we will not ratify the treaty unless the membership of the commission is increased to six, in effect we reject the treaty unless Mexico, by legislation or otherwise, or through negotiation \* \* \* should agree.

There are other Downey amendments, now to take form as reservations, to which the same objection will be made by those who favor the treaty in the form negotiated, plus the interpretative additions which the Committee on Foreign Relations has agreed to make. The Senate, when the ratification resolution comes before it, will be asked to reject all reservations which the treaty supporters analyze as amendments requiring renegotiation of the pact and, for the time being, constituting rejection of the treaty.

### An Awkward Alternative

But Senator Downey's tactics present another difficulty to those who are seeking ratification. A reservation can be adopted by majority vote of those present. But the resolution of final approval can pass only by the vote of two-thirds of those present. If, therefore, a "reservation" should be adopted which is opposed as requiring renegotiation of the compact, those in favor of the treaty would face the unpleasant alternative of voting for it in that form or marshaling two-thirds for the only other possible motion—to postpone its consideration indefinitely. Either event would be a defeat for the agreement in the form and substance negotiated.

The importance of the issue, and its possible bearing on opposition tactics when the peace treaties are considered, are not easily visible in these dusty parliamentary maneuvers. But they are there. And if the Senate rejects all "reservations" to the Mexican water treaty which the treaty's friends reasonably construe as amendments and not interpretations, it will be a hopeful sign for future, and vastly more grave, compacts between the United States and other nations.

DC-1 - misc. Conf -

45

# BIG 4 MINISTERS PLAN EARLY TALKS

Eden Says 'the More You Can  
Do in Advance' of Security  
Conference 'the Better'

By BERTRAM D. HULEN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 17—

Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, indicated tonight that there would be a meeting in Washington of Foreign Ministers of the four sponsoring powers in preparation for the international security conference which opens in San Francisco a week from tomorrow.

He made the statement at the State Department this evening after he had been in consultation with Secretary Stettinius more than an hour discussing "various problems confronting our Governments including the San Francisco Conference."

"In my experience the more you can in advance to prepare a conference the better," he said.

Some questions have developed since the Yalta agreements, notably the interpretation of the accord by which the British and United States Governments agreed to support the Soviet Union's request for three votes in the council, and the question of Polish representation at the conference. Asked if he felt that there was any foundation for optimistic reports on the prospects of a settlement of the reorganization of the Lublin Cabinet into the Provisional Government of National Unity, Mr. Eden said he would not wish to comment upon it at present. He expects a second talk with President Truman and will see Mr. Stettinius tomorrow.

## Arrival of Molotov Awaited

The date when the meeting of the four chief delegates is to take place is still in doubt, owing to uncertainty as to the time when Foreign Commissar Molotov will arrive in Washington. He is now expected either Thursday or Friday and will probably wish to confer with President Truman before undertaking other negotiations.

The prospect of the Big Four decisions raised again the question as to whether the Soviet Union, since the neutrality accord with Japan was denounced, will now be willing to sit with the Chinese delegation. At Dumbarton Oaks it was necessary to hold two successive meetings in which Chinese followed the Russians in the talks with British and United States delegations. Just a few days before President Roosevelt's death, however, Chinese and Russian Ambassadors here sat side by side in discussions.

T. V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister and Acting Premier, who also called on Secretary Stettinius today, would not commit himself on this subject, saying the best possible arrangements would be made.

Mr. Soong expressed the opinion that the declaration by Admiral Suzuki, Japanese Prime Minister, expressing sympathy with the

# THE DAY IN WASHINGTON

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, April 17—

President Truman briefly addressed the armed forces of the United States tonight after holding his first news conference earlier in the day.

The Senate continued its debate on the Mexican Water Treaty, rejecting two reservations before recessing at 8:05 P. M. until noon tomorrow.

The House heard Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo report on atrocities committed by the Japanese in the Philippines. A bill to permit Filipinos and those of Filipino descent to become American citizens was passed and sent to the Senate. The Appropriations Committee approved the \$24 billion Navy bill. The House adjourned at 2:22 P. M. until noon tomorrow.

American people over Mr. Roosevelt's death was a sign of the Japanese desire for peace.

## Many Delegations Arriving

Other delegates to the San Francisco conference are arriving now in quick succession. Among the callers at the State Department today were the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Henri Spaak, and Camille Gutt. The Egyptian delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Abdul-Hamid Badawi will soon start for the Pacific Coast with "several concrete proposals" to present to the conference. The Greek Ambassador, Cimon Di-Amontropoulos also called at the State Department to present the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Sofianopoulos.

In the House today Representative H. P. Kopplemann of Connecticut, spoke in behalf of a bill he introduced providing authority to the American representative on the international security council to pledge use of American armed forces as a policing measure to prevent a threat of war. He urged

joint action of Congress for a decision on this question.

Members of the United States delegation expect to complete their deliberations and their policy program by Friday. The jurists of the United Nations, who are meeting daily, expect to have ready their report by that time.

Scrap paper is precious—the armed forces urgently need it.

DC-1 music. Conf -

46

# 'PYGMIES' HELD BAR TO PEACE IN WORLD

Opponents of an International  
Agency Scored by Head of  
Wilson Foundation

Declaring that the fight for world peace might be "rough," Arthur Sweetser, president of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, said yesterday that opponents of an international organization would become active "when the war danger is past."

Mr. Sweetser spoke at formal dedication of the Woodrow Wilson House, 45 East Sixty-fifth Street, acquired in December as a center for activity in international affairs. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy in World War I, presented a key to the house to Mrs. Woodrow Wilson.

"Victory is possible," Mr. Sweetser asserted, "on one stern condition. The pygmies will come out of hiding again and attempt to disintegrate high ideals through prejudice, partisanship, distrust of our allies and small-mindedness, appealing to our fatigue, our patience and any other corroding emotion they can discover."

"Let us this time be forewarned and vigilant. Let us keep our perspective and ruthlessly resist anything which will make us fritter away the fruits of our victory in this war as we did those of the last war."

"God has given us a second chance, even those of us who were crushed last time. We owe it to the joint memory of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt to take the solemn obligation never to relax till we fulfill this chance."

## League of Nations Official

Mr. Sweetser, who attended the Paris Peace Conference and was an official of the League of Nations at Geneva for twenty years, said the names of Wilson and Roosevelt "seem destined to be ever more closely linked" as leading proponents of a world association for peace and justice.

"Mr. Wilson and Mr. Roosevelt," he declared, "have left us a great heritage and a great challenge. To our country has fallen the supreme honor of having produced two statesmen who, at the end of two world wars, led the world's battle for peace."

A telegram from President Truman to the foundation said:

"I send my greetings to all those lovers of peace and good-will among nations who are gathered today to dedicate the Woodrow Wilson House."

Mr. Daniels, only living member of the Cabinet in World War I, termed Wilson and Roosevelt "the Elijah and Elisha of this century." He said they would go down the ages as the foremost apostles of peace.

"It is my conviction," Mr. Daniels added, "that no two men have lived and been called to world leadership with such confident faith that war is an anachronism and can be avoided."

Three hundred persons attended the dedication. Among bouquets received was one from Mrs. Roosevelt, whose husband was the first president of the foundation. The home will serve also as headquarters for the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace and the American Association for the United Nations.

# GERMANS ENLARGE ON PARLEY RIFTS

Assume Differences Will Aid  
Them — British Officials  
Continue Their Plans

By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, April 6—Reports of disagreement among the Allies on matters related to the San Francisco Conference have inspired comment in the German press.

Commenting on the questions of Polish representation and multiple voting for the Soviet Union the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung says: "These are unmistakable signs heralding a political crisis in the camp of our enemies for which reason they desire nothing more urgently than that we should lay down our arms, knowing only too well that on this their chances of victory stand or fall."

"But we know this too and draw the only possible conclusion to fight until their timetables and their infamous plans lie in pieces at their feet."

A German foreign office spokesman suggested a quarrel between British and Americans as causing uneasiness about San Francisco Conference. After "the fiasco of Yalta."

The British, he said, were now in favor of indefinite postponement of the conference while for reasons of prestige Mr. Stettinius was advocating that the conference be held on the date fixed. Despite the doubts about the conference expressed in the British press officials are proceeding as scheduled with conference of commonwealth delegates who will go to San Francisco.

Other nations are going ahead with their plans. Jan Masaryk, foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, returned to Britain today after conferences in Moscow and is going to America.

Dr. Ivan Subasic, Yugoslav foreign minister, who is now in Moscow with Marshal Tito, is also reported to be preparing to leave soon for San Francisco.

Press pessimism here led the Tribune, Leftist labor party weekly, to say today "the shadow of next great war looms up ever before the thunder of the present one has died away. Surely mankind never faced a more terrible prospect." The Tribune has so little faith in the outcome of conference that it proposes that Socialist and trade union organizations of the world set to work to supplement the efforts of the governments themselves."

The economist foresees potential failure at San Francisco, arising from divergence in the Russian and American views calls on President Roosevelt to decide whether the conference should still be held.

The new statesman and nation admits the difficulties raised by some commentators but argues that the necessity to give these problems an airing before world public opinion is the very reason why the conference should be held.

DC -1 mix. Conf -

47

# Abroad

## Decisive Phase of Campaign for Collective Security

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

Stalin is the only one of the Big Three who has not, so far as we have heard, reported to his people on the Yalta Conference. But Mr. Roosevelt's report was published in extenso in the Soviet press. Churchill's disclosures to the House of Commons, soberer in tone and less revealing in content than usual, take their place in a long series of history-making accounts of the great operations and decisive meetings of the war. Until now the President has not followed his example. This time he went at once to the capitol on his return from his hard journey to give to Congress and the nation his first-hand story of the Crimean negotiations, and this action was as significant as anything in his speech. Because it revealed the end he has been working for since before Teheran and for which he accepts such dubious compromises as the decision on the Polish boundaries, "I didn't agree with it all by any means," he admitted.

It has been obvious for a long time that the President, in his early career not a fervent apostle of the League of Nations, has become as convinced as Woodrow Wilson was that this war must lead to an international security system in which the United States takes an active part. This may be said to be his paramount policy; it explains why the achievement of agreement and co-operation among the three powers—the *sine qua non* of any international organization—takes precedence over every other aim. Not only does this general objective overshadow lesser issues; the echoes and sequels of the Yalta conference suggest that Mr. Roosevelt is hopeful that a world security council, based on relations of confidence among the Big Three, can be counted on to correct the most unsatisfactory and unworkable of the war settlements.

This is going a long way on the Wilsonian road. Wilson believed that the League of Nations would rectify the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty. He may have been right; there was no chance to test his theory, because the League he envisioned never came into being. At any rate, Roosevelt is determined to avoid Wilson's errors by insuring the participation of the United States first. He is determined to get the peace machinery started before the war ends.

The formulas of agreement on thorny questions debated at the Yalta conference were, in the main, his formulas. The American delegation to San Francisco, where the cornerstone of the new edifice will be laid, is bipartisan and mostly Congressional. So were the consultations on world organization Secretary Hull carried on for months with the leaders of both houses. The present leadership of the State Department is making an unprecedented effort to mobilize public sentiment behind the Administration's foreign policy. The emissaries sent out into the country to explain the Dumbarton Oaks proposals give point to the remark going the rounds to the effect that "the State Department is establishing diplomatic relations with the United States."

The President's report on Yalta to a joint session of Congress is the opening of the final phase of the campaign. The United States is at the same crossroads it stopped at twenty-five years ago. By turning back we ran head-on into the war we tried to avoid, and this in itself is the strongest argument for taking the other road. The American people are more educated in world affairs than they were in Wilson's time. They have invested immeasurably more in the work and they have a greater stake in the peace. They are less idealistic. Mr. Roosevelt's address was on a matter-of-fact level; so is American thinking on this issue. There was hotter debate on the Polish issue and the Greek issue in England than there is here. If the British people give all but unanimous support to Mr. Churchill, despite their uneasiness on many points he has conceded, it is because they think he is pitted against stronger powers and that Britain must pay a price for their partnership.

The President is starting his campaign on the same note. There can be no hope of peace for us, he says in effect, unless it is guaranteed by the three most powerful nations. Even though this country has made up its mind to join a collective security system, it is subject to quick reactions, and it is to guard against these reactions in San Francisco and in the trying days beyond, that Congress and the public are given a glimpse behind the scenes.

There has never been any question of Britain's interest in a new society of nations. Nor is the United States the only uncertain quantity. Russia, too, has to be shown that she is safer in a collective security system than under a self-insurance policy. Stalin is said to be only lukewarm to the idea of international organization. But Russia will certainly join, as she did before, if he is convinced that the three major powers will stand together to maintain the peace, and the Yalta meeting, from all accounts, went far to assure him that they will. Stalin doesn't have to get the support of public opinion for his policies, but Roosevelt and Churchill do, and that puts the three statesmen in different positions, but it does not change the President's thesis that if Russia on one side and the American people on the other can be persuaded that, even for the most powerful, national security depends on international security, there will be—or "ought to be"—"the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries and have always failed."

DC-1 Musc. Conf -

48



## Equal World Rights Urged

Organization Like Our Senate and House Held More Representative

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Prof. Herbert F. Rudd has made a thoughtful and helpful analysis of the half-dozen leading suggestions for a sound basis of world organization, with a view to achieving fair representation for all nations on the governing body of the world organization which is to be created to deal with the problems of the world.

His own suggestion is that power over international affairs should belong to an assembly of 400 members, with 100 distributed on the basis of population, 100 on the basis of industrial production, 100 on the basis of foreign trade and 100 on the basis of general literacy and health achievements among the people.

Such a plan does not seem to me to be either feasible or desirable. According to the League of Nations Statistical Year Book, 1940-41, the total world population was then 2,169,837,000. On a continental basis, Africa had 157,330,000 inhabitants; Asia, exclusive of the U.S.S.R., 1,154,000,000; Europe, 402,000,000; the U.S.S.R., 172,000,000; North America, 184,260,000; South America, 88,680,000; Oceania, 10,803,000. The question I pose is, "Is any solution of this problem which does not give adequate representation to all the inhabitants of the earth a sound basis for a world constitution?"

It is true we must be realistic and take the world as it is constituted, rather than as it might be if we had an ideal human society. The Big Three or Four "Great Nations" (with help of small nations) have fought and are fighting and winning the battle for a free world. It is necessary, therefore, to accord to them the privilege and responsibility for safeguarding the dearly

won peace which is to follow World War II and for preventing a recurrence of such a terrible calamity.

I venture to suggest, however, that the unheard millions also have a right to a voice in shaping and running the world to come. To my mind, something analogous to universal suffrage might well be included as a basis for a World Parliament of Man, the dream of far-seeing poets and thinkers. The solution may be two bodies, such as our Senate, selected on the basis of states or nations, and a House of Representatives, based on population.

Taxation without representation is pretty well accepted to constitute tyranny. May not domination of the world without representation be likewise considered tyranny?

GEORGE B. BOOCHEVER.

New York March 25, 1945.

## Basic Law Held Need

Establishment Regarded as Main Issue at San Francisco

*The writer of the following letter is a former president of the Association of American Rhodes Scholars, a member of the Committee for National Morale and a trustee of the World Peace Foundation.*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

For over a decade we blamed the League of Nations because, although it had nearly everything else, it lacked force. Now, as we approach San Francisco, there is a tendency toward a holding up of hands at the thought that force as a pacifier is in the hands of a few great industrial powers.

No one of us citizens of these powers is in the slightest degree likely to offer to change this overbalance. Large and small, we the nations must gamble on ourselves as we are. It is a more principled gamble to bet on the United States - British Commonwealth - Soviet Russia - France - China - Allied Nations combination than on any other. Experience in the Assembly and in the Council of the League of Nations has shown that the moral and democratizing influence of small powers on great powers is a very real force. There is no possible further guarantee of the fairness of the large nations toward the small nations beyond the essential fairness and intelligence of their comparatively free peoples. If that is not a sound foundation, there is no other.

### Major Nations Bear Burden

The reservation contained in the Great Power veto on the use of force is but a realistic recognition of the fact that if the people back of that power cannot, in a later situation, feel the appeal of principle which they feel today, no present pledge by their Government would actually operate. To those industrial nations which must bear the greater burden of general defense there must fall the major decisions as to the use of force.

While the problem of individual liberties for citizens of other nations is vital one, we can approach it only in respect to how far the absence of such liberties constitutes a "menace to international peace and order and violence" which the dictates of humanity and justice shock the conscience of mankind. Only with such a proviso can we as to nations the right to determine kind of government they may want.

As to territories, while we can not to aggress, and can pledge ourselves to aid those who are aggrieved we cannot at this juncture do more than pledge to do the best we can to the conflicting issues of boundaries which, as yet, must be fluid.

### Program Analyzed

What essential yet feasible minimum does the Dumbarton Oaks program, as amplified at Yalta and since, hold out to us?

As its keystone, it pledges, so far as human beings can pledge, all-out force, when necessary, against violations of the elementary law of the community of nations. As a fundamental law, it recognizes as crimes against the nations those and similar primitive actions of aggression such as have lately been visited upon the world. It aims to stop the use of force as an instrument of purely national policy.

It institutionalizes in a Security Council the aims, pledges and actions of this present comradeship-in-blood among the United Nations.

It initiates a world military-staff committee to keep us prepared against major threats to the peace, with a possible quick-acting combination of national air forces for prompt monitoring police duty.

It affirms the right and duty of arbitral and conciliatory settlements in all situations short of complete defiance of peaceful means.

It perpetuates the institution of a court which already has a wide and admirable experience in the legal determination of rights under treaties and conventions.

### Provision for Welfare

It opens the door to a continuance and enlargement of all the ameliorative agencies of welfare relative to economic, labor and social conditions, which for so long have been valuable aspects of the work of certain League departments. It amply provides for the neighborliness of naturally assorted regions, without the dangers and embarrassments inherent in over-emphasis on the regional idea.

Any real need for change due to changed conditions is amply provided for in appeal to the Security Council, the court, or arbitration. Potential aggressors are not likely to appeal to such searching tribunals.

As to reduction in United Nations armament, save as natural economic and other considerations will bring that about the United Nations should make no commitment in that direction to which a disarmed Germany and a disarmed Japan can point in the future.

Decide the paramount issue of basic international law now. Even the issue involved in the Assembly vote ratio must not be allowed to halt the main conclusion; the ratio does not involve solutions which would mean the difference between a hope of peace on the one hand and no hope on the other, whereas the establishment of the fundamental law and its guardianship does hold within itself that critical difference.

We need to be hard, if just, on ourselves. We must hold fast to the central hard core of that decision and let nothing wreck its fulfillment, despite misrepresentation, derision, some disunity, and seeming compromise, to the end that the broken bodies, severed and remembered spirits shall not be given in vain.

LEONARD W. CRONKHITE.

Cambridge, Mass., April 12, 1945.

Dc. 1 - misc. Conf -

49

## Compromise for Unity

### Disagreement Is Held Danger to World Organization

*The writers of the following letter are respectively director of the World Peace Foundation and executive secretary of the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems; chairman of the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems, and of the American Defense, Harvard Group.*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

The undersigned, acting in their individual capacities as responsible American citizens, offer the following suggestions regarding the conference to be held in San Francisco beginning April 25, 1945. We address ourselves to the members of the delegation of the United States and to the American people and their representatives in Congress.

The outcome of the San Francisco Conference will be either compromise or failure. There are those who think of compromise as failure; but in this case a compromise which in some degree realizes the purposes set forth in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would be a success, providing (1) that it is agreed on in good faith after differing opinions have been heard and argued; and (2) that it is entered upon with a determination to carry it out in the spirit and in the letter. Hence it is extremely important that all parties shall be prepared to accept what they can get, even when it is less than what they want. Ultimata delivered early in the proceedings should be avoided, lest parties to the discussion should feel obliged to hold out in order to save face.

#### United Front Necessary

There is no important group either in the United States or elsewhere which would openly disavow the purposes and principles of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The opponents of world organization will hope to gain their end by dividing the friends of world organization. That is their only chance of success, but there is such a chance. If there should be an irreconcilable and acrimonious difference among the American delegates, opposing factions of opinion would line up behind them, and the isolationists would win the day. The friends of world organization must maintain a united front against ultimate disagreement, at the same time that each endeavors during the discussion to obtain the adoption of his own views.

The chief danger of disagreement arises from the fact that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, or any amendment of them which is likely to prevail, will fail to conform to the ideal moral, logical, political or juristic standards. It will discriminate among the powers on the basis of their military force. It will be a prolongation of a unity of action achieved in war. It will not be strictly representative in its apportionment of power and responsibility. Matters that ought to be governed by law will remain in the area of politics. It will attempt, more or less incoherently, to reconcile the myth of sovereignty and the sentiment of nationalism with submission to international control. Many dubious practices will hold over from the past until the time is ripe for their amendment.

#### Ideal Constitution Aim

This should be frankly admitted, lest the San Francisco Conference be condemned for failing to do what it was never intended to do, or what it could not reasonably be expected to do. In its initial phases world organization will be obliged to work with such co-operative attitudes and such agencies of control as are presently available. It must not destroy these through an ill-timed and over-insistent effort to get something better. At the same time, however, the international organization should be explicitly pledged to move in the direction of a more ideal constitution, so that it may win the adherence of the reason and conscience of the world and not be allowed to descend into a mere state of opportunism.

It would be fatal to the success of this conference to inject or reopen the particular issues which have arisen in the course of the war, and for which it has been necessary to find an immediate solution—issues connected with the settlement of disputed frontiers, the government of liberated countries, or the immediate treatment of Germany by the victorious powers. The San Francisco Conference is called for the purpose of inaugurating a permanent international organization. It will not itself be such an organization and will have no mandate to decide such questions as might properly come before such an organization, or such questions as have been and are now being decided through ordinary diplomatic channels, or by the agencies of the United Nations which have already been created by the Moscow, Crimean, or other diplomatic agreements.

#### Advice to Delegates

Having these considerations in mind, the American delegates should, in the judgment of the undersigned, seek to the best of their ability to secure acceptance of the basic plan of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals with the following changes and additions. We believe that these changes and additions are broadly consistent with the positions already taken by the representatives of the major belligerents, while at the same time giving greater weight to regional arrangements such as that proposed at Mexico City, to the role of the family of nations, large and small, and to the basic moral, legal and constitutional principles on which a permanent international organization must be founded:

1. In order to emphasize the moral

DC - 1 Misc. Conf - 50

basis of world organization as already acknowledged by the United Nations, Chapter I should be amended to include the following: "To establish justice and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as already set forth in the Atlantic Charter and other declarations of the United Nations."

2. The basic principles set forth in Chapter II should be so broadened as to make more explicit the role of law in world organization.

3. The supplementary proposals of the Crimea Conference, dealing with the voting procedure of the Security Council, set forth in the announcement of the State Department on March 5, 1945, and interpreted on that date by Secretary Stettinius, should be adopted, but with certain modifications as set forth below under paragraphs 4, 7 and 10.

4. To liberalize the admission of new members the General Assembly should be authorized to admit new members to the organization upon recommendation of the Security Council by a vote not requiring the concurrence of all permanent members. Chapter III (Membership) should contain a provision to the effect that membership in the organization shall be open to all states willing to accept the obligations of membership and able to give reasonable assurance that they will perform these obligations in good faith; and Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 2, should be appropriately modified.

#### More Power for Assembly

5. The powers of the Assembly should be increased by providing in Chapter V, Section B, Paragraph 1, that the General Assembly shall have the right to discuss questions relating not only to the maintenance of international peace and security but also to the promotion of international justice; and by omitting the last sentence of the paragraph which reads: "The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council."

6. The Assembly should be empowered to provide some appropriate agency for the continuing development of the body of international law.

7. The Security Council should be given specific power to recommend the settlement of disputes and the adjustment of situations brought before it, and to do so by a vote which does not require the concurrence of all permanent members which are not interested parties. Chapter VIII, Section A, Paragraph 5 should be modified accordingly.

8. To remove the ambiguity of "situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned," Paragraph 7 of Chapter VIII, Section A, should be deleted; or, as an alternative, a provision should be inserted to the effect that the question whether or not a situation or dispute does arise "out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state" shall be referred automatically to the Court of International Justice for final decision.

#### Authority for Court

9. The Permanent Court of International Justice as envisaged in Chapter VII should be given compulsory jurisdiction over all legal disputes arising between members of the organization.

10. Decision of the Security Council as to whether enforcement action shall be taken under a regional arrangement or by a regional agency, as provided for in Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2, should not require the concurrence of all the permanent members of the Council.

11. The authority of the Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council (Chapter IX) to further international cooperation with respect to economic and social matters, should be strengthened, especially with a view to achieving proper coordination of the activities of specialized organizations and agencies in this field.

12. A commission should be created to formulate a statement of basic human rights, and to recommend measures for securing general respect for such rights.

13. The charter should contain a statement of the principles governing the international supervision of the administration of dependent areas; and should provide suitable machinery for the application of such principles as required.

14. In order to provide for the reconsideration of the initial charter of the organization, and the adoption of such changes as may be considered desirable in the light of experience, Chapter XI should provide for a general conference of member states at the end of a specified period of time—not to exceed ten years.

The San Francisco Conference will be attended not only by the accredited delegates immediately present, but by millions of people throughout the world, who will follow its deliberations by press and radio. Their hopes of the future are staked on its outcome—not only on the specific proposals which the conference adopts, but on the degree to which the conference itself is conducted in a spirit of moderation and concord. It must not be allowed to fail.

LELAND M. GOODRICH

RALPH BARTON PERRY

Cambridge, Mass., April 10, 1945.

#### ELEGY

O fortunate man! who tilled the stubborn soil

Of hearts, undeviant from your earliest vow—

With what deep silence we re-view your toil,

Your hope . . . a parable now.

ARTHUR DAVISON FUDGE.

DC-1 Wise. Conf. 51

---

# Groups Besiege Parley

## State Department Is Losing Fight to Bar Special Issues at San Francisco

By ARTHUR KROCK  
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, April 10.—The State Department is fighting a losing battle on one front of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on International Organization. This was made additionally plain today when the department announced a long list of names of "consultants" to the American delegation.

The object of this battle is to prevent the descent on San Francisco of groups and individuals whose business, when they have any, is with the peace conference or conferences that will be held after the war against the Axis is over and not with the commission of experts who constitute the UNCIO.

The latest group to appoint a committee is the Assyrian National Federation of America. This committee is instructed to explain to the UNCIO experts the situation in which Assyrians in the Near East find themselves—a matter with which the experts have nothing to do. They will, it is true, attempt to draft a world security charter which will provide flexible machinery to adjust group, racial and national injustices and inequities. But if it were sought to equip this machinery with tolerances that are too minute—to try to include correctives for every specific grievance, now, previous and future—the machinery would break down of its own weight. Or it wouldn't ever start operating.

Nevertheless, thousands of persons with detailed specifications are going to San Francisco to describe them and to urge that these be included in the UNCIO blueprint for an international peace-keeping organization. And the more the State Department reiterates that this is impossible, that the blueprint must be general if anything effective can be built from it, the more the procession grows. The Polish question, the Zionist and India home rule issues and a hundred others are all to be offered for some sort of action or decision to a session of experts on a totally different assignment and without power to act on or decide any part of these issues.

### Subjects Limited by Agenda

Among the results of this stubborn refusal to accept the UNCIO meeting as merely the sequel to Dumbarton Oaks, its subjects limited by an agenda, will be days of wasted time, needless expense, the numerous discomforts of overcrowding, confusions in the news, and the mischief sure to be made by agitators and publicity hunters who will find no other way to register their presences.

But this country is sufficiently free, even in wartime, for anyone

who can make his way to San Francisco and find food and lodging there to go during the period of the UNCIO meeting and remain as long as his money, inclination or strength holds out. It is also sufficiently free to permit the attendance of many others who think they will see a great international show, rub elbows with celebrities and who want to say hereafter, "I was there."

Very many persons in all these categories will apparently be able to say it. But officials find consolation in the hope they won't stay very long.

### A Guide for Attendance

To representatives of groups, however, who feel that their special causes will be served by attendance on the conference, and neglected or endangered otherwise, a simple guide may be of value. It will not dissuade from the journey special pleaders who sincerely believe that a few minutes with some of the world statesmen who are expected—Foreign Secretary Eden of Great Britain, for example—will help them later to attain their ends, even though the statesmen will not deal with such questions at San Francisco. But at any rate the guide is this:

1. If there is anything in the draft of Dumbarton Oaks which is thought to freeze a group injustice or inequity—past, present or future—the UNCIO is a proper forum in which to argue the point.

2. If there is anything in the proposed amendments that is thought to have the same effect, the UNCIO is the proper forum to express that view.

3. If the Security Council voting plan agreed on by the Big Three at Yalta is held to be inimical to any of these group causes, the UNCIO is the proper forum for a hearing. And the same applies to the U. S. S. R.'s projected request for three seats in the Assembly and to the trusteeship system for conquered enemy territory, mandates of World War I and colonies.

But already it is known that the American delegation will probably support the amendment to Dumbarton Oaks which has been urged by former President Herbert Hoover and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg—giving authority to the new world organization at intervals to review past settlements growing out of war as well as those which will be made in the immediate and distant future. And this will provide machinery to adjust at the peace conferences, and periodically thereafter, all the grievances which certain groups plan to take to the UNCIO at San Francisco, which will be no more of a peace conference than Dumbarton Oaks was.

### AMERICANS UNITED

All signs indicate that most Americans favor United States participation in some form of world union to prevent war. There is still a chance, however, that the will of this peace-minded majority may be thwarted. To avert that possibility, a new group, Americans United for World Organization, has been incorporated and offers itself as a medium for voicing the popular determination. Its hope is for ten million members.

Americans United consolidates the activities of several older societies having the same object, among them the American Free World Association, Citizens for Victory, the Committee to Defend America, Fight for Freedom, and the United Nations Association. President Ernest M. Hopkins of Dartmouth College is chairman of the board. Henry J. Kaiser heads the membership campaign. Many other distinguished names appear on the list of officers and directors, representing all walks of life and all political parties.

The free peoples of the world have a chance this year—perhaps their last chance—to erect an international community in which national anarchy can never again plunge mankind into mass slaughter. The danger that the chance will be missed is here in our own land as well as abroad. Some United States Senators are on record as opposing any effective form of world organization. Others are doubtful. It still takes only thirty-three Senate votes to defeat the peace hopes of the nation, just as it did a quarter-century ago.

The time for decision is not far away. The need is for mobilization of the peace strength of the nation for immediate action. Americans United is one answer. This organization is already at work conducting town mass meetings for explaining and discussing the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the meaning of the San Francisco Conference. Here is a practical step toward rousing and marshaling a nation-wide demand which those in the seats of power will not dare to ignore.

DC-1

Muse. Conf -

S-



### (3) To Guarantee Peace

Only four months before the Yalta conference there had come out of Dumbarton Oaks a proposal for a broadly based world security organization giving all nations representation, giving the Big Five—including France and China—a special trusteeship of authority to curb aggression and enforce the peace. Yet the four-month interval had been long enough to see questions raised over whether wide collaboration was to be the foundation of peace or whether individual national interests would come to the fore again and result in a system of alliances, blocs and treaties aimed at establishing a balance of power.

France and Russia had signed a treaty, there was talk of various federations, east and west. To many it seemed the United Nations plan was endangered.

#### The Plan Endorsed

The Crimean conference reaffirmed the Dumbarton Oaks agreement, saying, "We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment \* \* \* of a general international organization." A new conference of the United Nations to prepare the security charter was called for April 25 at San Francisco. The major point left unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks—voting procedure in the Supreme Council—was resolved at Yalta, the communiqué said. Details were not announced but unofficial reports said Russia had yielded somewhat on her previous position of requiring a unanimous vote of the Big Five—including France and China—in measures to curb aggression. This amounted to giving Russia veto power against any combination of nations she thought might be joining up against her. Now it was reported that the Soviets were ready to consent to a simple majority vote on measures short of punitive action. France and China signified their acceptance of the new voting procedure.

Much of the success of the San Francisco conference will hinge, observers feel, on wide understanding and support for the Dumbarton Oaks proposal as the discussions proceed. With that in mind, seemingly, the President chose the American delegation not only on a two-party basis but also to include four members of Congress. Secretary of State Stettinius will be chairman. Former Secretary of State Hull will be senior adviser. With them will be Democratic Senator Tom Connally and Representative Sol Bloom, chairman of their respective foreign affairs committees, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Representative Charles A. Eaton, ranking minority members of the same committees. In addition, Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard College and Commander Harold Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota and a strong internationalist, will participate. Observers were agreed this was a more representative delegation than represented America at Versailles; they counted on it also to carry great weight with the American people.

## Abroad

### The Road to Berlin Crosses the Road to San Francisco

By ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK

It is extremely difficult to change the date of an international conference as well advertised and momentous as the gathering of the United Nations at San Francisco. The meeting at the Golden Gate is already a rather belated answer to the questions and misgivings of many nations, large as well as small. It is the first meeting in which other Governments besides the Big Three will have a chance to discuss in public the shape of things to come. To postpone such a Grand Inaugural is not merely to hold this vital interest in suspense; it is to negate the main purpose of the conclave, which is to set up a framework of future world organization before the fighting ends, thus perpetuating the great war coalition created by Axis aggression while divorcing the new league to enforce peace from the war settlements as such.

Suggestions in London and Washington that the conference be postponed are strictly unofficial. They have not the slightest backing, so far as can be learned, in the State Department or the Foreign Office. Even if war developments made it desirable to put off the meeting to a later date, it would be particularly hard for the sponsoring powers to do so now, when it might look as if the postponement were due to differences among them.

Yet if the date should be changed, it would not be because of the repercussions of the Yalta agreement to seek three votes for Russia and the United States in the Assembly of the security organization, or because the divergence between Russia and the western powers on the question of the Polish Provisional Government has come into the open.

It will be because events have outrun the calculations of Yalta. It was not foreseen in February that the enemy armies would crumble so rapidly that by April the major statesmen of the Allied nations might be obliged to remain at their posts to deal with the tremendous and instant questions arising out of a German collapse. It was not foreseen that it might be too late to organize the United Nations before the end of hostilities in Europe. Now it seems quite possible that this will be the case. If organized resistance stops before or during the coming meeting, the questions that are and should be reserved for the peace conference are pretty sure to distract the minds of the delegates, and to overshadow and confuse the debate on the limited business in hand and turn San Francisco into something it was not intended to be, into something too

much like another Versailles.

This would be a good reason for postponement, but nevertheless postponement would have great disadvantages. When the battle is over, it will be much harder to carry out the sound idea of divorcing the peace system from the war settlements. It will be harder to hold the coalition together. It will be harder to maintain the present strong and united support of the American people for international co-operation.

Delay will multiply and magnify obstacles. The reaction to the disclosure that Stalin asked and obtained support at Yalta for three votes for the Soviet Union in the Security Council is a case in point. As a matter of fact, the question of triple representation, for Russia or the United States, can be decided only at the conference itself, and this was explicit in the discussion at Yalta. As reported by the President to the American delegates he called to the White House on March 23; when Marshal Stalin requested more than one vote for the Soviet Union, Mr. Roosevelt remarked that if the question of votes for sixteen or seventeen Soviet republics was raised he would have to ask for forty-eight votes for the United States. Stalin then proposed votes for the Ukrainian republic and White Russia, and in response to the Marshal's arguments, based on the ground that he also had domestic problems to consider, Mr. Roosevelt said that he would be inclined to tell the American delegation that if he were a delegate he would favor three votes for Russia on the understanding that the United States would also ask for three votes.

In the President's statement to the delegates the "agreement" was only to submit the question to the conference, where it would be likely to come up anyway. It did not have the formal character given to it later in the White House announcement, issued after the news leaked out in Washington.

The difference on Poland is more serious, because the reality of the three-power agreements hinges on it. At Yalta, Russia accepted a compromise on Poland, and the heart of the compromise was that representatives of other Polish groups, in Poland and abroad, were to be added to the Soviet-sponsored Lublin committee. But so far Moscow has refused to accept any of the candidates proposed either by the Poles or the Allied Governments. The demand that the Lublin regime, established in Warsaw and acting as a de facto Government, represent Poland at San Francisco has been refused by London and Washington, and this first publication of differences among the Big Three is unfortunate in one sense but highly salutary in another. It is a reminder in the first place that words used internationally must be carefully defined and mean the same thing in all languages if nations are ever going to trust one another, and in the second that we have to begin early to air and solve differences—differences of warlike proportions—if the struggle for collective security is ever to be won.

DC-1 misc. Cart - 54

M. BARROWS & CO., INC.  
NEW YORK

New York Times  
New York, N.Y.  
Feb. 2, 1945.

Dumbarton Oaks

## CATHOLIC GROUP HITS DUMBARTON OAKS PLAN

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 (UP)—Unconditional acceptance of the Dumbarton Oaks plan as formulated would seem to utter "a death sentence" on the cause of smaller nations, the Postwar World Committee of the Catholic Association for International Peace said tonight.

The committee recommended immediate establishment of an interim advisory United Nations council to bring problems of smaller nations "into the open" and offer some escape from the present "incipient international anarchy."

Calling for acceptance of what is good in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the committee offered these specific criticisms:

The smaller nations note the assembly has no legislative power.

There is ambiguity about pacific settlement of disputes.

There is no direct provision for revision of treaties and peaceful change.

There is no arbitration machinery set up for settlement of non-justifiable political disputes, the council apparently being its own "court of arbitration," while it is a most partial body.

There is lack of explicit consideration to be given minorities.

There is no explicit commitment to the principle of reduction of armaments, which collective security is said to make possible.

The committee said there should be a codified statement of international law and added:

"We in the West should make clearly known to Russia what we hold."

DC-1

music + Conf -

15

New York Times  
New York, N.Y.  
Feb. 2, 1945.  
Dumbarton Oaks

## DUMBARTON OAKS PLAN SCORED BY DR. McIVER

Terming the Dumbarton Oaks proposals an "unequal arrangement" that eventually will lead to a division of the world into spheres of influence by the "great powers," Professor Robert McIver, head of the Department of Government at Columbia University, warned yesterday that the peace of the future depended upon a "more genuine international organization."

Professor McIver criticized the Assembly and Security Council features of the Dumbarton plan, particularly the "peace-loving nations" clause, and urged revision of that statement to include all nations. He stressed the advisory nature of the Assembly and called it inadequate without powers to regulate the affairs of nations on a democratic basis. He emphasized also the sharp cleavage between the five permanent members and the six rotating members of the Security Council and predicted that "smaller nations won't stand for it."

In an address to members of the World Government Association at an open meeting in the Hotel Pierre, Professor McIver declared that the Big Five, composed of Great Britain, Russia, the United States, China and France, would possess veto powers that might nullify "important" proposals of smaller countries. He attacked also the composition of the military staff, drawn only from the Big Five, under these proposals.

"All through Dumbarton Oaks the accent is on power," he said. "It is a dangerous way, which will lead to division and disruption of any organization. It means division of the world into spheres of influence and we must stand against that theory and for genuine international organization."

DC-1

music. Conf -

56


# Covenant Didn't Fail; It Was Governments— And the Human Spirit

This speech was written for the dinner celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the League of Nations Association in New York Thursday night.

By Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick

Former Undersecretary-General of the League of Nations

**T**WENTY-FIVE years ago the League of Nations officially came into existence. The necessary ratification of the Treaty of Versailles had been deposited and the first meeting of the League's Council began at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. Nothing like it had ever occurred before. The world was beginning one of the boldest experiments ever undertaken, an attempt to establish a parliament of nations in which common interests of humanity would be the subject of common counsel. It was a stupendous piece of social engineering.



DR. FOSDICK

... "Guerilla action now"

Representatives were conscious of being present at a unique moment in history. M. Bourgeois of France, elected chairman, said in halting words, charged with emotion, "January 16, 1920, will go down in history as the date of the birth of the new world. . . . Animated by deep conviction, supported by public confidence, we are determined to prevent the recurrence of those terrible disasters which have imperiled civilization and drenched the world in blood."

And then M. Bourgeois added a sentence which today, 25 years later, seems one of the most poignant ever recorded. "We respect," he said, "the reasons which still delay our friends in Washington, but we may all be permitted to express hope that the difficulties will soon be overcome and that a representative of the great American Republic will occupy the place which awaits him among us."

It is fashionable in certain quarters today to voice the easy generalization that the League of Nations failed. It all depends on what you mean. If by the League you mean the Covenant with its provisions for common counsel and collective security, I maintain that the League did not fail. It was people who failed. It was not the idea or the machinery that broke down. The breakdown was in governments and foreign offices, in public opinion and leadership, in courage and vision. It was not a failure of the Covenant that brought about the collapse of 1939. It was a failure of the human spirit.

It seems to me that this is important as we take up once more the task of building new international machinery. Because we live in a mechanistic age we are, perhaps, inclined to be misled by mechanistic analogies. We build a gyroscope to steer a ship or a plane. Why can't we have a kind of international gyroscope that we could set once and for all to avoid war—an automatic pilot that would allow the rest of us to go away and forget it? This, of course, is a picture in caricature, but there is enough truth in it to be dangerous. We have a tendency to over-emphasize the importance of the device, to underestimate the part patience, intelligence and hard work must play, 365 days a year, if we are going to make any device we can contrive effective. Our task is to create the best instrument we can make. But that is just the beginning. No plan on earth can guarantee an orderly future unless behind it there are continually marshaled the positive forces of public opinion. The Covenant of the League of Nations, loyally supported by the people and governments of the world, was entirely adequate to see us through.

(over)

## Improvements Needed After 25 Years, New War

In making this statement I do not say the Covenant was perfect or that its provisions cannot be altered to advantage. It would be an affront to human intelligence to assert that, after a quarter of a century of experience and a second World War, we could make no improvements upon a document drafted as a new experiment in a field where there were few signposts and no beaten paths. This is why Dumbarton Oaks is so significant. It is an attempt to build on knowledge gained in the last 25 years. It utilizes ideas that proved successful at Geneva such as the assembly of all the states, the small executive council, the permanent secretariat, the World Court; but to my mind—and I speak as an old league official—it introduces some structural improvements and the plan as a whole is better adapted to the circumstances we face in 1945. In respect to some details I believe tentative proposals of Dumbarton Oaks are at the moment less complete than the finished League Covenant but I am confident a satisfactory document will be evolved.

But again I would stress the point that the United Nations charter is only the foundation upon which the structure of a united world has yet to be built. Once this document is agreed on, are we prepared loyally to see it through, to support it, in all the discouragements of years ahead; when the real test is going to come? If we place behind this new organization the determination and power which to the world's infinite tragedy were denied to the League of Nations, it will succeed. But if apathy and discouragement and selfishness once more gain the upper hand, this experiment will go down as another attempt—perhaps the last—to avert a universal doom.

But this relates to the future. The immediate question is the ratification of the United Nations charter, once completed. Are we going to be able to do it? Can the isolationists defeat it? Personally, I am no longer afraid of anything the isolationists can do. Time has at last caught up with them—time and rocket bombs and airplanes flying 500 miles an hour. Thomas Jefferson, sailing as our minister to France, missed his boat at Baltimore because it took him five days to get there from Philadelphia. In that kind of world isolationism was at least understandable. Today the war against isolationism is finished. What remains is guerilla action—sniping on the part of isolated stragglers who have not caught up with the news that their army was definitely put to rout at Kittyhawk 42 years ago.

But I am afraid of perfectionists. I saw the damage they did in 1919. One bitter irony was that the Battalion of Death in the Senate was joined by many liberals in defeating the League. Their motives were completely different but their object was the same. One group said the League was too good to be true; the other said it wasn't good enough. This latter group—perfectionists who didn't want to start until every 't' was dotted—aided in crippling the League of Nations at its birth.

## Only Way Is to Begin—as Did Nation's Founders

Their arguments have a familiar ring today. They didn't like the way certain boundary lines were drawn. They didn't like the arrangement of the Saar Valley. They didn't like the ceding of Shantung to Japan. They didn't like the powers of the reparations commission. Many of us didn't like some of those things either. They were the result of compromises always incident to the settlement of complex issues. But where we in 1919 differed from the perfectionists was at this point: We refused to subscribe to their implied theory that unless a thing is perfect, it is not worth fighting for. The only way to begin is to begin—begin with what you have and work out the solution by trial and practice. Those people who don't want to start until every detail is ideally arranged will end up by not starting at all.

That is just the way the constitutional fathers felt in 1787. They finally produced a document that was, as Madison said, "a bundle of compromises." And when it was done, they said to themselves: "The only way to begin is to begin."

They had perfectionists in those days—conscientious men who, when the Constitution came before the States for ratification, fastened their gaze on details which they did not like and refused to think in terms of larger issues.

The perspective of nearly 160 years makes it possible for us today to see how shortsighted were perfectionists of 1787. Time has corrected many defects about which they complained but these were corrected only because there was a Constitution to support the Union of States. The Constitution and the Union came first; other issues could wait. Social advance is always a compromise between loyalties and progress is achieved only when men have perspective enough to choose the larger loyalty.

That is the lesson which our own history teaches us. The United Nations charter is not going to be perfect and settlement of many war issues will be along lines which will not completely satisfy us. But if we insist on waiting until our own unilateral standards of perfection have been attained and if, in our disillusionment, we refuse to accept practicable compromises, then the opportunity will have passed and it will be too late.

I am convinced that this time we shall not fail, that human intelligence is capable of solving the unprecedented chaos which the world faces. We shall solve it because we must. John Quincy Adams said of the Constitution that it had been "extorted from the grinding necessity of a reluctant nation." That is the way most advances come in human society. It was under such circumstances that Magna Carta was born, and the Bill of Rights of 1688, and the Mayflower Compact and the Declaration of Independence.



Dumbarton Oaks  
WDC Post  
2-5-45

WDC Post 2-5-45  
**Rep. Mahon Speaks  
On Peace at Forum**

"The American people are in no mood to be cheated again out of the peaceful fruits of a costly and bloody victory over oppressors," Representative George A. Mahon (D., Tex.) said yesterday.

"This time they intend to see to it that our boys do not die in vain," he told the Men's Forum at Mount Vernon Palace Methodist Church 9th and Massachusetts ave. nw. "Every American should inform himself on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which are concrete, and have for their objective the maintenance of international peace and security based on friendly relations among nations, international organization and cooperation to preserve peace, and to establish justice, without which no peace can endure."

90-1


made in 1940

8

## MacLeish Takes on All Comers in Dumbarton Debate March 12

Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish takes on all comers at United Nations Forum's March 12 meeting on the Dumbarton Oaks peace plan.

Senator panel members at the Constitution Hall meeting include J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), Leverett Saltonstall (R., Mass.), Brien McMahon (D., Conn.), H. Alexander Smith (R., N. J.).



United Nations Forum chairman, Mrs. Homer Ferguson, announced the opening 1945 program yesterday at a meeting at Mrs. Clifford Pincho's home. Representatives of United Federal Workers, Federal Employees' Recreation Services

**Mr. MacLeish**

as well as first ladies from United Nations' embassies and visitors from many community groups took a total of 2000 tickets for sale to group members.

Mrs. Ray Clapper urged visitors to spur ticket sales: "Peace must have its arsenal as well as war. This forum, grown from a small women's group who organized in 1940 to find out more about the world, has become one of the community's vital instruments in our peace-planning arsenal. Let's get more of the homefolks in on it—many of them have become expert peace planners by sending family and friends off to war."

United Nations series meetings to follow will take up political, economic and enforcement problems on March 19, 26, and April 2, with Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador; C. A. Berendson, New Zealand Minister, and John Foster Dulles, international law expert, as principal speakers. Series tickets for \$2.40 are on sale by various community groups and the United Nations Forum office at 1710 I-st.

90-1


Misc. Conf -

59

By Walter Lippmann

## The Philippines And Dumbarton Oaks

IN THE PHILIPPINES we have ourselves felt and have known—have not merely watched and sympathized with—the awful experience of the other nations. We have suffered the agony of defeat and the endless anxiety of a long occupation. With the Filipinos who have resisted we have paid the price, and known the glory, of liberation. Now, perhaps, we can see more clearly and more concretely what it will mean to pacify the world and to achieve a secure peace.



LIPPMANN

For the Philippines will be an independent sovereign state. In the relations which are then established between Manila and Washington, and with the world organization, we shall experience in the concrete, rather in abstractions and generalities, the problems of the small and the great powers which in a much more complicated form we are now meeting in Europe, and shall meet elsewhere later on in the Pacific and in Asia.

IT IS QUITE EVIDENT that the Philippine Republic cannot be strong enough to defend its own independence against external aggression. It is also evident that if the Philippines were conquered again by an aggressor, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, China, and all other peaceable nations in the Pacific would be threatened. This is so evident that despite everything that is said about "power politics", about "spheres of influence", and about "bilateral agreements", the Filipinos and the Americans will adhere to their agreements to establish in the Philippine Islands a powerful sea and air base under the command of the United States.

No one will contend seriously that the ratification of the Dumbarton Oaks charter makes it unnecessary or undesirable to establish this base, or to work out a military agreement with the Philippine Commonwealth by which Filipino troops will play a definite part in the defense of the base. It will be perfectly clear, after the lesson of Bataan and Corregidor, that adequate forces must always be within reach of the Philippines, that while it is glorious to return after three years, in the future

we shall wish to see to it that we are not driven out. This we cannot do unless we have specific and concrete military agreements with the Filipinos which will enable the United States to act decisively and immediately.

THESE AGREEMENTS must be concrete if they are to be relied upon. If no agreements exist between the Philippine Army and the American Army, Navy, and Air Force, then how in case of danger are the Philippines in fact to be defended? The world organization can judge the issue with the aggressor, it can mobilize the United Nations to reinforce the defense, but some great power—in this case the United States—must actually

conduct the defense. If this is "power politics", it is elementary common sense: if there are not naval bases, air fields, ships, planes, guns, ammunition, trained troops, and a well prepared strategical plan, the world organization will find itself improvising and may well be too late to prevent aggression.

The world organization cannot operate unless such concrete agreements and arrangements have been made, and can be relied upon. For if we look upon the Dumbarton Oaks charter as the one and only provider of security, if we seek to invest it with a global monopoly of security, it will be so universal and so anonymous that no nation will trust it. We shall not trust it in the Philippines, nor France on her eastern frontier, nor the Soviet Union on her western borders, nor Great Britain in her vulnerable maritime position. The world organization can coordinate, conciliate, and reinsure, but it cannot replace, the specific agreements which nations must make in order to provide against specific aggression where they are vitally affected.

If we object to others making the kind of agreements we shall negotiate with the Philippines, we shall not be letting the theories we offer to our Allies conform with our own practice.

THE AGREEMENTS we shall make with the Philippines will necessarily entail a reciprocal understanding. We shall be bound to respect the independence of the Filipino people. They will be bound to support the agreements—in their foreign relations to take no position which impairs the alliance, in their domestic policy to make sure that

the security of our forces is not imperilled by fifth columnists and enemies of the United States.

The Good Neighbor relationship between large and small powers is not a one-way relationship. The right of a small nation not to be dominated by its great neighbor has to be harmonized with the right of a great power not to have a small neighbor be used against it by its enemies. Thus we should be well within our rights if we insisted that the Philippine government contain no leading figures who have collaborated, or may wish to collaborate, with Japan or with any movement which is unfriendly to the United States. When we take this stand we shall not be violating unilaterally the sovereign independence of the Philippines. For they cannot remain independent if they are not secure, and they cannot be secure unless they are firmly allied with the United States.

THE FUNCTION of the world organization is to provide the means by which all such specific arrangements are reviewed and kept true to their avowed purposes. It cannot be the substitute for them, as, thanks to Senator Vandenberg, it is now becoming better and better understood. Nor can the world organization get along without them: for without them the means to carry out its purposes will not exist when and where they are most urgently needed.

Doc-1

11/22/22 Conf -

60

Dumbarton Oaks

WDC Post

2-8-45

10/05  
2-8-45

### United Nations Backers Open Washington Office

The American Association for the United Nations, conducting an educational campaign for implementation of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, has opened a Washington office at 1420 New York ave.

The local office will be headed by Livingston Hartley, recently released from the Navy, and will serve as an information center and will distribute a weekly Washington letter.

Melvin Hildreth, Washington attorney, is chairman of the Washington committee of the association.

20-1 - 1000 - 61



# Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

**DIPLOMATS WHO STUDIED THE AGENDA** of the Big Three Conference in advance, say that Franklin Roosevelt faces the most crucial conference of his career. Out of it will come World Peace and an ordered world for the next 50 years; or the early seeds of another war.

Roosevelt's problem will be to persuade Stalin and Churchill to go along on broad unselfish peace plans, including Dumbarton Oaks, at a time when most of the trump cards no longer are in his hands.

Four years ago, just after France fell, Churchill would have given anything, any kind of broad peace machinery, any reasonable part of the empire to to secure American support. Today he will not even promise the return of Hongkong to China.

Three years ago when Russia was fighting back to the wall at Stalingrad, Stalin would have given far-reaching pledges for a broad peace plan. Today he will not even accept Dumbarton Oaks unless Russia has a veto of the Council of the United Nations to block any disciplinary action against an aggressor nation.

FDR has to face the fact that both Stalin and Churchill now have most of what they want, and Roosevelt is left, with almost no trump cards, except the humanitarian appeal that the Allies must not abandon the goal of peace for which mankind fought, plus the threat that the American people, if disillusioned, will be come isolationist as never before.

## The Big Three Agenda

**PERHAPS THE TOUGHEST NUT ROOSEVELT** has to crack is to secure Stalin's acceptance of the Dumbarton Oaks peace machinery without crippling amendments. First, however, let's examine the points on the agenda which should be easier. There are six main items on the Big Three agenda, as follows:

1. War Against Japan—This was promised by Stalin at Teheran as soon as Germany was defeated. It was promised in return for the Allied second front in Germany and there is no reason to believe Stalin will not keep this pledge. He has been meticulous in keeping promises once they have been given, and F. D. R. expects no trouble about this.

2. Poland—Roosevelt is proposing a compromise whereby Premier Mikolajczyk, recently resigned from the London-Polish government, will enter the Russian-inspired Lublin government of Poland. The United States and Britain would then recognize the Lublin government. The President is also proposing that Russia withdraw some of its claims to old Poland as a conciliatory gesture to the Poles.

3. The Baltic provinces—The United States will now recognize Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as part of Russia. Thus far the United States has recognized them as separate countries, and still have Baltic diplomats in Washington. But as a gesture to Stalin we will now formally recognize these states as Russian.

4. Punishment of war criminals—The Big Three will have no trouble in agreeing on the strongest joint measures to punish the war guilty, including joint Allied courts.

5. Postwar trade with Russia—Roosevelt is proposing a loan or credit of about six billions for Russia to buy a tremendous amount of American goods to restore her war-torn economy.

6. Dumbarton Oaks—Last summer there was one crucial stumbling block in the path of a new machinery for permanent peace—the right of a big nation to sit on the council while the other nations debated as to whether she was an aggressor. Russia insisted on this right. This would give her the power to veto any action to be taken against her as an aggressor.

## Dumbarton 'on Rocks

**THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCE** nearly split to pieces over this point. Finally when pressure was put on the Russians, they threatened to put 16 members, including all the Soviet's satellite states, in the United Nations.

This would give the Russians 16 votes, 1 for each Soviet Republic, just as the British Dominions were all represented in the League of Nations.

This is the hardest problem Roosevelt faces. Today Russia is in a position to dominate not only the Balkans, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia, but also Germany. Stalin was far-sighted

enough to organize a committee of 10,000 Germans inside Russia, already trained to take over the new German government. Politically—and also militarily—most of Europe will be dependent upon him. Naturally he doesn't want to be voted an aggressor nation if, for instance, he wants to subdue trouble in Bulgaria or Romania.

So the diplomats who have sat close-up to the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations think that Roosevelt may have to return from the Big Three talks forced to accept Stalin's veto of who shall be an aggressor.

If that is the case, the President's difficulties in persuading the Senate to accept ratification will be mild compared with the present current fight over Henry Wallace. Also the return of the American public toward imperialistic isolation will be sorely tempting.

That is why the future peace of the world hangs so precariously in the hands of the Big Three.

Note—Many diplomats have wondered why the President didn't drive a tougher bargain three and four years ago with Stalin and Churchill when the trump cards were in his hand. The answer, according to close friends, is that (1) F. D. R. felt Russia and Britain were actually fighting our war, thus giving us more time to prepare; (2) F. D. R. can be very stubborn when riled, but day in and day out he likes to get along with people, didn't like to be in drastic opposition to Stalin and Churchill; (3) Harry Hopkins, who sat constantly at his elbow, leaned even further than F. D. R. toward all-out conciliation.

DC -1

Misc. C-8.

62

WDC Post 2-10-45

# The Gentler Sex

By Malvina Lindsay

## Five-Minute Road to Peace

Dumbarton Oaks explained in five minutes! Could it be done? Could such a capsule presentation of the proposals for world peace be made to average audiences who would — probably reluctantly — spare only this much time for it?

To find the answer, I attended a public speaking class of the District League of Women Voters dedicated to such a project. Here, I felt instantly, was something important going on. These women, most of them busy housewives, were giving of their time and thought to one of the most difficult and urgent tasks of the hour—bringing the Dumbarton Oaks peace plan to the people, not only in condensed form, but in terms of the average citizen's interests and background.

Impossible, a master race exponent might remark. Yet if this peace plan were not put into five-minute speeches and related to grocery bills, rent, jobs, children, another chance at peace would fail, or at least lack the roots to survive.

### Down to Earth Appeal

These "five-minute women" under direction of Mrs. Hugh Butler, exponent of the down-to-earth audience appeal, were wisely avoiding getting enmeshed in detail. Instead, they stressed these general principles:

First, there must be a plan of some kind for world cooperation. The alternative is to begin preparing for the next war in which the children of today will have to fight.

Second, such a war would come to American homes and soil—perhaps mean destruction of American civilization. For this country to exist as an armed camp ready for the next war would mean an insufferable load of taxes, further curtailment of personal freedom.

Third, the Dumbarton Oaks plan

is the result of long study by many qualified people in this and other countries. It represents the most workable plan so far evolved. In the words of one speaker, "It offers the best hope we have now to keep our children from having to fight another war."

Fourth, it is tentative and incomplete, is, as George Washington said of the Constitution, a good beginning.

The speakers explained briefly the basic structure of the plan in its four divisions: the General Assembly, to which all peaceful nations may belong; the Security Council of 11 members, of which the five most powerful nations shall be permanent members; the International Court, to which any dispute that can be settled by law may be referred; the secretariat, to carry on the routine work of the organization.

### Two-Purpose Plan

"Peace has a need for a mechanism for settling disputes, also a need for building conditions that will prevent war," emphasized one speaker. "The Dumbarton Oaks plan attempts to meet both needs."

Another speaker stressed in her five minutes that the plan sought to maintain peace by these main methods:

Preventing economic inequalities among nations that may lead to war.

Inducing nations to take their disputes to the International Court.

Levying economic and political sanctions against nations that try to start wars.

Use of force through the General Assembly to prevent wars.

Realistically, the "five-minute" women face the fact that very few Americans are going to become acquainted with the Dumbarton Oaks plan in detail. They also realize that any perfectionist or obstructionist can riddle it or any other plan to pieces. They know that its success will depend largely on the people's thinking on the broad general issue at stake—whether mankind shall make another attempt to stop war or throw up its hands in desperation.

20-1

misc. Cont.

63

# 'The Hour Is Late— —We Must Not Fail'

NY Times MAG. 2-11-45

**Grinding necessity, says Mr. Fosdick, urges  
us not to delay the rebuilding of the world.**

By **RAYMOND B. FOSDICK**

**T**WENTY-FIVE years ago the League of Nations came officially into existence. The necessary ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles had been deposited, and the first meeting of the League Council began at 10 o'clock in the morning of Jan. 16, 1920, at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris.

Nothing like it had ever occurred before in history. The world was beginning one of the boldest experiments ever undertaken. It was an attempt to establish a parliament of nations in which the common interests of humanity would be the subject of common counsel. It was a stupendous piece of social engineering conceived in planetary terms.

And the representatives who attended that meeting at the Quai d'Orsay were conscious of the fact that they were present at a unique moment in history. M. Bourgeois of France was elected chairman of the meeting and this is what he said in halting words, charged with emotion:

January 16, 1920, will go down in history as the date of the birth of the new world. \* \* \* Animated by deep conviction, supported by public confidence, we are determined to prevent, by all means in our power, the recurrence of those terrible disasters which have imperiled civilization and drenched the world in blood.

And then M. Bourgeois added a sentence which today, twenty-five years later, seems like one of the most poignant sentences ever recorded.

"We respect," he said, "the reasons which still delay the final decision of our friends in Washington, but we may all be permitted to express the hope that the difficulties will soon be overcome and that a representative of the great American republic will occupy the place which awaits him among us."

**I**T is fashionable in certain quarters today to voice the easy generalization that the League of Nations failed. It all depends on what is meant by the League of Nations. If by the League is meant the Covenant with its provisions for common counsel and collective security, I maintain that in that sense the League of Nations did not fail. It was people that failed. It was not the idea or the machinery that broke down at the end; the breakdown was in Governments and Foreign Offices;

in public opinion and leadership, in courage and vision. It was not a failure of the Covenant that brought about the collapse of 1939. It was a failure of the human spirit.

It seems to me that this point is important as we take up once more the task of building new international machinery on a global scale. Because we live in a mechanistic age we are perhaps inclined to be misled by mechanistic analogies. Some of us seem to have the idea that a world order can be devised which will be pretty well foolproof against human failure. We build a gyroscope to steer a ship or a plane, an instrument that keeps the vehicle true on its course. Why can't we have a kind of international gyroscope that we could set once and for all to avoid war—an automatic pilot that would allow the rest of us to go away and forget it?

This, of course, is a picture in caricature, but there is enough truth in it to be dangerous. We have a tendency to over-emphasize the importance of the device, and to underestimate the part which patience and intelligence and hard work must play, 365 days a year, if we are going to make any device we can contrive effective in avoiding catastrophe. Our task is to create, in cooperation with other nations, the best instrument that we can make.

**B**UT that is just the beginning, the first step. No plan on earth, no matter how water-tight it may seem to be, can guarantee anything in the way of an orderly future unless behind it there are continually marshaled the positive forces of public opinion. I have no hesitation in saying that the Covenant of the League of Nations, loyally supported by the people and Governments of the world, was entirely adequate to see us through the difficulties of the Nineteen Thirties.

In making this statement I do not say that the Covenant was perfect as it stood or that its provisions cannot be altered to advantage. It would be an affront to human intelligence to assert that after a quarter of a century of experience and a second World War we could make no improvements upon a document that was drafted as a completely new experiment in a field where there were few signposts and no beaten paths.

This is why

Dumbarton Oaks is so significant. It is an attempt to build on the knowledge gained in the last twenty-five years. It utilizes the ideas that proved successful at Geneva, such as the Assembly of all the States, the small executive Council, the permanent Secretariat, the World Court; but to my mind—and I speak as an old League official—it introduces some structural improvements in those ideas, and the plan as a whole is better adapted to the circumstances we face in 1945. In respect to some details I believe that the tentative proposals which have come out of Dumbarton Oaks are at the moment less complete than the finished League Covenant, but I am confident that a satisfactory document will be evolved. There is honor enough for both instruments without invidious comparisons.

**B**UT again I would stress the point that the United Nations charter is only the first step. It is the foundation upon which the structure of a united world has yet to be built. Once this document is agreed to, are we prepared loyally to see it through, to support it in good days and bad, in success and failure, in all the disappointments and discouragements of the years ahead? That is when the real test is going to come. If we place behind this new organization the determination and the power which, to the world's infinite tragedy, were denied to the League of Nations, it will succeed. But if apathy and discouragement and selfishness once more gain the upper hand, this experiment will go down as another attempt—perhaps the last attempt—made by the race of men to avert a universal doom.

But this relates to the future. First things come first. We have a problem to face here in this country in 1945. The immediate question is the ratification of the United Nations charter, once it is completed. Are we going to be able to do it? Can the isolation-

ists defeat it? Personally, I am no longer afraid of anything the isolationists can do. Time has at last caught up with them—time and rocket bombs and airplanes flying 500 miles an hour and new weapons, now within reach, which make our present weapons the toys that children play with.

**I**N such a world there is no longer any reality in the conception that we can be a Robinson Crusoe nation, frightened by footprints and living on illusions. The liberty to be left alone, not interfered with and not helped, is not real liberty. It is merely a primeval instinct. Thomas Jefferson, sailing as our Minister to France, missed his boat at Baltimore because it took him five days to get there from Philadelphia. In that kind of world isolationism was at least understandable. Today it is only an outworn shibboleth.

The war against isolationism is really finished, although there is some mopping up still to be done. What remains is guerrilla

action—pockets of resistance here and there—sniping on the part of isolated stragglers who still wear the uniform of the old cause and who have not yet caught up with the news that their army was definitely put to rout at Kittyhawk in North Carolina forty-two years ago.

**N**O, I am not afraid of the isolationists, but I am afraid of the perfectionists. I saw the damage they did in 1919. One of the bitter ironies of that period was that the Battalion of Death in the Senate was joined by many of the liberals in the United States in defeating the League of Nations. Their motives were completely different but their object was the same. One group said the League was too good to be true; the other said it wasn't good enough. And it was this latter group—these perfectionists who didn't want to start until every "i" was dotted and every "t" was crossed—that aided in crippling the League of Nations at its birth.

And the arguments of these perfectionists of 1919 have a familiar ring today. They did not like the way certain boundary lines were drawn. They did not like the Polish Corridor that separated East Prussia from the main body of Germany. They did not like the inclusion of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, or the Austrian Tyrolese in Italy. They did not like the arrangement of the Saar Valley. They did not like the ceding of Shantung to Japan. They did not like the powers of the Reparations Commission.

**W**ELL, many of the rest of us did not like some of these things either. They were the result of compromises that are always incident to the settlement of involved and complex issues. But where we in 1919 differed from the perfectionists was at this point: We refused to subscribe to their implied theory that unless a thing is perfect it is not worth fighting for. The only way to begin is to begin—begin with what you have, faulty as it may be, and work out the solution by trial and practice. Those people who don't want to start until every detail is ideally arranged will end up by not starting at all.

That is just the way the constitutional fathers felt in 1787. They finally produced a document that was, as Madison said, "a bundle of compromises." They had compromised the issue of slavery; they had compromised the question of representation; they had dodged the whole issue of the Bill of Rights. And when it was all done they said to themselves, "The only way to begin is to begin."

Do you remember what Benjamin Franklin said in the Constitutional Convention just as it was drawing to its close? He was 82 years old. He had written his speech, but he was too feeble to get up from his chair to read it and James Wilson read it for him. This is what Franklin said:

Mr. President, I conceive that there are several parts of this Constitution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure that I shall never approve them. For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information, or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. \* \* \* In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such.

I doubt too whether any other convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views. From such an assembly can a perfect production be expected?

It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear \* \* \* that our States are on the point of separation only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. Thus, I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not sure that it is not the best. The opinions I have had of its errors are sacrificed to the public good.

**T**HAT was Benjamin Franklin in 1787. Unfortunately his spirit was not the spirit of all of his contemporaries. They had perfectionists in those days just as we have them today—conscientious men who, when the Constitution came before the States for ratification, fastened their gaze on details which they did not like and refused to think in terms of larger issues.

There was James Neal of Massachusetts, to whom the issue of slavery came ahead of everything else. "I cannot agree," he said, "to the principle of making merchandise of the bodies of men, and unless this objection is removed I cannot put my hand to the Constitution." And then there was Patrick Henry of Virginia, who thought the absence of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution made the entire instrument not only useless but dangerous. "Our liberties," he cried, "have been won on many a field. Are we to surrender them supinely to this new tyranny?" And in the course of the debate in the Virginia Convention Patrick Henry used a sentence which has a curiously modern tone. "The other States," he said, "cannot do without Virginia, and we can dictate to them what terms we please."

**T**HE perspective of nearly 160 years makes it possible for us today to see how short-sighted and distorted was the vision of the perfectionists of 1787. Time has corrected many of the defects about which they complained, but these defects were corrected only because there was a Constitution to support the Union of States. The Constitution and the Union came first; they were fundamental; the other issues could wait. Social advance is always a compromise between loyalties, and progress is achieved only when men have perspective enough to choose the larger loyalty instead of the lesser one. John Hancock of Massachusetts speaks to us today. "I give my assent to this Constitution," he said, "in full confidence. \* \* \* The people of this Commonwealth will quietly acquiesce in the voice of the majority, and where they see a want of perfection in the proposed form of government, they will endeavor, in a constitutional way, to have it amended."

**T**HAT is the lesson which our own history teaches us. The United Nations charter is not going to be perfect, and the settlements of many of the war issues will be along lines which will not

completely satisfy us, and may not satisfy some of us at all. But if we insist on waiting until our own unilateral standards of perfection have been attained, and if in our disillusionment we refuse to accept practicable compromises, then the opportunity will have passed, and the strategic moment will be gone, and it will be too late. The Constitution of 1787 came just in time to avoid chaos. Such was the discord and bad feeling between the States that in another year the chance for union would have gone. Always in the affairs of men there is a clock that strikes the final hour.

But I am convinced that this time we shall not fail. I believe that human intelligence is capable of solving the unprecedented chaos which the world faces. And we shall solve it because we must. John Quincy Adams said of the Constitution of the United States that it had been "extorted from the grinding necessity of a reluctant nation." That is the way most advances come in human society. It was under such circumstances that the Magna Charta was born, and the Bill of Rights of 1688, and the Mayflower Compact and the Declaration of Independence. More often than not it has been necessity—grinding necessity—which has furnished the spur for the step that had to be taken.

**T**HAT necessity is with us now—imperative necessity—presenting us with the alternative of a doom to which we will not consent. But again I say the hour is late. In that first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations to which I referred there were strong overtones of urgency, reflected in all the speeches. Ten million soldiers lay buried on the Continent of Europe. It must not happen again. Here was a chance to begin the building of what M. Bourgeois called "the new world."

That was twenty-five years ago, and today the dead of this second World War, over an area far larger than Europe, are uncounted and uncountable. It is getting late for action. The sun is long past noon, and in wintry days like these the twilight falls swiftly.

De-1

Misc. Conf.

65



# U. S. Seen Set To Join World Peace Group

## Senate Approval Of 'Frisko Pact Is Held Probable

By Ben W. Gilbert

The United States yesterday appeared closer to joining in a world organization to keep the peace than at any previous time in the Nation's history.

State Department officials, expressing satisfaction with the "wide area of agreement" among nations with respect to the proposals worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, were of the opinion that the conference scheduled to get under way at San Francisco on April 25 would face no insurmountable obstacles in working out a final draft of a world security organization to replace the League of Nations.

The United States Senate which blocked American entry into the league appeared likely to accept the Dumbarton plan, once it is perfected at San Francisco. The President's appointment of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R., Mich.) as a delegate to the conference was viewed as an effort to insure Senate approval.

Associates of Vandenberg have

indicated that he had some reservations about accepting the appointment to avoid tying his hands in subsequent Senate debate, but it was pointed out in other quarters that the senior Senator from Michigan, who has become the spokesman of the "moderate" wing of the Republican Party on questions of foreign policy probably would have been offended, if he had not been selected.

Under the circumstances, his refusal to participate might be interpreted in some quarters as a death warrant to the international security plan. Therefore, it was thought that he would wind up by accepting the assignment.

At the conference, Vandenberg would be in an excellent position to insist on working out any kinks that might impede subsequent ratification.

Meanwhile, it was disclosed that Commander Harold E. Stassen, who also was designated to be a delegate to the San Francisco conference was in Washington, presumably on Navy business. A former Republican Governor of Minnesota, he has been serving on the staff of Admiral William F. Halsey in the Pacific.

### Stassen Refuses Comment

Friends of Stassen expressed the view that the President selected him, not as a Navy spokesman, but as a citizen who, prior to his entrance into the Navy, was an outspoken advocate of a vigorous foreign policy.

Under Navy regulations, Stassen could participate in the conference in or out of uniform, depending on official and personal preferences. Friends doubted that he planned to doff his uniform permanently, even if he did it to attend the parley.

Reached at his hotel, Stassen said he was here under military orders and not privileged to make any statement to the press until Navy clearance is provided. However, Navy sources expected that he probably would be authorized to hold a press conference shortly.

Solution of the knotty voting power controversy at the Crimean conference of the Big Three was interpreted as another reason for optimism.

With the voting question out of the way, only important unsettled question involves the mechanism for ending the work of the virtually defunct League of Nations and starting up the new United Nations agency. It is now believed that it may be unnecessary to burden the San Francisco conference with this question which is largely of a technical nature and might be worked out among the nations involved in the league through diplomatic channels.

### French Acceptance Probable

China's acceptance on Wednesday of the voting power proposals was expected to be followed shortly by its acceptance by France, making possible official release of the text of the proposals.

Under the proposals, as reliably reported, any one of the five great

20-1

music. Conf -

66

**Mahon Says:**

## **Few Know Text of Oaks Peace Plan**

**By Bert Andrews**

*Copyright by New York Tribune, Inc.*

"Not more than one out of four members of Congress have subjected the Dumbarton Oaks plan for world peace to a line-by-line reading.

"Not more than 100,000 Americans have ever given it that kind of study.

"With the population of the United States estimated at 138,000,000, this means that there are probably 133,000,000 Americans who have never seen or heard or read the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

"And while we are talking about figures, there are probably 100 million Americans who have never read the so-called Atlantic Charter, and the Fulbright and Connally resolutions on world peace."

These provocative assertions come from Representative George H. Mahon (D., Texas), and an answer to them is supplied by Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of public and cultural relations.

For MacLeish reveals that one of the most intensive educational campaigns in history will be waged during the next two months with one aim—to see that all of the American people have a chance to acquire a complete understanding of the D. O. plan before the full United Nations Conference convenes in San Francisco on April 25.

"The document will in a measure shape the destiny of our Nation for a thousand years to come," Mahon said. "I personally feel that there has been too little discussion in the House of Representatives and in the country of the proposed peace organization. I do not have a definite plan as to how this information might be furnished, but I do think that the facts of the situation should be recognized by the public and by the Congress."

MacLeish was told about Mahon's fears and hopes, and he said that the State Department does have "a definite plan;" that, in fact, it has several plans which envision the use of the press, the radio, the motion pictures and the lecture platforms to turn the United States into one vast town meeting devoted to learning the lowdown on Dumbarton Oaks.

For one thing, there will be a documentary film in which Edward R. Stettinius, jr., Secretary of State, will match his photogenic face, sans makeup, with the visages of Hollywood actors and actresses.

"The film, now in preparation, will attempt to show how the world peace organization will look in operation if it is put into effect,"

Mr. MacLeish said. "We expect to have it ready for general release in March and we hope to have it shown throughout the United States so that the people may know."

QC-1 - music. Cont. # - 67

# De Gaulle's Action

By Mark Sullivan

## American Reaction

THE PROSPECT for an international organization to prevent war, the Dumbarton Oaks plan or a variation of it, is now at a stage where it encounters a special danger. This danger lies in the mood of the people. A national mood which last fall was fervent for the plan runs the risk of being chilled by events, some of which have already arisen.

One such event is the snubbing of President Roosevelt by the head of the French government, General de Gaulle. To that incident, the reaction of the American people is certain to be one of irritation. No matter how diplomats may try to explain, and find condonation for De Gaulle's action, the American man in the street is certain to see it as distasteful.

Here is a country, France, which 10 months ago was under the German heel, which could not possibly save itself, and which has been saved by America and Britain. To the mind of the average American, the natural attitude of the rescued people, and their head, should be one of gratitude and willingness to reciprocate. That, the average American feels, would be his own attitude in corresponding circumstances.

But instead, the attitude of the head of the French government is one of truculence and demand. He seems to lack not only appreciation of favors received but that form of gratitude that is based on the anticipation of favors to come. France relies upon America for help in reconstruction, including food. Blandly continuing in that reliance, De Gaulle nevertheless snubs the head of the American Nation.

THE DANGER here lies in the arising of an American emotion which would express itself by saying, in effect, "What's the use—let's get out of it all and stay out of it." In short, isolation.

That is the American emotion which arose, out of similar incidents, 26 years ago, and which was more responsible than any other one factor for America's decision not to adhere to the League of Nations.

But America has had a costly education since then. We have

learned that while we may momentarily, get out of it, we cannot stay out of it. Probably American opinion can now be relied upon to endure irritation over the actions of other nations as patiently as may be, but still realize the necessity and maintain the determination to cooperate with other nations for the prevention of future wars.

There will be other incidents like the present French one, involving other nations. And there will be, there already are, incidents of a different kind, tending to arouse the same emotional impulse toward isolation. Much American opinion feels regret over what is being done about Poland.

HERE AGAIN is a parallel with America's reaction to the League of Nations. As President Wilson's idealistic 14 points, including the League of Nations, given to the world while the Great War was still on, were impaired and reduced by actual steps taken in the making of peace, so is the idealistic Atlantic Charter, given out by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill while the war was in its early stages, now being impaired by concrete details of the peace settlements now getting under way.

Fortunately, there is one deep difference between the mechanics for bringing about the League of Nations and that for bringing about the Dumbarton Oaks plan. Wilson firmly insisted on tying the League of Nations and the peace settlements at the end of the Great War into one document, so closely knit together, he said, that the two could not be separated. Wilson thought there was advantage in the union of the two. As it turned out, it was the union of the two that had most to do with preventing American adherence to the league.

At present, and doubtless because of the lesson of Wilson's failure, the careful effort of the architects of the Dumbarton Oaks plan is to have it stand alone, to avoid letting it get involved in the peace settlements. So far as the Dumbarton Oaks plan can be held to one clear purpose, the prevention of future wars, it has the greater chance of retaining the overwhelming support of American opinion which it so far has. American poise and intelligence will need to distinguish between this single purpose and momentary emotions of irritation that arise over details of the peace settlements.

Dec-1 misc. Conf - 68

# Security Organization

By Paul Winkler

## Discussion Of Proposals

WITH ONLY TWO MONTHS to go before the opening of the San Francisco Conference destined to prepare the charter for the international security organization originally proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, we are still very far from any general comprehensive exchange of ideas on this subject on an international scale. Without such an exchange, there is no basis for the establishment of a consensus of opinion among the members of the United Nations.

The Netherlands government has deplored this situation in its own memorandum of suggestions on this subject. "The proposals," it complained, "have not given rise to as much public discussion in all free countries as the Netherlands government had hoped."

It is not deplored by all. Those most devoted to the acceptance of the plan in its present form, without substantial amendment, regard this paucity of examination as an advantage. They express the fear that extensive discussion inspired by the desire to improve on the present text may endanger its being accepted at all by the American Senate.

On the other side are those who favor the widest discussion and point out that the world security organization cannot be expected to function satisfactorily unless it has the wholehearted backing of the peoples whose governments participate in it. Such backing will not exist, they believe, unless each nation enters into the arrangement with open eyes—that is, after ample argument has allowed full opportunity to assess the advantages and disadvantages of all details of the program. The spokesmen for some of the smaller nations who are urging the full threshing out of all points express at the same time their confidence in the good judgment of the American Senate, which, they feel, will not oppose the adoption of any plan whose merits have been demonstrated by free consideration of them.

### Netherlands Suggestion

The smaller nations have made some notable contributions to the subject of international organization, but that does not necessarily mean that all the amendments they suggest are of a nature to improve the original document. For instance, the Netherlands are strongly opposed to the obliga-

tion for every nation to participate in the application of armed force once it has been decided upon by the Security Council. "Every nation, great or small, should be at liberty . . . in every separate case to determine whether or not it wishes to participate in the application of armed force," the Dutch memorandum holds, adding: "No nation, whatever its size, will ever allow itself to be committed by a Security Council to a war in which the nation does not believe."

This, of course, is the complete negation of the principle of collective security. If each nation can decide for itself, at the last moment, whether or not to participate in collective sanctions against an offender, obviously the machinery for enforcing security collectively breaks down.

The only exception which the Dutch seem willing to make to their refusal to commit themselves in advance to the use of force is in the case of existing stipulations in regional agreements calling for such exercises of armed power. In other words, collective security would be reduced to the regional scale, and regional groups would take precedence over the general international organization.

### Consequence of Veto Power

This much must be said for the Netherlands point of view: Holland's refusal to commit herself to fight automatically at the order of the Security Council is a logical consequence of the suggestion that the great powers should be able to veto any military action. The Dutch accept this idea of a great power veto, though far from wholeheartedly, but it is then natural for them to add that if none of the major nations can be coerced into applying force even though all the other countries are in favor of it (and can even bar the others from resorting to it themselves), then the smaller nations should at least be permitted to decide for themselves, without coercion,

whether their own armed forces are to be thrown into action on any given occasion.

In other words, the great powers have already adulterated the principle of collective security by reserving for themselves the right to veto its application (and this would remain true even if they renounced the veto for cases where they are themselves a

party to a dispute, so that the small powers, if they follow the lead of the Dutch, will only be pursuing the same tactics to the point where the collective security principle disappears utterly, so far as its practical application is concerned. What the Dutch propose is the reduction ad absurdum of the same idea which lies behind the big power assumption of the veto power.

### Vandenberg Plan

Some observers suggest that if the great powers are going to maintain the right to veto punitive action in cases in which they themselves are involved (which unconfirmed reports have claimed was the understanding reached at the Yalta meeting), then the Vandenberg plan might just as well be accepted instead of the Dumbarton Oaks program, since that would assure the world against a new breach of the peace by the two powers most immediately dangerous, Germany and Japan. With the other great powers able to check action against themselves, there would be no case in which the international organization could act except those in which small powers violated the peace.

The Dutch remind us that there have been only two clashes of any importance between smaller states in this century (the various local struggles after the last war having, of course, been essentially part of that big-power conflict), the Balkan Wars of 1912 and the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. Neither of these disturbed the general peace and it seems like sending a B-29 to blast a mouse to set up a world-wide security organization to deal with conflicts on this scale.

Japan's attack on Manchuria, Italy's on Abyssinia, and Italy's and Germany's on Spain (provided this last is considered neither as a purely civil war nor as a part of the present war) would not have been checked if the Dumbarton Oaks organization had existed when they occurred, for a similar organization then would certainly have included Japan, Germany and Italy among the great powers with permanent positions on the Security Council and the right to veto punitive action against themselves.

It appears, then, that the Dumbarton Oaks scheme has only one advantage over the Vandenberg plan, and that is that it would have the right to employ the forces of all its members (who would be more numerous than the signers of the Vandenberg plan, as at present proposed). But this single advantage would be suppressed if other nations join in the attitude of the Dutch, which is a very likely conse-

quence of the big power insistence on the veto right. The only weapon that would then remain to the Dumbarton Oaks type of organization would be that of economic sanctions--and the experience of the League of Nations with this method is still fresh in all memories.

This single example brought forward by the Dutch demonstrates how little clarity exists on the subject of world organization, two months before it is intended to crystallize the Dumbarton Oaks plan in a permanent charter. The Inter-American Conference in Mexico City may help to throw some light on the matter, so far as the Latin-American nations are concerned, at least. What is said there may well be valid internationally, for Latin-American statesmen have shown a tendency to think much like European statesmen concerning the Dumbarton Oaks plan. Certainly it will be to the advantage of all if the project is thoroughly examined both there and elsewhere before next April 25; for unless all issues are thoroughly understood before the San Francisco meeting sets down its conclusions, the price in disaffection from them after they are formulated may be staggeringly high--high enough, perhaps, to imperil the future peace of the world.



YEAH...  
NO. 27  
2-4-45

9-45

## State Dept. Preparing 'Less Drastic' Peace Terms for Reich

By H. R. Shackford  
United Press Staff Writer

The State Department is preparing what it regards as hard, realistic and practicable peace terms for Germany, it was said last night.

These plans, it was learned, contemplate that Germany's war potential must be destroyed or at least rigidly controlled; that its standard of living must not be allowed to improve faster than that of any neighbor states which were ravished by the Nazis, and that Germany should help reconstruct Europe to the maximum of its ability.

Coincidentally, it was confirmed here that the Big Three leaders are expected to give quick, formal approval to armistice terms for Germany which have been pre-

pared by the European Advisory Commission.

### May Make Some Changes

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Marshal Joseph Stalin may find it necessary to make some changes, but it is anticipated that their approval of the terms to be handed the German high command when and if the Nazis surrender unconditionally will be more or less routine.

Members of the Advisory Commission drafted the proposals after consultation with their respective leaders.

The controversy in this country over a "soft" or a "hard" peace for Germany reached a climax last fall when the so-called Morgenthau Plan was publicized. Compared

with some proposals of the Morgenthau Plan—such as the flooding of all German coal mines—it might be said that the State Department's ideas are less drastic.

### Coal Vital to France

But it was pointed out they also were believed to be far more realistic. For example, most of the nations surrounding Germany are dependent upon her for coal. France, always deficient in coal, could hardly be expected to agree to the flooding of German mines, her main source of supply.

Political decisions may decide the future of German industry. If the Rhine Basin, including the

Ruhr and the Saar are internationalized, as the French and others demand, and if Silesia is given to Poland as compensation for lost Eastern territories, virtually all of Germany's industrial areas would be out of her hands.

DC - 1 music. Conf -

70

# 3 Peace Demands Stated by de Gaulle

## Says France Must Have Voice in Any Pact It Supports

Paris, Feb. 5 (AP).—Gen. Charles de Gaulle put forth three major demands for peace today, declared France was determined to secure their fulfillment in her own way if necessary, and asserted that the French nation will not be bound by any inter-Allied decisions unless it has an equal voice in framing them.

In a radio fireside chat which probably coincided with the Anglo-American-Soviet meeting, the chief of the French Provisional Government demanded the occupation of the entire length of the Rhine, the separation of the river's western banks and the Ruhr industrial area from the remainder of Germany, and the assurance of independence for the smaller nations of Europe.

Commenting on the exclusion of France from the Big Three conference, DeGaulle said the Allies had "shown great comprehension" of the French request for sole occupation of the Rhineland and predicted that French troops gradually would become the predominant element in the occupation of the Reich.

## Asks States' Independence

De Gaulle asked for assurance of independence for Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Balkan states "in friendship with the nations which will have to carry the principal burden of maintaining the peace of Europe." He obviously was referring to France and Russia.

He added that France naturally could not guarantee the security of Europe alone.

"For that we need alliances," he said, explaining that this was the reason he had signed a 20-year pact with Russia and his reason for seeking a similar agreement with Britain.

France also intends to negotiate pacts of mutual security and economic cooperation with Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and in time to resume good relations with "renovated Italy," De Gaulle said. He omitted Spain from his list of French neighbor countries.

## Wants Part in Peace

Finally De Gaulle asserted that France would be ready—after the war has ended and France has recovered all her territories—to participate in "studies and negotiations from which no doubt will emerge a world organization to maintain peace."

Regarding this world organization, the French leader said it "will include the United States of America at its head and will promise to each state a supreme guarantee of its life and development in human society."

Obviously referring to the Allied decision to defend Alsace, he said that "the inter-Allied high command shows an understanding which will be praised and which history will not fail to laud."

DC-1

Music Gf-

71

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, February 15, 1945

x\*\*\*\*

## Full-Dress Peace Conference Seen by Big 3 at End of War

By Flora Lewis

Associated Press Staff Writer

Indications mounted yesterday that the Big Three have definitely decided to hold a grandiose general peace conference when all the fighting is done.

This represents a change from earlier official views, especially among American authorities, that World War II would wind up with a series of piece-meal settlements unlike the long, formal peace of Paris and Versailles.

Doubtless, the conference will await the defeat of Japan. Officials hope that an international security organization will be set up by then.

The peace agency could handle many of the problems facing the Allies. It now appears, however, that the new map of the world will be drawn up in a separate, special meeting which will probably result in a treaty.

Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill

referred to a peace conference in their communique on Poland. They said the extent of German territory awarded Poland would be reviewed at such a meeting.

War Mobilizer James F. Byrnes, giving a first-hand report on the Big Three meeting, said "it is to be expected that there will be a peace conference."

The grand parley is bound to be different from Versailles, however. The League of Nations covenant was included in the treaty signed there, which made peace with Germany.

This time, the Dumbarton Oaks Charter is expected to be a separate treaty, and probably will come before the Senate for ratification before the map-making pact is even written.

Actual peace with Germany may not be signed for many years.

Territorial decisions already announced which would be wrapped up in a general peace conference accord are:

1. The award of Bessarabia to Russia.
2. The return of Transylvania to Romania.
3. The Curzon line as Russia's western frontier.

It is not yet clear whether Allied leaders intend to include their provisions for keeping Germany permanently disarmed in such a conference.

Presumably, any long range decisions such as international surveillance of the Rhineland would be set down.

There is scarcely a corner of the world which doesn't have problems subject to inclusion in a general peace parley and the possible resulting document.

80-1

mic. Gsf-

72

# ABA Indorses International Bank, Holds Bretton Woods Plan Unsound

By Thomas Hagenbuck

Associated Press Financial Editor

New York, Feb. 4 (AP).—The American Bankers Association put the stamp of approval today on the proposed 10 billion-dollar International Bank for reconstruction, but turned thumbs down on its Bretton Woods twin, the international monetary fund.

In its long-awaited report on the

monetary program which grew out of the Bretton Woods conference of 44 nations last July, the A. B. A. objected to the monetary fund as a method of lending which is "novel and contrary to accepted credit principles," and which goes far beyond the standards "heretofore accepted by the United States in recognizing and approving changes in currency values and maintenance of exchange controls."

The proposed International Bank, on the other hand, "embodies satisfactory principles and procedures," the report said, "and if we assume good management, the institution should be able to operate soundly and effectively."

## Bretton Woods Proposal

The fund, as approved by the Bretton Woods conference, would be constituted at \$3,800,000,000, to be contributed by the various nations on a quota basis. Its main purpose would be the lending of money to nations who might need it to maintain their balance of trade with other countries.

The International Bank would be set up to grant loans, or to guarantee those of private investors, for reconstruction and development purposes when the element of risk precluded the use of private capital. Its eventual capital would be 10 billion dollars, but only 20 per cent of each nation's contribution would be in gold or currency, the remainder being constituted as a guarantee fund callable as needed.

Although it condemned the monetary fund, the bankers' report recognized a need for some form of currency stabilization program

and recommended that the International Bank be given the "responsibility" for arranging agreements, removal of exchange controls and general rules of procedure in carrying out monetary policies.

## Would Broaden Powers

It also recommended that the lending powers of the bank be

"broadened sufficiently to allow it to make loans under the same safeguards as the other loans of the bank for the purpose of aiding countries in stabilizing their currencies."

"These provisions should enable the bank to carry out all the essential purposes of the fund in a sound and practical manner," the report said.

Furthermore, the bankers suggested that the capital funds of the Export-Import Bank of Washington be increased from \$700,000,000 to \$2,000,000,000 to "provide means for meeting promptly deserving credit needs prior to the setting up of an International Bank" and to "enable the United States to make loans in which this country has special interest and which can be made more effectively through a national institution than through an international body."

Finally, then recommended that the Johnson Act and "any analogous provisions in the Neutrality Act now standing in the way of private loans to certain foreign countries be repealed."

The report, which was made public by W. Randolph Burgess, president of the bankers association, will be sent to Secretary Morgenthau, who sponsored this country's participation in the Bretton Woods Conference, and to members of Congress, who must vote their approval before the United States can become a member of either the bank or the fund. Congressional action is expected to be undertaken shortly.

Collaborating with the A.B.A. in the study of the Bretton Woods program were the Association of Reserve City Bankers and the Bankers Association for Foreign Trade.

In objecting to the monetary fund, the report asserted that under the system of quotas established for the fund, a member country would be "virtually entitled to borrow in certain specified annual amounts from the international pool of resources" and that, while the borrowing would be subject to certain limitations, there would be "no stipulation that the loans should be good loans or—once a country had been admitted to full rights of membership in the fund—that the loans should be based on prior consideration of the economic conditions and prospects of the borrowing country."

Asserting that the whole emphasis of the fund "is to give countries experiencing difficulties the benefit of every doubt," the report said:

"As opposed to the usual lending practice which places the responsibility for making out a case for credit upon the borrower, the fund goes on the theory that the borrower is entitled to credit unless the lender can make out a case to the contrary. And under the Bretton Woods plan, the lender is an institution in which the United States would have only a minority vote as compared with actual and potential borrowers."

## Puts Burden on U. S.

Calling the \$2,750,000,000 which is the United State's quota in the fund an "initial subscription," the report said further:

"When the dollars we put into the fund are exhausted, as they may well be, we shall then be faced with the same problem, in even more pressing form, that we are faced with today—that is, putting up dollars or running the risk of seeing this scheme of currency collaboration break down, with consequent centering of responsibility for failure upon the United States."

In voicing approval of the international bank, the report said that it would operate "more on the basis of established banking and investment principles, with the criteria that the loans must be investigated in advance by a competent committee and must give adequate promise of repayment."

It also pointed out that this country will have a "veto power over loans floated in dollars, just as other countries would have such power in respect to loans in their currencies."

"There is no such veto power in the case of the fund. In other words, with the fund we should be handing over to an international body the power to determine the destination, time and use of our money."

In its recommendation for expansion of the Export-Import Bank, the report said "in many cases there will be substantial advantages in having other countries share with us the responsibility and risk of loans, and this can be done by the (international) bank effectively because of its structure. . . .

"In other cases where American interests are closely involved we may find it better to make the loans ourselves through a national organization such as the Export-Import Bank. Its continuance, with

sou: l management, is therefore desirable; it can be especially useful in meeting emergency needs in the period before an international plan can begin operations; and further needs will arise."

The report also suggested that Congress adopt "a certain number of safeguards" in the bank's operations when it considers enabling legislation.

"These should include the provision that the American governor and director of the bank should be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and that they should be men of tested banking experience.

"Provision should also be made for a United States directing committee consisting of officers such as the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve System, a representative of the Federal Reserve System, a representative of the Federal Reserve banks, the Foreign Economic Administrator and the president of the Export-Import Bank.

This committee might instruct the American governor or director of the bank in important decisions of broad policy affecting the welfare of the country. The committee also might act as the agency of the United States in those matters in which the articles of the bank call for a decision by this Government."



# The Text of the Roosevelt Message on Bretton Woods Financial Proposals

By The Associated Press.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12.—President Roosevelt's message to Congress on the Bretton Woods money and banking proposals follows:

To the Congress of the United States:

In my budget message of Jan. 9 I called attention to the need for immediate action on the Bretton Woods proposals for an international monetary fund and an international bank for reconstruction and development. It is my purpose in this message to indicate the importance of these international organizations in our plans for a peaceful and prosperous world.

As we dedicate our total efforts to the task of winning this war we must never lose sight of the fact that victory is not only an end in itself but, in a large sense, victory offers us the means of achieving the goal of lasting peace and a better way of life.

Victory does not insure the achievement of these larger goals—it merely offers us the opportunity—the chance—to seek their attainment. Whether we shall have the courage and vision to avail ourselves of this tremendous opportunity—purchased at so great a cost—is yet to be determined. On our shoulders rests the heavy responsibility for making this momentous decision. I said before, and I repeat again: "This generation has a rendezvous with destiny."

## Plans Called Cornerstones

If we are to measure up to the task of peace with the same stature as we have measured up to the task of war, we must see that the institutions of peace rest firmly on the solid foundations of international political and economic cooperation. The cornerstone for international political cooperation is the Dumbarton Oaks proposal for a permanent United Nations.

International political relations

will be friendly and constructive, however, only if solutions are found to the difficult economic problems we face today. The cornerstone for international economic cooperation is the Bretton Woods proposals for an international monetary fund and an international bank for reconstruction and development.

These proposals for an international fund and international bank are concrete evidence that the economic objectives of the United States agree with those of the United Nations. They illustrate our unity of purpose and interest in the economic field. What we

need and what they need correspond—expanded production, employment, exchange and consumption—in other words, more goods produced, more jobs, more trade and a higher standard of living for us all.

To the people of the United States this means real peacetime employment for those who will be returning from the war and for those at home whose wartime work has ended. It also means orders and profits to our industries and fair prices to our farmers. We shall need prosperous markets in the world to ensure our own prosperity, and we shall need the goods the world can sell us. For all these purposes, as well as for a peace that will endure, we need the partnership of the United Nations.

The first problem in time which we must cope with is that of saving life and getting resources and people back into production. In many of the liberated countries economic life has all but stopped. Transportation systems are in ruins and therefore coal and raw materials cannot be brought to factories.

Many factories themselves are shattered, power plants smashed, transmission systems broken, bridges blown up or bombed, ports clogged with sunken wrecks, and great rich areas of farm land

inundated by the sea. People are tired and sick and hungry. But they are eager to go to work again, and to create again with their own hands and under their own leaders the necessary physical basis of their lives.

## Big Job Must Be Started Soon

Emergency relief is under way behind the armies under the authority of local Governments, backed up first by the Allied Military Command and after that by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Our participation in the UNRRA has been approved by Congress. But neither UNRRA nor the armies are designed for the construction or reconstruction of large-scale public works or factories or power plants or transportation systems. That job must be done otherwise, and it must be started soon.

The main job of restoration is not one of relief. It is one of reconstruction which must largely be done by local people and their Governments. They will provide the labor, the local money and most of the materials. The same is true for all the many plans for the improvement of transportation, agriculture, industry and housing, that are essential to the development of the economically backward areas of the world.

But some of the things required for all these projects, both of reconstruction and development, will have to come from overseas. It is at this point that our highly developed economy can play a role important to the rest of the world and very profitable to the United States. Inquiries for numerous materials and for all kinds of equipment and machinery in connection with such projects are already being directed to our industries and many more will come. This business will be welcome just as soon as the more urgent production for the war itself ends.

The main problem will be for these countries to obtain the means of payment. In the long run we can be paid for what we sell abroad chiefly in goods and services. But at the moment many of the countries who want to be our customers are prostrate. Other countries have devoted their economies so completely to the war that they do not have the resources for reconstruction and development.

Unless a means of financing is found, such countries will be unable to restore their economies and, in desperation, will be forced to carry forward and intensify existing systems of discriminatory trade practices, restrictive exchange controls, competitive depreciation of currencies and other forms of economic warfare. That would destroy all our good hopes. We must move promptly to prevent its happening, and we must move on several fronts, including finance and trade.

## "U. S. Should Act Promptly"

The United States should act promptly upon the plan for the international bank, which will make or guarantee sound loans for the foreign currency require-

ments of important reconstruction and development projects in member countries. One of its most important functions will be to facilitate and make secure wide private participation in such loans. The articles of agreement constituting the charter of the bank have been worked out with great care by an international conference of experts and give adequate protection to all interests. I recommend to the Congress that we accept the plan, subscribe the capital allotted to us, and participate wholeheartedly in the bank's work.

This measure, with others I shall later suggest, should go far to take care of our part of the lending requirements of the post-war years. They should help the countries concerned to get production started, to get over the

first crisis of disorganization and fear, to begin the work of reconstruction and development; and they should help our farmers and our industries to get over the crisis of reconversion by making a large volume of export business possible in the post-war years.

As confidence returns private investors will participate more and more in foreign lending and investment without any Government assistance. But to get over the first crisis, in the situation that confronts us, loans and guarantees by agencies of Government will be essential.

We all know, however, that a prosperous world economy must be built on more than foreign investment. Exchange rates must be stabilized and the channels of trade opened up throughout the world. A large foreign trade after victory will generate production, and therefore wealth. It will also make possible the servicing of foreign investments.

Almost no one in the modern world produces what he eats and wears and lives in. It is only by the division of labor among people and among geographic areas, with all their varied resources, and by the increased all-around production which specialization makes possible, that any modern country can sustain its present population. It is through exchange and trade that efficient production in large units becomes possible. To expand the trading circle, to make it richer, more competitive, more varied, is a fundamental contribution to everybody's wealth and welfare.

#### Economic Cooperation Asked

It is time for the United States to take the lead in establishing the principle of economic cooperation as the foundation for expanded world trade. We propose to do this, not by setting up a super-government, but by international negotiation and agreement, directed to the improvement of the monetary institutions of the world and of the laws that govern trade.

We have done a good deal in those directions in the last ten years under the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and through the stabilization fund operated by our Treasury. But our present enemies were powerful in those years

too, and they devoted all their efforts not to international collaboration, but to autarchy and economic warfare. When victory is won we must be ready to go forward rapidly on a wide front. We all know very well that this will be a long and complicated business.

A good start has been made. The United Nations monetary conference at Bretton Woods has taken a long step forward on a matter of great practical importance to us all. The conference submitted a plan to create an international monetary fund which will put an end to monetary chaos. The fund is a financial institution to preserve stability and order in the exchange rates between different moneys. It does not create a single money for the world; neither we nor anyone else is ready to do that. There will still be a different money in each country, but with the fund in operation the value

of each currency in international trade will remain comparatively stable. Changes in the value of foreign currencies will be made only after careful consideration by the fund of the factors involved.

Furthermore, and equally important, the fund agreement establishes a code of agreed principles for the conduct of exchange and currency affairs. In a nutshell, the fund agreement spells the difference between a world caught again in the maelstrom of panic and economic warfare culminating in war—as in the Nineteen Thirties—or a world in which the members strive for a better life through mutual trust, cooperation and assistance. The choice is ours.

I therefore recommend prompt action by the Congress to provide the subscription of the United States to the international monetary fund and the legislation necessary for our membership in the fund.

The international fund and bank together represent one of the most sound and useful proposals for international collaboration now before us. On the other hand, I do not want to leave with you the impression that these proposals for the fund and bank are perfect in every detail.

It may well be that the experience of future years will show us how they can be improved. I do wish to make it clear, however, that these articles of agreement are the product of the best minds that forty-four nations could muster. These men, who represented nations from all parts of the globe, nations in all stages of economic development, nations with different political and economic philosophies, have reached an accord which is presented to you for your consideration and approval. It would be a tragedy if differences of opinion on minor details should lead us to sacrifice the basic agreement achieved on the major problems.

#### Other Proposals Due Shortly

Nor do I want to leave with you the impression that the fund and the bank are all that we will need

to solve the economic problems which will face the United Nations when the war is over. There are other problems which we shall be called upon to solve. It is my expectation that other proposals will shortly be ready to submit to you for your consideration.

These will include the establishment of the food and agriculture organization of the United Nations, broadening and strengthening of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, international agreement for the reduction of trade barriers, the control of cartels and the orderly marketing of world surpluses of certain commodities, a revision of the Export-Import Bank, and an international oil agreement, as well as proposals in the field of civil aviation, shipping and radio wire communications. It will also be necessary, of course, to repeal the Johnson Act.

In this message I have recommended for your consideration the immediate adoption of the Bretton Woods agreements and suggested other measures which will have to be dealt with in the near future. They are all parts of a consistent whole.

That whole is our hope for a secure and fruitful world, a world in which plain people in all countries can work at tasks which they do well, exchange in peace the products of their labor and work out their several destinies in security and peace; a world in which Governments, as their major contribution to the common welfare are highly and effectively resolved to work together in practical affairs and to guide all their actions by the knowledge that any policy or act that has effects abroad must be considered in the light of those effects.

This point in history at which we stand is full of promise and of danger. The world will either move toward unity and widely shared prosperity or it will move apart into necessarily competing economic blocs.

We have a chance, we citizens

of the United States, to use our influence in favor of a more united and cooperating world. Whether we do so will determine, as far as it is in our power, the kind of lives our grandchildren can live.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

The White House.  
Feb. 12, 1945.

74

100-1

March 11

BRETTON Woods

W.C. VENT  
2-15-45

WDC Post 2-15-45

## **Bretton Woods Ends Isolationism, Morgenthau Says**

St. Louis, Feb. 14 (AP).—Treasury Secretary Morgenthau said in a Nation-wide radio broadcast here tonight that the Bretton Woods international monetary agreements stand before the world "as a symbol of the end of economic isolationism in the United States."

Addressing his speech locally to the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, Morgenthau asserted that America is emerging from this war in a position of world leadership and that its willingness to take a clear and firm position on the problem of international cooperation "is the first step in meeting the greatest challenge of all history—the challenge of a lasting peace."

The underlying cause of failure to stabilize currencies after the last war was the view of each country that it was a problem of exclusive concern to them, the Secretary said, and added that the resultant instability must certainly be counted as a contributory cause of the great depression, and the first phase of the present war.

DC-1 misc. C-7-

75

## After Bretton Woods

The President has urged Congress to pass promptly the legislation and vote the funds necessary to assure our membership in the international monetary fund and international bank recommended by delegates to the Bretton Woods Conference. That appeal was made shortly after the American Bankers Association, the Association of Reserve City Bankers, and the Bankers Association for Foreign Trade, among other representative groups, had gone on record as opposed to the Monetary Fund, which in their opinion "is unsound and would increase the already grave danger of inflation; would delay fundamental economic adjustments; and would fail to protect the principles and interest of the United States and her citizens." These objections speedily found an echo in London, where there is much more criticism of Bretton Woods than in this country. As an alternative plan the American bankers indorse the proposed International Bank, which, they suggest, should be equipped to carry on some of the functions assigned to the fund by providing stabilization credits.

Thus Congress is confronted by a difficult choice: in accepting the Bretton Woods program, it would be acting contrary to the advice of the country's leading bankers. In accepting only part of the program in a modified form it would be repudiating an agreement reached after prolonged discussion—a "product of the best minds that 44 nations could muster." In view of the fact that the Treasury, with Administration support, played a leading part in bringing about the Bretton Woods Conference and determining the general nature of the agreement, the failure of Congress to approve that agreement would have serious political repercussions. For it would tend to confirm fears that our professions of willingness to cooperate with other nations is just talk—stopping short of action when any risk of loss is involved.

While the political arguments for acceptance of the agreement are extremely weighty, they are not, of course, the only decisive factors to consider. On the contrary, if the proposed Monetary Fund would, as the bankers contend, actually delay fundamental economic adjustments throughout the world, Congress ought to reject the plan forthwith. But would it? The matters at issue are

highly technical, while the views expressed by experts for and against the proposed fund are to some extent based on personal judgments that do not admit of proof or contradiction. However, this much can be said with certainty: many of the statements in the ABA memorandum present a distorted view of the nature of the fund, indicating the existence of a profound bias against experimentation with this particular device. The ABA critics appear to be inspired by a conviction that the fund would be dissipated by bad management, in disregard of the innumerable safeguards set up by the agreement to govern operations.

For instance, the ABA says: "Under the system of quotas in the fund a member country would be virtually entitled to borrow in certain specified annual amounts from the international pool of resources, provided the purpose of such borrowing were represented by it to accord with the broad purposes of the fund. The borrowing would be subject to certain limitations, but with no stipulation that the loans should be good loans or—once a country had been admitted to full rights of membership in the fund—that the loans should be based on prior consideration of the economic conditions and prospects of the borrowing country."

Such criticism is not soundly based. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the so-called borrowing country really buys currency from the fund in exchange for its own currency. And to the extent that the fund achieves its avowed purpose of establishing the monetary systems of its members on a more stable basis, the risk of loss to the fund would be minimized. Furthermore, by the terms of the agreement many conditions, general as well as specific, are attached to the so-called borrowing operation. Specifically the amounts of currency that may be obtained by a member from the fund within a year is limited, and the scale of charges imposed on members that buy currencies increases with the amount of their purchases and the length of time held. Finally, there is a comprehensive safeguard in the agreement providing that if any member uses the fund in a way contrary to its purposes the fund may limit use of its resources or declare the member ineligible to use its resources. In short, even if the fund should not come up to the expectations of its sponsors, given reasonably prudent management, the terms of the agreement provide multiple safeguards against excessive losses.

The ABA's fear that political considerations rather than sound economic judgments would dictate the management of the fund and spell disaster does not extend to the management of the proposed international bank. Possibly the more tolerant attitude displayed toward the bank proposal is trace-

able to the fact that the United States would retain a veto over loans payable in dollars. Moreover, the bulk of the bank's operations would be financed by sale of its own obligations or by guaranteeing loans made by private bankers. The latter proposal quite naturally makes a powerful appeal to some investment banking groups.

The often repeated assertions that sound internal policies, removal of trade barriers, elimination of discriminations and special privileges are essential to currency stabilization apply likewise to long-time investment operations, since credit operations of all sorts are seriously impeded by fluctuating currencies. The Bretton Woods currency plan is admittedly no cure for deep-seated economic ills. But under wise guidance in consultation with member states the fund managers could do a great deal to encourage and promote adoption of corrective measures designed to bring international payments into equilibrium. A start has to be made sometime, by some means, to bring about a revival and expansion of international trade. It seems logical to begin by setting up a fund to enable member countries to obtain temporary financial assistance in making external payments, preparatory to embarking on fundamental internal economic reforms.

WDC POST 2-5-45

## Move to Ask Canada to Join Americas' Setup Gains Favor

A strong movement is growing among Latin American diplomats to ask Canada to join the Pan-American system.

A formal invitation might be extended at the inter-American conference in Mexico City, scheduled to open February 21.

Doubtless, Canada would be sounded out ahead of time and presentation of such a resolution would depend on how favorable a view Ottawa takes.

Canada's position at present seems to depend on two points:

1. The unanimity of the invitation. Canadian sources say they have no intention of becoming another subject for inter-American dispute, but that a virtually unanimous request could strike a responsive note.

2. Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin decisions on open points in the Dumbarton Oaks world security plan. Canadian officials feel more direct-

ly concerned with world than with regional organization for peace. They might be hesitant about joining an American system if it tended to minimize their position in a general security agency.

The feeling that Canada belongs in the hemispheric system has become especially strong among the other American nations since the war. This has been accentuated by Canada's independent stand from Great Britain on such important foreign policy problems as aviation, a prime consideration in Ottawa.

A test case may come up in about a week. There is a strong possibility that the inter-American economic and financial advisory committee will pass a resolution next week asking Canadian participation.

The Mexico City conference is scheduled to discuss American plans for defense and participation

in a world security organization as a continental unit. Canadian manpower, production capacity and especially air and naval bases would form an important part of such an arrangement.

DC-1

misc. Conf -

77



## Donovan Proposes Super Spy System for Postwar New Deal

Would Take Over FBI, Secret Service, ONI and G-2 to Watch Home, Abroad

By WALTER TROHAN

Creation of an all powerful intelligence service to spy on the postwar world and to pry into the lives of citizens at home is under consideration by the New Deal.

The Washington Times-Herald and the Chicago Tribune yesterday secured exclusively a copy of a highly confidential and secret memorandum from Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, which co-ordinates intelligence information, to President Roosevelt proposing to set up the super-spy agency.

### Wholesale Grant of Power

Donovan left the decision as to whether the unit should be created by legislative action or Executive order up to the President.

Also obtained was a copy of an equally secret suggested draft of an order setting up the general intelligence service, which would supersede all existing Federal police and intelligence units, including military intelligence, G-2, naval intelligence, ONI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue agents and the Federal Communications Commission, which monitors all radio airways. The order gives the unit a wholesale grant of power.

### Spying at Home Indicated

Only 15 copies of the memorandum and draft order were made, each plastered with secrecy injunctions. These went to such high officials as Admiral Leahy, chief of staff to the Commander in Chief; General Marshall, chief of staff of the Army; Admiral King, chief of naval operations; Secretary of State Stettinius, Secretary of Navy Forrestal and Secretary of War Stimson.

Ostensibly the purpose of the super-intelligence unit is to spy on good neighbors throughout the world for the purpose of formulating a foreign policy and developing strategy. This stated purpose would indicate that neither Mr. Roosevelt nor General Donovan expects the end of the war to usher in an era of perpetual peace.

### Super Spies Would Have Tremendous Power

Under the draft order the director of the super-spy unit would have tremendous power in being charged with gathering and sifting intelligence for the White House and all Federal agencies. It is possible, under the order, for him to determine American foreign policy by weeding out, withholding or coloring information gathered at his direction.

Although the agency would be concerned primarily with foreign intelligence, and would have no police powers at home or abroad, the draft order would empower the spy chief to co-ordinate all intelligence agencies of the Government, establish a general policy for them and call upon them for any work or information. This would permit spying at home and employment of the police powers of existing agencies whenever needed.

The spy director could employ the facilities of such agencies and enjoin them from reporting to their superiors. Under this provision of the draft order the director might employ the FBI on some task and charge the G-men not to report to J. Edgar Hoover, their chief, or even Attorney General Biddle.

### Confidentially Called 'Frankfurter's Gestapo'

In the high circles where the memorandum and draft order are circulating the proposed unit is known as "Frankfurter's Gestapo," because the sister of Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter is said to hold a confidential personnel post in OSS. It is assumed she would pick key personnel, at the suggestion of her brother, for Donovan when, as he expects, he would be named spy chief. She is Miss Stella Frankfurter.

The unit would operate under an independent budget and presumably have secret funds for spy work along the lines of bribing and luxury living described in the novels of E. Phillips Oppenheim.

The secret Donovan memorandum is dated November 18, 1944, and reads as follows:

"Secret

"Enclosure

"18 November 1944.

"Memorandum for the President.

"Pursuant to your note of 31 October, 1944, I have given consideration to the organization of an intelligence service for the postwar period.

"In the early days of the war, when the demands upon intelligence services were mainly in and for military operations, the Office of Strategic Services was placed under the direction of the joint chiefs of staff. When our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace.

### 'Set Up As Permanent Long-Range Plan'

"This will require two things:

"1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision of the President.

"2. The establishment of a central authority reporting directly to you, with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and co-ordinate the intelligence material required by the executive branch in planning and carrying out the national policy and strategy.

"I attach in the form of a draft directive (appendix) the means by which I think this could be realized without difficulty or loss of time. You will note that co-ordination and centralization are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that per-

taining primarily to department action) remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central authority thus would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department of State, or other agencies.

"In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent long-range plan. But you may want to consider whether this (or part of it) should be done now, by executive or legislative action. There are common-sense reasons why you may desire to lay the keel of the ship at once.

"The immediate revision and co-ordination of our present intelligence system would effect substantial economies and aid in the more efficient and speedy termination of the war.

"Information important to the national defense, being gathered now by certain departments and agencies, is not being used to full advantage in the war. Co-ordination at the strategy level would prevent waste, and avoid the present confusion that leads to waste and unnecessary duplication.

"Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of transition which, before we are aware, will take us into the tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and

orderly intelligence system, will contribute to informed decisions. "We have now in the Government the trained and specialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed."

### **Suggested Form For Drafting Order**

The suggested order draft, sent to the White House by Donovan in an appendix to the memorandum, reads as follows:

"Substantive authority necessary in establishment of a central intelligence service:

"In order to co-ordinate and centralize the policies and actions of the Government relating to intelligence:

[The blank spaces are for names of executives and agencies to be filled in later by the President].

"1. There is established in the executive offices of the President a central intelligence service, to be known as the \_\_\_\_\_, at the head of which shall be a director appointed by the President. The director shall discharge and perform his functions and duties under the direction and supervision of the President. Subject to the approval of the President, the director may exercise his powers, authorities and duties through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may determine.

"2. There is established in the \_\_\_\_\_ an advisory board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and such other members as the President may subsequently appoint. The board shall advise and assist the director with respect to the formulation of basic policies and plans of the

"3. Subject to the direction and control of the President, and with any necessary advice and assistance from the other departments and agencies of the Government, the \_\_\_\_\_ shall perform the following functions and duties:

### **Provides for Training, Supervision of 'Spies'**

"(a) Co-ordination of the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government, and the establishment of such policies and objectives as will assure the integration of national intelligence efforts;

"(b) Collection either directly or through existing Government departments and agencies, of pertinent information, including military, economic, political and scientific, concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign nations, with particular reference to the effect such matters may have upon the national security, policies and interests of the United States;

"(c) Final evaluation, synthesis and dissemination within the Government of the intelligence required to enable the Government to determine policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war, and the advancement of broad national policy;

"(d) Procurement, training and supervision of its intelligence personnel;

"(e) Subversive operations abroad;

"(f) Determination of policies for and co-ordination of facilities essential to the collection of information under subparagraph 'B' hereof, and

### **'Such Other Functions As President May Order'**

"(g) Such other functions and duties relating to intelligence as the President from time to time may direct.

"4. The . . . shall have no police or law-enforcement functions, either at home or abroad.

"5. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof, existing intelligence agencies within the Government shall collect, evaluate, synthesize and disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein defined as intelligence required by such agencies in the actual performance of their functions and duties.

"6. The director shall be authorized to call upon departments and agencies of the Government to furnish appropriate specialists for such supervisory and functional positions within the . . . as may be required.

### **Goes Under Military In Time of War**

"7. All Government departments and agencies shall make available to the director such intelligence material as the director, with the approval of the President, from time to time may request.

"8. The . . . shall operate under an independent budget.

"9. In time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of the . . . in areas of actual or projected military operations shall be co-ordinated with military plans and shall be subject to the approval of the joint chiefs of staff. Parts of such programs which are to be executed in the theater of military operations shall be subject to the control of the theater commander.

"10. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the . . . the director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities and services. The director shall be assigned, upon the approval of the President, such military and naval personnel as may be required in the performance of the functions and duties of the . . . The director may provide for the internal organization and management of the . . . in such manner as he may determine."

20-1 Misc.  
78

# Congress Members Protest Plan for American 'Gestapo'

By WALTER TROHAN

Vigorous protest was voiced yesterday by members of Congress against the New Deal proposal to create a super-intelligence unit to formulate national policy and strategy in the postwar world.

Exclusive disclosure of the plan by the Washington Times-Herald and the Chicago Tribune, with the publication of a memorandum and appended suggested draft of an order, brought prompt congressional denunciation of the adoption of Gestapo, Nazi secret police, and OGPU, Russian secret police, methods in the United States.

## Suggested by President

The memorandum and appendix were sent to President Roosevelt last November by Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, which gathers and correlates war information. In the memorandum Donovan said his plan was prepared at the direct suggestion of Mr. Roosevelt.

Donovan could not be reached at his office for comment. The OSS has shrouded all of its operations and the movement of its personnel with secrecy.

Administration officials were also silent on the proposal. Most of them knew nothing of the plan until it was published as there were only 15 copies of the memorandum and its appendix, which went largely to top flight military leaders and Cabinet officers.

On Capitol Hill Members of Congress showed no hesitancy in unleashing indignation over what they condemned as a scheme to spy abroad and at home.

## Senators Play Proposal

Among those to blast the proposal were the following:

Senator Johnson (D.), of Colorado: "I don't want any Democratic Gestapo. I can't go along with any proposal for a domestic spy system."

Senator Bushfield (R.), of South Dakota: "What is it they call that Russian spy system—the OGPU? It would certainly be nice to have one of those in our own country."

Senator Moore (R.), of Oklahoma: "It looks as if we are not going to have too much confidence in our neighbors and our present Allies in the postwar world if we are going to spy on them. Bill Donovan apparently formulated this plan on a request from the President. This is just another concentration of power in the President following the pattern of the collectivist states."

## "Doesn't Sound Good"

Senator Capehart (R.), of Indiana: "I'm against any new superduper Gestapo or spy system. We certainly have an efficient FBI which proved itself capable of taking care of any domestic situation which may arise. Foreign intelligence should be under Army or Navy direction. If any necessity arises for anything in addition to military or naval intelligence outside the United States, it should be under FBI supervision. It doesn't sound good to me."

Senator Wherry (R.), of Nebraska: "I'm not in favor of any other Federal bureau to absorb anything. We know they don't absorb them. If the report is true, I'm against any superduper agency to pry into the private lives of American citizens. We have enough agencies doing that now."

Senator Revercomb (R.), of West Virginia: "It sounds like a far-reaching and perhaps very dangerous proposal to place such power in the hands of one organization."

Representative Knutson (R.), of Minnesota: "It's amazing if true. In my judgment, Congress will never knowingly vote money to set up a Gestapo in this country."

## Sees Avid Grasp for Power

Representative Shafer (R.), of Michigan: "This is another indication that the New Deal will not halt in its quest for power. Like Simon Legree it wants to own us body and soul. What kind of world peace is the New Deal cooking that will need an elaborate spy system? I'm for toleration at home and abroad."

Representative Sparkman (D.), of Alabama: "It doesn't sound to me as the thing to do. A great

many people would consider it a super Gestapo and it would start out with two strikes against it."

Representative Woodruff (R.), of Michigan: "What is this going to be—another Gestapo? As days go by and things continue to develop along certain lines pointing toward totalitarianism, it's becoming increasingly apparent that unless things radically change we in this country will experience all of the so-called blessings with which the German people have been favored since Mr. Hitler took charge."

## Leave FBI Alone

Representative Classon (R.), of Massachusetts: "My opinion would be that I'd be opposed to any legislation subordinating the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover to military controls. The FBI and Hoover are something the country established on a pinnacle—I would let them alone."

Representative Allen (R.), of Illinois: "I am determinedly opposed to the introduction into this country of any of the totalitarian concepts which millions of our men are fighting overseas. I am confident that Congress will bar any super-Gestapo at home and will view with suspicion any move to take compilation and evaluation of intelligence from the Army, Navy and State departments."

Representative Sumners (D.), of Texas: "Such a plan is very important and very far-reaching. It would require a most careful and close examination by Congress."

## Doing Good Job Now

Representative Bloom (D.), of New York: "Before setting up such an agency, you'd first have to see what the various heads of the existing intelligence agencies have to say about it. We must remember that the FBI, the Army and Navy intelligence offices have their own methods of investigation. Of course, I have the greatest respect for Bill Donovan's judgment, but it seems to me that we ought to win the war before we start changing the way our Government agencies do things. From the way the war looks right now I'd say they were doing a good job. After the war it's a different question."

DC-1 misc. Graft -

# DONOVAN UPHELD ON PEACE SPY PLAN

## Comparison of Proposal for Intelligence Service to the 'Gestapo' Is Denounced

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—Comparing the proposal of Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, for information of a strategic authority to coordinate United States intelligence services in peace-time to the organizing of an "American Gestapo" was received with surprise and not a little disapprobation in informed circles today.

It was pointed out that such a conclusion is refuted in General Donovan's memorandum to the President and has aroused discussion which can only create an impression of a glaring national weakness in respect to dealings with enemy countries. They could take this as notice that they were licensed to proceed with subversive activities unhampered by any vigilance on our part.

General Donovan's proposal, it was said, provides for an organization essentially unlike the terrorist character of a Gestapo, because its personnel would be without police authority over United States citizens and would operate only from the point of view of information and interpretation.

### Agency for Inquisition Is Scouted

The inference that such an organization could be turned into an agency for intimidation or inquisition over the American public is declared to be denied by the fact that the aim of the proposed intelligence system is to analyze and utilize to best advantage the floods of information already being collected by existing intelligence services of the Army, Navy, State Department and the Treasury.

Its purpose is to supplement this information by action of trained specialists whose services have been found essential in wartime, and whose absence in peace would place the United States at a disadvantage at a time when this country would be virtually making its debut in intelligent participation in world affairs.

Control of this organization is vested with Congress. Congress could therefore prevent its being turned into an agency for terrorism by limiting its appropriation.

### One Source of Opposition

One possible source for opposition to the proposal might lie, it is believed, in possible competition among government services for control and direction of its opera-

tions. But unless a superior authority is formed, with powers to examine, coordinate and draw conclusions affecting policy from all available information, the situation which prevailed before the war whereby each service kept its documents to itself would be perpetuated.

The OSS is expected to be dissolved at the end of the war, and nearly all government departments are said to be agreed on the need for a higher level service, which would coordinate intelligence, make use of the information obtained in framing policies, and assure exchange of information.

The system of intelligence abroad in war had to be organized under the military supervision, but in peacetime the military or diplomatic services could not engage in the required activities. Much supplemental work would have to be done by agents who could report on activities abroad which might be harmful to the United States.

The Gestapo, it is pointed out, is made up of active policemen, armed and directed to operate by force. In the proposal made by General Donovan to President Roosevelt the personnel would be trained observers and would include men wholly removed from the policing realm and fitted for the guiding of our policy.

Failure to support the proposal, it is held, would lay open the country to grave dangers from without.

Donovan Plan  
N.Y. Times  
2-12-45

DC-1 Misc. Conf - 80

## Donovan's Plan

A good deal of whatever unfavorable reaction there was on Capitol Hill to the plan for a central intelligence service may be traced to headline reading. The plan should be read as a whole. It should be reviewed in the light of what in this war intelligence has actually accomplished. It should be pondered with the aid of a little exercise of the imagination on what a better intelligence service might have accomplished. This is important. For the basic assurance of our national security in time to come is the absorption of the lessons of the last four years. And the greatest lesson is that national security depends upon knowledge of what is going on in the world, not appraised merely as a fact-finding or informational job, but synthesized by brains at the elbow of the policy-makers.

As to the plan itself, it is said to be the product of General Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services. Donovan is one of the trail blazers in our war organization. Before the war, in studies on the spot of 'tween war campaigns, he was impressed by the lamentable showing of intelligence services. Only the German had a rating on a par with the advancement in new war techniques. Accordingly, when this war broke out, he organized the group now known as the OSS, which functions under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a kind of brain trust for the men charged with making decisions based upon exact knowledge of all the detailed elements in hitherto unknown situations.

The proposed central intelligence service does not call for the absorption of existing intelligence agencies, either civilian, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or military, like G2 of the Army and the Office of Naval Intelligence. It would simply use their product, and evaluate it. It would be put in position to call for the interchange of the data they possess and collect. It would be responsible for policy directives. It would channel the "dope" to the Executive for the formulation of national and international policy. More than the saving of the present system from a postwar break-up is envisaged, more than transfer of authority over the military side of it from the Joint Chiefs to the executive office. There would be the addition of the priceless ingredient of coordination and over-all control which is still lacking in intelligence work as in so many other phases of our administration.

Examples galore could be given of faulty intelligence which has produced disaster and worse to modern nations. Russia got a bloody nose in Finland in 1939 because of a failure to appreciate the Finnish situation. For the same reason Britain trimmed in

recently in Greece. The same deficiency led to our own discomfiture when Rundstedt lunged through the Ardennes. In these cases what is called strategic intelligence was at fault. An excellent example of strategic intelligence was the job done in Normandy before the liberation of France. But there are all kinds of intelligence work. There is, for example, technical intelligence, which remits to the factories the lessons learned on the battlefield on weapons. We cannot pretend that in this war it has been either first class or expeditious. Then there is such a thing as clandestine intelligence. Mr. Sumner Welles was using it when he forewarned the Russians six months prior to the event that the Germans intended to invade Russia in mid-1941. Perhaps the greatest coup in clandestine intelligence in this war was the report of the robot bomb factories in the Baltic which were subsequently destroyed by the RAF. The man who got this news through saved Britain.

Brains make intelligence, not snooping. No correct "estimate of the situation," which precedes all military planning, is possible without this kind of intelligence service. Intelligence should equally be the eyes and ears of the Nation in time of peace. After the war the Government should not be left to frame policy on the basis of blind guesses. Statesmen in peace as well as generals in war require "estimates of the situation."

The German radio, picking up the details of the Donovan proposal, makes great play of the plan, which is called an evil design to control the postwar world. Most of the headlines are faithfully repeated, except, of course, the charge that the new plan is a super-Gestapo. That would not do in a country which is at the mercy of secret police. If so happens that no police or law enforcement function would be vested in the proposed over-all intelligence service, either at home or abroad. It would simply save policy-making from being done in the dark. If, for instance, the President is asking for appropriations for the armed forces, those appropriations must be for the purpose of meeting situations which, as we have learned from experience 'tween wars, are not known to ordinary observers, but are discoverable only by trained intelligence officers.

The Donovan proposal deserves consideration on its merits as a contribution to our national security. It is an effort to make a sum out of the parts of our intelligence services. Some of those parts have done well, some have done ill. Working together they could do an economical, efficient and fundamental service which hitherto has been neglected on the ground that intelligence work is somehow tainted. For our part we have not yet gone beyond the stage of wanting to see the military intelligence branches strengthened and unified as a basic preliminary to the merger of the armed forces.

DC-1 nose, Conf - 81



## Donovan Plan

The Donovan plan for a clearing house for information, military, political and economic, will be of little value unless and until the organs from which the information springs are renovated and perfected. I have in mind especially that emanating from the offices of the military and naval attaches. In the first place, the uniformed services have so little knowledge of international usage that they periodically urge that their representatives be directly accredited to foreign governments with no connection with or responsibility to diplomatic missions. This desire is due frequently to irritation with some diplomatic chief of mission and sometimes to vanity due to their being received in special audience, whatever their personal rank, by the chief of state, the idea obviously being the glorification of the military caste.

The blame for any dissatisfaction with the results obtained in time of peace from the offices of our military and naval attaches is traceable directly to the halls of Congress. It takes money to train observers; it takes money to enable them to carry out their missions; it takes more money to live in a capital city than in a smaller and less cosmopolitan place. Expenses increase with responsibilities. As a consequence of the failure of Congress to provide adequate funds, only officers having private means could be assigned to such duties. Special fitness could not be made the criterion. All but the rich were automatically barred. It was frequently the social rather than the professional aspect which offered sufficient inducement to a couple to spend their own money doing the job. Usually, in time of peace, I reiterate, the attache was allowed clerk hire of about \$1500 per annum. Can anyone imagine an American citizen competent in the language involved performing such services abroad for such a recompense? An interpreter was indispensable primarily because the untrained officer knew only the English language. Translations were necessary and someone had to collect information for reports to Washington. Of necessity, a national of the country was hired and so it came about that each attache, in time of peace, mind you, on his arrival found installed in his office the indispensable and "thoroughly trustworthy" native clerk who would perform any useful service for the officer except, of course, supply him with information which the native clerk might think was not in the interest of his country. Nor is it to be supposed that he failed to give reports the slant desired by his own government. That, in my opinion, is one of the reasons for the misinterpretation by our military and naval authorities of foreign psy-

chology which has cost us dear during the present war. Congress was obviously primarily to blame. The uniformed services did the best they could with the means placed at their disposal.

In short, no superstructure such as that proposed by General Donovan will be of value unless and until these two services are provided with ample funds for (1) the training of intelligent officers and their wives (equal rights, equal responsibilities), (2) the allocation of adequate funds for representation, and (3) most important of all, the hiring, regardless of cost, of competent American-born citizens as clerks. If such services are worth having they are worth paying for.

U. GRANT-SMITH.

Washington, Feb. 17.

Donovan Plan  
4/11/17  
2-23-75

DC-1 Miss. Conf -

82

W.L.C.  
NY Times  
1-24-45

## BRITON URGES U. S. LEAD WORLD UNION

An appeal to public opinion in the United States to take the leadership in a world organization for peace, based upon the proposals adopted at Dumbarton Oaks, was made yesterday by Capt. Leonard D. Gammans, Conservative member of Parliament, who came here on this mission a few weeks ago.

He addressed members and guests of Americans United for World Organization, Inc., who comprise representatives of various groups engaged in research and educational programs in this field. The session was held in conjunction with a luncheon in the Wall Street Club at 40 Wall Street.

Thomas K. Finletter, a member of the board of directors of the organization, announced that it had been formed recently under the chairmanship of Ernest M. Hopkins, president of Dartmouth College, "to consolidate public opinion in favor of our joining a world organization and to bring about the necessary action by the Senate." He added that a program to extend the membership would be conducted from its headquarters at 465 Fifth Avenue.

Declaring that the United States will have to accept "a disproportionate share" of leadership by reason of its geographical and strong moral position, Captain Gammans characterized this nation as "the architect of the United Nations."

He followed this plea with another dealing with various bilateral and regional agreements, such as the recent treaty between France and Russia, and Britain's treaty with Russia, which he regarded "not as a substitute for a system of world security but as part of it" and likewise as means "for dealing with potential aggression in different parts of the world between countries who have a special and intimate interest."

DC + 1

Misc. Conf -

83