

Note to the Chef de Cabinet

Lessons Learned Study on UNMEER

1. The attached draft Note to Mr. Atul Khare requests the Department of Field Support (DFS) to provide input for the Secretary-General's Lessons Learned Study on UNMEER.
2. The Note recalls the background leading to the Assembly's request that the Secretary-General provide detailed information on the outcome of the Lessons Learned exercise at the first resumed 70th session, and refers to the specific issues that the ACABQ recommended and the Assembly requested be included in the scope of the exercise. The Note further explains that DFS would be required to address some of the more technical/specialized issues, such as budgetary, planning and administrative matters, while OCdC and IPI would handle the remainder.

Proposed action:


- Favourable consideration of the enclosed draft Note to Mr. Khare is recommended.



Patrick Carey
22 September 2015

15-08365

HEA/08/003





Fw: ToR for UNMEER Lessons Learned and pending GA requirements

Patrick Carey to: Adele Grant

21/09/2015 04:24 PM

Will discuss

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----- Forwarded by Patrick Carey/NY/UNO on 21/09/2015 04:24 PM -----

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Date: 21/09/2015 11:43 AM
Subject: ToR for UNMEER Lessons Learned and pending GA requirements

Hi Christian,

I know that you are heavily focused on Umoja, but this is one of the items I want to discuss with you.

As you know, the Office of the Chef de Cabinet is taking the lead in conducting the GA mandated Lessons Learned study of UNMEER. That work is underway and attached please find the final TORs that have been extensively consulted with the lead AFPs involved in the response. We have forged a partnership with the International Peace Institute (IPI) to provide an external perspective, as well as to draw on their convening capacity and research capabilities..

In this context, while most of the specific requests will be addressed within the scope of the UNMEER lessons learned exercise led by the CdC with IPI - some aspects are too technical and specific in terms of their linkages DM and/or DFS and will, therefore, require coordination with these Departments that will need to lead in providing response.

Having analysed the requirements as captured in the extract of GA resolution 69/274B and related ACABQ report (A/69/903), whose recommendations were endorsed in the resolution, on the UNMEER lessons learned exercise (also attached) these areas are as follows:

From the GA report (69/274 b) [Para 10]	Further requests the SG, the context of the report mentioned in paragraph 9 above, to include the results of his in-depth review of the organizational, administrative and planning aspects, and operation on the ground, as well as information on the final performance <i>[HERE IS WHERE WE NEED DM and/or DFS]</i> including liquidation and the disposal of assets, if the Mission and the Office of the SE.
From ACABQ report (A/69/903) [Para 16] Staffing structure	Asset management and cost recovery for services provided by peacekeeping missions Suggest[ed lead - DFS (coordinated with DM)]
	"...the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the

From ACABQ report [para 49]	Secretary-General to comprehensively examine the organization and operational aspects of the UNMEER air services in the context of the above-mentioned lessons learned exercise with a view of assessing whether the services were delivered in the most effective and efficient manner possible". [Suggested lead (DFS in coordination with DM and WFP)]
From ACABQ report [para 50]	"The Advisory Committee reiterates the importance it attaches to ensuring strict compliance with all existing UN regulations and rules, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards and established procedures of the UN. It recommends that the GA request the SG to document, for future reference, the special measures implemented in the case of UNMEER in the context of the lessons learned exercise, along with an assessment of the impact of the application of such measures on the operations of the Mission." Suggested lead - [DFS (coordinated with DM)]

These are the four highly specialised and technical areas that call for DFS/DM to lead and provide response.

We can discuss the modality in terms of integrating with the EOSG-led UNMEER LL but since this is due to be presented in the first part of the resumed 70th session of the GA - we will need to activate DM and DFS almost immediately.

Lets discuss how you see this best progressing, who should lead, and we can formalize by memo after.

Regards

Patrick

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Final Terms of Reference for UNMEER lessons learned study.pdf



ACABQ UNMEER Report LL.docx

Final Terms of Reference:

Lessons learned study of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER)

September 2015

I. Background

Unique to the Ebola crisis was the establishment of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first-ever UN emergency health mission. UNMEER was established on 19 September 2014 after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 69/1, and in response to a joint request from the Presidents of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone for the UN to lead coordination of the international response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, as a temporary measure. UNMEER was mandated to harness the capabilities and competencies of all the relevant UN actors under a singular operational crisis management system to reinforce unity of purpose, effective ground-level leadership and operational direction to ensure a rapid, effective, efficient and coherent response to the Ebola crisis. By its design, UNMEER combined the technical expertise of the World Health Organization (WHO) with the operational capabilities of other UN agencies, funds and programmes.¹ UNMEER was designed to support the international response effort with a view towards reinforcing the national plans developed by the affected countries themselves.

Accordingly, UNMEER worked with host governments, the UN system and other national and international stakeholders to facilitate, under the technical guidance of WHO, putting in place the lines of action essential to stopping and treating the outbreak, including case management, case finding, safe and dignified burial practices and community engagement and social mobilization, as well as related enabling activities such as logistics, personnel and volunteers, training, cash payments and information management.

In his identical letters to the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council on 17 September 2014 indicating his intention to establish the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the Secretary-General informed that the Mission would exist only as long as necessary to stem the crisis. UNMEER was therefore conceptualized as a “temporary and short-term entity to galvanize the United Nations system, align all response partners on the ground, provide the logistics backbone to scale up the response and identify gaps and redirect resources until Ebola no longer posed a grave threat to the region and there were sufficient existing national and international capacities to contain the situation.”

¹ UNMEER included staff from across the UN system, including WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, OCHA, DFS, DPKO, DPA, IOM, World Bank, WFP, UN Women, OHCHR, UNFPA, DM, DSS, DESA and DPI, as well as from outside the UN system including from the U.S. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

As a temporary entity, UNMEER was not created to replace or supplant any operational actor on the ground. With many UN entities active in the affected countries since the onset of the outbreak in early 2014, the establishment of UNMEER was intended to respond to the growing severity of the emergency by, inter alia, building on and enhancing their efforts through establishing a crisis management system. This was designed to support the UN in coming together in a singular and unified response with a scale-up of efforts that took advantage of synergies between different entities. At the Operational Conference for scaling up the UN system approach to the Ebola response (“Accra Planning Conference”) held in Accra, Ghana from 15-18 October, it was agreed that UNMEER’s coordination role would be guided by seven shared principles: centrality of national ownership; national specificity; clarity with national governments about the UN’s role; complementarity in the work of the UN system; a singular UN approach to Ebola based on the four clearly defined lines of action; strong commitment to working with others on prevention and preparedness; and the centrality of a regional approach.

From the outset, the Secretary-General’s vision of UNMEER was for this new mission to remain agile and nimble, evolving as rapidly as necessary to keep up with the unfolding evolution of the outbreak. This approach required UNMEER to maintain a tailored approach to match national circumstances, and to continuously build on improved information-gathering and analysis systems in the field, including through rapidly and proactively adjusting the Mission’s operational posture and footprint, to respond to the evolution of the virus, its transmission and impact.

With UNMEER’s closure and liquidation in August 2015, the proposed lessons learned exercise is internally focused on the role that UNMEER played as a crisis management system in scaling up the UN system’s response to the Ebola crisis and enabling focused coordination of responders. It is not a formal evaluation of UNMEER, but rather seeks to draw lessons learned from the unique deployment of UNMEER that are transferable to non-health contexts and missions and to understand what lessons the UNMEER experience offers the UN system on how it works together in crisis. This exercise was requested to channel preliminary findings into the work of the High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises. In its resolution authorising the liquidation of UNMEER, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly also requested that the Secretary-General report on highlights of an internal lessons learned study to the General Assembly in the first resumed session of 2016.

II. Objectives

1. Report on key lessons learned findings to the General Assembly
2. Identify UN system-wide lessons learned that can be shared with organizational partners
3. Identify lessons learned and findings to be channeled into the High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises
4. Identify innovative approaches and strategies undertaken by UNMEER, as well as challenges faced in carrying out its mandate, that are transferable to other non-health missions and crisis contexts

5. Assess UNMEER's legacy, results, successes and lessons learnt for future operations in view of its intended purpose, mandate and role (as outlined in section one) to analyze if UNMEER is a model for the future or a one-off

III. Scope of study

In reviewing lessons learned and drawing up recommendations, the study should consider the following aspects:

A. Mandate and role

1) Rationale for the establishment of UNMEER:

- i. Why was UNMEER needed? Why was the UN system unable to respond without the creation of a new entity under urgent conditions?
- ii. Was this the right model/reaction?
- iii. What kinds of capacities did UNMEER introduce that need to be readily in place in future crises to avoid the creation of an ad hoc solution at the last minute?

2) Political and operational context:

- i. In the context in which UNMEER was created, what solutions/strategies had already been exhausted? How did UNMEER respond to the overstretch of existing capacities that had thus far been insufficient to respond to the crisis?
- ii. How appropriate were pre-crisis planning assumptions and operational practices in equipping UNMEER to deal with the situation at hand?
- iii. What was the role of 193 member states approving assessed contributions? Did this galvanize UN action?

3) Evolution of UNMEER's role and presence in line with the outbreak:

- i. How well did the Secretary-General's initial vision of an agile, nimble mission able to adjust to a fluid, evolving context materialize?
- ii. How capable was UNMEER of shifting gears in line with the outbreak and how what strategic shifts in its role and presence took place throughout its lifespan?
- iii. How was the exit strategy for UNMEER understood from the outset? Was there clear agreement on the benchmark that defines what is understood in the Secretary-General's statement "until Ebola no longer posed a grave threat to the region"?
- iv. How well was the transition managed to WHO and the UN country teams?

B. Governance and leadership

1) Strategic guidance and direction:

- i. How did the role of the Special Envoy on Ebola materialize vis-à-vis UNMEER in providing strategic direction for the response?
- ii. What was the role of WHO in the provision of technical guidance to inform approach and activities of UNMEER? How did this relationship with WHO function vis-à-vis UNMEER's Emergency Services pillar?
- iii. Were the guiding principles of UNMEER appropriate to guide the response?

2) National and regional engagement:

- i. How well did UNMEER support national ownership and to what degree was this principle embedded in UNMEER's governance?
- ii. How did UNMEER regional and national leadership leverage political good offices in support of the response?
- iii. What were the roles and approaches of the Ebola Crisis Managers in country? How effective was their interaction with their respective host governments?
- iv. What was UNMEER's contribution to the regional dimension of the response, including its work on cross-border issues and relations with regional entities?

3) Partnerships:

- i. What complementarity existed between UNMEER leadership and existing UN leadership in country (SRSGs, Special Envoys, Resident Coordinators, etc.)?

C. Organization

1) Creation of a crisis management system:

- i. What was UNMEER's role in creating a crisis management system to support coordination and ensure unity of effort among all UN entities? How well did UNMEER deliver on its expected results in this regard?
- ii. What impact did UNMEER have in creating a UN system-wide operational culture and in providing a synergetic enabling environment to scale up efforts?

2) Coordination with partners:

- i. What mechanisms and structures did UNMEER establish to support coordination with national and international response partners? What

mechanisms were established to facilitate decision-making? How well did they function?

- ii. In what ways did UNMEER leverage existing coordination mechanisms and structures? What was the role of OCHA in the response vis-à-vis UNMEER?

3) Structure of UNMEER:

- i. Was the structure of UNMEER a viable one? (Issues to consider include: organization at regional, country and sub-national levels, structural integration, designation of functional roles, lines of accountability and reporting, decision-making and delegation of authority and balance between UN and non-UN composition and roles)
- ii. At what point should the centre of gravity have shifted from Accra mission headquarters to the country and sub-national levels? Did that take too long?

D. Operations and impact

1) Delivery against operational objectives and plans:

- i. How effective was UNMEER in leading and/or enabling the activities of other response partners (national actors, other UN entities and international partners, regional actors, etc.)?
- ii. How did UNMEER support inter-operability among the different actors in the response?
- iii. How did UNMEER hold partners accountable to delivering on operational objectives? Was there space for partners to hold UNMEER accountable?

2) Results orientation:

- i. Did UNMEER add value? If so, where, how and why?
- ii. What systems of monitoring and evaluation were in place to know when and if UNMEER was having an impact?

3) Technological innovation:

- i. How did UNMEER leverage technology in the response to develop new approaches to do things? How well did data collection and information management processes work?
- ii. What new approaches have been developed as a result of the novel application of technology and organization to the crisis? Which new problems put forward by the crisis have not yet found a solution?

4) Field coordination:

- i. What role did UNMEER's field crisis managers play in each of the three countries? How well did the field coordination teams function?
- ii. What coordination and support role did UNMEER play vis-à-vis other specialized responders (e.g., NGOs, CDC, WHO, ASEOWA, etc.)? How did UNMEER input into and coordinate with national and major bilateral response partners (U.S., UK and France)?

E. Administration

- i. What logistical capabilities did UNMEER bring to bear in the response?
- ii. Human resources, including staffing strategy, availability of required specialist personnel, staffing and deployment achievements and challenges
- iii. How did UNMEER utilize the MPTF to address funding gaps in the response, including through community-based projects?
- iv. What issues were faced regarding duty of care for staff and special conditions of service?

IV. Methodology

The lessons learned exercise on UNMEER is planned to include a variety of methods of gathering and validating findings and lessons learned and will triangulate evidence garnered through these different methods, including:

1. A desk review of all relevant documentation, including code cables, General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, planning and strategy documents, UN senior leadership guidance documents, and monthly reports of the Secretary-General
2. Anonymous web-based surveys to a wide sample of UN working-level staff (deployed with UNMEER and UN agencies, funds and programmes) and international and national partners on the ground (including representatives from affected Governments, national civil society actors, international NGOs, deployed military and bilateral actors and private sector actors involved in the response) at all stages of the Mission's lifespan
3. Select interviews with key working-level and principal UN representatives, Member State representatives and international and national partners, conducted by phone, as well as in person in some instances in New York, Paris, Rome, London, Washington, D.C., Geneva, Dakar and Addis Ababa
4. Visits to Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (with a focus on sub-national and national operations)
5. Convening of a series of consultative roundtable fora to reflect on the UNMEER experience with target audiences (member states, UN implementing partners, key response stakeholders in each of the affected countries) in Dakar, Geneva and New York
6. Consultation of preliminary lessons learned and findings with all key working-level counterparts, as well as principal stakeholders through a validation workshop

7. Finalization of lessons learned study
8. Presentation of recommendations of the lessons learned study to UN senior leadership
9. Launch of conclusions of the lessons learned study

V. Options for implementation and profiles required

The lessons learned exercise is to be led by the International Peace Institute, as an external research institution, with substantial support from a dedicated expert resource person from the UN Secretariat who will assist in gathering research materials and accessing interviewees, analyzing lessons learned findings, drafting the final report for official consultation and distilling key findings for reporting by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.

VI. Proposed deliverables

The lessons learned exercise on UNMEER is expected to produce lessons learned and recommendations for both internal and external consideration. A report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly will highlight some of the key lessons learned in the first resumed session of 2016. In addition, the external research partner, the International Peace Institute, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary-General, will distil some strategic, crosscutting findings on crisis management in the UN system for external publication.

VII. Envisaged process and timeline

The lessons learned exercise is expected to involve five sequential phases of inquiry carried out over a six-month period from August 2015-January 2016.

August: development of a policy framework

- A desk review of relevant documentation related to the deployment, operations and transition of UNMEER

September-October: ensuring synergy of approach and capturing expert views

- Facilitation of an online survey for key operational stakeholders
- A series of qualitative in person and phone interviews with working-level and principal-level stakeholders in Geneva and New York
- Facilitation of two Chatham House consultative roundtable fora in New York for Member States and UN response actors/implementing partners, respectively

November: bridging theory with praxis

- Drafting of preliminary observations, findings and lessons learned

- Field visits to the region to undertake further qualitative interviews with key stakeholders and validate/test findings
- Facilitation of a Chatham House regional consultative roundtable in Dakar with key national, regional and international response actors
- Briefing and presentation on preliminary findings to the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises

December: validating and finalizing findings

- Drafting of the internal lessons learned study

January: presenting the findings

- Official consultation of the lessons learned study, including through a possible validation workshop with key principals
- Drafting of the SG report to the General Assembly
- Launch and publication of lessons learned report

Note to Mr. Khare

Lessons Learned Study of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER)

1. I write to request the assistance of the Department of Field Support (DFS) in the conduct of the Secretary-General's Lessons Learned Study on the functioning of UNMEER, which is due to be presented during the first part of the resumed seventieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Background

2. In the context of his submission of revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 as it related to the Office of the Special Envoy on Ebola and the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, the Secretary-General announced that he had appointed a High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises to make recommendations to strengthen national and international systems to prevent and manage future health crises, taking into account lessons learned from the response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease. The Secretary-General also announced that he intended to conduct a more specific lessons learned exercise on UNMEER, including on its performance and added value. In its report A/69/903, the ACABQ welcomed the lessons learned initiative, noting that "it is important to conduct an in-depth review of all the organizational, operational, administrative and planning aspects of the Mission and to document the lessons learned." The ACABQ identified the specific areas that it considered should be addressed in the lessons learned exercise, including issues relating to organizational structure, planning process, staffing structure, asset management and cost recovery for services and assets provided by peacekeeping missions. The ACABQ also referred to other budgetary and organizational issues that it had raised in its earlier report, A/69/660, including the role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and recommended that these issues also be addressed in the Secretary-General's Lessons Learned Study.

3. In its resolution A/RES/69/274 B, the Assembly endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained in the ACABQ report, and requested the Secretary-General to "provide, at the first part of the resumed seventieth session of the General Assembly, detailed information, in the context of his lessons learned exercise, on the coordination activities of the Mission and the Office of the Special Envoy with the wider United Nations system, the Governments of the most affected countries and other actors." The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to include, in the context of that report, "the results of his in-depth review of the organizational, administrative and planning aspects, and operation on the ground, as well as information on the final performance, including liquidation and the disposal of assets, of the Mission and the Office of the Special Envoy." The Assembly "[w]elcome[d] the establishment of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, which will take into account, inter alia, the recent experience in dealing with the Ebola outbreak, and encourage[d] the Secretary-General to ensure that the lessons learned exercises are complementary."

Required input for the Lessons Learned Study

4. The Terms of Reference (TORs) of the Study, which were extensively consulted with the agencies, funds and programmes involved in the response, are attached. As you can see, the Study is internally focused on the role that UNMEER played as a crisis management system in scaling up the response of the United Nations system to the Ebola crisis and enabling focused coordination of responders. In addition to reporting the outcome of the Study to the Assembly at the first resumed seventieth session, the findings of the exercise will be channelled into the work of the High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, which is currently scheduled to submit its report by the end of December 2015.

5. My office is leading the lessons learned exercise in partnership with the International Peace Institute (IPI), an external research institution that will bring an external perspective to the undertaking. While OCdC and IPI will review many of the areas within the scope of the Study, there remain a number of technical/specialized issues relating to planning, administrative and budgetary issues, among others, for which the DFS would be required to take the lead in consultation with other relevant departments, including the Department of Management. To this end, the Annex to this Note contains extracts of the specific issues identified by ACABQ and the Assembly, as well as those included in the TORs, that DFS should address.

6. As the Secretary-General's report must be submitted in early 2016, and as the internal timeline for the full study envisages drafting of preliminary findings in November 2015, I would appreciate your submitting DFS' input by Wednesday, **18 November 2015**. Please do not hesitate to contact the Office of the Director, OCdC, should you have any questions.

Thank you.



Susana Malcorra
22 September 2015

cc: Mr. Takasu
Ms. Wainana

Annex

A. Extracts from Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the Office of the Special Envoy on Ebola and the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, A/69/903 of 15 May 2015*

16. The Advisory Committee was further informed that the Secretary-General also intended to conduct a more specific lessons learned exercise on UNMEER, including on its performance and added value. **The Advisory Committee welcomes the Secretary-General's initiative in this regard. Given the unique nature of UNMEER, the Committee considers that it is important to conduct an in-depth review of all the organizational, operational, administrative and planning aspects of the Mission and to document the lessons learned.** In the paragraphs below, the Committee identifies several areas, which, in its view, should be covered in the lessons learned exercise, including organizational structure, planning process, staffing structure, asset management and cost recovery for services and assets provided by peacekeeping missions. In addition, in its earlier report on UNMEER the Committee raised some questions about the budgetary and organizational aspects of the Mission, in particular, the role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (see A/69/660, paras. 59-64), which, in the Committee's view, should also be covered in the Secretary-General's lessons learned exercise.

23. **The Advisory Committee notes that the assessment of the contributions of Member States to the United Nations regular budget for 2014-2015 exceeds the current proposal of the Secretary-General on revised estimates for the requirements of UNMEER by more than \$13.6 million. The Committee also points out that approval by the General Assembly of resources at the level of the initial proposal of the Secretary-General for revised estimates for the requirements of UNMEER (A/69/590 and Corr.1) would have resulted in an over-assessment of the contributions of Member States to the regular budget by more than \$100 million. In view of the foregoing, the Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will include in the above-mentioned lessons learned exercise (see para. 16 above) a review of the planning process for UNMEER.**

32. In view of the concerns expressed by the General Assembly (see para. 30 above), as well as its own observations on this matter, the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to ensure that UNMEER positions, in particular those at a high level, are maintained only as long as is necessary for the fulfilment of the mandate of the Mission. The Advisory Committee further recommends that the Secretary-General be requested to include in the above-mentioned lessons learned exercise (see para. 16 above), a comprehensive review of the staffing structure of the Mission and an assessment, in the light of experience, of the efficiency and effectiveness of the staffing structure of UNMEER, in particular, of the added value of the large number of high-level positions, as well as a comparison with the staffing structure of the other United Nations system entities operating in a similar environment.

implementation of the mandate of the Office of the Special Envoy on Ebola and UNMEER, and furthermore that the mandate of the Mission is not anchored in the framework for emergency humanitarian assistance adopted by the Assembly in its resolution 46/182, the Committee questions the rationale for incorporating the Mission into programme 23 of the strategic framework.

61. Furthermore, as indicated in paragraph 19 above, the bulk of the proposed resources for UNMEER, in the amount of \$184,676,500, is proposed under section 27, Humanitarian affairs. As shown in table 2 of the report of the Secretary-General, under this arrangement the resource allocation for section 27, Humanitarian affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 would rise from a total of \$31,762,900 to \$216,257,900, representing almost a sevenfold increase. **In view of the fact that the mandate of UNMEER is not of a continuing nature, the Advisory Committee is concerned that the proposed arrangement would create a distortion under the programme budget and artificially inflate the regular budget share of section 27, Humanitarian affairs. The Committee is also concerned about the possible implications of such an arrangement for the integrity of the Emergency Relief Coordinator role stipulated in resolution 46/182, which combined under a single focal point the functions carried out by the Secretary-General for major complex emergencies and by the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator.**

62. **In view of the concerns expressed in paragraphs 60 and 61 above, the Advisory Committee recommends the establishment of a separate and distinct special account for income and expenditures related to the Office of the Special Envoy on Ebola and UNMEER, including the related backstopping resources.**

63. The Advisory Committee recalls that, at the time of its consideration of the Secretary-General's initial funding request for the Mission in September 2014 (see A/69/404), given the extreme urgency of the conditions in which UNMEER was established, there was insufficient time to review the proposed organizational and budgetary arrangements or to analyse the reasons that it was not proposed that the Mission be established within the existing United Nations framework for emergency humanitarian assistance. The Committee notes that General Assembly resolution 46/182 was designed to strengthen the United Nations response to complex emergencies and has been applied to address numerous crises since its adoption in 1991.

64. **The Advisory Committee strongly believes that the existing institutional arrangements established by the General Assembly should be applied in a consistent manner. In the case of any possible exceptions, the Committee believes that it is incumbent upon the Secretary-General to explain why the existing arrangements may not have been applied. The Committee therefore recommends that such information be provided in the context of the detailed budget proposal (see para. 67 below). Furthermore, the Committee is of the view that an assessment of the approach taken in establishing the institutional arrangements to address the Ebola emergency response should be carried out at the appropriate time, with a view to analysing the lessons learned.**