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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 8 August 1995
NUMBER: 2629
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN CROATIA



UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
1995-08-09 P 0433

Please find attached for your Information the final text of the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on the above subject.

Regards.

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/666
7 August 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you, and through you to the members of the Security Council, information about the latest developments in Croatia and about United Nations activities before and since the recent outbreak of hostilities there. It covers events up to midnight New York time on 6 August.

Following the Croatian Army's takeover of Sector West in May 1995, tensions have remained high in the UNCRO area of operations. Croatian Army mobilization, troop movements and live-firing exercises increased throughout June and July. In the meantime, the local Serb authorities failed to extend the necessary co-operation to UNCRO to permit it to implement the mandate granted to it by the Security Council in its resolution 981 (1995).

On 19 July, the "Krajina Serb" army ("ARSK") and the forces loyal to Mr. Fikret Abdic launched offensives against the Bosnian Army V Corps in the Bihac pocket. The attacks were supported by Bosnian Serb shell fire along the southern confrontation line and were alleged to be in response to earlier military actions by the Bosnian Army. The following day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia warned the Security Council that "the displacement of the population of Bihac... would be considered a serious threat to the security and stability of Croatia... (and) Croatia may be compelled to undertake necessary measures to secure its status and territory".

His Excellency
Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti
President of the Security Council
New York

3/11

- 2 -

In an effort to stabilize the deteriorating military situation, UNPF finally succeeded in arranging a meeting between the military leaders of the Croatian Army and the "ARSK". The local Serb authorities subsequently cancelled the military meeting after they had accepted an invitation by the United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, to participate in a preliminary round of political talks in Geneva in early August.

The pace of events gathered momentum after 22 July, when the Presidents of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Split Declaration, which committed the Croatian Government to assist the Bosnian forces militarily in the Bihac pocket. The Croatian Government maintained the position, already conveyed by its Foreign Minister to the Security Council, that the fall of the Bihac pocket would threaten its national security interests.

On 28 July, the combined forces of the Croatian Army (HV) and Croat Defence Council (HVO) succeeded in capturing Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc in Western Bosnia and Herzegovina, severing the Krajina Serbs' main supply road from Banja Luka to Knin. In response, the Krajina Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs declared states of war against the Croats and mobilized their respective armies.

Within Croatia, the Croatian Army continued a major build-up of troops around Sectors North and South. The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, meanwhile, convened a session of their joint Supreme Defence Council on 1 August in Drvar in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The meeting resulted in an appeal to all Serbs, including the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to assist in the defence of Serb territory.

Meanwhile, on 29 July, my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, had met with President Tudjman to forestall what appeared to be an imminent military confrontation. President Tudjman expressed his Government's willingness to participate in political and military talks with Knin, but stressed that progress on the ground must necessarily follow. If such progress was not achieved in a matter of days, Croatia would take whatever measures it deemed

necessary to redress the situation. Specifically the President insisted on the reopening of the Adriatic oil pipeline within 24 hours, rapid agreement on the opening of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and immediate progress on political re-integration of the Serbs on the basis of Croatia's Constitution and Law on Minorities. President Tudjman did, however, agree to send representatives to Geneva for the ICFY-sponsored meeting on 3 August.

My Special Representative held emergency talks on 30 July with the local Serb authorities in Knin. He secured a six-point commitment that their forces would withdraw fully from the Bihac pocket and desist from further cross-border interference (see Annex A). However, the Croatian Government considered these commitments insufficient. In a written reply, President Tudjman rejected the agreement, on the grounds that it did not meet the terms he had presented to my Special Representative (see Annex B). The Croatian Government did, however, re-affirm its readiness to participate in the talks in Geneva.

On 3 August in Geneva Mr. Stoltenberg duly chaired the meeting of the representatives of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs. The former took the position that the Croatian Serb leadership must immediately accept reintegration under the Croatian Constitution and Laws. The Croatian Serb delegation proceeded from the starting point that there should be a cessation of hostilities, following which other issues could be discussed. After a series of bilateral meetings, the Co-Chairman presented to the two delegations a list of seven points covering, inter alia, reopening of the oil pipeline, reopening of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and negotiations on a final settlement on the basis of the "Zagreb-4" plan. The Croatian Serb delegation was inclined to accept the paper as a useful basis for progress, subject to clearance by its political leadership, but the Croatian Government delegation's view was that the paper did not address its fundamental concern for the Krajina Serbs to be reintegrated under the Croatian Constitution and Laws.

Following the Croatian Government's rejection of the paper prepared in Geneva, I telephoned President Tudjman on the evening of 3 August and urged the utmost restraint. At the same time, I instructed

5/11

- 4 -

Mr. Stoltenberg to proceed to Zagreb the next morning and to continue to work closely with Mr. Akashi in trying to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

Despite these United Nations efforts and similar efforts by various Member States, at 0500 hours on 4 August the Croatian Army launched a major offensive against the Krajina region (Sectors North and South). I immediately issued a statement expressing my regret at the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, and urging the parties to respect international humanitarian law and the human rights of the affected population.

At the start of the Croatian offensive, a significant number of United Nations observation posts were overrun by the Croatian Army, and some came under indirect and direct fire. UNPF have reported to me that on two occasions United Nations troops and Serb prisoners were used as human shields by Croatian Army units as they conducted their attacks. These incidents have been vigorously protested by the United Nations and the troop-contributing Governments concerned.

On the first day of the Croatian offensive, my Special Representative met with Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, the Head of the Croatian Commission for Relations with UNCRO, to seek assurances for the safety of all United Nations personnel. The Force Commander, Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier, took similar action with the Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army, General Cervenko. I regret to have to report that, these efforts notwithstanding, the United Nations has suffered a total of 18 casualties, all of which have also been protested. Three of these casualties (a Danish soldier and two Czech soldiers) have been fatal and two other soldiers are in serious condition. I should like to take this occasion to convey to the Government and people of the Czech Republic and Denmark my condolences at their loss.

On 5 and 6 August, my Special Representative held a number of meetings with Mr. Sarinic to discuss temporary arrangements that would allow the United Nations, together with other international organizations, to cope with the major humanitarian difficulties caused by the Croatian offensive and to monitor the human rights situation on the ground. These discussions resulted in a nine-point agreement that was signed on 6 August (see Annex C).

- 5 -

On 6 August in Geneva, the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY Steering Committee, Mr. Carl Bildt and Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, along with the Foreign Minister of Spain, representing the Presidency of the European Union (EU), and the External Relations Commissioner of the EU, met the Foreign Minister of Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, to discuss the political consequences of the Croatian offensive. The ICFY Co-Chairmen and the representatives of the EU strongly condemned the shelling of civilians and the attacks on United Nations personnel and expressed great concern at the humanitarian crisis which was unfolding. Foreign Minister Granic, who expressed confidence that the Croatian military operation would be completed within 24 hours, indicated that Croatia would investigate incidents in which United Nations troops had been attacked and gave assurances about access for humanitarian organizations to civilians displaced by the fighting.

In the meantime, the Force Commander's representatives have been in contact with the military authorities of the Croatian Army and the "ARSK". They have discussed the medical evacuation of United Nations personnel, and the need to alleviate the consequences of the military operations for the civilian population. A refugee crisis of major proportions has already started. Tensions remain high and the possibility of continuing hostilities cannot be ruled out.

I should be grateful, Mr. President, if you would bring the above information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

~~Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.~~

(Signed)

Boutros Boutros Ghali

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

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Annex A

Following the visit to Knin by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and General Bernard Janvier, the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces, and the important discussions held with the leadership in Knin, led by Mr. Martić and in which Mr. Šabić and General Mrksić participated, and in light of assessing the extreme seriousness of the situation in the area, the RSK leadership reiterated their commitment to the peaceful solution of the conflict and for that purpose agree to the following:

1. That there are, and there will be, no troops or individual soldiers of the ARSK in the area known as the Bihać pocket.
2. That the ARSK forces will refrain entirely from directing any kind of fire (shell, mortar, tank, etc.) into the Bihać pocket from territory that they control, and expect that the V Corps shall in reciprocity refrain from any offensive action against that territory.
3. That troops and Military Observers of the United Nations deployed in territory under RSK control will be allowed unhindered access to the area bordering the Bihać pocket to monitor any crossing of the border in either direction by any forces.
4. That the military commander of the ARSK, General Mrksić, is prepared to have the first meeting with the commander of the Croatian army at any time under UNPF auspices at the Turanj crossing, including as early as 31 July 1995 at 14:00.
5. Reaffirming their commitment not to carry-out cross-border activities, the RSK reiterates its support for, and willingness to continue the talks with the UNPF regarding the establishment of appropriate observation posts in the area of Mount Dinara, and to facilitate the implementation of the border crossing points under the mandate of UNPF.
6. That no impediments will be placed in the way of delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Bihać pocket, based on the principle of assessed need, and with the understanding that humanitarian aid will be delivered to the Krajina region based on the same principle, as applied by the UNHCR.

30 JULY 1995
K.

- 7 -
Annex B

8/11

Letter dated 30 July 1995 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

His Excellency
Special Representative of
the UN Secretary General
Zagreb

~~Your Excellency,~~

In response to your fax which I received today, at 21:30, together with the enclosed proposals from the Knin rebels, I would like to state the following :

1) it is surprising that in your letter you never mention UNCRO - the UN peace forces which were under this name given the mandate to act in Croatia by a Security Council resolution and in contrast, you do mention the Knin leadership and the RSK;

2) it is unacceptable for us to have UNCRO troops deployed only on the border towards the Bihać pocket. Our request was and remains that UNCRO forces undertake the monitoring of internationally recognized borders between the Republic of Croatia and B+H, but at the same time also between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, that is SRY, which is particularly significant because in these last few days new formations and equipment of the Yugoslav army have been transferred across the Danube.

3) in regard to what was stated under point 2) there can be no question of deploying UN border crossing monitors only in the region of Dinara;

4) Serb rebel leaders again want to outwit UN representatives and UNCRO for their own benefit. That is apparent from their proposal to allow humanitarian aid for Bihać under the condition that it is at the same time delivered to them;

5) such proposals do not represent any basis for peaceful reintegration and do not contain a response to any of the conditions which I put forward in discussions with you on Saturday 29 July 1995, when I expressly indicated that negotiations on a peaceful reintegration with Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas can commence under the following conditions :

a) that Croatian authorities will not negotiate with Milan Martić, who has been placed on the list of war criminals by the International Court in the Hague or with anyone else representing him.

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b) that negotiations can commence if the oil pipeline passing through the occupied areas is operational in a period of 24 hours,

c) that direct discussions commence immediately concerning the opening of all communication lines through the occupied areas, and in particular the railway line Zagreb-Split via Knin, and

d) that discussions are simultaneously undertaken concerning the immediate implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the occupied areas as well as the provisions of the Constitutional Law concerning the rights of the Serb ethnic community.

6) only on the basis of this can we reach a peaceful solution and with this aim I propose discussion between military and civilian representatives of Croatian authorities and the rebel Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas.

~~Best regards,~~

The President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo Tudman

(Original signed - sealed)

~~Brijuni, 30 July 1995, at 22:20 hrs.~~

-9-

Annex C

10/11

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND
THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES-UNCRO
ON TEMPORARY MEASURES IN THE AREAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS
"SECTOR NORTH" AND "SECTOR SOUTH"

We the undersigned,

Concerned by the effects of the hostilities on the lives of civilians in the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and "Sector South" (hereinafter referred to as the Areas),

Committed to minimizing the loss of civilian life from hostilities,

Dedicated to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the full protection of civilians and of their human rights,

Committed to providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population affected by the hostilities in the Areas,

Recognizing the need to ensure full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law,

Agree to the following:

1. That Croatia expresses its complete and unequivocal commitment to the full respect for the human rights of all individuals in the Areas concerned, and guarantees that those rights will be respected by all Croatian authorities.
2. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia concurs that UNCRO, together with UNHCR and ICRC where appropriate, will monitor and report on the human rights situation in the Areas, and intervene with the Croatian authorities on human rights matters when appropriate.
3. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia encourages all those previous inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia who so wish to remain peacefully in the areas over which Croatian authority is exercised. However, Croatia will allow, with full guarantees for security, the departure from those areas of all those who express their desire to do so, except those who committed violations of international criminal law. In the event of any such departures, Croatia pledges to allow UNCRO and humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to assist and coordinate such departures in conformity with recognized international standards.


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4. That full access by UNCRO and by humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to the civilian population, for the purpose of providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, will be assured by the authorities of Croatia, to the extent allowed by objective security considerations.
5. That UNMOs and human rights monitoring elements of UNCRO will carry out surveillance immediately in all areas except where, in the opinion of the local UNCRO military commanders after consulting Croatian army commanders, the security situation does not permit for such surveillance.
6. That Croatia, and in particular its military authorities, will make every effort to ensure that civilian areas are not targeted by direct or indirect military fire as long as the hostilities continue.
7. That, if UNCRO commanders become aware that local military personnel have departed from a specific location where only non-combatants are present, and that the location is under fire by Croatian forces, this information will be immediately passed to the Headquarters of the Croatian Army for appropriate action.
8. That, in conformity with its international obligations, Croatia reiterates the inviolability of United Nations premises and establishments, and its vehicles, and all those therein, and thus commits all Croatian authorities to fully respect such inviolability. Croatia further emphasizes that none of its authorities will seek to remove any person or persons from such United Nations premises, establishments or vehicles.
9. That the future relations of the two parties in this matter will be defined as soon as possible.



Hrvoje Sarinic
Republic of Croatia



Yasushi Akashi
United Nations
Peace Forces

Zagreb
6 August 1995

1995-08-09 02:14

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

'95 AUG -9 -3 103



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 8 August 1995
NUMBER: 2624
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN CROATIA

[Handwritten signature]

Please find attached for your Information three letters from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the above subject.

Regards.

BGR 6876
informed
CNZ 724 CYZ 733 P 1/1

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
1995 AUG -8 P 9 32


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by EOSG Duty Secretary 2/11

СТАЛНА МИСИЈА САВЕЗНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ ПРИ УЈЕДИЊЕНИМ НАЦИЈАМА
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
854 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 TEL: (212) 879-8700 FAX: (212) 879-8705

No. 710/95



4 August 1995

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to transmit, enclosed herewith, the Statement of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 4 August 1995.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 81 of the provisional agenda and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dragomir Djokic

Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of
the United Nations
New York

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A N N E X

The Federal Government condemns most strongly the latest armed aggression of Croatia against the Serbian people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina which by its width and ruthlessness exceeds all hitherto acts of aggression committed by Croatia. The massive artillery and missile bombardment of all towns in the Republic of Serbian Krajina demonstrates that one of the main objectives of the aggression is to cause great losses to the civilian population.

Of particular concern is the fact that the general brutal aggression took place at the time of the resumption of direct negotiations on the relation Knin-Zagreb in which the Krajina side expressed the highest readiness for a political solution of the status of Krajina, accepting the Agreement proposed by a co-chairman of the International Conference on Yugoslavia, while the Croatian side arrogantly rejected that proposal.

The aggressive attitude of Croatia confirms the correctness of the constant warnings of the FR of Yugoslavia that the presence of the regular armed forces of Croatia in former Bosnia-Herzegovina constitutes a flagrant violation of the resolutions of the Security Council. Such an attitude of Croatia towards the resolutions of the United Nations and its countenance by the international community constitutes a danger for the efforts to put an end to the crisis in the territories of the former Yugoslavia in a peaceful way and by political means.

The aggression of Croatia against Krajina is a continuation of the practice of the heightening of tension and the escalation of military conflicts whenever there emerge serious prospects for achieving concrete progress in the political solution of the crisis.

The Federal Government recalls that, by accepting the Vance Plan, the United Nations has assumed direct responsibility for physical security and the maintenance of peace in the territory of Krajina and considers it duty-bound to oppose Croatia in an outright way and restore the status quo ante within the shortest period of time.

The Federal Government warns that a continued countenance of the aggressive behaviour of Croatia would increase conviction in an unequal treatment of the parties in conflict and in a continuation of the policy of double standard by the international community.

The Serbian people in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, exposed to an unprovoked aggression, has a legitimate right to self-defence and it is the duty of the international community to protect it.

The Federal Government demands from the Security Council to observe consistently its own decisions related to the prohibition of presence of armed forces of other States in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina and to take urgent and efficient measures to compel all regular military and

4/11

para-military forces of Croatia to withdraw from former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

The Federal Government reiterates also on this occasion the firm commitment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to a political solution of all problems of the crisis, including all questions in the relations between Kln and Zagreb.

Proceeding from the assumption that this is the conviction also of the preponderant part of the international community, and above all of the United Nations, the Federal Government demands from the Security Council to order an urgent cessation of all war operations and to ensure withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces to the separation lines established by relevant resolutions of the Security Council, as well as to create conditions for the resumption of negotiations of the two sides.

Belgrade, 4 August 1995

*circulated to
all concerned*



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
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СТАЛНА МИСИЈА САВЕЗНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ ПРИ УЈЕДИЊЕНИМ НАЦИЈАМА

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

854 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 TEL: (212) 879-8700 FAX: (212) 879-8705

No. 712/95



6 August 1995

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to transmit, enclosed herewith, the Statement of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 6 August 1995.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 81 and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dragomir Djokic

Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Dr. Boutros-Boutros Ghali
Secretary-General of the
United Nations
New York

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u Bali
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ANNEX

The Federal Government has noted that, despite strong condemnations by numerous countries and international fora, Croatia continues its ruthless and brutal aggression against the Republic of Serbian Krajina unperturbed. The towns and other settlements in the territory under attack are being ruthlessly shelled and bombarded, which brings enormous human losses and destruction in its train. The fact that the aggressor army shells and strafes long columns of fleeing people is the bloodiest confirmation of one of the primary goals of the aggression - causing considerable losses among civilian population and its expulsion from the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

The Federal Government expresses its concern over the ever more frequent and convincing information that some of the big powers, members of the Security Council, aid and abet the aggression of Croatia and prevent the adoption of a decision by the Security Council on stopping the aggression. By such attitude, some international factors are becoming accessory to the ethnic cleansing of the Serbian people from the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

The Federal Government expresses its profound dissatisfaction at the inefficiency of the international community in stopping the aggression of Croatia, which may lead to undesirable political, security and humanitarian consequences in the region and beyond.

The Federal Government expects and demands that, proceeding from Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the international community, and the Security Council in particular, take immediate and resolute measures to put an end to the aggression and the killing of the innocent civilian population and the prevention of ethnic cleansing and to see to it that Croatian armed forces withdraw to the separation lines established by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

The Federal Government reiterates that a peaceful solution through negotiation and political agreement is the only way for solving the overall Yugoslav crisis, including the situation created by the aggression of Croatia against the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Bearing in mind the reaction of the most important international factors, inappropriate to the nature and size of the aggression, the Federal Government has charged the competent authorities with the task of intensifying political, diplomatic and informative activities aimed at having adequate decisions brought by the international community and at fully informing it of the policy of Croatia which constitutes the greatest danger for peace and security in the Balkans.

The Federal Government accorded special attention to the dramatic humanitarian situation. The exodus of tens of thousands of refugees, of the exhausted and old people, of women and children, calls for taking energetic and urgent measures by the Committee of the Federal Government for collecting humanitarian assistance. The Committee of the Federal Government will ensure continued cooperation with all important international humanitarian organizations, particularly with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Some, but insufficient part of humanitarian assistance has already been dispatched to the affected area. In order to ensure a

7/11

regular dispatch of the assistance, the Security Council Sanctions Committee is expected to consent to humanitarian flights to the Banja Luka airport. The Federal and Republican Governments, together with the Republican Commissariats for Refugees and the Federal and Republican organizations of the Red Cross, will invest maximum efforts in collecting and dispatching humanitarian assistance to refugees from the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the accommodation and care of which is concentrated in Banja Luka, as well as in dispatching assistance to individual refugee columns.

The Federal Government has established a round-a-clock service in order to satisfy the humanitarian needs of refugees from the Republic of Serbian Krajina in a most effective way.

Belgrade, 6 August 1995

*circulated to
all concerned*



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
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СТАЛНА МИСИЈА САВЕЗНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ ПРИ УЈЕДИЊЕНИМ НАЦИЈАМА

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

854 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 TEL: (212) 879-8700 FAX: (212) 879-8705

No. 714 /95



7 August 1995

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to request that my letter No. 711/95 addressed to you on 5 August 1995 (a copy enclosed), be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dragomir Djokic
Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Dr. Boutros-Boutros Ghali
Secretary-General of the
United Nations
New York

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СТАЛНА МИСИЈА САВЕЗНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ ПРИ УЈЕДИЊЕНИМ НАЦИ

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

834 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10021 TEL (212) 679-6700 FAX (212) 679-6705

No. 711 /95

5 August

Your Excellency,

Upon instructions of my Government, I wish to draw attention to the extremely serious situation brought about by the aggression of the armed forces of Croatia against the territorial population of Serb Krajina.

The totally unprovoked, brutal and shameless aggression was launched by Croatia in the early morning hours of 4 August against the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), is continuing unabated. This is the seventh aggression of Croatia against UNPAs which has been allowed to go unpunished.

Horrific destruction, the murder of innocent civilians, women, children and the elderly - and the violation of the principles of humanitarian law are taking place. The exodus of the civilian population and unprecedented wave of "ethnic cleansing" which is displacing more than 100,000 Krajina Serbs, are a proof of policy of genocide against the Serb people. The fear of the Tudjman regime instilled in the Krajina Serbs has been drastically confirmed and fully justified.

Like the fascist rule of the infamous Ustashi in the Independent State of Croatia from 1941-45, the regime of F. Tudjman has before it the same final goal - to annihilate and expel the Serb people from their ancestral homes in the territory of Krajina.

His Excellency
Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York

10/7/1

Long before the aggression against the Krajina Serbs, which is now at its height, pressures and intensive preparations began by F. Tudjman and his regime for a confrontation with the Serbs. More than 350,000 Serbs from the territories which are under Tudjman's control have already fled. On the other hand, those who attempted to remain in their homes, were mistreated in every conceivable way and forcibly converted into the Catholic faith. Discrimination in all areas of everyday life and work (eviction, lay-offs on grounds of nationality and illegal seizure of property) and gross violations of fundamental human and civil rights, were rampant. During the aggression of Croatia against the UNPA Sector West in May of this year, virtually the whole Serb population was murdered, wounded, imprisoned or expelled from the region.

All of this clearly indicates that what is at stake is a thoroughly planned aggression whose aim has been to "cleanse" the territories of Krajina of the Serb population.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia notes with utmost indignation and bitterness that the international community is not undertaking resolute measures to stop and disenable the monstrous policy of Croatia against the Krajina Serbs. Particular responsibility rests with the Security Council whose primary role, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, is to maintain peace, security and protect the victims of aggression. The Security Council, which already confirmed that such actions of Croatia seriously threaten to escalate the conflict, must undertake concrete and resolute measures against such criminal and genocidal acts of Croatia.


From the very beginning of the outbreak of the crisis in the territory of the previous Yugoslavia, the Security Council has directed its decisions and activities against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia imposing on her, without any justification, the most comprehensive, harsh and unprecedented sanctions in the history of the United Nations. The question must be raised what criteria is the Security Council now implementing considering the open aggression of Croatia against Krajina and flagrant violations of humanitarian law. It is also cynical that the Council ignored the involvement of NATO aircraft on the side of the aggressor. Regrettably, the Security Council is not endeavoring to secure the implementation of its own decisions and resolutions regarding the arms embargo on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the prevention of "ethnic cleansing" and the prosecution of Croatian and Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat war criminals.

Your Excellency,

Stemming from the above, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened to consider the situation caused by Croatia's aggression against Krajina with a view to adopting a resolution under the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The resolution must in most resolute terms condemn the Croatian aggression, the crimes committed, particularly "ethnic cleansing" and destruction. It must also demand that Croatia's aggression cease immediately and that its troops withdraw to positions prior to the offensive. Concrete punitive measures must be undertaken against Croatia by introducing sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter because of Croatia's aggression against Serb Krajina.

I request that you immediately inform the members of the Security Council of the contents of this letter.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest considerations.



Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

UNUG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

BGR: 6873
informed
CNZ 721 CYZ 730 P 1/1

'95 AUG -9 -3 :05 **OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC/CAO
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 8 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: 2621
SUBJECT: Situation in Croatia

S. J. Riza

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
R95 AUG -8 P 4 32

Riza summoned the Permanent Representative of Croatia, Ambassador Nobilo, this morning to lodge a strong protest on the treatment of United Nations peace-keepers during the recent Croatian offensive. He protested in particular the actions leading to the deaths of three United Nations peace-keepers and the using of seven others as "human shields". He called for a full investigation into each of these incidents. Noting that, in the latter case, a Croatian Major had been arrested, Riza hoped that suitable action would be taken against him for his unacceptable conduct.

Nobilo was conciliatory, assuring us that the deaths were an unavoidable concomitant of warfare rather than deliberate targeting, but promising a full investigation. On the "human shields" incident, he stated that the Croatian Government had already issued a public apology and that the officer concerned would be punished.

Copy to CB, TS, LS, DA, DM, gen Elliot, gen de Laporte. Bly
950805/18

1995-08-08

RUSSIAN CHARGÉ ON TUDJMAN/MILOSEVIC MEETING

1. I today on the phone inquired Russian chargé in Geneva, Boris Chabirov, for details on president Yeltsins move to invite Messrs. Tudjman and Milosevic to Moscow for peace talks.
 2. Chabirov said Tudjman had accepted the invitation, whereas Milosevic, expressing his interest, asked for clarification on the agenda. A final answer was expected tonight or tomorrow. Chabirov though the meeting could take place in Moscow during this week.
 3. The purpose of the meeting would be to deescalate the present tense situation primarily in order to avoid Croat/FRY confrontation in Eastern Slavonia. There would be a fairly broad agenda, Chabirov said without being too specific;
 - humanitarian issues, including the situation of Serb refugees from Sector North and South,
 - military issues,
 - other political questions.
 4. In response to Chabirovs question I said the Yeltsin initiative could be viewed as interesting, however details were still lacking. I also cautioned Chabirov that the fact that Russia invited only Tudjman and Milosevic inevitably would lead to further speculations of a Croat/Serb deal to divide the remains of Yugoslavia.
- The Russian agreed that the perception could be this but strongly stressed that there was no such intention and that Moscow did not believe in these speculations. However, the Russians were genuinely worried about rising tension in the area and felt an initiative was needed. Any result of the meeting would then be handed over to the ICFY co-chairmen to pursue further. Moscow had no intention to interfere, or create difficulties for the co-chairmen, Chabirov stressed.
5. I also briefed Chabirov of Mr. Bildts assessment of the situation in the area and his travelling plans. The Russian said Moscow fully supported the statement made by Mr Bildt August 4, and thought it could have been even sharper.



Björn Lyrvall

TS/CB/DLP/CE/GA/ED

031

UNGG Telecomm. Unit

Patrol Communications

CODE RESTRICTED

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

CZV=1342'95 AUG -7 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CZE=1090

CZB= 47

'95 AUG -7 19:17

SSN= 2043

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 3

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPF Z-1355

DATE: 07 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: TRIP TO KNIN

1. Accompanied by the Chief of Mission of UNCRO, by the Deputy Force Commander, and also by a representative of the UNHCR, the U.N. Centre for Human Rights, and several journalists, I travelled to Knin today to examine the current situation first-hand. Upon arrival, I toured the city and visited the hospital. I then went to our Sector South Headquarters, where I met the new Croatian army commander for the Knin region, General Cermak. Afterwards, I toured the HQ compound and talked with several of the 799 persons from Knin who have sought refuge there, and met privately with two of their representatives.

2. My overall impression of the town of Knin is that it suffered considerable damage from artillery fire, which was evident in the streets, where I observed many shops with broken windows, cars damaged and off the road, artillery shell holes in the road, etc.. However, the damage to the town's structures, while noticeable, was less than I anticipated. Large numbers of homes and buildings were left untouched by the fighting. Utilities were still off, but General Cermak told me that he expected water and electricity to be restored today, and phones tomorrow. There was a significant HV presence in the town, but the soldiers did not appear overly unruly, although several were drinking beer or spirits around noon time. Cermak also told me that very soon, perhaps as early as tomorrow, regular HV units would be removed, and only military and civilian police would remain, together with the nascent civilian administration. There were a few people, mostly elderly, observed in the towns, otherwise it appeared empty of civilians. Several of the shops still had cheap household goods and clothes on their shelves, even though their windows were broken.

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; COM UNCRO; DFC; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC; ICFY,

LO Belgrade

95 AUG -7 19:27

3. The hospital was not crowded with either patients or staff, most but not all of the former having already been transported to the UNCRO compound in Knin. Those remaining patients appeared to be mostly elderly, and not hospitalized due to war wounds. Some of the hospital's staff remained; one doctor of Serb background with whom I spoke stated his desire to continue living and working in Knin, as it was his birthplace and that of his parents (this statement was however made in the presence of local Croatian military authorities and the press). The hospital was large and in generally good condition, having been hit by only one artillery round. A lack of water and medicines was the biggest problem the hospital apparently faced; both problems were in the process of being addressed.

4. My meeting with General Cermak went very well. He pledged to respect fully the agreement signed by Mr. Sarinic and myself yesterday, copies of which I shared, in English and Serbo-Croat. He reiterated on several occasions that his forces would comply not only with the agreement, but also with international standards for human rights, as well as the laws of war. He professed a strong desire for all those people still in Knin, for the most part the 799 in the UNCRO camp, to remain living there, and not to leave their homes. He claimed that the mass exodus of Serbs from the Krajina to Bosnia was the product of political propaganda by the Krajina Serb leadership that was designed to make the population mistrustful of the Croatian army. Cermak assured me that the population had nothing at all to fear from his forces, and asked that I assist in conveying this message to the people. When I thanked him for his assurances for the rights and safety of all those who wished to stay, but then asked that safe passage be provided for those who make an informed decision to leave, Cermak stated that all such people would be allowed to leave freely and without hindrance. He returned to his point about the preferability of people remaining in Knin, with full rights under the laws of Croatia, and stated that all those in the UNCRO camp could begin returning to their homes to examine the state of their abodes, and the property in it, either to move back in, or to return to the UNCRO camp. I raised the issue of freedom of movement for UNCRO troops, and for our UNMOs and human rights teams, and Cermak again assured me that there would be no problem with these matters, contingent upon the security situation in a given area. He also said there would be no problems with humanitarian aid convoys gaining access to Knin.

5. One issue that may present a problem is Cermak's insistence that the military-age men in the UNCRO compound be interviewed by Croatian authorities. While I recognize that the government of Croatia has a legitimate interest in seeking to determine if any of those men were involved in war crimes, you will recall that this same issue caused us great difficulties in the case of Western Slavonia. In subsequent talks with the refugees in the camp, it was clear that the prospect of the men being interviewed was cause of great concern to them. However, I received strong assurances from Cermak that the interviews would be done in Knin, not far away, that the interviewers would be civilian not military police, that the families would be able to visit those being interviewed every day, and that the U.N. could have free and unfettered access to these people at any time. If Cermak fulfils his promises, I believe that the process will be transparent and along acceptable international standards. In cooperation with ICRC, UNHCR and the Centre for Human Rights, we will keep a very close eye on this matter in order to deter any potential lapses or abuses. Even in these circumstances, however, we will face an image problem, not

only in the eyes of the media, but more importantly in the eyes of the families of those detained in the course of the interviews. Great effort will be made at the local level in Knin to address this problem. I believe that given the resources at our disposal in Knin, and the additional human rights monitoring personnel to be deployed there, we will be able to satisfactorily overcome this problem. However, we are likely to face a similar one of much greater proportions with the thousands of Serb refugees and military personnel now apparently trapped in Sector North.

6. In talks with the refugees in the camps and with their two designated representatives, several common concerns repeatedly emerged in addition to the one on interviews. The most striking aspect of my conversations, however, was the fact that all of those with whom I spoke uniformly expressed a desire to leave Croatia (with the exception of the doctor mentioned above). Perhaps the refugees' greatest preoccupation was, would they be able to freely leave Croatia for the FRY, or alternatively Bosnia, and if so when, and would the U.N. help them with their departure. The refugees also sought assurances that they would not be expelled from the UNCRO compound, pending a more permanent resolution of their predicament. They also wanted to know whether they would be able to take mobile property with them when they departed, and whether they would be compensated for fixed property left behind. The representatives of the refugees also asked about the status of other Serbs in the Krajina, particularly large groups of civilians, and asked as well for an accounting for the prisoners taken in the fight for Knin. All these issues are being examined by the appropriate UNCRO personnel and/or U.N. agency and/or ICRC.

7. My trip to Knin was generally a sad experience, bearing witness to the results of the parties' failure to compromise, and to the tragic results of their military engagement on the civilian population and on a community's way of life. However, with only 799 people identified remaining in the area, Knin is no longer amongst our greatest worries or priorities. When time permits, together with colleagues from other organizations, we will examine ways in which we can encourage all those who may wish to return in safety and dignity to their former homes in the Knin area. For now though, our attention must be focused on the looming crisis in Sector North, the volatile situation in Sector East, and the unclear but increasingly difficult situation in western Bosnia, namely Banja Luka and Bihac.

8. As a final note, the most encouraging moment of my trip today came toward the end of the day, when one of the two refugee representatives said at the conclusion of our meeting: "Mr. Akashi, I just wish the leadership of the Kraginas would have listened to your advice and counsel, and not left us in this predicament. Now, we can be more responsible to international calls and international advice, and deal with problems more efficiently so that the conflict will not continue." There is some glimmer of hope in those words to suggest that the people may be tiring sufficiently of their suffering to exact a different type of policy from any new leadership that may emerge from this crisis. While we are still a long way from that point, we will do our best to develop such attitudes amongst the population and their leaders.

9. Regards.

CNZ 712 CYZ 722 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE
Palais des Nations

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB ^{95 AUG 8 2 15} attn SRSG/EC
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 7 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: 2602
SUBJECT: Situation In Croatia: your visit to Knin

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
1995 AUG -7 P 10:53

Your Z-1355 made enlightening reading. On your return from this timely visit to Knin, permit me to say how much all of us here appreciate the excellent and comprehensive reporting we have had from UNPF throughout this period of crisis, and in particular your valuable assessments of the evolving situation. This has enabled us to keep the Secretary-General fully informed.

We all greatly admire the dedication and energy with which you have led the mission at this difficult time. Please do not hesitate to let us know if there is anything more we can do at our end to support you and your dedicated staff.

Best regards.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TO: Stoltenberg/Bildt, ICFY Geneva FAX NO: 19 41 22 917 0079
Info: Ramcharan

FROM: Tom Colborne-Malpas, ICFY Zagreb

DATE: Monday 7 August 1995 PAGES: 4

SUBJECT: Update


Please find attached a map issued by the UNPF Joint Operations Centre. It illustrates the territory taken by HV forces so far. However, this should not be taken as an accurate picture - the ability of the UN to monitor events remains severely curtailed. UN deployment was mainly in the ZOS and therefore of no use once the fight passed their location, especially as many have been overrun. Furthermore, there appears to be a complete restriction of movement on the UN within the sectors.

Have arranged with JOC for military sitreps to be copied to us as they are produced. Will ensure that they are relayed to you in Geneva as they arrive.

Regarding the refugee situation, there are no accurate numbers to go on at this stage - only estimates. The description of numbers being used at present is "biblical". UNHCR have been informed by local Serb authorities in NW Bosnia that some 35,000 refugees have already crossed into Bosnia. 80,000 are reported to be on the move in Sector North. No doubt there is great confusion on numbers and some probable duplication. Attached is a summary of information from UNHCR time/dated yesterday afternoon.

Airstrike by one jet aircraft last night at 19.30 hrs on Petro-chemical plant in Kutina was confirmed by JOC (Joint Ops Centre).





FROM: MLO UNHCR - ZAGREB
TO: MLO UNHCR - SAR 7217

FROM: Llosa Vargas Gonzalo, Ext.Rel.

TO: #Crisis Group

DATE: 08-06-95

TIME: 15:33

CC:

SUBJECT: info. from BLK, Knin and Topusko

PRIORITY:

ATTACHMENTS:

The following info has been received from UNHCR in BLK, Knin, Topusko and Belgrade in the course of this morning:

1. Banja Luka

There are reportedly 120,000 persons on the move into northern BH, in addition to the 30,000 refugees who have already arrived there and been accommodated in makeshift shelters, some with no facilities. UNHCR BLK reports women outside the office, camped out on the streets. Most people are fleeing without any belongings. The authorities in BLK expect another 30,000 refugees to come from Sector South and 60,000 from Sector North.

According to the Bishop of BLK there have been some evictions as well as movement of Croats out of northern BH (through the Srbca-Davor ferry).

UNHCR chaired an inter-agency meeting in Zagreb today with other UN agencies and NGOs to share information and discuss the humanitarian response.

The UNHCR SE, accompanied by two other UNHCR staff, is planning to travel to BLK tomorrow if all the necessary arrangements can be made.

2. Knin

UNHCR Knin reports that there are some 650-700 civilians inside the UN HQs in Knin, including 50 patients from the Knin hospital who were previously evacuated to the base. There are apparently three medical cases who urgently need to be evacuated. The HV continues to impose restrictions of movement on UN. Civilians inside the UN compound are very concerned about their safety.

3. Topusko

UNHCR Topusko reports that between 7,000 to 10,000 displaced persons have arrived there from Slunj. They wanted to proceed to Dvor, but due to the security situation the local Serb authorities stopped them at Topusko and did not allow them to proceed further. They are now scattered around the UN compound, in the streets, etc. Among this group there are armed "RSK" soldiers, in addition to their families. According to HOO Topusko, this group may have taken some UN staff (not UNHCR) hostage.

4. Belgrade

The Bosnian Serb authorities in Bijeljina (northern BH) have today informed the UNHCR Office in Belgrade that there is a 10km long line of refugees from the Sectors making their way through the Brcko

corridor towards the FRY. UNHCR cannot confirm this at this stage; however a UNHCR convoy will go back from BLK to Belgrade today via this route and will be able to verify this information.

There is a large UNHCR convoy from Belgrade to BLK planned for tomorrow.

=====

SENT BY:YUGOSLAV MISSION GVA - 7- 0-85 : 16:26 :

FAX_838-38-50-41 22 817 0123

STALNA MISIJA RAVEZINE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE PRI ORGANIZACIJI UJEDINJENIH NACIJA

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE DE YOUGOSLAVIE AUPRES DE L'OFFICE DES NATIONS
UNIES ET DES AUTRES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES AYANT LEUR SIÈGE A GENEVE

8, chemin Thury • 1200 Genève • Téléphone (33) 33 44 • Fax (33) 33 50 • Télec 42 77 64

Fax No: No.525/1
Fax brq:Date: Aug. 7. 1998
Date:No. of pages (exam included):
Brq strana (na ovom): 1His Excellency
TO: Mr. Vladimir PETROVSKI
Director General
FROM: United Nations Office

Fax 917 01 23

Message:

Peru:

Excellency,

MSC-25

I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter H.E. Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has sent to the United Nations representative concerning the massacre the members of the Moslem and Croat troops have committed this very day on imprisoned officers and soldiers of the Serb Krajina Army.

Would you please take immediate measures aimed at halting this massacre, which is still under way.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Vladimir Pavicovic
Mr. Vladimir Pavicovic
Ambassador

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations
25 AUG -7 16:51

c.c.: Their Excellencies

907 00 69

Mr. Thorvald STOLTENBERG and

Mr. Carl BILD

Co-Chairman

International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

Geneva

Her Excellency

Mrs. Sadako OGATA

731 95 46

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Geneva

SENT BY:YUGOSLAV MISSION OVA : 7- 8-95 : 18:28 :

FAX_898-83-50+41 22 817 0129 :

INFORMATION TO AKASHI AND PEETERS

Further to my recent telephone conversation with Lt.-Col. Heisel, I request you to urgently intercede and prevent immediately a further massacre of the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, being committed at this moment in a most savage way by the Croatian Army and the members of the Fifth Corps from Bihać at Topusko. According to available information, the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Croatian Army reached agreement today in the presence of General Peeters on ceasing hostilities according to which the Serbian side was to hand over the heavy arms to UNPROFOR, while the Croatian side was to allow Serbian officers and soldiers to cross to the territory of the Republic of Srpska.

However, after the Serbs handed over their heavy arms to UNPROFOR, the Croats and Muslims attacked immediately and took them prisoner and commenced their bloody massacre. I plead and demand from Mr. Akashi and General Peeters to intervene and prevent further massacre and to see to it that those responsible be punished.

Vladimir Jovanović
Federal Minister of
Foreign Affairs of
The Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia

CZV-1333
CZG-1083
SSN-2032

CODE RESTRICTED

OUTGOING CODE CABLE
MOST IMMEDIATE

UNDP
COMM. LINE

702/C13

'95 AUG -7 13:39

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK (atten. RIZA)
: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE : 7 August 1995

SUBJECT : Secretary-General's Letter to the Council

1/8
for - *[Signature]*
F. Cider

Z-1346

With reference to your code cable of 6 August, the following is a summary of the developments leading up to 4 June, and our negotiations, prior to and after, the outbreak of hostilities.

On 19 July, the Krajina Serb army ("ARSK") and the forces loyal to Fikret Abdic, launched offensives against the Bosnian army V Corps in the Bihac pocket. The attacks were supported by Bosnian Serb shell fire along the southern confrontation line, and were said to have been in response to earlier military actions by the Bosnian army. The following day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia warned the Security Council "that the displacement of the population of Bihac..... would be considered a serious threat to the security and stability of Croatia..... (and) Croatia may be compelled to undertake necessary measures to secure its status and territory."

In an effort to stabilize the deteriorating military situation in the region, UNPF had finally succeeded in arranging a meeting between the military leaders of the Croatian army and the Krajina Serb army. Having accepted the invitation to participate in a preliminary round of political talks in Geneva in early August, the local Serb authorities subsequently cancelled the scheduled military meeting.

The pace of events increased after 22 July, when the Presidents of Croatia and Bosnian-Herzegovina signed the Split Declaration. The agreement committed the Croatian Government to assist militarily the Bosnian forces in the Bihac pocket. The Croatian Government maintained that the fall of the Bihac pocket would threaten its national security interests.

On 28 July, the combined forces of the Croatian army (HV) and Croat Defence Council (HVO) succeeded in capturing Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was a severe blow to the Krajina Serbs, as the Croat advance severed their main supply road from Banja Luka to Knin. Responding to the attack, the "RSK" and the "RS" declared states of war.

UNOG Telecom. UN
Palais des Nations
AUG -7 14:11

against the Croats and mobilized their respective armies.

2/8

Within Croatia, the Croatian army continued its build-up of troops around Sectors North and South. The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, meanwhile, convened a session of the joint "RSK" and "RS" Supreme Defense Council on 1 August in Drvar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The meeting resulted in an appeal to all Serbs, including the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to assist in the defence of Serb territory.

On 29 July, my Special Representative met with President Tudjman to forestall what appeared to be an inevitable military confrontation. President Tudjman expressed his Government's willingness to participate in political and military talks with Knin, but stressed progress on the ground must necessarily follow. If such progress was not achieved in several days, he stated Croatia would take whatever measures it deemed necessary to redress the situation. Specifically, the President expected negotiations to result in the reopening of the Adriatic oil pipeline within 24 hours, rapid agreement on the opening of the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway and immediate progress on political re-integration based on Croatia's Constitution and its Law on Minorities. President Tudjman did, however, agree to send representatives to Geneva for the ICFY-sponsored meeting.

My Special Representative held emergency talks on 30 July with the local Serb authorities in Knin. He secured a six-point commitment from the Krajina Serbs that the "ARSK" would withdraw fully from the Bihać pocket and desist from further cross-border interference (see Annex A). However, the Croatian Government considered the pledges insufficient. In a written reply, President Tudjman rejected the six-point agreement reached in Knin, on the grounds that it did not meet the terms he had presented to my Special Representative (see Annex B). The Croats did, however, re-affirm their readiness to enter into talks in Geneva.

Following the failure of the talks in Geneva, I personally telephoned President Tudjman and urged utmost restraint. Despite the efforts of the United Nations and the international community to defuse the situation, at 0500 hours, on 4 August, the Croatian army launched a major offensive on the Krajina region (Sectors North and South). My Special Representative issued a statement expressing his regret at the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia, and urged the parties respect international humanitarian law and ensure the observance of the human rights of the affected population. In the meantime, a significant number of United Nations observation posts were overrun by the Croatian army, and some came under indirect and direct fire. On the same day, my Special Representative met with Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, the Head of the Commission for Relations with UNCRO, to seek assurances for the safety of all United Nations personnel in the Sectors. The Force Commander also held discussions with General Cervenko to ensure Croatia's respect for the security for United Nations personnel.

3/8
On 5-6 August, My Special Representative held a number of meetings with Mr. Sarinic to discuss temporary arrangements that would allow the United Nations, together with other organizations internal, to cope with the major humanitarian difficulties, caused by the Croatian offensive, and to monitor the human right's situation on the ground. The result of these discussions was a nine-point agreement that was signed on 6 August (see Annex C).

In the meantime, the Force Commander's representatives have been in contact with the military authorities from the Croatian army and the Krajina Serb military. They have discussed possible medevacs of UN personnel, and the need to alleviate the consequences of the military operations on the civilian population.

C2N-1290

C2G-1048

Annex A

7/7

4/8

Following the visit to Knin by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and General Bernard Janvier, the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces, and the important discussions held with the leadership in Knin, led by Mr. Martić and in which Mr. Šabić and General Mrksić participated, and in light of assessing the extreme seriousness of the situation in the area, the RSK leadership reiterated their commitment to the peaceful solution of the conflict and for that purpose agree to the following:

1. That there are, and there will be, no troops or individual soldiers of the ARSK in the area known as the Bihać pocket.
2. That the ARSK forces will refrain entirely from directing any kind of fire (shell, mortar, tank, etc...) into the Bihać pocket from territory that they control, and expect that the V Corps shall in reciprocity refrain from any offensive action against that territory.
3. That troops and Military Observers of the United Nations deployed in territory under RSK control will be allowed unhindered access to the area bordering the Bihać pocket to monitor any crossing of the border in either direction by any forces.
4. That the military commander of the ARSK, General Mrksić, is prepared to have the first meeting with the commander of the Croatian army at any time under UNPF auspices at the Turanj crossing, including as early as 31 July 1995 at 14:00.
5. Reaffirming their commitment not to carry-out cross-border activities, the RSK reiterates its support for, and willingness to continue the talks with the UNPF regarding the establishment of appropriate observation posts in the area of Mount Dinara, and to facilitate the implementation of the border crossing points under the mandate of UNPF.
6. That no impediments will be placed in the way of delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Bihać pocket, based on the principle of assessed need, and with the understanding that humanitarian aid will be delivered to the Krajina region based on the same principle, as applied by the UNHCR.

30 July 1995
Knin

81:61 1-AUG 95

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

13:18 1-AUG 95

UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS

Annex B

Translation/rs
Original : Croatian

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
PRESIDENT

CZN-1280

CZG-1038

4/7

5/8

His Excellency
Special Representative of
the UN Secretary General
Zagreb

Your Excellency,

In response to your fax which I received today, at 21:30, together with the enclosed proposals from the Knin rebels, I would like to state the following :

- 1) it is surprising that in your letter you never mention UNCRO - the UN peace forces which were under this name given the mandate to act in Croatia by a Security Council resolution and in contrast, you do mention the Knin leadership and the RSK;
- 2) it is unacceptable for us to have UNCRO troops deployed only on the border towards the Bihać pocket. Our request was and remains that UNCRO forces undertake the monitoring of internationally recognized borders between the Republic of Croatia and B+H, but at the same time also between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, that is SRY, which is particularly significant because in these last few days new formations and equipment of the Yugoslav army have been transferred across the Danube.
- 3) in regard to what was stated under point 2) there can be no question of deploying UN border crossing monitors only in the region of Dinara;
- 4) Serb rebel leaders again want to outwit UN representatives and UNCRO for their own benefit. That is apparent from their proposal to allow humanitarian aid for Bihać under the condition that it is at the same time delivered to them ;
- 5) such proposals do not represent any basis for peaceful reintegration and do not contain a response to any of the conditions which I put forward in discussions with you on Saturday 29 July 1995, when I expressly indicated that negotiations on a peaceful reintegration with Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas can commence under the following conditions :

a) that Croatain authorities will not negotiate with Milan Martić, who has been placed on the list of war criminals by the International Court in the Hague or with anyone else representing him,

6/8

CZK-1280

CZG-1038 5/7

b) that negotiations can commence if the oil pipeline passing through the occupied areas is operational in a period of 24 hours,

c) that direct discussions commence immediately concerning the opening of all communication lines through the occupied areas, and in particular the railway line Zagreb-Split via Knin, and

d) that discussions are simultaneously undertaken concerning the immediate implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the occupied areas as well as the provisions of the Constitutional Law concerning the rights of the Serb ethnic community.

6) only on the basis of this can we reach a peaceful solution and with this aim I propose discussion between military and civilian representatives of Croatian authorities and the rebel Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas.

Best regards,

The President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo Tudman

(Original signed + sealed)

Brijuni, 30 July 1995, at 22:20 hrs.

Annex C.

7/8

**AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND
THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES-UNCRO
ON TEMPORARY MEASURES IN THE AREAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS
"SECTOR NORTH" AND "SECTOR SOUTH"**

We the undersigned,

Concerned by the effects of the hostilities on the lives of civilians in the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and "Sector South" (hereinafter referred to as the Areas),

Committed to minimizing the loss of civilian life from hostilities,

Dedicated to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the full protection of civilians and of their human rights,

Committed to providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population affected by the hostilities in the Areas,


Recognizing the need to ensure full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law,

Agree to the following:


1. That Croatia expresses its complete and unequivocal commitment to the full respect for the human rights of all individuals in the Areas concerned, and guarantees that those rights will be respected by all Croatian authorities.
2. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia concurs that UNCRO, together with UNHCR and ICRC where appropriate, will monitor and report on the human rights situation in the Areas, and intervene with the Croatian authorities on human rights matters when appropriate.
3. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia encourages all those previous inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia who so wish to remain peacefully in the areas over which Croatian authority is exercised. However, Croatia will allow, with full guarantees for security, the departure from those areas of all those who express their desire to do so, except those who committed violations of international criminal law. In the event of any such departures, Croatia pledges to allow UNCRO and humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to assist and coordinate such departures in conformity with recognized international standards.

8/8

4. That full access by UNCRO and by humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to the civilian population, for the purpose of providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, will be assured by the authorities of Croatia, to the extent allowed by objective security considerations.
5. That UNMOs and human rights monitoring elements of UNCRO will carry out surveillance immediately in all areas except where, in the opinion of the local UNCRO military commanders after consulting Croatian army commanders, the security situation does not permit for such surveillance.
6. That Croatia, and in particular its military authorities, will make every effort to ensure that civilian areas are not targeted by direct or indirect military fire as long as the hostilities continue.
7. That, if UNCRO commanders become aware that local military personnel have departed from a specific location where only non-combatants are present, and that the location is under fire by Croatian forces, this information will be immediately passed to the Headquarters of the Croatian Army for appropriate action.
8. That, in conformity with its international obligations, Croatia reiterates the inviolability of United Nations premises and establishments, and its vehicles, and all those therein, and thus commits all Croatian authorities to fully respect such inviolability. Croatia further emphasizes that none of its authorities will seek to remove any person or persons from such United Nations premises, establishments or vehicles.
9. That the future relations of the two parties in this matter will be defined as soon as possible.



Hrvoje Sarinic
Republic of Croatia



Yasushi Akashi
United Nations
Peace Forces

UNPF/FCR/3
COMMUNICATIONSUNHCR CODE
RESTRICTED

95 AUG -6 16:30

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

95 AUG -6 16:44

C2N = 1329

C2G = 1080

IMMEDIATE

SSN = 2020

Page 1 Of 3

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPF Z-1342

DATE: 06 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT WITH CROATIAN GOVERNMENT

IMMEDIATE

1. Attached is a copy of an agreement signed today by myself and Mr. Sarinic, which addresses primarily human rights and humanitarian issues in Sectors North and South. I plan to go to Knin tomorrow, with the Force Commander and COM UNCRO, to provide some impetus for the agreement's implementation on the ground.
2. The main elements of the agreement are:
 - a) Croatia's expressed commitment for full respect for human rights.
 - b) Croatia's consent to allow UNCRO, UNHCR and ICRC to monitor human rights and intervene where appropriate.
 - c) Croatia's expressed wish to have all those originally from the areas to remain, and its commitment to provide safe passage for all those who wish to leave.
 - d) Croatia's commitment to allow full access to the civilian population by UNCRO, UNHCR and ICRC for humanitarian purposes.
 - e) Croatia's commitment not to target civilian areas.
 - f) Croatia's reiteration of the inviolability of U.N. premises (included to address the issue of civilians seeking refuge in UNCRO compounds).
3. I will provide additional information upon my return from Knin.
4. Regards.

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; COM UNCRO; DFC; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC; ICFY

C2N-1324 P2/3

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND
THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES-UNCRO
ON TEMPORARY MEASURES IN THE AREAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS
"SECTOR NORTH" AND "SECTOR SOUTH"

We the undersigned,

Concerned by the effects of the hostilities on the lives of civilians in the areas formerly known as "Sector North" and "Sector South" (hereinafter referred to as the Areas),

Committed to minimizing the loss of civilian life from hostilities,

Dedicated to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the full protection of civilians and of their human rights,


Committed to providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population affected by the hostilities in the Areas,

Recognizing the need to ensure full respect for international human rights and humanitarian law,


Agree to the following:

1. That Croatia expresses its complete and unequivocal commitment to the full respect for the human rights of all individuals in the Areas concerned, and guarantees that those rights will be respected by all Croatian authorities.
2. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia concurs that UNCRO, together with UNHCR and ICRC where appropriate, will monitor and report on the human rights situation in the Areas, and intervene with the Croatian authorities on human rights matters when appropriate.
3. That, further to clause 1 above, Croatia encourages all those previous inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia who so wish to remain peacefully in the areas over which Croatian authority is exercised. However, Croatia will allow, with full guarantees for security, the departure from those areas of all those who express their desire to do so, except those who committed violations of international criminal law. In the event of any such departures, Croatia pledges to allow UNCRO and humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to assist and coordinate such departures in conformity with recognized international standards.

4. That full access by UNCRO and by humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to the civilian population, for the purpose of providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, will be assured by the authorities of Croatia, to the extent allowed by objective security considerations.
5. That UNMOs and human rights monitoring elements of UNCRO will carry out surveillance immediately in all areas except where, in the opinion of the local UNCRO military commanders after consulting Croatian army commanders, the security situation does not permit for such surveillance.
6. That Croatia, and in particular its military authorities, will make every effort to ensure that civilian areas are not targeted by direct or indirect military fire as long as the hostilities continue.
7. That, if UNCRO commanders become aware that local military personnel have departed from a specific location where only non-combatants are present, and that the location is under fire by Croatian forces, this information will be immediately passed to the Headquarters of the Croatian Army for appropriate action.
8. That, in conformity with its international obligations, Croatia reiterates the inviolability of United Nations premises and establishments, and its vehicles, and all those therein, and thus commits all Croatian authorities to fully respect such inviolability. Croatia further emphasizes that none of its authorities will seek to remove any person or persons from such United Nations premises, establishments or vehicles.
9. That the future relations of the two parties in this matter will be defined as soon as possible.



Hrvoje Sarinic
Republic of Croatia



Yasushi Akashi
United Nations
Peace Forces

Zagreb
6 August 1995



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Office of the Co-Chairmen

CRYPTOFAX TRANSMITTAL

MOST IMMEDIATE

PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: The Secretary-General

COPY: Goulding, Annan, Charekhan (New York)
Akashi (Zagreb)

FROM: Stoltenberg *[Signature]*

DATE: 7 August, 1995

SUBJECT: Meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic
Geneva, 6 August 1995

Summary

Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner van den Broek, Carl Bildt, and I met with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic for two hours on Sunday morning in Geneva to discuss the situations in Croatia and in B-H. Granic's main messages were that he expected military operations to be essentially over within 24 hours; Croatia would allow access by humanitarian organisations to Serbs fleeing, or still inside, Croatia; the situation in B-H would be much better for the Muslims, who would now have a stronger negotiating hand; and Croatia would be unhappy if the FRY recognised B-H alone. Highlights follow.

Granic's assessment

In his opening presentation Granic said that Croatia expected to finish its military operations within twenty-four hours. It was assisting and would continue to assist the B-H Fifth Corps in Bihac. Humanitarian convoys to Bihac could start operating from tomorrow (Monday). Croatia had invited ICRC to help Croatian Serb refugees.

In Granic's assessment the B-H Fifth Corps would be much stronger. He expected the 'Abdic problem' to be solved without fighting. He thought that the strategic situation of the Muslims in B-H would now be much different, as a result of which the prospects for negotiations would be quite different than

hitherto. In this regard, the struggle between Mladic and Karadzic was important. If Mladic won, it would be easier to talk with Belgrade about Bosnian issues. If Karadzic won, it would be more difficult.

For its part, Croatia would respect the constitutional, human and minority rights of its Serb population. As for the situation in Sector East, there was no longer any point of discussing with Martić and Babić who had been from the Knin leadership. Croatia would be interested in talking with local leaders from Sector East. Croatia would also be interested in talking to Belgrade: "Now we can talk...".

Foreign Minister Solana's rebuke

Foreign Minister Solana crisply reiterated the EU position, deprecating Croatia's military actions even as it was engaged in talks, condemned the shelling of civilian areas in Knin, expressed concern over the humanitarian situation, protested about the treatment of UN troops, and handed over a formal protest from Denmark about the treatment of its troops.

Granic said he understood these concerns. However, he said that he was confident that in a few weeks time it would be seen that Croatia, far from being part of the problem, had now become part of the solution.

Humanitarian and UN-related issues

Granic was pressed to explain the shelling of civilian areas in Knin and was told in no uncertain terms that that involved war crimes, a matter falling within the province of the International Tribunal in the Hague. Would the Croatian Government cooperate with the Tribunal in investigating the attacks on civilians? He did not answer directly, but said that there had been three military barracks in Knin and that most of the civilians had already fled the city before it was shelled. He was told that his explanation did not stand up to the known facts.

On the treatment of UN troops Granic said that Croatia would investigate the incidents and would write letters of apology to the Governments concerned. I raised the problem of civilians in the UN compound in Knin and the situation at Knin hospital. Granic replied that as regards the civilians in the UN compound, the Croatian Government was ready to provide access to the ICRC to register them, ascertain their wishes and to assist them. He expected the hospital in Knin to be functioning again soon.

As the meeting was going on, President Milosevic called me to say that there was a report of Croatian planes firing on columns of refugees fleeing to Banja Luka. At my request Granic said he would immediately be in touch with Zagreb on the matter. He later called me and said he had been in contact with his military authorities and could assure me there would be no shooting on refugees. I conveyed this to President Milosevic.

Political aspects

Granic indicated that Croatia considered the situations in Sectors West, North and South to be now solved and did not see room for continuing UN operations in these areas, save in respect of humanitarian issues. He recognised that there was a continuing need for a UN role in Sector East.

When Granic was asked whether he saw a need for future negotiations regarding the Croatian situation, he replied that Croatia had two main objectives: the return of Serbs who had fled from other parts of Croatia to Sector East to their homes; and the recognition by FRY of Croatia within its internationally recognised borders. Croatia was interested in a "process" that would lead to the achievement of these objectives. He acknowledged that with tens of thousands of Croatian Serb refugees moving to Sector East it would be even more difficult for Milosevic to recognise Croatia in the near future. However, he said Croatia would not negotiate about its territorial integrity.

On the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was pointed out to Granic that the prospects for a negotiated solution would be markedly improved were the FRY to recognise B-H. Given the difficulties of Milosevic recognising Croatia immediately, would Croatia now concur with the FRY's recognition of B-H going ahead? Granic referred to the recent letter from Foreign Minister Sacerbey and himself to the Co-Chairmen, pointing out that they would not accept FRY recognition of B-H without Croatia also being recognised. A suspension of sanctions on FRY now would not be helpful for the interests of Croatia. The cooperation between BiH and Croatia had been strengthened considerably lately - in connection with Bihac. Foreign Minister Solana then concluded that contrary to what was said in Foreign Minister Granic's opening statement, the latest developments had actually made negotiated solutions more difficult - not less.

CHRISTIAN B LOTZ

733 2917

TO: D407

MSG: HQ

39697 121

FROM: PRESS&INFO

PRESS

UNPROFOR ON FX 2672

PRESS RELEASE 1 - 487 * INFO: ECMM

Page 1 of
06-Aug-95 18:4*Mr. DINTER*

ECMM HQ ZAGREB	
CAT	
NR/NAME	DATE
	06.08.95

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND
THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES-UNCRO
ON TEMPORARY MEASURES IN THE AREAS FORMERLY KNOWN AS
"SECTOR NORTE" AND "SECTOR SOUTH"

We the undersigned,

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Committed to minimizing the loss of civilian life from
hostilities,

Dedicated to ensuring to the maximum extent possible the
full protection of civilians and of their human rights,

Committed to providing for the humanitarian needs of the
civilian population affected by the hostilities in the Areas,

Recognizing the need to ensure full respect for
international human rights and humanitarian law,

Agree to the following:


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Croatian authority is exercised. However, Croatia will
allow, with full guarantees for security, the departure
from those areas of all those who express their desire to
do so, except those who committed violations of
international criminal law. In the event of any such
departures, Croatia pledges to allow UNCRO and humanitarian
organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to assist
and coordinate such departures in conformity with
recognized international standards.

B/B

4. That full access by UNCRO and by humanitarian organizations, particularly UNHCR and the ICRC, to the civilian population, for the purpose of providing for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population, will be assured by the authorities of Croatia, to the extent allowed by objective security considerations.
5. That UNMOs and human rights monitoring elements of UNCRO will carry out surveillance immediately in all areas except where, in the opinion of the local UNCRO military commanders after consulting Croatian army commanders, the security situation does not permit for such surveillance.
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9. That the future relations of the two parties in this matter will be defined as soon as possible.



Hrvoje Sarinic
Republic of Croatia



Yasushi Akashi
United Nations
Peace Forces

Zagreb
6 August 1995

C2N-1323

CZG-1076

SSN 2008

UNPF - HQ
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNPROCESSED
COMMUNICATIONS
Page 1 of 2
cas-19
95 AUG -4 19:47
MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -ok

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICEY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE: 4 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1336

SUBJECT: Update on the current situation in Croatia

95 AUG -4 20:02

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

Following are further highlights of the situation in Croatia today:

1. Four axes of HV advance into Sectors North and South have become evident throughout the day. The initial HV thrust into the Krajina was along the Gospic-Gracac route. It was reported this morning that 20 HV tanks led this attack. While we believe the HV has made some progress, it has been difficult to estimate how far they have proceeded into SS due to impediments placed on our ability to observe and report in the area. Croatian military report that the only place the HV has taken is the village of Rok, near Gospic. They have dismissed earlier accounts made by the local press of wide-spread territorial gains. The second major axis of attack has been west of Sisak towards Gora. Two columns of HV troops have split at Gora, with one heading in the direction of Glina and the other towards Petrinja. Heavy fighting has subsequently been reported in Petrinja; although Croatian radio initially reported that the town has been taken, we have no information to confirm this. UNMOs in Glina report that there have been 30 casualties from shelling of the town. The UNMOs have also investigated the scene of an Croatian air attack that took place at 1100 hours near the village of Mija, southeast of Glina. They discovered that two houses were destroyed, one truck of medical equipment destroyed and two civilians killed in the attack. The third and fourth axes of attack are from Karlovac through to Turanj (where we suspect fighting is taking place) and towards Drnis in Sector South. We have no information on any territorial gains in these areas.

2. It should be emphasized that in all progress made by the HV along these fronts, UNCRO OPs have been taken and moved out of the way, seriously hampering our ability to report on developments. As of 1900 hours, HV forces in Sector North had captured 13 UNCRO OPs along the ZOS and taken 47

Internal distribution: SRSG, FC, CoM UNCRO, CoM UNPROFOR, DFC, COS,
DOA, SE/UNHCR

P 2/2

soldiers from these locations. Eight Danish soldiers were removed from two OPs by the ARSK but freed following negotiations by the DANBAT commanding officer. In Sector South, four OPs have been captured by the HV. At 1510 hours, a CZECHBAT OP was shot at by three HV jets with 30mm cannon. UNCRO protested the incident. Furthermore, Croatian radio was reporting that CANBAT in SS was aiding the ARSK through its reporting by radio communications. As a result of this report, CANBAT personnel in Zagreb have been subject to hostile gestures by the local population in Zagreb. This clearly indicates the sensitivity of our peace-keeping troops reporting in detail on events on the ground - a consideration to be kept in mind in expecting detailed reporting.

3. After receipt of a request from the CANBAT commander, the Force Commander requested at 1700 hours NATO air presence over the CANBAT Rastevic camp near Knin. While conducting their mission, a NATO jet was illuminated at 1855 hours near Knin by a Serb radar linked to the Serb air defence system. The NATO jet engaged the radar in accordance with its rules of engagement. The result is unknown at this time and a full report will be sent to you tomorrow as more detailed information becomes available.

4. We have been advised by the civil affairs office in Sector South that the Knin leadership have requested UNHCR and UNPF assistance in evacuating approximately 32,000 civilians from Benkovac, Obrovac, Gracac, and Knin to Petrovac and Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is a wide range of policy, political, military, and logistical implications that must first be examined with UNHCR before we can contemplate such a commitment. Accordingly, Sector South has been advised by UNCRO to make no commitment to the Knin authorities, other than that the matter will be examined tomorrow. The Special Envoy of UNHCR, who at his Geneva office, is also aware of the Krajina Serb proposal.

CZN - 1322
CZG - 1075
SSN - 2006

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS
COS-14
95 AUG -4 18:01

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 3

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ✓
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ✓
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ✓
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB
NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1335
DATE: 04 AUGUST 1995
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SARINIC.

95 AUG -4 18:17

Palais des Nations

UNOG Telecom. Unit

J. Akashi

1. I met at my request for an hour this afternoon with Mr. Sarinic to discuss the Croatian military operations in Sectors North and South, and in particular to convey my deep concern at the dangers posed by the operation to the civilian population and United Nations personnel. Sarinic was composed and confident, suggesting by implication at one point that the operation was expected to last about ten days. He expressed full understanding for the need to avoid as much as possible civilian casualties, and assured me that firm orders had been passed throughout the chain of command that the security of U.N. personnel was to be fully respected. Sarinic also gave official endorsement to the idea that, in the event the Croatian army takes large swaths of territory, the United Nations would be permitted to monitor human rights and assist on humanitarian matters. Sarinic expressed tentative but non-committal endorsement of my suggestion that UNCRO maintain its full responsibilities with respect to border monitoring if the Croatian army advances to the international border. In response to my comment on the possibility of NATO close air support to protect out troops if they were under fire, Sarinic said that NATO action in Croatia against Croatia would severely harm the relations between his government and the United Nations. Below is a more complete summary of the meeting.

2. I began the meeting by giving to Mr. Sarinic a copy of the statement that I read out to the press today at 12:30 local time, about which he expressed no disagreement after having read it. I then reiterated the statement by the President of the Security Council made last night, and expressed my view that the efforts by Mr. Stoltenberg, by U.S. Ambassador Galbraith and by myself had produced new opportunities for the Croatian government to achieve their goals through peaceful means. While I expressed full sympathy for the dissatisfaction of the Croatian government with the past behavior of the Krajina Serb leadership, the Croatian decision to proceed with military operations in

the new context was particularly regrettable. However, with the operations already well under way, I had two major concerns: a) the plight of civilians in the Krajina, and b) the dangers posed to United Nations personnel by the Croatian army attacks. In this regard, I expressed my regret that more than 200 shells had fallen on the town of Knin, that other towns in the Krajina had been shelled, that many of UNCRO's Observation Posts (OPs) had been targeted, attacked and/or overrun, that one Danish peacekeeper had been killed by direct fire from the Croatian army, and that two Polish peacekeepers were injured, one of them seriously. Although the "ARSK" had also shelled some Croatian cities today, such activity was subsequent to the Croatian shelling of Knin and in any case, I insisted, was not a justifiable pretext for shelling urban areas. I informed Sarinic that, after consultations with me, the Force Commander had asked NATO for air presence in areas where UNCRO peacekeepers were under direct threat from the fighting, and urged Sarinic to ensure that the HV commanders were fully cognizant of the United Nations' intention to take all necessary measures to protect its forces. Finally, I suggested that, in the event that the Croatian authorities extend their control over large amounts of territory, consideration be given to future United Nations' responsibilities in those areas. Serious thought would have to be given to this question I noted, but I strongly believed that provision should be made for monitoring of human rights, for assisting in addressing humanitarian needs of the civilian population, and also for UNCRO to fulfil its border monitoring responsibilities.

3. Sarinic explained to me the reasons for which Croatia had decided to reintegrate territories and put them under the sovereign, constitutional authority of Croatia on the present course of action. He said that his government had been patient for four years, had been the repeated victim of machinations by the Serb leadership to which the international community had also fell victim, and that recent expressions of flexibility by Babic and others was simply another ruse designed to buy time but avoid resolving the problems. The fact that Babic had initially been designated the leader of the Serb negotiating team after being appointed "Prime Minister", but then did not go to Geneva, was yet another example of Serb disingenuousness, claimed Sarinic; Babic's agreement with Ambassador Galbraith in Belgrade, which was followed by a statement from Babic which did not go as far as the agreement, was another such example. Sarinic asserted that such games by the Serb leadership could not be tolerated any more, and that Croatia was disappointed that the international community was again fooled by them. I described again what I considered to be the differences between the previous situation characterized by Serb foot-dragging and intransigence and the most recent one in which substantive concessions were made in the context of a much more flexible attitude. After further discussions on this, we agreed that we did not share the same judgement of the Krajina Serb leadership's intentions.

4. Sarinic then addressed the issue of security of U.N. personnel, assuring me that the Croatian authorities were fully aware of their responsibilities and would take all necessary measures to ensure that our personnel were not targeted. He informed me that the initial, unconfirmed information he had on the death of the Danish peacekeeper was that the soldier had been tied by the "ARSK" next to a gun position from which the "ARSK" was firing at advancing HV troops. The HV fired back unaware of the Danish soldier's presence and unfortunately killed him. Sarinic expressed regret, and promised to pass on additional information on the incident as soon as it became available to him.

On the two Polish peacekeepers injured, Sarinic gave no explanation for the cause of their injuries, but stated that they were in HV hands, were being cared for in a hospital, and that the other Poles who had been accompanying the two but who were not injured could be picked-up by UNCRO, or the HV could transport them to Zagreb, as we pleased.

5. On the subject of civilians, Sarinic claimed that Croatia would like all the people to remain in the Krajina after the operation is over, as it had wished the people to stay in Western Slavonia, and that the human rights of those remaining would be guaranteed. Sarinic stated that he accepted UNPF monitoring of the behavior of Croatian military, police and civilian authorities in the field of human rights and humanitarian assistance in the future in areas of the Krajina taken by the HV. He officially accepted my proposal to deploy at least two integrated human rights monitoring teams to each of Sector North and Sector South when conditions would permit. Sarinic also pledged that the entire leadership, from the top to the bottom, would do its best to behave in a "civilized manner", and assured me that efforts were being made to avoid civilian casualties, but that war is a terrible environment, and it is the civilians who always suffer the most in such conditions. When I asked about future border monitoring by UNCRO in the Krajinas, Sarinic said that he could not give me an "official" answer yet, but in principle he stated that UNCRO's presence on the international border would be "useful". Here he let slip what may be the general time frame the Croats envision for their operation by saying that "in 10 days time when we have succeeded with our operation, our border with Bosnia will be unstable, your presence with observation posts would be welcome - it would help to stabilize the border." Sarinic noted here that Croatian police would also be present on the border as is done "in every country in the world." Just to be explicit, I asked about humanitarian assistance to Bihać; Sarinic pledged 100 percent cooperation.

6. Sarinic then returned to the subject of the Danish peacekeeper who was killed, and said that "we will take very severe and hard steps to prevent it in the future." I noted that, during the period of the operation in Western Slavonia, assurances by Mr. Sarinic and General Cervenko had not always been respected in practice on the ground, and strongly urged him to ensure that such divergences did not occur in the current context. When Sarinic said that it was impossible to ensure 100 percent compliance with orders in any army, I insisted that greater attention be paid to this matter. Sarinic relented, then brought up the issue of the possibility of NATO close air support, claiming that the international community had been reluctant to use NATO air power in the past, and that if it were used "in Croatia, against Croatia" relations between the government and the U.N. would worsen. I told Sarinic that I had taken note of his concern.

7. Generally speaking, Sarinic appeared to be greatly concerned that events would transpire on the ground which would show Croatia in an unfavorable light. Because of these concerns, I believe we can expect generally good cooperation from the Croatian authorities in the areas of our own greatest concern now, namely assistance to the civilian population and security for United Nations personnel. Although the cooperation will be welcome, to the extent that it materializes, it will be the result of Croatian self-interest rather than munificence. Nonetheless, Croatian anxiety over their image in the eyes of the world can be used in an appropriate manner to advance our concerns.

ENDALL..



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Office of the Co-Chairmen


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PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: The Secretary-General

COPY: Goulding/Annan/Gharekhan, New York
Akashi, Zagreb

FROM: Thorvald Stoltenberg, Geneva 

DATE: 5 August 1995

SUBJECT: The situation in Croatia.
Meetings with Milosevic and with Sarinic,
4 August 1995

-
1. Following our meeting in Geneva on Thursday, 3 August, I travelled to Belgrade the following morning accompanied by Generals de Lapresle and Peeters and Ambassadors Ahrens and Eide. In Belgrade Bildt and I had a meeting with President Milosevic, while other members of my delegation met with Babic (a separate report has been sent from the latter meeting). We then travelled to Zagreb where de Lapresle, Ahrens, Eide and I met with Sarinic.
 2. Milosevic seemed to be very concerned with the developments in Croatia. He did not say much about the Croatian offensive, but emphasised that the Croatians were not fully aware of what they had embarked on. He predicted a war which would drag out and where the parties would push each other back and forth on the battlefield for quite some time to come. The costs on both sides would be high, he said. Milosevic did not express any intention to engage directly in the war. However, he repeatedly underlined that the pressure on him from public opinion in Serbia to take action would grow every day. He did not give us any political message to bring to Zagreb.

3. - In our meeting with Sarinic, I emphasised that the Serb delegation in Geneva had accepted my 7-point proposal, which was largely based on Croatian demands. In Belgrade Babic had today again, without reservations, accepted to negotiate a political solution on the basis of the Z-4 plan, which Babic knew meant integration of Serb-held territories into Croatia. Furthermore, Babic had accepted the full implementation of the UNCRO mandate, including UNCRO presence in Croatia's international border to Bosnia and to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It therefore seemed to me that the Krajina Serbs had accepted the Croatian demands and to solve the conflict at the negotiating table on that basis. On this background, I said that the war was unnecessary and should be stopped in order to allow for negotiations to resume.
4. Sarinic replied that he had to be candid; the Croatian Government was fed up with the Krajina Serbs. Croatia had been the victim of Serb games for four years. The Serbs had been reluctant to negotiate and it had even been difficult to know with whom Zagreb should negotiate. The Croatian public was tired of the situation, especially the displaced persons. Now the Serbs said they were accepting to negotiate but, at the same time, they were shelling Dubrovnik. They could simply not be trusted. If Babic or the Serb delegation in Geneva had explicitly said that they accepted peaceful reintegration and accepted to disarm quickly, then war could have been avoided. If they now gave up their arms immediately and stated clearly that they accept to be part of Croatia under the Croatian constitutional system, then Croatia would stop the offensive. Croatia was ready to let the Serbs stay and to respect their rights. Unfortunately, they had almost all run away from Western Slavonia, but Sarinic hoped it would be better in Sector South and North. The only real problem was if Milosevic decided to engage in the conflict. However, Sarinic believed that to be unlikely.
5. I expressed our serious concern about the shelling of civilian targets and towns, including the very intense shelling of Knin. De Lapresle emphasised that there was a very high number of military targets in the area. Why did the Croatians then carry out such heavy shelling of more densely populated areas!
6. Sarinic could not give a clear answer to that. He pointed out that there were probably also military targets in Knin. However, Knin would not be taken at this stage of the conflict, he said. That would be part of the last stage of the operation.
7. Coming back to the Geneva negotiations on Thursday, and the statements of Babic, I repeated that there could be no doubt that the Serbs had accepted the substance of the Croatian demands. They had not formulated themselves explicitly and publicly in terms of total capitulation. But the meaning was clear. I therefore repeated my disappointment that the Serb "yes" had not been accepted.

ENDALL

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'95 AUG -4 21:07

Page 1 of 1

TO : THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : GOULDING, GHAREKHAN, ANNAN, UNNY
AKASHI, UNPF HQ
STOLTENBERG/BILDT, ICFY GENEVA

FROM : *for* STOLTENBERG, P.T., ZAGREB *Vukobratovic Joffe*

DATE : 4 August 1995

NUMBER : _____

SUBJECT : MEETING WITH BABIC IN BELGRADE, 4 AUGUST 1995

1. While Gen. de Lapresle and I saw President Milosevic in Belgrade this afternoon, Ambassadors Ahrens and Eide and Gen. Peeters had a meeting with Babic. When they arrived, he was speaking to Amb. Galbraith on the telephone. Babic urged us to communicate the following message from him:

- a) He is ready to negotiate on the basis of the Z-4 plan without any qualifications. (Yesterday in a public statement he said "on the basis of a revised and modified version of the Z-4 plan". Today, he said "on the basis of the Z-4 plan - period". Asked if he understood that this meant within Croatia Babic said yes, that is the substance of the Z-4 plan. Asked about the views of Martić he replied that Martić shared his position on this issue.
- b) Babic also urged us to do our utmost to stop the Croatian shelling of cities and towns, which only led to civilian casualties. There had been shelling of a large number of towns from Petrinja in the north to Knin in the south. There were reports that Dmš had fallen, but this was not confirmed. They did not have any reliable numbers of civilian or military casualties, due to lack of communication. But they knew that parts of Knin were destroyed. Babic underlined that they had not retaliated with attacks against Croatian cities, but that it seemed to be more "acceptable" for Croats to shell Serb towns probably killing a large number of civilians - than it had been for the Serbs to shell Croatian towns in May.

Bureau Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

'95 AUG -4 19:27

MSC 206/08

CODED CABLE

CYZ 703 CNZ 687 P1/1

'95 AUG -3 23:27

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TO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
INFO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 3 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: 2548
SUBJECT: Croatia: Geneva Meeting

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
1995 AUG -3 P 18

1. As agreed, the Secretary-General spoke to Tudjman at about 1700 hours New York time today. Tudjman was initially reluctant to take the call and referred us to Sarinic but he relented after we had warned his Office that we might have to make public his refusal to speak to the Secretary-General.
2. Tudjman took the line that the Krajina Serbs were making public statements which did not correspond with reality (presumably a reference to Babic's statement in Belgrade today) and had just "bombed" Dubrovnik. How could they be trusted? However he would take no decision on his own sole responsibility and was about to meet with his staff (we understand this to be a reference to a meeting with his National Security Council).
3. The Secretary-General would like you to travel to Zagreb tomorrow even if hostilities break out overnight or tomorrow morning. He thinks it important that the United Nations should be seen to be doing everything possible to control the situation on the ground.


Warm regards.

CODED CABLE

CNZ 688 / CYZ 704 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB attn SRSG & FC
 INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 3 August 1995
 NUMBER: 2552
 SUBJECT: Situation in Croatia



UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
1995 AUG -3 P 8 11

Further to our telecons, please find enclosed for your information a copy of a self-explanatory Note to the Secretary-General. We would appreciate your comments and advice, as mentioned in the last paragraph.

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations
95 AUG -4 -0 :41

CNZ 688 / CYZ 704 P2/2

Note to the Secretary-General

SITUATION IN CROATIA

As discussed this afternoon, the prospects for war in Croatia continue to appear alarmingly high despite the significant concessions announced by the Croatian Serbs in Geneva. The security of United Nations personnel in this situation is, therefore, of major concern both in UNPF and here at Headquarters. Ambassador Albright plans to call you this afternoon to express her Government's conviction that we are not doing enough in this regard.

At our urging, Mr Akashi and Gen. Janvier have taken all possible steps to enhance the safety of United Nations personnel, both military and civil, and to reduce their vulnerability to retaliation and hostage-taking. However, there is no escaping the basic reality that the overwhelming majority of UNCRO personnel is deployed in Serb-controlled territory. They are located in observation posts, at border crossings and checkpoints; their barracks, offices and residences are all in Serb-ruled towns. Whether in small groups or large, they are all vulnerable to attack or capture. It is not a practicable proposition to withdraw 10,000 people at short notice from a variety of dispersed locations and take them out of Serb territory, even if, in present conditions, they are prevented from implementing fully the mandate given to them by the Security Council. At the least, UNCRO's presence has some stabilising effect in Sectors North and South.

Ambassador Albright has made clear her Government's view that the continued presence of United Nations personnel in exposed conditions reveals "ineptitude" on our part and that our vulnerability "reduces the options" of the international community. It is not clear what more Mr Akashi and Gen Janvier can do that they have not already done. Nor is it evident that an attempt to abandon our positions and withdraw would necessarily be successful. Indeed, UNCRO considers that this may expose our personnel to greater risk, since a moving column is more vulnerable than an entrenched position, and further that it might provoke the very retaliation we are anxious to avoid. Nevertheless, Mr Akashi is again reviewing the situation and will report back tomorrow.

S. Iqbal Riza
3 August 1995

cc: Mr Annan (o/r)
Mr Gharekhan
Mr Goulding
Gen. van Kappen
Mr Tharoor

ST/st

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ZG-1052
SSN-1963

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95 AUG -2 11:47

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -11513
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO
DATE : 2 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER : Z-1307
SUBJECT : BIHAC AND LIVNO VALLEY UPDATE
REFERENCE : UNPF Z-1297 Dated 31 July 1995

1. The aim of this cable is to provide an update on the current situation in the Bihac pocket and the Livno Valley from what was reported at reference.

2. Livno Valley. There is limited information about the current situation in the Livno Valley due to the total restriction of movement imposed on UN forces. Sporadic shelling has been reported in the Strmica area, however, the HV do not appear to have closed with or crossed the border at this time. The ARSK is reacting to the threat posed by the HV/HVO forces in the Livno Valley. Artillery shells were fired by the ARSK into HV/HVO positions in the Livno Valley. It has also been reported that three ARSK jets (suspected Super Galeb) fired three rockets into the Livno Valley from a point near Strmica. It is likely the HV/HVO will, for the short term, consolidate their positions.

3. Bihac. The situation remained quiet in the Bihac Pocket with the exception of the northern confrontation Line (CL). Fighting was reported along the northern CL and 1,521 detonations were reported around Todorovo. It is assessed that the fighting is a BiH offensive to regain lost ground. UNMO reports indicate that Pecigrad is under BiH 5 Corps control.

4. Minor firing incidents were reported along the western and southern CL and a low level of activity was reported along the eastern CL. This has been the first day that the ARSK has not carried out cross border shelling into BiH territory. The significant decrease in activity along the western CL may be an indication of a reduced ARSK presence, likely the result of the HV build up along the Croatian/RSK boundary to the west and in the Livno Valley to the south.

5. There were no reports of shelling into the Bihac Safe Area.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, UNCRO, COS, COS L/A

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PAGE 1 OF 2

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -11512
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB
DATE : 2 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER : Z-
SUBJECT : **LETTER FROM PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA**
REFERENCE : UNNY 2508 Dated 31 July 1995

1. The letter from the Croatian Charges d'Affaires at reference made several allegations concerning ARSK activity and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) involvement in Sector East. Unfortunately, UNPF cannot confirm or deny the majority of these allegations. As has been stated several times before, we lack the necessary intelligence assets to properly collect and analyze information. In addition, the severe restrictions of movement imposed on UN forces by the ARSK throughout the Sector compounds this problem. The difficulties in obtaining accurate information on ARSK movement in the southern part of the Sector also hinders our ability to confirm or deny ARSK troop movements, or the transfer of new equipment and troops from the FRY into the Sector. This includes command, control and communications assets.

2. In the northern part of the Sector, the 18th Armoured Brigade (VJ) of 12 Novi Sad Corps (FRY) has not entered the Baranja by the bridge in Batina. This bridge is the only fixed crossing point over the Danube River in this area. This does not rule out the use of ferries to transport these forces across the Danube River but we have not observed anything or received any reports to support this. Although ARSK imposed restriction of movement in the area north of Beli Manastir precludes observation in this area, the assets mentioned at reference have not been observed by UN forces in the other parts of Baranja. Therefore, it is our assessment that the allegations on the operational deployment of the VJ Brigade into the Baranja are likely wrong. However, UNCRO is currently implementing its new mandate in Sector East in accordance with SCR 981. Therefore, they are only able to monitor the international border crossing points. Consequently, it is possible that VJ officers have entered the Sector via other means (ie: ferries) or through these crossing points out of uniform. UNPF is unable to confirm this.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, UNCRO, COS, COS L/A

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C2N-1296 PAGE 2 OF 2

3. The ARSK Slavonia Baranja Corps held a major exercise from 19 to 26 July 1995. In the absence of a direct link between the northern and southern part of the Sector, due to the River Drava and marshy terrain, redeployments of troops and equipments must take place via FRY territory. Reports from the northern part of the Sector indicated 33 x T-34 tanks, 6 x M-36 tanks, 1 x BTR-50 APC and 12 x M-56 Howitzers were transferred from the Rusbat AOR to the Belbat AOR across the Batina Bridge. These military assets have not been reported withdrawn at this time.

4. As the southern part of the Sector is the most suited for mechanized operations, the fact that the 33 x T-34 tanks have not been withdrawn raises the unconfirmed possibility that some other, possibly newer and more modern, equipment have taken their place in the south, making the older tanks available to reinforce the Baranja. However, UNPF is not able to confirm this.

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 CZG - 1046
 CZK - 113
 SSN - 1946

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 95 AUG -1 12:51

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 1256M
 FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB
 INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
 SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO
 DATE : 1 AUGUST 1995
 NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1299
 SUBJECT : CROATIAN MOBILIZATION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
 REFERENCES: A. UNNY 2511 Dated 31 July 1995
 B. UNPF HQ Z-1283 Dated 29 July 1995

UNPROFOR
 COMMUNICATIONS
 95 AUG -1 12:57

1. The mobilization of HV forces continues, with the mobilization of HV Home Guard units in the north being observed. Special Croatian police troops, assessed as up to 800 in total, have been reported in the Velebit mountains and to the southeastern edge of these mountains in the Jasenice area. This, with the continual traffic of HV buses heading to points along the Croatian/RSK boundaries indicate that the mobilization continues. An increased state of alert has also been reported in the Sisak area.

2. It is assessed that the Croats have as many as six brigades deployed along key approaches into the RSK. In addition, there are an estimated 8000 to 10,000 HV/HVO troops in the Livno Valley. However, it cannot be accurately determined what the exact numbers or deployments are due to the lack of intelligence gathering resources in UNPF and the restrictions of movement imposed on our forces in these areas.

3. There is no change to the HV objectives as detailed at reference B except that the increase in activity in the Ogulin and Karlovac areas would indicate that the main point of effort will be in the Sector North area of responsibility.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, HCA, DFC, COS, RRFPT, COS L/A

Report on a meeting between representatives of
the Croatian Government and representatives of
the leadership of the Croatian Serbs

Geneva

3 August 1995

I. INTRODUCTION

As part of an ongoing process within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee have been having contacts with the Government of Croatia and with the Croatian Serb leadership with a view to promoting implementation of the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions and Presidential statements. The Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, Carl Bildt and Thorvald Stoltenberg, have travelled to Zagreb, to Knin and elsewhere, in pursuance of these objectives, and have had a number of meetings with Croatian Government leaders and Croatian Serb leaders.

In the light of these contacts, the following announcement was made on 1 August:

"Following consultations which the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg, has carried out with representatives of the Croatian Government and the Serb authorities in Knin, they have agreed to meet in Geneva on Thursday, 3 August 1995, at 10.00 a.m. The meeting will take place under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and will be chaired by Mr Stoltenberg."

II. ORGANISATION, ATTENDANCE AND AGENDA

Pursuant to the abovementioned announcement, representatives of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serb leadership met in Geneva on Thursday, 3 August 1995. The Croatian Government delegation was led by Dr Pasalic and included General Stipetic, Mr Reljic and Ms Skare Ozbolt. The Croatian Serb leadership was led by General Novakovic and included Messrs Vojnovic, Prijic and Macura.

The agenda of the meeting was open-ended, it being understood that either side could raise any issue for discussion. It was further understood between the two sides that the purpose of the meeting was to start a process of talks that would continue under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The meeting was chaired by Mr Stoltenberg.

At the start of the meeting Mr Stoltenberg told the two delegations that everyone was aware of the seriousness of the

situation. However, the recent negative developments could be reversed if the two sides agreed to restart negotiations. The meeting was part of a process in which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Yasushi Akashi, the Co-Chairmen, and others had been engaged. The aim of the meeting was to try, on the basis of an open-ended agenda, to re-establish the process of negotiations without delay. It was important to halt military actions and to stabilise the situation on the ground. At the same time one should be able to demonstrate that the wider political issues could be settled through negotiations.

III. POSITION OF THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

In its opening statement, the Croatian Government delegation stated that it was very much in favour of political solutions and against war but, at the same time, that negotiations could not be prolonged too long. The crucial question was whether a political solution could be achieved that was acceptable to the Government of Croatia. The Croatian Government wanted first to be assured that the Croatian Serbs were in favour of the peaceful reintegration of the "occupied territories" and serious talks on this basis should then begin. The Croatian Government's conditions for serious talks had been stated in President Tudjman's letter to Mr Akashi. He wished to draw particular attention to the following points:

- a) The Croatian authorities will not negotiate with Milan Martić, who has been placed on the list of war criminals by the International Court in the Hague or with anyone else representing him or with anyone who has been sentenced by the Croatian Courts;
- b) Negotiations can commence if the oil pipeline passing through the occupied areas is operational within a period of 48 hours after the conclusion of the meeting;
- c) Direct discussions should commence immediately concerning the opening of all communication lines through the occupied areas and, in particular, the railway line Zagreb-Split via Knin; and
- d) Discussions should simultaneously be undertaken concerning the immediate implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the occupied areas as well as the provisions of the Constitutional Law concerning the rights of the Serb ethnic community.

The delegation emphasised that what was at issue was rebellion against the Croatian constitutional order which was illegal. The Croatian Serb "rebels" must, therefore, be disarmed within three to eight days of the termination of the meeting. Arms should be handed over to the Croatian authorities under the supervision of the United Nations. The Croatian Government would guarantee the security of the population in the occupied areas, it being understood, however, that those who had committed war crimes would be prosecuted. At the same time, there was a

Croatian Law on Amnesty.

The delegation continued that it was aware that there were some Serbs who did not want to live in Croatia. While the Croatian Government's desire was that everyone should remain, for those who did not want to stay and wanted to leave freely, the Croatian Government was willing to consider a mechanism for compensation on the basis of reciprocity.

Following the termination of the rebellion in the occupied territories, the Croatian Government would establish civil authorities, would hold elections, would arrange for local self-government, and for the local police to reflect the ethnic composition of the areas concerned.

With regard to the situation in Bihac, the delegation stated that it was directly connected with the situation in the occupied areas. Croatia could not accept the Croatian Serb military involvement in Bihac. Nor could it accept that military personnel and arms were crossing the Drina from the FRY into the occupied territory.

The delegation concluded that unless the representatives of the "rebel" Serbs responded positively to the peaceful reintegration of Serb-occupied areas into Croatia that very day and agreed to start negotiations on the basis mentioned above, the Croatian Government did not see any point of continuing the talks.

IV. POSITION OF THE CROATIAN SERB DELEGATION

In its opening presentation the Croatian Serb delegation stated that its basic point of departure was that if there were to be negotiations it should be between equals. The Croatian Serb delegation was against unilateral dictates. The delegation was determined to achieve results through negotiations; its political and military leadership were agreed on this. However, it was an absurd situation to say that any point or issues could be discussed if one side was threatening the outbreak of war at any moment. It was of the greatest importance that the two sides concert their efforts for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994 that had been signed by both sides.

V. PROPOSAL

Having listened to the presentation of the two sides, and in the light of further, individual meetings with the two delegations, Mr Stoltenberg proposed the following text to the two sides:

"On the basis of the agreement specified below, the delegations of the Croatian Government and of the Serb authorities in Knin have decided to halt all military actions directed against each other from 12 noon on Friday, 4 August 1995. They have agreed to the following undertakings:

1. The segment of the oil pipeline referred to in the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 will be reopened under the supervision of the United Nations by Monday, 7 August 1995 provided that there are no technical obstacles to this caused by the recent closure of the pipeline. A meeting will be held at Pleso on Tuesday, 8 August, to determine the quantities as well as other modalities for supply of oil and oil products from Sisak to Petrinja.
2. A meeting will take place on Wednesday, 9 August, in Knin to determine the modalities and timetable for opening the railway between Zagreb and Split via Knin.
3. Negotiations concerning a final political settlement concerning the status of the Krajina will commence on the basis of the Z-4 plan. The first meeting will take place in Pleso on Thursday, 10 August 1995, and the second in Knin on Thursday, 17 August 1995.
4. The access for delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bihac pocket will be permitted without hindrance.
5. There will be no cross border interference in Bihac by presence, fire power or air activity in violation of international law.
6. Immediate steps will be taken to implement fully the mandate established in United Nations Security Council Resolution 981.
7. In the light of the above agreement, and the decision on that basis to halt all military actions directed against each other, the signatories agree that a meeting of the senior military commanders will take place in Turanj on Saturday, 5 August 1995, under the auspices of General Janvier in order to consolidate the cessation of hostilities and further stabilise the military situation."

VI. REACTION OF THE CROATIAN SERB DELEGATION

The reaction of the Croatian Serb delegation was that it generally accepted the document and agreed that all military activities on the frontline should be ceased immediately and that a meeting should be held as soon as possible between General Mrksic and General Cervenko to discuss details. The implementation of the Economic Agreement should then be re-started. It agreed to open the pipeline and start talks on the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway immediately. It agreed that meetings of experts be held to follow up on this.

With regard to the situation in Bihac, it stated that there was no Croatian Serb military presence in the area, and that the Croatian Serbs would not carry out any military operations from their territory to Bihac. With regard to humanitarian access to the Bihac pocket, the delegation stated that it had already agreed to humanitarian convoys going into Bihac and that, in fact, such convoys had already started. With regard to the deployment of United Nations troops, the delegation stated that it agreed to such deployment in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The only substantial reservation of the Croatian Serb delegation concerning the proposal was the reference to the Z-4 plan. On this they said that they would need to consult their authorities. Mr Stoltenberg underlined that the formulation offered was the best that could be hoped for and urged that it be accepted.

VII. REACTION OF THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

The reaction of the Croatian Government delegation was that the fundamental question remained that of the peaceful reintegration of the "rebels" into the Croatian Constitutional order. Once the Croatian Serbs accepted that, discussion of the other issues would follow.

As regards the reopening of the pipeline, the delegation noted that it had been reopened and that the Croatian Serbs had closed it again. If the Croatian Serbs accepted peaceful reintegration, then discussions could start thereafter on the pipeline. Regarding the Zagreb-Split railway, the position was the same: if peaceful reintegration were accepted, talks could take place on this issue.

With respect to negotiations concerning a political settlement, that was linked to acceptance of peaceful reintegration. Peaceful reintegration would mean that the Croatian Serbs accepted the Constitution and Laws of Croatia. That would require that they disarm.

Regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid in the Bihac pocket, the Croatian delegation had no objection. In respect of the situation in the Bihac area, the delegation stated that the situation was catastrophic and recalled that the Croatian Serbs were in and around the area.

Regarding the deployment of United Nations forces, it laid particular emphasis on deployment along the borders. The delegation concluded by stating that it wished to hear a straightforward answer from the Croatian Serb delegation whether it accepted peaceful reintegration into the constitutional and legal order of Croatia.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

In the light of the reactions of the two delegations, Mr Stoltenberg requested that they take back the proposal he had put on the table to their respective leadership. He,

Mr Stoltenberg, would travel to Zagreb on Friday, 4 August, for follow-up discussions about it with President Tudjman and Mr Sarinic. He would also proceed to have discussions with the Croatian Serb leadership.

Mr Stoltenberg appealed to both delegations for the utmost military restraint.

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CZG-1048
SSN-1952

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TOR C43
95 AUG -1 18:19

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 7

TS/KE/ GA/ED

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1303

DATE: 01 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: MEETING IN KNIN -- FULL SUMMARY

95 AUG -1 19:23

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. The results of my meeting in Knin on 30 July, together with a brief summary, have already been communicated to you in my Z-1287. Below is a more comprehensive summary of that meeting.

2. I went to Knin with the intention of exacting very specific commitments from the leadership there on measures to be taken that would clearly contribute to a stabilization of the situation. The main areas of concern were the "ARSK" involvement in Bihac, the precarious humanitarian situation in Bihac, and the need to immediately start political and military talks between Croatian authorities and the Knin leadership. I was accompanied in the meeting by the Force Commander and senior aides. "President" Martić, dressed in a camouflage t-shirt, led the delegation from Knin, and was accompanied by General Mrksić, "Prime Minister" Babic, the new "RSK Foreign Minister Milivoj Vojnović, and a fluent English speaking aide named Mr. Matsura. Martić explained that, under the new governing structure in Knin, Mr. Vojnović would henceforth be participating in all the political negotiations with the United Nations. The meeting lasted for over five and one-half hours. The mood of our interlocutors was fairly gloomy and resigned. They showed themselves to be in a vulnerable position and in need of assistance. There was never any mention of even the possibility of Grahovo being taken back by the Serbs, in marked contrast to statements made by Mladic the following day.

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; DFC; COS; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC; ICFY; UNHCR SE;

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3. I began the meeting by describing the extremely volatile military situation with which we were all confronted, declared that there was an absolute need for substantial and identifiable progress on political and military issues, and stated my opinion that the adamant attitudes of the parties was in the end going to result in a tragedy if not changed. I briefed the leadership in general terms on the outcome of my meeting with President Tudjman, and observed that the Krajina Serbs and the United Nations shared a common interest in achieving practical results in order to avoid a larger outbreak in the fighting. I identified the large "ARSK" presence in Bihac as a major source of the current tensions, and noted that, regardless of the views of the Knin leadership, Croatia viewed the "ARSK" actions in Bihac as offensive military moves. I then informed the leadership that, in order to have a realistic chance to avoid further fighting, I needed to receive from them concrete commitments on the following: a) a withdrawal of "ARSK" forces from Bihac and no further shelling of Bihac from Sector North; b) participation in a meeting of army commanders and a willingness to engage in serious political discussions; c) unimpeded delivery by UNHCR of humanitarian assistance to Bihac; d) establishment of border monitoring posts. In return for these commitments, I was prepared to order an active deployment of UNCRO forces along the likely main axis of any potential HV advance into the Krajina, provided that the necessary security and freedom of movement assurances for UNCRO troops were provided by the "ARSK", and to dedicate all my efforts of persuasion at convincing the Croatian authorities to pursue negotiations rather than war.

4. In his initial presentation, Martić emphasized that the meeting should focus on "Croatian aggression" rather than the situation in Bihac, as Knin regarded "the Muslim issue" as subsidiary. Martić subjected us to the expected histrionics throughout the meeting, starting early with claims that the war in the former Yugoslavia began with clashes between Serbs and Croats in the Grahovo region, and that the "RSK" had "made every effort" to avoid involving the "Muslims" from Bihac in the fighting; it was only as the result of Croat and German pressure that the "Muslims" themselves attacked the "RSK." Martić even went so far as to claim that "we are in no way interested in the Bihac pocket." Although clearly actions by the "ARSK" on the ground refute this claim, it must be true that the "RSK" has less interest in advancing deep into the Bihac pocket than in securing under Serb control the area of Bosanska Grahovo.¹ Martić stated that it

¹ It is not surprising that the "RSK" considers the "Muslim" issue, i.e. Bihac as subsidiary to the HV advances in the Grahovo area. Not only is this explained by the vital strategic importance of the town of Bosanska Grahovo to Knin, but also by the pre-war population figures for the areas now being contested:

	Total Pop.	% Serb	% Croat	% Muslim
Bihac	70,896	18%	8%	67%
Velika Kladusa	52,921	4%	1%	92%
Cazin	63,406	1%	0%	98%
Bos. Grahovo	8,303	95%	3%	0%
Glamoc	12,421	79%	1%	18%

(Opstina figures based on the 1991 census; percentages do not add to 100 because figures for "Yugoslavs and others" are not included).

3/7

was "incomprehensible" that the international community was paying so much attention to the situation in Bihac, and so little to the Croatian attacks, which marked the fifth case of "aggression" by Croatia against the "RSK". Martić continued by saying that "should the United Nations bring Izetbegović to reason, not a single 'ARSK' bullet will be fired at Bihac" (approximate quotation).

5. Later in the meeting, General Mrksić stated that "our intention is not to wage war against V Corps, as we already have enemies who are too strong" (approximate quotation). General Mrksić also claimed that V Corps attacks against the "RSK" were orchestrated by the HV for its own reasons, and stated that "you can inform your superiors that the 'ARSK' is no longer involved in the fighting in Bihac... You have our commitment that our soldiers are not involved in the Bihac pocket... I expect that Abdić understands the very dangerous situation now and will cease attacks... You can launch your diplomatic initiatives to obtain the withdrawal of the HV from Grahovo" (approximate quotation). While I was of course pleased to hear this commitment, my optimism was tempered when General Mrksić added that "ever since I became commander of the 'ARSK', Bihac was never shelled from our territory." The generous interpretation to put on Mrksić's claims is that he has decided to at least substantially disengage from Bihac in order to politically and militarily protect himself against his real enemy, the HV, but that he is not willing to openly admit the "ARSK" involvement in Bihac up until this time.

6. Martić demanded that certain measures be taken, and stated that, if they were not, the fighting would spread and escalate. Specifically, he insisted that: a) the international community condemn and punish Croatia for its "aggression" in the Grahovo region; and b) the HV withdraw from Grahovo.² Martić stated that "if we do not focus on (the withdrawal), we can anticipate a much wider war spreading throughout the (former Yugoslavia). In this case, I can guarantee you that Yugoslavia will not sit on its hands." He warned that no amount of pressure or sanctions would prevent Serbs in the FRY from rescuing their brethren, and that "unless the current HV offensive stops, the 'RSK' will retaliate against all targets within Croatia." Martić also demanded that the United Nations and the world adopt "a more neutral stance" towards the "RSK", and told us that we cannot expect only one side to fulfil agreements, claiming that Croatia had reneged on all agreements entered into between the sides due to pressure from "Croatian extremists" and their "German and American" supporters. NATO was accused by Martić of partiality for not shooting down Croatian MiGs in the air, and for not bombing Pleso once the planes that had attacked his forces had landed. On this issue, I informed Martić that NATO had almost shot down some MiGs flying over the Livno valley on 28 July, but they had remained over Bosnian air space for too short a period.

² Such a withdrawal was important for Martić because, *inter alia*, Grahovo was a key communications link for the "RSK", and the international phone lines for Knin passed through the town; since the HV took Grahovo, it was no longer possible to make calls to Belgrade from Knin, only local ones, Martić claimed.

4/7

7. Addressing my demand that UNHCR have unimpeded access to Bihac, Martić stated that this was possible either through Velika Kladusa, if Abdić agreed, or through Licko Petrovo Selo, if the United Nations could guarantee that V Corps would not launch any further attacks against the "RSK" and that it would abandon some terrain that it had allegedly occupied inside the "RSK", and if the amount of aid provided by UNHCR to the Krajina was increased by 50 percent (the increased assistance did not have to come from the amounts provided to Bihac, which could remain the same). I pointed out that Abdić was extremely recalcitrant on this issue, routinely blocked certain types of supplies, and demanded an unfair percentage (50%) of the total amount of aid, making the Velika Kladusa option undesirable. As for increases in the amount of aid going to the Krajina, I repeated the tired point that UNHCR provides assistance based on immutable principles and assessed needs of the population, neither of which any political entity of the United Nations has any influence over, and insisted that there be no linkages applied by any party to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population on any side of the confrontation line.

8. Responding to my insistence for full respect by "RSK" authorities for the United Nations' right to freedom of movement, Martić stated that restrictions had been applied for "RSK" "security reasons", which were necessary in part because, Martić claimed, the HV had painted 100 combat vehicles white with the UN insignia, and were now using them in Grahovo and Karlovac. I responded that "no side has a monopoly on the misuse of the UN insignia," and that the United Nations had no confirmation of the allegations made by Martić. Eventually, Martić assured us that relations between the United Nations (the term "UNPROFOR" was often used by our interlocutors, but never UNCRO) and the "RSK" would remain good, as they had always been. General Mrksić later explicitly stated that there would be no restrictions on the United Nations' freedom of movement in "RSK" territory.

9. On the subject of a meeting between the sides in Geneva, Martić said that the "RSK" was willing to send a delegation, and that it would probably be led by General Novaković, who would be empowered to commit to a subsequent meeting between army commanders. I expressed my opinion that the Geneva meeting should take place as soon as possible, without pre-conditions, and told Martić that I could pass on any message that he might have on this subject to Mr. Stoltenberg.

10. The Force Commander supported my efforts throughout the meeting, and by making the following explicit points to Martić and Mrksić: a) there was a need for precise, concrete commitments from the "RSK" to avoid a military escalation; b) Croatia considers the "ARSK" involvement in Bihac as justification for its own military moves in Grahovo and Glamoc; c) the "RSK" cannot complain about the United Nations' inability to implement our mandate if it does not provide us with the minimum degree of freedom of movement needed for us to operate; d) NATO CAS is available for him to use against any force attacking United Nations personnel.

11. I then tried to pin Martić down on the commitments that I believed he had made during the course of our discussions. I observed that Martić had committed himself to the following: a) ensuring there was no "ARSK" presence in Bihac, which was tantamount to an immediate and total "ARSK" withdrawal from Bihac; b) that the "RSK"

5/7

had no territorial or offensive military intentions toward Bihac; c) that UNHCR aid deliveries to Bihac would not be hindered by the "RSK" authorities; d) that army commanders should meet right away, as early as tomorrow. Although Martić did not fully endorse my interpretation, I suggested that the meeting recess to allow me to draft a document that Martić would sign containing specific commitments on the above issues. The draft that I produced was essentially acceptable to the leadership, with a few relatively minor changes. The rapidity and ease with which our interlocutors accepted my proposals came as a pleasant surprise. However, one sticking point was Martić's insistence that I condemn in the document the Croatian "aggression" against the "RSK". I pointed out that the document contained a series of unilateral measures to which Martić was committing the "RSK", and thus it would be inappropriate for me to pass a judgement in the context of that document; furthermore, at this sensitive time when cooperation from both sides was needed, it would be inappropriate to single out any one party. I proposed as an alternative to make a separate statement to the waiting press, calling on all sides to cease any cross-border military activities. Martić was incensed that I was not willing to issue a condemnation of the Croatian "aggression", but was suggesting instead a call to both parties, thus implying that the "RSK" was as guilty as the HV. He said that "if the United Nations condemns both sides, then we might as well rocket Zagreb."

12. Another issue that was the subject of substantial disagreement was my effort to use the term "international" in the document to qualify "borders". After some discussion, Martić said: "We cannot accept that there are borders between the Serbs. Mr. Akashi, you are asking me to capitulate... Let me be honest. The 'RSK' is really in a very difficult position, and we want to find a peaceful solution. But.. it will be a capitulation."

13. In the end, agreement was finally reached on the exact wording of the text, with the understanding that Martić would sign it. As it was evident that the meeting was concluding, Mr. Matsura asked me if I had asked President Tudjman to sign a similar document. The answer to that question was of course well known to all present, and there had been no mention of the issue at any other time during the meeting. Nonetheless, Martić used it as an excuse not to sign the document. As an alternative, it was agreed that Mr. Matsura, as a fluent English speaker, would read the document out *verbatim* and in the name of "President" Martić to the waiting press. I expressed my conviction that, by doing so, Martić was fully accepting on his honor the terms of the commitments contained in the document. However, when we went down to meet the press, Matsura was the only one from the delegation not to accompany us (except General Mrksić who had left the meeting as soon as final agreement on the text was reached). Martić made some comments to the press some of which were consistent with the document, but others that were not; he did not use the language that had been meticulously negotiated. I then made comments to the press to the effect that I had received explicit assurances from Martić that the "RSK" authorities considered themselves bound by the full terms of the document, and that I considered them similarly bound.

14. I also met the press upon my return to Zagreb. One question I was asked illustrated a point that, I fear, has not been lost on the parties. The reporter noted that the six points appeared to be significant concessions by the "RSK", and asked what those

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6/7

concessions showed, in the context of the HV successes in Glamoc and Grahovo, about the viability of the military option. I of course answered that peaceful negotiations were in the best interest of all parties, etc.. I am not convinced, however, that all parties see their interests defined in the same manner as do I.

15. I am attaching for ease of reference another copy of the six point document that resulted from my meeting in Knin.

16. Best regards.

ENDALL..!

7/7

Following the visit to Knin by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and General Bernard Janvier, the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces, and the important discussions held with the leadership in Knin, led by Mr. Martić and in which Mr. Babić and General Mrksić participated, and in light of assessing the extreme seriousness of the situation in the area, the RSK leadership reiterated their commitment to the peaceful solution of the conflict and for that purpose agree to the following:

1. That there are, and there will be, no troops or individual soldiers of the ARSK in the area known as the Bihać pocket.
2. That the ARSK forces will refrain entirely from directing any kind of fire (shell, mortar, tank, etc..) into the Bihać pocket from territory that they control, and expect that the V Corps shall in reciprocity refrain from any offensive action against that territory.
3. That troops and Military Observers of the United Nations deployed in territory under RSK control will be allowed unhindered access to the area bordering the Bihać pocket to monitor any crossing of the border in either direction by any forces.
4. That the military commander of the ARSK, General Mrksić, is prepared to have the first meeting with the commander of the Croatian army at any time under UNPF auspices at the Turanj crossing, including as early as 31 July 1995 at 14:00.
5. Reaffirming their commitment not to carry-out cross-border activities, the RSK reiterates its support for, and willingness to continue the talks with the UNPF regarding the establishment of appropriate observation posts in the area of Mount Dinara, and to facilitate the implementation of the border crossing points under the mandate of UNPF.
6. That no impediments will be placed in the way of delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Bihać pocket, based on the principle of assessed need, and with the understanding that humanitarian aid will be delivered to the Krajina region based on the same principle, as applied by the UNHCR.

30 July 1995
Knin

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95 AUG-1 18:14

TO: ANNAN, UNATION, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
NUMBER: Z-1302
DATE: 1 August 1995
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN CROATIA

1 of 3

Y. Akashi

95 AUG-1 19:22

UNUG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. The explanatory note attached to your 2509 was an excellent summary of the situation and there was nothing in it with which we take issue.
2. However, an invitation to produce comments from the appropriate departments here has produced the following:
3. A. The second sub-paragraph should read that the HV/HVO are capable of impeding the logistic resupply of Knin. They cannot "cut" it with the capture of Bosanska Grahovo because the RSK can use alternate routes from the North for resupply. However, they are putting a severe crimp in these operations.

B. The comment concerning crucial roads being blocked is valid, however, it should be emphasized that the road blocks are only for limited durations. This is to clear these particular routes in order to expedite HV troop movements (i.e. remove civilian traffic for periods of time). The airfield at Zemunik is not known to us. Perhaps the reference is to the Zadar airfield. As we do not have access to this airfield, we cannot confirm that it has been closed to civilian traffic. However, the airfield has been expanded and there are defensive preparations by the HV in this area.

C. The sketch requires additional information to make it more accurate and complete. In general, the likely avenues of attack in the Sector South area are as depicted, however, the troop movement has recently been relatively slow. There are two additional avenues that should be noted in the Sector North area and these are the Ogulin - Slunj avenue (which has seen the greatest activity over the last 24 hours and is the site of large troop movements) and the Sisak - Glina avenue. In

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, COS, HAAU, CM/UNCRO, DI, ICFY

addition, there is a substantial force build up in the Karlovac area. These factors indicate that although our earlier assessment that any attack would be all encompassing still holds true, the point of main effort may be from the northern approaches.

D. The execution by the RSK of the military points from the Knin meeting have not been confirmed yet. No reports have been received of recent ARSK troop withdrawals since the agreement was made. UNMOs and UNCRO have yet to patrol or establish OPs in the area of Mount Dinara, however, the HV are insisting that UNCRO activity in the Dinara area has to be negotiated with them and have warned against UNCRO acting unilaterally in this area. Today, however, a joint ECMM/MilPol/UNMO patrol with the RSK gained access to the Bihac Pocket but no further information has been received. The meeting in Turanj did not take place as a result of the lack of representation by the HV.

4. A. Referring to President Tudjman's calculations. The Croatian government did not view their Army's victory in the Sector West "unexpected". They have appeared genuinely confident at least since the "termination" of UNPROFOR in January 1995.

B. The Croatian government is not prepared to "liberate" all the "occupied territory" in a near-term offensive. They appear unprepared to take back parts of Sectors North and South and are unlikely to attack Sector East. Thus, the action would not shed the political weight of refugees from Vukovar.

D. Nor would a "partial liberation" marginally enhance President Tudjman's prospect for re-election. He will not be forced to stand for re-election until 1997. In addition, elections to the more important lower house of the Sabor must take place by August 1996 and not, as the note suggests, by March 1996. In any case, the ruling HDZ is preparing a new electoral law which will enable it to dominate Croatian politics.

E. Finally, a "partial liberation" may not enhance the prospects for the next tourist season. The next military campaign for Sector East and remaining parts of Sectors South and North will certainly cut into next summer's season.

5. Events appear to have overtaken para 3. The Krajina Serbs may have resolved their internal disagreements to some degree, and could now seek accommodation with the Croatian government in negotiations under the wing of Belgrade. ECMM reports that 18 of the 26 delegates from Sector East attended the session of the "Assembly" in Topusko on 26 July and UNCRO has established

that the new government has five ministers from Sector East. Eight of the new "ministers" served in the Mikelic "cabinet". Some reasonably important figures are pragmatic moderates committed to negotiations.

6. A. The Foreign Minister is Milivoj Vojnovic, from Glina in Sector North. He was elected to the Croatian Sabor as a reform Communist in 1990, where he led the Serb caucus there until the war broke out. In Fall, 1993, he was mentioned in the Croatian press as a man with whom they could do business. He has never been close to Babic and is currently a Social-Democrat. As "Minister" of Sport in the Mikelic "government", he attended the meetings of the rump "Mikelic cabinet" in Sector East and was in Belgrade on business just prior to the session in Topusko.

B. The Minister of Interior is Toso Pajic, from Vojnic in Sector North and is well-travelled in France and the US. He was an "Assistant Minister of Interior" in Sector North until the end of 1993 and was linked to Fikret Abdic in the period after Abdic split with the government in Sarajevo and before the Washington Agreement. In Autumn 1994, he was scheduled to work as an FRY counsellor in Greece, but was called back at the last moment.

7. The authority of these relatively junior officials in Knin remains unclear, but their presence suggests that Belgrade will continue to influence events in Knin in the near term and the Knin government may be ready to deal with a Croatian government that demonstrates some flexibility itself.

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95 AUG -1 19:18

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Page 1 of 7

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CZG- 1038

SSN- 1929

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: Z - 1293

DATE: 31 JULY 1995

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM/TO PRESIDENT TUDJMAN

UNPF
COMM
IONS
95 JUL 31 14:44



..... Please find attached letter from President Tudjman, dated 30 July 1995, in Croatian
..... text together with English translation. Please also find attached my reply of today's date.

Regards.

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations
95 JUL 31 15:47

Internal Distribution: FC, DFC, COM UNCRO, DI, PLA, HAAU, ICFY



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*Republika Hrvatska / Republic of Croatia**Predsjednik / President*

Nj. E. Yasushi Akashi
Posebni izaslanik
Glavnog tajnika UN
Zagreb

Vaša ekscelencijo,

U odgovoru na Vaš fax, koji sam primio danas u 21,30 sati s priloženim prijedlozima kninskih pobunjenika priopćavam Vam sljedeće:

- 1) začuđujuće je da u dopisu nigdje ne govorite o UNCRO - mirovnim snagama Ujedinjenih naroda koje su pod tim nazivom dobile mandat za djelovanje u Hrvatskoj rezolucijom Vijeća sigurnosti, a nasuprot tome spominjete kninstvo vodstvo i RSK;*
- 2) za nas je neprihvatljivo da se postrojbe UNCRO rasporede samo na granicu prema bihaćkom džepu. Nas je zahtjev bio i ostaje da UNCRO snage preuzmu nadzor nad međunarodno priznatim granicama između Republike Hrvatske i BiH, ali istovremeno također između Republike Hrvatske i Srbije, odnosno SRJ, što je posebno aktualno, jer je i ovih dana došlo do novih prebacivanja postrojbi i opreme jugoslavenske vojske preko Dunava;*
- 3) u svezi s rečenim pod 2) ne može biti govora da se promatrači UN za prijelaz preko granice rasporede samo u području Dinare;*
- 4) da srpski pobunjenički vođe žele ponovo izigrati predstavnike UN i UNCRO u svoju korist vidi se i iz prijedloga da će dopustiti humanitarnu pomoć za Bihać pod uvjetom da se ona istovremeno dostavlja i njima;*
- 5) ovakvi prijedlozi ne znače nikakve osnove za mirnu reintegraciju, i ne sadrže odgovor ni na jedan uvjet koji sam postavio u razgovoru s Vama u subotu 29. srpnja 1995., kada sam Vam izričito naveo da pregovori o mirnoj reintegraciji s hrvatskim Srbima iz okupiranih područja mogu početi pod sljedećim uvjetima:*
 - a) da hrvatske vlasti neće voditi pregovore s Milanom Martićem, koji je od međunarodnog suda u Hagu stavljen na listu ratnih zločinaca, a također niti s ikim drugim u njegovo ime,*

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b) da pregovori mogu otpočeti ako se u roku 24 sata pusti u promet naftovod koji prolazi kroz okupirano područje,

c) da odmah otpočnu izravni razgovori o otvaranju svih komunikacijskih veza preko okupiranih područja, a osobito željezničke pruge Zagreb-Split preko Knina, i

d) da se istovremeno vode razgovori o neodložnoj primjeni Ustava Republike Hrvatske na okupiranim područjima i odredaba Ustavnog zakona o pravima srpske etničke zajednice.

6) samo na tim osnovama može doći do mirnog rješenja i u tu svrhu do predloženog razgovora između vojnih i civilnih predstavnika hrvatske vlasti i pobunjenih hrvatskih Srba s okupiranih područja.

Sa štovanjem,

Predsjednik Republike Hrvatske



dr. Franjo Tuđman

Brijuni, 30. srpnja 1995., 22,20 sati

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
PRESIDENT

CZN-1280

CZG-1038

4/7

His Excellency
Special Representative of
the UN Secretary General
Zagreb

Your Excellency,

In response to your fax which I received today, at 21:30, together with the enclosed proposals from the Knin rebels, I would like to state the following :

1) it is surprising that in your letter you never mention UNCRO - the UN peace forces which were under this name given the mandate to act in Croatia by a Security Council resolution and in contrast, you do mention the Knin leadership and the RSK;

2) it is unacceptable for us to have UNCRO troops deployed only on the border towards the Bihać pocket. Our request was and remains that UNCRO forces undertake the monitoring of internationally recognized borders between the Republic of Croatia and B+H, but at the same time also between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, that is SRY, which is particularly significant because in these last few days new formations and equipment of the Yugoslav army have been transferred across the Danube.

3) in regard to what was stated under point 2) there can be no question of deploying UN border crossing monitors only in the region of Dinara;

4) Serb rebel leaders again want to outwit UN representatives and UNCRO for their own benefit. That is apparent from their proposal to allow humanitarian aid for Bihać under the condition that it is at the same time delivered to them ;

5) such proposals do not represent any basis for peaceful reintegration and do not contain a response to any of the conditions which I put forward in discussions with you on Saturday 29 July 1995, when I expressly indicated that negotiations on a peaceful reintegration with Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas can commence under the following conditions :

a) that Croatain authorities will not negotiate with Milan Martić, who has been placed on the list of war criminals by the International Court in the Hague or with anyone else representing him,

CZN-1280

CZG-1038 5/7

b) that negotiations can commence if the oil pipeline passing through the occupied areas is operational in a period of 24 hours,

c) that direct discussions commence immediately concerning the opening of all communication lines through the occupied areas, and in particular the railway line Zagreb-Split via Knin, and

d) that discussions are simultaneously undertaken concerning the immediate implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the occupied areas as well as the provisions of the Constitutional Law concerning the rights of the Serb ethnic community.

6) only on the basis of this can we reach a peaceful solution and with this aim I propose discussion between military and civilian representatives of Croatian authorities and the rebel Croatian Serbs from the occupied areas.

Best regards,

The President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo Tudman

(Original signed + sealed)

Brijuni, 30 July 1995, at 22:20 hrs.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

CZAC-1280

CZG-1038

6/7

United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies
Zagreb

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for the Former Yugoslavia

31 July 1995

Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter which you sent to me yesterday evening in response to the fax outlining the undertaking that was entered into yesterday by the political leadership in Knin.

May I use the opportunity afforded by this reply, to reiterate my deep concern and that of the international community, that a wider war is imminent. It is a war which can still be avoided by statesmanship and understanding. The undertaking reached yesterday in Knin was an important step and deserves closer attention.

In this regard, may I emphasise that the statement was not a bilateral agreement to which the UN was a party but the record of a commitment made by the leadership in Knin. Thus the omission of UNCRO was solely the decision of the leadership. However, I am of the view that clear acceptance of UNCRO's mandate was implied in other parts of the statement (for example see Paragraph 5).

Paragraph 5 of the statement also mentions the full implementation of the border crossing points under the UNPF mandate referred to in Your Excellency's letter. We took a very firm line with the Knin leadership on this issue emphasising our intention fully to implement our mandate. In the present circumstances we are giving priority to the Bihac pocket. However, I wish to assure you that other deployments will follow.

His Excellency
Mr. Franjo Tudjman
President of the Republic of Croatia
Zagreb

I do not believe it is as easy as Your Excellency suggests to outwit the UN representatives whom I lead. On the question of humanitarian aid, we are following, and will continue to follow, the well understood and accepted criteria applied by UNHCR. Aid is delivered, without exception, strictly in accordance with need and should not be obstructed by any of the parties.

With reference to the oil pipeline, the railway line and the very important constitutional matters referred to in your letter, I am fully cognizant of the position of Your Excellency's Government, but as you are aware these are matters within the competence of the ICFY Co Chairmen. I have met yesterday and today with Mr. Stoltenberg and have drawn his attention to your concerns which I know he is already addressing in his efforts to bring about a meeting in Geneva as soon as possible.

Mr. President, I am gravely concerned that the momentum for war is now so great that only a determined and statesmanlike intervention will prevent it. The undertakings given by the Knin leadership, if implemented promptly and in good faith, would surely mark a significant step towards creating the conditions for peace that you seek. In that event I would have every confidence that a peaceful solution could be found which would fully meet those conditions. In order to achieve it, positive action must be taken now and any preconditions should not be too rigid.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Yasushi Akashi

1995-08-01 01:07 5603
UNUG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

001

CNZ 666 CYZ 687 P 1/
(ZAG - Pls protect
Sarajevo)

'95 AUG -1 -3 :48

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSQ/FC
INFO: AKASHI, UNPF, SARAJEVO attn COM/ CMDR UNPROFOR
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 31 JULY 1995
NUMBER: **2508**
SUBJECT: **Letter from Permanent Mission of Croatia**



RECEIVED
OPERATIONS
31 JUL 1995

Please find enclosed for your information a copy of a self-explanatory communication from the Permanent Mission of Croatia. We would appreciate your comments and advice.

CNZ 666 CYZ 687 P 2/3

UNITED
NATIONS

A S



General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/318
S/1995/628
28 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 92 of the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 27 July 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to express the serious concerns of the Government of the Republic of Croatia concerning the recent developments in the occupied territories of Croatia, in particular in sector "Vukovar".

The irregular Serbian forces are conducting "military exercises" throughout the sector and have been deploying new troops and equipment from the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)". Since 25 July 1995 the 18th armoured brigade of the 12th "Army of Yugoslavia" Corps from Novi Sad, Vojvodina, armed with over 30 T-55 tanks, 10 armoured personnel carriers and one mixed artillery battery consisting of 18 guns and howitzers of various calibres, along with over 1,000 troops, has been operationally deployed in Baranja, within the sector on the occupied territory of Croatia.

In the period from 19 to 21 July, from the Valjevo and Prokuplje barracks of the "Army of Yugoslavia" within the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", additional military equipment was transferred, including 10 T-34 tanks, over 250 tons of ammunition, and equipment for pontoon bridges.

We have observed a sharp increase of assistance to the command and control structure of the Serbian irregular forces on the occupied territories, provided by professional staff of the "Army of Yugoslavia", in particular in the field of communication. In this regard, the presence of Major-General Ljubo Andjelkovic,

* A/50/150.

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CNZ 666 CYZ 687 P 3/3

A/50/318
S/1995/628
English
Page 2

Assistant Commander for Communications of the "Army of Yugoslavia" General Staff, has recently been observed in the sector on a regular basis.

The United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) has not yet deployed in accordance with its mandate, as defined in Security Council resolution 981 (1995), thus allowing for this very serious development, which my Government sees as a continuation of previous practices that my Government found unacceptable. The attention to the problem of the continued presence of the "Army of Yugoslavia" personnel and equipment on the occupied territories of Croatia was first brought to your attention in the letter of my Minister for Foreign Affairs (A/50/119-S/1995/223, annex). This incident further emphasizes the need to re-evaluate the cooperation of the Belgrade authorities in the peace process, and in particular in the light of Council resolution 1003 (1995).

I would kindly request your assistance in distributing the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under item 92 of the provision agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

CNZ 667 CYZ 688 P 1/1
(ZAG - Pls protect
Sarajevo)

'95 AUG -1 -3 :48

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC
INFO: AKASHI, UNPF, SARAJEVO attn COM/ CMDR UNPROFOR
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 31 JULY 1995
NUMBER: 2509
SUBJECT: Situation in Croatia

A. G. Hige

1995 JUL 31 P 8:48
UNATIONS
OPERATIONS

Please find enclosed for your information a copy of a self-explanatory Note to the Secretary-General on the above subject. Since the pressure of time did not permit us to await your input, we would appreciate your comments.

Note to the Secretary-General

SITUATION IN CROATIA

1. At the moment, the prospects for war in Croatia appear alarmingly high. The indicators are multiplying:

- ▶ the Croatian army has some 6 or 7 brigades concentrated near Sectors North and South, with reserves already mobilized;
- ▶ the recent capture of the villages of Glamoc and Bosanska Grahovo have given the Croatian Army the possibility of cutting Serb supplies from Bosnia and the FRY, as well as an eastern route of attack into Sector South (Knin);
- ▶ crucial roads have been blocked for civilian traffic, as has the airport in Zemunik;
- ▶ restrictions on movement of United Nations personnel have been increased;
- ▶ the Croatian Army chief did not proceed with today's meeting, arranged by Mr Akashi, with the commander of the Krajina Serb forces;
- ▶ President Tudjman's letter to Mr Akashi today makes it uncompromisingly clear that he considers the Krajina Serb leadership has exhausted his patience.

A map indicating both recent and possible future Croatian offensives is attached.

2. President Tudjman's motives and calculations are likely to be as follows:

- ▶ his own determination to "liberate" Croatian territory, which he sees as his historic mission as the Father of his country;
- ▶ the prospect of national elections scheduled in March 1996 in which the opposition will undoubtedly attempt to capitalize on the continued "occupation" of one-third of Croatia by rebel Serb forces;
- ▶ the damage being done to Croatia's economy, especially its tourist trade, by continued uncertainty about the military situation; [while some might consider this an argument against the military option, President Tudjman sees it as an argument for exercising the military option quickly and "getting it over with" so as to restore normalcy];
- ▶ the unexpected ease of the Croatian Army's victory in Western Slavonia in early

May, which has led to considerable hubris in official circles in Zagreb and expectations that the rest of the Krajina will be almost as easy to conquer;

► the modest criticism of this last offensive by the international community, which leads the Croatian Government to believe that the world will acquiesce in military action aimed at capturing territory already recognized by the United Nations to be part of Croatia;

► the perception that Croatia must strike while President Milosevic and the FRY remain under sanctions; Croatia has for some time been concerned that if they delay this action, they would find themselves forced to exercise it at a time when sanctions have been lifted and Serbia is free to intervene; at this stage, they believe that Milosevic, whose main concern is getting sanctions on his country lifted, will stay out of a war in Croatia, fearing he has too much to lose.

3. In addition, it is fair to point out that President Tudjman has received little or no co-operation from the Krajina Serbs, who have proved unwilling, in the wake of the Western Slavonia offensive, to negotiate the economic agreements that might have given substance to hopes of a gradual, peaceful re-integration of Serb lands into Croatia. The predictable inability of UNCRO to fulfil its mandate in the absence of the co-operation of the parties has also undermined the case for continued reliance upon the United Nations to settle the problem. Tudjman can, and does, vehemently argue that unless he is prepared to wait indefinitely — which he is not — he has no option other than the military one. The exercise of this option, despite the certainty that it will cause some casualties in Croatia and damage to its infrastructure, is nonetheless broadly popular with the Croatian electorate at large. Tudjman's only worry would be that if Croatia is seen as the aggressor, his country might suffer in its relations with its influential backers in the West, and particularly in the EU, for whose membership Croatia is an aspirant. But with the Serb attack on Bihac last week having given him a perfect excuse to act, he expects to be able to count on the sympathy of his allies, two of whom (Germany and the USA) are also on the Security Council.

4. The prospects in the next few days are therefore for the launching of a determined Croatian offensive. If it goes as smoothly as Zagreb expects, the Security Council might indeed content itself with a few ritual words of condemnation and learn to live with a new reality, as it has done in Western Slavonia. Milosevic may also protest loudly but do little, in order not to jeopardise his chances of getting sanctions lifted. The Bosnian Serbs, who have suffered a setback in western Bosnia at the hands of the Croatian forces, are also unlikely to


be able to do much to support their Krajina Serb brethren. However, despite the undoubted improvements in Croatian military capacity in recent years (under an arms embargo!) it is still our military assessment that Croatia might be overestimating its strength. If the Krajina Serbs resist effectively, if there are television pictures of Croatian atrocities and civilian casualties, if the Serbs take United Nations personnel hostage — If, in short, there is a prolonged international crisis for several days, rather than a swift and decisive victory — then President Tudjman's calculations could all collapse. President Milosevic may be unable to resist domestic pressure to intervene, if not officially, then through supplies and "volunteers". The Bosnian Serbs might be able to move forces from elsewhere in the theatre (there is as yet no indication that they are already doing this). And major Governments, who might have tolerated a two- or three-day war, could finally intervene firmly to put a stop to a longer campaign, with Tudjman being obliged to choose between the attendant political humiliation and losing foreign support and aid Croatia desperately needs.

5. Your options are invidious ones: you cannot claim that the U.N presence has made enough of a difference to deserve another chance; you cannot question the legitimacy of Croatia's aspirations, only its means, but you cannot point to alternative means with a proven track record of having worked in the Balkans. Nor can you realistically count on the full support of the Security Council for a cease-fire and a long-term negotiated settlement which the Krajina Serbs show no willingness to negotiate. You may, in short, have little choice but to draw the world's attention to the looming conflict, deplore the recourse to the battlefield, but acknowledge that, if the Government wishes to pursue the military option, there is little the United Nations can do about it. In the circumstances, we propose to delay your report to the Security Council on UNCRO by another 24 to 48 hours in order to enable us to take these events into account, should they occur.


S. Iqbal Riza
31 July 1995

cc: Mr Annan (o/r)
Mr Gharekhan
Mr Goulding
Gen. van Kappen
Mr Tharoor

ST/st



p1/3

MOST IMMEDIATE UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
h32

EZN=1274
EZG=1033
EZE=140
EZB=43

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

95 JUL 30 19:34

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 3

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO (ATTN: PEDAUYE/SMITH)
AKASHI, UNPF, BELGRADE (ATTN: MIYAKOTNYKH)

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-1287

DATE: 30 JULY 1995

SUBJECT: MEETING IN KNIN

CODE RESTRICTED

95 JUL 30 20:07

UNPROFOR Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Accompanied by the Force Commander I met for over five hours today in Knin with Mr. Martić, Mr. Babić, General Mrksić, and the new "RSK" Foreign Minister, Mr. Milivoj Vojnović. As indicated in a cable yesterday, the purpose of the meeting was to solicit "RSK" agreement to withdraw from the Bihać pocket, and to start new talks at a political and military level. It was clear from our discussions today that the "RSK" leadership recognized the seriousness of the situation and the difficulties that they are in. Although we were subjected to many of the same drawn-out points about the alleged partiality of the international community and the portrayal of the Serbs as victims, I was pleasantly surprised by the refreshing degree of pragmatism demonstrated by the leadership when it came to negotiating a text that we envisaged Martić signing. After protracted discussions, agreement was reached on a text (attached) that I felt would, if respected, go a long way toward addressing the concerns expressed to me by President Tudjman yesterday, and thereby contribute in a substantial manner toward a stabilization of the extremely volatile situation in which we now find ourselves. To my great annoyance, Martić at the very end of the meeting stated that he would not sign the document because Tudjman had not signed a similar document committing the Croats to any measures. I reluctantly accepted the proposal that the document be read to the waiting press on Martić's behalf by one of his associates who spoke English; I stated that by reading the document in such a manner, on his honor, Martić would be making a solemn commitment to its terms. To my even greater annoyance, the intended reader did not join us at the press conference and the document was not read. Rather, Martić made a statement including some of the points in the document, but using different words.

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; UNCRO COM; DFC; COS; HAAU; DI; DOA; ICFY; UNHCR;

omitted some points that should have been included, and included others that should have been omitted. In my own comments I strongly stated my understanding that the "RSK" leadership had committed itself to the six points in the document, that if those six points were respected we could expect a stabilization of the situation, but failure to respect them would likely result in the deterioration of an already very dangerous situation.

2. Upon return to Zagreb, I met with the press at Pleso airport and explained my views on the results achieved at the meeting in Knin, notably that I had received a commitment from the "RSK" leadership to the terms of the document, and I considered the leadership bound to it. The document was distributed to the press corps.

3. The Force Commander is now fully engaged in trying to arrange for a meeting between military commanders, at the Mrksic and Cervenko level, tomorrow at Turanj crossing in the ZOS, as foreseen in point number four of the document. General Janvier will also issue the necessary orders regarding UNCRO and UNMO patrols in "RSK" controlled areas bordering Bihac as envisaged in point number three.

4. I will be in immediate contact with Croatian government authorities, including President Tudjman if possible, to convey to them the terms of the undertakings of the in Knin leadership, particularly regarding the non-presence of "ARSK" in the Bihac pocket and that the "ARSK" will not launch any cross-border attacks into Bihac, as foreseen in points one and two. I will ask the Croatian government to instruct its military forces to exercise maximum restraint in the Sectors and in the Grahovo/Glamoc areas while we endeavor to implement the commitments made by the Knin authorities. I will also inform UNHCR of Knin's undertaking to allow passage of humanitarian assistance to Bihac, and suggest to UNHCR that it immediately submits new convoy requests for this purpose.

5. If Martić and Mrksić respect the commitments they have made, and we can achieve progress on the ground today and tomorrow, there is the possibility that we can avert a major outbreak of fighting. Although Martić backed-down from making a public commitment, which, had he made it, might have appeared to his constituents as a sign of weakness during this period of crisis, the Knin leadership did appear to uniformly recognize the dangers that they are facing and the need to show pragmatic restraint in order to avoid a further deterioration in the situation. If, on the other hand, Knin was not serious in our talks today, and does not quickly demonstrate through actions an intention to de-escalate the situation, then we can expect Croatian policy to follow the lines described by President Tudjman yesterday for that eventuality. Clearly the events of the next 48 hours will be important.

6. Martić also stated that his authorities are willing to send a delegation to Geneva at any time. I have conveyed this message to Mr. Stoltenberg who, as you know, was meeting with Mr. Sarinac in Split today.

7. A more complete summary of the meeting will be sent to you tomorrow.

8. Best regards.

ENDALL..

Following the visit to Knin by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and General Bernard Janvier, the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace Forces, and the important discussions held with the leadership in Knin, led by Mr. Martić and in which Mr. Babić and General Mrksić participated, and in light of assessing the extreme seriousness of the situation in the area, the RSK leadership reiterated their commitment to the peaceful solution of the conflict and for that purpose agree to the following:

1. That there are, and there will be, no troops or individual soldiers of the ARSK in the area known as the Bihac pocket.
2. That the ARSK forces will refrain entirely from directing any kind of fire (shell, mortar, tank, etc..) into the Bihac pocket from territory that they control, and expect that the V Corps shall in reciprocity refrain from any offensive action against that territory.
3. That troops and Military Observers of the United Nations deployed in territory under RSK control will be allowed unhindered access to the area bordering the Bihac pocket to monitor any crossing of the border in either direction by any forces.
4. That the military commander of the ARSK, General Mrksić, is prepared to have the first meeting with the commander of the Croatian army at any time under UNPF auspices at the Turanj crossing, including as early as 31 July 1995 at 14:00.
5. Reaffirming their commitment not to carry-out cross-border activities, the RSK reiterates its support for, and willingness to continue the talks with the UNPF regarding the establishment of appropriate observation posts in the area of Mount Dinara, and to facilitate the implementation of the border crossing points under the mandate of UNPF.
6. That no impediments will be placed in the way of delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Bihac pocket, based on the principle of assessed need, and with the understanding that humanitarian aid will be delivered to the Krajina region based on the same principle, as applied by the UNHCR.

30 July 1995
Knin

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

p1/3

'95 JUL 29 15:40

CODE RESTRICTED

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONSOUTGOING CODE CABLE

'95 JUL 29 15:24

CZU=1271

CZG=1030

MOST IMMEDIATE

SSN=1914

Page 1 Of 3

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-1284

DATE: 29 JULY 1995

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN



1. At my request, I met today with President Tudjman at his residence on the island of Brioni. Interior Minister Jarnjak and President Tudjman's aide-de-camp, Brigadier General Kresimir Kaspar, were also present at the meeting. I was accompanied by Senior Political Officer J. Almstrom. I requested the meeting due to the increasingly high level of military tensions generated by the "ARSK" incursions into Bihac, and the build-up of HV forces along the borders of Sectors South and North, followed by the HV/HVO attacks in the Livno valley, which culminated yesterday in the fall of Bosanska Grahovo and Glamoc to the HV/HVO. The main message delivered by President Tudjman in the meeting was clear: Croatia was willing to participate in political and military talks with Knin, but the talks would need to be rapidly followed by the achievement of real progress on the ground; without progress within days, Croatia would take whatever measures it felt necessary in the circumstances, strongly implying a continuation of military offensives. During the meeting I was passed a message from Martić that he urgently wanted to meet with me or Stoltenberg, either today or tomorrow. President Tudjman agreed that I could pass on his willingness to have a Croatian representative meet with a Knin representative in Geneva at any time, but the Knin representative could not be Martić or anyone talking on his behalf. After consulting with Mr. Stoltenberg, I plan to go to Knin tomorrow to follow-up on Tudjman's offer and try to get an early date for the Geneva meeting, and to warn Martić on the dangerous course of action that the "ARSK" has embarked upon in Bihac. Below is a more complete summary of my meeting with President Tudjman.

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; UNCRO COM; DFC; COS; HAAU; DI; DOA; ICFY

02N=1271 P2/3

2. I began the meeting by expressing the grave concern of the United Nations over recent incursions into the Bihac pocket by the "ARSK," in violation of the international border between Croatia and Bosnia and the rising military tensions that this activity had generated. I also expressed concern over Croatian army movements in the areas of Sectors East, North and South, and over HV/HVO military advances in the areas of Bosanska Grahovo and Glamoc, and asked President Tudjman for his assessment on these developments. Starting off by saying, "Mr. Akashi, you know how these tensions developed," President Tudjman cited the Serb attacks against Srebrenica and Zepa, the risk that Gorazde might be attacked, and the ongoing activities by the Serbs around Sarajevo as the reasons why Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation had recently taken certain joint decisions. Tudjman then observed that the events around Glamoc and Grahovo showed the Serbs that they cannot continue to get away with whatever they want or try. "Our actions are directly aimed at helping the situation in Bihac... We will be obliged to take measures (in Bihac) as agreed with Bosnia." President Tudjman then proceeded to talk about the situation within Croatia, and the UNCRO mandate. He stated that he was "very disappointed" that UNCRO was not fulfilling its mandate, but would be happy and cooperative if UNCRO were able to carry-out its functions.

4. I explained to Tudjman UNCRO's plans to implement a policy of "active deterrence" both along the international border and in the ZOS; I pointed out that we had already established 20 posts on Croatia's international border and hoped to establish six more, which would take us a long way toward implementing that part of UNCRO's mandate dealing with border monitoring and control. Specifically regarding Bihac, I informed President Tudjman that I had already written to Martić and the Force Commander had written to General Mrksić warning them not to allow their forces to cross the international border between Croatia and Bosnia, and of the escalatory and dangerous repercussions that such a crossing would produce. The Force Commander was also continuing his efforts to convene a meeting of military commanders of the Croatian army and the "ARSK" to help stabilize the situation, but Knin had cancelled the meeting originally scheduled for 21 July because of the planned Geneva meeting. I also told President Tudjman that we had received unconfirmed reports that the "ARSK" may have begun a partial withdrawal from Bihac, and that it was possible that Abdić and "ARSK" forces intended only to go so far as the line previously held by Abdić in August 1994. (Although I did not add it, if true, such a withdrawal would evidently be in response to HV movements to the west of Sectors North and South, and to a lesser extent HV/HVO gains around Grahovo and Glamoc).

5. President Tudjman asked what UNCRO had done to control the border with Serbia, stating that Yugoslavia is sending additional tanks and armour into Sector East, and that General Perisic has been in Sector East recently. Tudjman also was not impressed with the suggestion that the fighting in Bihac might stop at the August 1994 confrontation line, stating that I "must bear in mind that the official policy of Croatia is to re-integrate the temporarily occupied territories;" given this policy, any expansion of the occupation of territory by the "ARSK" is unacceptable. Tudjman alleged that Knin had cancelled the military commanders' meeting because Mrksić was engaged in preparations for military action in Bihac and elsewhere, and stated that "we cannot allow this to continue." Tudjman said that results were needed and, if they could be achieved with the

CEN=1271 P3

UN's help, he would be very satisfied. He stated that his government was willing to meet in Geneva at any time, but the only purpose of such a meeting would be to establish the agenda for negotiations that would subsequently take place in Croatia; furthermore the Croats would not meet in Geneva with Martić or anyone talking on his behalf. Tudjman said that they would meet with Mikelic or Babic, and that they were "for talks, but not for stalling." Several times during the course of the meeting Tudjman made the basic point that Croatia would accept negotiations, but only if they produced results, and those results were quickly implemented. Tudjman said that he expected from the negotiations the opening of the oil pipeline in 24 hours, quick agreement on the opening of the railway, and progress on resolution of constitutional matters, such as the rights of the Serb minority within the Republic of Croatia. Without real and very rapid progress on these issues, Croatia would take whatever measures it felt necessary to achieve its policy objectives, strongly implying further military action against the Krajina Serbs as well perhaps as the Bosnian Serbs. Tudjman claimed that the muted response of the EU and the UN to Croatian actions, and the indictments of Martić, Karadžić and Mladić, clearly showed the international community's position with regard to both the Croats and the Serbs. In the end, Tudjman summed up his position by saying that "We are for peace, but we will not wait."

6. I believe that Tudjman has probably given us 24-48 hours to get the Krajina Serbs to back-down on Bihać, and to show a genuine interest in progress in political talks. Consequently, I will go to Knin tomorrow with two main objectives: 1) to get the "ARSK" to begin withdrawing from Bihać, and 2) to set an early date for talks in Geneva.

7. There are however two major problems with which we are now confronted. One is that the Knin authorities are unlikely to fulfil the conditions set by Tudjman (pipeline, railway, and talks on Constitutional rights of Serb minority in Croatia). A firm and early Geneva date may be able to buy us more time. The second is that Croatia may not wait; the HV could either continue its offensive in the Livno valley, or it could launch a new offensive against one of the Sectors at any time. Clearly Tudjman feels that the international community would at least not condemn him for doing so. Croatia has in the past pledged to negotiate or act in the interest of peace just prior to launching an attack (the Croatian authorities had promised to open the highway through Sector West at 06:00 on 01 May, but launched their offensive against Sector West at 04:30 that morning). Consequently, the situation is extremely fragile. Any pressure that can be exerted upon Croatia by member-states and/or the Council to buy us more time would be most useful; this is particularly true in light of President Tudjman's comments about the EU and the UN.

8. I will remain in close touch with Mr. Stoltenberg, and inform you right away of the results of the Knin meeting.

9. Best regards.

ENDALL..

UNUG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

'95 JUL 29 15:29

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

LZN=1270

MOST IMMEDIATE

'95 JUL 29 14:25

LZG=1029

Page 1 of 2
SSN=1912

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB
DATE : 29 JULY 1995
NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z-1283
SUBJECT : OBJECTIVES OF HV/HVO
REFERENCE : UNNY 2499 Dated 29 July 1995

CODE RESTRICTED
MOST IMMEDIATE

1. In response to your cable at reference, our initial assessment of HV objectives in the Livansko Polje was twofold:

- a. The primary aim was to put pressure on the "RSK". By capturing Glamoc and Bosanka Grahovo, the HV/HVO have succeeded in interrupting the main supply route to Knin. This will have significant effects on both the logistic capabilities of the ARSK in Sector South and the economic situation in that area in general.
- b. The secondary aim was assessed as satisfying, or being seen to satisfy, the requests from the Bosnian government for military support. The HV/HVO operations in the Livansko Polje will require a BSA/ARSK redeployment of troops to either block the advance as a minimum or to try and push back the HV/HVO. This will directly affect the situation in Bihac by alleviating some pressure on the BiH 5 Corps.

2. Recent build ups by the HV along the primary avenues of attack into Sectors North and South would now seem to indicate that the HV/HVO offensive was broader in scope than first assessed. It is probable that the Livansko Polje offensive is only the first phase of a major HV military campaign aimed at collapsing the "RSK".

3. It is our assessment that Croatia is poised to strike at the "RSK" but are waiting for a trigger. It is assessed that they will wait for favorable conditions before launching their campaign thereby minimizing the negative reaction from the International

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C2N=1270

Page 2 of 2

Community. There are several possible triggers, such as the collapse of Bihac, a predetermined political timeline or reaction to ARSK action. It is also probable that they will attempt to provoke the ARSK/BSA into further actions which would lend the perception of just cause for launching the Croatian campaign. If the ARSK is provoked into retaliating or reinforcing their actions in Bihac as a result of the loss of Bosanko Grahovo, it could be used by Croatia to justify the start of a comprehensive campaign against Sectors North and South.

4. It is estimated that the HV/HVO forces in the Livansko Polje number between 8,000 to 10,000 troops. This size would indicate that the HV/HVO intend to continue their advance in this area to further isolate Knin.

5. Potential HV offensives into Sector North are assessed to have the objective of cutting a corridor towards the Bihac enclave, via either Sisak-Glina or Ogulin-Slunj. This is expected only if the Bihac enclave is on the verge of collapsing. However, HV operations against Sector North could possibly be concentrated on initially securing the terrain North of the Sisak-Glina axis. This would force the withdrawal of ARSK heavy weapon assets that are within range of Zagreb and other populated and/or industrialized areas like Sisak and Karlovac.

6. It is our assessment that the HV will not continue with minor skirmishes. They will conduct a comprehensive campaign against both Sectors North and South. Their current build up allows them to commence operations almost immediately on any combination of four avenues of approach into the "RSK". These avenues are the Sisak-Glina axis from the North, the Ogulin-Slunj axis from the northwest, the Medak axis from the west and from the south via the Livansko Polje and the adjacent Croatian side of the border.

7. However, the capture of Bosanka Grahovo is a very striking illustration of an indirect Croatian strategy that could force the Croatian Serbs to enter very quickly into a negotiation process.

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CZG-1016
SSN-1493

CODED CABLE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

95 JUL 27 17:49

MOST IMMEDIATE

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -17518
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM : 6. JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB *[Signature]*
DATE : 27 July 1995
NUMBER : UNPF Z- 1268
SUBJECT : **CROATIA UPDATE**

95 JUL 27 18:02

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. **Current Situation.** Resumption of hostilities in Croatia seems increasingly likely. Both factions have significantly increased their military activity. Serb offensives continue in the Bihac Pocket against the BiH 5th Corps, and Croatian forces have substantially increased their rate of build-up along the primary avenues of attack.

2. **Indicators.** A variety of indicators point increasingly to HV offensive intentions within the next two weeks. Specifically, since 260001B July 1995, an additional three to four HV Brigades were observed moving into areas adjacent to Sector North and the northernmost area of Sector South, along primary HV avenues of attack into the Krajina from the West.

3. Successive Croat attacks in the Dinara Highlands/Livno Valley area have met with some success, prompting renewed concerns that Serb authorities might shell adjacent Croatian areas. If such a retaliatory shelling were to occur, it would likely spark an HV offensive from the West, and the Croatian military seems poised to do so.

4. Similarly, President Tudjman recently reiterated Croatian concerns over Serb attacks into the Bihac Pocket, and that Zagreb could not permit the Bihac Pocket to collapse without response. The 22 July 1995 conference in Split between Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic confirmed their commonalities of view on the deteriorating military situation in the Bihac Pocket. Despite Croatian efforts to demonstrate concern for Bihac, Zagreb's overriding intent is to achieve a permanent solution to the Krajina problem, and Bihac may represent a justification palatable to the international community.

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5. Croatian Options. Despite HV desires to regain all of the Krajina in the near term, practical military considerations will likely restrict an HV attack to four main avenues of attack:

- a. Attacks across northernmost Sector North aimed at taking the terrain north of the Ogulin-Slunj-Sisak axis;
- b. Bisecting attack from the West, along the Otocac-Korenica axis, connecting through to the Bihac Pocket;
- c. Truncation of southernmost Sector South along the Gospic-Gradac-Knin axis;
- d. Rear-area attack from the Livno Valley area, capitalizing on the gains made in that area;

6. Prior to any Croatian attack in the West against the Krajina, it is assessed that a rapid generation of a large HV blocking force in Eastern Slavonia will occur. The purpose of this force would be to preclude any intervention from the direction of Sector East. While such a blocking force has not been observed, it could be generated in a short time. Furthermore, current restrictions of movement imposed by Croatian authorities would make detection very difficult.

7. Separate cables address our ongoing efforts to stabilize this tense situation.

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1212 1019

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

95 JUL 28 15:58 2

95 JUL 28 15:58 2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: Z- 1271

DATE: 28 JULY 1995

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM FRY FM ON CROATIA

CODE RESTRICT

IMMEDIATE

Your 2465 of 25 July 1995 refers.

1. You should be aware that a letter on the same subject dated 27 June 1995 was received here, sent by Mr. D. Zlokas, Chief of the Representative Office of the Serbs of Gorski Kotar.
2. This letter was replied to by the Head of Civil Affairs on 3 July 1995 (copy attached). It was pointed out in this letter that the matter had been discussed with Ambassador Ahrens, Chairman of the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities of ICFY, and that he had agreed to raise the question of the Serbs in Gorski Kotar with the Croatian government.
3. We understand that the Centre for Human Rights in Zagreb is currently responding to issues raised in the letter of the Foreign Minister.
4. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in his tenth periodic report (16 January 1995) addressed the situation in Gorski Kotar.
5. It is difficult to determine the facts on the ground in Gorski Kotar, not least because it is unclear whether UNCRO has a mandate to monitor human rights in areas of Croatia outside the sectors (Legal Affairs, Zagreb, is studying this). In the meantime, action in this area is co-ordinated with the Centre for Human Rights and ICFY. There is also considerable restriction of movement in Karlovac/Ogulin area due to the military situation in Sector North.
6. We suppose that the reason for the re-appearance of these grievances at this time reflects increased mobilisation in Croatia as a whole.

Internal Distribution: FC, DFC, UNCRO, DI, PLA

95 JUL 28 -9 :14

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies
Zagreb

Civil Affairs

Michel Moussalli
Head of Civil Affairs
Tel. : (385) (41) 180-050
Fax no. : (385) (41) 170 099

3 July 1995

Dear Mr. Zlokas,

Thank you for your letter dated 27 June 1995 concerning forced mobilization in Gorski Kotar. We have had the opportunity to discuss your letter with Ambassador Ahrens, the Chair of Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia.

Ambassador Ahrens has agreed to raise the concerns noted in your letter with the Croatian government. We intend to follow this issue as well, and look forward to hearing from Ambassador Ahrens regarding his efforts to address your concerns.

Please let us know if we may be of further assistance.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'PM' followed by a stylized flourish.

Michel Moussalli
Head of Civil Affairs

Mr. Dusan Zlokas
Office of the Serbs of Gorski Kotar
Belgrade

CODE RESTRICTED

22N21254
22G-1020
22K-126

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1 of 2

IMMEDIATE

22N21298

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: Z-1272

DATE: 28 JULY 1995

SUBJECT: DECLARATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENT

Your 2456 of 25 July refers.

1. Our assessment of the implications of the text of the declaration signed by Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic in Split on 22 July 1995 is as follows.
2. The declaration had both political and military aims but the most significant element was the reference to mutual military assistance including logistic and military co-operation. Whereas the declaration refers to the agreement on friendship and co-operation of 21 July 1992, the Split agreement differs from the former in that it precisely defines a concrete and limited goal: the defence of the Bihac pocket. We assess that the inclusion of this military agreement in the framework of a general declaration of intent to support the Federation was intended to capitalise on the known support for the Federation in the West.
3. Although a similar military pact was signed in early March between Croatia, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnia Herzegovina, little evidence emerged of the agreement being translated into action on the ground until recently. Since the 21 July declaration there has been significant Croatian military activity to relieve pressure on the 5th Corps and a significantly higher level of logistic support into the Bihac pocket, mostly at night, and from more than one direction.
4. In politico-military terms we assess that the Split agreement seeks to establish a legal basis for further Croatian support in Bosnia Herzegovina and for eventual action in the UNPAs. (As we have stated elsewhere, we do not believe that Croatia has the intention, for the present, to mount an offensive in any of the Sectors - but this option remains very firmly available later in the year.) This legal justification is based upon:
 - a. the universal right of national survival;
 - b. the right of self defence;
 - c. the Washington agreement; and
 - d. the agreement on military co-operation between Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina of July 1992.

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- 2 -

5. We assess that both Presidents received what they wanted from the agreement in Split. President Izetbegovic is already receiving support for the 5th Corps as pressure is increased on the ARSK, and President Tudjman has again been able to be seen to support the victim Bosnia Herzegovina while securing his own military and political interests.

6. The agreement simply signals some major implications for the immediate future. Whilst repeatedly stressing their intention not to go to war during the life of the mandate, senior Croatian officials and leading politicians have equally put emphasis on the fact that Croatian vital interests are threatened in the Bihac pocket. The fall of the enclave would not only cause a massive exodus of refugees, it would also give the Serbs an enormous strategic advantage which Croatia could not accept. The Split agreement serves to underline and give respectability to Croatian political and military objectives.

Regards.