

[6 CONFIDENTIAL]

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BOX G5

FILE 5

ACC. 1998/0283


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MEMORANDUM

TO: MILOB GP HQ
FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ
SUBJECT: VISIT OF FC TO MILOB GP HQ
DATE: 10 MAR 95

1. The info requested on 7 Mar for subject activity is indicated below. You may notice that most of it is already in your possession. Please note that some information requested is not available at this time.

- A. RPA,
See attached report.
- B. Prefecture of Gitarama NYANDWI, DESIRE, Hutu,
Bourgemestres: see attached.
- C. Prisons,
Gitarama Prison, 5,200 inmates
Butare Prison, 4,500 inmates
Every commune has a detention facility, the communes of Kigoma, Ntongwe, Murama, Musambira, Tambwe, and Mugina are thought to have hidden prisons.
- D. Op Retour,
Has virtually ground to a halt with only a handful of returnees coming in each week. See attached paper on the subject.
- E. DPCs,
Nil per se; however, there are a small number of IDPs in each commune occupying commercial buildings and school houses. The largest concentration is in the commune of NYABIKENKE.
- F. Major Incidents,
i) 14 Feb 95, arrest of Sub-Prfect of Ruhango, investigation carried out, report attached;
ii) 5 Mar 95, assassination of prefet of Butare; investigation carried out, copy of increp attached.
- G. Security Appreciation,
Situation deteriorating rapidly with many worrisome indicators; full reports attached.


S.A. Hasnain
Col
Sect Cdr

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MEMORANDUM

TO: MILOB GP HQ/OPS

FROM: SECTOR 3 GITARAMA

SUBJECT: ARREST OF SUB-PREFECT OF RUHANGO

REFERENCE: YOUR REQUEST OF 07 MAR 95

1. THE SUB-PREFECT OF RUHANGO, M. COLONI, PLACIDE, WAS ARRESTED ON 14 FEB ON CHARGES OF GENOCIDE. THE ARREST WAS CARRIED OUT OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE PREFECT OF GITARAMA WHO, HAVING BEEN ADVISED OF HIS ARREST AFTER THE FACT, CARRIED OUT HIS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES AND WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANY REASONABLE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. APPARENTLY, HIS ONLY KNOWN INVOLVEMENT IN THE GENOCIDE WAS, ON ONE OCCASION, TO GIVE A RIDE IN HIS VEHICLE TO AN INTERHAMWE MEMBER. ACCORDING TO THE PREFECT, THIS RIDE WAS GIVEN UNDER DURESS. M. COLONI IS A HUTU BELONGING TO THE MDR PARTY. THE ORDERS FOR HIS ARREST WERE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DMI).

2. M. COLONI IS PRESENTLY BEING HELD IN PRISON BUT WE ARE STILL NOT SURE WHERE. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DISCOVER HIS WHEREABOUTS AND TO LEARN WHETHER THERE EXISTED ANY PERSONAL ANIMOSITY TOWARDS HIM THAT MIGHT HAVE PROMPTED THE AUTHORITIES TO USE GENOCIDE AS A PRETEXT.

PC Runcost
MAT
0950

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MEMORANDUM

TO: FHQ/DFC/COS/DCMO/DCOS OPS/HAC

SUBJECT: RECONCILIATION/OP RETOUR

DATE: 9 MAR 95

1. Aim. The aim of this paper is to review the logic of Op Retour and to discuss some of the factors affecting the possibility of reconciliation. It is hoped that this will be viewed as a fresh line of thinking that may have some use in the development of future UN policy and plans.

2. Background. Prior to the outbreak of the war of Apr 94, the struggle between Hutu and Tutsi seemed to be going largely in the favour of the Hutu. They used their majority status to seize and maintain political power, effectively squeezing out the Tutsi minority. If one begins with the Tutsi success in the previous war and understands that this success both forced the majority to acknowledge the power of the minority and gave impetus to the growing fear of Tutsi domination, one can begin to understand the main elements of the problem now facing the present government. On the one hand, moderate elements believed that compromise was both necessary and possible. On the other hand, hardliner Hutus felt that compromise would lead to loss of power and a return to domination by the Tutsi minority. Hardline demagogues were able to play on the fears of the largely illiterate Hutu peasants to create a level of paranoia that spilled over into hysteria under the impetus of the dramatic death of the president, in Apr 94. The trouble was, the militias, who carried out the majority of the genocidal acts so far recorded, were armed and organized while the Tutsi minority within the country had no weapons and had put their faith in compromise, the UN and the RPF. Ultimately, the RPF provided the only meaningful defence; and only after a terrible price in blood.

3. Current Situation. Having lost nearly one million lives, there are very few Tutsi families in Rwanda who were not personally affected by the massacres. Over and over again one hears harrowing tales of narrow escape and eye witness accounts of horrible atrocities. Underlying every story is the fear that it might all happen again. Given the depth of fear and the emotional state of the survivors of what must, in all frankness, be termed a genocide, it would be expecting a degree of forgiveness more reasonably attributable to angels than humans. Moreover, the fear that the Hutus will one day finish what they started is a powerful motivating force among the survivors. The most pressing concern of the government then is to deal with this fear. Given the stark realities the Tutsis face: the fact that they are a minority, the

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fact that they have little financial help, the fact that they have a large Hutu population within their borders and the fact that they have an intact army under the same leadership that perpetuated the genocide sitting just outside their borders, it is not surprising that the present government sees democratic compromise in a poor light. They were betrayed once by their belief in the Arusha compromise. They are unlikely to trust their fate to a similar compromise in the near future. We should not underestimate the importance of the survival imperative to a people who believe that they prevented complete annihilation only through force of arms.

4. Recent Events. The large number of arrests and the emerging pattern of intimidation and terror in many communes may indicate an effort to consolidate power by eliminating opposition. The death of the Prefet of Butare can also be seen as a step in the process of establishing control. For that matter, the arrest and continued detention of the Sous-Prefet of Gitarama on apparently groundless charges also fit into the same pattern. It would appear that either the government is committed to a course of repressive measures or that they exercise little control over some elements who are determined to take a hard line. In either case, the prisons are overflowing, communal detention centres are full and Hutus are very nervous in most communes in this Sector. Meanwhile, the main focus of UNAMIR over the past few months has been to bring as many people back to their homes as possible.

Operation Retour

5. The operation to try peacefully to empty IDP camps as a precursor to enticing refugees home from neighbouring countries was launched with the conviction that there was no alternative. It was feared that the only way to avert forced closing of the camps and bloodshed was to take the initiative to encourage people to go home of their own volition. While it is understood that life in the camps is not exactly idyllic and that the presence of camps within the country's borders poses a security threat to the present government, one cannot reasonably expect to overcome the deep fears and hatred that exist on both sides by merely solving a few logistic problems. The single biggest problem to be dealt is the psychological effect of genocide. Bringing victims and perpetrators of this genocide back together while the memories of its horror are still so fresh is bound to cause problems. Given the scope of the trauma that has to be worked through, bringing the two sides face to face this soon after the event, while bodies are still being exhumed from mass graves for reburial, is hardly conducive to reconciliation.

6. Alongside the passion for vengeance that almost certainly exists among the survivors, more reasonable people will be concerned to make sure that they protect themselves from the possibility of a repetition. Given their numeric minority status

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and their recent history, the responsible members of the government would be irrational if they did not seek to establish some sort of minority control. At the moment, with the memories so strong and with options so limited, it would be understandable for the government to be inclined to take a fairly hard line and to use its most reliable element to maintain control - the RPA. If the government's aim is to establish control through repression and force of arms then bringing people home in easily manageable numbers, as we are currently doing with Op Retour, delivers them to repression. Op Retour, in so far as it brings victims and perpetrators together, would seem to invite the kind of reaction that has been noticed in Musambira, Mugina and Kigoma, of which we have been reporting regularly. These communes appear to have become a hotbed of repression over the past few weeks.

7. Bringing people back together without dealing with the fear that drove them apart is similar to an attempt to move a battered woman back into the same home as her abusive husband. They are unlikely to kiss and make up as long as one fears further abuse and the other fears retaliation. While both are safe while apart, neither is safe if forced to live under the same roof without having worked through their problems and having come to terms with them. Seen in this light, any attempt at precipitous reconciliation is unwise; and possibly dangerous. Op Retour seems to overlook an essential element of reconciliation - that it is unlikely to come about if either or both sides have reason to fear the other. If Op Retour is completely successful, it will recreate many of the conditions that led to one of the most horrible massacres in recent history. If partially successful, it is liable to expose many innocent families to repression for the foreseeable future. The operation may also discredit the agencies that participated in it.

8. Perhaps where Op Retour went wrong was in its failure to address the security problems likely to be faced by the returnees and the possibility of repression. Yet, given the dangers faced by the current government and the constraints they work under, repression would seem the most likely way of meeting their survival imperatives; at least in the short term. From a cynical point of view, it is just possible that the government expressed its willingness to go along with Op Retour because it perceived that it was the best way to get the people and the suspects home to be arrested without losing the support of the international community. It may also be possible that the threats against the camps were a deliberate ploy to get our cooperation in a well conceived cover plan. We thus need to analyse whether Op Retour was a result of our inability to correctly perceive the real intentions of the present government.

9. The situation at the moment is far from clear.

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What does seem obvious however is that there are good reasons for the present government to use its military power to maintain itself. To allow democracy in the traditional sense of the word is to run the risk of losing power to a majority guilty of a genocide and to run the risk of the genocide starting again. It also seems evident that there are deep sentiments of fear and vengeance at work behind the scenes and that until these sentiments are resolved, there can be no reconciliation. Finally, it also seems that reconciliation in advance of the resolution of the issues that led to the war will fill whatever new prison space is created and lead to more repression and intimidation as the government tries to restrain its people, prevent chaos and retain power. For these reasons, it seems unwise to press on with reconciliation attempts that are not aligned with efforts to resolve the underlying issues that exist. The fear and the hatred must be dealt with if there is to be lasting peace. These issues will require both intelligent structural adjustments and time.

RECOMMENDATIONS.


10. It is believed that there are few easy choices open to UNAMIR at the present time. If we push on with repatriation, we run the risk of being accused of assisting the present government to establish a repressive regime. If we try to slow down the present initiative to close the IDP camps in Rwanda, we run the risk of having the RPA do it by force. But, if the logic in this paper is accepted, that is a step we ought to take. The present government has an interest in keeping international support and funding flowing in and may be reluctant to show their hand too plainly out of fear of alienating countries on whose help they presently rely. It may therefore be possible to prevail upon them to accept a longer period of IDP return by pointing out to them that unilateral military action in this case may have financial consequences that outweigh the security concerns caused by the presence of these camps. In the meantime, it is recommended that more time be devoted to resolving the issues that block reconciliation and that more aggressive action at the political level may be required.

11. The fear and the hatred that lie close to the surface on both sides of the political dynamic must be assuaged to some degree by the establishment of a justice system that is perceived by both sides to be fair. At the moment, such a system does not exist and the present practice of placing persons suspected of genocidal acts in "preventative detention" without trial, and without hope of trial in the near future, is widely perceived as repressive and arbitrary. Perhaps it would be worth exploring the possibility of making the establishment of at least a rudimentary judicial system a precondition for further repatriation. It has been learned that such a system, with international judicial talent, is already on

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the cards. The question is whether the government will seriously work towards the implementation of a system which will prevent arbitrary arrests and preventative detention. It is for the international community to, once again, ensure its implementation with a carrot and stick policy.

12. An easy alternative to Op Retour is not easy to conceive of at this time. With all its failings, Op Retour is still a workable plan provided that it is stretched out over a longer period so as to allow the establishment of a judicial system and to permit passions to subside a little. In the prevailing circumstances, time may, by itself, be a great healer and perhaps would also give us breathing space which could be used to put greater diplomatic pressure on the government to find a better way to face its survival imperatives.



S.A. Hasnain
Col
Sect Cdr

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MEMORANDUM

TO: FHQ/CMO/COS/DCOS OPS
INFO: MILOBS GP HQ/DCMO

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PREFET OF BUTARE

DATE: 5 MAR 95

1. THIS IS A FOLLOW UP OF THE INCREP PERTAINING TO SUBJECT EVENT SUBMITTED BY THIS HQ ON 4 MAR 95.

2. ON THE NIGHT OF 4 MAR, AT APPROX 2100 HRS, A CAR CARRYING THE PREFET OF BUTARE, A DRIVER, A UNIFORMED BODY GUARD AND ONE OTHER PASSENGER WAS WAVED TO A HALT APPROX 5 KM NORTH OF BUTARE ON THE MAIN ROAD TO GITARAMA. THE PREFET REPORTEDLY LOWERED HIS WINDOW TO ENQUIRE INTO THE REASON FOR THE STOP AND WAS SHOT THROUGH THE HEAD IMMEDIATELY AT CLOSE RANGE. ACCORDING TO THE SOLE SURVIVOR, APPROX FOUR OTHER GUNS OPENED UP AT VERY CLOSE RANGE FROM THE WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD (RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE VEHICLE) AND KILLED THE DRIVER AND THE OTHER PASSENGER. THE GUARD WAS SITTING IN THE BACK LEFT HAND SEAT AND WAS UNTOUCHED IN THE INITIAL VOLLEY. HE MANAGED TO GET OUT OF THE BACK DOOR AND TO FIRE A FEW ROUNDS BEFORE TURNING TO RUN TO THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD. THE ATTACKERS FIRED AS HE RAN HITTING HIM IN THE SHOULDER AND LOWER LEG. HE LATER REPORTED THAT HIS ASSAILANTS WERE DRESSED IN SHORT PANTS, LONG COATS AND HOODS. SHORTLY AFTER THE SOLDIER WENT DOWN, A BROWN AND ROOT VEHICLE, DRIVEN BY MR BEAVER, CAME UPON THE SCENE, SAW THE VEHICLE AND THE BULLET HOLES, AN IMMEDIATELY WENT TO TAC HQ TO REPORT.

3. SECTOR 3A MILOBS OPSO, MAJ NUNDWE, WAS CALLED TO INVESTIGATE, IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED THE RPA LO AND MALAWICOY, AND PROCEEDED TO THE SCENE. HE WAS OBLIGED TO WAIT FOR MALAWICOY FOR SAFETY AND TRANSPORT REASONS AND SO ARRIVED SEVERAL MINUTES AFTER THE RPA LO. THE LO HAD, BY THIS TIME, TAKEN THE WOUNDED SOLDIER INTO HIS VEHICLE AND DEPARTED FOR THE HOSPITAL. MAJ NUNDWE MADE AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE SIGHT WITHOUT HINDRANCE FROM THE RPA ELEMENTS WHO HAD BY THIS TIME DEPLOYED, AND THEN SUBMITTED AN INCREP. THE SIGHT WAS THEN SEALED OFF BY THE RPA AND TRAFFIC HALTED. IT REMAINED SEALED UNTIL APPROX 0845H 05 MAR, AT WHICH TIME THE BODIES WERE REMOVED AND THE CAR TOWED AWAY.

ASSESSMENT

4. THERE ARE SEVERAL INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THIS EVENT THAT NEED CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THE PREFET, A M. PIERRE...., BELONGED TO THE PARTI SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIQUE, AND WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A MODERATE FORCE. HE WAS NOT VERY POPULAR WITH THE LOCAL RPA AND HAD NOT BEEN

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GIVEN A SEAT AT THE WEDDING FEAST OF THE LOCAL BDE CDR SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. SECOND, THE PREFET HAD ENEMIES WITHIN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ONE OF WHOM HAD RECENTLY ACCUSED HIM OF FRAUDULENT USE OF PUBLIC MONEY. THIRD, THE SHOOTING TOOK PLACE A SHORT DISTANCE FROM MBAZI COMMUNE (7218) A COMMUNE FROM WHICH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN FLEEING RECENTLY. FOURTH, THE RPA, CONTRARY TO WHAT ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED FROM A FORCE AS COMPETENT AS THEY IN NIGHT OPS, TOOK NO IMMEDIATE ACTION. FIFTH, THOUGH THE ATTACKERS WERE REPORTEDLY IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, THEY EXECUTED THEIR AMBUSH WITH A PRECISION USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY UNITS. IT IS EASY TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF SHORT PANTS BY PULLING LONG PANTS UP UNDERNEATH A LONG COAT. SIXTH, THE ATTACKERS MUST HAVE HAD SOME MEANS OF IDENTIFYING THE CAR AND POSITIONING THEMSELVES AT THE RIGHT TIME TO CARRY OUT THEIR ATTACK. THE PREFET HAD SPENT THE DAY WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MEMBERS IN KIGALI AND HAD MADE A BRIEF STOP WITH THE BOURGMESTRE OF RUSATIRA ON HIS WAY TO BUTARE. FINALLY, THIS ACTION PROVIDES THE PERFECT EXCUSE FOR TIGHTENING UP SECURITY INCLUDING FORCED CLOSURE OF THE IDP CAMPS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS LONG HELD TO BE THE SOURCE OF ALL SUCH ATTACKS.

5. THE TWO MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITIES ARE THAT HARDLINER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE RPA STAGED THE ATTACK INTENDING TO BLAME IT ON FORMER MILITIA OR THAT SOME FORMER MILITIA ELEMENT STAGED THE ATTACK IN THE HOPE OF INDUCING THE GOVERNMENT TO OVER REACT. EITHER POSSIBILITY COULD BE PLAUSIBLY ARGUED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE MAJORITY POPULATION IN THIS SECTOR IS ALREADY DISAFFECTED BY FEAR AND THUS THERE WOULD BE LITTLE TO GAIN FOR FORMER RGF OR MILITIA ELEMENTS FROM AN ATTACK SUCH AS THIS AT THIS TIME. MOREOVER, IF THE CAMPS ARE CLOSED AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK, THE FORMER GOVERNMENT FACTION STANDS TO LOSE A VALUABLE BASE OF OPERATIONS INSIDE RWANDA. THE HARDLINERS IN THE RPA, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD LITTLE TO LOSE AND MUCH TO GAIN FROM THIS ACTION. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, IT IS JUST TOO GOOD AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER REPRESSIVE MEASURES.

6. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS EVENT OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED VERY SERIOUSLY. IN THE COMING WEEKS, UNAMIR SHOULD MONITOR ACTIONS OF ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT CAREFULLY TO OBSERVE WHICH WAY THEY DECIDE TO MOVE. IT IS VERY POSSIBLY THE FIRST STEP IN A POWER GRAB BY HARDLINERS. IT IS ALSO OMINOUS THAT THE PREFET SHOULD BELONG TO THE SAME PARTY AND COME FROM THE SAME AREA AS M. GATABAZI, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED LAST YEAR AT ABOUT THIS TIME.

S.A. HASNAIN
COL
SECT CDR

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4 MAR 95

ESTIMATE OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SECTOR 3

Prepared by Col S.A. Hasnain and Maj P.C. Lancaster

1. Over the past few weeks we have gathered a number of rumours of systematic intimidation and oppression by the Bourgmestre of MUSAMBIRA Commune (8374), MARTIN KALISSA. The rumours prompted us to enlist the aid of UNHCR and Human Rights, who had been active in attempting to confirm the rumours already. The following facts have come to light:

A. UNHCR and MILOBS both confirmed a pattern of intimidation in the cellule of IMBARE (8374). The women of this cellule launched a demonstration at the prefecture office in GITARAMA last week to protest against the harrassment they were suffering at the hands of the RPA. In the wake of this sign of desperation, UNHCR confirmed that there are only three men left in the cellule. The remaining four hundred have been arrested, killed or have fled. The three that remain are all over 60 years of age.

B. A MILOBS patrol again confirmed that the pattern is not confined to one cellule. They visited the NYARABUKA sector (8268) where they discovered that people slept in the fields to avoid being surprised in their homes by armed uniformed men. These night visits usually result in extortion of a peculiar form: either the family hands over money or goods or one of them is arrested on trumped up charges.

C. A MILOBS patrol confirmed the above information with one of the priests in the commune who stated that the arrests have been going on for a long time and that there are so many possible ways of laying charges that no one can escape arrest if the local authorities want them. He cited the case of two brothers, NDAGIJIMANA GABRIEL NATUS and HAKIZIMANA EMMANUEL NATUS, arrested for the murder of their brother in law when in reality the murder had been carried out by the RPA (unconfirmed allegation). He went on to claim that there is a deliberate pattern of intimidation in effect and that the people live in a perpetual state of fear.

D. The Prefet of GITARAMA acknowledged to the Sector Commander that MUSAMBIRA is his most serious security problem and that he had sent a letter to the Bourgmestre to try to restrain him. He can do little else without the support of the RPA. Since the recent arrest by the local Brigade commander of his sous-prefet and of a priest known for his good work on behalf of the Tutsi population during the war, he appears to be powerless in this matter. As a Hutu, he is in

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a precarious position himself.

Assessment of the Situation

2. Before embarking on any assessment it needs to be borne in mind that the overall security situation in GITARAMA and BUTARE Prefectures has taken a turn for the worse. While assessing the situation in Sector 3 in general and MUSAMBIRA in particular we are also trying to relate this to the possible deterioration elsewhere in Rwanda. This assessment may therefore be a little beyond the realm of a purely sector level appreciation.

3. The situation in MUSAMBIRA is very worrying. Even leaving aside the fate of individual people who have been terrorized, the situation is illustrative of what can happen if there is no judicial system in place to put a brake on the power of local government. The people have no protection from the excesses of their own officials and thus may be arrested for any reason whatever. In this prefecture, most arrestees that survive the arrest process end up in GITARAMA prison where they may languish for many months in the most inhuman conditions with no possibility that their cases will be heard in the foreseeable future. Many of them will die without having their day in court. Moreover, the situation invites reflection on several alarming possibilities.

4. If the Prefet is truly against the action of his Bourgmestre and is unable to bring him into line because of the RPA then the appearance of civil order is highly illusory. If the RPA fail to act to prevent the kinds of abuse carried out at night in Musambira then we need to know if they enjoy the support of the national government or if they actually are the power. Given the terrible price that the Tutsi population paid for their lack of power in the past, it would be logical to expect them to take steps to ensure that they never pay the price again. Since they are still in a minority position, retaining power will be difficult if the contest is too democratic. One way to power is through judicious use of military strength. But here the problem is to operate without the international community seeing what is going on. If the military is seen to be terrorizing the people, the money the government needs to rebuild the country may well dry up. If that happens they will be more vulnerable to attack due to a lack of financial resources. So there are good reasons for saying one thing and doing another. It is very possible that what is going on in Musambira is indicative of just such an approach.

5. Were this confined to one commune, it would not be so alarming. But it also appears that similar conditions obtain in Mugina and Kigoma. We do not yet have sufficient confirmation to be confident of the rumours yet but, given their strength and the fact that the returnee flow has all but stopped into these areas, it is expected that we will soon have the evidence we need to make a similar list of violations for each of these communes.

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6. The problem that we face is very complex. On the one hand we have an urgent need to confirm our suspicions if we are going to be able to provide the information needed to make wise decisions. On the other hand, we must accept the government's position at face value if we are going to continue to operate. Our suspicions do not lend themselves to easy confirmation and to act on them without considerable confidence could lead to embarrassment and loss of credibility. Overshadowing our suspicion is the realisation that the Tutsi population has a terrible burden of grief and shock to work through before we can reasonably expect compassion or restraint from them. They do not seem to subscribe to internationally accepted legal precepts and at times seem more concerned with revenge for the wrongs of the past than with care for the future. They do not appear bothered by the possibility of a few innocent people being punished by mistake. The attitude of some local officials to the inhuman conditions in the Gitarama prison is quite instructive in this context.

7. If the conditions of Musambira commune obtain in other communes then there is a clear possibility that the government has embarked on a deliberate programme of deception designed to allow them to establish a militarist regime. If we persist in our present attempt to bring IDPs and refugees home, then we will play into their hands. In the worst case, this would appear as if the UN and the international community are assisting in the creation of a militarist state. It is suggested that the best way to avoid this is to slow down the process of return until there is a credible judicial system in place. In the meantime, far more emphasis has to be placed on the task of observing and reporting what is really going on in the communes. Possibly a larger and more realistic picture would emerge if the other Sectors were analysed at the same time. This assessment is suggested as a precursor of a wider estimate of the situation which, no doubt, must already be in process at the Force HQ.

8. It is my considered opinion that a schism within the RPA appears to be on the cards. The sudden change for the worse in an otherwise seemingly moderate RPA BDE CDR indicates a possible attempt to show himself in a stronger light to the more extremist elements within the RPA. It is also possible that the events of the last few weeks are reflective of an upper hand being gained by the hardliners. Viewed purely from a military angle, such actions appear to indicate the RPA's desire to clamp its stamp of authority over the majority population and enforce a form of population control in anticipation of the infiltration of militia elements into the hinterland areas. Militarily, this is an astute step but is likely to have a very negative political backlash.

9. The above is offered as one view of the emerging situation as seen in the light of what appears to be happening on the ground.

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In the mean while, if we are to continue to monitor the situation effectively it is imperative that MILOBS, who are the best eyes and ears for this kind of situation, be more adequately equipped with transport resources to allow us to permeate every nook and corner of our area of responsibility. At the moment, we lack the means to travel into the more isolated parts of the Sector due to the lack of motorcycles and we also lack the requisite number of patrol vehicles needed for basic investigative work which is so essential in such an emerging situation. Efforts are, however afoot to ensure that the channels to the RPA and the other officials remain open through effective liaison. Formed troops are also being used to show the UN flag in the affected areas to advertise our knowledge of the happenings with a hope that this will at least reduce the quantum of illegal arrests.

UN RESTRICTED



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

URUGUAY - MINUAR

TO: MILOB GP HQ

FILE REF : 4B/OPS/95

FROM: ~~SECTOR 4B~~ KIBUYE

DATE : 13 MAR 95

SUBJECT: ^{KIBUYE}
INFORMATION ON ~~SECT 4B~~REFERENCE: VISIT OF FC TO MILOB GP HQ dated 07 Mar 95

1. Please find listed below the required information.

a. RPA

i. 59 RPA bn was replaced by 9 RPA bn on 03 Feb 95. No change in deployment has been observed except closing down of five check points in order to beef up the strength in coastal areas for patrolling. See Annex 1.

ii. Names of Commanders are not available because no Liaison Officer has been appointed and RPA is not cooperative so far to provide any information.

b. PREFECTURES and COMMUNES

i. See Annex 2.

ii. One community/ethnic group has been shown in brackets.

UN RESTRICTED

(2)

c. PRISON and TRANSIT HOUSES

i. There is one prison at KIBUYE (GR 2771) with approximately 316 inmates

ii. Every commune has 1 to 2 "Transit Houses" with 30 to 100 inmates at any one given time. However this figure varies owing to frequent moves of the detainees.

iii. Two clandestine prisons have been observed/reported in the Prefecture at Kibuye 2772 and Mutaba 3179. No figures concerning inmates available. There are reportedly many more such prisons of which we have sketchy information.

d. OP RETOUR The details of the returnees have been given in Annex 3.

e. DPCs There is only one DP Camp at NYAMISHABA 2571. No IDPs are there at present.

f. MAJOR INCIDENTS. The details of major incidents have been given in Annex 3.

g. SECURITY APPRECIATION. See Annex 4.

2. Best regards

A. Krishna
A KRISHNA
MAJOR
ACT SECT CDR
SECT 4B - KIBUYE

2

UN RESTRICTED

(3)

Annexure 1
(Refers to Para 1e.)

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THE KNOWN RPA TROOPS DEPLOYMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS :

- A. HQ 9 BN AND COY HQ AND TWO RIFLE PLS (?) AT NYAMISHABA (GR 258 715).
- B. TRAINING CAMP AT KIBUYE (GR 272725) EXACT STR IN CAMP NOT KNOWN.
- C. ONE RIFLE PL AT GASURA (GR 265 695).
- D. COY HQ AND RIFLE PL AT MUBUGA (GR 243 638).
- E. ONE RIFLE PL AT MARA (GR 205 685).
- F. ONE RIFLE PL AT MURANGARA (GR 225 675)
- G. COY HQ AND ONE RIFLE PL AT GISHYITA (GR 205620).
- H. ONE RIFLE PL AT RWAMATAMU (GR 165 565).
- I. ONE RIFLE PL AT NYABINAGA (GR 138 508).
- J. COY HQ AND ONE RIFLE PL AT GISOVU (GR 290 525).
- K. ONE RIFLE PL AT KIRONJE (GR 302 625).
- L. ONE RIFLE PL AT BIRAMBO (GR 475 628).
- M. COY HQ AT RUBENGERE (GR 349 744).
- N. ONE RIFLE PL AT RUTSIRO (GR 315 835).
- O. ONE RIFLE PL AT KIVUMO (GR 558 735).
- P. ONE RIFLE PL AT RUGABANO (GR 430 667).

(4)

Annexure 2
(Refers to Para 1b)

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SECTOR 4B
PREFECTURE KIBUYE

PREFECT KIBUYE Prefecture	Mr KABEERA Assiel
Sous Prefect --	Mr RUTABAIRO Raymond
Bougemestre GITESI Commune	Mr GATERE Felix
Sous Prefect MUSHUBATI	Mr RUGAMBWA Emmanuel
Bougemestre MABANZA Commune	Mr ABIMANA Mathias
Bougemestre RUTSIRO --	Mr KARANGWA Pierre
Sous Prefect BIRAMBO	Mr RYUMUGABE Innocent
Bougemestre KIVUMO Commune	Mr NSANZABAGAMWA Theoneste (H)
Bougemestre BWAKIRA --	Mr TWAGIRUMUNGU Zacharie
Bougemestre MWENDO --	Mr KAYLGAMBA Vincent
Sous Prefect NGOMA	(Not appointed so far, duties temporarily performed by Security Officer Mr KARAMGAWA Fabien)
Bougemestre RWAMATAMU Commune	Mr KARARA Appollinaire
Bougemestre GISOVU --	Mr NJULUNZIZA Jan Marie Viande
Bougemestre GISHYITA --	Mr RWANTUALI Emmanuel (H)

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Annexure 3
(Refers to Para 1f)MAJOR INCIDENTS

1. General. Rumors are still rife within the Sector especially in the coastal areas that the FRG forces are going to launch an attack in not a distant future by infiltration through lake KIVU. Consequently the RPA have intensified their operations particularly along the lake. They are also known to have established three sentry posts along the lake in RWAMATAMU commune. So far we have had seven instances of intrusions through the lake in the southern part of the Sector. Details are given in the succeeding paragraphs. We also have report of existing bandit camps in the forest north of BWIZA (GR 3694). Though uninhabited, one such camp has been spotted in 3298 by our heli patrol. The details of known killings, arrests and returnees during the last one month are given in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. Intrusions. The details are as under:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Commune</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Rubarega 1158	Rwamatamu	18/19 Jan	no casualty reported
Mubuga 1054	Rwamatamu	23/24 Jan	-do-
Muhave 1056	Rwamatamu	27 Jan	-do-
Rwabisindu 1860	Rwamatamu	01 Feb	one person hacked to death and 06 injured
Rwaramba 2063	Gishyita	03 Feb	no casualty reported
Ngoma 2159	Gishyita	07 Feb	-do-
Mara 2068	Gishyita	14 Feb	-do-

3. These intrusions have taken place during the hours of darkness reportedly by bandits in groups of 8 to 10 mainly to steal livestock. However this clearly exposes the vulnerability of the coastal areas in this sector which is difficult to guard owing to its configuration.

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4. Killings. Killings which have taken place during the period are as under:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Rwabisindu 5951	01 Feb	bandits killed one and left six injured
Rwaramba 2063	03 Feb	one person suspected to be assisting bandits, killed by RPA
Gitsimbwe 1052	07 Feb	one local leader killed who refused to obey RPA
Rugaragara 1656	25 Feb	multiple murder case of Rwamatamu commune
Rwamatamu 1557	01 Mar	Two suspected bandits killed by RPA

5. One abortive attempt was made by 70 to 80 people to escape by boat at Gasura 2470 on 25 Feb at 0300 hrs. The RPA patrol foiled the attempt by opening fire and reportedly killing five persons. This information was provided by one individual who managed to escape unhurt. He has requested for anonymity. The RPA commanders denied occurrence of such an incident.

6. Arrests. The RPA is alleged to have arrested an unconfirmed number of people during the period. The Bougemestres always decline to comment or are untruthful and evasive. The details of known arrests are as under:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Feb 95</u>	<u>Mar 95</u>
Rwamatamu	24	06
Gisovu	06	01
Gishyita	04	03
Gitesi	02	07
Mwendo	NIL	02
Bwakira	01	19
Mabanza	NIL	NIL
Rutsiro	NIL	NIL
Total	37	38

(7)

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7. Returnees. The details of the UNHCR aided returnees are given as under:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Destination</u>
12 Feb	88	Rwamatamu, Gishyita, Gisovu, Gitesi and Bwakira
28 Feb	64	Rwamatamu, Gishyita, Gitesi Bwakira and Mwendo
01 Mar	202	Rwamatamu, Gishyita and Gitesi
08 Mar	370	Rwamatamu, Gishyita, Gitesi, Bwakira and Mabanza

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Annexure 4
(Refers to Para 19)

SECURITY APPRECIATION

1. The general situation over the last six months has remained calm. In fact the months of Nov and Dec witnessed a significant improvement in the overall situation indicating a positive future in the offing. However since Jan the security situation has remained somewhat mixed and thus an uneasy calm has prevailed. The initial upswing that one saw seems to have come to a halt if not a downslide.

2. While the prison and detention centres are a disgrace to human rights, there are an increasing number of indications that the local authorities are in no mood to reconcile and laying their hands on more and more to punish. Since Jan a large number of persons are being arrested on their alleged involvement in genocide or even on petty grounds and have no hope of justice in the foreseeable future.

3. Deterioration in the situation is further anticipated if the majority community continues to be subjugated and witch hunting by the Govt and the RPA goes on. Attempts at reconciliation are only half hearted. The system of forgive and forget is not likely to be resorted to by the Govt as this may be taken as a sign of weakness. It is too early to expect the TUTSI population who are in control of the state at present to forget the deep scars of wounds inflicted on them in so recent a time. The RPA commanders are generally seen to be adopting hardline approach. Locals do express apprehensions and feeling of insecurity when given an opportunity to do so. In some communes TUTSIs are actively engaged in identifying those returnees allegedly involved in the genocide or theft of their property and get them arrested. On the issue of reconciliation the Govt is definitely in a Catch 22 position. The international community is watching every move while the hardliners within the military are in no mood to soften their instance. As things stand today reconciliation does not appear on a higher priority in practice with the Govt at the grassroots level as this would further provoke hardliners of the military. It remains to be seen how the Govt punishes those of one community responsible for genocide and protect those of the other holding strings within the Govt hierarchy.

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4. The RPA is very much in control everywhere and the civil officials are powerless to do much to prevent harassment of innocents. This is likely to prove counter productive to the Govt as the moderates and fence sitters within the majority population will be driven to desperation. The security situation in the coastal areas has also not been conducive for peace to return. There have been instances of seven intrusions by suspected militia from across the border. The threat from within and outside has rendered the present security situation suspect. The continued ascendancy of the RPA over the civil administration and subjugation of the majority community will make matters worse in the future to come.

Fax: 083911

FILE

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - KIGALI

TO : MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 12 MARCH 95

FROM : ~~SECTOR 4B~~ KIBUYESUBJECT : RETURN ON SECTOR ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE : YOUR LETTER DATED 06 MARCH 1995

1. PLEASE FIND LISTED BELOW THE REQUESTED INFORMATION.

A. RETURNEES/INHABITANTS

POPULATION BEFORE THE WAR	AS OF JAN 95	UNHCR SPONSORED RETURNEES SINCE JAN 95
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448744

369306

1135

NO PRESENT PERCENT IN ETHNIC GROUPING AVAILABLE.
LOCAL AUTHORITIES REFUSE TO GIVE INFORMATION.

B. HEALTH SERVICES

ALL PRE-WAR FACILITIES ARE OPERATIONAL.
AT PRESENT THERE ARE 3 HOSPITALS AND 13 DISPENSARIES/HEALTH
CENTERS FUNCTIONING.
DETAILED INFORMATION SHOWN IN ANNEX 1

1

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SRGG's Return


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C. EDUCATION

PRIMARY SCHOOLS	OPEN	CLOSED	TOTAL
	181	21	202
SECONDARY SCHOOLS	OPEN	CLOSED	TOTAL
	6	14	20

DETAILED INFORMATION SHOWN IN ANNEX 2

2. BEST REGARDS.



C. KAEFER
MAJOR
HUMANITARIAN OFFER
SECT 4B KIBUYE

ANNEX 1
(Refers to Para B)

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HEALTH SERVICES

KIBUYE PREFECTURE

GITESI COMMUNE

KIBUYE (GR 2772)

HOSPITAL

28 STAFF (MSF, SDR)

SOUS PREFECTURE MUSHUBATI

MABANZA COMMUNE

RUBENGERA (GR 3374)

DISPENSARY

5 STAFF, 20 BEDS
ELECTRICITY/WATER
NGO (MSF)

MUSHUBATI (GR 3279)

DISPENSARY

14 STAFF, 10 BEDS
ELECTRICITY/WATER
(CARITAS)

RUTSIRO COMMUNE

RUTSIRO (GR 3183)
(CRETE ZAIRE NILE)

DISPENSARY

11 STAFF, 20 BEDS
NO MATRASSES, NO
SHEETS, NO ELECTR.
(CARITAS)

MURUNDA (GR 3088)

DISPENSARY/
HEALTH CENTRE32 STAFF, 68 BEDS
EVERYTHING AVAILABLE
NGO (MEMISA)

SOUS PREFECTURE BIRAMBO

BWAKIRA COMMUNE

KILINDA (GR 5358)

HOSPITAL

22 STAFF, 120 BEDS
EVERYTHING AVAILABLE
NGO (MEMISA)

MURUNDI (GR 5366)

DISPENSARY

6 STAFF, 5 BEDS
NO WATER, NO ELECTR.
NGO (MEMISA)

BIRAMBO (GR 4763)

DISPENSARY

5 STAFF, 10 BEDS,
NO WATER,
NO ELECTRICITY
NGO (MEMISA)

RUGABANO (GR 4268)

DISPENSARY

NO FIGURES AVAILABLE

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MWENDO COMMUNE RUGANDA (GR 4354)	DISPENSARY	NO FIGURES AVAILABLE
MUTUNTU (GR 3552)	DISPENSARY	24 STAFF, 48 BEDS NO ELECTRICITY (CARITAS)
KIVUMU COMMUNE NYANGE (GR 5573)	DISPENSARY	4 STAFF, NO WATER NO ELECTR. NGO (MSF)
SOUS PREFECTURE NGOMA		
GISHYITA COMMUNE NGOMA (GR 2059)	HOSPITAL	5 STAFF, 50 BEDS NGO (ADRA)
MUBUGA (GR 2364)	DISPENSARY	4 STAFF, 5 BEDS NO WATER, NO ELECTR. (CARITAS)
RWAMATAMU COMMUNE NYABINAGA (GR 1350)	DISPENSARY	3 STAFF, 10 BEDS NO ELECTR. (CARITAS)
GISOVU COMMUNE GISOVU (GR 2853)	DISPENSARY/ HEALTH CENTRE	12 STAFF, 25 BEDS NO ELECTRICITY (CARITAS)

ANNEX 2
(Refers to Para C)

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EDUCATION

KIBUYE PREFECTURE

GITESI COMMUNE

21 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
3861 PUPILS
100 TEACHERS

SOUS PREFECTURE MUSHUBATI

MABANZA COMMUNE

21 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
3 SECONDARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
6783 PUPILS
138 TEACHERS

RUTSIRO COMMUNE

21 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
10100 PUPILS
179 TEACHERS

SOUS PREFECTURE BIRAMBO

BWAKIRA COMMUNE

22 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
4 PRIMARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
4 SECONDARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
7399 PUPILS
123 TEACHERS

MWENDO COMMUNE

22 PRIMARY SCHOOLS
2 SECONDARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
6867 PUPILS
136 TEACHERS

KIVUMU COMMUNE

15 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
2 SECONDARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
4832 PUPILS
128 TEACHERS

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SOUS PREFECTURE NGOMA

GISHIYITA COMMUNE

20 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
12 PRIMARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
3 SECONDARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
2574 PUPILS
47 TEACHERS

RWAMATAMU COMMUNE

21 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
1 SECONDARY SCHOOL OPEN
5428 PUPILS
135 TEACHERS

GISOVU COMMUNE

18 PRIMARY SCHOOLS OPEN
5 PRIMARY SCHOOLS CLOSED
3643 PUPILS
90 TEACHERS