

UNAMIR

CODE CABLES - OUTGOING

9 NOV - 29 DEC 1993

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U N A M I R

CODE CABLE

CRN 32

1/1
16212 29 DEC 1993
81.

To: Maj Martin, DPKO, UNHQ, NEW YORK
From: BGen Dallaire, FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
Date: 29 December 1993
Number: MIR 324
Subject: Burundi and DMZ Command

TOT
16262

1. Burundi:

In informal conversations between FC and OAU rep in Kigali, it was gathered that more and more information is becoming avail that not only do we suspect some Rwandan Government contacts with elements in Burundi, but the RPF also have ties and interests with/in that country. It would be most beneficial to this Mission if any pertinent information avail on the Burundi situation be communicated by code cable to SRSG or FC in order to guide us in this matter.

2. DMZ Command:

FC has made it quite clear to head of Ghanaian recce team (Col Kwateng) that he wishes to keep Col Figoli in his current appointment as DMZ Sector Commander until his tour ends in June 94. A possible change in the leadership of that critical Sector at this time, when it will become the central focus of our activities in Phases 2 and the first period of Phase 3, is unacceptable. Your full support in this operational matter is required.

TOT

U N A M I R
CODE CABLE

CRN 32

1/1
16207 29 DEC 1993
B

To: Annan, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
From: Dallaire, Force Commander, UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda
Date: 29 December 1993
Number: MIR 323
Subject: Inclusion of Romania in the troop contributing countries list
Reference: Your code cable UNAMIR 2504 of 22 Dec 93.

1. FC has spoken to Rwandan Foreign Minister and RPF Chairman and Vice-Chairman on reference subject today. No problem for this initiative.
2. FC wishes to be assured that these five (5) officers from Romania are in addition to current Belgium contingent strength.
3. Also be advised that the Belgium wish us to consider inclusion of an additional coy of infantry in their Bn, which would be provided by Austria. Correspondence is avail on this matter at Military Adviser desk officer.
4. FC applauds these initiatives but is strictly concerned that these unusual and not the most effective troop mixes could possibly create difficulties to the overall operational output of our forces.
5. FC will not stand in the way of these suggestions as long as they do not create any fundamental language and doctrine problems.

TOT
16257

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

13301 28 DEC 1993

CRN 29

1/4

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM : DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE : 28 DEC 93
NUMBER : *111R 312*

SUBJECT : WEEKLY SITREP No 11, 21 DEC 93 - 27 DEC 93

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

THE SITUATION IN THE MISSION AREA IS CALM BUT TENSE AS WE APPROACH THE INSTALLATION OF THE BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT DATE. UNAMIR IS FACING THE MOST CRITICAL WEEK AND TENSION IS RAISING. THE IMPORTANT MILESTONES OF THE PAST WEEK ARE A BREAKTHROUGH ON THE ISSUE OF THE GARRISON SITE FOR THE RPF BATTALION TO BE INSTALLED IN KIGALI CITY AND THE SIGNATURE OF THE SOPs FOR THE KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA. THE OBSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF ALL PARTIES LEAD TO A LATE DECISION IN THIS DOMAIN AND IN CONSEQUENCE ALL SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES LIKE RECONNAISSANCES, ENGINEERING AND LOGISTICAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN HURRIEDLY. ALL ASSETS ARE BEING COMMITTED TO THE INSTALLATION OF THE BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVT THIS WEEK. SEC KIGALI PREPARED OPERATION CLEAN CORRIDOR CONSCIENTIOUS AND WE ARE ALL LOOKING FORWARD FOR ITS EXECUTION. UNAMIR IS READY TO GO.

2. MILITARY

A. DEPLOYMENT

(1) HQS

ALL THE HQS ARE OPERATIONAL AS FAR AS MANPOWER IS CONCERNED. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE HQS IS THE MAIN TASK.

(2) KIGALI SECTOR

DURING THIS WEEK BELGIAN BATTALION (KIBAT) CONDUCTED PTL IN KIGALI CITY AND BANGLADESH BATTALION (RUTBAT) CONTINUED THE PREPARATION PHASE PRELIMINARY TO ITS ENGAGEMENT IN THE TERRAIN. THE UNMOs CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCES OF THE CAMPS AND GARRISONS IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA. FC FORCED THE APPROVAL OF THE SOPs FOR THE KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA (KWSA) IN A MARATHON MEETING ON 23 DEC 93. THE KWSA IS ESTABLISHED BY UNAMIR SINCE 241600 DEC 93.

(3) **MILOB HQ**

NORMAL ESCORT DUTIES HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT. THE UNMOs HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED ACCORDING TO THE MOVE OF THE GRAVITY CENTER TO KIGALI.

(4) **DMZ SECTOR**

DMZ SECTOR IS GRADUALLY GETTING OPERATIONAL. THE TUNISIAN COY IS STILL MISSING IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT. GHANA RECCE TEAM ARRIVED IN THE MISSION AREA AND CONDUCTED RECCE FOR THE GHANA BATTALION TO BE STATIONED IN THE DMZ AREA AT BYUMBA (BYUBAT).

(5) **UNMUR SECTOR**

RWANDA-UGANDA BORDER CROSSING REMAINS DIFFICULT DUE TO THE LACK OF COMMUNICATION. THINGS ARE DISCUSSED AT HIGH LEVEL BUT CHANGES ARE VERY SLOWLY VISIBLE IN THE TERRAIN. FC/CMO WILL RETURN EARLY JAN 94 TO UGANDA IN ORDER TO SORT OUT THE CROSS BORDER PROBLEM WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND COS. ONCE AGAIN THE RPF LEAD A FUND RAISING MEETING IN MULINDI ON 27 DEC 93 AND A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF MINISTERS ATTENDED THROUGH GATUNA CROSSING. ALL VEHICLES WERE CHECKED WITH NO RESULTS. SOME NAMES ETC. WERE TAKEN. NRA HAD NO OBJECTIVES OF THEIR CROSSING AT ALL. SOME VEHICLES ARE REPEAT CROSSERS AND CAME WITH DIFFERENT LICENCE PLATES. THIS IS BEING REVIEWED.

(6) **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

AS LONG AS NO EQUIPMENTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY BANGLADESH THIS PERSONNEL WILL BE TASKED AS INFANTRY. HOWEVER SOME MINOR WORKS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED BY THIS PERSONNEL IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WORKS FOR THE GARRISON FOR THE RPF BATTALION.

B. UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH

PERSONNEL STRENGTH ON 27 DEC 93 IS 1260. DETAILED INFORMATION IS ATTACHED HEREBY.

C. MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE

THE UNAMIR FIELD HOSPITAL HAS BEEN INAUGURATED IN THE KING FAYCAL HOSPITAL AT KIGALI. STAFFING IS BUSY ON THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL SUPPORT TO LOCAL POPULATION AND ON TASK SHARING BETWEEN UNAMIR AND HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT.

3. POLITICAL

SRSG HAD MEETINGS WITH ALL POLITICAL PARTIES. NO TANGIBLE CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED. ON 23 DEC 93 SRSG AND FC MET THE HEAD OF STATE TO DISCUSS PROSPECT OF THE BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT MDR AND PL PARTIES NOT BEING IN AGREEMENT FOR THEIR MINISTERIAL AND DEPUTY APPOINTMENTS.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

THE LOGISTICAL ENVIRONMENT IS STILL FAR FROM IDEAL IN ORDER TO CONDUCT THE OPERATIONS SMOOTHLY. WE ARE BARELY AT THE MINIMUM VIABLE LEVEL. SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORT AND LACK OF COMMUNICATION IS THE MAIN PROBLEM. SUSTAINEMENT OF FIELD TROOPS AND OPERATIONS IS NON EXISTANT IN THE FORCE CONCEPT EXCEPT FOR BELGIUM CONTINGENT.

5. CONCLUSION

AS EXPECTED THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT FOR UNAMIR, THIS WEEK IS BEING CONDUCTED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF INCREASING TENSION. ECHOES OF ACTIVITIES ON TRAINING AND ARMING OF POLITICAL MILITIES HAVE REACHED UNAMIR. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SOME INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATIONS WOULD LIKE TO SEE UNAMIR SLOW DOWN AND DELAY PHASE ONE OBJECTIVES. UNAMIR IS HAVING A RESOLUTE ATTITUDE CONCERNING TIMING MATTERS AND THERE ARE NO VALID ARGUMENTS FOR DELAYING THE EXECUTION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.

6. REGARDS

UNAMIR
WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

DATE : 27 DEC 93
CORRECTED UP TO
27 0900 Dec 93

SRL NO	COUNTRY	TROOPS										MILOB	GRAND TOTAL
		INF BN	LOG COY	ENG COY	MED COY	MOVCON PL	MP SEC	DMZ COY(+)	SUB TOTAL	STAFF	TOTAL		
1.	ARGENTINA												
2.	AUSTRIA											5	5
3.	BANGLADESH	265	83	85	27	20	5		485	28	513	51	564
4.	BELGIUM	409							409	15	424		424
5.	BOTSWANA											9	9
6.	BRAZIL	3							3		3	10	13
7.	CANADA									1	1	1	2
8.	CONGO											25	25
9.	ECUADOR												
10.	EGYPT												
11.	FIJI											1	1
12.	GHANA									14	14	23	37
13.	HUNGARY											4	4
14.	MALI											10	10
15.	NETHERLANDS											10	10
16.	NIGERIA												
17.	PAKISTAN												
18.	POLAND											5	5
19.	RUSSIA												
20.	SENEGAL											39	39
21.	SLOVAKIA											5	5
22.	TANZANIA												
23.	TOGO											15	15
24.	TUNISIA							60	60	1	61		61
25.	URUGUAY											21	21
26.	ZIMBABWE											10	10
GRAND TOTAL		677	83	85	27	20	5	60	957	59	1016	244	1260

REMARKS

* Out of 244 MILOB 78 are in Uganda.
* 14 Staff Offrs have newly been converted in MILOBS wef 10 Dec 93.

7/4

281050Z

UNAMIR
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 28 December 1993
NUMBER: MIR 311
SUBJECT: Draft report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR
REFERENCE: CNR 033 of 23 December 1993 received today.

TOT 1055Z

1. With reference to the revised draft of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, Force Commander is submitting for your consideration the following amendments:
 - A. Paragraph 11, top of page 6: Date should be "24 December" (not 20 December). At end of same paragraph, scratch the phrase: " or in early January 1994."
 - B. Paragraph 14, page 7, should read as follows:
"...operations of the observers. Although the southern region is at present reasonably quiet, the relative ease of access to considerable arms and the ethnic tensions amongst and around the refugees, have created a potentially destabilizing situation which had not been foreseen in my initial assessment of requirements for the Mission. For the time being, the Force Commander is attempting to reallocate personnel within the overall resources projected in my report of 24 September. This solution may be acceptable for the

Dec - distribute - under control

near term if the flow of observers planned for Phase II are deployed on an urgent basis. If, however, experience and circumstances were to require additional observers, I would bring this matter to the Council for its consideration."

2. *... from
... files.*

KMF 77 P2/2

CRN-27 1/1

280500Z

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 27 DECEMBER 1993

TO: ANNAN\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE MIR-305	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL RECOMMENDED FOR UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO BURUNDI	
ATTN: MAJ MARTIN	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL, PRESENTLY SERVING WITH UNAMIR\UNOMUR ARE RECOMMENDED AS MEMBERS WITH THE UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO BURUNDI:

- A. LCOL NOTAYI-ZIMBABWE-UNOMUR;
- B. MAJ KIRSCHNER-AUSTRIA-UNAMIR; AND
- C. CAPT BABAKAR-SENEGAL-UNAMIR.

2. THE FIRST TWO ABOVE NOMINATED OFFICERS HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY EXPERIENCE, TRAINING, LINGUISTIC ABILITIES (ENGLISH, GERMAN, SWAHILI AND SHONA) AND PREVIOUS PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE WITH UN OR OAU. HOWEVER NEITHER IS FLUENT IN FRENCH.

3. THE THIRD OFFICER IS RECOMMENDED BECAUSE OF TOTAL BILINGUAL ABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

TOT 280525Z NTK

KMF 77

P4/2

280500Z

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 27 DECEMBER 1993

TO: MTIWAZA\UNOMUR\KABALE	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE INMARSAT: MISC-63	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL RECOMMENDED FOR UN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MISSION TO BURUNDI	
ATTN: COL MTIWAZA	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

- 1, THE ATTACHED CODE CABLE WAS FORWARDED TO NEW YORK ON 27 DEC 93,
- 2, FOR YOUR INFORMATION,
- 3, REGARDS.

TGT. 0625Z

KMF 77 P2/2

CRN-27 1/1

280500Z

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 27 DECEMBER 1993

TO: ANNAN\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAH\UNAMIR\KIGALI
MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE MIR-305	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
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2. THE FIRST TWO ABOVE NOMINATED OFFICERS HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY EXPERIENCE, TRAINING, LINGUISTIC ABILITIES (ENGLISH, GERMAN, SWAHILI AND SHONA) AND PREVIOUS PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE WITH UN OR OAU. HOWEVER NEITHER IS FLUENT IN FRENCH.

3. THE THIRD OFFICER IS RECOMMENDED BECAUSE OF TOTAL BILINGUAL ABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

TOT 280525Z NTK

U N A M I R

CRN-26 P1/1

211540Z

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 21 DECEMBER 1993

NUMBER: MIR-282

TOT
1545Z

SUBJECT: Incident involving members of Belgian contingent

REFERENCE: Your code cable UNAMIR 2429.

This is to inform you that an incident, a quarrel between some Belgian soldiers and an UNMO (all in civilian dress) over a woman, took place on the night of 3/4 December 1993 in a local Disco at Kigali. An investigation was immediately carried out by the Belgian Battalion Commander. As a result, two Belgian soldiers are being returned to Belgium for appropriate disciplinary action. This type of incident will surely be covered in daily sitreps or otherwise in future.

Regards.

OUTGOING CODE

211520Z

CRN-25
1/4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM : DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE : 21 DEC 93
NUMBER : MIR-281
SUBJECT : WEEKLY SITREP NO 10, 15 DEC 93 - 20 DEC 93

TOT
1535Z

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

THE SITUATION IN THE MISSION AREA IS QUITE CALM. NO MAJOR INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE, EXCEPT ONE INCIDENT BETWEEN CIVILIANS AS PER DAILY SITREP 17/18 DEC 93. UNAMIR IS IN A CRITICAL PHASE AND BUT STILL FACES NUMEROUS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF LACK OF VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATION. UNAMIR BEING OBSTRUCTED BY THE RW GOVT, RGF AND RPF IN GETTING AN AGREEMENT REGARDING THE LOCATION OF THE RPF BATTALION TO BE INSTALLED IN KIGALI CITY. ALSO, WE ARE STILL DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF THE SOPs FOR THE KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA. ONCE THAT IS ACHIEVED, THE NEXT GOAL FOR UNAMIR WILL BE THE MOVE OF THE BATTALION TO THAT PLACE. CLEAN CORRIDOR IS THE NAME OF THAT OPERATION. ONCE AGAIN THE LOGISTIC COMPONENT WILL BE A MAJOR PARAMETER IN CONDUCTING THIS OPERATION SMOOTHLY.

2. MILITARY

A. DEPLOYMENT

(1) HQS

- (A) ALL THE HQS ARE OPERATIONAL AS FAR AS MANPOWER IS CONCERNED. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE HQS IS THE MAIN TASK.
- (B) BANGLADESH CONTINGENT AND IN PARTICULAR THE FORCE RESERVE NEEDS VEHICLES AND APC'S. AN IMMEDIATE AIRLIFT FROM BANGLADESH COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF MOBILITY AT THIS PARTICULAR PHASE OF THE OPERATION UNAMIR (ESTABLISHMENT OF KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA AND INSTALLATION OF BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVT IN RWANDA).

(2) KIGALI SECTOR

- (A) DURING THIS WEEK BELGIAN BATTALION (KIBAT) CONDUCTED PTL IN KIGALI CITY AND BANGLADESH BATTALION (RUTBAT) CONTINUED THE PREPARATION PHASE PRELIMINARY TO ITS ENGAGEMENT IN THE TERRAIN. THE UNMOs CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCES OF THE CAMPS AND CANTONNEMENTS IN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE KIGALI WEAPON

- SECURE AREA.
- (B) PLEASE NOTE THAT EACH OF THE SUBORDINATE UNITS HAVE THEIR OWN LIMITATIONS:
- KIBAT IS STILL LOOKING FOR APPROPRIATE CANTONNEMENTS FOR SOME OF THE SUB-UNITS;
 - RUTBAT FACES NUMEROUS LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF MEANS. THE POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL TASKS ARE LIMITED;
 - THE UNMOs HAVE NO WORKING RADIO EQUIPMENT AS YET;
 - HQ SEC KIGALI HAS NOT YET AN APPROPRIATE WORKING LOCATION.
- (C) THE OPERATIONS TO BE STARTED FROM TODAY 21 DEC 93 ARE LARGELY AFFECTED BY THESE LIMITATIONS AND EACH OF THEM CONSTITUTES A POTENTIAL REASON FOR DELAY.
- (D) THE WEAPON SECURE AREA IS NOT OPERATIONAL AS YET AS THE UNAMIR TROOPS ARE STILL BEING DEPLOYED AND THE RGF HAVE NOT IMPLEMENTED ANY OF THE SOPs AS WE STILL DON'T HAVE AGREEMENT. THESE DELAYS MAY CAUSE A DELAY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BTG BY 29/30 DEC 93.
- (3) **MILOB HQ**
- NORMAL ESCORT DUTIES HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT. THE UNMOs HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED ACCORDING TO THE MOVE OF THE GRAVITY CENTER TO KIGALI.
- (4) **DMZ SECTOR**
- DMZ SECTOR IS GRADUALLY GETTING OPERATIONAL. THE TUNISIAN COY IS STILL MISSING IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT (NO RIFLES AND ONLY ONE VEHICLE PER PLATOON FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION). LOCAL COY COMD APPROACHED HIS GOVT SINCE THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE. NO REPLY HAS COME SO FAR. INVESTIGATIONS OF THE MUTURA MASSACRES IS ONGOING. THE REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY WILL BE FORWARDED ASAP. BOTH COMMITTEES OF THE KINIHIRA ACCORD ARE SLOWLY COMING BACK TO LIFE.
- (5) **UNMUR SECTOR**
- FC WENT THIS WEEK TO UGANDA TO NEGOTIATE OPENING THE BORDER. FC MET THE UGANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 18 DEC 93. HE STATED: (A) FULL SUPPORT TO THE EXTENSION OF THE MISSION BY THE GOVT; (B) WISHES TO EASE ACCESS BY UNAMIR ELEMENTS TO UGANDA BY THE USE OF MULTIPLE ACCESS VISAS TO BE ISSUED IN KIGALI AND BY RECEIVING WARNING IN ADVANCE; (C) ANXIOUS TO SEE THE KIGALI-KABALE ROAD CORRIDOR REOPENED. FC WILL RETURN TO KAMPALA IN THE FIRST

WEEK OF JANUARY TO SEE DEFENCE MINISTER AND ALL INTERESTED MILITARY/LOCAL STAFFS.

(6) **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

LARGE ADVANCE PARTIES OF FORCE ENGINEERS, LOG AND MED ELEMENTS HAVE ARRIVED IN THE MISSION AREA. AS LONG AS NO EQUIPMENTS ARE PROVIDED BY BANGLADESH THIS PERSONNEL WILL BE TASKED AS INFANTRY.

B. UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH

THE FORCE STRENGTH AS ON 21 DEC 93 IS:

BANGLADESH CONTINGENT - 266
BELGIUM CONTINGENT - 409
TUNISIAN CONTINGENT - 59
LOG COY - 83
ENGINEER COY - 85
MED COY - 26
MOV CON - 20
STAFFS - 53
MP SEC - 5
UNMOS - 179

TOTAL - 1190

C. MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE

THERE IS NO SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE GENERAL HEALTH STATE OF MILITARY COMPONENT. DEDICATED FIELD HOSPITAL WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND PROCEDURES FOR MEDEVAC CAPABILITY BY HELICOPTER ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION. HOSPITAL IS NOW ESTABLISHED IN KING FAYCAL COMPLEX BUT HAS NO EQUIPMENT NOR SUPPLIES AS YET.

3. POLITICAL

THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL VISITED FRIDAY 17 DEC 93 TWO CAMPS FOR THE BURUNDESE REFUGEES IN THE VICINITY OF BUTARE, A TOWN LOCATED IN THE SOUTH OF RWANDA, AT ABOUT 200 KMS FROM KIGALI. 200,000 PERSONS, FROM THE HUTU TRIBE IN THEIR MAJORITY LIVE IN THOSE CAMPS. HYGIENIC CONDITIONS ARE ALMOST NON EXISTENT AND FOOD IS VERY SCARCE. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE URGE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONTINUE ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES. THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY BUYING SEVERAL THOUSAND TONS OF CEREALS IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE BURUNDESE REFUGEES.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. FC IS CONCERNED THAT FORCE RESERVE HAS NO MOBILITY AT ALL, NO APC OR HELICOPTER FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT IF SITUATION FORCES IT TO BE DEPLOYED AT SHORT NOTICE.

B. COMMUNICATIONS ABOVE UNIT LEVEL HAVE NOT YET BEEN INSTALLED.

C. ONLY BELGIAN BATTALION AND SOME UNMOS HAVE FLACK JACKET. OTHER TROOPS HAVE NO FLACK JACKETS AT ALL.

5. CONCLUSION

THE MILITANT ACTIVITY TO DESTABILISE THE SITUATION IN PHASE ONE HAS APPEASED SIGNIFICANTLY. UNAMIR CONTINUOUSLY DEMONSTRATES CONCRETELY THAT IT IS GROWING IN STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC BUILD IS STILL A CONCERN IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVE PHASE ONE OBJECTIVES. THERE ARE SIGNS BY BOTH SIDES ON HARDENING POSITIONS IN THE DETAILS OF GETTING ALL THESE ELEMENTS IN PLACE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG BY 29/30 DEC 93.

6. REGARDS

201500Z

U N A M I R
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-23

1/3

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, CMO-UNOMUR/FC-UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
NUMBER: MIR-275
SUBJECT: VISIT TO KAMPALA - UNOMUR -- 16/17/18 DEC 93
DATE: 20 December 1993

To T
1505Z

1. The Ugandan Ambassador had stated that all was arranged in Kampala. When FC/CMO got there, nothing was arranged at all.

2. 16 Dec 93. FC/CMO was not met at airport except by UNOMUR personnel. Organized a visit to the French and UK Embassies. Meet with Premier Consul and High Commissioner. They were both very keen on UNOMUR staying another six months and will support our cause with Foreign Minister. Organized a visit to Foreign Minister for 17 Dec 93 by imposing a request. Minister of Defence, Chief of Staff and Commander of NRA were all out of town/country until Tuesday at least.

3. 17 Nov 93. Met with U.S.A. Ambassador who not only supports our efforts with Foreign Minister but is keen on making Defense Minister and Chief of Staff well aware that UNOMUR is to be helped in its tasks. He would consider that not to do so on their part could be misinterpreted as tacit support of RPF activities. Met with Foreign Minister in a very relaxed and warm atmosphere. He stated:

- a. Full support to the extension of the Mission by the Government;
- b. Wishes to ease access by UNAMIR elements into Uganda by:

- (1) Use of multiple access visas to be issued in Kigali (this is ongoing with no problems);

- e. Implement boat patrols soonest but by day only for now;
 - f. Prepare draft letter to NRA High Command for better logistic support to their LOs and escorts (no vehicles, no stores). They are traveling with us in our vehicles and that tends to restrict our operation;
 - g. Increase heart and minds operations in small enclaves (soccer, small donations).
5. Information had not reached the NRA/Border LOs about our authority received the previous day to cross the border. FC/CMO was, with difficulty, permitted to cross, but civilian staff and stores are still held up for next few days until word rushes its way from Foreign Affairs, to Defence, to local staff in Kabale.
6. FC/CMO UNOMUR will return to Kabale and Kampala during first week of January to see Defence Minister and all interested military/local staffs.
7. Regards.

- (2) Receiving warning in advance of visits to Kabale so as to inform border post personnel (NRA soldiers) already in location with UNOMUR (final procedure for this specific passage of information will be sorted out over next few days);
 - (3) Remain in the limits of the SOMA for transfer of material (we are doing that with support of UNDP staff in Kampala but this will be taken over more and more by our military and civilian personnel now permanently in Kampala);
 - (4) Possibly reviewing the visa requirement through the use of the UNAMIR ID cards (this will be the subject of correspondence over next weeks).
- c. Anxious to see the Kigali-Kabale road corridor reopened. FC/CMO state that the same desire was expressed by Rwandan Head of State to SRSG very recently, and that the former hoped it would open about the same time as the BBTG came into being. UNAMIR staff doing military security and engineering assessment (one bridge and about 1 kilometer of road work) of the task.

4. 18 Dec 93. Went to see/brief staff at UNOMUR HQ Kabale. Visited CP5 construction and gave direction in the following areas:

- a. Reassess, once again, force structure in order to get 10 UNMO teams for patrol activities soonest;
- b. Continue implementation of construction/improvement of CP2 and CP4;
- c. Maximize night patrols/observation posts with recently received night vision equipment;
- d. Conduct more night searches of vehicles as the trend is for these vehicles to travel between midnight and 0200 hrs, when civilian local staff are not available to off-load vehicles for searches;

CRN 20

1757 14 DEC 1993

BP

CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM : DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE : 14 DEC 93
SUBJECT : WEEKLY SITREP NO 9, 08 DEC 93 - 14 DEC 93

1/4

MIR 243

1 GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

THE SITUATION IN THE MISSION AREA IS QUITE CALM. EXCEPT ONE MURDER INCIDENT, AS PER DAILY SITREP COVERING PERIOD 11/12 DEC 93, NO MAJOR INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING THIS PERIOD.

2 MILITARY

A. DEPLOYMENT

(1) **HQS**

ALL THE HQS ARE OPERATIONAL AS FAR AS MANPOWER IS CONCERNED. ADDITIONAL OFFICE EQUIPMENTS, FURNITURE, COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS AND MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION ARE NEEDED URGENTLY.

(2) **KIGALI SECTOR**

BELGIUM BATTALION (KIBAT) IS ALMOST WITH 80% ON GROUND WITH MEN BUT MATERIAL STILL COMING IN WITH VEHICLES AND CONTAINERS THE PRIORITY. BANGLADESH BATTALION (RUTBAT) IS 56% ON GROUND WITH MEN ONLY. DUE TO SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORT RUTBAT WILL HAVE LESS MOBILITY AND REDUCED EFFECTIVENESS. SECTOR HQ YET TO BE ESTABLISHED IN NEW LOCATION IN CITY CENTER.

(3) **MILOB HQ**

15 NEW OBSERVERS JOINED THE MISSION (5 FROM AUSTRIA AND 10 FROM URUGUAY). THEY WERE TO BE DEPLOYED IN THE DMZ SECTOR BUT THE TASK OF UNMOs FOR THE KIGALI SECTOR AND THE URGENCY OF ESTABLISHING THE BBTG BEFORE THE NEW YEAR HAS CALLED FOR A REDEPLOYMENT OF UNMOs AWAY FROM THE DMZ (WITH THE INHERENT RISKS) AND INTO KIGALI.

(4) **DMZ SECTOR**

THIS SECTOR STILL HAS NOT ENTERED ITS NEW HQ IN BYUMBA DUE TO LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS. THE TUNISIAN COY(-) IS STILL WITHOUT ANY OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT OR RIFLES AND ONLY ONE VEHICLE PER PLATOON FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION. WE HAVE HAD LITTLE TO NO PATROLS DUE TO LACK OF VEHICLES AND RADIOS THAT ARE STILL NOT DEPLOYED. INVESTIGATIONS OF THE MUTURA MASSACRES IS ON-

10T
19/02

GOING AS IS THE BOARD OF INQUIRY ON THE DMZ MASSACRE ALTHOUGH IT IS STALLED AWAITING THE NAMES OF THE TWO GOVERNMENT MEMBERS OF THE BOARD.

(5) **UNOMUR SECTOR**

THE RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT OF UNOMUR PATROLS REPORTED IN THE PREVIOUS WEEKLY SITREP SEEM SOLVED. THE RELATIONS WITH THE NRA ARE LUKE WARM. NRA REMAINS HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO THE SUGGESTED CROSS BORDER RUNS TO RWANDA AND BACK. THE PATROLS CONTINUE TO REVEAL ACTIVITY ALONG THE BORDER BUT LITTLE TO NO TANGIBLE EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE.

(6) **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

ONLY ADVANCE PARTIES OF FORCE ENGINEERS, LOG AND MED ELEMENTS HAVE ARRIVED AT KIGALI TILL NOW. THEY WERE SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN REQUESTED. FC SENT BULK OF ENGR AND LOG PERS INTO RUTBAT AS INFANTRY UNTIL RUTBAT COMPLEMENT IS ON THE GROUND AND THE ENGR AND LOG EQUIPMENT ARRIVES.

B. UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH

THE FORCE STRENGTH AS OF 14 DEC 93 IS:

BANGLADESH CONTINGENT - 226
BELGIUM CONTINGENT - 398
TUNISIAN CONTINGENT - 59
LOG COY - 83
ENGR COY - 85
MED COY - 26
MOV CON - 20
STAFFS - 53
UNAMIR OBSERVERS - 88
UNOMUR OBSERVERS - 78
TOTAL - 1165 (SEE ATTACHED CHART)
LEAVE - 19

C. MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE

THERE IS NO SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE GENERAL HEALTH STATE OF MILITARY COMPONENT. DEDICATED FIELD HOSPITAL WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND PROCEDURES FOR MEDEVAC BEING FINALIZED.

3. POLITICAL

A. EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND ARE CONTINUING ON ESTABLISHMENT OF KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA BETWEEN THE UNAMIR AND THE PARTIES CONCERNED. OPTIONS AND COUNTER OPTIONS ARE BEING FLOATED BY BOTH RPF AND RGF SIDES ON POSSIBLE LOCATION OF RPF BATTALION AND THEIR POLITICAL GROUPS IN KIGALI. AN UNDERSTANDING IS EXPECTED SOON.

- B. DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND NGOs WERE BRIEFED BY FC ON SECURITY SITUATION IN KIGALI AND ON THE PROCEDURE OF ESTABLISHMENT OF WEAPON SECURE AREA. A MORE TECHNICAL BRIEFING IS BEING ARRANGED FOR ALL UN AGENCIES AND NGOs FRIDAY. THIS IS PRIMARILY TO INSTALL CONFIDENCE IN UNAMIR.
- C. THE MAIN EVENT OF THE WEEK WAS THE MEETING BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF IN KINIHIRA ON 10 DEC 93 (75 KM NORTH OF KIGALI) UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SRSG. AFTER FIVE HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS THE PARTIES HAVE ADOPTED A JOINT STATEMENT TO REAFFIRM THEIR READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS OUTLINED IN THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. THE BBTG SHOULD BE IN PLACE BY 31 DEC 93.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- A. FC IS CONCERNED THAT FORCE RESERVE HAS NO TRANSPORT, NO APC OR NO HELICOPTERS FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT IF SITUATION FORCES IT TO BE DEPLOYED AT SHORT NOTICE.
- B. COMMUNICATIONS ABOVE UNIT LEVEL HAVE NOT YET BEEN INSTALLED. UNMOs HAVE NEXT TO NO COMMUNICATIONS.
- C. ONLY KIBAT AND A FEW UNMOs HAVE FLAK JACKETS. MOST TROOPS HAVE NO FLAK JACKETS AT ALL.
- D. FEEDING AND WATER FOR RUTBAT BEING SOLVED.
- E. LACK OF BIVOUAC STORES BY KIBAT IS CAUSING ACCOMMODATION AND STORAGE DIFFICULTIES SINCE THEY WERE MOVED OUT OF THE STADIUM TO MAKE ROOM FOR RUTBAT.

5. CONCLUSION

THE MILITANT ACTIVITY TO DESTABILIZE THE ACTIVITY IN PHASE ONE HAS APPEASED SIGNIFICANTLY. UNAMIR CONTINUES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS GROWING IN STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC BUILD UP SHOULD PROGRESS QUICKLY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVE PHASE ONE OBJECTIVES. APC AND HELOS, OTHER TRANSPORT FOR UNMOs AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT REMAIN THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE OPERATION. THE REDUCTION OF UNMOs OUT OF THE DMZ IN FAVOR OF KIGALI SECTOR DUE TO OVERALL LACK OF UNMOs IS A SIGNIFICANT RISK BUT BASED ON ESSENTIALITY OF GETTING BBTG IN PLACE SOONEST AND BASED ON THREAT ASSESSMENT THAT PREDICTS NEXT SUBVERSIVE ACTION WILL BE IN OR AROUND KIGALI. THE RISK IS DEEMED ACCEPTABLE. SHOULD SIGNIFICANT UNEXPECTED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY COMMENCE, UNAMIR REACTION TO CONTAIN SITUATION IS VERY, VERY LIMITED UNTIL APCs AND/OR HELOS AND/OR TRUCKS ARE DEPLOYED.

6. REGARDS.

UNAMIR
WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

DATE : CORRECTED UP TO 14 DEC 93

SRL NO	COUNTRY	TROOPS										UNMOS	GRAND TOTAL
		INF BN	LOG COY	ENG COY	MED COY	MOVCON PLT	MP SECT	DMZ COY(-)	SUB TOTAL	STAFF	TOTAL		
1.	ARGENTINA												
2.	AUSTRIA											5	5
3.	BANGLADESH	266	83	85	26	20	5		485	28	513	32	545
4.	BELGIUM	398							398	15	413		413
5.	BOTSWANA											9	9
6.	BRAZIL	3							3		3	10	13
7.	CANADA									1	1	1	2
8.	CONGO											25	25
9.	ECUADOR												
10.	EGYPT												
11.	FIJI											1	1
12.	GHANA									2	2		2
13.	HUNGARY											4	4
14.	MALI												
15.	NETHERLANDS											10	10
16.	NIGERIA												
17.	PAKISTAN												
18.	POLAND									5	5		5
19.	RUSSIA												
20.	SENEGAL											39	39
21.	SLOVAKIA											5	5
22.	TANZANIA												
23.	TOGO												
24.	TUNISIA							59	59	1	60		60
25.	URUGUAY									1	1	16	17
26.	ZIMBABWE											10	10
GRAND TOTAL		667	83	85	26	20	5	59	945	53	998	167	1165

4/4

1707 13 DEC 1993 CRN 18
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1/2

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 13 DECEMBER 1993

TO: ANNAN\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE INMARSAT: MIR 236	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: UNOMUR REPORT	
ATTN: MR RIZA	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 12	

1. THIS MESSAGE IS FORWARDED PURSUANT TO OUR CONVERSATION OF 13 DECEMBER 1993. UNOMUR HAS IN OUR OPINION BEEN AN OPERATIONAL SUCCESS IN DETERRING CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND WAR MATERIAL.

2. WHILE TANGIBLE PROOF OF THIS SUCCESS HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, SOURCES IN THE LOCAL POPULATION, THE NRA AND THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP HAVE ALL INDICATED THAT OUR BORDER OBSERVATION AND PATROL OPERATIONS HAVE IN FACT INTERDICTED CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT AND FORCED SERIOUS MODIFICATION OF FORMER CROSSING POINTS, METHODS OF TRANSPORT AND QUANTITIES OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL WHICH ARE ABLE TO CROSS THE BORDER.

3. INVESTIGATIONS OF CAMPS AND CROSSING SITES HAVE REINFORCED THE FACT THAT PREVIOUSLY WELL USED VEHICLE, BICYCLE AND FOOT ROUTES HAVE NOT RECENTLY BEEN IN USE EXCEPT IN CHECKPOINT 5 AREA WHERE THE NRA HAVE SPECIFICALLY DEPLOYED NEW ROADBLOCKS AT CERTAIN TIMES TO PREVENT OUR OBSERVATION. OUR SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION OF THE AREA REVEALED NEW VEHICLE TRACKS CROSSING THE BORDER. EXTENSIVE OBSERVATION AND PATROLLING IN THE OTHER PARTS OF THE BORDER HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO LARGE SCALE CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT WITHIN OUR AREA OF OPERATIONS. WE HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED THEIR NORMAL MOVEMENT PRACTICES IN THE BORDER AREA.

4. THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE COMPLAINTS AND ATTEMPTS BY ELEMENTS OF THE NRA TO DETER UNOMUR OPERATIONS, BY ATTEMPTS BY ELEMENTS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION TO DISCREDIT UNOMUR UNDER STATED DIRECTION BY CERTAIN LOCAL OFFICIALS AND BY THE DELIBERATE ATTEMPTS TO DELAY ACCESS TO CERTAIN AREAS BY THE USE

17/12

OF NEW ROADBLOCKS. ALL THESE FACTORS POINT TO THE EFFECTIVENESS UNOMUR OPERATIONS MUST BE HAVING IN ENFORCING ITS MANDATE.

5. UNOMUR IS VIEWED AS A STABILIZING FACTOR AND A CONFIDENCE BUILDING INSTRUMENT IN THIS CENTRAL AFRICAN AREA. ALTHOUGH NO SIGNIFICANT TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF WAR MATERIAL HAS FALLEN AS YET INTO UNOMUR HANDS, IT IS STRONGLY FELT BY THE UNMOS THAT SUCH AN EVENT WILL ARISE DUE TO OUR INCREASED NIGHT OPERATIONS USING NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES AND THE EMINENT ARRIVAL OF THE THREE HELICOPTERS. THESE NEW CAPABILITIES WILL PERMIT UNOMUR FORCES TO MORE EFFECTIVELY COVER SOME OF THE TIME AND SPACE GAPS STILL EXISTING IN OUR OVERALL SURVEILLANCE PLAN.

131200 Z

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 13 December 1993
NUMBER: MIR-230

SUBJECT: UNOMUR -- CROSS-BORDER AND MANDATE EXTENSION

1. Cross Border. In a fax received from the Resident Representative of UNDP Kampala dated 8 December 1993, the following information was provided:

- a. He spoke with officials only of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence;
- b. Their commitment to UNOMUR operations agreement is still strong, including free movement in Uganda;
- c. Cross-border movement, however does not form part of the agreement in their mind and should be dealt with outside the agreement;
- d. The current procedures for movement of UNOMUR personnel and equipment in and out of the country is appropriate and should be maintained in their mind;
- e. As far as their government is concerned, the common border with Rwanda is open. Thus Uganda sees no difficulties in issuing clearances when and if requests are received by normal channels;
- f. UNDP Resident Representative recommends that those expected to cross the border be issued multiple VISA. For equipment and supplies, he recommends normal procedures and the possibility of using his offices to help facilitate the process.

2. The above information is most encouraging and we have reacted to it in the following way:

a. CMO UNOMUR and Dr. Kabia have attempted to confirm these procedures locally and in Kampala, but have not received satisfactory results or guarantees of the procedures being correct;

b. We had prepared a letter to be delivered by the FC to the President requesting the Ministers and officials to clarify this situation as soon as possible;

c. Not being able to secure any meetings with either the President nor any of the Ministers involved, the plan was changed to the following:

1. A letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs was prepared to be hand delivered by the FC as it was felt that the subject should not be raised with the President;

2. A meeting with the Ugandan Ambassador is organized so that we use his auspices to get to the Ministers as we are having no success in Kampala;

3. FC plans to go to Kampala on a days notice this week to meet with the Ministers.

3. Mandate extension. In your fax to the SRSG of 7 December 1993, you indicated our responsibility in consultations with Ugandan authorities on the extensions of UNOMUR's mandate, and that the results be reflected in our draft report. We have had no satisfaction whatsoever to the efforts by the CMO, the Political Advisor nor the UNDP Resident Representative in meeting anyone who wants to talk on this subject. Constitutional electoral activities are used as the excuse so far.

4. In para 2 of the same 7 December fax, your request for a sitrep by 14 December 1993 from the Force Commander on meetings to be held on and around 12 December 1993 will not be possible. Neither Dr. Kabia, nor the UNDP Resident Representative in Kampala, nor the CMO sitting outside these Ministers' offices has produced any success to speak of. However, we propose to implement the current plan as described in para 2 above:

- a. Get the Ugandan Ambassador in Kigali more involved now/today that he is on the ground in a formal meeting with the FC;
- b. Present a letter for him to deliver by fax to the Foreign and Defence Ministers on the subject at hand;
- c. Urge in the strongest of terms meeting before the end of this week between the FC and their Ministers.

5. No matter what the outcome of the FC's meeting with the Ambassador today, he is going to Kampala no later than Thursday in order to attempt personally to get to see these gentlemen. The FC has lost patience with all these intermediaries and obvious stalling tactics used by some of them.

6. The option of talking to the President directly on the subject was not recommended verbally by the Ugandan Ambassador, by the Kampala UNDP Resident Representative and by Dr. Kabia. The FC is willing to go along with this but requests your agreement on this specific point. Please remember that the FC was received by the President in the early stage of the mission and the later was very specific on his thoughts on the mandate and its relationship with UNAMIR, i.e. he was supportive of the management/command relationship between both missions but wanted the mandates to be clearly separate.

7. Regards.

091435Z

OUT GOING CODE CABLE

CRN-13

1/4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM : DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE : 09 DEC 1993
NUMBER : MIR-207
SUBJECT : WEEKLY SITREP NO 8, 30 NOV TO 07 DEC 93

TOT 091440Z

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW NO MAJOR INCIDENTS OCCURRED. SITUATION IN GENERAL REMAINED TENSE IN THE CAPITAL AND IN THE NORTH WESTERN TOWN OF RUHINGARI OVER THE KILLING OF 17 CIVILIANS ON THE NIGHT 29/30 NOV 93 (REPORTED IN WEEKLY SITREP NO 7). AS A FOLLOW UP OF THE KILLING, THROUGHOUT THE DAY HOURS OF 30 NOV 93 RUHINGARI TOWN DWELLERS SAW MOVEMENT AND DEPLOYMENTS OF RGF FORCES AROUND THE TOWN. MOST CIVILIANS HAD VACATED THE TOWN IN PANIC ANTICIPATING A FRESH BREAK OUT OF WAR BETWEEN THE RGF AND RPF FORCES. ON 01 DEC A SPECIAL UNAMIR PATROL DISCOVERED 5 DEAD BODIES OF YOUNG GIRLS AGED BETWEEN 12 TO 15 YEARS IN THE BAMBOO FOREST NOT FAR FROM THE VILLAGE WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON THE NIGHT OF 29/30 NOV. ONE GIRL WAS FOUND ALIVE WHO WAS EVACUATED TO RUHINGARI HOSPITAL AND DIED THE NEXT MORNING. ON 04 DEC A UNAMIR TUNISIAN PATROL WAS SENT TO THE SAME SPOT TO FIND TRACES OF ATTACKERS. ONE CIVILIAN GUIDE OF THE PATROL WAS HIT BY A MINE AND WAS SERIOUSLY INJURED. EOD TEAM INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT SIMILAR MINES ARE USED BY RGF FORCES. THE PATROL WAS DEEMED TO BE THE TARGET OF THIS MINE, AS WHOEVER IS TO BE BLAMED, DID NOT WANT THE UNAMIR IN THE FOREST. RGF DID NOT FOLLOW PERPETUITIES IN THE FOREST AT ALL. INVESTIGATION IS LEANING AWAY FROM LOCALLY HELD OPINION THAT RPF FORCES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS VIOLENT ACT. EVIDENCE OF OTHER DESTABILIZING INCIDENT IS A LARGE BOOBY TRAPPED MINE EXPLOSION ABOUT 40 KM WEST OF KIGALI NEAR A SCHOOL BUILDING KILLING 11 CHILDREN AND INJURING SEVERAL OTHERS ON 03 DEC 93. THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE KILLINGS IN NGILMA (SOUTH) NEAR REFUGEE CAMP BY ALLEGED BURUNDI FORCES IS STILL INCONCLUSIVE.

2. MILITARY

A. DEPLOYMENT

(1) HQS

HQ UNAMIR, KIGALI SECTOR HQ AND DMZ SECTOR HQ HAVE RECEIVED ALMOST FULL COMPLIMENT OF STAFF OFFICERS FROM BANGLADESH AND BELGIUM EXCEPT THE

DFC AND CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER. ALL THE HQS ARE OPERATIONAL AS FAR AS MAN POWER IS CONCERNED. OFFICE EQUIPMENTS, FURNITURE, COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS AND TRANSPORTS ARE STILL SCANTY. SHORTAGES OF THESE IMPORTANT ITEMS ARE MAKING STAFFING AND COMMAND AND CONTROL ALMOST INEFFECTIVE.

(2) KIGALI SECTOR

BELGIUM BATTALION IS ALMOST 80% ON GROUND WITH MEN AND MATERIAL. BANGLADESH BATTALION IS 50% ON GROUND WITH MEN ONLY (ARRIVED ON 08 DEC). REST OF THE BANGLADESH INFANTRY IS SCHEDULED TO REACH KIGALI ON 11 DEC 93. DUE TO SHORTAGE OF INTEGRAL TRANSPORT THE BANGLADESH INFANTRY BATTALION WILL HAVE REDUCED MOBILITY AND THUS LESS EFFECTIVE IN THEIR OPERATIONAL TASKS. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT FALLOW ON EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT FROM BANGLADESH BE SHIPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (EVEN BY AIRCRAFT IF POSSIBLE).

(3) MILOB HQ

13 NEW OBSERVERS JOINED THE MISSION (7 FROM BANGLADESH AND 6 FROM URUGUAY). THEY ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN TO THE DMZ SECTOR AS A FIRST PRIORITY. BUT SHORTAGES IN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT WILL HINDER THE OBSERVERS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR MISSION. OBSERVERS FROM GHANA, TOGO, MALE AND AUSTRIA HAVE NOT YET ARRIVED IN THE MISSION AREA BUT ARE EXPECTED IN THE NEXT WEEK.

(4) DMZ SECTOR

WITH THE INCREASE OF VEHICLE FLEET TO 40 (FOR THE WHOLE FORCE) AND WITH THE INCREASE IN UNMO STRENGTH THE DMZ SECTOR IS GRADUALLY GETTING OPERATIONAL. ESCORT DUTIES STILL CONTINUES TO BE ONE OF THE MAJOR OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT WHICH TAKES AWAY LOT OF EFFORT IN TERMS OF ALREADY MEAGER OPERATIONAL RESOURCES. THE HQ COULD NOT YET BE MOVED TO ITS OPERATIONAL LOCATION IN BEYUMBA DUE TO LIMITATIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. 4 UNMO TEAMS ARE SO FAR DEPLOYED IN DMZ AREA. DEPLOYMENT OF MORE UNMO TEAMS AND AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY BATTALION IN DMZ WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN INSTILLING CONFIDENCE IN THE LOCAL POPULATION ABOUT UNAMIR.

(5) UNOMUR SECTOR

A TOTAL OF 81 UNMOS ARE DEPLOYED IN UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER. NORMAL PATROL ACTIVITIES ARE ROUTINELY BEING CARRIED OUT BY UNOMUR UNMO TEAMS. DURING

THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW UNMO TEAMS WERE AT TIMES STOPPED BY NRA SOLDIERS TO GO TO THE BORDER OUT POSTS WITH SOME PRETEXT OR THE OTHER. THE MATTER WAS HOWEVER SOLVED AFTER DISCUSSION WITH NRA BATTALION COMMANDERS. UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER IS STILL CLOSED FOR CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT. FC PROCEEDING TO UGANDA ON 11 DEC (SATURDAY) TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT ON THE BORDER ISSUE AND ON OTHER UNAMIR- UNOMUR RELATED SUBJECTS.

(6) FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENT

WITH THE ARRIVAL OF BANGLADESH CONTINGENT ON 08 DEC ADVANCE PARTIES OF FORCE ENGINEERS, LOG AND MED ELEMENTS HAVE ARRIVED.

B. UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH

THE FORCE STRENGTH AS ON 09 DEC 93 IS :-

BANGLADESH CONTINGENT - 225
 BELGIUM CONTINGENT - 398
 MOV CON - 20
 TUNISIAN CONTINGENT - 59
 STAFFS - 53
 UNAMIR OBSERVERS - 73
 UNOMUR OBSERVERS - 81

 TOTAL - 909

C. MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE

THERE IS NO SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE GENERAL HEALTH STATE OF MILITARY COMPONENT. DEDICATED FIELD HOSPITAL IS YET TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE FORCE (COMPLETE COMPLIMENT OF BANGLADESH MEDICAL PLATOON WILL ARRIVE ON 11 DEC 93). WITH THE BUILD UP OF FORCE MEDEVAC CAPABILITY BY HELICOPTER IS ESSENTIAL.

3. POLITICAL

- A. POLITICAL SITUATION IN RWANDA IS TENSE. EXTREMIST HOUTO ELEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN ALLEGING THAT THE MASSACRES ON 17/18 NOV AND ON 29/30 NOV HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE RPF. THEY ALSO CLAIMS THAT TUTSI TRIBE HAS A REGIONAL PLAN TO ULTIMATELY DOMINATE THE PARTS OF RWANDA, UGANDA AND BURUNDI. UNAMIR ASSESSES THAT THERE IS NO PROOF IN IT.
- B. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL TURMOIL IN EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY EXCEPT THE PUBLIC CHAOS IN RUHINGERI ON 30 NOV AND 01 DEC 93 AS AN AFTER EFFECT OF MASSACRE IN THAT GENERAL AREA. THE SITUATION HOWEVER HAS BEEN STABILIZED BY THE

GOVERNMENT BY DEPLOYING MASS TROOPS.

C. RELATIONS WITH HOST NATION

VISIT THIS WEEK BY MR JAMES JONAH TO THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA REAFFIRMED BOTH UN COMMITMENT AND THAT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE HEAD OF STATE WAS IN VERY POSITIVE SPIRITS. SEVERAL INFORMAL MEETINGS WERE HELD BY THE SRSG AND FC WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AND SENIOR GOVT OFFICIALS. ALL DEMONSTRATED CONCERNS ON DELAYS OF UNAMIR LETTING BBTG COME INTO EFFECT IN KIGALI AND THE FUTURE ANTICIPATED SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS WHEN THE FRENCH FORCES LEAVE ON 12 DEC 93.

4. CONCLUSION

THE MILITANT ACTIVITY TO DESTABILISE THE SITUATION IN PHASE 1 HAS INCREASED. UNAMIR IS MAKING ITS ALL OUT EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE CONCRETELY THAT IT IS GROWING IN STRENGTH, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENERGY IN GETTING THE BBTG IN PLACE BEFORE THE NEW YEAR. FOLLOW ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS BUILD UP MUST CONTINUE WITH SAME ENERGY AND PRIORITY DEMONSTRATED OVER THE LAST WEEK. INITIAL RESULTS ARE MOST ENCOURAGING (SHIPMENT OF VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS), BUT THE OVERALL VERY TIGHT CONTROL ON RESOURCES DUE TO NO BUDGET OR SPECIFIED FUNDING IS MOST LIMITING TO OPPORTUNITY AND TIMELY STAFF ACTIONS. ARRIVAL OF BANGLADESH CONTINGENT ON 08 DEC WILL GREATLY HELP IN CREATING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN KIGALI WITHIN THE STIPULATED TIME FRAME. THE REPORT OF VIOLENT ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH ALLEGEDLY BY THE RPF CAN NOT BE COMPLETELY VERIFIED OR MONITORED UNLESS MORE UNMO TEAMS WITH ENOUGH TRANSPORTS AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS CAN BE DEPLOYED. UNAMIR IS UNDER CONSTANT AND ENORMOUS PRESSURE FROM MODERATES TO PURSUIT BBTG TO BE ESTABLISHED SOONEST. FC WILL NOT RECOMMEND THIS UNTIL BANGLADESH BATTALION IS REASONABLY EFFECTIVE ON THE GROUND.

4. REGARDS.

CRN 007/11 3/1
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1993
NUMBER:

SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 7, 22 TO 29 NOV 93.

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

OVER THE LAST WEEK, A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS THAT HAVE CAUSED CASUALTIES ON THE GENERAL POPULATION AND THE BELGIQUE RED CROSS (ONE KILLED AND TWO INJURED) HAS CONTINUED TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND IN THE CAPITAL. OUR INABILITY TO CONFIRM THE PERPETRATORS OF THE MASSACRES ON 17/18 NOV 93 HAS FUELLED SPECULATION ON UNAMIR'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE THE SECURITY IN THE DMZ. LAST NIGHT'S ALLEGED ATTACK BY THE RPF IN THE NORTH-WEST NEAR THE DMZ HAS CAUSED 17 CASUALTIES AND A NUMBER OF MISSING PERSONS. THIS INCIDENT, AS A NUMBER OF OTHERS, IS NOT BEING TIMELY DOCUMENTED AS THE MISSION CANNOT GET THE UNMOS INTO THE AREA DUE TO A LACK OF VEHICLES AND INCREASINGLY CONFLICTING DEMANDS.

2. MILITARY

(A) DEPLOYMENT

(1) HQ/CP

THE KIGLAI SECTOR HQ HAS COMMENCED WORK USING OFFICES IN THE FORCE HQ BLDG UNTIL THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IS READY. THE CYANIKA OP/CP1 WAS OFFICIALLY OPENED ON 27 NOV 93.

(2) PATROLS/ESCORTS

THE PATROLS IN THE DMZ HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO ONE A DAY IN THE WESTERN PART AND ONLY IN DAYLIGHT. ALL OTHER EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DEDICATED TO ESCORT AND PROTECTION DUTIES INTO AND THROUGH THE DMZ FOR VIP, DIPLOMATIC, NGO AND JOINT MEETINGS. IN UNOMUR, THE OVERALL PATROL ACTIVITY HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED AS A RESULT OF THE FORMATION OF ANOTHER UNMO TEAM AS WELL AS THE ARRIVAL OF 4 VEHICLES FROM UNOSOM. APART FROM THE

DAY PATROLS, NIGHT PATROLS ARE ALSO CONDUCTED TO REINFORCE AS WELL COMPLEMENT THE DAY PATROLS, BUT THE ABSENCE OF NIGHT VISION AIDS IS SERIOUSLY IMPEDING OUR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ON THIS REGARD.

(B) PERSONNEL

(1) STRENGTH

(A) SEE ATTACHED CHART

(B) CASUALTIES - NIL

(2) LEAVE - 13

(3) MEDICAL SITUATION

SUPPLIES HAVE ARRIVED AT UNOMUR AND VACCINATIONS ARE COMMENCING. UNAMIR HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY OF ITS SUPPLIES AS YET BUT OVERALL THE PERSONNEL ARE HEALTHY.

(C) RELATIONS WITH FACTIONS AND HOST NATION

UNOMUR. RELATIONS WITH THE NRA ARE LUKE WARM. THE CHIEF LIAISON OFFICER HURRIEDLY LEFT KABALE FOR KAMPALA ON 23 NOV 93, CLAIMING THE HE WAS ORDERED TO DO SO BY HIS ARMY COMMANDER. BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, HE OFFICIALLY INFORMED US THAT THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES WERE NOT AMUSED WITH CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS BY BOTH UNAMIR/UNOMUR OFFICIALS AND A RESULT THEREOF, HE WAS STRICTLY INSTRUCTED TO STOP THE CROSS BORDER RUNS UNTIL A SOLUTION IS FOUND AND TO DATE NO OFFICIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN WRITING. RECENTLY THE NRA WAS ISSUED WITH NEW CHINESE CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORMS. COINCIDENTALLY, THE ISSUES OF UNIFORMS HAPPENED TO COINCIDE WITH ALLEGATIONS OF TROOPS AMASSING ALONG THE BORDER. HOWEVER NO CLUES WERE FOUND. TWO NRA POSITIONS WERE FOUND DESERTED BY OUR TEAMS. WE ARE INVESTIGATING.

(D) UNAMIR. OPEN DISCUSSIONS HAVE CONTINUED AND JOINT SESSIONS ARE ABOUT TO RECOMMENCE. COOPERATION FROM BOTH SIDES HAS BEEN GOOD ALTHOUGH ESSENTIAL INFO REQUESTED ON MILITARY MATTERS HAS NOT BEEN READILY FORTHCOMING. THIS HAS NOT TILL NOW CAUSED ANY SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN OUR SCHEDULE OF WORK. THE INCREASES IN CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AND ALLEGED INCIDENTS REPORTED BY BOTH SIDES ARE BUILDING UP TO A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLES IF NOT ON THE GROUND. NEITHER SIDE HAS PROVIDED ANY SUBSTANTIVE PROOF OF THE SOURCES OF THEIR ALLEGATIONS.

3. VIOLATIONS, INCIDENTS AND COMPLAINTS

(A) UNOMUR. NTR

(B) UNAMIR SEVERAL INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED THIS WEEK INCLUDING SHOOTINGS, KIDNAPPING AND SIGHTINGS IN THE DMZ IN PARTICULAR. THE PATTERN IS VERY MUCH AIMED AT DESTABILIZING THE WESTERN DMZ SECTOR WHICH IS A STRONG HOUTU AND MRND AREA. ALL ALLEGATIONS ARE DIRECTED AGAINST THE RPF BUT NO SUBSTANTIVE PROOF HAS AS YET BEEN FOUND. AS WE ARE REACTING, AND USUALLY LATE, TO THESE INCIDENTS, OUR INVESTIGATIONS ARE STILL VERY SUPERFICIAL DUE TO THE LIMITATIONS OF MOBILITY AND NUMBERS.

4. POLITICAL

(A) THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY TENSE WITH REPORTED MASSACRES IN THE NORTH WEST OF RWANDA, PRECEDED BY EARLIER MASSACRES IN THE RUHENGARI AREA. THOUGH THESE INCIDENTS ARE LOCALIZED, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

(B) SINCE MY ARRIVAL IN THE MISSION AREA, I HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE RPF AND MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. I HAVE BEEN ASSURED OF THEIR SUPPORT IN CARRYING OUT OUR MANDATE. I AM SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES ON 1 DECEMBER 1993.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EFFORT BEING DEPLOYED TO PROVIDE THIS MISSION WITH THE MINIMUM AND URGENT VEHICLE AND RADIO MEANS TO MEET THE RAPIDLY ESCALATING TENSIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE THE ESTABLISHMENT THE WEAPON SECURE AREA IN KICALI. THE NEED TO GET A CRITICAL MASS OF FORMED UNITS AND UNMOS IN THEATRE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BY INCREASING THE RATE OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHASE 1 AND 2 PERSONNEL MUST REMAIN A PRIORITY.

6. LIAISON, CONTACTS AND MEDIA

THE LARGE PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON 26 NOV 93 REGARDING THE MASSACRE INVESTIGATION RESULTS PROVED TO BE EVENHANDEDLY RECEIVED EXCEPT FOR THOSE WHO INSIST THE RPF DID THIS TERRIBLE ACT. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO BE MORE PRO-ACTIVE IN THE MEDIA BATTLE IN ORDER TO QUELL THE ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF DISINFORMATION PARTICULARLY ON THE RADIO. ALL OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION ARE OPEN WITH BOTH FACTIONS WHICH HAS BEEN MOST HELPFUL IN PASSING INFORMATION RAPIDLY.

7. OBSERVATIONS

- (A) UNOMUR. THE SUDDEN AND UNCALLED FOR ACTIONS BY THE NRA TO STOP CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS BETWEEN UNAMIR AND UNOMUR OFFICIALS SHOWS THAT THE NRA ARE LESS THAN SATISFIED WITH OUR PRESENCE. OUR ACTIVITY RATE WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE AS WE ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW CERTAIN LEADS REGARDING TROOP AND CIVILIAN MOVEMENT.
- (B) UNAMIR. THE OVERALL SITUATION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY DETERIORATED IN THE DMZ AND THE AREA OF RUHENGERY. SOME DESCRIBE THE SITUATION AS VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT HAPPENED JUST BEFORE THE 8 FEB 93 RPF ATTACK. THIS MISSION HAS DEPLOYED EVERY POSSIBLE ELEMENT IN ORDER TO GAIN A REASONABLE HAND ON THE VIOLATIONS IN THE DMZ WHILE CONTINUING TO BUILD UP ITS FORCES IN KIGALI. ONLY THE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS, VEHICLES AND RADIOS WILL PERMIT US TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE THAT WE ENJOYED AT THE START OF THE DEPLOYMENT. IF WE DO NOT SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING THE BBTG SOON IN KIGALI, THERE WILL NEVER BE A PHASE 2, 3 OR 4. AS CLEARLY INDICATED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE TECHNICAL REPORT, THIS MISSION WILL SINK OR SWIM WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 1.

REGARDS.

UNAMIR/LINOMUR

DATE: 30 Nov 93

WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

SRL NO	COUNTRY	TROOPS										UNMOS	GRAND TOTAL
		INF BN	LOG COY	ENG COY	MED COY	MOVCON PLT	MP SECT	DMZ COY(-)	SUB TOTAL	STAFF	TOTAL		
1.	ARGENTINA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.	AUSTRIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3.	BANGLADESH	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	20	27	47	27	74
4.	BELGIUM	370	—	—	—	—	—	—	370	2	372	—	372
5.	BOTSWANA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10
6.	BRASIL	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	3	10	13
7.	CANADA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	2
8.	CONGO	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	25	25
9.	ECUADOR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10.	EGYPT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
11.	FII	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
12.	GHANA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	2
13.	HUNGARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4
14.	MALI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15.	NETHERLANDS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10
16.	NIGERIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17.	PAKISTAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
18.	POLAND	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5	—	5
19.	RUSSIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20.	SENEGAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	29	29
21.	SLOVAKIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	5
22.	TANZANIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
23.	TOGO	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
24.	TUNISIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	59	59	1	60	—	60
25.	URUGUAY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1
26.	ZIMBABWE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	10
GRAND TOTAL		373	—	—	—	20	—	59	452	39	491	132	623

CRN 005 1/7

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1993

NUMBER: UNAMIR 002

SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 6

KABALE PROTECTED

I. GENERAL

THE COUNTRY IS GENERALLY TENSE DUE TO THE MASSACRES OF THE NIGHT 17/18 NOV 93 IN RUHENGIRI PREFECTURE, AND THE APPROACH OF THE DEPOSED BURUNDI PRESIDENT'S FUNERALS. THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST FORMED MILITARY TROOPS (BELGICQUE COMPONENT OF THE KIGALI BATTALION) HAS DEMONSTRATED UNRESOLVE IN GETTING BBTG IN PLACE SOONEST. OVERALL LOGISTICAL SITUATION IS STILL DESPARATE BUT VERY POSITIVE ANSWERS IN THIS REGARD ARE COMING IN.

II. POLITICAL

A. CRYING WOLF. ON TWO SEPERATE OCCASIONS THIS LAST WEEK (MONDAY AND THURSDAY), THE HEAD OF MISSION WAS CALLED BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITH INFORMATION REGARDING THE MASSING OF NRA (UGANDAN) TROOPS AND RPF ELEMENTS IN KABALE AND VOLCANO AREAS WITH THE AIM OF ATTACKING RWANDA. ALSO, THE RWANDAN AMBASSADOR TO UGANDA STATED THE SAME TO CMO UNOMUR IN KABALE. THERE WAS EVEN TALK OF THE PRESIDENT'S ENTOURAGE DEMANDING THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER TO FORMALLY PROTEST IN PERSON TO THE UGANDAN PRESIDENT. THE LATTER REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THAT SUGGESTION. IN ALL CASES UNOMUR PATROLS WERE DEPLOYED AND ABSOLUTELY NO SIGNS OF SUCH ACTIVITY WERE SEEN. THE SOURCES OF THE ERRONEOUS INFORMATION COME FROM THE CABINET OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC. MISSION HEAD QUERIED THE STAFF OF THE PRESIDENT TO PROVIDE THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND SO FAR THE ONLY ANSWER HAS BEEN THEIR CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY WAS TO GIVE A FORMAL REPLY TO THESE QUERIES BUT HAVE RECEIVED NOTHING TO DATE. HEAD OF MISSION HAS FORMALLY DEMANDED THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TO GIVE US HIS SOURCES OF INFORMATION OR ELSE A LETTER OF CONCERN WILL BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT REQUESTING HIM TO GIVE THE REASONS OF SUCH POTENTIALLY ESCALATING

- 1 -

TOT 23/1230Z

ALLEGATIONS. IT HAS BEEN VERY USEFUL TO HAVE HAD UNOMUR FORCES READILY AVAILABLE ON THE BORDER TO NIP IN THE BUD THESE UNPROVEN ALLEGATIONS BY THE PRESIDENTS ENTOURAGE. IT IS A SUBJECT THAT THE NEW SRSG SHOULD TAKE UP WITH THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY IMMEDIATELY. WHY THE PRESIDENT, WITH A SEEMINGLY COMPLICITY OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (SAME POLITICAL PARTY), IS CREATING THESE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SCENARIOS IS NOT QUITE CLEAR EXCEPT TO POSSIBLY DISRUPT OR SLOW DOWN OUR DEPLOYMENTS AND THUS AFFECT THE DATE OF ESTABLISHING THE BBTG.

- B. MASSACRES 17/18 NOV 93. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THE NUMBER OF DEAD AT 21, INJURED AT 2 AND KIDNAPPED AT 2 PERSONS. MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE THE VICTIMS. THE INVESTIGATION IS ABOUT 2/3 FINISHED WITH NO HARD INFORMATION SO FAR ON WHO DID THIS TERRIBLE ACT. THE VICTIMS SEEM TO BE EITHER RECENT WINNERS IN THE LOCAL COMMUNAL ELECTIONS, LOCAL SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSMEN, OR CANDIDATES FOR THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. THE KILLINGS WERE EITHER FAMILY MEMBERS AND/OR POSSIBLE WITNESSES. THE OPERATION WAS VERY WELL PLANNED BETWEEN 2300 HRS AND 0230 HRS IN FIVE SEPARATE LOCATIONS NORTH-EAST AND EAST OF RUHengeri. SOME OF THE VICTIMS WERE OF THE MRND PARTY (SAME AS THE PRESIDENT). THE AIM OF THIS MASSACRE WAS VERY MUCH TO DESTABILISE THE DMZ AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. THE GOVERNMENT RADIO HAS ACCUSED THE RPF AND EXAGGERATED CONTINUOUSLY THE CASUALTY FIGURES EVEN THOUGH THE HEAD OF MISSION HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY ON THE MEDIA STATING THE REAL SITUATION. SUNDAY 21/11/93, THE DEFENCE FORCES EXPRESSED THE INDIGNATION OF THE MASSACRE AND WARNED THE RPF TO CEASE THEIR EVIL WAYS. THEY STATED THAT THEY WERE BREAKING OFF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT COMMISSION FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE FORCES AND GENDARMERY AS PER THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT. THE TALKS HAD BEEN OFF SINCE MID-OCTOBER BUT HEAD OF MISSION HAD BEEN INFLUENCING THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO COME BACK TO THE TABLE OVER THE LAST WEEK IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY DELAYS IN THE DEMOBILIZATION CALENDER. HEAD OF MISSION HAS DEMANDED FROM THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE THE PROOF HE HAS OF THE RPF PARTICIPATION IN THE MASSACRE. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE IS FROM THAT GENERAL AREA AND A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENTS PARTY. THE INVESTIGATION SHOULD BE FINISHED BY MID-WEEK BUT PROGRESS IS VERY SLOW DUE TO LARGE DISTANCES AND LIMITED RESOURCES.
- C. POLITICAL RALLY. WE RECEIVED INFORMATION ON SATURDAY THAT A POLITICAL RALLY WAS GOING TO END UP IN THE AMAHORO STADIUM ORGANISED BY THE MRND PARTY (THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY) IN ORDER TO CONDEMN THE MASSACRE. THE STADIUM HAS BEEN LENT TO UNAMIR TO HOUSE TWO COMPANIES. THE BELGIQUE CONTINGENT IS IN AT THIS TIME. WE SUCCESSFULLY STOPPED THE RALLY WITH THE HELP OF THE GENDARMERIE. THE MINISTER OF YOUTH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR

THIS INFRASTRUCTURE AND IS OF THE MRND PARTY. HE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO LEND US THE BUILDING AND CLOSE IT TO ANYTHING ELSE EXCEPT THE ODD NATIONAL FOOTBALL GAME.

- D. BELGIUM CONTINGENT AND FORCE HQ OPENING. THE MEDIA HAVE MADE A LOT OF EFFORT IN QUESTIONING THE LOGIC OF BRINGING IN THE OLD COLONIAL POWER BACK TO KIGALI. WE HAVE FOUGHT THAT AFFAIR WITH AGGRESSIVE RESPONSES IN LINE WITH THE UN NATURE OF THE CONTINGENTS AND NOT THE NATIONAL ASPECTS OF THEIR BACKGROUND. FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT THE KIGALI BATTALION IS A COMPOSITE UNIT WITH A LARGE BANGLADESH COMPONENT HAS HELPED. NONE OF THE PROBLEMS EXPECTED AROUND THE BELGIQUE DEPLOYMENT HAVE MATERIALISED. THE MISSION HQ OPENING WAS A GREAT SUCCESS WITH THE PRESIDENT GIVING A RELATIVELY LENGTHY SPEECH TOTALLY SUPPORTING THE MISSION AND ITS AIMS, BUT ALSO ASKING FOR MORE MONITORING IN THE DMZ. HEAD OF MISSION SPEECH STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE POLITICAL PARTIES TO STAND FIRM AND SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS.
- E. COMMENT THERE ARE SIGNS THAT LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT THE MRND PARTY IS NOT FULLY IN STEP WITH THE EXERCISE EVEN THOUGH IT SAYS IT IS. THE RECENT SPLIT OF THE LIBERAL PARTY ALONG ETHNIC LINES, AND THE EVER PRESENT CDR PARTY HUTU HARDLINERS MAKE FOR A LEVEL OF CONCERN THAT WILL REQUIRE PRO-ACTIVE DEFUSING BY UNAMIR IN ORDER TO DEFLATE THE INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC AND EXTENSIVE DISINFORMATION. THE ACTIONS IN THE DMZ REPORTED IN PREVIOUS SITREPS IN THE EASTERN PORTION, COUPLED WITH THE MASSACRE IN THE WESTERN PORTION THIS LAST WEEK, SEEM TO POINT TO A WELL PLANNED EFFORT TO RE-ORIENT UNAMIR EFFORTS AWAY FROM KIGALI, TO CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE THAT MIGHT MAKE THE DONATING COUNTRIES WANT TO SLOW DOWN THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR TROOPS, AND TO GENERALLY DELAY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL FOR THE BBTG TO GET STARTED IN KIGALI. OUR RESPONSES HAVE BEEN THAT ALL THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE DONE NOTHING MORE THAN ACCELERATE OUR DEPLOYMENT PLAN, INCREASE OUR EFFORTS IN THE DMZ, AND HARDEN OUR RESOLVE TO ESTABLISH THE KIGALI WEAPONS SECURE AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE HAVE MADE THAT QUITE CLEAR TO ALL THE POPULATION.

III. MILITARY

- A. UNOMUR. THE MISSION CONTINUES TO ENHANCE ITS KNOWLEDGE AND FEELING FOR ITS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THANKS TO AN INCREASE IN VEHICLES, CHECK POINT INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS, IT IS OVERALL BECOMING MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE. THE ARRIVAL OF THE SLOVAK CONTINGENT OF 5 UNMOS AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF THE BANGLADESH UNMOS HAS PROVIDED MORE PATROL DEPTH. THE QUICK RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS FOR VERIFICATION OF MOVEMENT OF NRA TROOPS ACROSS THE BORDER TO REENFORCE THE RPF HAVE

DEFUSED ESCALATING RUMOURS ON THE SUBJECT HERE IN KIGALI. THIS HAS BEEN A PRICELESS ADVANTAGE TO US IN ATTEMPTING TO KEEP THE SITUATION REASONABLY AT HAND. THE RWANDAN CHIEF OF STAFF STILL INSISTS THAT NRA TROOPS (UP TO 2 BATTALIONS) ARE CURRENTLY TRAINING IN RPF TERRITORY AND THAT THEY INFILTRATED IN SMALL GROUPS ACROSS THE NUMEROUS TRACKS ALONG THE BORDER. THE EMINENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE 3 HELICOPTERS AND THE ARRIVAL OF LONG RANGE DAY AND NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES WILL GIVE US A MUCH NEEDED LEVEL OF EFFECTIVE COVERAGE IN ORDER TO CONDUCT THESE RAPID RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT TROOP MOVEMENT AND PROVIDE THE CONTINUOUS OBSERVATION, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT THAT IS ESSENTIAL TO FIND THESE TROOPS THAT OPERATE IN SMALL GORILLA TYPE GROUPINGS. THE SOON TO ARRIVE AMBULANCE AND MEDICAL STORES WILL REESTABLISH A STRONGER SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE UNMOS TO CONDUCT MORE AGGRESSIVE PATROLS AT NIGHT, IN SECLUDED AREAS AND ON FOOT.

- B. DMZ SECTOR. WITH THE VEHICLE FLEET DOWN TO 3 OR 4 OPERATING VEHICLES DUE TO EXTENSIVE USE ON POOR ROADS AND TRAILS IN ORDER TO MEET THE MINIMUM OF MOST URGENT ESCORT REQUESTS HAS HAMPERED OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT ANY PATROLLING EVEN DURING THE DAY. THE VIOLENT INCIDENT OF THE NIGHT OF 17/18 NOV 93 HAS KEPT THE BULK OF THE UNMOS TEAMS FULLY OCCUPIED WITH THE INVESTIGATION AND THE CALMING OF THE POPULATION THROUGH MEETINGS AND SHEER PRESENCE. THE TUNISIAN PLATOONS ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE SAFE LOCATIONS BY THEIR PRESENCE AT THEIR BASE CAMPS FOR SOME CIVILIANS THAT HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES(ABOUT 200) BUT THEY ARE EXTENSIVELY LIMITED DUE TO A TOTAL LACK OF AUTONOMY OF DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT AS THEY WERE HANDED OVER TO UNAMIR WITH NO EQUIPMENT NOR VEHICLES NOR RADIOS AND ONLY PISTOLS. THE UPCOMING VISIT OF THEIR CHIEF OF STAFF MAY CHANGE THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION. THE DMZ HQ SHOULD BE READY IN BYUMBA BY NEXT WEEK BUT THERE ARE NO FACILITIES FOR THE 15 MEMBER STAFF TO BE ACCOMMODATED AND FED. CAO IS LOOKING INTO THE MATTER IN ORDER TO GIVE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO THE DMZ COMD TO EMPLOY THE STAFF IN EVEN UNMOS RELATED DUTIES AS THE TASKS ARE INCREASING EXPONENTIALLY. WE MUST SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE OUR EFFECTIVE FULL TIME PRESENCE IN THE DMZ IF WE DO NOT WANT A SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF THE SITUATION IN THAT SECTOR. THE OPTION OF AN EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF MORE UNMOS IN THAT AREA, WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF MANY MORE VEHICLES AND RADIOS NOW COULD REINSTILL CONFIDENCE IN THE POPULATION AND REDUCE TENSIONS DRAMATICALLY. THIS NEW SITUATION IN THE DMZ DOES CHANGE THE SCENARIO WE HAD ENVISAGED IN THE TECHNICAL REPORT BUT RAPID RESPONSE TO THIS CHANGING SITUATION WILL PERMIT US TO KEEP THE UPPER HAND.

- C. MILOB GROUP HQ. THIS HQ HAS BEEN TOTALLY DEDICATED TO

- C. MILOB GROUP HQ. THIS HQ HAS BEEN TOTALLY DEDICATED TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MASSACRE IN THE DMZ. THE FEW UNMOS AVAILABLE WERE LENT TO THE DMZ COMD FOR HIS USE. WORK ON THE KIGALI WEAPONS SECURE AREA OBSERVER CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS HAS NOT ADVANCED AS ANTICIPATED BUT CAUSES NO PARTICULAR DELAY. THIS HQ AS OTHERS IS STILL PLAGUED BY THE LACK OF RESOURCES DESCRIBED IN SITREP 5, BE IT FURNITURE, ELECTRICITY, PAPER, VEHICLES, RADIOS.
- D. KIGALI SECTOR. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THE KIGALI SECTOR HQ FRIDAY WITH TWO STAFF OFFICERS AND EXPECT BY THE END OF THE WEEK TO BE ABOUT AT 50% STRENGTH. WORK IS ONGOING WITH BOTH PARTIES REGARDING THE DRAFT SOPS FOR THE WEAPON SECURE AREA AND THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE BELGIEU COMPONENT OF THE KIGALI BATTALION. RECCES BY THE STAFF TO FINALISE THE VARIOUS BIVOUACS AND INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE UNITS IN AND AROUND KIGALI IS ONGOING. THE BELGIEU CONTINGENT HAS NOW 185 PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND (COY PLUS HQ AND LOG ELEMENTS) AND IS SHAKING ITSELF OUT. THEIR EARLY ARRIVAL HAS BEEN WELL PUBLICISED AND HAS HAD A POSITIVE AND SEEMINGLY CALMING EFFECT IN KIGALI. NO OVERT OBJECTIONS HAVE MANIFESTED THEMSELVES AGAINST THEM SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL. WE HAVE NOT FALLEN INTO THE TRAP OF DENUING THE KIGALI SECTOR OF ITS LIMITED FORCES TO REINFORCE THE DMZ. SUCH A DECISION COULD OPEN A NEW FLANK FOR HOSTILE ACTIVITY AND IT WOULD REDUCE OUR ARGUMENTS IN URGING THE RAPID ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WEAPONS SECURE AREA IN KIGALI IN ORDER TO GET THE BBTG HERE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.
- E. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAS MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE FC THAT THEY SINCERELY HOPE TO HAVE AN ANSWER FROM US ON WHEN WE EXPECT THEIR FORCES TO LEAVE. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT IF WE CANNOT REPLACE THEM IN SITU BEFORE 18 DEC 93 THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONDUCT A ROTATION OF THEIR TROOPS. FC HAS MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT SUCH A ROTATION OR EVEN HINT OF A ROTATION WOULD BE VIEWED VERY PESSIMISTICALLY BY ALL CONCERNED AND CAUSE A SERIOUS EROSION OF OUR CREDIBILITY IN TRYING TO GET THE KIGALI AREA SECURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR THE BBTG. THUS THE URGENT DEPLOYMENT OF AT LEAST ONE BANGLADESH COY MUST BE ATTEMPTED IN ORDER TO MEET THAT CRITICAL DATE. THERE MAY BE COMMAND AND CONTROL NUANCES THAT WILL HAVE TO BE IRONED OUT WITH THE BANGLADESH RECCE PARTY AS THE BANGLADESH CONTINGENT MAY NOT WANT ITS COYS UNDER COMMAND OF ANOTHER CONTINGENT COMMANDER (A PRINCIPAL IN NATO). FC BELIEVES WE CAN READILY WORK THROUGH THIS EVENTUALITY.
- F. THIS SECTOR SHOULD HAVE ITS HQ IN THE CITY CENTRE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. THE BATTALION WILL ALSO HAVE A COY IN THE CITY ONCE SUITABLE PLATOON LOCATIONS ARE CONFIRMED.

- G. RGF SECTOR. YOU MAY BE SURPRISED THAT WE MENTION THIS SECTOR AT THIS TIME FOR IT IS NOT SUPPOSED TO COME INTO EFFECT UNTIL THE LATER PART OF PHASE 2. HOWEVER, WE ARE GETTING MORE AND MORE REPORTS THAT CERTAIN FACTIONS, EITHER RELATED TO CERTAIN POLITICAL PARTIES OR SIMPLY USING RPF EXPANSIONISM AS A REASON, ARE ARMING AND TRAINING YOUNG MEN IN AND AROUND THE BURUNDI REFUGEE CAMPS. FURTHERMORE, WE ARE STARTING TO RECEIVE REQUEST FOR ESCORTS FOR FOOD AND AID CONVOYS TO THESE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH. WE HAVE RECEIVED ALL PERTINENT DATA ON THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND ARE TRYING TO FINALLY GET A REASONABLE RECCE PARTY DOWN IN THAT AREA TO BOTH ASSESS THE CURRENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS DURING DEMOBILISATION OF THE GENDARMERY SHOULD THE CAMPS STILL BE THERE, AND ALSO TO SHOW THE UN FLAG IN ORDER THE APPEASE THE POPULATIONS INVOLVED. WE CANNOT NEGATE THE FACT THAT THIS NEW FLANK WILL REQUIRE SOME MONITORING THAT WILL AFFECT OUR PLANNED PHASE 2 AND PHASE 3 DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PLANS FOR UNMOS. MILOB GROUP HQ IS MONITORING THIS SECTOR AS OF NOW.
- G. FORCE TROOPS. WE ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MORE STAFF OFFICERS IN ORDER TO REGAIN THE UPPER HAND ON THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC SITUATIONS. THE BANGLADESH RECCE PARTY IS EXPECTED OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND THAT WILL PERMIT US TO HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF OUR SUPPORT ELEMENTS DEPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITIES AND ALSO ASSESS WHEN THE KIGALI SECTOR WILL BE SECURE. STAFF MORAL IS STILL VERY LOW DUE TO THE REMUNERATION SYSTEM THAT GUIDES THEIR QUALITY OF LIFE IN COMPARISON TO ALL OF THE OTHER PERSONNEL THAT WORK IN THE HQ. THIS SITUATION IS BEING PERSONALLY MONITORED AND DOCUMENTED BY THE FC. THE LOGISTICS ASPECTS HAVE NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE LAST REPORT BUT NOW WE NOW HAVE A BUDGET THAT SHOULD MAKE RESOURCES MORE READILY AVAILABLE.
- H. LOGISTICS/MEDICAL. THE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE BELGIQUE CONTINGENT FOR USE OF THEIR AIRCRAFT AND MEDICAL TEAMS, AND THE LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCIES HAVE ALLAYED MAJOR MEDICAL CONCERNS. THE ESSENTIAL MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE STILL URGENTLY REQUIRED. THE RESPONSES TO SITREP 5 LOGISTICS CONCERNS ARE BEING ACTIONED WITH VIGOUR AS WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY CAO STAFF. EFFORTS IN THAT AREA ARE MOST APPRECIATED.

IV. CONCLUSION

THE SCALE OF ACTIVITY IN PHASE 1 HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED OVER THE LAST WEEK AND IT IS ONLY BY USING EVERY BIT OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES THAT WE ARE ABLE TO HOLD THE LINE. DISINFORMATION IS RAMPANT IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR. WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON ACTIVITIES IN THE RPF SECTOR. WE WILL HAVE TO COMMENCE BALANCING OFF THE REPORTS OF RPF INCREASED ACTIVITIES IN AND NORTH OF THE

DMZ BY MUCH MORE PRESENCE IN THE DMZ AND BY COMMENCING MONITORING IN THE RPF SECTOR NOW INSTEAD OF AT THE END OF PHASE 2. CONSIDERABLE EFFORT IS BEING EXPENDED TO KEEP BOTH SIDES TALKING IN ORDER TO MEET THE TIMINGS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT ARTICLES OF THE PEACE ACCORD THAT HAVE LONG LEAD TIMES TO IMPLEMENT. THIS EFFORT IS BEING DONE EVEN BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG UNDER TO LESS THAN FULLY EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP OR SUPPORT OF THE PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE. SO FAR THE RPF HAVE BEEN MOST COOPERATIVE WHILE CERTAIN MINISTRIES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN OBSTRUCTIONIST. THESE LATER ELEMENTS HAVE ALL BEEN RELATED TO THE MRND PARTY ALTHOUGH THE EXTREME RIGHT WING HUTU CDR PARTY IS KNOWN TO BE IN THE SHADOWS. THE FLOW OF OUR TROOPS AND LOGISTICAL DEPLOYMENT MUST NOT BE SLOWED DOWN. AU CONTRAIRE, WE ARE STATING THAT WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN INCREASING THE RHYTHM OF DEPLOYMENT. YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL IF WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE PHASE 1 STALL AND NOT MEET ITS OBJECTIVES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG IS NEEDED NOW IF WE EXPECT TO KEEP THE LID ON THIS SITUATION AND PERMIT THE MODERATES TO MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT POSITION.

V. REGARDS.

CAF/UNAMIR

19 November 1993

MEMO

Subj:

Telephone call from Mr. Steinar Bjornssen,
Acting Chief Logistics & Communication/FOD

The call came at 15:30 hrs local time. It was a conference call with Messrs. Marcel Savad and Girson de Almeida joining.

1. The main reasons for the call was for Mr. B. to acquire info and to give info. The background for acquiring info was, that FC's latest Weekly SitRep with comments on the administrative and logistic situation in UNAMIR had somehow reached the Secretary-General personally. SG has requested "a full report" on the situation in UNAMIR.

Mr. B. conveyed the following: Acting Director/FOD would expect, that administrative and logistic reports come only from CAO's office in the future.

2. After having received information on the current status viz. personnel and vehicles, Mj B. advised of the following:

- (a) UNAMIR could not get equipment until a budget was approved.
- (b) UNTAC has been very slow in releasing equipment.
- (c) CAO/UNTAC has refused to release staff. He left yesterday and as from today staff will be diverted i.a. to UNAMIR.
- (d) UNOSOM will be asked to air transport (with an Il-76) 30 4 x 4 's to UNAMIR as soon as possible. (CAO to call CAO/UNOSOM on Saturday, tel # 212 - 963 - 3086 - 2110, to find out time schedules.)
- (e) From UNTAC will soonest be flown to Kigale
 - 4 radio technicians
 - 2 radio operators
 - 2 electricians
 - 2 generator mechanics
 - 2 tons of assorted comm's equipment.

CO
ml

(SAO -pls have CCO prepare a communications concept and brief FC and CAO not later than Thursday 25 November, please).

(f) Mr. B. would endeavour to ascertain that the financial instructions, delegated authority be sent to CAO/UNAMIR as soon as possible.

Distribution (your eyes only): FC, CAO, SAO

11-17-93 : 20:23 :

UN HQ NY FOD-

7 6263: #

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION

CAO
SAO
FC

Outgoing Fax No.: MIR-18	Date: 12 November 1993
To: Hallqvist, CAO UNAMIR INFO: Dallaire, FC UNAMIR	From: Beissel/Acting Director FOD/DPKO/UNHQ-New York
Fax: 250-84269 XXXXXX	Fax: (212) 963-2116
Number of transmitted pages: 10	Ref.:
Subject: Reference FC Sitrep No. CRN-04	

MESSAGE:

THIS REFERS TO THE WEEKLY SITREP NO.5 FROM DALLAIRE/FC TO ANNAN DATED 16 NOVEMBER. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN REGARDS TO ITEMS F,G,H AND J WHICH DEAL WITH THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ASPECTS TO UNAMIR.

ITEM F:

1. WITH REGARD TO THE LOCAL PROCUREMENT OF FORTY FOUR VEHICLES AS PER YOUR FAX NO. MIR-90 OF 13 NOVEMBER, THE PRESENTATION TO HCC IS SCHEDULED FOR 23 NOVEMBER. WILL ADVISE ON OUTCOME. ✓
2. PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF FOUR TOYOTA 4X4 LANDCRUISERS : TO ARRIVE IN UNAMIR FROM UNOSOM AROUND 17 NOVEMBER. UNOSOM HAS FURTHER IDENTIFIED FIVE MITSUBISHI L300 MIN FOR SHIPMENT TO UNAMIR. THESE VEHICLES ARE POSITIONED MOGADISHU AIRPORT FOR ONWARD TRANSPORTATION TO UN. WILL ADVISE ON MOVEMENT DETAILS SONNEST. ✓
3. ARRANGEMENTS ARE CURRENTLY BEING FINALIZED FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF EX-UNTAC ASSETS TO UNAMIR. WILL ADVISE WITH FINAL DETAILS. ✓

SAO
-pls
comply

② CAO.
our concerned
efforts are having the
effect. Please speak.

③ FC
Pls see Memo of 19/11/93
referring to telephone call
from A/C LOG & COMMS/FOD

145 Rec'd
19/11b6
b7C

ITEM G:

- CCO
- pls note*
1. AS PER ATTACHED FAX NO. 004090 FROM UNTAC, AN INITIAL SHIPMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO UNOMUR DEPARTED FROM PHNOM PENH ON 5 NOVEMBER. PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT. FURTHER, AS PER ATTACHED FAX NO. 004084 FROM UNTAC, ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE TO AIRLIFT ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO THE AREA. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING FLIGHT DETAILS AND WILL ADVISE WHEN AVAILABLE.

ITEM H:

- SAO
- pls comply*
1. WE HAVE REQUESTED FOR TWO (2) FAX MACHINES AND TWO (2) COPIERS (ONE HEAVY DUTY AND ONE MEDIUM SIZED) TO BE AIRLIFTED FROM UNOSOM TO THE AREA. WE HAVE ALSO SENT TWO SHIPMENTS OF STATIONARY : 119 LBS. ON 15 OCTOBER AND 361 LBS. ON 20 OCTOBER. PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT.

ITEM J:

1. A REQUISITION HAS BEEN RAISED FOR 10,000 LARIUM TABLETS 250 MG. TO BE DELIVERED TO THE AREA NO LATER THAN 1 DECEMBER.
2. PARTIAL SHIPMENT OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES PURCHASED FROM LEBANON IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN UNOMUR ON 15 NOVEMBER ON FLIGHT BA 069. THE REMAINDER MEDICAL ITEMS WILL DEPART FROM LONDON ON BA 069 ON 17 NOVEMBER TO ENTEBE. PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT.

OTHER:**FOD DIRECTOR'S NOTE**

AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MISSION LET US AGREE TOGETHER ON THE LOGISTICS REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS. THE CAO HAS FINANCIAL AND LOGISTIC COMMITMENT AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM BY THE UNITED NATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, HE CAN BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR PERFORMANCE IN THESE AREAS ONLY IF COMMUNICATIONS ON THESE MATTERS ARE INVARIABLY, REPEAT INVARIABLY, ROUTED THROUGH HIM. FOD CAN ENSURE ITS BEST SUPPORT PERFORMANCE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THIS IS THE CASE. WE CAN ASSURE YOU OF A HIGH SUPPORT PERFORMANCE LEVEL, BUT ONLY IF WE KEEP THE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS PROPERLY CHANELLED. REGARDS.

Prepared by/Cleared by: Leung/Almeida

Authorized by: S. B. Bjornsson
[Signature]

CRN-04

PAGE 1 OF 6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN UNATIONS NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR KIGALI RWANDA
DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1993
NUMBER: CRN-04
SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 5

NEW YORK COMM CENTRE: PLEASE ON FAX TO
MATIWAZA UNOMUR KABALE UGANDA

WEEKLY SITREP NO. 5, 16 NOV. 1993I. GENERAL

THE OVERALL SITUATION IS STILL RELATIVELY CALM EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE LOTS OF RUMOURS ABOUNDING OF RPF INCURSIONS IN THE DMZ AND OF POSSIBLE RPF REINFORCEMENTS. RIGHT WING HUTU ORGANISATIONS ARE EXPRESSING CONCERNS OVER THE BELGIUM PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI BATTALION. WE HAVE INVESTIGATED ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS AND CONTINUED OUR LIMITED AT BEST MONITORING OF THE UGANDAN/RWANDAN BORDER WHICH HAS PRODUCED NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION, EXCEPT FOR A POINT ON NGARAMA LISTED BELOW. THE ABSENCE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN BOTH MISSIONS AND THE ACUTE LACK OF VEHICLES AND RADIOS FOR THE DMZ SECTOR ARE REDUCING OUR OPERATIONS TO NEXT TO NIL AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE PRESSURE IS BEING EXERCISED BY ALL CONCERNED TO GET THE PARTIES TOGETHER AND IMPLEMENT THE PEACE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE EXTREME FACTIONS GAIN THE UPPER HAND IN SPREADING DISCONTENT THROUGH MISINFORMATION.

II. POLITICAL

- A. OVERTLY THE SITUATION SEEMS RELATIVELY CALM, BUT THERE IS A LATENT TENSION WITHIN ALL THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AS ETHNIC POINTS ARE COMING TO THE FORE AS WE APPROACH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG. ON 11 NOV. 93, FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES (MDR, PSD, PDC, PL) PUBLISHED A SEVEN-POINT DECLARATION TO WHICH THE MRND DID NOT ADHERE. IN THE AFTERNOON OF 12 NOV 93, THE MRND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL TO EXPLAIN ITS POSITION, AS FOLLOWS: CONSIDERS INAPPROPRIATE THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE OTHER PARTIES; DEEMS UNTIMELY THE APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES (PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE DECLARATION); CONSIDERS THAT ONLY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IS ACCREDITED TO APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND NOT THE POLITICAL PARTIES; RECALLS THAT THE MRND IS NOT AGAINST BELGIUM NOR THE BELGIAN PEOPLE.
- B. ON THE EVENING OF 13 NOV 93, THE NATIONAL RADIO, IN RESPONSE TO REACTIONS FROM THE POLITICAL MILIEU CONCERNING BELGIUM'S PARTICIPATION, COMMENTED THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RWANDA, MR ANASTASE GASANA, STRESSING THAT THE VARIOUS CONTINGENTS ASSIGNED TO UNAMIR FORCE HQ ARE UNDER THE SOLE COMMANDMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND NOT UNDER THE COMMANDMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.
- C. THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) HELD A SUDDEN CONVENTION ON SUNDAY 14 NOV, THE RESULT OF WHICH WAS A SPLIT RIGHT DOWN ETHNIC LINES WITHIN THE PARTY. THE PL MINISTERS IN THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT FIRED THE MEMBERS OF THEIR

PERSONAL STAFF WHO ATTENDED THIS UNUSUAL PARTY MEETING. THIS IS THE SECOND PARTY TO DO THIS (MDR PREVIOUSLY OVER PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE APPOINTMENT).

- D. THERE IS OVERREACTION ON THE PART OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AS YOU WILL SEE BELOW. HE IS CONTINUOUSLY FEEDING US WITH INFO ON RPF INCURSIONS IN THE DMZ AND HE IS ALWAYS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO GO THERE (HE IS FROM THAT AREA).

III. MILITARY

- A. UNOMUR. THE OFFICIAL FLAG RAISING AT CHECK POINT 3(KATUNA) WAS HELD ON 13 NOV 93 WITH A LARGE DELEGATION OF OFFICIALS AND LOCAL POPULATION. FC DID NOT ATTEND FOR PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED REASONS. WE ARE FORMALISING PROCEDURES WITH UGANDAN OFFICIALS FOR THE PASSAGE OF CIVILIANS, UN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FROM RWANDA INTO UGANDA. WE HAVE UNCONFIRMED INFO THAT POSSIBLE RPF WEAPON CASHES EXIST IN THE AREA OF NGARAMA. WAITING FOR YOUR CONSENT FOR US TO INITIATE A COORDINATED EFFORT WITH NRA AUTHORITIES IN THAT AREA. THE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT SITUATIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AT BEST. IT IS AFFECTING OUR CREDIBILITY IN A SERIOUS WAY.
- B. DMZ SECTOR. INFORMATION ON MOVEMENT OF POPULATION IN BWISEGE AREA (EAST OF BYUMBA) DUE TO PRESENCE OF RPF WAS GIVEN OVER THE RADIO. WE ARE INVESTIGATING THIS ALLEGATION. WE ARE INCREASING THE NUMBER OF UNMO TEAMS BY REDISTRIBUTING PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO ENSURE MORE PATROLS AND ESCORT CAPABILITIES. THE RHYTHM OF ACTIVITY INSIDE THE DMZ DUE TO THE RUHENGERI COMMUNAL ELECTIONS AND THE JOINT DISCUSSIONS IN KINIHIRA BY BOTH FACTIONS WITH NGOS AND UN AGENCIES ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION IN THE POST DEMOBILIZATION PERIOD HAS PUT SEVERE AND UNMANAGEABLE A STRAIN ON OUR VERY LIMITED PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE RESOURCES. FC HAS MAINTAINED THE LIMITATIONS ON VEHICLE MOVEMENT TO TRAILS IN DAYLIGHT AS INDICATED IN PREVIOUS SITREP. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE DMZ HQ INTO BYUMBA NEXT WEEK AS HQ BUILDING IS CONFIRMED BUT ONLY IF WE GET A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE TO OUR QUERY ON DMZ COMD AND HIS STAFF SUBSISTENCE STATUS AS WE CAN MEET THEIR NEEDS IN THAT DESTROYED AREA. WE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE OUR EFFECTIVENESS IN THAT TROUBLED AREA IF WE GET MORE BLUE BERETS PERMANENTLY IN THE DMZ.
- C. MILOB GROUP. TASKING HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THAT HQ TO CONDUCT FORMAL 3 DAY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR EX-NMOG PERSONNEL ON THE INTRICACIES OF UNMO DUTIES (NEXT WEEK). FURTHERMORE, THE GROUP IS CONDUCTING THE DETAILED SOP WORK FOR THE KIGALI SECTOR UNMO RESPONSIBILITIES. ONCE REASONABLE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE

BEEN ACQUIRED, UNOMUR WILL REVERT TO UNDER COMMAND TO MILOB GP HQ AS PER PHASE 1 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

- D. BELGIUM REAR PARTY. THEY ARE STILL CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE OF THE KIGALI WEAPONS SECURE AREA FOR OPERATIONAL INFORMATION AND FOR BIVOUAC/INFRASTRUCTURE SITES. HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE FIRST C-130 CHALK WILL ARRIVE ON THURSDAY 18 NOV AND THE FIRST COY OF ONLY TWO(2) PLATOONS WILL ARRIVE ON 19 NOV. RECEPTION PLAN IS BEING FINALIZED WITH STAFF. RECCE PLAN FOR THE BANGLADESH RECCE GROUP IS BEING PREPARED. STILL NO WORD ON THIS RECCE PARTY. PROPOSED ARRIVAL OF THE REST OF THE KIGALI BN FROM BANGLADESH BY LATE DEC IS MUCH TOO LATE. THAT DATE MUST BE ADVANCED BY AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. DETAILS OF THE BELGIUM CONTINGENT FOR KIGALI BN ARE TWO COYS OF TWO PLATOONS EACH FOR 90 PERSONNEL PER COY, HQ OF 30 PERS, RECCE PLATOON OF 8 JEEPS AND 24 PERS, HELO PLATOON OF 2 AIRCRAFT, CSS COY OF 125 PERS. A TOTAL OF 20 STAFF OFFICERS ARE ALSO SUPPOSED TO ARRIVE WITH THE CONTINGENT BEFORE THE END OF NOV 93.
- E. FORCE HQ. FC RECEIVED A CALL FROM RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE IN EVENING OF 14 NOV INDICATING THAT THE RPF WERE REINFORCING THEIR TROOPS FROM KABALE FOR AN EMINENT ATTACK. HE INDICATED INFO WAS RECEIVED FROM THEIR STAFF IN WASHINGTON. FC PUT UNOMUR ON INCREASED VIGIL. FC FOUND OUT FROM SEPARATE SOURCE THAT INFO PROVIDED TO MINISTER OF DEFENCE WAS GIVEN TO HIM FROM HEAD OF STATE ENTOURAGE. WE HAVE PUT A DEADLINE OF FRIDAY 19 NOV FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE US THE COMPOUNDS IN WHICH THEY RECOMMEND TO PUT THE RPF SECURITY BATTALION AND VIPS IN KIGALI. FC HAS PUBLISHED OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE NO 1 WHICH GIVES ALL SUBORDINATE SECTORS AND STAFFS THEIR MARCHING ORDERS DURING PHASE 1. OPERATIONS ORDER FOR KIGALI SECTOR AND DMZ SECTORS ARE BEING FINALISED. OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE FORCE HQ IS PLANNED FOR WEDNESDAY 17 NOV. THE PRESIDENT (HEAD OF STATE) WITH ALL THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND NGOS AND MINISTERS ARE INVITED.
- F. LOGISTICS. THE VEHICLES THAT WE ACQUIRED FROM THE NMOG HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AND ALL BUT 10 HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED FOR DISPOSAL. NO MAINTENANCE AND EXCESSIVE MILAGE (200,000 KMS PER VEH) HAVE RENDERED THEM BEYOND REPAIR. LOCAL PURCHASE IS URGENTLY REQUIRED AS WE CANNOT MEET OUR DMZ ESCORT AND PATROL COMMITMENTS WITH LESS THAN 30 VEHICLES. WE ARE BARELY ABLE TO REACT TO EMERGENCY REQUESTS FOR ESCORT, LET ALONE RESPOND TO THE INCREASING NUMBER OF REPORTED/ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.
- G. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WE ALSO HAVE A DESPERATE NEED FOR RADIOS. ONLY THREE VEHICLE RADIOS AND THREE BASE STATIONS ARE OPERATIONAL. THE REST HAVE BEEN DEEMED INEFFECTIVE (ESPECIALLY THE VHF RADIOS) OR INOPERABLE. THIS IS A MAJOR RESTRICTION IN OUR ABILITY

TO SEND OUT PATROLS EVEN IF WE HAD THE VEHICLES. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPT OF THE MISSION ABOVE THE FORMED UNITS. THIS IS A VERY HIGH RISK SITUATION AS WE ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ON NON-SECURE, NON-RELIABLE PHONES. WE CANNOT RESPOND TO ANY EMERGENCY AT THIS TIME AT ALL.

- H. THE PROCESS OF INSTALLING THE MISSION IS ON-GOING WITH DEFICIENCIES IN ALL TYPES OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE THE VARIOUS HQS. APART FROM THE PHONE AND INCONSISTENT FAX CAPABILITIES, WE HAVE NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MY SUBORDINATE HQS. THE KIGALI SECTOR IS ABOUT TO START UP FROM SCRATCH. ADP ASSETS HAVE BEEN LOANED TO THE FORCE HQ FROM STOCKS SENT TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION BUT WE HAVE NO PAPER NOR OTHER ESSENTIAL OPS RELATED STATIONERY.
- I. THE USEFULNESS OF THE TUNISIAN COY(-) IS STILL VERY LIMITED AS THEY HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES EXCEPT THE CLOTHES ON THEIR BACK AND A PISTOL EACH. THAT SUB-UNIT HAS NO RESOURCES TO SURVIVE ON ITS OWN AND HAS NO MOBILITY. WE ARE FEEDING THEM UNDER CONTRACT FROM AFAR WITH LIMITED SUCCESS AND ARE DESPERATELY AWAITING FOR EQUIPMENT FROM THEIR COUNTRY.
- J. THE MEDICAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT WE HAVE A CONTINUATION OF MALARIA AND RELATED PROBLEMS. A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE NOT IMMUNISED FOR THIS COUNTRY. WE HAVE NO MEDICAL STOCKS AT ALL AND WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO WORK OUT SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNDP CLINIC AND THE LOCAL HOSPITAL UNTIL THE BELGIQUE MEDICAL TEAM WITH THE SMALL BN WILL ARRIVE. THE MEDICAL OFFICER IS LOOKING AT THE OPTION OF WHAT CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO USE THE FAYSAL HOSPITAL IF WE MAN IT BY CIVILIANS ONLY IN CASE THE RUSSIAN PLATOON DOES NOT APPEAR. THIS LIST WILL ALSO BE HELPFUL FOR THE RUSSIANS SHOULD THEY STILL BE COMING. WE HAVE NO MEDICAL EVACUATION CAPABILITY AT THIS TIME WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO OUTSIDE.
- K. PERSONNEL. WE ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE PERSONNEL ESSENTIAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KIGALI SECTOR HQ. THE FORCE HQ REQUIRES A SERIOUS INJECTION OF STAFF QUALIFIED OFFICERS IN ORDER TO BUILD THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS NEEDED TO GET THE MISSION OPERATIONAL AND SUSTAIN THE INCREASING FAST PACE OF THE DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS.
- L. WE HAVE BEEN APPRAISED OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF STAFF OFFICERS AND THE SITUATION DEFIES ALL LOGIC AND RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT. WITH THE CURRENT CONTRACT FOR FEEDING AND LODGING, WE HAVE SERIOUSLY REDUCED OUR FLEXIBILITY IN OUR WORKING HOURS. THE OFFICERS INVOLVED HAVE NO PERSONAL FUNDS

NOR ANY AMENITIES THAT NORMALLY ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO MILITARY PERSONNEL IN A FORMED CONTINGENT. ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING WORKED OUT TO MAKE HAIRCUT ETC CONTRACTS BUT THE EFFORTS BEING EXPENDED IN THIS AREA FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF THE RESULTS IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST. FC IS PREPARING A FORMAL REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT TO MR KOFI ANNAN FOR HIS ACTION AS THIS CURRENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL NOT PART OF A FORMED CONTINGENT(IE STAFF OFFICERS IN HQS) IS NOTHING LESS THAN LUDICROUS WHEN THE LETTER OF THE LAW IS APPLIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

- A. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR MISSION IN UNOMUR IS STILL SERIOUSLY AFFECTED DUE TO A LACK OF VEHICLES, RADIOS AND ESPECIALLY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THE SITUATION IN UNAMIR , IN THE DMZ SECTOR IN PARTICULAR IS NOT EFFECTIVE. THE LOSS OF THE FEW OAU VEHICLES DUE TO THEIR DANGEROUS STATE OF DISREPAIR AND THE WORSENING OF THE WEATHER AND OF THE ROAD CONDITIONS, THIS AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE PRESSURE IS BEING EXERCISED BY THOSE WHO WISH THE MISSION TO SUCCEED IN PHASE 1 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND BY THOSE WHO ARE CREATING TURMOIL THROUGH INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC AND ERRONEOUS INFIRMATION THAT CANNOT BE VERIFIED AND PROVEN WRONG IS BECOMING MOST TROUBLESOME.
- B. IT IS THE FC ESTIMATE THAT WITH THE LIMITED STRENGTH OF THE BELGQUE PORTION OF THE KIGALI BN, COUPLED WITH OUR LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS IN MONITORING THE DMZ, AND OUR OVERALL LACK OF VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL AND BASIC WORKING TOOLS IN THE HQ, WE MAY FACE AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF INCAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE SITUATION OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. LOW MORAL IN THE STAFF DUE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VERY STRINGENT AND BASICALLY UNREASONABLE RULES TO MILITARY PERSONNEL EMPLOYED AS STAFF OFFICERS EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE UNMOS WHO VOLUNTEERED TO COME AND HELP LAUNCH THIS MISSION AT CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF PERSONAL WELLBEING IS MAKING INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS TO THIS MISSION'S CURRENT EQUIPMENT DIFFICULTIES AND OVERTASKINGS MOST DIFFICULT TO BRING ABOUT.
- C. LASTLY, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TUNISIAN ARMY HAS INFORMALLY REQUESTED TO COME AND VISIT HIS PERSONNEL AT THE END OF NOVEMBER 1993. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, FC WOULD VERY MUCH PREFER THIS VISIT TO BE POSTPONED UNTIL JANUARY WHEN PHASE 1 IS COMPLETED AND WE ARE AT A REASONABLE STEADY STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2. YOUR INTERVENTION IN THIS AREA IS REQUESTED SOONEST.

V. REGARDS. PEUX CE QUE VEUX.

Transmission OK.
15:40 16/11/93
Pgm

CRN-04

PAGE 1 OF 6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN UNATIONS NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR KIGALI RWANDA
DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1993
NUMBER: CRN-04
SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 5

Seen by COS S/18/11
Please return to FC.

NEW YORK COMM CENTRE: PLEASE ON FAX TO
MATIWAZA UNOMUR KABALE UGANDA

WEEKLY SITREP NO. 5, 16 NOV. 1993I. GENERAL

THE OVERALL SITUATION IS STILL RELATIVELY CALM EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE LOTS OF RUMOURS ABOUNDING OF RPF INCURSIONS IN THE DMZ AND OF POSSIBLE RPF REINFORCEMENTS. RIGHT WING HUTU ORGANISATIONS ARE EXPRESSING CONCERNS OVER THE BELGIUM PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI BATTALION. WE HAVE INVESTIGATED ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS AND CONTINUED OUR LIMITED AT BEST MONITORING OF THE UGANDAN/RWANDAN BORDER WHICH HAS PRODUCED NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION, EXCEPT FOR A POINT ON NGARAMA LISTED BELOW. THE ABSENCE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN BOTH MISSIONS AND THE ACUTE LACK OF VEHICLES AND RADIOS FOR THE DMZ SECTOR ARE REDUCING OUR OPERATIONS TO NEXT TO NIL AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE PRESSURE IS BEING EXERCISED BY ALL CONCERNED TO GET THE PARTIES TOGETHER AND IMPLEMENT THE PEACE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE EXTREME FACTIONS GAIN THE UPPER HAND IN SPREADING DISCONTENT THROUGH MISINFORMATION.

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- A. OVERTLY THE SITUATION SEEMS RELATIVELY CALM, BUT THERE IS A LATENT TENSION WITHIN ALL THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AS ETHNIC POINTS ARE COMING TO THE FORE AS WE APPROACH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG. ON 11 NOV. 93, FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES (MDR, PSD, PDC, PL) PUBLISHED A SEVEN-POINT DECLARATION TO WHICH THE MRND DID NOT ADHERE. IN THE AFTERNOON OF 12 NOV 93, THE MRND HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL TO EXPLAIN ITS POSITION, AS FOLLOWS: CONSIDERS INAPPROPRIATE THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE OTHER PARTIES; DEEMS UNTIMELY THE APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE FOUR POLITICAL PARTIES (PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE DECLARATION); CONSIDERS THAT ONLY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT IS ACCREDITED TO APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND NOT THE POLITICAL PARTIES; RECALLS THAT THE MRND IS NOT AGAINST BELGIUM NOR THE BELGIAN PEOPLE.
- B. ON THE EVENING OF 13 NOV 93, THE NATIONAL RADIO, IN RESPONSE TO REACTIONS FROM THE POLITICAL MILIEU CONCERNING BELGIUM'S PARTICIPATION, COMMENTED THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF RWANDA, MR ANASTASE GASANA, STRESSING THAT THE VARIOUS CONTINGENTS ASSIGNED TO UNAMIR FORCE HQ ARE UNDER THE SOLE COMMANDMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND NOT UNDER THE COMMANDMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.
- C. THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) HELD A SUDDEN CONVENTION ON SUNDAY 14 NOV, THE RESULT OF WHICH WAS A SPLIT RIGHT DOWN ETHNIC LINES WITHIN THE PARTY. THE PL MINISTERS IN THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT FIRED THE MEMBERS OF THEIR

PERSONAL STAFF WHO ATTENDED THIS UNUSUAL PARTY MEETING. THIS IS THE SECOND PARTY TO DO THIS (MDR PREVIOUSLY OVER PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE APPOINTMENT).

- D. THERE IS OVERREACTION ON THE PART OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AS YOU WILL SEE BELOW. HE IS CONTINUOUSLY FEEDING US WITH INFO ON RPF INCURSIONS IN THE DMZ AND HE IS ALWAYS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO GO THERE (HE IS FROM THAT AREA).

III. MILITARY

- A. UNOMUR. THE OFFICIAL FLAG RAISING AT CHECK POINT 3(KATUNA) WAS HELD ON 13 NOV 93 WITH A LARGE DELEGATION OF OFFICIALS AND LOCAL POPULATION. FC DID NOT ATTEND FOR PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED REASONS. WE ARE FORMALISING PROCEDURES WITH UGANDAN OFFICIALS FOR THE PASSAGE OF CIVILIANS, UN PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FROM RWANDA INTO UGANDA. WE HAVE UNCONFIRMED INFO THAT POSSIBLE RPF WEAPON CASHES EXIST IN THE AREA OF NGARAMA. WAITING FOR YOUR CONSENT FOR US TO INITIATE A COORDINATED EFFORT WITH NRA AUTHORITIES IN THAT AREA. THE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT SITUATIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AT BEST. IT IS AFFECTING OUR CREDIBILITY IN A SERIOUS WAY.
- B. DMZ SECTOR. INFORMATION ON MOVEMENT OF POPULATION IN BWISIGE AREA (EAST OF BYUMBA) DUE TO PRESENCE OF RPF WAS GIVEN OVER THE RADIO. WE ARE INVESTIGATING THIS ALLEGATION. WE ARE INCREASING THE NUMBER OF UNMO TEAMS BY REDISTRIBUTING PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO ENSURE MORE PATROLS AND ESCORT CAPABILITIES. THE RHYTHM OF ACTIVITY INSIDE THE DMZ DUE TO THE RUHENGERI COMMUNAL ELECTIONS AND THE JOINT DISCUSSIONS IN KINIHIRA BY BOTH FACTIONS WITH NGOS AND UN AGENCIES ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION IN THE POST DEMOBILIZATION PERIOD HAS PUT SEVERE AND UNMANAGEABLE A STRAIN ON OUR VERY LIMITED PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE RESOURCES. FC HAS MAINTAINED THE LIMITATIONS ON VEHICLE MOVEMENT TO TRAILS IN DAYLIGHT AS INDICATED IN PREVIOUS SITREP. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE DMZ HQ INTO BYUMBA NEXT WEEK AS HQ BUILDING IS CONFIRMED BUT ONLY IF WE GET A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE TO OUR QUERY ON DMZ COMD AND HIS STAFF SUBSISTENCE STATUS AS WE CAN MEET THEIR NEEDS IN THAT DESTROYED AREA. WE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE OUR EFFECTIVENESS IN THAT TROUBLED AREA IF WE GET MORE BLUE BERETS PERMANENTLY IN THE DMZ.
- C. MILOB GROUP. TASKING HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THAT HQ TO CONDUCT FORMAL 3 DAY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR EX-NMOG PERSONNEL ON THE INTRICACIES OF UNMO DUTIES (NEXT WEEK). FURTHERMORE, THE GROUP IS CONDUCTING THE DETAILED SOP WORK FOR THE KIGALI SECTOR UNMO RESPONSIBILITIES. ONCE REASONABLE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE

BEEN ACQUIRED, UNOMUR WILL REVERT TO UNDER COMMAND TO MILOB GP HQ AS PER PHASE 1 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

- D. BELGIUM REAR PARTY. THEY ARE STILL CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE OF THE KIGALI WEAPONS SECURE AREA FOR OPERATIONAL INFORMATION AND FOR BIVOUAC/INFRASTRUCTURE SITES. HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE FIRST C-130 CHALK WILL ARRIVE ON THURSDAY 18 NOV AND THE FIRST COY OF ONLY TWO(2) PLATOONS WILL ARRIVE ON 19 NOV. RECEPTION PLAN IS BEING FINALIZED WITH STAFF. RECCE PLAN FOR THE BANGLADESH RECCE GROUP IS BEING PREPARED. STILL NO WORD ON THIS RECCE PARTY. PROPOSED ARRIVAL OF THE REST OF THE KIGALI BN FROM BANGLADESH BY LATE DEC IS MUCH TOO LATE. THAT DATE MUST BE ADVANCED BY AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. DETAILS OF THE BELGIUM CONTINGENT FOR KIGALI BN ARE TWO COYS OF TWO PLATOONS EACH FOR 90 PERSONNEL PER COY, HQ OF 30 PERS, RECCE PLATOON OF 8 JEEPS AND 24 PERS, HELO PLATOON OF 2 AIRCRAFT, CSS COY OF 125 PERS. A TOTAL OF 20 STAFF OFFICERS ARE ALSO SUPPOSED TO ARRIVE WITH THE CONTINGENT BEFORE THE END OF NOV 93.
- E. FORCE HQ. FC RECEIVED A CALL FROM RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE IN EVENING OF 14 NOV INDICATING THAT THE RPF WERE REINFORCING THEIR TROOPS FROM KABALE FOR AN EMINENT ATTACK. HE INDICATED INFO WAS RECEIVED FROM THEIR STAFF IN WASHINGTON. FC PUT UNOMUR ON INCREASED VIGIL. FC FOUND OUT FROM SEPARATE SOURCE THAT INFO PROVIDED TO MINISTER OF DEFENCE WAS GIVEN TO HIM FROM HEAD OF STATE ENTOURAGE. WE HAVE PUT A DEADLINE OF FRIDAY 19 NOV FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE US THE COMPOUNDS IN WHICH THEY RECOMMEND TO PUT THE RPF SECURITY BATTALION AND VIPS IN KIGALI. FC HAS PUBLISHED OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE NO 1 WHICH GIVES ALL SUBORDINATE SECTORS AND STAFFS THEIR MARCHING ORDERS DURING PHASE 1. OPERATIONS ORDER FOR KIGALI SECTOR AND DMZ SECTORS ARE BEING FINALISED. OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE FORCE HQ IS PLANNED FOR WEDNESDAY 17 NOV. THE PRESIDENT (HEAD OF STATE) WITH ALL THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND NGOS AND MINISTERS ARE INVITED.
- F. LOGISTICS. THE VEHICLES THAT WE ACQUIRED FROM THE NMOG HAVE BEEN INSPECTED AND ALL BUT 10 HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED FOR DISPOSAL. NO MAINTENANCE AND EXCESSIVE MILAGE (200,000 KMS PER VEH) HAVE RENDERED THEM BEYOND REPAIR. LOCAL PURCHASE IS URGENTLY REQUIRED AS WE CANNOT MEET OUR DMZ ESCORT AND PATROL COMMITMENTS WITH LESS THAN 30 VEHICLES. WE ARE BARELY ABLE TO REACT TO EMERGENCY REQUESTS FOR ESCORT, LET ALONE RESPOND TO THE INCREASING NUMBER OF REPORTED/ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.
- G. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WE ALSO HAVE A DESPERATE NEED FOR RADIOS. ONLY THREE VEHICLE RADIOS AND THREE BASE STATIONS ARE OPERATIONAL. THE REST HAVE BEEN DEEMED INEFFECTIVE (ESPECIALLY THE VHF RADIOS) OR INOPERABLE. THIS IS A MAJOR RESTRICTION IN OUR ABILITY

TO SEND OUT PATROLS EVEN IF WE HAD THE VEHICLES. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPT OF THE MISSION ABOVE THE FORMED UNITS. THIS IS A VERY HIGH RISK SITUATION AS WE ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS ON NON-SECURE, NON-RELIABLE PHONES. WE CANNOT RESPOND TO ANY EMERGENCY AT THIS TIME AT ALL.

- H. THE PROCESS OF INSTALLING THE MISSION IS ON-GOING WITH DEFICIENCIES IN ALL TYPES OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE THE VARIOUS HQS. APART FROM THE PHONE AND INCONSISTENT FAX CAPABILITIES, WE HAVE NO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MY SUBORDINATE HQS. THE KIGALI SECTOR IS ABOUT TO START UP FROM SCRATCH. ADP ASSETS HAVE BEEN LOANED TO THE FORCE HQ FROM STOCKS SENT TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION BUT WE HAVE NO PAPER NOR OTHER ESSENTIAL OPS RELATED STATIONERY.
- I. THE USEFULNESS OF THE TUNISIAN COY(-) IS STILL VERY LIMITED AS THEY HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES EXCEPT THE CLOTHES ON THEIR BACK AND A PISTOL EACH. THAT SUB-UNIT HAS NO RESOURCES TO SURVIVE ON ITS OWN AND HAS NO MOBILITY. WE ARE FEEDING THEM UNDER CONTRACT FROM AFAR WITH LIMITED SUCCESS AND ARE DESPERATELY AWAITING FOR EQUIPMENT FROM THEIR COUNTRY.
- J. THE MEDICAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT WE HAVE A CONTINUATION OF MALARIA AND RELATED PROBLEMS. A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE NOT IMMUNISED FOR THIS COUNTRY. WE HAVE NO MEDICAL STOCKS AT ALL AND WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO WORK OUT SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH THE UNDP CLINIC AND THE LOCAL HOSPITAL UNTIL THE BELGIQUE MEDICAL TEAM WITH THE SMALL BN WILL ARRIVE. THE MEDICAL OFFICER IS LOOKING AT THE OPTION OF WHAT CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO USE THE FAYSAL HOSPITAL IF WE MAN IT BY CIVILIANS ONLY IN CASE THE RUSSIAN PLATOON DOES NOT APPEAR. THIS LIST WILL ALSO BE HELPFUL FOR THE RUSSIANS SHOULD THEY STILL BE COMING. WE HAVE NO MEDICAL EVACUATION CAPABILITY AT THIS TIME WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO OUTSIDE.
- K. PERSONNEL. WE ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE PERSONNEL ESSENTIAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KIGALI SECTOR HQ. THE FORCE HQ REQUIRES A SERIOUS INJECTION OF STAFF QUALIFIED OFFICERS IN ORDER TO BUILD THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS NEEDED TO GET THE MISSION OPERATIONAL AND SUSTAIN THE INCREASING FAST PACE OF THE DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS.
- L. WE HAVE BEEN APPRAISED OF THE RULES GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF STAFF OFFICERS AND THE SITUATION DEFIES ALL LOGIC AND RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT. WITH THE CURRENT CONTRACT FOR FEEDING AND LODGING, WE HAVE SERIOUSLY REDUCED OUR FLEXIBILITY IN OUR WORKING HOURS. THE OFFICERS INVOLVED HAVE NO PERSONAL FUNDS

NOR ANY AMENITIES THAT NORMALLY ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO MILITARY PERSONNEL IN A FORMED CONTINGENT. ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING WORKED OUT TO MAKE HAIRCUT ETC CONTRACTS BUT THE EFFORTS BEING EXPENDED IN THIS AREA FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF THE RESULTS IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST. FC IS PREPARING A FORMAL REPORT ON THIS SUBJECT TO MR KOFI ANNAN FOR HIS ACTION AS THIS CURRENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RELATING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL NOT PART OF A FORMED CONTINGENT(IE STAFF OFFICERS IN HQS) IS NOTHING LESS THAN LUDICROUS WHEN THE LETTER OF THE LAW IS APPLIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

- A. THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR MISSION IN UNOMUR IS STILL SERIOUSLY AFFECTED DUE TO A LACK OF VEHICLES, RADIOS AND ESPECIALLY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPLIES. THE SITUATION IN UNAMIR , IN THE DMZ SECTOR IN PARTICULAR IS NOT EFFECTIVE. THE LOSS OF THE FEW OAU VEHICLES DUE TO THEIR DANGEROUS STATE OF DISREPAIR AND THE WORSENING OF THE WEATHER AND OF THE ROAD CONDITIONS, THIS AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE PRESSURE IS BEING EXERCISED BY THOSE WHO WISH THE MISSION TO SUCCEED IN PHASE 1 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND BY THOSE WHO ARE CREATING TURMOIL THROUGH INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC AND ERRONEOUS INFIRMATION THAT CANNOT BE VERIFIED AND PROVEN WRONG IS BECOMING MOST TROUBLESOME.
- B. IT IS THE FC ESTIMATE THAT WITH THE LIMITED STRENGTH OF THE BELGIQUE PORTION OF THE KIGALI BN, COUPLED WITH OUR LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS IN MONITORING THE DMZ, AND OUR OVERALL LACK OF VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDICAL AND BASIC WORKING TOOLS IN THE HQ, WE MAY FACE AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF INCAPACITY TO INFLUENCE THE SITUATION OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. LOW MORAL IN THE STAFF DUE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VERY STRINGENT AND BASICALLY UNREASONABLE RULES TO MILITARY PERSONNEL EMPLOYED AS STAFF OFFICERS EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE UNMOS WHO VOLUNTEERED TO COME AND HELP LAUNCH THIS MISSION AT CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF PERSONAL WELLBEING IS MAKING INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS TO THIS MISSION'S CURRENT EQUIPMENT DIFFICULTIES AND OVERTASKINGS MOST DIFFICULT TO BRING ABOUT.
- C. LASTLY, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TUNISIAN ARMY HAS INFORMALLY REQUESTED TO COME AND VISIT HIS PERSONNEL AT THE END OF NOVEMBER 1993. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, FC WOULD VERY MUCH PREFER THIS VISIT TO BE POSTPONED UNTIL JANUARY WHEN PHASE 1 IS COMPLETED AND WE ARE AT A REASONABLE STEADY STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2. YOUR INTERVENTION IN THIS AREA IS REQUESTED SOONEST.

V. REGARDS. PEUX CE QUE VEUX.

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CRN-01 PAGE 1 OF 6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN UNATIONS NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR KIGALI RWANDA
DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1993
NUMBER: CRN-01
SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 4

Dallaire

NEW YORK COMMCEINTRE: PLEASE ONFAX TO
MATIWAZA UNOMUR KABALE UGANDA

info copy CAC

WEEKLY SITREP NO. 4, 9 NOV. 1993

I. GENERAL

THE OVERALL SITUATION IS STABLE IN THE COUNTRY BUT TENSION IS RISING IN AND AROUND THE CAPITAL. THE MISSION ADVANCE PARTY IS DOING ALL IT CAN WITH LITTLE RESOURCES AND NO BUDGET. OUR EFFECTIVENESS IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE UNACCEPTABLE BUDGETARY SITUATION. THINGS ARE PROGRESSING CALMLY IN THE UNOMUR SECTOR.

A. POLITICAL

- (1) THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL ADVISER IS NOT PERMITTING THE MISSION TO BE AS PRODUCTIVE AND AS CLOSE TO THE SUBTLE TRENDS EVOLVING WITHIN THE CAPITAL IN PARTICULAR. DR KABIA IN KABALE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SHUTTLE TO KIGALI IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO, AS THE SITUATION IN UGANDA AND IN KABALE IN PARTICULAR STABILIZES AND GETS INTO A STEADY STATE OF OPERATION. A PA IS SUPPOSED TO ARRIVE THIS WEEK.
- (2) THE EXTREME HUTU WING OF THE MDR PARTY, WAS TO HAVE A DEMONSTRATION LAST FRIDAY 5 NOV. IT NEVER REALLY MATERIALIZED DUE TO THE EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF THE GENDARMERIE. THE KIGALI OFFICIALS AND MOST GOVERNMENT LEADERS DID NOT WANT NOR DID THEY AUTHORIZE THIS DEMONSTRATION, AS IT HAD TONES OF CRITICIZING THE PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE RPF BATTALION INTO KIGALI ACCORDING TO THE PEACE AGREEMENT. THE LEADERS OF THE DEMONSTRATION CAME TO SEE THE UNDP RES REP ON THURSDAY TO CONFIRM THAT THE DEMONSTRATION WAS NOT AGAINST UNAMIR IN ANY WAY. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN POSTURING. DPA HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH RES REP ON THIS BUT NOT WITH UNAMIR.
- (3) THE MRND PARTY HELD A RALLY YESTERDAY BUT ALL THE RHETORIC WAS AIMED AT SUPPORTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS. WE HAVE HOWEVER SEEN MORE OF THE YOUTH PARA-MILITARY ELEMENTS OF SOME OF THE PARTIES DRIVING AROUND THE CAPITAL IN THEIR PARTICULAR UNIFORMS MAKING NOISE. NO WEAPONS HAVE BEEN SEEN.
- (4) THE NGO AND UNHCR ARE WORKING HARD IN HELPING THE BURUNDI REFUGEES IN THE SOUTH OF RWANDA. THE HORROR STORIES ARE NOT BEING REPEATED TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT IN RWANDA AND ALL SEEM TO BE TRYING TO DOWN PLAY THE ETHNIC ASPECTS OF THIS CATASTROPHE. IT REMAINS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP SOMETHING POSITIVE MOVING IN ASSISTING BURUNDI TO

RESTABILIZE ITSELF, AS THE SOONER THAT HAPPENS, THE SOONER THE 300,000 REFUGEES IN THE SOUTH OF RWANDA WILL RETURN HOME, AND THE LESS WE WILL HEAR OF THE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN BURUNDI UP HERE. THIS WILL REINFORCE THE ATTENTION OF ALL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. DEFUSING THE BURUNDI PROBLEM WITH OUTSIDE HELP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A VIABLE OPTION IN SUPPORTING THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS.

- (5) THE UNOMUR POLITICAL SITUATION IS STABLE, EXCEPT FOR THE LOCAL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS NON-AVAILABILITY TO DISCUSS THE NEGATIVE PRESS ARTICLE OF LAST WEEK REGARDING UNOMUR PERSONNEL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES.
- (6) TODAY, FC, COS AND ADC FINALLY MET WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA JUVENAL. FC INDICATED TO THE DIFFERENT MINISTERS OVER THE WEEKEND THAT AFTER TWO WEEKS ON THE GROUND, IT WAS HIGH TERM FC WAS RECEIVED AT PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES. LAST NIGHT, FC RECEIVED THE INVITATION FOR THIS MORNING. IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS PERSONAL STAFF AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS TOTAL SUPPORT, AVAILABILITY AT ANY TIME TO THE FC AND OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE. HE INDICATED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIGALI POPULATION WORRYING OVER THE ARRIVAL OF THE RPF SECURITY BATTALION. HE ASKED FC WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DO TO ALLAY THE FORCES. FC EXPLAINED THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE WEAPONS SECURE AREA AND THAT AFTER THIS WEEK'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES, WE WILL BE INFORMING THE POPULATION OF OUR METHODOLOGIES.
- (7) AFTER THE SESSION, THE MEDIA ATTEMPTED TO QUESTION THE BELGIAN (EX-COLONIAL POWER) PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI BN. ANSWER WAS DEFLECTED BUT FC REGRETTED THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT APPEAR WITH HIM ON THE SCREEN.

B. MILITARY

- (1) THE STAFFS ARE BUILDING THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SETTING UP A FORCE HQ UNDER UNACCEPTABLE LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS THAT COME FROM THE INEFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF LAUNCHING MISSIONS WITH NO SET-UP PACKAGES OR BATTLE BOXES OF AT LEAST THE MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL NEEDS. THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE ADVANCE PARTY HAS THUS BEEN LESS THAN HOPED FOR BUT STILL THE PERSONNEL IS GETTING ON WITH ITS JOB WITH DEDICATED ZEAL AND INTEREST. THE LANGUAGE

(FRENCH/ENGLISH) SITUATION IS DIFFICULT AS THE BULK OF THE MISSION STAFF IS MONOLINGUAL (ENGLISH).

- (2) THE DMZ SECTOR HAS BEEN IN OUR HANDS SINCE 1 NOV. 93 AND WE HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW IN DETAIL THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC SITUATION. THE FEW FUNCTIONING VEHICLES HANDED OVER FROM NMOG II HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO HARD SURFACE ROADS, TO THE VALLEY FLOORS AND NO NIGHT PATROLS. NO MAINTENANCE HAS BEEN DONE ON THESE VEHICLES OVER THE LAST 15 MONTHS AND THEY ARE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TRAILS THAT COVER THE DMZ. THE FRENCH FORCES HAVE REQUESTED ME TO RETURN ALL 12 VXHF RADIO SETS THEY LOANED TO NMOG II AS THEY NEED THEM FOR BURUNDI. WE ARE ALREADY LOW IN WORKING RADIOS AND WE WERE TRYING TO INSTAL THE FRENCH SETS IN OTHER VEHICLES. THIS AFFAIRE WILL BE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION IN MORE DETAIL IF WE CAN'T GIVE THE 12 SETS BACK TO THE FRENCH. THE TUNISIAN PLATOONS AT THIS TIME ARE LIMITED TO DOING STATIC PROTECTION OF HQS, THE JOINT SESSION/DISCUSSION SITES IN THE DMZ AND CERTAIN ROAD BLOCKS. A DETAILED LIST OF THEIR NEEDS HAS BEEN COMPILED AND WILL BE SENT. A NUMBER OF THESE SOLDIERS ARE CONSCRIPTS WITH TWO MONTHS OR SO FORMAL TRAINING. IT IS THUS MY ASSESSMENT THAT, WITH THE SIGNIFICANT VOLUME OF ESCORT DUTIES THROUGH THE DMZ DUE TO THE INCREASE IN CONTACT WITH THE RPF LEADERSHIP BY ALL SORTS OF FORMAL AGENCIES, ETC., WITH THE TERRIBLE STATE OF OUR VEHICLES AND RADIOS, AND NO NIGHT MONITORING (NMOG II NEVER PATROLLED AT NIGHT) RENDER OUR OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS IN MONITORING THE DMZ EXTREMELY LIMITED. WE ARE INVESTIGATING ALL VIOLATIONS AND WE ARE SUPPORTING THE KINIHIRA ACCORDS FOR THE DMZ THAT IMPLICATED THE NMOG II IN THIS PART AND NOT UNAMIR AS SUCH, BUT WE ARE PATROLLING IS AT A TRICKLE AT BEST. THIS SITUATION IS CONSIDERED CRITICAL AND REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.
- (3) THE KIGALI WEAPONS SECURE AREA DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IS STILL EVOLVING AS WE PREPARE FOR A SECOND ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES ON THE DETAILED SOPs THAT WE WANT TO IMPLEMENT. WE STILL ARE CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE OF ALL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN THE AREA AND ARE REVIEWING THE KIGALI BATTALION DEPLOYMENT PROPOSALS. WE STILL DON'T KNOW WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO PUT THE RPF VIPS AND SECURITY BATTALION. OUR ADVANCE

PARTY HAS NO PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE KIGALI SECTOR HQ SO WE HAVE BEEN DOING THE WORK FROM FORCE HQ ON THE SUBJECT. WE WILL INVOLVE THE MILOB GP HQ AS OF NOVEMBER.

- (4) MILOBS GROUP HQ IS REASONABLY IN PLACE AND HAS BEEN SUPPORTING THE DMZ SECTOR HQ IN ITS ACTIVITIES. IT HAS NOT REALLY TAKEN UNDER COMMAND THE UNOMUR SECTOR DUE TO ITS LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (THIS IS A CIVILIAN STRUCTURE AND NO PERSONNEL NOR EQUIPMENT ARE ON THE GROUND NOR EXPECTED DUE TO BUDGET DELAYS). THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE UGANDAN POSITION ON UNOMUR INTEGRATION WITH UNAMIR HAS SLOWED DOWN THE INTEGRATION. THE UTILITY OF DEPLOYING UNMOS BEFORE AT LEAST THE END OF NOVEMBER 93 BECAUSE OF OUR TOTAL LACK OF VEHICLES AND RADIOS TO EFFECTIVELY USE THEM IS OF CONCERN.
- (5) THE MEDICAL SUPPORT AND EVACUATION SITUATION IS AT BEST DANGEROUS. OUR DOCTOR HAS DONE A COMPLETE REVIEW OF EX-NMOG II PERSONNEL AND OUR NEW ARRIVALS. A LIST OF URGENT MEDICAL SUPPLIES IS BEING FINALIZED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, AS WE HAVE LITERALLY NO BASIC MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR OUR PEOPLE. CASES OF MALARIA ARE APPEARING. THIS HAS ALSO AFFECTED THE OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ AS THERE ARE NO EVACUATION CAPABILITIES FROM THAT SECTOR. NMOG II HAD TWO POORLY TRAINED NURSES UNDER CONTRACT. WE ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GENERAL HOSPITAL IN KIGALI AND ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN KIGALI CONTINGENT NEXT WEEK TO GIVE US SOME SUPPORT.
- (6) THE UNOMUR SECTOR IS PROGRESSING STEADILY IN ALL ASPECTS. THE PERMANENT CHECK POINTS 1 AND 3 ARE NEARLY COMPLETED AND THE OTHER IN THE PAPER MILL. THE PATROLS ARE CONTINUING BUT BOTH THE LACK AND STATE OF VEHICLES IS SEVERELY RESTRICTING THE EFFECTIVE USE OF ALL THE PERSONNEL. THE MEDICAL EVACUATION SITUATION HAS NOT IMPROVED AS YET. WE HAVE ORDERED A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT AT THE BORDER AND ALSO INTO THE SEX ALLEGATIONS IN THE MEDIA.

(7) VIOLATIONS, INCIDENTS AND COMPLAINTS

DATE/ TIME	PLACE	EVENT	REMARKS
02.11.93	VUGAMBA RANGE (4810)	MINE INCIDENT, A 12 YEAR OLD BOY STEPPED ON AN AP MINE AND LOST BOTH LEGS	NOT ON THE TRACK USED FOR FOOT PATROLLING
03.11.93	KATUNA OP/CP	A UGANDAN TRUCK CAME FROM RWANDA AT APPROXIMATELY 2330. DRIVER HAD NO DOCUMENTS SUCH AS PASSPORT OR DRIVER'S LICENSE. TRUCK WAS EMPTY AND THE DRIVER SAID THAT HE WAS COMING TO COLLECT FOOD FOR THE RPF.	TRYING TO MAKE CO-RELATIONS AMONG OTHER VEHICLES.

C. CONCLUSION

WE ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE KIGALI DEDICATED BN. MORE AND MORE PEOPLE ARE WANTING TO MEET WITH THE RPF AS THEY ARE MORE AND MORE INTO THE JOINT WORK SESSIONS IN PREPARATION OF THE BBTG. THE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AS DESCRIBED IN CAO REPORT TO FOD ARE NOTHING LESS THAN URGENT. THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE CRITICAL. THE BUDGET IS FUNDAMENTAL TO US BEING ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD IN A REASONABLE WAY. THIS MISSION IS OPERATIONALLY COMMITTED IN TWO SECTORS (DMZ AND UNOMUR) AND IS ABOUT TO LAUNCH A THIRD SECTOR (KIGALI). VEHICLES, RADIOS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO DO THE JOB AT LEAST TO A MINIMUM VIABLE LEVEL ARE URGENTLY REQUIRED, PARTICULARLY AT DMZ.

REGARDS.

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CRN-01 PAGE 1 OF 6

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN UNATIONS NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR KIGALI RWANDA
DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1993
NUMBER: CRN-01
SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 4

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MATIWAZA UNOMUR KABALE UGANDA

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RESTABILIZE ITSELF, AS THE SOONER THAT HAPPENS, THE SOONER THE 300,000 REFUGEES IN THE SOUTH OF RWANDA WILL RETURN HOME, AND THE LESS WE WILL HEAR OF THE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN BURUNDI UP HERE. THIS WILL REINFORCE THE ATTENTION OF ALL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. DEFUSING THE BURUNDI PROBLEM WITH OUTSIDE HELP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A VIABLE OPTION IN SUPPORTING THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS.

- (5) THE UNOMUR POLITICAL SITUATION IS STABLE, EXCEPT FOR THE LOCAL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS NON-AVAILABILITY TO DISCUSS THE NEGATIVE PRESS ARTICLE OF LAST WEEK REGARDING UNOMUR PERSONNEL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES.
- (6) TODAY, FC, COS AND ADC FINALLY MET WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA JUVENAL. FC INDICATED TO THE DIFFERENT MINISTERS OVER THE WEEKEND THAT AFTER TWO WEEKS ON THE GROUND, IT WAS HIGH TERM FC WAS RECEIVED AT PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES. LAST NIGHT, FC RECEIVED THE INVITATION FOR THIS MORNING. IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS PERSONAL STAFF AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS TOTAL SUPPORT, AVAILABILITY AT ANY TIME TO THE FC AND OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE. HE INDICATED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE KIGALI POPULATION WORRYING OVER THE ARRIVAL OF THE RPF SECURITY BATTALION. HE ASKED FC WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DO TO ALLAY THE FORCES. FC EXPLAINED THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE WEAPONS SECURE AREA AND THAT AFTER THIS WEEK'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES, WE WILL BE INFORMING THE POPULATION OF OUR METHODOLOGIES.
- (7) AFTER THE SESSION, THE MEDIA ATTEMPTED TO QUESTION THE BELGIAN (EX-COLONIAL POWER) PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI BN. ANSWER WAS DEFLECTED BUT FC REGRETTED THAT THE PRESIDENT DID NOT APPEAR WITH HIM ON THE SCREEN.

B. MILITARY

- (1) THE STAFFS ARE BUILDING THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SETTING UP A FORCE HQ UNDER UNACCEPTABLE LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS THAT COME FROM THE INEFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF LAUNCHING MISSIONS WITH NO SET-UP PACKAGES OR BATTLE BOXES OF AT LEAST THE MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL NEEDS. THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE ADVANCE PARTY HAS THUS BEEN LESS THAN HOPED FOR BUT STILL THE PERSONNEL IS GETTING ON WITH ITS JOB WITH DEDICATED ZEAL AND INTEREST. THE LANGUAGE

(FRENCH/ENGLISH) SITUATION IS DIFFICULT AS THE BULK OF THE MISSION STAFF IS MONOLINGUAL (ENGLISH).

- (2) THE DMZ SECTOR HAS BEEN IN OUR HANDS SINCE 1 NOV. 93 AND WE HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW IN DETAIL THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC SITUATION. THE FEW FUNCTIONING VEHICLES HANDED OVER FROM NMOG II HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO HARD SURFACE ROADS, TO THE VALLEY FLOORS AND NO NIGHT PATROLS. NO MAINTENANCE HAS BEEN DONE ON THESE VEHICLES OVER THE LAST 15 MONTHS AND THEY ARE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TRAILS THAT COVER THE DMZ. THE FRENCH FORCES HAVE REQUESTED ME TO RETURN ALL 12 VXHF RADIO SETS THEY LOANED TO NMOG II AS THEY NEED THEM FOR BURUNDI. WE ARE ALREADY LOW IN WORKING RADIOS AND WE WERE TRYING TO INSTALL THE FRENCH SETS IN OTHER VEHICLES. THIS AFFAIRE WILL BE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION IN MORE DETAIL IF WE CAN'T GIVE THE 12 SETS BACK TO THE FRENCH. THE TUNISIAN PLATOONS AT THIS TIME ARE LIMITED TO DOING STATIC PROTECTION OF HQS, THE JOINT SESSION/DISCUSSION SITES IN THE DMZ AND CERTAIN ROAD BLOCKS. A DETAILED LIST OF THEIR NEEDS HAS BEEN COMPILED AND WILL BE SENT. A NUMBER OF THESE SOLDIERS ARE CONSCRIPTS WITH TWO MONTHS OR SO FORMAL TRAINING. IT IS THUS MY ASSESSMENT THAT, WITH THE SIGNIFICANT VOLUME OF ESCORT DUTIES THROUGH THE DMZ DUE TO THE INCREASE IN CONTACT WITH THE RPF LEADERSHIP BY ALL SORTS OF FORMAL AGENCIES, ETC., WITH THE TERRIBLE STATE OF OUR VEHICLES AND RADIOS, AND NO NIGHT MONITORING (NMOG II NEVER PATROLLED AT NIGHT) RENDER OUR OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS IN MONITORING THE DMZ EXTREMELY LIMITED. WE ARE INVESTIGATING ALL VIOLATIONS AND WE ARE SUPPORTING THE KINIHIRA ACCORDS FOR THE DMZ THAT IMPLICATED THE NMOG II IN THIS PART AND NOT UNAMIR AS SUCH, BUT WE ARE PATROLLING IS AT A TRICKLE AT BEST. THIS SITUATION IS CONSIDERED CRITICAL AND REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.
- (3) THE KIGALI WEAPONS SECURE AREA DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IS STILL EVOLVING AS WE PREPARE FOR A SECOND ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES ON THE DETAILED SOPs THAT WE WANT TO IMPLEMENT. WE STILL ARE CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE OF ALL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN THE AREA AND ARE REVIEWING THE KIGALI BATTALION DEPLOYMENT PROPOSALS. WE STILL DON'T KNOW WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO PUT THE RPF VIPs AND SECURITY BATTALION. OUR ADVANCE

PARTY HAS NO PERSONNEL DEDICATED TO THE KIGALI SECTOR HQ SO WE HAVE BEEN DOING THE WORK FROM FORCE HQ ON THE SUBJECT. WE WILL INVOLVE THE MILOB GP HQ AS OF NOVEMBER.

- (4) MILOBS GROUP HQ IS REASONABLY IN PLACE AND HAS BEEN SUPPORTING THE DMZ SECTOR HQ IN ITS ACTIVITIES. IT HAS NOT REALLY TAKEN UNDER COMMAND THE UNOMUR SECTOR DUE TO ITS LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (THIS IS A CIVILIAN STRUCTURE AND NO PERSONNEL NOR EQUIPMENT ARE ON THE GROUND NOR EXPECTED DUE TO BUDGET DELAYS). THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE UGANDAN POSITION ON UNOMUR INTEGRATION WITH UNAMIR HAS SLOWED DOWN THE INTEGRATION. THE UTILITY OF DEPLOYING UNMOS BEFORE AT LEAST THE END OF NOVEMBER 93 BECAUSE OF OUR TOTAL LACK OF VEHICLES AND RADIOS TO EFFECTIVELY USE THEM IS OF CONCERN.
- (5) THE MEDICAL SUPPORT AND EVACUATION SITUATION IS AT BEST DANGEROUS. OUR DOCTOR HAS DONE A COMPLETE REVIEW OF EX-NMOG II PERSONNEL AND OUR NEW ARRIVALS. A LIST OF URGENT MEDICAL SUPPLIES IS BEING FINALIZED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, AS WE HAVE LITERALLY NO BASIC MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR OUR PEOPLE. CASES OF MALARIA ARE APPEARING. THIS HAS ALSO AFFECTED THE OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ AS THERE ARE NO EVACUATION CAPABILITIES FROM THAT SECTOR. NMOG II HAD TWO POORLY TRAINED NURSES UNDER CONTRACT. WE ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GENERAL HOSPITAL IN KIGALI AND ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN KIGALI CONTINGENT NEXT WEEK TO GIVE US SOME SUPPORT.
- (6) THE UNOMUR SECTOR IS PROGRESSING STEADILY IN ALL ASPECTS. THE PERMANENT CHECK POINTS 1 AND 3 ARE NEARLY COMPLETED AND THE OTHER IN THE PAPER MILL. THE PATROLS ARE CONTINUING BUT BOTH THE LACK AND STATE OF VEHICLES IS SEVERELY RESTRICTING THE EFFECTIVE USE OF ALL THE PERSONNEL. THE MEDICAL EVACUATION SITUATION HAS NOT IMPROVED AS YET. WE HAVE ORDERED A FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT AT THE BORDER AND ALSO INTO THE SEX ALLEGATIONS IN THE MEDIA.

(7) VIOLATIONS, INCIDENTS AND COMPLAINTS

DATE/ TIME	PLACE	EVENT	REMARKS
02.11.93	VUGAMBA RANGE (4810)	MINE INCIDENT, A 12 YEAR OLD BOY STEPPED ON AN AP MINE AND LOST BOTH LEGS	NOT ON THE TRACK USED FOR FOOT PATROLLING
03.11.93	NTUNA OP/CP	A UGANDAN TRUCK CAME FROM RWANDA AT APPROXIMATELY 2330. DRIVER HAD NO DOCUMENTS SUCH AS PASSPORT OR DRIVER'S LICENSE. TRUCK WAS EMPTY AND THE DRIVER SAID THAT HE WAS COMING TO COLLECT FOOD FOR THE RPF.	TRYING TO MAKE CO-RELATIONS AMONG OTHER VEHICLES.

C. CONCLUSION

WE ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE KIGALI DEDICATED BN. MORE AND MORE PEOPLE ARE WANTING TO MEET WITH THE RPF AS THEY ARE MORE AND MORE INTO THE JOINT WORK SESSIONS IN PREPARATION OF THE BBTG. THE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AS DESCRIBED IN CAO REPORT TO FOD ARE NOTHING LESS THAN URGENT. THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE CRITICAL. THE BUDGET IS FUNDAMENTAL TO US BEING ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD IN A REASONABLE WAY. THIS MISSION IS OPERATIONALLY COMMITTED IN TWO SECTORS (DMZ AND UNOMUR) AND IS ABOUT TO LAUNCH A THIRD SECTOR (KIGALI). VEHICLES, RADIOS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO DO THE JOB AT LEAST TO A MINIMUM VIABLE LEVEL ARE URGENTLY REQUIRED, PARTICULARLY AT DMZ.

REGARDS.