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REPORT ON THE MEDAK OPERATION
AND ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN CASUALTIES
AND MATERIAL DAMAGES

REPORT ON THE MEDAK OPERATION AND ASSESSMENT
OF HUMAN CASUALTIES AND MATERIAL DAMAGESMILITARY REPORT

Chronology of the Croatian Army incursion into the Medak pocket from 9 September and subsequent deployment of UNPROFOR troops in the area after a cease-fire agreement was signed on 15 September

1. 9 September: Early morning shelling began along both sides of the confrontation line in Sectors North and South. General Cot mediated a cease-fire agreement that was to have gone into effect at 11 a.m. However, at that time, Croatian Army (CA) units launched a surprise offensive with heavy artillery and mortar fire into the region south of Gospic, attacking the area of Licki Citluk, Strunici (Divo Selo) and Donji Selo near the confrontation line in the "pink zone" (see map, Annex 1). The CA seized the villages of Licki Citluk and Donji Selo. Canbat 1 was in the process of establishing observation posts in the general area. A reconnaissance had been completed on 8 September and a post was to be established in the area of Debela Glau on 10 September. Canbat 1 had established a forward platoon in Medak as a preliminary move. Nine Platoon C Company received artillery and mortar impacts within 50m of their location.

2. 10 September: There were further CA attacks against Medak and south of Licki Citluk. The CA seized the village of Njegovani. Serbian artillery fired at the Sisak oil refinery, which prompted Croatian artillery retaliation and rocket fire over Turanj. UNPROFOR intensified efforts to mediate a cease-fire. The Croatian President, Mr. Tudjman, told the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, that he had ordered a cessation of shelling but could not order a withdrawal from the occupied villages until a generalized cease-fire agreement was signed. General Cot sent special envoys to meet General Bobetko and General Novakovic. However, General Bobetko declined to meet the envoy and General Novakovic said Serbian forces would attack CA positions throughout the country if they did not withdraw from the villages seized in the offensive.

3. 11 September: More than 6,000 artillery and rocket impacts were reported in Sector South, mainly along the confrontation line between Baljci and Medak, in the areas of Obrovac, Mali Golici, Mali Alan, Ubdina and Gospic. The Serbs shelled Karlovac and the Sisak refinery and fired a FROG-7 rocket at Zagreb.

4. 12 September: Samobor was hit by Serbian multiple-launch rockets and Karlovac was shelled. Scheduled cease-fire negotiations were cancelled and the CA continued its offensive in the "pink zones" and Sectors. General Cot sent an identical proposal to General Bobetko and General Novakovic for a cease-fire, withdrawal by the CA to pre-9 September positions and the deployment of UNPROFOR in the captured areas.

5. 13 September: General Novakovic accepted the proposal but General Bobetko and the Croatian director of National Security, Mr. Sarinic, indicated Croatian acceptance would be subject to UNPROFOR taking exclusive control of the three villages occupied by the CA on 9-10 September. Canbat 1 received a warning order which started the battle procedure for the implementation of the Medak pocket agreement. Attached under operational control to Canbat 1 were two Frebat Companies, one from Frebat 1 in Sector North and one from Frebat 3 in the Bihac area, Bosnia-Herzegovina. General Cot visited the confrontation line in the Blinski Kut, Moscenica and Glinska Poljana areas in Sector North to inspect the deployment of UNPROFOR troops.

6. 14 September: Croatian air force jets fired rockets at Blatusa, near Vrginmost, and bombed near Gradusa: One of the jets was shot down by the Serbs. General Cot continued negotiations in Zagreb with General Bobetko, while the chief UNMO, Brigadier-General Bo Pellnas, went to Knin for talks. Canbat 1 issued orders for a four phase operation that involved:

*Phase 1 - C Company Canbat 1 and 15 Company Frebat 1 would replace the Serbs in their front line positions; UNMOs would

confirm pre-9 September Croatian lines;

*Phase 2 - Canbat 1 would open a crossing point on the main road from the Serbian front line to the Croatian front line; Anti-Armour Platoon to provide over-watch;

*Phase 3 - D Company Canbat 1 and 16 Company Frebat 3 would cross to the Croatian side with D Company to occupying Croatian front line and 16 Company to occupy the pre-9 September Croatian front lines. Anti-Armour Platoon to provide over-watch; and

*Phase 4 - Canbat 1 to ensure Croats withdraw to pre-9 September positions; patrolling tasks to begin within the new buffer zone; a sweep team would deploy to clear villages of bodies, survivors and assist in the provision of humanitarian relief with UNPROFOR Civil Affairs and UNHCR.

7. 15 September: Both sides signed a cease-fire agreement of UNPROFOR control of the Medak pocket after General Cot went to Gracac to arrange the deployment of UNPROFOR troops along the confrontation line in the area between warring parties. Despite the agreement, there was no CA withdrawal. The operation began with the occupation of Serbian front line positions. C Company and 15 Company had taken up platoon positions. On many occasions soon after, occupying Croatian forces directly engaged these UNPROFOR soldiers with small arms, heavy machine-gun and, in some instances, 20mm cannon fire. The Canbat 1 troops returned fire when it was obviously directed at them. There were no casualties suffered by Canbat 1 and it was unknown whether there were Croatian casualties. Although negotiations at the Serbian 9 Brigade HQ stopped this exchange of fire, Croatian forces continued to engage sporadically Canbat 1 positions. The Croatian military agreed to a meeting during the evening to be attended by the Croatian Operation Zone Commander, General Ademi, and UNPROFOR's Chief Operations Officer, Colonel Maissoneuve, Lieutenant-Colonel Calvin (CO Canbat 1) and Lieutenant-Colonel Nielsen (SMO Sector South). At the meeting, it was agreed that Canbat 1 would be allowed to establish a crossing site on the main Medak-Gospic road during that night and that the two Companies for Phase 3 of the plan would be allowed to cross,

starting at 1200hrs, 16 September. The first Company to cross would occupy the front line of the Croatian defenses and the second company, crossing at 1330hrs, would occupy the 9 September Croatian line. The crossing point was established at 2400hrs when D Company HQ crossed from the Serbian to the Croatian side via the road that leads north-west from Medak towards Licki-Ribnik. Tactical HQ remained on the Croatian side to hold the crossing open until the Companies could cross on 16 September.

8. 16 September: Croatian forces in the pocket systematically burnt houses. At first light, the forward positions reported smoke rising from the villages of Donji Selo and Licki Citluk. Sporadic small arms fire and large explosions were also heard. During the morning, several meetings occurred in Gospic between the Croatian authorities and the UNPROFOR negotiating team led by Colonel Maissoneuve, resulting in substantial changes to the original Canbat operation. Rather than immediately occupying both the forward Croatian line and the 9 September Croatian line, Canbat was directed to conduct the operation in phases by occupying successive road lines from east to west until they finally reached the 9 September line. As well, the deadline for withdrawal was extended by 24 hours so that the Croatian forces did not have to be clear of the 9 September cease-fire line until 1800 hrs, 17 September. At 1200 hrs, the first Company from Canbat 1 (D) Company) started moving across the crossing point to the Croatian side, where they found barriers and mines still in place. The Company was held up until 1330 hrs, during which time small arms fire and explosions could be heard coming from the town held by the C.A. At 1330 hrs, D Company began to occupy the Croatian front line. The second Company was held back until 1430 hrs, when it was allowed to move to the second road line to the town of Ornice. Here it was ordered to wait before moving into Licki Citluk at 1800 hrs, the time agreed by the UNPROFOR negotiating team in Gospic. Explosions and small arms fire continued in the Croatian-held towns. At 1630 hrs, CO Canbat met with Colonel Maissoneuve to explain the situation concerning suspected "ethnic cleansing"

-5-

occurring in the area. At 1800 hrs, the second Company moved into Licki Citluk and found it razed to the ground. At the same time, the Battalion received orders from Command Sector South to proceed west to try to rescue an enclave of Serbian civilians in the area of Strunici, but a French Company platoon sent forward found no sign of the Serbs. Every building was burning or had been razed between the towns of Licki Citluk and Strunici. The platoon returned to Licki Citluk for the night so it would not disrupt ongoing operations. The two Companies in position were directed to consolidate in their locations and do a quick sweep for survivors, however, they found only several bodies.

9. 17 September: Bodies of Serbs were found in the Medak pocket. At first light, the Companies were ordered to conduct a further sweep of their areas. At 0900 hrs, the Frebat 3 Company began moving westward towards the next phase line - Strunici-Poljari - which was achieved by 1200 hrs. The CA had moved about 50 soldiers into the area and they staged a small demonstration of shooting at the highlands before withdrawing. A Frebat 3 Company platoon was sent to conduct a dismounted patrol into the highlands to try to locate the enclave of Serbs reported to be there. None was found. At this time, the Frebat 1 Company moved up to the Strunici area and was ordered to conduct a forward passage of lines through the Frebat 3 Company to the 9 September Croatian line, which ran from V. Krag to Podklisa to Vedric Polje. This line was achieved by 1800 hrs, by which time all Croatian forces had withdrawn from the area. Deputy Force Commander Major-General MacInnis visited the Medak pocket and UNPROFOR completed the full deployment of almost 500 troops. During the period 17-18 September, the actual boundaries of the new UNPROFOR buffer zone were uncertain and there numerous instances of confrontation with Croatian military and police forces, characterized by threats to shoot UNPROFOR soldiers.

10. 18 September: The Croatian side handed over to the Serb authorities 51 bodies found in the Medak pocket.

11. 19-21 September: The final negotiations were held between CO Canbat 1 and General Ademi and the Chief of the Special Forces of the Croatian Police, General Markac, to determine the CA front line positions and the boundaries of the UNPROFOR zone.

12. 23 September: General Cot wrote a letter to General Bobetko giving his assessment of the negotiation process leading to the 15 September cease-fire agreement and the difficulties encountered in applying the terms of the agreement on the ground. The Force Commander said in the letter that he hoped this would not affect the success of future military negotiations.

13. 25 September: Four French soldiers were injured by mine explosions in two incidents in the Poljari area. UNCIVPOL found three more bodies in the Medak pocket, bringing the total number of bodies recovered by UNPROFOR to 16.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES OF UNPROFOR MILITARY, CIVPOL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

14. A team was formed to search the main roads and inhabited areas for survivors and bodies, and to give an authoritative assessment of the destruction. Following a sweep by UNPROFOR engineers of the main roads and inhabited areas for mines and booby-traps, the team entered the area at 1545 hours on 16 September 1993 and wound up the initial search operation at 1800 hours on 19 September 1993. The search team consisted of Canbatt soldiers and a medical officer, and CIVPOL monitors. Civil Affairs officers liaised with the team. The team searched for survivors and bodies and recorded their findings, and recorded damages to buildings, but not to infrastructure. Reports have been prepared by CIVPOL (see Annexes 2 and 3).

15. From 20 September UNPROFOR military continued mine-clearing operations of hamlets and areas outside the inhabited areas, and conducted frequent patrols of de-mined areas in the Medak pocket to secure the area and to assist in the search for

bodies. Another purpose of the patrols was, initially, to make the UNPROFOR presence apparent, in the event that there were survivors who might come forward. From 24-26 September, CIVPOL conducted a second, more thorough search of the inhabited areas for remaining bodies. Civil Affairs personnel participated in the search. Many of the ruins of houses consist of exploded and burned structures with corrugated roofs that collapsed onto the remaining rubble, leaving the possibility of bodies trapped beneath. The second search team is still on call to investigate if reports or indications are given of further potential sites of bodies.

16. CIVPOL, Civil Affairs and UNHCR conducted interviews of people displaced from the Medak pocket by the recent conflict (see Annex 4). They also liaised with local civil defence officials, the Knin authorities and among themselves in attempts to determine the number and present location of the displaced, the number and location of survivors and prisoners of war, and the number of dead. ECMM and ICRC conducted interviews, as did a representative of the Centre for Human Rights. UNHCR and ICRC provided humanitarian assistance to those who were displaced from the pocket.

17. Civil Affairs played a coordinating role for the civilian part of the UNPROFOR operation, and provided close liaison between UNPROFOR military, CIVPOL, UNHCR and the local authorities. Civil Affairs also facilitated and guided UNPROFOR Press and Information personnel who came to the area to provide coverage for the media and for UNPROFOR's own use. Material for TV, radio, the print media, and for UNPROFOR's own records was thus obtained (see Annex 5). Among the material are interviews with displaced. Visits of international media were facilitated by Civil Affairs and other UNPROFOR units, and Civil Affairs assisted in a visit by local media which had been organized by Canbatt I.

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES TO STRUCTURES

18. CivPol assessed the damages to many of the structures in villages and hamlets in the Medak pocket. Sketches were made of the areas investigated, with structures indicated. Photos were taken. Descriptions were made of the condition of the homes and out-buildings, and in some cases, of each structure. Some properties consisted of only a main building (usually a house; one or two large buildings may have been used as schools); but most consisted of a house with associated outbuildings such as barn, garage, workshop, chicken coop.

19. The first UNPROFOR team which entered villages in the Medak pocket on 16 September reported that houses, barns and haystacks were still on fire. A member of this team (see Annex 4, W 17) estimated that the fires had been burning for almost two hours before their arrival. Bags full of looted property were found on positions held by the Croats prior to UNPROFOR's arrival. Serb cars and wagons in the area had been burned, riddled with bullets and turned over. The wells in Citluk had oil, dead animals and dirt thrown in them. Many discarded rubber/surgical gloves were found.

20. According to UNPROFOR military, 164 homes and 148 barns and outbuildings in the area were destroyed. Due to security reasons, CivPol did not have access to all areas. CivPol investigated 95 structures deemed to be houses, although a few may have been used for other purposes. Of these, CIVPOL found nearly all houses to be totally destroyed by explosion and fire. Some structures were completely demolished, including the foundation, leaving only rubble. In some cases only the foundation remained standing; and in others one or more walls remained. A very few showed minor or no damage. Some houses were burned but not blasted by explosion. According to UNPROFOR military, many Croatian military and police trucks loaded with timbers and firewood were seen delivering these materials throughout the area where buildings were set on fire.

21. Of the houses described by CivPol as totally destroyed, most had outbuildings which were also destroyed. A few outbuildings were found burned but with walls still standing, and a few were left intact. With the exception of one building, which may have been used as a bunker/observation post, none of these buildings had any apparent military use. Virtually all vehicles/machines/implements as well as ordinary objects used in domestic life that had been left behind by the inhabitants, and that had not been driven or carried off by the Croatians or destroyed by the explosions and fire, had been systematically destroyed/damaged by vandalism.

22. With few exceptions, the livestock and farm animals remaining in the areas investigated were found dead. Most had been burned; and many were found with bullet wounds. Some animals had been removed from the area by the Croatian forces, according to witnesses.

23. UNPROFOR military personnel who initially entered the area assessed that various explosive devices including specially rigged anti-tank mines were systematically used for thorough destruction of structures. They estimated that the level of destruction found in the Medak pocket would have required more than 200 mines.

ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN CASUALTIES

Survivors

24. UNPROFOR met some civilian survivors, 3 Serb military (who were turned over to the Serb side) and on 26 September 12 members of the Croatian forces were disarmed by Canbatt/Frebatt elements and escorted out of the area. During the time when UNPROFOR was moving into the pocket, UNPROFOR troops viewed Croatian soldiers and police vehicles moving out.

Bodies found by UNPROFOR personnel

25. As of 29 September, 18 bodies had been found by UNPROFOR military or CIVPOL (see Annex 3). The bodies were numbered, tagged, and placed in body bags. A description of each body was made by CIVPOL in situ, and sketches were made. Some photos were taken. Bodies of both civilians and military personnel were found, in the inhabited areas and in outlying areas. Bodies found inside the exploded and burned houses were heavily burned.

26. The first search team found the first body on the evening of 16 September 1993. The search team investigated the bodies at the place where they were discovered and a medical officer, Dr. Ross or Dr. Brett from Canbatt, examined bodies found during the initial days. Autopsies were conducted later by a local pathologist at either the Medak, Gracac or Korenica morgues (see Annex 6). CIVPOL monitors were present at some of the autopsies (see Annex 7). After the examinations, the bodies were turned over to relatives.

Descriptions

27. Of the eighteen bodies found by UNPROFOR by 29 September, 11 were men and 7 were women. Of the 11 men, 8 were soldiers, two were civilians and one was unidentifiable. All the soldiers had been shot, seven of them most likely during combat.

28. One of the civilians was found close to a path leading to Bungrovac Mountain. Wounds close to the right eye indicate that he may have been shot at a fairly close range. The other civilian male person was found at a path approximately 80 metres south of a nearby structure in the village of Krajnovici. There were eight entry wounds to the right side of the head including the neck and jaw, there were entrance wounds to his back as well as other parts of the body. The victim appears to have been shot at least 24 times in the back. The unidentifiable male person, believed to be non-military, was found in a shed in the village of Raicevici. The shed was burned down and the body was heavily burned. The right arm, both legs and part of the head were

missing and were probably burned. Nothing could be stated concerning the cause of death.

29. The seven women were all civilian and most were estimated to be more than 60 years old. Four female bodies were found burned or burning. When discovered, two of them were in a chicken coop in the basement of a dwelling house in the village of Citluk. Several munitions casings were found next to the door of the chicken coop, which had bullet holes in it. On the body that was burning, there were no visible wounds and the skull was intact. The other body was severely burned. The third burned female body was found in Citluk in a house which was levelled with the floor. Body parts of another female, badly burned, were found in what appeared to have been the living room of a house. The body could not be identified from the remains. Cause of death could not be determined.

30. Three women had been shot. One woman's body was found in a grass field approximately 60 metres from the nearest house in the hamlet of Raicevici (the village of Citluk). She had three shot wounds in the right side of her body, one inside her left upper leg, and one rather deep knife wound on the upper side of her breast. Both legs were broken. Forensic opinion is that she was dragged to the location where she was found and then shot. The second female body was found four metres off-shore in a marsh area and submerged in approximately 30 cm of water. This woman had been shot at least six times, four of which were in the back. Manipulation of the head indicated a broken neck. The third female body was found in a small grass field near a totally destroyed house in the Miscevic hamlet (the village of Pocitelj). The victim had been shot from behind at close range through the head. The face was blown away and the fingers on the right hand were partly amputated.

Bodies delivered from the Croatian side

31. On 17 September, the Croatian authorities delivered 51 bodies from the Medak pocket to the Serb authorities, at the

Otocac crossing point, in the presence of UNPROFOR Civil Affairs, ICRC and ECMM. The bodies were received and taken to Korenica. According to ECMM monitors present at the body handover, the body bags were leaking blood and other material. The bodies were not viewed by international observers at the Otocac crossing. One body was handed over to the Serb authorities on 23 September.

32. The Serb authorities plan to issue a report on the bodies turned over to them by the Croatian side. They have given out a list of identified soldiers and civilians among the bodies from the Medak area (see Annex 9).

Statements of witnesses

33. As of 29 September, 22 eye-witness reports have been prepared, most by CIVPOL, one by a representative of an NGO in the area (the "Ockenden Venture"), one statement has been given by the first Civil Affairs officer to enter the area with Canbatt troops, and one by a Canbatt officer who was in the first UNPROFOR team to enter the area on 16 September. These statements are in Annex 4, numbers W 1-17.

34. The witnesses state that the attack commenced at about 0600 on 9 September 1993, with mortar and grenade fire, and that Croatian tanks were involved. Croatian troops moved quickly to occupy the villages of Divoselo and Citluk. A Serb soldier (see Annex 4, W2) said that Serb forces were not prepared for the attack and offered almost no resistance. The attack commenced on several villages at the same time.

35. In the village of Divoselo, a witness (see Annex 4, W7) stated that Croatian forces fired at her and up to 47 other civilians as they were fleeing the village seeking cover amongst trees. Another witness (see Annex 4, W9) fled by car from the village at about 0700 with two wounded Serb soldiers. The vehicle was caught in a crossfire and he escaped leaving the wounded soldiers, one of whom had been hit by bullets in this attack and was presumed dead. From a distance of 20 metres he

saw 10-15 soldiers drag the two men out of the car and place them in a building which they then set on fire. Another witness (Annex 4, W10) returned by stealth to Divoselo on 10 September with a friend. The two were arrested by two Croat soldiers. He was hit with a rifle butt in the chest and chin but escaped under gunfire. His friend did not escape and his fate is unknown. During his escape he was shot at on two occasions and wounded once. He saw Croatian forces kill some dogs, and remove livestock.

36. In the village of Citluk, a 50 year old female witness (see Annex 4, W3 and W4), states that she was in her house with her invalid son when a soldier appeared at the window. She looked the soldier in the eye as he broke the window and threw in a grenade. She was wounded and lay on the floor. The soldier then opened the door and started indiscriminately shooting but she was not hit by any of the bullets. She saw four men in camouflage uniform speaking German and she heard a voice say (in Croatian) words to the effect that this was a Serb village and everything should be slaughtered. She saw an elderly woman in a neighbouring house in her bed and on fire while soldiers were standing around. Although wounded, she escaped from the house the following dawn (10 September). She witnessed soldiers burning animals and houses and removing tiles from roof tops and taking them away in a truck.

37. Three witnesses saw the death of Bosiljka Bjegovic, an 84 year old blind female. While precise details about the number of soldiers involved in her killing differ, witnesses are consistent in stating that at least 10 soldiers sprayed Mrs. Bjegovic with bullets while she was on her front porch. One witness reports that a younger woman who was with Mrs. Bjegovic was told by the soldiers to leave the place. Another witness (see Annex 4, W16) stated that the attack on 9 September commenced with the explosion of many grenades in the village. He believes he was the last person to escape from Citluk and that at least three Serbs were left in the village and that the

village was on fire as he fled.

38. Another witness (see Annex 4, W12), whose house was close to Citluk, escaped in a group of ten. On 9 September he went back and saw that his house was burning and Croatian soldiers were destroying everything in it. Most of his livestock was dead. He hid in the woods and on 12 September his wife and one other person went to find water. He heard shots fired and neither person returned. He stated that at night the Croatian forces used large lights to search for people and they were shooting everything. At Sasine Bare, near Drlic village, a woman in the group was killed by gunfire and he was wounded by a bullet and shrapnel.

Prisoners of War

39. According to Serb authorities, eight Serb soldiers are prisoners of war and fourteen civilians are on the Croatian side (see Annex 10). ICRC also reported that 8 Serb military are being held in Croatian prisons (See Annex 11).

Displaced Persons and Missing Persons

40. According to Serb authorities, eighteen civilians from the Medak pocket area remain missing and five military as of 29 September 1993 (see Annex 10), and the whereabouts of five other persons, who may have been in the area are unknown.

41. Serb authorities have also reported to UNHCR that around 1000 people were displaced from the Medak pocket and nearby areas as a result of the fighting, but this figure remains unconfirmed.

OBSERVATIONS

42. UNPROFOR encountered delays and resistance from the Croatian side in implementing the agreement that had been signed by both sides for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Croatian forces

from the Medak pocket, and for UNPROFOR to take control of the area. According to the agreement, Croatian forces were to have completely withdrawn from the area by 1800 on 15 September, but there was no withdrawal. After negotiations held on the evening of the 15th and on the 16th, the time for completion of the Croatian withdrawal was extended to 1800 on 17 September; and times were set for a phased withdrawal. UNPROFOR was to start moving into the pocket at 1200 on 16 September.

43. At first light on 16 September, UNPROFOR peacekeepers observed smoke rising from the villages of Donji Selo and Citluk; they also heard large explosions and small arms fire. When they started moving across the crossing point at 1200 hours, they found barriers and mines still in place. Held up at the crossing point until 1330 hours, they heard small arms fire and explosions coming from Croatian-held towns. Further delays were encountered throughout the day, while the explosions and small-arms fire continued. UNPROFOR troops gained access into Liki Citluk at 1800 hours, the time previously negotiated, and found it razed to the ground. Despite immediate searches for survivors, none were found.

44. On the 17th at first light, UNPROFOR troops conducted sweeps of the areas from which the Croats had withdrawn, and continued to search for Serb survivors, including a patrol sent to the highlands, but none were found. By 1800 hours, the Croatian forces had withdrawn and UNPROFOR had taken control of the area.

45. The fact that explosions and small arms fire were heard during the period when the Croats were resisting and delaying their withdrawal and the deployment of UNPROFOR, and the assessment of material damage, suggests that the Croatian forces were systematically destroying buildings during their drawn-out withdrawal. Houses were still on fire when UNPROFOR first entered some areas, and some bodies were still burning/smouldering.

46. The assessments of UNPROFOR lead to the conclusion that the destruction of physical structures and materials by the retreating Croatian forces was systematic, thorough, and well planned. UNPROFOR military personnel assessed that most of the physical destruction of structures was methodically carried out by destruction teams who apparently came equipped for that purpose. Various explosive devices including specially rigged anti-tank mines were used for thorough destruction of buildings.

47. The evidence collected by UNPROFOR and statements by witnesses suggests that civilians were intentionally killed by the Croatian forces; some were burned in houses and other structures, and others were shot. Three witnesses say they saw the killing of one blind old woman. Some military appear to have been shot at close range.

RECOMMENDATION

48. UNPROFOR has conducted a systematic investigation of conditions in the Medak area, and the events described in the report show that the Croatian Army attack in the area on 9 September was fully coordinated and planned. It met little or no Serb resistance. Croatian troops killed most of those who were unable to make good their escape, regardless of age, sex or status; a number are still missing. Massive destruction to property was conducted by the Croatian forces during their advance, and particularly during their withdrawal. Virtually all houses and outbuildings in the villages and surrounding hamlets were destroyed, many by explosion. Wells were destroyed or damaged. Household chattels were deliberately destroyed, and almost all remaining domestic animals killed. During a period in which UNPROFOR personnel were prevented from moving into the area, in accordance with a prior agreement with the Croatian Army, the destruction was completed, UNPROFOR members hearing explosions and shooting, and, shortly after, observing houses in

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INFO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB
THORNBERRY, ZAGREB

FROM: *for* COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *by* CHARLES CORBERAND
via to Force Commander

DATE: 4 OCTOBER 1993

NUMERO: UNPROFOR Z- **1248**

SUBJECT: LETTERS ADDRESSED TO GENERALS BOBETKO AND NOVAKOVIC
BY THE FORCE COMMANDER ON 3 OCTOBER 1993

The above letters (attached herewith) were prepared jointly
by the FC and HCA.

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Both prior to, and since, the events which began around Madak on 9 September last, UNPROFOR has observed a disturbing level of escalation in military activities undertaken by both sides in and around the United Nations Protected Areas.

In addition to the almost daily tragic exchange of small arms, mortar and cannon fire; multiple rocket launchers, unguided rockets and extended range artillery have been employed by the sides, often with lethal results. In addition, both sides have redeployed and reinforced well-equipped troops in opposing positions along the confrontation line, especially in sectors North and South. Equally ominous, there has been reported infiltration, again by both sides, of specialized infantry elements across the confrontation lines and in some cases within the UNPAs. These intensely provocative activities have led to the development of growing levels of tension. Both military commands seem to be preparing for, and are poised to undertake, a resumption of major hostilities.

The delicate process of dealing with the mandate question is at an advanced stage in the Security Council. If it is successfully resolved, much work will need to be undertaken by all of us. It could prove virtually impossible to achieve this if the levels of tension that have been escalated in recent weeks are not quickly defused. I therefore wish to request that the Croatian Army be directed to exercise the maximum possible degree of restraint; and that it refrain from any action that could destroy the possibility of peaceful negotiation and resolution of the underlying problems.

Yours sincerely,

Jean Cot (General)

General Janko Bobetko
Chief of the Defence Staff
Zagreb

FAX NO.: 452 - 279

FC

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UNPROFITOR ZÄGERER

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3 October 1993


Dear General Novakovic,

Both prior to, and since, the events which began around Medak on 9 September last, we have observed a disturbing level of escalation in military activities undertaken by both sides in and around the United Nations Protected Areas.

In addition to the almost daily tragic exchange of small arms, mortar and cannon fire; multiple rocket launchers, unguided rockets and extended range artillery have been employed by the sides, often with lethal results. In addition, both sides have redeployed and reinforced well-equipped troops in opposing positions along the confrontation line, especially in sectors North and South. Equally ominous, there has been reported infiltration, again by both sides, of specialized infantry elements across the confrontation lines and in some cases within the UNPAs. These intensely provocative activities have led to the development of growing levels of tension. Both military commands seem to be preparing for, and are poised to undertake, a resumption of major hostilities.

As you know, the Security Council at this time is actively engaged in dealing with the question of UNPROFOR's mandate. If this matter is successfully resolved, as we hope it will be, a vital period of consultation and negotiation will immediately begin. I should like to request that the forces under your command take immediate steps to diminish and defuse the tensions which have now arisen. I am deeply concerned that, if such action is not immediately initiated, we could begin to see a descent into widespread hostilities, with all the tragic consequences that would then follow for the whole region.

Yours sincerely,



Jean Cot (General)

General Mile Novakovic
Commander of Serb Forces
Knin

15/19

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

Page 1 of 5

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UN RESTRICTED

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG	DATE/TIME: 3 OCT 1993
TO: SRSG, GENEVA	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO.: <i>R. Ollivier</i> DRAFTER : COL B AHLQVIST MA TO THE SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG - BOSNIA STATEMENT	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE	

MESSAGE:

*Attached please find a statement by
the Herzeg-Bosnia president.*

DISTRIBUTION:	
ACTION	INFO
WS	SC
DL	J.P.M.
MA	J.W./PK
	J.M.
	J.V.B.

8

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES -

Number: 01-II-33-01/93
 Date: 30 September 1993

16/19

[Handwritten signature/initials]

Based on article 69. of the Journal of the House of Representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, the House of Representatives, on the II Assembly held on 30 September 1993 and following the report by the President of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia about talks for the future organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, promulgated the following

C O N C L U S I O N S

Based on the report of the President of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia at today's Assembly, the conclusions of the I Assembly of the House of Representatives and based on the fact of the rejection of the peace plan by the Muslim Parliament, inasmuch as both sides do not accept the peace plan by 15 October, we direct our representatives in negotiations to:

1. Support the implementation of the Izetbegovic-Krajisnik Joint Declaration of 14 Sept. 1993 and direct all state bodies to execute their duties with regard to it, and authorize the preparation of a peace agreement with representatives of the Serb people following the signed Izetbegovic-Krajisnik Declaration that damages the preservation of the integrity of B-H.

2. Withdraw all territorial concessions, which means the right to all free Croat territory as well as the right to all temporarily occupied Croat territory and the return of all displaced persons.

3. Reject all discussions about any kind of protectorate on Mostar, the capital city of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

4. Reject all discussions about access to the sea of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in the sense of territorial concessions.

5. Unanimously support the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Government of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Ministry of Defense of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Central Headquarters in executing all necessary actions to defend the Croat people and their rights.

(TRANSLATION)

MA:

DIR:

SA:

DSRSG:

SRSG:

Date:

P R E S I D E N T

(signed)

Perica Jukic

SRSGS OFFICE

3/10-93

BA

Oct. 03 1993 1:38PM P00

17/19

20/19

(TRANSLATION)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

Neum, 30 September 1993

D E C I S I O N

of the House of Representatives of the
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia for the

A C C E P T A N C E

of International standards for the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms based on the 10 December 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations General
Assembly.

P R E A M B L E

Guided by the fact that peace is the basis to realize all rights
and that no foreign peace can exist without the domestic peace of
people,

Guided by the fact that peace only exists through freedom and
that freedom exists only through the truth,

Moved by the tragic experience of victims caused by the violation
of all fundamental rights and individual freedoms

N O W A N D B E C A U S E O F T H I S

The most senior representative body and bearer of legislative
authority of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia accepts all
promulgated documents about the protection of human rights at the
level of the United Nations and Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe and

D I R E C T S

The Legislative and Legal Committee of the House of
Representatives to determine the procedure for ratifying the
above documents and incorporating norms for the protection of
human rights into the legal system of the Croatian Republic of

18/19

21/22

(TRANSLATION)

Based on Article 6. of the Founding Decision on the Establishment and Declaration of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Article 7. of the Decision on the Establishment of the House of Representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, on the second Assembly held on 30 September 1993 the House of Representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia promulgated a

DECLARATION

for the acceptance of documents
about the protection and realization
of individual freedoms and human rights

Article 1.

Instruments for the implementation of human rights incorporated in the following documents are accepted:

A. General Human Rights, especially Civil and Political Rights

1. 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
2. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 1-21
3. 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Laws of War, and the 1977 Geneva Protocols I-II thereto
4. 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and Protocols 1-10 thereto
5. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto
6. 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
7. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 1966 and 1989 Optional Protocols
8. 1979 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
9. 1981 (UN) Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief
10. 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
11. 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

03/10 '93 15:03

38 41 176709

UNPROFOR-SRSG

→→→ SRSG GENEWA

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From : URED PREDSEDNIKA HR H-B

PHONE No. : 088 662 064

Oct. 03 1993 1:39PM PO

19/19

~~SECRET~~

12. 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child

D. Protection of Groups and Minorities

13. 1990 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation on the Rights of Minorities, paras. 10-13

14. 1992 (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities

C. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

15. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, paras. 22-27

16. 1961 European Social Charter and the Protocol 1 thereto

17. 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

D. Citizenship and Nationality

18. 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women

19. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

Number: 01-11-35-01/93
Neum, 30 September 1993

PRESIDENT
(signed)
Perica Jukic

ENDALL

保羅明

10/10

252
252
252

END

CZG-1107

CZN-1251

UNHCR Telecomm Unit
CODE RESTRICTED

Palais des Nations

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

010/12

1/2

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

93 OCT -2 15:25

TO : STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREBINFO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW-YORK
HCA

FROM : COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 2 OCT 1993

NUMBER: Z-1235

DISTRIBUTION	
ACTION	INFO
JWP/K	BL
CDC	SC
MOST IMMEDIATE	
JyD	

OCT -2 15:13

MOST IMMEDIATE

J-PM

JM

PS

(9)

MOST IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY IDEAS TO A MEDIUM TERM STRATEGY FOR CROATIA

I recently visited sector East where I had the opportunity to talk with representatives from a wide selection of the population. This visit reinforced my opinion, following similar discussions during on previous visits to other sectors. It is my firm belief that the population could still live together again if a peaceful settlement could be reached. This war is being generated by local self-made politicians applying pressure to a population raised in a communist society, used to obeying the authorities. The people have suffered enough. They are ready for peace.

I am convinced that one avenue offered to us to influence the population and pressure the authorities through a concerted media campaign. We must have the means to communicate unbiased information directly to the local population and counter-balance the propaganda they are currently being fed. Furthermore, in order to keep pressuring the political leaders, we must do our utmost to facilitate the coverage of international media, and remove the present restrictions imposed on the support the UN could provide to them.

The problem of ensuring that Humanitarian Aid reaches those it is intended for has always been a concern of mine. In order to restore our credibility with the local population, the UN should establish a list of those who receive humanitarian assistance delivered through UNHCR, and verify that it does indeed reach the intended beneficiaries. This is where UNPROFOR can play a useful role. Because they are in direct contact with the local population, Civpol and military personnel can identify those who are in real need. They could, furthermore, establish whether the aid has reached those it was intended for. Such closer cooperation between all of UNPROFOR's elements deployed in the field would greatly help to improve the current situation.

Discussions with military leaders on both sides made me realize that a strategy of "small steps" might apply in this particular situation. All cease-fire negotiations so far have failed.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CZG-1107

CZN-1251

UNCLASSIFIED

2/2

Therefore, it is my intention to initiate cease-fire negotiations between local military leaders and to deploy my troops into observation posts co-located with both sides. In addition, constant patrols along the confrontation line could force further disengagement (attached is a rough sketch of BelBat location in Sector East where this could be accomplished now). Were this to be achieved, it could create the necessary atmosphere to facilitate further global cease-fire negotiations. These ideas, which apply not only to military matters, but to public information and humanitarian aid as well, could be the basis of a common approach, developed under our joint leadership, to the problem of Croatia in the medium term, with a view to the new mandate.

MOST IMMEDIATE

010/12

CZN-1235
CZG-1090

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

CRYPTO CABLE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

CODE RESTRICTED

SEP 26 19:32

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY UNOG
FROM : STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB
DATE : 27 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-1218
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION BY CROATIAN REFUGEES

Code Thompson

SEP 27 20:09

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

Further to our UNPROFOR-Z-1214 on the above, today Auger and Abdul-Aziz met with 29 representatives of the mothers of missing persons who expressed their frustration and sadness for not receiving information on their fate from the organizations concerned. Particular reference was made to 2600 persons from the area of Vukovar in addition to several hundreds from other villages and towns in the United Nations Protected Areas. They strongly demanded to know the fate of their sons and requested that their concern be conveyed to the Secretary-General for him to exert utmost pressure on all concerned to settle this issue. They said they would continue to demonstrate at the gate of UNPROFOR until they received a satisfactory reply. It was made clear to them that UNPROFOR is not in a position to provide such a reply. We offered, however, to meet again with a small group on 4 October. In the interim, we would obtain information from those directly concerned, namely, the ICRC, the staff of the Special Rapporteur and the War Crimes Commission, and thus be in a position to discuss what further steps could be taken to determine the fate of the missing persons. They agreed to this proposal.

DISTRIBUTION:	
ACTION	INFO
WS	PK
SL	J-PM

Endall

4

UNITED NATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS

CODE RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

'93 SEP 27 12:21

CRYPTO CABLE

CZN-1231
CZN-1086

Page 1 of 4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK -1235Z
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY UNOG
FROM : *for* STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *Edin Thunberg*
DATE : 27 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 1214
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION BY CROATIAN REFUGEES

..... Yesterday saw a mass demonstration (perhaps 4,000) by Croatian refugees in Zagreb's main square, followed by a march to UNPROFOR-HQ (perhaps 500). Similar events occurred elsewhere. The Zagreb demonstration was addressed by Seks, Deputy Prime Minister and, until last week, Head of the Government's Committee for UNPROFOR (Sarinic, Director of National Security, has now taken over). The Zagreb message was "UNPROFOR go Home". Auger is today seeing a small follow-up delegation of "Mothers of Vukovar". We attach translations of the placards - which were in Croatian, French, English - and a note by a local translator. You may thereby gauge some of the local atmospherics and approaches. Understandably, this group represents many of the most desperate.

DISTRIBUTION:	
PK	WS
PS	bl
SC	gpm
	WD

Endall

'93 SEP 27 13:16

UNOG Palace
Palais des Nations

Messages on Placards
Seen at a Demonstration in Front of UNPROFOR HQ
26 September 1993

1. Butros Butros - potpora genocidu nad Hrvatima i nesrbima
(Butros Butros - supporter of genocide against Croats and non-Serbs)
2. Thornberry - on a marre de tromperies!
(Thornberry - we are fed up with lies!)
3. France-Britain ex kess UN-USA
Stop Serbian aggression
(France-Britain, EC, CSCE, UN-USA)
4. Metiez à exécution les résolutions d'UN
(Fulfil the resolutions of the UN)
5. Vratite mi moga tatu!
(Give me back my father!)
6. Boutros laze kao i Srbi
(Boutros lies as much as the Serbs do)
7. Vratite nam djecu iz logora
(Return our children from the camps)
8. France, Britain, ez, kess, UN, USA
Where is your conscience?
(France, Britain, EC, CSCE, UN, USA)
9. Thornberry - stop deluging us! ?!
10. UN + Fasizam = Srbizam (This was a big sign.)
[Letter z in "Srbizam" was replaced with the swastika.]
(UN + Fascism = Serbism)
11. Where is my son?
12. Gdje su nasi ranjenici?
(Where are our wounded?)

13. Samo iz R. Hrvatske nepoznata je sudbina više od dvadeset tisuća osoba.

(Only in the Republic of Croatia the fate of more than 20,000 people remains unknown.)

14. Mafia-UN - Verbrecher raus aus Kroatien

(UN Mafia - gangsters get out of Croatia)

15. Vratite nam naše sinove

(Give us back our sons)

16. UNPROFOR - cuvar četnika u našim selima

(UNPROFOR - the guardian of the četniks in our villages)

17. Start caring for Croatian in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina

18. Oslobođenje Hrvatskih teritorija!
Povratak Prognanika!
Kaznjavanje Zločinaca!

*(Liberation of Croatian territories!
Return of the refugees!
Punishment for the criminals!)*

19. Rendez-moi mon père!

(Give me back my father!)

20. Major - Mitterand - fascists!

21. If you cannot do it - return the money and go away!

22. We support Tudjman and the Parliament

CZAN-1231
CZG-1086

P4/4

Memo to the Press & Information Officers

Monday, 27 September, 1993

NOTE ON THE SUNDAY PROTEST RALLIES AGAINST THE UNPROFOR:

Judging by the footage given in the Sunday night TV reports and the description of events in the Monday morning newspapers, one could draw the conclusion that the rallies were fully orchestrated. In all the cases mentioned in the media, the participants (and most of the speakers addressing the crowds) were displaced Croats from the UNPAs, most often, it would seem, from Vukovar, Sector East. To all appearances, the spontaneous participation of local residents was negligible.

The exiles from the UNPAs have been organized for well over a year now in the (state-aided) regional associations of displaced Croats, and are easily mobilized through this network.

The above is not an indication that the exiles' sentiments are anything but genuine, of course. They do harbor very strong negative feelings towards the UNPROFOR. The origin of such negative stance lies partly in the fact that the UNPROFOR has been originally introduced to them unequivocally (and rather unrealistically, with a lot of media hype) as the mechanism which would enable their return to homes in the UNPAs in a very short time. Needless to say, this has led to strong disappointment. The other part of the reason have been the shortcomings, real and/or perceived, of the mission itself.

Such sentiments are to a certain extent shared by the population at large. Larger scale protest demonstrations would not be too hard to arrange, should the powers-that-be find it expedient to encourage them.

CODE RESTRICTED

UNEP - UNOG Telecomm. Unit
COMMUN. DES Nations

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE CB

UNPROFOR

93 SEP 26 12:54 SEP 26 13:13

CRYPTO CABLE

CZN-1225

CZG-1081

010/12

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO : STOLTENBERG, UNOG
FROM : (m) STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 1208
SUBJECT: CROATIAN MIG-21S UPDATE

Adrian Thaw

DISTRIBUTION:	
PC	WS
EdC	JPM
SC	g
	JUB

1. On 24 September, the UNMOs at Pleso Airfield in Zagreb were allowed access to the Croatian military side for the first time in over a week. Inspection of the area revealed the presence of eight MIG-21 aircraft (one grey, seven camouflaged). This is an increase of one in the total number of aircraft previously observed, but an increase of three in the number of camouflaged aircraft seen. The previously seen aircraft inventory consisted of three grey MIG-21s (after the crash of one) and four camouflaged. It is possible that two of the grey aircraft were repainted. However, we believe this to be unlikely.

2. Our assessment is, that the CAF has acquired at least one additional MIG-21 aircraft. However, it is probable that they have acquired three additional MIG-21 aircraft, from unknown sources. Since this was the first inspection performed by our UNMOs in 10 days, further inspection may reveal additional aircraft, or provide more information on the exact breakdown of aircraft type at Pleso. Patrols will be continued. Some recent Croatian official statements have suggested that further aircraft may be about to appear.

Endall

(C)

010/12

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

Page 1 of 7

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UN RESTRICTED

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG	DATE/TIME: 23 SEP 1993
TO: SRSG, GENEVA	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: MR B RAMCHANDAN MR P KARONEN	FILE REF. NO.: B. Olley DRAFTER : COL B AHLQVIST MA TO THE SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: MEDAK	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE	

MESSAGE:

1. Jeremy asked me to call either of you but I did not get you on the phone.
2. To have something about the Medak - pocket I send you
 - an extract of Sitrep / Sec South 22 Sep 93
 - FC's letter to gen Novakovic 22 Sep 93
 - Mil Info Summary no 68 21 Sep 93
 - and
 - UNPROFOR News article "Conflict in Croatia"

3. Regards

DISTRIBUTION:	
ACTION	INFO
BL	PK

(2)

2/7

R4374

UNPROFOR
SECTOR SOUTH

Page 1 of 3 Pages

VBDNR 571035				
TVA	COMCEN ID	COMCEN ID	COMCEN ID	COMCEN ID
REVISED	SSHQ 63	SSSN 62	SSBG 41158	SSCZ 852
for comcen	SSSW 79	SSMH 786	SSBR 4.1	SSCA 221
use only	SSSE 81	SSZU 023	SSCR 102	SSKE 815

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: 1736	DATE/TIME: 222359 SEP 93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR/ZAGREB	FROM: HQ SECTOR SOUTH
ATTN: FC, DFC, COS, DOO	FILE REF NO : 1000(DO)
	DRAFTER : MAJ LINTEAU
	TITLE : DUTY OFFICER
	RELEASING OFF: DUTY OFFICER
	SIGNATURE: <i>William Har</i>
INFO: SECTOR WEST, SECTOR EAST, SECTOR NORTH, LOGBASE ZAGREB, FINCOBATT, BRITMEDBATT, HQ BELGRADE, LOGBASE BRAVO, CAN ENG BATT, CZE BATT, KEN BATT, UNMO KNIN, UNCIVPOL, ECOMM, CAC, BIH COMMAND, TF 212.	
SUBJECT: DAILY SITREP SECTOR SOUTH	

MESSAGE

1. GENERAL SITUATION

A. STABLE BUT TENSE IN THE PODLAPAC VILLAGE (WK 50 37) AND IN THE MEDAK POCKET.

B. CZECH BATT AOR

(1) CONFRONTATION LINE: NTR.

(2) MOVEMENT: FROM CP 03 (WK 485 466) TOWARDS LICKI OSIK: 7 TRUCKS, 3 BUSES, 225 SOLDIERS. ONE 105MM HOWITZER WAS MOVED TO LICKI OSIK.

- FROM LICKI OSIK TOWARDS THE UNPA: 3 TRUCKS, ONE BUS AND 60 SOLDIERS.

C. CAN BATT AOR: OPS CONT IN AOR. FREBATT 1 AND 3 HAVE COMPLETED SWEEP IN THEIR SECTOR. MORE BODIES WERE FOUND FOR A TOTAL OF 14 TO DATE. FREBATT 1 COY AWAITS FC DECISION TO GO BACK TO THEIR UNIT ON 23 SEP.

TVO 022
0218

1805 v14

3/7

T= 4150

COM

SRSG'S OFFICE

Date: 20/9-93

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
93 SEP 22 15:30

SRSG:

ROUTINE - PRIORITY - IMMEDIATE - MOST IMMEDIATE

DSRSG:

UNCLASSIFIED - RESTRICTED - CONFIDENTIAL - CRYPTO - ONLY

UNPROFOR		PAGE 1 OF 2	
OUTGOING FAX NO.: 194		DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1993	
TO: SECTOR SOUTH		FROM: OFFICE OF THE FORCE COMMANDER UNPROFOR ZAGREB	
FAX NO:		FAX NO:	
ATTN: COMMANDER		FILE NO: COL. CORBERAND DRAFTER: MA TO FC	
INFO: FAX NO.:			
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG/DFC/COS/CMO, MA TO FC			
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM FC TO BRIG.GEN. NOVAKOVIC			

BA

72

Copy

U. Melzer

PLEASE FORWARD ATTACHED LETTER TO BRIG.GEN. NOVAKOVIC UPON RECEIPT.

THANKS AND REGARDS.

HQSS 286 tuz 19:15 v19

RETOUREXEMPLAAR

SEP 22 19:21

T-4156
4/7
2/2
UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

Zagreb, 22 September 1993

Dear General,

I have received your letter dated 18 September 1993 and I can assure you that we are doing our best to ensure that the agreement concerning the MEDAK pocket is respected. To give direct answers to the questions you ask, you should be aware that at the moment :

- 1) It is still too dangerous for civilians to enter the villages and up to now four UNPROFOR vehicles have already sustained damage from anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, fortunately causing only five minor casualties.
- 2) UNPROFOR units including Engineers, Medical Teams and Protection Forces, as well as representatives of Civil Affairs and CIVPOL have been deployed to clear the terrain. I assure you that this is our priority.
- 3) Search for missing or killed persons continues and during the past 24 hrs no people or bodies were found.
- 4) Mine lifting performed by Engineer units is in progress, but the work is going to be very complicated due to the lack of information on minefields from both Serb and Croat sides.

Also be aware that all possible efforts are made to resume the negotiations on a more general cease-fire as soon as possible, which is, as you know, our common objective.

General COT
Force Commander

Brigadier General NOVAKOVIC
KNIN

UN RESTRICTED

21 September 1993

MIL INFO SUMMARY NO 68

14 TO 21 SEPTEMBER 1993

INTRODUCTION

1. The situation in the sectors was relatively quiet except in sector south and B.H. COMD. The conflict between HVO and BiH still continue in BH. The HVO trying to add pressure and BiH is launching several attacks with shelling from both sides.

SECTOR EAST

2. The situation in the sector remains stable. The "SBC" (Slavonia Baranja Corps) is still mobilized. During the night of 12-13 sep 93 a partial mobilization was noticed in the area of KNEZEVI-VINOGRADI but the population has very low motivation because they don't want to send soldiers to reinforce sector south.

3. On 17 sep, 100 to 150 Serb "Arkan soldiers" were performing a force demonstration along the CFL between SARVAS (CR 3144) and BRADIN (CR 3625) in order to intimidate the population.

4. Comment: It is assessed that the situation in the sector will remain calm in the near future. Neither the Croats nor the RSK have the capabilities to perform an offensive activity. Both sides will probably maintain their defensive postures, however if the situation deteriorates in other sectors, the status can change rapidly.

SECTOR WEST

5. The situation in the sector appeared to be less tense than last week. Both CA and TDF seem to be adopting a defensive posture. The RSK has proved that it can hurt the Croats by using its artillery.

6. Comment: The situation is expected to remain quiet.

SECTOR NORTH

7. Except for the overflights of Croats MIG21 aircrafts, the reporting period was generally more quiet than the previous period. However, the situation remains tense.

8. Comment: The future development depends primarily on what is going on outside sector north.

SECTOR SOUTH

9. The situation in sector south remains very tense following the Croatian attack in the MEDAK pocket on 9 Sep. There has been steady art fire exchange during the week in several areas which escalated to the shelling of KNIN on 16 Sep.

10. Some reinforcement in the northern part of the Krajina mainly north of UBDINA and around KORENICA. The level of military activity throughout the AOR has been high.

11. The CA have now withdrawn to the 9 Sep line and the SA has withdrawn to a position of about 600m of their front line in the MEDAK area.

12. Comments: The willingness of the Croats to withdraw from the MEDAK pocket indicates that the operation was a test or a local move. It surely boosted the morale of the Croatian people who were expecting a successful operation as opposed to their unsuccessful operations in BH. The Croats now know the reaction time and defense capability of the Serbs, and the Serbs will readjust their defense posture in the Krajina.

13. It seems that the Geneva talks have no or minimal influence on the operations in the Krajinas.

14. The Croats keep the initiative and the pressure on the Serbs due to their higher capacity to produce war materials than the Serbs, despite the fact that the Serbs have a lot of stocks.

15. The Croats are expected to prepare an offensive in the southern part of this sector a few months after a cease fire has been agreed in BH, fearing an influx of BSA troops to the "RSK". Their intention seems to be to move on KNIN from the MILJEVCI plateau.

UN RESTRICTED

CONFLICT IN CROATIA



Kenyan soldiers are greeted by displaced refugees living in an UNPROFOR-protected compound in Podlug near Benkovac, Sector South
- Photo: ANDY BURRIDGE

From page 3

and Medak in the areas of Obrovac, Mali Golac, Mali Alan, Uhdina and Gaspic.

Serbian artillery resumed shelling the Sisak refinery and Karlovac was hit by several hundred rounds throughout the day and the evening, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. Among them were those injured by the ERIC-7 missile that struck Lucko in Zagreb about 7 p.m.

At 8 a.m. on Sunday, 12 September, eight multiple-launch rockets landed in the area of Samobor to the west of Zagreb. Karlovac also continued to be shelled.

The cease-fire negotiations scheduled for that day were cancelled after the Serbian side refused to attend while offensive actions by the Croatian Army continued in the "pink zones" and the Sectors.

At 8.30 p.m., General Cot sent an identical proposal to General Bobetko in Zagreb and General Novakovic in Knin for a cease-fire and withdrawal to the positions held before 9 September.

The proposal urged the resumption of cease-fire talks between the parties and recommended finding a local solution in the Medak area as a first step towards defusing the tense situation.

This solution would include the withdrawal of Croatian forces from the areas captured

after 9-10 September, followed by a strong UNPROFOR presence in the area.

It also urged a firm commitment from both sides that they would stop shelling civilian targets from noon, 13 September, and that the Serbs specifically guarantee that from that time until the conclusion of the cease-fire negotiations heavy weapons such as rockets or multiple-rocket launchers would not be used.

At 12.30 p.m., 13 September, the Force Commander received a letter from General Novakovic that accepted most of the proposals. At 3 p.m., General Cot received a response from the Croatian Director of National Security, Mr Sarinic, followed by a letter from General Bobetko, who indicated that Croatian acceptance would be subject to UNPROFOR's taking exclusive control of the three villages occupied by Croatian forces on 9-10 September.

General Cot then began trying to secure full implementation of the proposal, and through Mr Stoltenberg informed the Secretary-General, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, of the situation and of the ongoing heavy fighting around Karlovac, Kostajnica, Sisak, Petrinja, Glina and many other locations in, and adjacent to, Sectors North and South.

The UN Security Council, expressing profound concern at reports of recent military hostilities in Croatia, called on the Croatian

Government to withdraw its armed forces to positions before 9 September and called on Serbian forces to halt all provocative military action.

General Cot visited the confrontation line in the Blinski Kut, Moscenica and Glinska Poljana areas to inspect the deployment of troops during the recent fighting. After returning to Zagreb, General Cot wrote in a letter to Sector North Commander, Brigadier-General B. Hesselberg: "I was able to measure, on the ground, the extent of the good work accomplished by your units... by moving in between the combatants in order to calm tempers and help the populations. I would like this exemplary work to be better acknowledged in all places, but it is enough for us to be sure that we are working for peace, despite all the difficulties."

By 14 September, the parties had not formally agreed to the proposal, although tensions along the front line in Sector South, particularly in the Medak pocket, had diminished.

Sector North, however, remained tense. UN Military Observers and UNPROFOR troops reported Croatian Air Force MIG-21 jets in action over the Sector early in the morning, with rocket attacks on Blatusa, near Vrginmost, at 6.37 a.m., and bombs dropped near Gradusa at 6.40 a.m.

One of the jets crashed and although the reason was unknown, the siting of aircraft wreckage was confirmed. The pilot was killed.

General Cot continued his negotiations in Zagreb - including with General Bobetko - for a cease-fire to be monitored by UNPROFOR. The Chief UN Military Observer, Brigadier-General Bo Pellnas, visited Knin for discussions on the operational aspect of a possible monitoring mission should a cease-fire be implemented.

After gaining a cease-fire agreement in principle between the two sides on Wednesday morning, 15 September, General Cot went to Gracac to arrange the deployment of UNPROFOR troops along the confrontation line in the area between the warring sides south of Gaspic, warning both sides UNPROFOR would take the necessary action to fulfil the cease-fire proposal.

In the early afternoon, after intensive negotiations with General Cot, and his special representative, General Pellnas, both sides finally signed the cease-fire agreement of UNPROFOR control of the Medak pocket. The operation was successfully concluded on 17 September. Efforts are now focused on negotiations for a global cease-fire agreement.

CONFLICT IN CROATIA

UN MEDIATORS BATTLE FOR PEACE

By MARC McEVoy

The force of the impact from the missile was heard across Zagreb - a dull thud that shook windows kilometres away and forced residents to turn out their lights and run for cover.

A FROG-7 surface-to-surface missile carrying a 500kg warhead crashed into the outer suburb of Lucko on a blustery Saturday evening, 11 September.

It was an obvious message from the Serbs that the Croatian capital was not immune to attack and could pay for the recent incursion by the Croatian Army into Serb-held territory in Krajina.

The result of the most intensive fighting between Croats and Serbs since the Croatian Army offensive of 22 January, this was the closest the war had reached Zagreb during the past 18 months.

The renewal of hostilities

on 9 September with early morning shelling along both sides of the confrontation line in Sectors North and South.

UNPROFOR's Force Commander, General Jean Cot, mediated a cease-fire agreement that was to have gone into effect at 11 a.m. on the same day.

At that precise time, however, Croatian Army units launched an offensive into the region south of Gospić, seizing the villages of Citluk and Dunje Selo near the confrontation line in the "pink zone".

The attack provoked a widespread exchange of fire, targeting mainly civilian centres on both sides. The following day, 10 September, fighting continued and spread to additional areas in, and around, the Sectors.

There were further Croatian Army attacks against Medak and south of Citluk, and UN military and Civil Affairs officials confirmed the Croatian Army seizure of a third village, Njegovina. Serbian refugees from the seized

villages were reportedly moving towards Gracac.

At 7.40 p.m. that day, the oil refinery at Sisak was hit by approximately 20 shells from

General Bobetko declined to meet the envoy, while General Novakovic reaffirmed a message he had relayed earlier to Croatian authorities through the Force Commander stating that Serbian forces would attack Croatian Army positions throughout the country if they did not withdraw from the villages seized in the offensive.

Fighting again spread and intensified on Saturday, 11 September. More than 6,000 artillery and rocket impacts were reported by UN officials in Sector South alone, mainly along the confrontation line between Baljci

Continued page 4



A UN supply convoy (above) passes the Turanj crossing near Karlovac, which was heavily shelled this month - Photo: JIHAD EL-HASSAN

Serbian gunners.

Croatian forces in the area immediately responded with heavy fire in the direction of Serbian artillery emplacements and with rocket fire over Turanj. UNPROFOR intensified its efforts to mediate a cease-fire on 10 September.

The Croatian President, Mr Tudjman, told the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg, that he had ordered an immediate cessation of shelling but could not order a withdrawal from the occupied villages until a generalized cease-fire agreement was signed.

UNPROFOR relayed Mr Tudjman's message to Serbian officials. Meanwhile, General Cot sent personal envoys to meet the Commander of the Croatian forces, General Bobetko, and the Commander of the Serbian forces in Krajina, General Novakovic.



General Jean Cot

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COMMUNICATIONS Unit

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TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, GENEVA

FROM: VOLLEBAEK/AHRENS, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: _____

CODED CABLE

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH MR HADZIC AND MR JARCEVIC IN ERDUT AND
FOREIGN MINISTER JOVANOVIC IN BELGRADE 23 SEPTEMBER 1993

1. Today I travelled together with Ambassador Ahrens to Erdut and Belgrade. In Erdut we met Mr Hadzic, President of the so called RSK, and Mr Jarcevic, the Foreign Minister. In Belgrade we met Foreign Minister Jovanovic. These meetings were the continuation of the meeting yesterday with Mr Sarenic, the Croatian Director of National Security, in which Ahrens outlined the French/German proposal for a secret meeting to provide impetus to the current Krajina talks.

2. Before we left Zagreb this morning, Ahrens received a phone call from Sarenic. Sarenic confirmed that he had discussed the proposal with President Tudjman and that in principle Croatia was in favour of the proposal. The formal withdrawal from the 802 areas was difficult, however there was room for manoeuvre within the framework of a separation of forces. He said that after the ceasefire they would move straight on with the elements of 847, attempting to gain concrete results against set time limits. He also said that we should not approach other politicians to discuss the subject, as Ahrens had offered to speak to people such as Seks to gain a broader consensus.

3. At both the meetings today Ahrens outlined the basic position, that France and Germany, with the backing of the EC and ICFY, wanted to try to break the current deadlock of negotiations. This initiative was intended to achieve limited objectives, probably a comprehensive ceasefire and a start on opening key infrastructure such as roads, railways and power transmission lines. The more complex political questions could be discussed but would not be resolved in these meetings. However, it was essential that the parties agreed that these objectives could be reached before the prestige of France and Germany was put on the line.

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I endorsed the initiative, confirming that it had the full backing of the Co-Chairmen.

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4. Mr Hadzic said that he fully accepted the idea and would be happy to participate since it was clear that the alternative was war. In fact he pressed for an early start to the process because he feared further Croatian attacks in the near future. He agreed that a ceasefire was vital and that reopening communications routes was of interest to both parties and should be done as soon as possible. On the question of return of displaced people, Ahrens mentioned that while in New York the principle had been agreed that all displaced people should return, including Serbs to Croatian held territory, Paspalj had said that no Serbs would want to go back. Hadzic said that the principle was correct, but then went on to say quite strongly that Serbs and Croats could never live together again. It might be possible for Croats to return to Krajina, but it was inconceivable for Serbs to want to return to Croatia.

5. Minister Jovanovic was initially cool towards the idea, saying that it was not possible for Serbia to be included in negotiations between Krajina and Croatia, because Knin would object. At the same time there was deep mistrust of Croatia in Knin, while there were increasing high level contacts between Belgrade and Zagreb to discuss matters such as the economic reconstruction. Ahrens explained that Serbia's role in the negotiations was twofold: to raise the level of the meeting so that Croatia would be represented by someone other than the usual team, with whom no progress was being made, and at the same time to get them to leave the country for negotiations; and secondly to bring Serbia into the international arena as one of the mediators, alongside France and Germany, as this would help its reintegration into Europe which was of long term importance for all concerned. Jovanovic agreed that the principle was good, but would need some consideration. He ended by saying that it might be easier for Serbia to attend if there were greater concrete incentives for Serbia, with the lifting of sanctions being the key issue.

6. We agreed at both meetings that progress should be made in the military working group so that there is a ceasefire agreement ready to be signed in Strasbourg, and that this activity should take place next week. We also agreed that we should be able to return during the week starting 4 October to confirm their positions before making a final recommendation to Bonn and Paris.

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Office of the
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

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TO: Mr. Stoltenberg and Lord Owen, Geneva
FROM: Ambassador Vollebaek and Ambassador Ahrens, Zagreb
DATE: 23 September 1993
SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Sarenic

93 SEP 23 -8 :00

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Ambassadors Ahrens and Vollebaek met yesterday with Mr. Sarenic, Director of National Security. The discussion focused mainly on the French/German initiative.
2. Ambassador Ahrens started by making a resume of the past events and negotiations on the Krajina stressing the fact that these talks had moved in circles ever since they started in February in New York. The main problems have been the withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces from the areas mentioned in SCR 802 and who will police the areas vacated by the Croatian Army.

Ambassador Ahrens then explained that Ambassador Vollebaek and himself had been given the task of sounding out with their interlocutors the French/German initiative about both the format and the chances of success. Bonn and Paris would then decide, accordingly, whether or not to hold a meeting. He explained that the initiative could go further than the Krajina issue and touch the question of the Serb/Croat relations in general. The idea was to hold a high level meeting with representatives from Zagreb, Belgrade and Erdut/Knin which would be chaired by high ranking officials of the French and the German Foreign Ministries. A precondition for convening such a meeting was, however, that both sides showed more willingness for compromise than had so far been the case.

Ambassador Vollebaek added that this idea had strong international support and that the Co-Chairmen were strongly in favour of it.

3. Mr. Sarenic explained that if Croatia had enough guarantees that the long term solution would not in any way be an independent "RSK", it would be much more flexible in the negotiations. He was in favour of a negotiated solution and said that Croatia would work on restoring the confidence starting with UNPROFOR in which the Croatian public has lost faith. He added that Croatia's aim was to grant the Serb majority areas an autonomy based on what some regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina) had under the 1974 constitution in Former Yugoslavia. He also stated that Croatia would support reexchanges of population with the goal of a return to the pre war ethnic compositions, i.e., return of all the refugees.

4. Both Ambassadors plan to go to Erdut and Belgrade today for talks with Krajina's "President", Hadzic, and Serbian Foreign Minister, Jovanovic. They plan to go to Knin tomorrow for talks with "Prime Minister". Bjegovic, and with the Serbian military leadership.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

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TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

IMMEDIATE

INFO: SRSG, FC, HCA

FROM: VOLLEBAEK, ZAGREB

DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: 126-1054

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR DEGORICIJA - 21 SEPTEMBER 1993

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1. Last night I met Mr Degoricija at my initiative for over an hour. In a difficult meeting Mr Degoricija gave a very strong warning that if progress was not made very soon in Sector West then Croatia would have to take the matter into its own hands, as it did near Gospic on 9 September.

2. When we arrived Mr Degoricija was watching TV Banja Luka news, showing coverage of the Canadian/French battalion moving into the Medak pocket. Mr Degoricija was very depressed, but justified the Medak action by saying that he and Croatia had been warning the international community for a long time about the armament of the Krajina by the Serbian and Bosnian Serbs, and that they had been saying for a long time that if nothing was done to stop the terrorist attacks, then Croatia would have to do something about it. Croatia had now taken action and given the Serbs a very clear message that they should desist. The fact that the Serbs might have drawn completely different conclusions was lost on Mr Degoricija.

3. Although we discussed the impact of the Medak action on the current negotiations and concluded that the military expert group should continue to meet and that there was a chance to sign a ceasefire, Mr Degoricija stressed the fact that the situation in Sector West was still very bad and getting worse, with terrorist incidents and killings every day. If this situation did not change in the very near future, then Croatia would once again have to take military action to stop it. Croatia had the military ability to take as much territory as it wanted in Krajina and had taken a very limited objective in the Medak action. However, Sector West

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was about to be object of the next Croatian interest. This was not aggression on the part of Croatia, because it was acting on its own territory.

4. Mr Degoricija has invested great personal effort in the attempts to negotiate a solution with the Serbs, through previous negotiations and through the Croatian proposals that are nearing completion, despite the tone of his rhetoric. This may explain why he is so depressed. While I do not agree with his logic in justifying the Medak action, I believe that he may reflect the line of thought that actually prevails within the Croatian Government and that Croatia may be on the brink of a further military action in Sector West. If this is true, and it is easy to cry wolf, I recommend that we should take the following actions:

- a. Politically, we should take all possible diplomatic steps to persuade the Croatian Government that such action would be a political disaster.
- b. Militarily, we should attempt as soon as possible to put into practice in Sector West a similar buffer with UNPROFOR to that which seems to have held the two sides apart in Sector North during the Medak action. I realise that this is manpower intensive, and that manpower is short in Sector West. However, it is a positive action which, in the light of the UNPROFOR success over the Medak action, might prove decisive in defusing the situation.

ENDALL

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 CZN-1181
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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -11502

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICPY, GENEVA

FROM: *fn* STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Adrian Thunberg*

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-2-1159

SUBJECT: Analysis of Political Aspects of Recent Medak Pocket Conflict

... 1. I attach for your consideration copy of CAC-SN Kirudja's analysis of recent happenings. Much of it we find rather persuasive. The events of the last 9 days have been detrimental to the Croatian Government. We rather wonder what certain elements will try to do next. Their position must have been weakened by what has occurred.

2. The impact of this week's two Geneva BH bilateral agreements, especially on the "right to secede", could also be seismic. All eyes will be on Sarajevo Airport next Tuesday. The implications for the "RSK" of the BH process, and the latest Croatian military escapade, will be analysed -- we suspect -- cautiously, and without any urgency, by its leadership.

3. CAC-SS Peterson tells us that the atmosphere in Knin today is extremely tense, in view of the amount of deliberate destruction in the formerly-occupied villages, and the autopsies now being conducted in respect of the retrieved bodies. There are rumours of mass graves. A memorial service will be conducted tomorrow in Knin. The leadership there has already told her that the recent events have caused them to conclude that they are unlikely any longer to accept the continuance of the mandate in its present form. The possibility of having an early "general cease-fire meeting" with both sides seems a little remote.

Endall.

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SECTOR NORTH - TOPUSKO

CIV/AFF/09/30
SECTOR NORTH
17 September 1993**RESTRICTED**Subject: Civil Affairs SitRep No. 21

1. The Sitrep immediately preceding this one was CIV/AFF/08/37 dated 31 August 1993.
2. Today, on the sixth day following the most intensive conflict between Croats and Serbs since UNPROFOR arrived in this Sector, the situation is calm. The high tension appears to have dissipated. The attention of the warring parties now seems to be turned to assessing damages inflicted on or suffered from each other and what their state of political relationship is or will be. Most ordinary people seem to have heard of the latest ceasefire agreement with Croats and that the CA is withdrawing from the three villages (Divoselo, Citluk, and Pucitelj) where their action on 9 January touched off a general conflict along the frontlines in Sectors North, South and, to a lesser extent, West. This Sitrep is intended as a "post mortem" review of the four day conflict with a view to drawing lessons for this mission. The heroic assumption is that the recent fighting has for the moment run its course to the end.

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

3. Two days before the fighting started, the SC, CAC and COS of Sector North had a meeting on 7 September with Gen. Bobetko, at our request, after observing a rapidly

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deteriorating situation along the CFL running from Ogulin down to Gospić. The request for this meeting had been triggered by:

(a) Mounting CF violations from CA units;

(b) A warning by a CA Commander in the Ogulin/Plaski CFL area that he would fire directly on POLBAT units deployed in the area since, according to him, UN troops were not supposed to be deployed in the "Pink Zone" area, and ;

(c) Information from the CA commander of OZ Karlovac (Brig. Miljevac) that CA units operating in the area from Ogulin down to Gospić were now under the direct command of Gen. Bobetko himself.

4. At the 7 September meeting in Zagreb, Gen. Bobetko assured us that no UN positions would be endangered unless the Serbs used the UN positions as a shield from behind which they fired at Croat positions; that the CA had no offensive plans in the Ogulin/Plaski area but the CA intended to retaliate heavily to the "continued shelling" of Gospić; and that the Serbs continue to menace Sisak with artillery which UNPROFOR had failed to take control of and remove from the area. Bobetko's statements become more transparent, in the light of the recent fighting, when seen against a previous context he had set beginning on 7 April 1993 at his first meeting with the SC, Sector North. Also present at the meeting were the then FC Wahlgren, the CA Commander of OZ Zagreb (Gen. Stipetić), and the CA Commander of OZ Karlovac (Brig. Miljevac).

5. The purpose of the 7 April meeting was to consider Sector North's proposals on three hot spots along the CFL (Blinski Kut, Moscenica and Turanj) as well as lay a basis for an overall *modus operandi* along the entire CFL in the Sector. At the end of that first meeting, Bobetko had tacitly authorized and set in motion a process that resulted in a significant redeployment and unique presence of Sector North troops along most of the CFL. The presence of those troops and maintenance of manned OPs/CPs along the hot parts of the CFL during the recent intensive fighting made a critical difference in the course of the fighting and may have provided a turning point in the perceptions of the role

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of UNPROFOR among the warring parties on the ground.

6. By mutual agreement of both sides BGen. Hesselberg had been permitted to negotiate and conclude local agreements to resolve conflicts in Banija and Kordun areas along the CFL. The notable exception was the CFL in the Ogulin to Gospić area. At a meeting on 1 June in Zagreb, Bobetko made it clear that he would "retaliate with all forces against Korenica if attacks on Gospić did not stop". In that area up to Ogulin, it was evident that Bobetko would not accept the separation of forces under similar local agreements as he had accepted in Banija or Kordun. It was also evident at that time that the Croatian side would neither understand nor accept the message conveyed by the SC that the Serbs would consider an attack on Korenica or anywhere else as an attack on their collective territory and would retaliate against Croat positions across all over the CFL as they choose. Nevertheless, the Croats respected the undertakings they had pledged on 7 April at the first Bobetko meeting with Sector North with regard to conflicts in Banija or Kordun.

7. The Blinski Kut local agreement was implemented successfully. DANBAT troops were deployed in a security zone effectively separating the two opposing forces and thereby provided a practical example of a successful locally negotiated solution. Units of DETARGBAT were next successfully deployed in the Glinska Poljana - Slana pocket enclosing a "reversed Pink Zone" and thereby achieving a similar separation of forces. POLBAT units were similarly placed in an attempt to effectively separate the two forces in Turanj. Both DETARGBAT and POLBAT were replaced in their positions and tasks by FREBAT 1 transferred by the FC from Sector South. All the battalions involved in the separation of forces positioning had the capability in personnel and equipment to remain and hold defensive positions under fire. By order of the SC, the OPs/CPs had to conform, as an additional measure of security, to the UN/Nordic standards of fortifications.

8. On 13 September the FC, Gen. Jean Cot, visited the CFL in Blinski Kut area, Moscenica, and the Glinska Poljana area to inspect the deployment of the troops during the recent fighting. Upon return to Zagreb, he wrote to Gen. Hesselberg the following

message:

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"Once again, I was able to measure, on the ground, the extent of the good work accomplished by your units, especially at this time of serious tension, by moving in between the combatants, in order to calm tempers and help the populations.

I would like this exemplary work to be better acknowledged in all places, but it is enough for us to be sure that we are working for Peace, despite all the difficulties".

On 4 September and five days before the fighting erupted, Amh. Vullcback had visited Blinski Kut and Glinska Poljana CFL area and expressed similar conclusions as conveyed by the FC.

9. On 10 September, the second day and at the apogee of the heavy fighting, Sector North made the assessment that the Serbs had concentrated forces in the vicinity of Turanj and might have been planning to break through CA frontlines to River Mreznica and place their forces in a position to control by fire all traffic from Karlovac to Rijeka - a vital road link between major Croatian population centres. Five FREBAT 1 positions in this area came under direct line of fire from both sides. Most of the fire directed at the UN troops, (80 percent by the SC's estimate), came from CA positions. Two FREBAT 1 APCs were hit but sustained minor damages. Neither side attempted, however, to move Infantry past the UN positions. A similar situation, though with less fire intensity, was contained by DANBAT in Blinski Kut and Sunja area. At POLBAT positions around Vojnavac in Plaski, the UN positions were secured after reinforcement by reserve units from FREBAT 1. The CA fire subsided and the position remained fully manned.

10. In brief, despite the shelling with heavy weapons and regroupings of Infantry positions, neither side advanced across the CFL in the AOR of Sector North. There were clear signs, however, that there was potential for this to have happened particularly in the areas of Turanj, Sunja and Plaski. While neither side appeared to have seriously wanted to advance their positions, the cycle of retaliatory actions were several times broken or

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impeded by UNPROFOR actions or presence in the CFL.

11. The international border with BH remained calm during the whole period of the conflict and the main crossing point at Maljevac (Velika Kladusa) remained open. This is remarkable considering there had been a serious conflict on 27 April involving Serbs re-entering by force into the enclave of Bosanska Dvora. The 5 July ceasefire brokered by Sector North and involving face-to-face meetings between Serbs and Bosnians from Blum held throughout the recent fighting between Serbs and Croats.

POLITICAL REVIEW

12. While each side claims they did not want the fighting, it is also evident that neither side was shocked or surprised when it happened. Further, each side openly declared to the other what it was prepared or intended to do and then set about doing it. It is also, in our view, not an accident that the fighting, precipitated by actions on the Croatian side, happened three weeks before the mandate of UNPROFOR was due for renewal. The Croatian side has publicly been pre-occupied for several months now with the role of UNPROFOR in the UNPAs and what Croats see as the inadequacy of UNPROFOR's mandate. The government of Croatia had issued publicly what it would accept in order to agree to a renewed mandate. The letter dated 13 September and addressed to the Secretary-General by President Tudjman was reportedly reproduced in the press along with the details of the demands that UNPROFOR must fulfill. Included is the much publicized view on the part of Croatia that UNPROFOR has the obligation to:

- (a) Disarm the Serbs with or without their co-operation;
- (b) Return Croatian authority, if not immediately to all the UNPAs, then certainly to the "Pink Zones" and;
- (c) Somehow in all of that process enable the displaced Croats to return to their

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homes in safety and in a relatively short time (measured in months).

13. The CA action from Gospić into the three villages was preceded by a renewed and virulent attack on UNPROFOR in the Croatian media. Croatian reporters appear to have embarked on a witch hunt for all objectionable things UNPROFOR did or failed to do. The apparent motive was to prop the official demand that UNPROFOR's mandate needed to be fundamentally changed and its command or organisational structure broken up into three i.e. separate missions for Croatia, BH and FYROM. In other words, the Croats seem to have embarked in a rather successful media campaign to vilify UNPROFOR and its personnel in the eyes of their own public in an ironic attempt to coerce the mission to act more in line with official policy for reintegrating the UNPAs back into the rest of Croatia on a fast track. The events that happened in the recent fighting seem to have dealt a severe blow to Croatian official aspirations in this respect.

14. The CA incursion from Gospić into the "Medak pocket" also happened at the time when both sides were reported to be not too far apart in reaching an accord for a general ceasefire. The negotiating parties were scheduled to meet aboard a British warship on the Adriatic on 12 September to finalize the agreement. The attack by the CA seems to have pushed the negotiating track to the back burner if not straight into the icebox. For how long will depend, perhaps, on how the Serbs interpret their positions coming out of the recent fighting. It may be significant in that process to note that the CA in general, and Bobotko in particular, may have acted in the conviction that the CA action in the "Medak pocket" would be viewed by the Serbs as an isolated but a potent indicator of Croatian military might to which they would be compelled to respond with a frontal counter attack where the action happened. In retrospect, the CA Chief of General Staff appears not to have been persuaded that the Serbs were poised to respond in full, in total and everywhere along the CFL. Two days ago, he stated to the Croatian press that "now the Serbs have felt the long arm of Croatia". It was the same message he had asked us on 7 September to convey to the Serbs. We did.

15. By 18:00 hrs this evening, UNPROFOR units based at Divoselo will have taken control of the "Medak pocket" after the last CA units vacate the area according to the

CZN-1181 8/07 8/9
CZG-1034 T548

agreement signed by both parties on 18 September. Reports from the villages from which the CA has left includes tales of burned houses and general destruction. The CA will reportedly be back to their positions as of 9 June without a military victory. The intense shelling by Serbs from positions in Sector North directed to heavily populated Croatian towns across the CFI, also served to expose the "soft underbelly" of Croatia proper as well as to demonstrate the extent of the fire power presently in Serb hands. The Serbs come out with visibly buoyed morale about their own security as well as their ability to threaten the other side. From an international public relations point of view, they also come out of this conflict with three villages as "testimony" to their often repeated claim that the return of Croatian authority to Serb villages can only mean disaster.

16. The recent fighting appears to have lifted most of the doubt the Serbs may have privately harbored about their ability to withstand a Croatian military attack on an all out basis. Indirectly this may also have served to strengthened, within the local Serb leadership quarrels, those leaders who want to rely solely on "Krajina Serbs" without overt dependence on Bosnian Serbs or Belgrade for military support. In other words, the Serbs seem to come out of the fighting convinced they can defend themselves without the need for more infantry. The much publicized complaint by Croatia of troops coming from outside the UNPAs seems to have been a moot issue. The fighting seems to have been determined solely by the use of heavy fire power by both sides against populated areas.

PROGNOSIS

17. The recent fighting and the active involvement of UNPROFOR, from the FC down to the units at OPs/Cps may have placed this mission close to a turning point. From an operational viewpoint, the Serb side may have restored a degree of confidence lost after 22 January. UNPROFOR was seen to have held its positions and the FC to have demonstrated his resolve to act decisively. The news that the CA units actually could have withdrawn from the villages within the relatively short time frame seems to be received here with a mixture of disbelief and relief.

CZW-1181 9/9
CZG-1034
TF 548

18. While UNPROFOR's relationship with the Serb side may have improved after the recent fighting, it is doubtful that Croatian opinion of UNPROFOR could have changed for the better. It can be expected that the Serbs will harden their negotiating positions at the ICIFY level and will seek to recruit UNPROFOR to its political views. One of those will no doubt be the right to be consulted in the decision of the Security Council regarding any change in the mandate of UNPROFOR. Hard times for UNPROFOR loom ahead.

Regards.

Charles Kinnear, CAC, Sector North

TO: Mr. C. Thornberry, HCA, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

cc: Sector Commander
Chief, UNCIVPOL
SMO
M&AO
DANBAT
POLBAT
PREBAT
UNHCR

DISTRIBUTION:

PK
CAC
1610/1650
1/10

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

SECTOR SOUTH

Page 1 of 2

VBDNR	T 8042			
TVA	TVZ	COMCEN ID	TVZ	COMCEN ID
1610		53H2 951		
for comcen		535N/633		
use only		535W 712		

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX IMMEDIATE XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
UNCLASSIFIED XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE/TIME: 17/615 B SEP 93
TO: UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB	FROM: HQ SECTOR SOUTH
FAX NO.:	FAX:
ATTN: COO DUTY OFFR	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : MAJ KELLY TITLE : DSOO RELEASING OFF. : SOO SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO : SECTOR NORTH SOO, SECTOR WEST SOO FAX NO.:	
INTERN DISTR.: SC, DSC, CAC, UNHCR, ECMM, SMO	
SUBJECT: SITREP MEDAK POCKET OPS	

MESSAGE

1. OPS TO OCCUPY AREA TAKEN BY CROAT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY SINCE 9 SEP ARE PROCEEDING GENERALLY AS PLANNED. LIMIT OF ADVANCE OF CANBAT 1 FORCES ON 16 SEP WAS TO THE GENERAL LINE RUNNING NE FROM KRAJINOVICI 3125 TO ORNICE 3327 (ALL GR WK).

2. ADVANCE CEASED AT LAST LIGHT ON 16 SEP AND IN SPITE OF EXTENSIVE ARTY EXCHANGES IN SOUTHERN PART OF SECTOR SOUTH LATE ON 16 SEP, THE CA WDR AND CANBAT ADVANCE CONTINUED AT FIRST LIGHT ON 17 SEP. CANBAT C COY CURRENTLY MANS SERB FRONT LINE POSNS NEAR SITNIK 3522, NJEGOVANI 3524, AND BEGLUK 3725.

3. FREBAT 1 COY IS ON SERB FRONT LINE POSNS NEAR BARLETE 3731, KORMLJOVACA 3629 AND ZAVODE 4130. THIS COY WILL MOVE LATER ON 17 SEP TO OCCUPY POSITIONS IN THE NEW UNPROFOR BUFFER ZONE. LOCS NOT YET DETERMINED; RECCE IN PROGRESS.

4. CANBAT D COY DISPOSED AREAS VUKSANI 3421, DRIJICI 3422, D. SELQ 3423 AND UZELCI 3424. THEY WILL CONTINUE PATROLLING AND ROUTE CLEARANCE IN THE AREA BETWEEN C AND D COYS.

5. FREBAT 3 COY IS LOCATED ALONG THE ROAD JOINING KRAJINOVIC 3124 AND LICKI CITLUK 3224 AND IN THE AREA SW OF ORNICE 3327. THEY WILL SWEEP VILLAGES OF STRUNICI 2927, PODKUSA 2828 AND NORTH

COO/DO
R
F

CZ N=1180

4

TO THE AREA OF GR 2930 AND POLJARI 3027.

6. THE PRECISE LOC OF THE CA PRE 9 SEP LINE IS BEING DEFINED AND WILL BE OCCUPIED BY LAST LIGHT. DETAILED SWEEP OF VILLAGES WILL CONTINUE FOR REMAINDER OF DAY. ACTIVE PATROL SCHEDULE BEING MAINTAINED.

7. CO CANBAT 1 REPORTS THAT CA FORCES DELAYED ADVANCE OF CANBAT BOTH DAYS WHILE SYSTEMATIC AND THOROUGH DESTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGES OF D. SELO, UZELCI, ROGICI, RAICEVIC, CITLUK, KRAJINOVICI AND STRUNICI WAS CARRIED OUT. BLDGS NOT DAMAGED IN PREVIOUS FIGHTING WERE FLATTENED AND LIVESTOCK DESTROYED.

8. NO REFUGEES HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED AND SEVEN BODIES WERE DISCOVERED ON INITIAL SWEEPS AND HANDED OVER TO LOCAL CIVIL AUTH IN MEDAK. COOPERATION BETWEEN ALL AGENCIES, UNMO, UNCIVPOL, CAC, ECMM, UNHCR, ICRC, LOCAL RED CROSS AND LOCAL CIVIL AUTH HAS BEEN OUTSTANDING AND CONSIDERABLE WORK LIES AHEAD. SWEEPS WILL CONTINUE FOR AT LEAST 48 HRS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT IS UNDERWAY. THREE SERB SOLDIERS WHO WERE ISOLATED IN THE HIGH GROUND SOUTH OF THE MAIN FIGHTING PRESENTED THEMSELVES TO CANBAT TPS AND WERE HANDED OVER TO SERB 9 BDE HQ AT MEDAK. AN ESTIMATE 100 SERB SOLDIERS ARE STILL CUT OFF IN THIS AREA AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE THEIR WAY OUT DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

9. MORALE REMAINS HIGH BUT ALL INVOLVED HAVE BEEN SHOCKED BY THE EXTENT OF THE DESTRUCTION. THIS DETAIL IS CURRENT TO 1430 HRS AND WILL BE UPDATED IN REGULAR SITREP.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

010/12

P1/1

CODE RESTRICTED

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 SEP 16 18:14

'93 SEP 16 17:41 **MOST IMMEDIATE**

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *[Signature]* STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

EZN=1174

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA, FC, HCA, CMO

EZG=1026

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: *Z=1152*

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA AT 1800 HOURS LOCAL

1. Further to my report as at 1500 hours local this afternoon, the situation has started to change in a positive manner and should stabilise again overnight.

2. Croatian forces have begun to withdraw from their front line positions to their first line of withdrawal, three kilometres from the front line. This first move was to have been completed by 1800 hours, but will take longer than that. UNPROFOR troops have already taken over the Croatian front line and are moving up to this three kilometre line tonight, so the Croatian forces are withdrawing through what are now UNPROFOR positions.

3. We anticipate that the second and third stages of the Croatian withdrawal, from the three kilometre line to the pre-9 September 1993 line, will commence at 0800 hours tomorrow morning and will be complete by 1800 hours tomorrow.

4. The Serbs seem to be prepared to wait overnight before taking any further action, to see whether the Croatian forces do complete their withdrawal.

ENDALL

DISTRIBUTION:	
ACTION	INFO
SC	WS
	JVD
	JW/PK
	PS

(5)

1 = 1816
ZAM = 363

COM

WS

CO

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010/12

UNPROFOR

16 15:05

Page 1 of 2

17 - 6 125

T-1884

FLASH

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

~~INTERMEDIATE~~

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UN RESTRICTED

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.: C 513	DATE: 16/09/93
TO: SECTOR SOUTH	FROM: <i>for FC</i>
FAX NO.:	FAX NO.:
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO.:
	DRAFTER: COS
INFO: LIST D (LESS SECTOR SOUTH)	
FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: <u>CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM MEDAK POCKET</u>	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: LISTS A + B - SOO - SAO	

MESSAGE

SRSG'S OFFICE

Date: *17/9-93*

SRSG: _____

DSRSG: _____

SA: _____

DIR: _____

MA: _____

7m

REF.: Operation Order 18/93 of 14 Sept 1993

1. As a complement to the Operation Order in Reference, you will find enclosed the Civil Affairs Guidelines with respect to the operation in MEDAK pocket.

2. Moreover, CIVPOL Commissioner in Zagreb has transmitted a special order to CIVPOL Sector South.

3. Regards.

FLASH

SRSG FC HCA DFC CAO COS SOO SAO CIVPOL
CMO ACOS O of 1 ACOS PL CDO CPO CPIO CMPAO
CHGO CMLO CGO CMCC FMEDO FE FPM

CIVIL AFFAIRS PARTICIPATION IN THE MEDAK OPERATION

1. Two Civil Affairs Officers (Göran Stigmer and Kabelo Makhetha) will be assigned to the forward Headquarters in Gracac, co-locating with CIVPOL. In fulfilling their tasks, Civil Affairs will co-ordinate with all UNPROFOR components as well as with humanitarian organizations;
2. During the withdrawal stage, UNPROFOR will move in, starting with engineers and then the medics and soldiers. Upon clearance by UNPROFOR military, particularly with respect to security and safety, Civil Affairs, CIVPOL, UNHCR, ICRC and the local red cross will move into the area from which the withdrawal has occurred in order to check the situation and determine the human needs.
3. CanBatt will provide emergency rations, and ambulances for medical cases while UNHCR will provide blankets and assistance as needed. Any transfer of people from the area will be co-ordinated with all concerned.
4. Upon clearance by UNPROFOR military that adequate conditions for safety and security exist, Civil Affairs will liaise with the humanitarian organizations and the local authorities concerning the return of displaced persons.
5. UNPROFOR military and CIVPOL will man checkpoints into the area and ensure safe movement.
6. The Civil Affairs Coordinator in Sector South will have the overall responsibility for co-ordinating and liaising with the local and international media.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

R3534

IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR

CO

Page 1 of 2

SECTOR SOUTH

VBDNR T-801				
TVA	TVZ	COMCEN ID	TVZ	COMCEN ID
22-15	2300	SSHQ 937		
for comcen use only				

Date:

SRSG'S OFFICE

1979-93

SRSG:

DSRSG:

SA:

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY ☐ IMMEDIATE ☒ MOST IMMEDIATE ☐Unclassified ☒ Restricted ☐ Confidential ☐ Crypto Only ☐

Date & Time: 16 2215B SEP 93	
TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB	FROM: HQ SECTOR SOUTH
Fax No.:	Fax No.:
Attention: F.C	File Ref. No.: 1681 Drafter: Lt Col RIVET Title: M.A Releasing Off : SAME Signature:
Info : DFC/C.O.S/ C.M.O fax no.:	
SUBJECT: ATTITUDE OF SERBIAN AUTHORITIES ABOUT THE MEDAK POCKET	
Internal Distribution:	

MESSAGES

1- On: General NOVAKOVIC's request at 160900B SEP, S.S.C kept the Serbian authorities informed about the situation in the MEDAK pocket.

2- At 161930B SEP, the Serbian authorities have been informed of the withdrawal as it has been planed at GOSPIC on the 16th SEP in the morning. The situation in the area, as far as it was known at 1800 hrs, has also been passed to them, stressing on the Croats' unwillingness and on the pressure of UNPROFOR units to oblige the Croat unit's to withdraw.

Two / 0645
W21

SRSG
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VBDNR T-868				
TVA	TVZ	COMCEN ID	TVZ	COMCEN ID
0133	035	SSHQ 94L		UNMO ZAGREB
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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/RESTRICTED/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/XXXXXXXXXXXX

FILE REF:	DATE: 170125B SEP 93
TO: UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB	FROM: UNMO HQ SECTOR SOUTH
ATTN: OPS	DRAFTED BY: MAJ REINAMO
	TITLE: DSMO
INFO: UNMO HQ ZAGREB	RELEASED BY: SECTOR COMMANDER
ATTN CMO	SIGNATURE:
UNMO GOSPIC	<i>for Reinamo</i>
ATTN SMO	
SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN SECTOR COMMANDER AND SA AUTHORITIES REGARDING CEASEFIRE IN SECTOR SOUTH	

MESSAGE

1. THE MESSAGE CONCERNING THE SHELLING OF SECTOR SOUTH HAS BEEN PASSED TO SERB MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE MESSAGE WAS THAT THE FC HAS EXERTED HIGH PRESSURE TO CA AUTHORITIES TO STOP ALL SHELLING.
2. COL KOSTA NOVAKOVIČ STATED THAT GEN MILE NOVAKOVIČ RENEWED AN ORDER AT 2245 HR TO STOP ALL SHELLING AND NOT RETALIATE TO PROVOCATIONS.
3. COL KOSTA NOVAKOVIČ MADE SOME ALLUSION TO "UNCONTROLLED ELEMENTS". THE SECTOR COMMANDER RESPONDED BY STATING THAT SERB AUTHORITIES MUST MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO CONTROL THEIR UNITS.
4. COL NOVAKOVIČ STATED THAT SA SIDE WILL NOT DO ANYTHING TO JEOPARDISE THE CA WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MEDAK POCKET.
5. THE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SHELLING FROM THE SERB SIDE HAS BEEN SENT TO SPLIT OP ZONE COMMANDER IN ORDER TO TRY TO ACHIEVE THE CEASEFIRE.

SRSRG'S OFFICE

Date: 1719-93

SRSRG: _____

DSRSRG: _____

SA: _____

DIR: _____

MA: _____

A4 -> A4

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FSC
DRC
COS
ECO
SEC



UNPROFOR

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

PRESS RELEASE

16 September 1993

UNPROFOR Chief Operations Officer, Colonel Michael Maisonneuve, reported from Gospic tonight that UNPROFOR had good cooperation from Croatian forces in planning final details for the full implementation of the Medak pocket agreement. The operation is scheduled to conclude tomorrow by 1900 hours with UNPROFOR deployed in the Medak area up to the line of separation existing before the Croatia Army incursion of 9 September.

The UNPROFOR battalion, comprising Canadian and French peacekeepers, advanced today to the first of the three lines of demarcation, following the moving back from positions by Croatian troops. Upon entering the villages of Citluk, Dunje Selo, Licki Citluk, Raicevici and Ornice, they found a high level of destruction with most buildings and homes destroyed by explosives. Some buildings are still burning.

UNPROFOR Force Commander General Jean Cot commended his personnel for their excellent coordination. "The work of the Canadian and French companies, together with the UN Military Observers and the UN Civilian Police, has shown exemplary teamwork."

The operation, scheduled to resume tomorrow morning, will complete the deployment of UNPROFOR troops in the areas vacated by the Croatian Forces. Negotiations for a lasting cease-fire are expected to begin soon after UNPROFOR has assumed control of the defined areas.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Shannon Boyd", is written above the typed name.

Shannon Boyd
UNPROFOR Spokesperson
Zagreb HQ, 180053

2174

010/12

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION	INFO
EA	WS/TS
SC	DL/LC
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	J-PM
	JVB

JW/PK

PS

JMCEN-1171

CZG-1023

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 SEP 16 14:09

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA, FC, HCA, CMO

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-1149

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA AT 1500 HOURS LOCAL

1. As reported yesterday, we had hoped that following their signature of an agreement to withdraw by 1900 hours yesterday there would be a belated withdrawal by Croatian forces from the Medak pocket today. Unfortunately this has not taken place so far; and we believe that without significant pressure on the Croatian Government there will be no withdrawal.

2. UNPROFOR troops have taken over the Serb positions in the area and have moved up to the Croatian front line. The Croatian forces have shown no sign of withdrawing. In one area captured by the Croats it seems that a small group of Serbs are holding out because there is still the sound of fighting. On the Croatian side the UN Military Observers have very limited freedom of movement, however it is clear to them that houses in the captured villages are being blown up and burned. The Serbs have said that if there is no Croatian withdrawal very soon then they will be forced to break the ceasefire that they are currently observing.

3. At 1130 today, in response to a direct question in a press briefing, the Deputy Force Commander explained that the agreement signed by both parties yesterday did not expressly rule out the possibility that Serb police could enter the area once it had come under UNPROFOR control. As a result both General Stipetic, who signed the agreement, in Gospic and Mr Sarenic, the Director of National Security, in Zagreb, have said that there can be no Croatian withdrawal until there have been negotiations in Gospic between the Croatian side and UN Civil Affairs regarding the civil administration of the pocket. UNPROFOR has said clearly that the Croatian forces should withdraw, as agreed, after which further discussion on the question of administration and policing of the area can be contemplated.

UNHCR
Refugees Unit
Palazzo
Nations

1993 SEP 16 14:29

CZN-1171 CZG-1023

4. In view of the extremely volatile situation, with the risk not only to the negotiating process but significantly to the UNPROFOR soldiers deployed in the area if the Croatian forces do not withdraw this afternoon and the Serbs start shelling, I have briefed the French, German and Russian Ambassadors and Head of ECMM in Zagreb. I have asked them to exert whatever influence they can both within Zagreb and through the wider mechanisms available to them in order to convince the Croatian Government that failure to honour this agreement, under such similar circumstances as surrounded the Erdut agreement at the end of July, would be politically disastrous. As time permits I am contacting the other diplomatic missions in Zagreb to brief them and to invite their support. At the same time we are speaking to the Serbs to convince them that military action at this stage can only damage the positive position they currently enjoy.

5. I believe that following the clear interest in this situation expressed by the statement by the President of the Security Council on 14 September 1993, the Security Council should again be briefed on the critical situation we face. A further timely and clear indication to the Croatian Government from the Security Council that a return to the situation that existed on 8 September followed by the immediate resumption of the ongoing negotiations for a general ceasefire, in order to move on to negotiations on economic and political matters, is the only sensible and acceptable course of action could prove decisive at this time.

6. The Force Commander believes that by 1800 he will need to state publicly that the Croatian forces have refused to move, if that is still the case by then. We will send you a further report at that time.

ENDALL

CZN=1157

CZG=1008

MOST IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 SEP 14 15:51

MOST IMMEDIATE

P1/2

93 SEP 14 16:25

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *for* STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB *[Signature]*

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA, FC, HCA, CMO

DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: Z = 1135

CODE RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL

1. The military situation today has remained extremely tense, with heavy shelling by both sides along the confrontation line. The most significant event was the attack by four Croatian Mig 21 aircraft on targets believed by the Croats to be Frog missile launchers in Northern Krajina this morning. One of the jets was shot down by the Serbs. In the Medak area the situation seems to have stabilised somewhat, but remains very tense.

2. Late last night we received a positive answer from the Serbs to the Force Commander's proposal. The Serbs have been told that UNPROFOR will take the necessary action to fulfill the proposal and were asked to show maximum restraint until it can be carried out. UNPROFOR is moving a force of four companies, about 600 soldiers, up to the Medak area. They should be ready to move into the area in the morning at 0900 hours as suggested by the Force Commander.

3. Today the Force Commander met General Bobetko, who did not give a clear reply as to Croatian acceptance of the proposal or to the timeframe of 0900 hours suggested by the Force Commander. Instead General Bobetko suggested that his staff should meet later in the day with UNPROFOR to discuss modalities and details. The Force Commander believes that this seems to be a timewasting exercise on General Bobetko's part.

4. Mr Stoltenberg met President Tudjman in Geneva at midday and informed him that we had received a positive response from the Serbs. This was received positively by President Tudjman who said that the time was right for peace.

DISTRIBUTION:

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	JVB
	JWPK

8

PS
JM

C2N-1157

P2/2

5. Our assessment is that the restraint being shown by both sides this afternoon will only last for a few more hours at most. If the Croats stick to their insistence that the area to be taken over by UNPROFOR should be under UNPROFOR's exclusive control, with no Serb police or civil authorities present, we believe that this will not be acceptable to the Serbs, in accordance with their earlier statements. We believe that the Serbs will react very badly if the Force Commander's proposal is not implemented, with dire consequences for Croatian targets and UNPROFOR.

6. I propose that the Secretary General should bring the present serious situation to the attention of the Security Council in order for the Security Council to call on Croatia to accept without reserve the Force Commander's proposal and to call on both parties to implement the proposal as soon as possible.

ENDALL

'93 SEP 15 19:34

2167

010/12

CODE RESTRICTED

OUTGOING

OUTGOING CODE CABLE
IMMEDIATEUNPROFOR ZAGREB
COMMUNICATIONS

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *for* STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB *Stoltenberg*

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA, FC, HCA, CMO

DATE: 15 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z - 1146

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA AT 2000 HOURS LOCAL

'93 SEP 15 19:25

DISTRIBUTION:	
ACTION	INFO
GA	
SC	WS/TS
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CZ-N-1168-1926

CZ-B-1019

J-PM
JUB
JW/PK
PS JM

(12)

1. The military situation today has remained tense, although both sides appear to have shown some restraint in their artillery attacks. This morning the Serbs, then the Croats signed the attached Agreement on UNPROFOR Control of "Medak Pocket". On the Serb side it was signed by General Novakovic, the commander of the army; on the Croat side it was signed by General Stipetic, a member of the Croatian negotiating team.

2. The Force Commander travelled to Gracac this morning to personally brief the Canadian Battalion Commander who will mount the UNPROFOR operation. Following confirmation that both sides had signed the agreement the UNPROFOR troops moved up to the Serb positions and took them over with no difficulties and good cooperation from the Serb side. However, there has been great difficulty so far on the Croat side, with restricted freedom of movement for the UNPROFOR Military Observers and recce teams trying to operate there. The withdrawal of Croatian forces has not happened to any significant extent.

3. In the light of this, the Force Commander sent his Chief Operations Officer to Gospic to liaise with the local Croatian commanders managing the Croatian side of the operation. He also sent a senior staff officer to see General Bobetko and to ask him to exert some influence over the local Croatian commanders in order to get the operation running smoothly. It was explained that General Stipetic was on his way to Gospic to actually give the orders to the local commanders to withdraw. We hope that these delays will be solved by tomorrow morning.

CODE RESTRICTED

ENDALL

CNZ 782 CYZ 657 P1/2


2151

CODED CABLE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

010/12

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB **FOR COT/ VOLLEBAEK**
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER: 1747
SUBJECT: Military Situation in Croatia

1993 SEP 14 P 10:00
CABLE OPERATIONS
UNITED NATIONS

Further our 1735 and telecon Vollebaek-Tharoor, USG Gharekhan conveyed to the Council this morning your appeal to SecCo to urge the parties to accept UNPROFOR's proposal. Council responded positively and adopted the attached Presidential Statement this afternoon. Portions in bold were added by the United States to this morning's consensus text.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION	INFO
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	SC
	J-PM
	JVB
	JM

CdC
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9

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

'93 SEP 15 -2:54

CNZ 782 CYZ 657 P2/2

Draft Presidential Statement

The Security Council expresses its profound concern at the reports from the Secretariat of recent military hostilities in Croatia, in particular the escalation of the means employed, and the grave threat they pose to the overall peace process in Geneva and overall stability in the former Yugoslavia.

The Council reaffirms its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and calls on both sides to accept UNPROFOR's proposal of an immediate cease fire. It calls on the Croatian Government to withdraw its armed forces to positions occupied before 9 September 1993, on the basis of that proposal, and calls on the Serbian forces to halt all provocative military actions.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen

010/12



FAX

PAGE 1 OF

TO: Annan

FAX NO: 1-212-963 9222

COPY: Eide/Cot

FAX NO: 38-41-170 199

FROM: Stoltenberg

DATE: 14 September 1993

SUBJECT: Your 1742 of 13 September

The draft letter attached to the above-mentioned cable seems fine to me and I believe we should proceed with it. In the circumstances prevailing in Croatia now, the timing seems right for such a step.

CODED CABLE
CODE RESTRICTEDCZM-1150
CZG-1001

010/12

UNITED NATIONS
COMMUNICATIONSUNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

CRYPTO CABLE

FLASH

93 SEP 13 19:24

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM : STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

DATE : 13 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 1128

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA

93 SEP 13 19:48

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Further to my earlier report of today on the above, focussing especially on the last 24 hours, we have now received from Mr. Sarinic, Croatian Director of National Security, a text of their alternative proposal, a copy of which is attached. You will see from it that they want UNPROFOR to take exclusive control of the areas of their incursion. We have also received a text from Bobetko, a copy of which is attached, which adds further elements of imprecision to Sarinic's response. This is not what we proposed. It is also highly unlikely to be accepted by the Serb side. For their part, the Serb side has not accepted para 3 of the Force Commander's proposals; indeed, the response leaves open the possibility that they will continue with heavy rockets until a ceasefire materializes. Meanwhile, heavy fighting continues in a number of areas in Sectors North and South. Gen. Pellnas is now in Knin and the Force Commander proposes to follow up tomorrow with the Croatian and the Serb side.

2. I believe it would be very helpful at this time for the Security Council to intervene in the situation, calling on the parties to cease-fire immediately and to resume the positions which

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CZN-1150
CZG-1001



they held prior to the Croatian incursion of 9 September 1993, 1100 B hours. I am scheduled to meet with the Ambassadors of France, Germany and Russia at 2030 hours to update them on the situation and convey to them my suggestions.

3. I will keep you informed of any new developments.

P2/7

CZN-1150
CZG-1001

2/3

THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA
HEADQUARTERS OF SERB ARMY
No.01-798
Knin, 13 September 1993

Response to the Proposal.-

TO:

UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB (Gen.Cot)
RSK GOVERNMENT - KNIN (info)

Considering the fact that the other (Croat) side never and nowhere so far has demonstrated the intention to withdraw, and that Croat General Staff refused to withdraw in order to conceal true facts about the crimes committed on the innocent Serb population, all of which is well known to us, and that the international community has shown neither willingness nor strength to force the Croat side, on the basis of the Charter and other documents of the UN, and the resolutions of the Security Council, to abide by accepted norms of conduct of the international community, to which it wishes to belong, we give the following answer:

1. We accept a ceasefire according to your proposal, in the area Medak- Gospic, starting from the moment which the other side designates as the beginning of its withdrawal.

2. Any other circumstances would represent a legalization of already committed crimes on innocent civilian populations.

At same time we request that, to the area of Divoselo - Citluk, where the consequences of these crimes are heavier than in Srebrenica and Zepa, and where the Security Council and the UNP force commander have committed themselves personally, we request immediately that representatives of UNPROFOR, ECMM, ICRC with necessary medical staff and means, as well as the members of the Commission for War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia, come immediately.

Any other mode of conduct or engagement of UNPROFOR members and international organizations would be too hypocritical. The precedent of the killing of innocent people in Serb villages in the RSK (in January 1993 Ravni Kotari, now Divoselo and Citluk), and only after this, that UNPROFOR proposes a ceasefire, cannot be tolerated.

Dear Sir,

We would like to draw to your attention that the problem is not only Divoselo and Citluk, but that a large concentration of Croat forces is going on in the regions of Gospic, Maslenica, Stankovci, Biograd, on Velebit mountain, near Sibenik, Karlovac, and Sisak.

P3/2

CZN-1150

CZG-1001

3/3

We are aware that you know this, and that you know as well that Croat forces are engaged in the territory of the former BH, in Central Bosnia.

If you want to be a serious authority, and we are sure of that, then you must have the same approach to Serb, Moslem and Croat people. That is why we call on you to go personally to Divoselo, as Gen. Morillon did in Srebrenica.

Please, do not request us Serbs to accept something which you do not request from other participants in the civil war on the territories of the former Yugoslavia and former Croatia.

With respect,

BY THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE SUPREME
COUNCIL OF DEFENCE
THE COMMANDER OF THE RSK ARMY
Brigadier General
Mila Novakovic

P. 1/2

3/09 '93 14:05



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICE

CZN-1150
CZG-1001

GENERAL CECCALDI, CHEF D'ETAT MAJOR DU
GENERAL JEAN COT, COMMANDANT DE FORCES DE N.U.

MONSIEUR,

SUITE A NOTRE ENTRETIEN TELEPHONIQUE DE CE JOUR JE VOUS
CONFIRME CE QUI SUIT: L'ARMEE CROATE ACCEPTE DE RETIRER SES
..... FORCES DES TERRITOIRES QUELS AVAIT OCCUPE AU COURS D'UNE ACTION
DE RETORSION LE 9. SEPTEMBRE 1993 (DIVOSELO, CITLUK ET POČITELJ) ET
CECI SOUS CONDITION QUE LES TERRITOIRES EN QUESTION SOIENT LIVRES
SOUS CONTROL EXCLUSIF DE LA FORPRONU. CE GESTE TRES DIFFICILE
POUR LA CROATIE N'A POUR LE BUT QUE L'APAISEMENT DE LA SITUATION
AINSI QUE LA CREATION DES CONDITIONS QUI PERMETTRAIENT LA
CONCLUSION D'UN ACCORD DE CESSÉ LE FEU GENERAL, CE QUI A
TOUJOURS ETE LA POLITIQUE DE LA CROATIE.

..VEUILLEZ AGREER, MONSIEUR, L'EXPRESSION DE MA HAUTE
CONSIDERATION.

FAIT A ZAGREB, LE, 13-09-93

Harjo Šarinić

HRVOJE ŠARINIĆ
DIRECTEUR DE LA
SECURITE NATIONALE

P5/7



CZN-1150
CZG-1001

Zagreb, le 13 septembre 1993

Monsieur Général Ceccaldi,

A la suite l'ordre qui a été donné par le Chef des Forces Armées de la République de Croatie et qui a été reporté dans le fax que vous avez reçu de la part de M. Hrvoje Šarinić, président du Bureau pour la Sécurité Nationale de la République de Croatie, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que l'ordre que je vais donner aux unités du HV, dès réception de l'accord de la FORPRONU au sujet de nos propositions, sera dans l'esprit de la décision du Chef des Forces Armées. Je vous propose que les modalités de l'exécution soient définies avant 24 heures ce jour. Je pense que vous considérerez comme moi que la tâche doit être abordée avec responsabilité et précision.

Je vous prie de me mettre au courant le plus vite possible de l'heure de la réunion qui nous permettra de discuter les modalités de la réalisation du contenu de ce fax.

Veuillez agréer l'expression de ma plus haute considération.

Signe: Janko BOBETKO, Chef d'Etat-Major de l'Armée Croate

P.L.



REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA
MINISTARSTVO OBRANE
GLAVNI STOŽER HV

Zagreb, 13. rujna 1993.

GENERAL CECCALDI
Chef d'état
Major du general Jean Cot

Gospodine generale Ceccaldi,

Na osnovu zapovijedi Vrhovnog zapovjednika oružanih snaga Republike Hrvatske, a u svezi faksa kojeg ste primili od gospodina Hrvoja Šarinića, predstojnika Ureda za nacionalnu sigurnost Republike Hrvatske, priopćujem Vam da ću u duhu odluke Vrhovnog zapovjednika dati odgovarajuću zapovijed jedinicama Hrvatske vojske, čim primim suglasnost UNPROFOR-a u svezi našeg prijedloga. Predlažem Vam da modalitete izvršenja sačinimo danas do 24 sata. Smatram da se možemo složiti da k tomu zadatku treba pristupiti precizno i odgovorno.

Molim da mi hitno javite termin sastanka radi modaliteta sprovođenja sadržaja faksa i njegove primjene kako Vam je to naznačeno.

Izvolite primiti izraze mog visokog štovanja.



P7/7

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations
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OUTGOING 13 15:25 **CODE RESTRICTED** **MOST IMMEDIATE**

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: *W* STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB *Estim*
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA, FC, HCA, CMO
DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-1126
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA

C2N-1148
C26-1000

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1. The following detailed report can be used by you for background. As you requested, a report to update the UNPROFOR Press Release is being sent separately.
BACKGROUND

2. A number of military actions have taken place in Croatia during the last week which have raised political and military tension dramatically: on 6 September 7 Serb civilians were killed in Mirlovic Polje, near Drnis, as the result of a Croatian Army attack on the village; on 8 September a number of Croats were killed and wounded in Pakrac as a result of a booby trap mine which exploded at a memorial service; on 9 September the Croatian army launched an attack on three Serb villages South West of Gospic, capturing two of them. On 10 September the Serbs retaliated with artillery fire on Karlovac and Sisak, to which the Croats responded by dropping bombs from a jet South of Sisak. On 11 September the Serbs fired on Frog 7 missile which landed on the Southern edge of Zagreb. UNPROFOR is blamed by the Croats for failing to prevent Pakrac and by the Serbs for failing to prevent the attack near Gospic.

3. The ceasefire negotiations lead by Ambassadors Vollebaek and Ahrens have continued, with Vollebaek shuttling between Zagreb and Knin last week. They were close to finalising the ceasefire, although the question of withdrawal of Croatian forces was greatly complicated by a Croatian statement that the withdrawal of police was not specified in resolution 802, so the Croatian police would remain after the army left. The next step was to have been a meeting on Sunday 12 September of the military experts from both sides on board a British warship in the Adriatic to finalise technical aspects of the ceasefire.

4. On 10 September General Novakovic in Knin issued an ultimatum that if the Croatian army did not withdraw from the villages captured near Gospic, there would be Serb artillery fire along the entire confrontation line and no military negotiations. This message was passed to General Bobetko in Zagreb by the Force Commander. General Bobetko answered that there would be no withdrawal until the Serbs stopped shelling Gospic. When Mr Stoltenberg spoke to President Tudjman on Friday night, asking him for a ceasefire and a withdrawal, he replied that he would give the order to stop shelling immediately. However, he could not withdraw for political reasons. Later in the evening Croatian jets attacked Serb positions South of Sisak.

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5. Mr Stoltenberg spoke to President Tudjman on 11 September and passed a message to the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, saying that he was very concerned at the deteriorating situation in Croatia and urging both sides to show restraint. President Tudjman said that he was prepared to stop shelling if the Serbs did, and this message was passed to the Serbs.

6. On Sunday 12 September Mr Stoltenberg met with President Tudjman and Foreign Minister Granic. President Tudjman said that he would order a 24 hour ceasefire to allow us time to negotiate a proper ceasefire. Mr Stoltenberg asked him again about the withdrawal of Croatian troops but he would not commit himself.

7. During the day we contacted the French, German and Russian Embassies in Zagreb as well as the ECMM, and spoke to New York. There was support for a deal between the parties which would entail the withdrawal of Croatian forces from the territory they had captured on 9 September, with UNPROFOR moving in to secure the area, in return for a commitment from the Serbs to stop using heavy weapons along the whole confrontation line while a proper ceasefire was negotiated.

8. On Sunday afternoon the Force Commander visited General Bobetko to propose this short term solution to the problem. (The proposal is attached) He was told that his response would be conveyed to New York where there was great interest in the matter. The Force Commander also raised the question of the shelling by the Croats of a Polish UNPROFOR observation post and the fate of the Serb civilians remaining in the surrounded village. General Bobetko said that these latter problems would be taken care of, but that there could be no withdrawal. Instead he had ordered a 24 hour ceasefire that had started at midday. Although the Croat position was not acceptable to the Serbs, who had issued a list of military targets they were going to shell in Croatia, the same proposal for a short term solution was conveyed to Knin for an urgent response which would be conveyed to New York.

THE LAST TWENTY HOURS

9. This morning we have been waiting for the formal response to the Force Commander's proposal from the two parties. At 1230 Ambassador Vollebaek briefed the French, German and Russian Ambassadors, together, on the current situation so that they would be aware both as members of the Security Council and in light of the joint French German initiative in support of the ICFY negotiations. Ambassador Vollebaek has also spoken to the American Ambassador and briefed his deputy in detail on the situation as we see it. All parties have offered their support of the action being taken to try to stabilise and defuse the situation. Ambassador Vollebaek has also spoken to Mr Jovanovic in Belgrade so that he would be aware of the situation.

10. At 1000 the French and German Ambassadors were contacted by Mr Radic, the Chief of President Tudjman's Cabinet, who informed them that the Croats were pleased to accept the Force Commander's proposal. The same message was passed to UNPROFOR by Mr Sarenic, the Croatian Director of National Security, who confirmed in writing that Croatian forces would be withdrawn from the areas captured on 9 September, on the condition that the areas came under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR, in order to create the necessary conditions to allow the negotiation of a general ceasefire. The Chief Military Observer of UNPROFOR went to see General Bobetko to confirm this with him, but General Bobetko

2-1126 3/4

said that there would be no Croatian Army withdrawal. Mr Sarenic was contacted again to clarify the situation. Mr Sarenic said that this afternoon we would receive a written statement from General Bobetko saying that the Croatian forces would withdraw.

11. In Knin the Serb authorities were asked for a formal response to the Force Commander's proposal. They gave a written reply stating that they accepted a ceasefire according to our proposal, starting from the moment the Croatian withdrawal started. They also asked for the international community to investigate the condition of the civilians remaining in the villages. We have informed the Serbs in Knin of the verbal acceptance by the Croats, but await the written response from General Bobetko before telling them that we have a formal answer from the Croats.

12. We propose now to maintain very close contact with the military commanders in Zagreb and Knin so that the tentative acceptance of the ceasefire and withdrawal can be turned into reality. UNPROFOR have issued a warning order to troops in Sector South who will move in to the area and take control of it as soon as the modalities of the ceasefire and occupation have been agreed between the two parties. As soon as the situation is clear, we will contact you again with a draft Presidential Statement to confirm the situation and to back up the action that we are taking.

ENDALL

2-126 4/4

UNPROFOR PROPOSAL TO THE CROATIAN AND SERB MILITARY AUTHORITIES -
12 SEPTEMBER 1993

1. The talks between the two parties about the ceasefire should be resumed as soon as possible.
2. As a first step, aiming at defusing the tense situation, a local solution in the Medak area should first be found. This solution should contain:
 - a. A withdrawal of Croatian forces from the area captured after 9 September 1993, facilitated by a local ceasefire and a strong UNPROFOR presence in the area.
 - b. A firm commitment by the Serb authorities to comply with the modalities stipulated in para 3 below.
3. The two sides declare their commitment to stop the shelling of all civilian targets from not later than 1200 hours 13 September 1993. The Serb side specifically guarantee that from this time until the conclusion of ceasefire negotiations, heavy weapons such as artillery rockets (Luna 17) or multiple rocket launcher systems will not be used. Both sides agree that any use of indirect weapons from 1200 hours on 13 September 1993 should only be used in clear self defence and in protection of forces being directly attacked.
4. As soon as possible after the provisions of paras 2 and 3 above have been met, ceasefire negotiations will start as previously prepared and agreed by the two parties on board a ship in the Adriatic.

General J Cot
Force Commander
UNPROFOR

Zagreb

12 September 1993

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

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OUTGOING SEP 13 15:43
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CODE RESTRICTED MOST IMMEDIATE

010/12

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -
FROM: *for* STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB *Stolt*
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z - 1125
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN CROATIA

C2N-1147

C2G-999

SEP 13 15:43

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Today Ambassador Vollebaek briefed the American, French, German and Russian Ambassadors on the current situation. All parties have offered their support of the action being taken to try to stabilise and defuse the situation.

2. This morning the Croatian Director of National Security confirmed in writing that Croatian forces would be withdrawn from the areas captured on 9 September, on the condition that the areas came under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR, in order to create the necessary conditions to allow the negotiation of a general ceasefire. However, an hour later the UNPROFOR Chief Military Observer met General Bobetko to reconfirm the Croatian position and was told that there would be no withdrawal. We are waiting for further written confirmation of the Croatian position.

3. In Knin the Serb authorities gave a written reply stating that they accepted a ceasefire according to our proposal, starting from the moment the Croatian withdrawal started. They also asked for the international community to investigate the condition of the civilians remaining in the villages. We have informed the Serbs in Knin of the verbal acceptance by the Croats, but await the written response from General Bobetko before telling them that we formal answer from the Croats.

4. We propose now to maintain very close contact with the military commanders in Zagreb and Knin so that the tentative acceptance of the ceasefire and withdrawal can be turned into reality. UNPROFOR have issued a warning order to troops in Sector South who will move in to the area and take control of it as soon as the modalities of the ceasefire and occupation have been agreed between the two parties.

ENDALL

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93 SEP 13 15:27

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COMMUNICATIONS

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

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'93 SEP 13 20:18

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER: 1735
SUBJECT: Military Situation in Croatia

FOR: COT/VOLLEBAEK

CODED CABLE



SEP 13 P 4:00

UNATIONS

Further telecons Vollebaek-Tharoor, we are most grateful for your detailed reporting in recent days on this situation. I delivered the attached statement to consultations of SecCo this morning. As agreed, no action was proposed at this stage.

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**Remarks to the
Informal Consultations of SecCo**

13 September 1993

I wish to inform the Council that a number of military actions have taken place in Croatia in recent days and throughout the weekend which have raised political and military tension considerably. On 6 September, 7 civilians were killed in Mirlovic Polje, near Drnis in the "pink zones", as a result of a Croatian Army attack; on 8 September a number of Croats were killed and wounded in Pakrac, in UNPA Sector West, in the explosion of a mine which exploded at a Croatian Army memorial service; on 9 September the Croatian Army launched an attack on three Serb villages south-west of Gospic, capturing two of them (Citluk and Donje Selo), and on 10 September the Serbs retaliated with artillery and rocket fire on Karlovac, Sisak and other towns, with one missile, probably a FROG-7 rocket, landing in Lucko, a suburb of Zagreb. Throughout the weekend firing has taken place across the line of confrontation between forces of the Croatian Army and the Krajina Serbs, though there was a significant decrease in the intensity of the military activities yesterday, 12 September, following the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire by President Tudjman. (The Serb side has refused to accept a cease-fire that is not accompanied by Croatian withdrawal from the captured villages). Civilian centres have been targeted by both sides and populations have been displaced. One significant element in the recent hostilities has been the use of aircraft by the Croatian forces to bomb Serb positions, and heavy missiles by the Serbs, both a serious escalation of the military means used in this conflict. UNPROFOR's freedom of movement in the area of fighting has been restricted, with access blocked by both parties.

The SRSG, Mr Stoltenberg, has expressed his grave concern about the effects of this resurgence of hostilities on the entire peace process in the former Yugoslavia. He spoke to President Tudjman of Croatia urging him to withdraw from the captured villages and to start an unconditional cease-fire followed by negotiations between the two sides which had previously been planned to take place on a ship in the Adriatic on Sunday. The Croatian Director of National Security, Mr Sarinic, today declared his Government's acceptance of UNPROFOR's request, on condition that the areas came under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR. However, confirmation from the Croatian Army command of their willingness to withdraw is still awaited. The Serb side has accepted the proposal and called upon the international community to investigate the condition of the civilians remaining in the villages. UNPROFOR is fully ready to help maintain the cease-fire and has troops standing by in UNPA Sector South who will move into the area and take control of it as soon as the modalities of the cease-fire have been agreed between the two parties.

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

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TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *P. 12*

DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: 1731

SUBJECT: Letter from Permanent Representative of Croatia

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Attached please find a letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia which was handed over to the DPKO Duty Officer this afternoon by the Second Secretary of the Croatian Mission, Mr. Pelicaric.

Asked what the United Nations was expected to do above and beyond the ongoing intensive mediation efforts of the Special Representative and the Force Commander, Mr. Pelicaric indicated that the Secretary-General himself might approach President Milosevic with a view to exerting pressure on the Knin authorities. It appears that, at this point, the Croatian Government does not intend to approach the Security Council directly, although this may change subject to further developments.

In case you wish to recommend a direct involvement by the Secretary-General in the mediation efforts, please note that he will be leaving for Washington tomorrow morning.

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CNZ - 774 / CYZ - 649 P2/2



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

201 East 42nd street; Suite 3108
New York, NY 10017 USA

Tel: (212) 986-1585
Fax: (212) 986-2011

New York, 12 September 1993

H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York

Your Excellency,

In the last 48 hours, on the territory of the Republic of Croatia there has been a considerable increase in military attacks on the civilian targets and population perpetrated by insurgent Serbian paramilitary units. Due to the weapons that were deployed - including multiple rocket launched rockets, heavy artillery and land-to-land missiles FROG-7 - on the cities of Karlovac, Zadar, Otocac, Sisak, Kutina and ultimately on the Samobor, Jastrebarsko and Lucko outskirts of the Croatian capital Zagreb itself, the toll in human casualties [20 killed and 58 wounded civilians] and material damage is heavy.

Acting upon direct instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you of some developments and initiatives undertaken from our side. The President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudjman has ordered an unilateral and unconditional cease-fire to all the units of Croatian Army for the period of 24 hours. Croatian Army units are forbidden to undertake even defensive action, and are under strict orders not to respond to insurgents' attacks. At the same time, my Government has - through your Special Representative, and requesting help from the diplomacies of United States and the Russian Federation - launched an initiative to sign a cease-fire agreement with the representatives of local Serbian population at the earliest possible time.

My Government wishes to urge you to use the authority of your high office to exert pressure on the representatives of Serbian insurgents to come to the negotiating table - thus preventing an escalation in fighting that could quickly lead to an all-out war with unpredictable consequences for both sides, for Geneva peace-process and for international peace and security in the region.

The President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudjman shall address you a letter in the immediate future, clarifying the position of the Republic of Croatia with regard to the possible extension of the mandate of peace-keeping force on its territory.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Dr. Mario Nobilo
Permanent Representative




010/12



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



TO: Stoltenberg, Zagreb
FM: LO Geneva 
DATE: 9 September 1993
PAGE: 1 of 4
SUBJECT: Message from Croatian Mission

Please find attached a message received this date, which may not have been sent to your location directly.

Regards.

010/12



Stalna misija Republike Hrvatske pri Uredu Ujedinjenih naroda
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations Office
Geneva

25, route de Ferney, 1209 Geneva, Tel: (022) 7403243, Fax (022) 7403251

Za/Att.

Datum/Date

SEPTEMBER 9, 1993

Fax br./Fax No.

917 00 79

Od/From

Predmet/Subject

Br. str./No. of pages

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Poruka/Message:

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CO-CHAIRMEN
H.E. MR. THORVALD STOLTENBERG
H.E. LORD DAVID OWEN

Upon instructions from the Government of the Republic of Croatia the Permanent Mission of Croatia has the honour to transmit you herewith the letter of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the Co-chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia H.E. Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and H.E. Lord David Owen.

Please accept, Excellencies, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Aleksandar Heina
First Secretary
Charge d'affaires a.i.

Send
at
to
091800
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VLADA REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE
PREDSJEDNIK

NJ. E.

Lord David Owen

Thorvald Stoltenberg

Supredsjedatelji Međunarodne konferencije
o bivšoj Jugoslaviji

Štovana gospodo,

Moja Vlada i ja osobno skrećemo Vam pozornost na zločin koji se danas dogodio u selu Kusunje u blizini Pakraca - Zapadni sektor.

Prilikom komemoracije osamnaestorici hrvatskih policajaca, koji su na tom mjestu poginuli prije dvije godine, od neprijateljske mine smrtno su stradale tri osobe, a ranjena osmorica prisutnih. Među žrtvama su pripadnici Hrvatske vojske, novinari i jedna majka poginulog policajca, kao i pripadnik UNPROFOR-a iz argetinskog bataljuna.

Taj teroristički čin po svojim tragičnim posljedicama i morbidnim porivima - pucanje na ljude u trenutku davanja počasti umrlima - jasno svjedoči o zločinačkom ponašanju i namjerama naših neprijatelja.

Snage Ujedinjenih naroda su suodgovorne za takvo terorističko djelovanje, jer nisu onemogućile napade iz područja UNPA zona pod svojom zaštitom. Stoga hrvatska Vlada opetovano upozorava ukoliko UNPROFOR nastavi takvim neučinkovitim djelovanjem da će iznaći načine da sama spriječi terorizam onim sredstvima koja joj stoje na raspolaganju i koje smatra legitimnim. Taj tragični događaj je uistinu ona kap koja može prekriti čašu naše strpljivosti. O tome moraju voditi računa srpske paravojne snage na UNPA područjima, postrojbe Ujedinjenih naroda, ali i cjelokupna međunarodna zajednica. Republika Hrvatska je dovedena na krajnju granicu tolerancije i dostojanstva.

Upućujući Vam ovaj prosvjed istovremeno tražimo od Vas da učinite sve da se akti zločinačkog terorizma zaustave.

Uvažena gospodo, primite izraze mog osobitog štovanja.

Zagreb, 08 rujna 1993.

PREDSJEDNIK

Nikica Valentić

TRANSLATION

H.E. Lord David Owen
H.E. Mr Thorwald Stoltenberg
Co-chairmen of the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia

Your Excellencies,

My Government and I personally hereby draw your attention to the crime which occurred today in the village of Kusunje near Pakrac - Sector West. During the ceremony in commemoration of eighteen Croatian police officers, who perished on that spot two years ago, three persons were killed and eight wounded by an enemy mine. The casualties include members of the Croatian Armed Forces, newsmen and the mother of one of the commemorated policemen, as well as a member of the Argentine battalion of UNPROFOR.

In terms of its tragic consequences and morbid motives this terrorist act - the attack on people in a moment when they were paying homage to the dead - clearly bears witness to the criminal behaviour and intentions of our enemy.

United Nations forces share responsibility for such terrorist activity because they have not prevented attacks with the UNPA's under their protection. Therefore, the Croatian Government again cautions that it will, should the conduct of UNPROFOR continue to be inefficient, find ways to prevent terrorism on its own with legitimate means at its disposal. This tragic event is indeed the last straw which may overtax our patience. This should be borne in mind by the Serbian paramilitary forces in the UNPA's and United Nations units, but also by the entire international community. The Republic of Croatia has really been taxed to the limits of its tolerance and dignity.

In addressing this protest to you, we concurrently urge you to do everything in order to put a stop to acts of criminal terrorism.

Rest assured, gentlemen, of my particular consideration.

Zagreb, September 8, 1993

THE PRIME MINISTER
Nikica Valentić

2088
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C2N-1119

C2G-976

CODE RESTRICTED



IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR

FORN ONU

9 SEPTEMBER 1993

United Nations Protection Force
Force de protection des Nations Unies
Zagreb

10:13

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

INFO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, GENEVA

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, GENEVA

SUBJECT: Complaint by the Croatian Government

Z-1096

Reference: Code Cable, Annan to Stoltenberg, subject as above, 3 Sep 93

IMMEDIATE

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION	INFO
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UNPROFOR has acknowledged and reported over the last several weeks on some Serb reinforcement from Bosnia into Sector North and especially Sector South. Our information, does not, however, correspond precisely to that information provided by the Croats. Based on multisource information received here, we can loosely estimate an approximate increase of about 3500 Serb troops including light infantry, mech infantry and some armor forces. This contrasts with the Croatian claim of 6000-7000 new troops. It is extremely unlikely that the claim of a Serb brigade in Western Slavonia is true. Based on earlier and more recent insertions of armor elements, the Croatian claim of 40 new tanks into Sectors N and S is probably roughly accurate. It is emphasized that the troop strengths we have presented here cannot be determined with precise detail. Given the lack of freedom of movement afforded UNPROFOR by both sides, the restraints against Recce flights over Croatia and the innate difficulty in locating well dispersed and camouflaged units in wooded and mountainous terrain, our information collection capabilities are necessarily limited.

The Croatian account of Serb shelling generally corresponds with information we have here but it should be made clear that the Croatian Army has also shelled so-called RSK territory at a similar level over the same time period.

Indications are that some of these Serb units were redeployed from 5 Corps elements around the Posavina corridor and possibly from the Sarajevo/Mt. Igman area as well. Some units, normally at company strength, are also rotated in and out of the Baranja division in Sector East. It is also likely that at least some officers from the Yugoslavian Army (AJ) are serving in a staff leadership cadre role with "RSK" forces. The "RSK" in Sector South probably genuinely fears a renewed CA offensive in the area based on the 22 JAN 93 offensive and recently elevated Croatian public rhetoric. Current CA force dispositions in the area do not support the likelihood of such an offensive in the immediate future however. We assess these larger than normal troop deployments are to bolster existing RSK defensive positions, especially in Sector South and moreover to put political and military pressure on the Croatian government after its renunciation of the Erdut agreement.

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