

UNHWWK

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S VISIT TO
RWANDA

[JUNE -31 AUG 1995]

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1. Rwanda: general political situation

**BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON THE GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN RWANDA**

1. The current political situation in Rwanda can best be described as volatile. While the five-party governing coalition has generally held together since it came to power nearly a year ago, growing frictions have been unfolding within the regime and the society at large, denoting either inter-party rivalries or more fundamental disagreements on policies. Occasional squabbling is not unusual in any government or society. However, with Rwanda still struggling to recover from the damaging consequences of last year's civil war and genocide and now facing a seemingly increasing threat of destabilization, even the perception of tension within the political establishment and/or the society at large can assume potentially alarming proportions.

2. From the onset, the ruling coalition had, as its common denominator, opposition to the late President Habyarimana and his MRND party. That factor alone, as time has shown, is clearly not a sufficiently cohesive unifying force. The real and perceived inequalities in power among the various parties in the coalition, as well as their competing and sometimes conflicting agendas, strategies and interests, have become more noticeable. As a result, inevitable strains have emerged in the alliance, occasionally leading to open dissension.

3. Some of the areas of disagreement have been more specific while others concern the overall strategy of the Government and the society. Differences over the role and responsibilities of the army constitute perhaps the most vociferous and specific point of discord, especially between the two main coalition partners, the RPF and the MDR. The Prime Minister Twagiramungu, a Hutu who is also President of MDR, has publicly called for greater restraints on the army which is viewed as largely Tutsi-dominated and loyal above all to the RPF. The two senior MDR officials who defected from the Government and fled the country, namely the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Jean-Marie Vianney Ndajimana, and the Prime Minister's former Director of Cabinet, Mr. Jean Damascène Ntakirutimana, both mentioned, as part of their reasons for leaving, the army's alleged dominance over the country and what they saw as its responsibility for arbitrary acts of violence and insecurity.

4. It would appear on the surface that the divergence over the general strategy of Government also follows largely ethnic and political lines. At the same time, it can be said that the differences are rather mainly between moderate and more extremist factions of the ruling coalition. While the moderate approach has been led principally by the Hutu dominated MDR with the RPF seen as heading the more radical faction, moderates within the RPF have also sided with the MDR, especially on the need to pursue more vigorously national reconciliation and a more inclusive society as well as to maintain a more cooperative relationship between Rwanda and UNAMIR as well with the international community as a whole. Even within the RPA which is generally perceived as a largely monolithic entity,

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there have been increasing reports of a growing rift, especially between English-speaking Rwandese troops who have recently returned from Uganda and occupy the most senior positions, and their French-speaking counterparts from Burundi who are said to resent seriously their less favourable positions.

Poverty

5. The slow disbursement of pledged assistance as well as the delay in bringing suspected genocide perpetrators to trial are also seen as widening gaps within the society and the political establishment and fueling inter-ethnic strife. Lack of foreign economic and financial assistance is contributing to more widespread property, heightening social tensions and provoking political acrimonies as some members of the regime (e.g. moderate Hutus), blame their more hardline partners (e.g. RPF) for policies and practices and an overall climate viewed as discouraging the speedier flow of international support. At the same time, the absence of quicker movement in the area of justice could encourage more revenge killings which, in turn, could worsen ethnic polarization and hinder refugee repatriation efforts.

6. Despite the Government's stated policy downplaying the ethnic factor in building a new Rwandese society and political system, there are strong indications that the level of inter-ethnic suspicion, even hostility, remains disturbingly high. The Government's efforts, despite their merits, are still at an early stage to have had any meaningful impact. Moreover, if Rwanda's history as well as developments elsewhere in Africa are taken as a guide, the Government's policies and efforts in this regard might even ultimately be futile as ethnic solidarity has frequently emerged as a more resilient and decisive factor for forging alliances in African societies than shared political philosophies.

7. The potentially explosive mixture of ethnic and political rivalries is especially pronounced in Rwanda with its long history of ethnically and politically-motivated violence as well as its massive poverty. Ethnic and political polarization, despite the Government's best intentions and efforts, continues to characterize the fundamental basis of contemporary Rwandese society and politics. Against that background, the potential for violence remains an ever-present threat. The primary responsibility for preventing the present political coalition from unravelling rests with the Government. The international community also an important role to play and to this end should continue and indeed intensify its efforts to assist in stabilizing the internal situation, preventing threats of destabilization from becoming a reality and facilitating the repatriation of Rwanda's 2 million refugees.

8. The Secretary-General may wish to felicitate the government for its achievements during the past year. He may add that it was important for the United Nations and the international community to cooperate with the government of Rwanda in addressing the following main outstanding issues that were causing tension and frustration in Rwanda and the region:

- a: Safe return of refugees from neighbouring countries;
- b: Early dispensation of justice to relieve appalling conditions in prisons;
- c: Quick disbursement of funds pledged at Geneva Round Table; and
- d: Meaningful steps towards political ethnic harmony.

BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

ON RWANDA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

ESPECIALLY WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS

1. The perception that the present Government in Kigali symbolizes the victims of last year's genocide and other atrocities has helped mold and determine foreign attitudes to and relations with the new regime.

2. ~~When the Government assumed power on 19 July 1994~~, following the defeat of the former regime blamed for the genocide, much international goodwill was bestowed on Rwanda as the international community looked to the new leaders to turn the country away from its tragic past towards a more peaceful future. The new regime's army, the RPA, was hailed nationally and internationally as liberators. Even the French Government, viewed at best suspiciously by the victorious RPF, the dominant force in the new governing coalition in Kigali, sent a high-level delegation to Kigali on 21 July, just two days after the Government had assumed office. Although the delegation received only a cool reception, especially as its requests for meetings with the President and the Vice-President and Minister for Defence were refused, the mere fact of its arrival demonstrated the degree of international interest in opening or strengthening contacts with the new leadership. Similarly, even Zaire and Kenya, among others, which had criticized Uganda's alleged role in bringing the RPF-dominated government to power in Rwanda, recognized the new reality and demonstrated a readiness to work with the authorities.

3. The immense promise of that auspicious beginning soon turned awry as increasing reports of RPA atrocities, culminating in particular with the Gersony allegations in August/September 1994 and the Kibeho tragedy in April 1995, began to erode the new Government's moral credibility and to tarnish its international reputation. Consequently, the attitudes of the international community towards Rwanda also began to change. This change has been reflected in particular in the slow disbursement of pledged assistance and the placing of conditions for the future release of such aid. Furthermore, Rwanda's relations with its neighbours, especially with Tanzania and Zaire which host the largest number of Rwandese refugees, as well as with Kenya which, although not an immediate neighbour, plays an influential political and economic role in the subregion, have increasingly become tense. The three countries have accused the Rwandese regime of not doing enough to expedite the repatriation of refugees and of not creating internal conditions and a climate propitious for their safe return and resettlement. Tanzania has alleged that the Government is practising selective repatriation favouring refugees of the Tutsi ethnic group. Kenya and Zaire have accused the Government of "arrogance" and the Kenyan Government has recently expelled the two most senior diplomats from Rwanda's Embassy in Nairobi. The possibility that

Rwanda may merely be a victim in the strained relations between Kenya and Uganda, has also been raised, with Kenya said to be extending its hostility to Uganda to Rwanda which is viewed as Uganda's ally.

4. Largely because of the widespread belief that France supported and sustained the former regime and army, the new leadership appears to have tilted towards the English-speaking world, reversing Rwanda's traditional, colonial-based bent towards the francophone community. Thus, relations with France and other francophone countries are generally said to be correct while they are viewed as significantly warmer with the United Kingdom, the United States and Uganda; the impression of an enhanced anglophone diplomatic presence was strengthened when the United Kingdom recently announced its intention to upgrade its diplomatic representation in Kigali to that of a full embassy. It is conceivable that the appearance of a tilt towards the anglophone community is not really a deliberate choice, but merely reflects the fact that many of the key leaders of the new regime grew up as refugees in English-speaking Uganda and thus neither speak French nor have had extensive contacts with the francophone world. Tensions with Kenya and Tanzania could also be seen as weakening the perception of an automatic inclination in favour of English-speaking countries. Should the language factor grow as a divisive element, this could complicate not only Rwanda's foreign relations with a large number of states but also could serve to separate and polarize Rwandese.

5. Relations with Rwanda's former colonial powers, Belgium and Germany, can be described as ambivalent. Despite the traditional support that both countries continue to provide to Rwanda, the new Rwandese regime has in particular blamed Belgium for promoting ethnic animosity and strife in the country. Belgium and Germany have also used aid as leverage to influence the Government's policies and actions.

6. It has increasingly become clear that Rwanda's relations with the international community and in particular the donor countries and major international organizations are likely essentially to remain unequal, with the latter in a stronger position to dictate terms or influence the behaviour of the Rwandese Government. This has been demonstrated by the Government becoming more cooperative and positive with the international community and more accommodating with its own population following the threats or the actual withholding of economic and financial assistance. If this small and desperately poor country is to continue to function and to develop, such assistance is deemed indispensable. Thus, in the tradition of realpolitik, the Government may increasingly realize that in foreign affairs there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests.

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3. Rwanda: justice system situation, including
state of prisons

RWANDA: JUSTICE SYSTEM AND STATE OF THE PRISONS

~~The Rwandese legal and judicial system has yet to be fully re-established following~~
the devastation resulting from the recent genocide and civil war in Rwanda. There is an acute shortage of virtually every category of law-enforcement and judicial personnel, and of the logistic and material resources needed for performing normal law-enforcement functions.

As a result, formal legal procedures are generally not observed in the arrests of persons suspected of crimes. Wholesale arrests of persons accused of participation in the genocide have proceeded virtually on a daily basis, throughout the country, although the rate of arrests has declined considerably in recent months. The prisons are overcrowded many times beyond normal capacity by persons awaiting trial, most of whom have not been formally charged with any offence. The following sample of statistics from the Ministry of Justice illustrates the problem:

<u>Prison</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Current number of inmates</u>
Butare	1,000	6,582 (comprising: 6,208 men, 210 women, 114 minors, and 50 infants/babies with their detained mothers)
Cyangugu	700	1,868 (1,797 men, 23 women, 36 minors, 12 infants)
Gikongoro	700	873 (844 men, 12 women, 17 minors, 2 infants)
Gisenyi	800	1,197 (1,140 men, 28 women, 29 minors, 7 infants)
Gitarama	750	7,018 (6,780 men, 218 women, 20 minors)
Kibungo	400	2,990 (2,526 men, 48 women, 53 minors, 4 infants)
Kigali	2,000	9,246 (8,651 men, 290 women, 235 minors, 70 infants)

Conditions in the prisons are atrocious and inhuman. In many cases, the inmates stand in open yards within the prison walls, day and night, rain or shine, with barely any space to sit or lie down, taking turns to sleep in the overflowing cells. Food and medical care are woefully inadequate. As a result, a number of inmates die daily without ever going before a court of law.

There are very few functioning Prosecutor's Offices and investigators available to process the cases of detainees. Plans to allow the employment of foreign personnel to assist in the investigation and processing of cases are not proceeding fast enough, owing partly to donor fatigue or lethargy and partly to the slowness in passing the requisite enabling legislation in the Rwandese Parliament.

A Joint Commission comprised of Government representatives, United Nations staff and the ICRC was formed in June 1995 and is now implementing measures aimed at expanding capacity at some of the prisons, transferring prisoners from some of the most congested prisons to less congested ones, and locating premises for use as additional prison sites. However, these efforts are only temporary palliatives. The solution to the overall problem lies in the acceleration of assistance to the Rwandese Government in the re-establishment of its legal and judicial system and in the speedy processing of cases. This would allow for the release of inmates against whom charges cannot be substantiated, the release pending trial of those with relatively minor charges, and the preparation of full briefs for those charged with more serious offences in order to expedite their trial proceedings.

Recommendations and observations

The Secretary-General may wish to convey to the Rwandese leaders that the need to start the judicial process is of vital importance. The United Nations would support the Rwandese Government in this effort. It would help the screening of nearly 50,000 prisoners, have a beneficial impact psychologically on the Rwandese people, would encourage refugee return and open the way to reconciliation.

RWANDA: SUMMARY OF KIBEHO INQUIRY

~~Following the high number of casualties which resulted from the attempted closure by the~~ RPA of the Kibeho camp for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in south-western Rwanda between 18 to 23 April 1995, an Independent International Commission of Inquiry was established on 3 May 1995 to investigate circumstances surrounding the incident. The Commission, composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Organization of African Unity, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, the United Nations and the United States, presented its report to the President of Rwanda on 18 May 1995.

In the report, the Commission gives an account of the events leading to the decision by the Government of Rwanda to close down all IDP camps on Rwandese territory. The report provides a chronological summary of events at Kibeho during the attempted closure operation. It omits any reference to the actual number of fatalities which, the Commission claims, it was unable to determine due to logistical and time constraints. It states that there is evidence to indicate that many suffered injuries from machetes (used by civilians), stampede and weapons fire, although the exact proportions cannot be determined, and that bodies were buried outside the Kibeho camp.

According to the Commission, the operation of the Government of Rwanda to close the IDP camps was well-planned, but failures occurred in its implementation and ensuing panic. The RPA's response to the threat was deemed disproportionate and a violation of international law, and the RPA failed to distinguish between hostile and non-hostile targets and engaged in indiscriminate firing. There was also credible evidence that individual RPA soldiers conducted summary executions. The Commission found that the following factors contributed to the RPA's behaviour: deficiencies in communications systems, equipment (the RPA has limited means with which to apply force), training (the RPA is trained as a guerrilla army, and not a law enforcement body), and experience (the RPA had never engaged in a similar operation of this kind). Additionally, the RPA command failed to appreciate the determination with which hard-core elements (that is, extremists most likely involved in criminal activity) would refuse to leave the camp voluntarily. The report criticises UNAMIR for its inadequate response to the acts of intimidation and violence against other IDPs undertaken by these hard-core criminal elements within UNAMIR protected zones.

In its conclusions, the Commission stated that the Kibeho tragedy resulted neither from a planned action by Rwandese authorities to kill a certain group of people, nor was it an accident which could not have been prevented. It regretted that United Nations agencies and NGOs were not able to contribute more efficiently to the speedy evacuation of IDPs from the camp. It added that unarmed IDPs were subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm in violation of human rights and humanitarian law by RPA military personnel, as well as by armed elements among the IDPs themselves.

Among its various recommendations, the Commission called upon the United Nations system to review its chain-of-command and its operations procedures to ensure that, in the future, "an entire operation is not held hostage or bogged down by one or several agencies and organisations with limited mandates and responsibilities." It further recommended that the international community continue encouraging and assisting Rwanda in its efforts to achieve justice, national reconciliation and reconstruction.

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Observations and recommendations

- a) The Secretary-General may commend the Rwandese Government's decision for an international inquiry on Kibeho. The Commission's input helped to allay misgivings in the international community on human rights issues.
 - b) The conclusions and recommendations of the Kibeho Commission absolved the Government of pre-meditated action. Its recommendations relating to observation of human rights may be implemented by the Government.
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5. STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

With the adoption of resolution 955 on 8 November 1995, the U.N. Security Council voted for the creation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute those individuals suspected of having committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the crime of genocide, in the territory of Rwanda and by Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.

Following the initial visit of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Richard Goldstone, to Rwanda in December 1994, efforts were undertaken in January 1995 to establish the Prosecutor's Office in Kigali, with the assistance of UNAMIR. These efforts were constrained by financial and related staffing problems. In order to address these problems, the Prosecutor called for a meeting of the Rwanda Operations Support Group, which was held in Kigali on 19 May 1995. At that meeting, approximately \$6.3 million was pledged by various donors to enable the Prosecutor's Office to accelerate its investigative work and the preparation of indictments, pending finalization of the Tribunal's budget and the election of its Judges.

In that same week, a delegation comprised of representatives from the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) in New York, the Tribunal and UNAMIR visited Arusha to discuss arrangements for the establishment of the Tribunal's headquarters there, in accordance with Security Council resolution 977 adopted on 22 February 1995. Among the members of the delegation were Mr. Ralph Zacklin, Deputy Legal Counsel (OLA) and Mr. Justice Honoré Rakotomanana, Deputy Prosecutor of the Tribunal. It emerged from their visit that it would take between six to twelve months to complete necessary refurbishment of the premises designated for the Tribunal. Additionally, several outstanding issues remain to be resolved in the negotiation of the Tribunal's Headquarters Agreement with the Government of Tanzania, as well as the Lease Agreement for the premises.

The six Judges of the two trial Chambers of the Tribunal were elected by the General Assembly in June 1995. The Judges were sworn in on 27 June and held their first meeting on 30 June, together with the five Judges of the Appeals Chamber (which is the same as that of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). At that meeting, they elected Judge Laity Kama (Senegal) as the President of the Tribunal, and also adopted the Rules of Procedure. It is now envisaged that the Tribunal's first indictments will be made before the end of this year. However, due to the continuing problems being experienced with regard to the Tribunal's premises in Arusha, it is, as of yet, still uncertain where the initial trial proceedings will take place.

Recommendations and observations

The Secretary-General may wish to inform the Rwandese leaders that every effort was being made to enable the International Tribunal to start functioning in Arusha and in Kigali, and that he would ensure that financing and administrative arrangements are put in place as early as possible.

6. UNAMIR/RWANDA: THE STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT

~~The Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) was signed between the former~~
Government of Rwanda and the United Nations on 5 November 1993. In a letter addressed to the ASG for Peace-Keeping Operations dated 21 November 1993, the Rwandese Patriotic Front promised to cooperate fully in the implementation of the provisions of the SOMA. In accordance with well-established principles of international law, the applicability of the SOMA is not in doubt despite the recent change of Government in Rwanda.

The current Government of Rwanda has verbally expressed its adherence to the SOMA, but it has also expressed reservations regarding certain of its provisions. UNAMIR continues to urge the Government to respect the SOMA, while conceding the possibility of renegotiating certain of its provisions on the basis of the Government's proposals. Such proposals are expected to be received shortly.

~~The main areas of difficulty which have arisen~~ over the past several months in our dealings with Rwandese officials include:

1. Tax liabilities of UNAMIR contractors in Rwanda - whether contractors and their personnel are entitled to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations contained in the 1946 Convention and the SOMA.
2. Government's obligations with respect to the provision of premises to UNAMIR and attempts to eject UNAMIR from various Government-owned premises without sufficient notice.
3. Impoundment of UNAMIR supplies and imports, particularly those imported by contractors, in attempts to charge customs and other duties.
4. Systematic impoundment of UNAMIR and other UN vehicles following traffic accidents, in violation of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the SOMA.
5. Hijackings of UNAMIR vehicles and armed robberies of UNAMIR personnel by persons in military uniform - although not necessarily attributable to the Rwandese Government, they relate to its obligations with regard to the security and safety of UNAMIR personnel and its investigation of such offences.
6. Restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNAMIR personnel, particularly with regard to helicopter flights.
7. Imposition of passport and visa requirements on UNAMIR personnel, contrary to the SOMA.
8. Occasional illegal searches of UNAMIR personnel.
9. Detention of UNAMIR and other UN local staff on charges of genocide without any progress in the investigation of their cases or the laying of formal charges - this is related to the broader problem of extreme congestion in the prisons and of slow progress in the reactivation of the Rwandese legal and judicial system.

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Recommendations and observations

The Secretary-General may wish to underline the importance of adhering to the SOMA. Any amendments proposed by the Rwandan Government would be considered and negotiated.

7. UNAMIR: Administrative, logistical and budgetary problems

Briefing note for the Secretary-General's visit to UNAMIR

Main difficulties in the Administrative area

Two major difficulties affect UNAMIR's Administration: One relates to delays at HQs/NY in the budget and contract areas; the other stems from uncooperative attitudes by the Government of Rwanda towards UNAMIR needs.

1. Delays at HQs/NY: In the past, UNAMIR was functioning for several months without adequate resources, because the appropriate budget was finalized and authorized at HQs only towards the end of the mandate. At present, the budget for the new mandate, while generally expected to be adequate at a level of about \$110 million, is still not finalized and authorized, leaving UNAMIR essentially without formal authorization to incur many of the costs it urgently requires for the troop reduction and redeployment. This difficulty is resolved by the UNAMIR Administration having taken the responsibility and accountability to allow expenditures ahead of full formal budgetary authorization; else, many immediately-needed actions would have been materially delayed.

2. In the same vein, a major contract with the provider of practically all local construction, repairs and day-to-day maintenance services (the Brown and Root Service Company) expired on 30 May 1995. While steps to renew the contract had been initiated several months ago, the various contract reviews and negotiations - all at HQs, given the size of the contract -- have been slow and remained uncompleted at the time of contract expiration. Formally, UNAMIR remained with no contractor to provide many of its basic needs. The problem has been resolved given the contractor's willingness to continue working without a contract, (in the expectation of being awarded a retroactive contract, or of otherwise being paid by the UN for the continued services); nevertheless, given the uncertainty, the contractor reduced many key personnel, and the entire issue has inevitably caused delays in various pending works.

3. Uncooperative government attitudes: While not necessarily a matter of a "policy" by the Government of Rwanda towards UNAMIR, the fact is that a number of acts and attitudes

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have been taken by various ministries and other parts of the Government which have caused notable difficulties in UNAMIR's operations: among them are:

- During a period of several months, ending recently just 2-3 weeks ago, a substantial number of vehicles were robbed from UNAMIR and other UN staff by what were clearly in most cases members of the Rwandese army. Over 100 vehicles were stolen from UNAMIR alone: many of these vehicles, repainted, are ubiquitously circulating on the roads.
- Several weeks ago, a government official (albeit at low level) requested UNAMIR to vacate several premises it uses for its operations. Failure to vacate by the set date the letter said, would bring in the local police to enforce vacating (see enclosed letter). UNAMIR largely disregarded the letter and nothing happened; yet, the attitude demonstrated by the demand is a matter of fact.
- Again several weeks ago, another abrupt demand was received, (again from a low level official), demanding that UNAMIR re-negotiate a contract only recently concluded for one year for use of the airport helicopter hangars. Failure to reach a new contract within two weeks, the letter said, would bring about closure of the hangars. (This is, incidently, when the Government itself makes frequent use of the helicopters and when UNAMIR provides several essential services to the airport itself). At our insistence, the ultimative tone was withdrawn, however, the demand for renegotiation of an existing contract stands.
- And then, there is the Government attitude towards UNAMIR's contractors: notably, UNAMIR is heavily dependent on one international contractor for the provision of food-rations to the troops (until 30 June 1995 it was the Economat de l'Armée Company of France; and from 7 July it is the ES-KO company of Monaco). The Government has taken the attitude that these and other contractors, although working in Rwanda solely for UNAMIR, are not exempt from Rwandan taxes. In the case of Economat, they presented to the local representative a bill for some US\$1.6 million of tax dues and effectively banned his departure from Rwanda pending settlement of

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these dues. Irrespective of how the issue will be eventually resolved, in recent weeks, and in the coming ones, UNAMIR will clearly face the difficulties associated with the issue. Underscoring it is UNAMIR's high dependence on such international contractors for the provisions of most goods and services it requires

8.

The new mandate - political

1. The new mandate was negotiated against a backdrop of tension and pressure, deliberately provoked by the Rwandese hierarchy [RPA and Tutsi elements in government] to reduce UN presence in Rwanda. Moderate elements within the government [Prime Minister and like minded elements] were opposed to the hierarchy's insistence for a drastic reduction in UNAMIR and silently sided with elements inclined to keep UNAMIR reduction to the minimum.
2. Rwandese hierarchy declared aims to seeking reduction of UNAMIR strength were:
 - a) To enhance the government sovereignty over its territory which a large UN presence tended to inhibit.
 - b) To prevent a "parallel force" operating in Rwanda with regard to security, law and order.
 - c) The presence of UNAMIR was not achieving meaningful objectives and tended to create social problems with the population.
3. There was also an impression that, apart from the above, publicly stated views, Rwandese hierarchy wanted a thinning out of UN presence in order to carry out its "hidden agenda". So far, there are no indication that this assertion is based on facts. In fact, Rwanda's agreement to accept UNAMIR presence in the provinces as also, human rights observers, MILOBs and CIVPOL suggests the contrary, ie that UN and international presence in the provinces is not being discouraged.
4. After hard negotiations which included informal contact by a Rwandese delegation with the Security Council in New York, an agreement was reached which would essentially reduce UNAMIR force strength to 40% of its existing strength. The mandate itself was altered so that the security and protection of Rwandese citizens would be the responsibility of the Rwandese government while UNAMIR would help to provide confidence and stability to returning refugees. UNAMIR would protect UN premises and personnel, especially those engaged in sensitive tasks such as Human Rights monitors and the International Tribunal.
5. After the agreement on the mandate, there has been a perceptible improvement in Rwanda's relations with UNAMIR and with the international community. Over the past six weeks tension, recrimination and an aggressive non-cooperative attitude has given way to cooperation on all fronts, understanding and a welcoming approach. The government has also adopted moderate policies as public stated by the Vice-President and Prime Minister in their speeches at the recently concluded UNDP mid-term review of the Geneva Round Table.

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6. The Secretary-General may wish to make the following remarks regarding the new mandate:

- 1) The new mandate would be scrupulously carried out by UNAMIR:
 - a) military contingents would phase out according to schedule;
 - b) politically, UNAMIR would work within new mandate's objectives. Informal understandings given (early phase out of certain contingents) would be implemented;
- 2) New spirit of cooperation may be welcome;
- 3) ~~UNAMIR with its limited resources would play a helpful role for Rwanda's socio-economic recovery;~~
- 4) ~~Meanwhile, SOMA needs to be respected meticulously;~~
- 5) within UN regulations, we shall aim to leave behind as much surplus, redundant equipment as possible.

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PREPARED 8 JUL 95

G2 ASSESSMENT
PROBABLE FRGF/MILITIA SITUATION

FRGF CAPABILITIES

STRENGTH

1. ESTIMATES OF THE FRGF STRENGTH IN SEP 94 WERE:
 - A. 15,000 - 20,000 IN THE GOMA AREA;
 - B. 10,000 - 12,000 IN THE BUKAVU AREA; AND
 - C. ABOUT 3000 IN TANZANIA WITH THE BULK IN THE BENACO REFUGEE CAMP IN NGARA DISTRICT.
2. ASSESSING THE CURRENT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY OF THE FRGF IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE FRGF ARE SCATTERED AMONG MANY CAMPS BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN. THE CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE FRGF CLAIMS THAT HE HAS A FORCE OF 40,000 MEN WHILE A HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION REPORTS THAT THE FRGF IS 50,000 STRONG AND THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ARMS SHIPMENTS FROM EAST EUROPEAN BLOCK COUNTRIES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE FIGURES RELATE ONLY TO THE FORCES IN ZAIRE AS THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF RECRUITING AND TRAINING FOR THE FRGF BEING DONE IN TANZANIA OR BURUNDI.
3. THOSE FRGF UNITS WHO ESCAPED TO ZAIRE REMAIN AS COHESIVE MILITARY UNITS AND HAVE BEEN UNDERGOING MILITARY TRAINING AT LEAST IN THE CAMPS THAT ARE DESIGNATED AS MILITARY CAMPS IN ZAIRE:
 - A. ETAT MAJOR WHICH IS THE PRINCIPLE FRGF CAMP IN THE GOMA AREA AND WHERE THE FRGF ARMY HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED. IT HAS BEEN RUMOURED THOUGH THAT THE HEADQUARTERS HAS MOVED TO THE BUKAVU AREA.
 - B. PANZI IN THE BUKAVU AREA WHERE THERE IS AN ESTIMATED 4000 SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES; AND
 - C. ANOTHER CAMP SOUTH AND WEST OF BUKAVU, POSSIBLY AT BULONGE, WHERE IT IS BELIEVED THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST 8000 SOLDIERS.
4. THE REPORTED POPULATION OF THE MILITARY CAMPS IS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE CLAIMED STRENGTH OF THE FRGF. THIS LENDS CREDENCE TO THE BELIEF THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AS YET UNIDENTIFIED FRGF CAMPS IN BOTH THE BUKAVU AND GOMA AREAS.
5. RECENT REPORTS CLAIM TWO POSSIBLE FRGF CAMPS ON THE NORTH END OF IJWI ISLAND AND THREE CAMPS WEST OF LUBERIZI, ZAIRE NEAR THE BURUNDI BORDER. THESE REPORTS HAVE NOT BEEN VERIFIED BY CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE BUT COME FROM CREDIBLE SOURCES.
6. THERE ARE LIKELY A LARGE NUMBER OF THE FRGF LIVING IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND USING THE RELIEF AID PROVIDED AS A MEANS OF FEEDING THEIR TROOPS.

ARMS

7. THE FACT THAT THE FRGF ARE RECEIVING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION HAS BEEN REASONABLY VERIFIED THROUGH SEVERAL SOURCES TO DATE

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IT APPEARS THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED ONLY SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT CREW SERVED WEAPONS SUCH AS MORTARS. THIS HOWEVER IS SUFFICIENT AS THE RPA LACK ANY LARGE WEAPONS SUCH AS AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY OR ARMoured CARS. THE ARMS AND AMMUNITION APPEAR TO BE COMING FROM ~~ALBANIA AND BULGARIA BUT THERE ARE REPORTS THAT~~ FRANCE, CHINA, SOUTH AFRICA, THE SEYCHELLES AND EVEN ZAIRE HAVE ALSO PROVIDED WEAPONS TO THE FRGF AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER.

8. THESE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE FRGF ARE A POINT OF DISCONTENT WITH THE RPA WHO ARE UNDER A UN ARMS EMBARGO. THE RPA LACKS SUFFICIENT WEAPONS TO ARM ALL THEIR SOLDIERS AND BELIEVES THAT THEY LACK EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO REPEL AN FRGF ATTACK.

TRAINING

9. THE LEVEL OF THE FRGF TRAINING IS BELIEVED TO BE STILL AT A LOW LEVEL; SECTION AND PLATOON, BUT THIS IS SUFFICIENT TO CONDUCT GUERRILLA/INSURGENCY OPERATIONS WHICH COULD DESTABILISE THE CURRENT RWANDA GOVERNMENT AND CAPTURE A PORTION OF RWANDA. IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND HOWEVER THAT THIS BELIEF IS FOUNDED ON THE ABSENCE OF INFORMATION THAT HIGHER LEVEL TRAINING NEEDED TO INVADE RWANDA AND DEFEAT THE RPA IS NOT BEING CONDUCTED. WITH THE TOPOGRAPHY, ABSENCE OF UN MILITARY AND THE POOR COMMUNICATIONS IN ZAIRE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH TRAINING COULD BE ONGOING IN SECRET BASES.

INTENTION

10. THE FRGF INTENTION INITIALLY WAS UNCLEAR AS THERE WERE TOO MANY PEOPLE CLAIMING TO REPRESENT THE FRG. IN SEP 94, IT APPEARED THAT A NEGOTIATED RETURN UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO BUY TIME TO REBUILD THEIR ARMY. THE POSITION OF THE CURRENT RWANDAN GOVERNMENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NO AMNESTY FOR THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE AND THAT ANYONE WHO HAD FLED RWANDA MUST HAVE DONE SO BECAUSE THEY PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLINGS. FRG NOW HAS NO OTHER OPTION BUT TO ATTEMPT A RETURN BY FORCE AND HAS REPEATEDLY ANNOUNCED DATES WHEN THEY WILL INVADE RWANDA. THE NEXT DATE ANNOUNCED DATES ARE 15 JUL AND 15 AUG 95. THESE DATES SHOULD NOT BE DISREGARDED OUTRIGHT GIVEN THE ARMS SHIPMENTS AND THE TIME THAT THE FRGF HAS HAD TO PREPARE.

11. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE FRGF HAS THE CAPABILITY AND IS CONDUCTING INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE BORDER AREAS RWANDA WITH THE VIEW OF DISCREDITING THE ABILITY OF THE RPA, MAINTAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE HUTU MAJORITY IN RWANDA AND DEFINING RPA CAPABILITIES. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE FRGF HAS SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO DEFEAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT HOWEVER THE FRGF COULD CAPTURE AND HOLD A PORTION OF RWANDA IN THE GISENYI AND CYANGUGU AREAS. SUCH AN ACTION HOWEVER WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON EVENTS AND THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN ZAIRE AND BURUNDI.

MILITIA

12. THERE ARE NO RECORDS OF HOW LARGE THE MILITIA WAS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. IN SEP 94, THE MILITIA HAD AN ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF 3,000 TO 4,000 OUTSIDE RWANDA; 1000 IN THE GOMA AREA, 1,500 IN THE BUKAVU AREA, 1,000 IN THE BENACO CAMP IN TANZANIA

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AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER HIDING IN THE IDP CAMPS. THOSE IN THE IDP CAMPS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE ESCAPED TO BURUNDI AND ZAIRE WHEN THE CAMPS WERE CLOSED.

13. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MILITIA ARE PRESENT IN EVERY REFUGEE CAMP IN ZAIRE, BURUNDI AND TANZANIA AND THAT THEY EXERCISE CONTROL OF THESE CAMPS THROUGH THE CAMP LEADERS.

14. THE MILITIA HAS PROVEN TO BE A RUTHLESS, USING INTIMIDATION AND MURDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR CONTROL AND THE SECRECY OF THEIR IDENTITIES. FOR THIS REASON IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE ORGANIZATION BUT LIKELY IT IS SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER THAN 5,000 AS ITS MEMBERS WILL HAVE COERCED PEOPLE INTO JOINING OR CREATED CONDITIONS WHEREBY PEOPLE MUST JOIN TO SURVIVE.

15. GIVEN THE REARMING OF THE FRGF, THE MILITIA LIKELY HAS ACQUIRED SMALL ARMS AND GRENADES TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR CUSTOMARY WEAPONS; THE MACHETE AND CLUBS.

16. THE MILITIA HAS BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS COMMITTING ACTS OF BANDITRY AND MURDER IN RWANDA AND WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR MOTIVES ARE TO KILL WITNESS WHO COULD IDENTIFY THEM AT TRIBUNALS AND THOSE WHO DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR CAUSE AS A WARNING TO OTHERS.

17. WHILE IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE MILITIA TAKE ORDERS DIRECTLY FROM THE FRGF, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS COOPERATION AT LEAST BETWEEN THE LEADERSHIP AS ALL LEADERS ARE POLITICALLY ALIGNED. RECENTLY HOWEVER THERE HAS BEEN A RUMOUR THAT THE FRGF ARE TRYING TO CONTROL THE MILITIA AS THE MILITIA'S UNCONTROLLED ACTIVITIES ARE INTERFERING WITH THE FRGF'S FUTURE PLANS.

RECENT ACTIVITIES

18. NEITHER THE FRGF NOR THE MILITIA HAVE PUBLICLY TAKEN CREDIT FOR ATTACKS IN RWANDA. INCURSIONS FROM ZAIRE OCCUR DAILY, NORMALLY UNDER THE GUISE OF BANDITRY ACTIVITY. THE FACT THAT THE FRGF DOES NOT CLAIM RESPONSIBILITY, MEANS ONLY THAT THEY DO NOT WISH INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF THEIR ACTIONS. RATHER THE PEOPLE WHO THEY MUST SUBJUGATE KNOW OR BELIEVE WHO IS RESPONSIBLE AND THAT IS ENOUGH.

AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS

19. SINCE 15 JUN, THERE HAVE BEEN REPEATED SIGHTINGS OF AIRCRAFT OVERFLYING THE NYAMASHEKE/KIRAMBO AREA OF SECTOR 4C. TO DATE THERE HAS BEEN NO TREND TO THEIR TIMINGS OR DIRECTION OF FLIGHT NOR HAVE THE AIRCRAFT BEEN SEEN IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS KIBUYE. FURTHERMORE THERE APPEARS TO BE MORE THAN ONE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED ALTHOUGH THE EXACT TYPES AND MARKINGS CANNOT BE DETERMINED DUE TO ALTITUDE AND DISTANCE. AN EYE WITNESS FROM ZAIRE CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN AN AIRCRAFT WITH THE FLAG OF RWANDA ON THE TAIL, PARKED AT THE BUKAVU AIRPORT BUT THIS HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.

20. INITIALLY, IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE AIRCRAFT WERE CONDUCTING AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE HOWEVER DUE TO THE FREQUENCY OF THEIR APPEARANCE, RANDOM FLIGHT PATH AND THEIR ALTITUDE, IT IS NOW

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INTENT, THEN IT IS TO CREATE CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION.

MILITARY OPTIONS

21. THE FRGF HAVE TWO MILITARY OPTIONS AVAILABLE:

A. MOUNT AN INSURGENCY OPERATION TO EMBARRASS AND DISCREDIT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL HUTU POPULATION THROUGH TERRORISING THOSE WHO DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR CAUSE; OR

B. AN INVASION OF RWANDA WITH A LIMITED OBJECTIVE OF SEIZING A PORTION OF THE COUNTRY SO AS TO BE IN A POSITION TO FORCE RECOGNITION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND TO FORCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. IF HOWEVER THE INITIAL OBJECTIVE IS SEIZED RELATIVELY EASILY THEN A FULL SCALE CIVIL WAR COULD OCCUR AS THEY TRY TO SEIZE THE CAPITAL.

22. OF THE TWO OPTIONS, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FRGF HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND HAVE ALREADY BEGUN INSURGENCY OPERATIONS ALBEIT NOT YET AT A TEMPO SUFFICIENT TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR AGAINST THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. IT IS FURTHER BELIEVED THAT THE FRGF DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES AT THIS MOMENT TO INVAD E AND HOLD A PORTION OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS ANTICIPATED THEREFORE THAT THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS ALONG THE BORDER (SECTOR 4C, 3A AND 5) WILL INCREASE STEADILY OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS AND OCCUR DEEPER INTO RWANDA PARTICULARLY IN THE RUHENG ERI AREA.

23. WHEN, NOT IF, THE FRGF INVAD E RWANDA WILL DEPEND UPON THE TYPES OF WEAPONS RECEIVED IN FUTURE SHIPMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. SEP/OCT WOULD SEEM TO BE A GOOD PERIOD FOR AN FRGF OFFENSIVE AS RENEWAL OF THE UN MANDATE WOULD SHORTLY BE DUE. POTENTIALLY, THE FRGF COULD USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE AN AREA OF THE COUNTRY WITH THE VIEW OF HAVING UN FORCES REMAIN IN RWANDA AS A MEDIATOR AND A BUFFER AGAINST THE RPA. THIS SCENARIO WAS SUCCESSFULLY USED BY THE RPA IN 1993 TO FORCE THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.

24. WHERE THE FRGF WILL ATTACK IS MORE UNCERTAIN BUT IN VIEW OF TACTICAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE PRIORITY LIKELY WOULD BE:

A. TO SEIZE CYANGUGU PREFECTURE. THIS WOULD DEPRIVE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF A VALUABLE ECONOMIC AREA AND A SOURCE OF ELECTRIC POWER FOR THE NATION.

B. TO SEIZE THE AREA OF GISENYI/RUHENG ERI AS THIS WAS A FORMER POWER BASE FOR THE MILITIA AND PROVIDES EASY ACCESS TO KIGALI.

C. TO LAUNCH DIVERSIONARY OPERATIONS FROM BURUNDI OR TANZANIA INTO GIKONGORO/BUTARE OR KIBUNGO PREFECTURES. AS FRGF FORCES ARE NON EXISTENT IN BURUNDI AND TANZANIA, THEY MAY USE THE MILITIA LIVING IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS TO FORCE A SUDDEN MASS MIGRATION OF REFUGEES INTO RWANDA THEREBY MASKING THEIR MOVEMENT AND CREATING CONFUSION REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT RPA FORCES.

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25. THE USE OF REFUGEES TO CREATE CONFUSION WHILE MOUNTING AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION IS NOT A UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED THEORY BUT IT IS PLAUSIBLE. IT IS ASSUMED THAT SUCH USE OF REFUGEES WOULD OCCUR ~~IN AREAS REMOVED FROM THE MAIN FIGHTING~~ EXPRESSLY TO DRAW THE RPA FORCES FROM COMBAT. GIVEN THE FRG'S DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE HOWEVER, ANY SUDDEN MASS MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES OR CONCENTRATION OF REFUGEES AT THE BORDER, PARTICULARLY FROM ZAIRE, SHOULD BE CRITICALLY VIEWED AS AN INDICATOR OF PENDING FRGF ACTIVITY.

ATTITUDES OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

ZAIRE

26. THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED CHANGE IN A MARKED CHANGE IN ATTITUDE, AT LEAST PUBLICLY, BY THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE FRGF:

A. ON 9 APR, THE ZAIRE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE FRGF WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TRAIN IN ZAIRE AND THAT SEVERE MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST ANYONE CARRYING WEAPONS.

B. ON 9 JUN, THE DEFENCE MINISTERS OF RWANDA, BURUNDI AND ZAIRE ANNOUNCED AN AGREEMENT TO CONDUCT JOIN PATROLS OF THEIR COMMON BORDERS, TO TAKE MEASURES TO ELIMINATE ARMED GANGS AND TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF ARMS IN THE REGION.

BURUNDI

27. ASIDE FROM THE ACCORD SIGNED BY ITS DEFENCE MINISTER REGARDING SECURITY OF THE BORDER, ARMED GANGS AND ARMS CONTROL, THE BURUNDI GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN QUIET CONCERNING RWANDA DESPITE SEEMINGLY CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. THIS IS LIKELY BECAUSE BURUNDI IS CONCENTRATING UPON ITS OWN INTERNAL ETHNIC PROBLEMS. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED RUMOURS THAT THE RPA HAVE MADE INCURSIONS INTO BURUNDI.

28. THERE HAVE BEEN NO CLAIMS THAT THE FRG HUTU MILITIAS ARE SUPPORTING BURUNDI HUTU MILITIAS. HOWEVER GIVEN TRIBAL AFFILIATION, THE SIMILAR GOALS OF BOTH MILITIAS, THE BURUNDI REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT SOME FORM OF COOPERATION EXISTS.

TANZANIA

29. THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO ANNOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING THE FRGF/MILITIA NOR AGREEMENTS WITH THE CURRENT RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ON DEFENCE MATTERS. THEIR CHIEF CONCERN IS THE DISRUPTION WHICH RWANDAN AND BURUNDI REFUGEES ARE CAUSING WITHIN TANZANIA. LIKELY ANY OVERT ACTIVITY BY THE FRGF/MILITIA WILL BE DEALT WITH SEVERELY.

UGANDA

30. THERE ARE NO FRGF/MILITIA ELEMENTS ACTIVE IN UGANDA.

STATUS OF THE NEW MANDATE

Appendix : Drawdown and Rotation Plan

Gen

1. The UNAMIR mandate has been revised and renewed till 08 Dec 95. There has been a shift in focus from the peace keeping to a role of assisting in normalisation and stabilisation of Rwanda.

New Mandate

2. The new mandate lays down the following:

- a. ~~Exercise its good offices to help achieve the~~ national reconciliation with in the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement.
- b. Assist the Govt of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Govt of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks through out the country with military and police observers.
- c. Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining.
- d. Assist in the training of a national police force.
- e. Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of UN agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full time protection for the Prosecutor's office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need.

Force Structure

3. The revised mandate will require UNAMIR to reach a formed troop strength to 18,00 personnel by 09 October 95 passing through a strength of 2,330 by 09 Sept 95, or sooner. The force level of 2,330 will be a bench mark rather than an intermediate stage in order to avoid disruption in redeployment. The Mil Obs and Civ Pol will remain at their authorised levels of 320 and 120 respectively

4. Following force structure has been approved vide code cable No 2063 from UN HQ NY.

- a. Sector 1. INDBATT with a strength of 660 and a GHANA company of 135

personnel for the Tribunal Protection duties, in Kigali.

- b. **Sector 2.** One GHANA company of 135 personnel.
- c. **Sector 3.** One MALI company of 135 personnel.
- d. **Sector 4.** One MALAWI company of 135 personnel.
- e. **Sector 5.** One NIGERIAN company of 135 personnel.
- f. **With Force HQ in Kigali.**
 - i. Staff at the HQ. 35.
 - ii. Force Engr Company. 125.
 - iii. Force Sig Company. 75.
 - iv. Med Company. 100.
 - v. FLSG/Logistics Unit. 85.
 - vi. MP Platoon. 45.
- g. Mil Obs. 320.
- h. Civ Pol. 120.

Implied Tasks for UNAMIR With in Its Capability

5. Contingents.

- a. Occupy respective sectors.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.

h. Contribute to the security of humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

j. Force Engr Coy to provide engr support to UNAMIR, carry out EOD tasks, assist restoration of essential services as ordered by UNAMIR HQ and provide expertise to the Govt of Rwanda on engr matters.

k. Force Sig Coy to provide communication support to HQ UNAMIR, Mil Ob HQ and the contingents, also assist UN agencies in sig matters as required.

6. **Mil Obs.**

i. Occupy sectors.

ii. Provide escorts as required.

iii. Assist in the coordination of humanitarian agencies in their operations.

iv. Assist in the coordination of NGOs in their operations.

v. Be prepared to coordinate and possibly provide transport for the movement of refugees.

vi. Assist in motivating the persons to return to their homes.

vii. Monitor refugee movement and conditions in communes.

Drawdown and Rotation Plan

7. The approved plan vide Fax from UN HQ, NY dated 26 Jun 95 is attached as Appendix.

8. All necessary instructions have been issued to all concerned.

EFFECTIVE: 5 JUL 95

UNAMIR DRAWDOWN AND ROTATION PLAN

CONTINGENT	FLIGHT DATES	PERS DEPARTING	PERS ARRIVING	FORCE STRENGTH (5622)	REMARKS
TUNBATT	30 JUN 95 6-9 JUL 95	814	0	4808	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
MOVCON	JUL 95	0	15	4823	TBA
NIBATT	12 JUL 95	184	0	4639	135 PERS REMAIN
ETHIOBATT	17-19 JUL 95	830	0	3809	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
95 FLSC	24-25 JUL 95	91	85	3803	ROTATION
ZAMBATT	1-4 AUG 95	795	0	3008	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF) IF NOT DIRECT TO ANGOLA
MALAWICOY	6-7 AUG 95	179	135	2964	ROTATION, REPLACED BY 135 (PLUS STAFF)
MEDCOY	9-10 AUG 95	0	100	3064	TBA
SENBATT	11-13 AUG 95	237	0	2827	ALL PERS GONE (LESS STAFF)
AUSMED	21-23 AUG 95	310	0	2517	ALL PERS GONE
MALICOY	1-3 SEP 95	198	135	2454	135 REMAIN OR ROTATION?
GHANBATT	6-9 SEP 95	530	0	1924	270 PERS REMAIN (PLUS STAFF)
INDBATT	5-8 OCT 95	65	0	1859	660 PERS REMAIN
MP COY	9 OCT 95	21	0	1838	45 PERS MP PL REMAINS
HQ STAFF	9 OCT 95	23	0	1815	35 STAFF REMAIN
MOVCON	9 OCT 95	15	0	1800	

T 660
 TT 270
 135
 COY 135
 Y 135
 FF 35
 COY 125
 S 75
 100
 85
 45
 1800

NOTE: MP COY & HQ STAFF WILL COMMENCE DRAWDOWN THROUGH PERIODIC NATURAL ATTRITION TO BE COMPLETED BY 9 OCT 95.

The Arms Embargo

Rwanda feels aggrieved at the continuation of the Security Council arms embargo. It considers it unfair that while no embargo applies to the former government now acquiring arms freely and openly training for a military campaign into Rwanda in the camps of Zaire and Tanzania. Rwanda considers the extension of the embargo into the refugees camps as without means of effective monitoring and implementation. Gen. Kagame is, therefore, expected to raise this issue in the talks with the Secretary-General.

The issue was discussed by the Security Council, both formally and informally, during the recent debate on the new mandate. There was understanding of Rwanda's view on the embargo. However, the consensus was inclined towards extending the mandate into the camps (which is included in para 4 of the resolution no.997) rather than lifting it from Rwanda. It was generally accepted that should Rwanda make a formal request to the sanctions committee for the acquisition of non-lethal arms, its request would be favourably treated.

Brief

In the event of the arms embargo issue being raised by the Rwandese government, the Secretary-General may wish to respond by stating:

a) While Rwanda's contention of unfair application of the embargo is understood, the Security Council, traditionally, is inclined against lifting arms embargoes. Thus in the recent resolution the embargo has been extended to the refugee zones in neighbouring countries.

b) Rwanda's request to the sanctions committee for the acquisition of non-lethal arms would be sympathetically considered.

12. Situation in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi

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ZAIRE

There is a great desire on the part of the refugees to return. Whereas most of the camp population is waiting for an improvement in the security situation in Rwanda that will enable them to return in safety.

The Government of Zaire has expressed grave concern over the continued presence of refugees and demands their immediate return.

TANZANIA

In an election year, the question of refugees in Tanzania has become an important election issue.

The closure of the Burundian border with Tanzania instigated by the fear of a massive influx of Rwandese refugees living in Burundi and Burundian asylum seekers, resulted in a widespread approval within Tanzania and several other countries especially within the Sub-region.

In Parliament, the complete absence of a significant dissenting voice to the emerging negative policy on asylum is most striking.

BURUNDI

Open conflict and instability continue to force Burundians to seek asylum in neighboring countries.

UNHCR is informing the refugee population in Burundi about conditions in Rwanda through visits by delegations from the camps and the dissemination of recorded testimony from returnees. These efforts have provided a means to counter rumors and allegations of an unfavorable climate for return and have had a positive effect on repatriation.

unhcr - rwanda

Overview

With a determination to create an enabling environment conducive for the return of Rwandese refugees from neighbouring countries, UNHCR resumed its activities in Rwanda in July 1994 immediately after the hostilities ceased. From a central office in Kigali, UNHCR rapidly expanded to other areas of the country and to date the organization has opened offices in Butare, Cyangugu, Gisenyi/Ruhengeri, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kibuye Nyagatare, and Nyamata.

UNHCR has set up transit/reception centres at entry points and at other parts in the country to provide international protection and material assistance to returnees. International protection consists of monitoring the fulfillment of commitments made by the Government regarding the safety and dignity of returnees. The assistance includes transportation to their home areas, distribution of take-home family packages composed of food, plastic sheeting, blankets, soap, mats, kitchen utensils, seeds and a

gricultural tools. In some areas, veterinary products have been provided. To facilitate the return, UNHCR has acquired 33 lorries and 46 buses to transport returnees and displaced persons. These vehicles are operated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on behalf of UNHCR.

UNHCR's overall goal in Rwanda is to promote the voluntary return and reintegration of all Rwandese who found refuge in neighbouring countries over the last three decades and particularly in 1994. To achieve this goal UNHCR's assistance activities in Rwanda are structured as follows:

1. International Protection
2. Direct Assistance to returnee families;
3. Community assistance and development of new rural settlements
4. Institutional assistance

1. International Protection

UNHCR monitors that the return of refugees be done in safety: legal and physical safety, material security, and in dignity: unconditional return, no arbitrary separation from family members, respect, full acceptance of their rights.

2. Direct assistance to returnee families

2.1 Transport: UNHCR in cooperation with IOM provides transport for both "old" and "new" case load returnees ~~from the countries of~~ asylum to temporary reception centres or home communes in Rwanda. Between August 1994 and June 1995 UNHCR transported 275,508 people from outside and 229,701 IDPs from several camps within the country.

2.2 Relief Items All returnees are provided with a **one month food ration**. Drinking water and biscuits are distributed at reception/training centres and way stations. **Non-food relief items** are provided to needy returnee families as follows:

Blankets: 3/family
Hoes & other tools: 1 each/family
Jerry cans: 2/family
Seeds: according to season
Soap: 1 bar/person
Plastic sheeting: 4X5m 1/family
Plastic mats: 3/family

Kitchen sets are normally provided at the camp level in countries of asylum. reception/transit centres.

3. Community assistance and development of new rural settlements

UNHCR is **funding rehabilitation projects**, using the expertise of non governmental organizations, in the field of shelter, health, water, education, community services and logistics.

3.1. Shelter About 30,000 returnee families or **180,000 people will benefit** from the 1995 shelter programme, where UNHCR, through agencies is assisting returnees who do not have a house in settling them on new, ~~government~~ designated rural settlements by the provision of **building materials** such as corrugated iron sheets, wooden poles, nails and where necessary brick-making machines.

3.2 Health UNHCR continues to **support five district hospitals and 42 health centres** in various regions throughout Rwanda in the areas which returnees are expected to resettle in large numbers - specifically, Kibungo, Byumba, Kigali rural, Cyangugu and Gisenyi, through the provision of medical supplies and equipment, training and payment of incentives to local medical staff and rehabilitation of buildings.

3.3. Water UNHCR provides funding to agencies who are **rehabilitating simple water systems** at the commune/secteur level. In cooperation with other UN agencies, UNHCR may also provide partial funding for development of simple water sources in new rural settlements.

3.4. Education UNHCR provides funding to agencies which are **rehabilitating primary, secondary and professional training schools**, has provided 15 light trucks to the

Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education for use in secondary schools, and is assisting in the distribution of food items to secondary schools that have recently reopened. UNHCR has **repaired 16 out of 25 schools** it plans to rehabilitate in Gisenyi. Also, UNHCR is funding the provision of school equipment and materials as well as **supporting teacher training programmes**, and in cooperation with other UN agencies, may provide partial **funding for construction of schools** in new rural settlement areas.

3.5. Community services UNHCR provides funding to agencies supporting **unaccompanied returnee minors** as well as IDPs and locals. The objectives are to prevent separation of children and families; to reunite unaccompanied children with parents/members of families; to enable children with no families to receive care that meets their full range of needs for normal growth and development; and to enable children with special needs to receive care and necessary treatment. UNHCR assistance is provided to selected community-based **projects which help vulnerable families**.

Assistance includes **monitoring health/nutritional status of children, facilitating the provision of food and non-food items, social support and promoting income-generating activities**. UNHCR supports children's centres and programmes with active tracing and **family reunification** components as well as agencies who assist Rwandese, especially women and children, who have suffered severe traumatic experiences.

3.6. Logistics UNHCR - in cooperation with LWF and ADRA - has set up a system of **warehouses for relief items** in Gisenyi,

Butare, Cyangugu, Kibungo, Byumba and Kibuye, in addition to the central warehouse in Kigali. The central warehouse caters for the needs of Kigali, Gitarama and South Kigali Prefectures.

4. Institutional assistance To improve the capacity of line ministries, particularly those directly involved in the implementation of UNHCR projects to function properly, the Organization has **donated 49 vehicles and 34 motorcycles** to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, the Ministry of Interior and Communal Development, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Family and Women's Promotion and the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. UNHCR has also **provided cash grants** to some of the above Ministries to enable them to meet running costs related to work that has direct relevance to returnee/refugee programmes.

RETURNEE STATISTICS: JANUARY-JUNE 1995
STATISTIQUES DES RAPATRIES: JANVIER-JUIN 1995

MON	BURUNDI		TANZANIA		UGANDA		ZAIRE		OTHER		T O T A L		MONTH TOTAL
	new cl	old cl	new cl	old cl	new cl	old cl	new cl	old cl	new cl	old cl	new c/l	old c/l	
JAN	3,019	68	384	1,511	-	18,850	4,650	4,195	1,440	360	9,493	24,984	34,477
FEB	1,149	46	482	1,318	-	14,625	4,400	4,401	-	-	6,031	20,390	26,421
MAR	718	352	433	629	-	20,964	3,795	3,456	-	-	4,946	25,401	30,347
APR	39	480	63	1,111	-	16,652	667	4,038	-	1	769	22,282	23,051
MAY	-	1,328	175	35	-	17,513	467	3,627	-	100	642	22,603	23,245
JUN	4,176	200	672	36	-	3,376	275	2,452	-	12	5,213	6,076	11,199
TOT	9,101	2,474	2,209	4,640	-	91,980	14,254	22,169	1,440	473	27,004	121,736	148,740

Averages: Monthly average Jan-June: 24,790
Weekly average, Jan-June: 5,720.7

New Case Load: Monthly average, Jan-June: 4,501
Weekly average, Jan-June: 1,038.6

Old Case Load: Monthly average, Jan-June: 20,290
Weekly average, Jan-June: 4,682

BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**UNDP PROGRAMMES IN RWANDA****Mid-Term Review - Round Table**

Participants at the Mid-Term Review, held in Kigali from 6-7 July 1995, agreed on the need:

- (1) to accelerate disbursements;
- (2) to improve coordination, both within the Government, between the government and international donors, and among international donors;
- (3) to support the government's new plan of action for the resettlement and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons;
- (4) for the Government and donors to work together to relieve the overcrowding in the country's prisons and move forward as quickly as possible with the fair trials of genocide suspects;

Participants also agreed to the proposal of the Prime Minister to hold the next Round Table on Rwanda in January 1996 in Geneva.

Trust Fund

As of 5 July 1995, \$12.8 million had been received by UNDP for the United Nations Trust Fund for Rwanda. A further \$9.5 million had been pledged to the Fund, but had not yet been received by UNDP. The Netherlands was by far the biggest contributor to the Fund (total amount received and pending: \$19.3 million).

The other contributors were the UK, Switzerland, Canada, and Spain. All of the projects listed in the section, "UNDP Programme Activities" (below), except for the last, are funded under the Trust Fund. Other Trust Fund projects include:

- a project for the rehabilitation of public buildings in Kigali and other administrative centres;
- a project designed to support the reopening of key faculties of the National University of Rwanda, in particular the Faculty of Law;

UNDP Programme Activities

JUSTICE SYSTEM

Support to the Rehabilitation of the Rwandese Justice System, Phase I: the Phase I programme involves: (1) rehabilitation of existing prisons (space for an additional 3,700 prisoners created); (2) construction of new prisons (construction of a new prison at Nsinda, designed to hold 5,000 prisoners, expected to be completed in August).

Support ..., Phase II: Phase II involves: (1) recruitment of expatriate judicial personnel for work in the Rwandese system (magistrates, prosecutors, investigators); candidates already submitted to the Government, approval of which depends on the adoption by the National Assembly of a needed amendment to Rwandese law; (2) training of Rwandese judicial personnel.

Rwandese Communal Police Training Programme, Phase I: existing buildings will be rehabilitated and new facilities constructed and equipped at a site in Gishari in order to permit the training of 1,500 communal police for work throughout Rwanda. UNAMIR/CIVPOL, WFP and WHO are assisting.

Strengthening the National Gendarmerie of Rwanda: renovation of the National Gendarmerie training facility in Ruhengeri.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Support to the Reintegration of Returnees and Rehabilitation of Communes: the project is designed to assist the resettlement of the inhabitants of the former IDP camps in southern Rwanda, closed in April; items such as office equipment (for the reinforcement of local administrative capacity) and housing construction materials are being provided to targeted communes.

STRENGTHENING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES OF THE STATE:

State Capacity Building: this large-scale programme, with a total budget of \$9.5 million, covers the following areas: (a) organisation design, management systems and human resources development; (b) specialised technical assistance for economic and financial management; (c) capacity building for local administration.

Brief:

SG may express satisfaction at the result of the UNDP mid-term Round Table review which focussed on:

- a) early disbursement of pledged funds,
- b) responding meaningfully to Rwanda's socio-economic needs.

15. Status of Operation

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR)

UNITED NATIONS

UNITED NATIONS

UPDATE ON PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES OF HRFOR

There are presently 114 Human Rights Field Officers (HRFOs), from 45 countries, working throughout Rwanda for the HRFOR. The Operation, the first under the auspices of the HCHR, was invited into the country by the Government of Rwanda (GOR) to assist in reestablishing a civil society based on law and respect for human rights.

The HRFOR functions under an agreement between HCHR and the GOR. This agreement is pursuant to the mandate of the HCHR as set out in the General Assembly resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993. The agreement includes human rights monitoring, investigations into past human rights violations, including genocide, and present human rights violations, assisting with setting up structures to safeguard human rights (specifically judicial), promoting human rights education and confidence building measures.

The HRFOR has developed a number of projects with the GOR to address the daunting problem of ending the cycle of impunity in a post-genocide society. The Office of the President and Vice-President have been supportive of a number of these initiatives including a summit on finding a viable Rwandese solution to genocide, which would include inviting experts from Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, Ethiopia, and Israel to compare methods of fostering national reconciliation after massive human rights violations. Since November the HRFOR has identified grassroots needs of judicial authorities and brought these needs to the attention of donor organisations. The HRFOR has helped distribute equipment to judicial authorities for GOR.

The HRFOR has 11 field offices throughout the country. These field offices work as base stations for mobile teams of up to 15 HRFOs. Every day HRFOs travel from commune to commune meeting with civil, judicial and military authorities and local population learning about the general conditions of each commune. Specifically, HRFOs learn about the sense of security that people have, access to property, the morale and material needs of judicial authorities, how the judicial system functions, customary law in practice, conditions of detention centres, and they learn of alleged human rights violations. Allegations are investigated and when they prove true solutions are sought with local, or when needed, national authorities.

HRFOR's agreement with the GOR allows Field Officers to visit all places of detention and interview all Rwandese in private. The agreement goes beyond identifying problems. The HRFOR, in close consultation with the GOR, continues to help find immediate, mid- and long-term solutions to problems.

Nationally, relations with all relevant Ministries (Justice, Interior, Promotion of Women and Family Affairs, Rehabilitation, Prime Minister, Vice-President and President) are very constructive and the HRFOR is in the process of establishing prefectural human rights committees which would meet regularly with local representatives of these Ministries under the chairmanship of the Prefects.

The HRFOR, since its began in September 1994, has cost 8 million USD. It presently has a budget to continue as it is until the end of September

16.

Status of Humanitarian Assistance for Rwanda

1. 1994 Overview:

In response to the 1994 crisis in Rwanda and its spill-over effects in the sub-region, the United Nations launched a UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal covering the period from July up to the end of December 1994. The Appeal requested a total of US\$ 589.4 million for activities designed to meet the basic emergency needs of vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons and refugees.

UN Agencies operating in Rwanda within the framework of the July-December 1994 Appeal were UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO, UNV, UNIFEM and DHA's field unit in Rwanda, UNREO. IOM activities were also included in the Appeal. In addition, substantial funding was requested by NGOs, ICRC and other international organisations for activities in Rwanda and the sub-region.

During the six months covered by the Appeal, displaced persons in camps in Rwanda, refugees in neighbouring countries and other vulnerable groups received extensive emergency assistance in the form of food, nutritional services, health care, water supply and sanitation. Programmes were also initiated in the sectors of agriculture and education in Rwanda and some emergency support was extended to central and local government structures to enhance their capacities to respond to the crisis. As of the end of December 1994, some 91% of the requirements identified in the Appeal had been met or pledged.

2. 1995 Overview:

Taking into account substantial carryover contributions from 1994, the 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal requested US\$ 208 million for activities specifically for Rwanda in 1995. Programmes included in the 1995 Appeal were designed to continue to meet the most critical emergency needs of vulnerable populations, while at the same time recognising the need to move beyond relief towards recovery. A main goal of UN Agencies in 1995 has been to assist the Government create conditions conducive for the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees and begin to restore normal life in the country.

Amongst some of the major achievements of humanitarian assistance in 1995 have been:

- * Prevention of serious food shortages and hunger;
- * Provision of seeds, tools and other agricultural inputs to displaced persons, returnees and needy farmers;
- * Rehabilitation of infrastructure and income-generation through food for work activities, including support for teachers and civil servants;
- * Rehabilitation of some 150 health centres;
- * Restoration of electricity and water supplies;
- * 1,500 primary schools opened;
- * Supply of Teachers Emergency Packages and school supplies for 720,000 children;
- * More than 2,000 social workers trained;
- * Elaboration with MINISANTE of a National Health Policy;
- * Support for the establishment of national epidemiological surveillance;
- * Supply of cold chains, vaccines and training of health personnel;

- * Provision of vehicles, equipment, office supplies and technical support for Government Ministries;
- * Provision of shelter;
- * Provision of transport for IDPs and refugees;
- * Enhancing the Government's emergency response capacity.

The 1995 Appeal was planned with the participation of the Government of Rwanda and also took into account a number of other major initiatives, including the Round Table Conference, initiated by the Government and facilitated by UNDP. Wherever possible, activities funded through contributions to the Consolidated Appeal have attempted to complement those of the longer-term rehabilitation and development goals.

Agencies whose activities are reflected in the 1995 Appeal are: UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, IOM, UNIFEM, UNV, UNHCHR, DHA/UNREO. Some activities implemented by cooperating international and national NGOs in the field of health care, assistance to displaced persons, shelter and capacity building were also included in the Appeal.

As of the end of May 1995, some 42.7% of the 1995 Appeal for Rwanda had been covered by contributions, pledges and carry-over funds. This includes some 72,518 metric tonnes of food aid out of a total request by WFP of 116,466 metric tonnes for Rwanda.



Office of the Spokesman

*Biographical Note***BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL**

Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations on 1 January 1992, when he began a five-year term. At the time of his appointment by the General Assembly on 3 December 1991, Mr. Boutros-Ghali had been Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt since May 1991 and had served as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from October 1977 until 1991.

The Secretary-General's priority has been to strengthen the United Nations Organization, to enable it to seize the opportunities offered by the post-cold-war era, and to realize the goals of the Charter and the objectives of peace, development and democracy.

On 31 January 1992, the Secretary-General, at the *first Security Council meeting ever held at the level of heads of State and government*, was invited to prepare an analysis and recommendations on ways to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for *preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. The Secretary-General added to these dimensions of peace a further concept, that of post-conflict peace-building. His report, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, was published on 17 June 1992.

An Agenda for Peace defines the role and functions of the United Nations in a new era which has seen the establishment of numerous peace-keeping operations and observer missions under the authority of the Security Council and the command of the Secretary-General. The report, which has been translated into at least 29 languages, has been the focus of wide-ranging discussions.

On 3 January 1995, the Secretary-General issued a supplement to An Agenda for Peace as a position paper. This paper highlights certain areas where unforeseen difficulties have arisen with regard to United Nations peace-keeping operations. The supplement reviews the lessons learned and offers guidelines for improving future operations.

Since the cold war ended, the United Nations has mounted more peace-keeping operations than in its previous 40 years, involving the deployment of some 70,000 troops, military observers and civilian police, in addition to civilian personnel. These operations include notably the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, the United Nations Observer Mission in *Salvador*, the United Nations Operation in *Mozambique*, the United Nations Operation in *Somalia*, the United Nations Protection Force in the republics of the *former Yugoslavia*, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in *Cambodia*.

The Secretary-General has also appointed a number of Special Envoys and Representatives to advise him on the creation of conditions for ending hostilities, defusing tensions or consolidating peace in various areas of the world. Peace-building activities, to provide the foundations for lasting peace, include measures to enhance confidence, to reform and strengthen democratic institutions,

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to integrate former combatants into civilian society, and to restore the fabric of war-torn societies so as to prevent a recurrence of conflict.

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Since his first year in office, the Secretary-General has worked towards a *reinvigorated and expanded vision of development*. A series of landmark conferences has been held, including the Summit on the Economic Advancement of *Rural Women*, held at Geneva in February 1992, the United Nations Conference on *Environment and Development*, held at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and the World Conference on *Human Rights*, held at Vienna in 1993. In May 1994, the World Conference on *Natural Disaster* Reduction was held in Yokohama. In September 1994, the International conference on *Population* and Development was held in Cairo, and the World Summit for *Social Development* was held in Copenhagen in March 1995. In September 1995, the Fourth World Conference on *Women* will be held in Beijing. The Second Conference on *Human Settlements*, "The City Summit", will take place in Istanbul in 1996. The Secretary-General sees this series of conferences as a continuum, offering unique opportunities to raise levels of awareness and to set norms and standards. *In these conferences and summits, Member States and non-governmental organizations, as well as concerned individuals, work together to create a global commitment to all aspects of development.* In this year, as the United Nations celebrates its fiftieth anniversary, global awareness of the crucial importance of development is an important aspect of the work of the Organization.

The Secretary-General's own vision of development was set out in May 1994 in a report to the General Assembly entitled *An Agenda for Development*. In his report, the Secretary-General addressed peace, the economy, the environment, society and democracy as the five foundations of development. The Secretary-General also examined the multiplicity of actors engaged in development work and outlined his vision of the role of the United Nations in development in an increasingly complex world. *Universal respect for and protection of human rights is an integral part of development*, he declared. Human rights, including group rights such as those of indigenous peoples, women, children and the disabled, are a focus of the Secretary-General's attention. In November 1994, in response to the request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General issued his recommendations for the implementation of *An Agenda for Development*.

The two agendas, peace and development, are inextricably linked. In February 1995, the Secretary-General published in companion volumes, as parallel texts, the revised *An Agenda for Peace* and *An Agenda for Development*.

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The Secretary-General has advocated a strong supporting role for the United Nations in the democratic transformation which has characterized the post-cold-war period. The United Nations has responded to the calls of some 40 nations for assistance in the organization and supervision of democratic elections. The presence of more than 2,100 observers in the South African elections in April 1994 made it the largest United Nations electoral assistance operation ever mounted. Recognizing that democracy is far more than the holding of free and fair elections, the United Nations has also developed various programmes to cooperate in the development of democratic

institutions, rule of law and popular participation. In addition, *the best support for democracy must lie in the democratization of international life*, which the Secretary-General has pursued throughout his term.

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The financial crisis, suffered by the Organization because assessed contributions for the regular budget and for peace-keeping are not paid on time and in full, threatens the effective operations of the Organization. The Secretary-General has commissioned a number of studies aimed at ensuring that the United Nations is an organization capable of meeting the challenges of the next 50 years.

The Secretary-General has undertaken a programme of restructuring and reform designed to reduce the number of high-level posts in the Secretariat, to decentralize decision-making and to reduce costs and managerial inefficiencies. However, the capacity of the United Nations to deal with vastly expanded operations has been a particular source of concern to the Secretary-General.

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Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has travelled to more than 50 countries to represent the United Nations and to offer his good offices to further the cause of peace. In December 1993, he was the first non-Korean to cross the DMZ from Seoul to Pyongyang.

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Honorary Degrees, Awards, Memberships

The Secretary-General's role in advancing the goals of peace, development and democracy has been recognized by many awards and honorary degrees.

He was awarded a doctorate of law *honoris causa* from the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (September 1992); a doctorate *honoris causa* from l'Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris (January 1993); the Christian A. Herter Memorial Award from the World Affairs Council, Boston (March 1993); a doctorate *honoris causa* from The Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium (April 1993); the "Man of Peace" award, sponsored by the Italian-based Together for Peace Foundation (July 1993); an honorary doctorate degree from the University of Laval, Quebec (August 1993); and the Arthur A. Houghton Jr. Star Crystal Award for Excellence from the African-American Institute, New York (November 1993).

In addition, he was given an honorary membership of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Moscow (April 1994); an honorary foreign membership of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (April 1994); an honorary foreign membership of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Minsk,

(April 1994); an honorary doctorate from the University of Carlos III of Madrid (April 1994); an honorary degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (May 1994); a doctorate in international law honoris causa from the University of Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada (August 1994); and honorary doctorates from the University of Bucharest (October 1994), University of Baku (October 1994), University of Yerevan (November 1994), University of Haifa (February 1995), University of Vienna (February 1995), and University of Melbourne (April 1995). He was made a Fellow of Berkeley College, Yale University (March 1995).

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His Early Career

Mr. Boutros-Ghali has had a long association with international affairs as a diplomat, jurist, scholar and widely published author.

He became a member of the Egyptian Parliament in 1987 and was part of the secretariat of the National Democratic Party from 1980. Until assuming the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations, he was also Vice-President of the Socialist International.

He was a member of the International Law Commission from 1979 until 1991, and is a former member of the International Commission of Jurists. He has many professional and academic associations related to his background in law, international affairs and political science, among them, his membership in the Institute of International Law, the International Institute of Human Rights, the African Society of Political Studies and the Academie des Sciences morales et politique (Academie Française, Paris).

Over four decades, Mr. Boutros-Ghali participated in numerous meetings dealing with international law, human rights, economic and social development, decolonization, the Middle East question, international humanitarian law, the rights of ethnic and other minorities, non-alignment, development in the Mediterranean region and Afro-Arab cooperation.

In September 1978, Mr. Boutros-Ghali attended the Camp David Summit Conference and had a role in negotiating the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, which were signed in 1979. He led many delegations of his country to meetings of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, as well as to the Summit Conference of the French and African Heads of State. He also headed Egypt's delegation to the General Assembly sessions in 1979, 1982 and 1990.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali received a Ph.D. in international law from Paris University in 1949. His thesis was on the study of regional organizations. Mr. Boutros-Ghali also holds a Bachelor of Laws degree, received from Cairo University in 1946, as well as separate diplomas in political science, economics and public law from Paris University.

Between 1949 and 1977, Mr. Boutros-Ghali was Professor of International Law and International Relations at Cairo University. From 1974 to 1977, he was a member of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the Arab Socialist Union.

Among his other professional and academic activities, Mr. Boutros-Ghali was a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University (1954-1955); Director of the Centre of Research of The Hague Academy of International Law (1963-1964); and Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law, Paris University (1967-1968). He has lectured on international law and international relations at universities in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali was President of the Egyptian Society of International Law from 1965; President of the Centre of Political and Strategic Studies (Al-Ahram) from 1975; member of the Curatorium Administrative Council of The Hague Academy of International Law from 1978; member of the Scientific Committee of the Academie Mondiale pour la Paix (Menton, France) from 1978; and associate member of the Institute Affari Internazionali (Rome) from 1979. He served as a member of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organization from 1971 until 1979. Mr. Boutros-Ghali also founded the publication Alahram Iqtisadi, which he edited from 1960 to 1975, and the quarterly Al-Seyassa Al-Dawlia, which he edited until December 1991.

The more than 100 publications and numerous articles that Mr. Boutros-Ghali has written deal with regional and international affairs, law and diplomacy, and political science.

During the course of his career, Mr. Boutros-Ghali has received awards and honours from 24 countries, which, besides Egypt, include Belgium, Italy, Colombia, Guatemala, France, Ecuador, Argentina, Nepal, Luxembourg, Portugal, Niger, Mali, Mexico, Greece, Chile, Brunei Darussalam, Germany, Peru, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Central African Republic, Sweden and the Republic of Korea. He has also been decorated with the Sovereign Military Order of Malta.

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Mr. Boutros-Ghali was born in Cairo on 14 November 1922. He is married to Leia Maria Boutros-Ghali.
