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'94 MAY -8 20:20

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CZN-659

CZG-341

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 8 MAY 1994

NUMBER: Z-710



SUBJECT: HCA'S MEETINGS WITH PM SILAJDZIC AND DR. KARADZIC
ON 7 MAY IN VIENNA AND PALE RESPECTIVELY, AND WITH
PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC ON 8 MAY IN SARAJEVO

.... Please find attached a report on the meetings Sergio Vieira de Mello had,
on my behalf, with the above officials on Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 May 1994.

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UNPROFOR Unit
Palais des Nations

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC

1. Mr. Silajdzic and I met for over two hours in Vienna on 7 May. Silajdzic plans to remain there for "two or three days" for negotiations with Minister Granic of Croatia and Mr. Zubak, representing the Bosnian Croats, on: (i) the cantonal boundaries ; (ii) the incumbency of the posts of President and Co-President of the Federation; (iii) the composition of the new central Government.

2. At the outset, Silajdzic expressed disappointment at the results of the Contact Group visit. He said they lacked a clear plan, time-table and ideas on how to ensure compliance by Bosnian Serb side with an eventual political agreement. The level of the group was "too junior". No wonder, he said, President Milosevic did not make himself available in Belgrade. Silajdzic was, as a result, rather discouraged as regards the likelihood of political negotiations or even talks about a general cessation of hostilities resuming in the near future. Towards the end of our meeting he reverted to this topic and said that "the international community should impose a strict time-frame on all parties".

Transit of Tanks through TEZ

3. I briefed Silajdzic on the circumstances that led to the understanding on the transit of a small number of tanks from the Gorazde area through the TEZ, the BSA's non-compliance therewith and the cancellation of the transit of the last two tanks. I handed a letter addressed by Mr. Akashi to Silajdzic, which he read and kept. His position, however, remained very critical throughout the painful discussion we had on this subject. I impressed upon him that there was a fundamental difference of perception between his Government and UNPROFOR on the question of the use of air power. He agreed but dwelled upon other differences which were more fundamental and more damaging. It should be noted that Silajdzic claimed to have received a detailed account of the meeting held in Pale on 3 May and even quoted statements allegedly made by some participants.

"Our intelligence, he said, is one of the few left-overs from the communist era we are proud of."

Gorazde

- 4. The attached Note on interim arrangements in and around Gorazde was delivered to and reviewed in detail with Silajdzic. It was explained to him that the set of proposals contained therein was the only formula which, in our view, would resolve an impasse which was making progress on the wider issues impossible.
5. After some discussion he agreed to all our proposals (including the non-deployment of BH forces in the area between the 23-24 April cease-fire line and the edge of the 3-kms zone on the right bank, which, however, he would have to discuss by telephone with his military commanders), except the one concerning the no-return, for the time being, of displaced persons to the Zupcici/Krsnica strip of land in the southern part of the right bank. I promised to check with Dr. Karadzic whether he would be prepared to display flexibility on this question and allow Muslim DPs to return, but expressed my skepticism. Silajdzic insisted that the 3-kms zone around Gorazde was a minimalist test of the Serb good faith in the implementation of agreements and ultimatums and that it was unfair to expect concessions from the "victim of only the latest in a long series of aggressions".
6. On the 20-kms heavy weapons (HW) exclusion zone, Silajdzic claimed there were still some in hiding. He mentioned, in particular, the locality of Jabucko Selo where, he said, several HWs were "masked". I promised we would immediately investigate and a team is visiting the location today.
7. On the question of Serb prisoners of war and, in particular, of the twelve (out of twenty two) missing in Gorazde, Silajdzic admitted that this would be one of the most difficult problems to resolve. He had been informed that they had died during the heavy shelling of Gorazde. Having visited the remaining ten while in Gorazde, I expressed my disbelief of that version and insisted that early light be

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shed on their fate. Transparency and, perhaps, the release - as a gesture of goodwill - of the remaining group with a proposal for the reopening of talks, under ICRC auspices, on the issue of prisoners and the missing as a whole, might be the only way of preventing revenge. Silajdzic replied that he had requested the local authorities to produce the remains of the twelve and agreed that the early resolution of the problem of the missing was essential. He said that if the Serbs provided information on the 180 missing from Hadzici, this would unblock the entire process. He was reminded that the ICRC had, several weeks ago, made concrete suggestions both to Silajdzic and to the Bosnian Serb side on how to tackle this sensitive issue. On Saturday night, I again raised this question with Dr. Karadzic who took the well-known line: the problem of the missing can only be solved after a peace agreement; his army had no knowledge of the fate of the 180 missing from Hadzici; negotiation on the release of prisoners can begin immediately. Today it was agreed with President Izetbegovic and Minister Muratovic that UNPROFOR would attempt to organize a visit to Gorazde by the latter (other such attempts were made in the past) and other BH Government officials to try and address on the spot this highly controversial issue.

8. On the future of fearful Serb civilians still residing in Gorazde (estimated at some 200-300), many of whom live in cellars of houses on the right bank, Silajdzic expressed regret and said he was doing his best to improve their security. I informed him of measures Civil Affairs and UNCIVPOL, together with UNHCR and ICRC, had taken since their arrival in Gorazde to provide them with medical and other types of assistance as well as with a modicum of confidence. Silajdzic did admit, however, that it would be difficult for him to persuade his local leaders to let them go to Serb-held areas. "Gorazde has reverted to the stone-age, he said. There is no sense of humanity left".

Brcko

9. Silajdzic was briefed on the outcome of our negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs on 5 May (our Z-689) and commented with relief that the agreed deployment

of UNMOs was an indication that the BSA was not planning to launch an offensive in that area. When informed of the BSA proposal for a meeting between the two corps commanders with a view to concluding a local cease-fire, Silajdzic took note of the agenda put forward by the BSA, promised to discuss it with General Delic but was not certain that such cease-fire talks were desirable until Gorazde was satisfactorily resolved. Both Silajdzic and, today, Izetbegovic raised the passage of troops and military equipment through the Brcko corridor. They were told that this could be seriously addressed only in negotiations leading to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities.

Bihac

10. I informed Silajdzic that a letter would follow proposing the deployment of UNCIVPOL in Bihac. Recurrent reports of human rights violations were reaching UNPROFOR and Mr. Abdic had agreed to the presence of Civpol monitors in the area under his control. Silajdzic stated that the Bihac authorities did not trust UNPROFOR because of the assistance it had provided to Abdic, but did not object to UNCIVPOL deployment in the area under central Government control.

Cessation of Hostilities

11. While discussing Gorazde and Brcko, I insisted on the need to move swiftly to the wider agenda, first and foremost to an agreement on a general cessation of hostilities, which should include a pause in the movement of troops, military equipment and supplies.

12. Silajdzic commented that, in addition to the above, cessation of hostilities should also mean the discontinuation of external military aid - he referred to the need for UNPROFOR to establish a monitoring presence at the main crossing points with Serbia and Montenegro -, of hostile propaganda as well as of "preparations for war". Any such arrangements, he said, should be "guaranteed by the Security Council with a mandate to NATO to ensure compliance by all sides".

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13. We agreed to remain in telephone contact during Silajdzic's stay in Vienna.

MEETING WITH DR. KARADZIC

14. In the evening of 7 May, I met with Dr. Karadzic, Prof. Koljevic and the former's Private Secretary and Spokesman Zametica.

Transit of Tanks and HWs in the 20-kms TEZ

15. Karadzic readily agreed, following Mr. Akashi's telephone calls, that a further transit of tanks was out of the question (he spoke of "suspension" while I called it "cancellation") as a result of the non-observance by the BSA of the terms of the understanding. I told him that this matter had caused great embarrassment to UNPROFOR and to Mr. Akashi, which he acknowledged.

16. On heavy weapons, he complained that the international community had imposed a prohibition on movements of BSA HWs over large areas of "his country", while the "Muslims could do what they liked". He stated that should the US Congress decide to unilaterally lift the arms embargo - in violation of Security Council decisions -, the Bosnian Serbs "would themselves ignore all Security Council resolutions, starting with the one declaring a no-fly zone". Following that rethorical outburst, he went on to say that it was essential that his military strictly obey his instructions and remove all remaining HWs or place them under UNPROFOR control. On weapons in Grbavica, to which I called his attention, Karadzic said that he had understood that regrouping sites could cover an area of up to 1.5 x 1.5 km. I replied that if that was acceptable in the early stages and in open and uninhabited areas, this was certainly not admissible in urban areas close to the centre of Sarajevo. He requested that we submit an up-to-date list of such weapons which we did today. He said he would use it at the meeting he would have today with the BSA "Supreme Command".

17. He referred several times to the importance of the "Supreme Command"

gathering on 8 May. The main objective, he said, was to ensure the complete loyalty of the armed forces, their unrestricted obedience and timely execution of orders ("I want to avoid bureaucracy and unnecessary delays in future."). The military must understand "how we intend to move to peace even if the Muslims do not want it". There was perceptible irritation in some of his and Koljevic's comments about the behaviour of some military commanders in the recent past. Both confided that the meeting could be "difficult".

Brcko

18. Karadzic was very satisfied with the arrival of our first UNMO team Saturday 7 and with the expected arrival of the second today, totalling 16 observers. He and Koljevic were grateful for our visit to Brcko on 5 May which helped "overcome the incredulity of their military at UNPROFOR's genuine desire to prevent conflict in that area". Karadzic requested, for internal consumption purposes, that Russia be adequately represented and I replied that all observers were, by definition, impartial and that the composition of teams in Brcko would obey normal criteria and procedures. I said, however, that two or three monitors out of 16 would be Russians.

19. Karadzic stated that Gen. Mladic had told him that the first UNMO group had brought with it "Forward Air Control" communication equipment aimed at directing NATO aircraft in close air support missions. I expressed strong doubts but said I would check (which indeed I did -- the allegation is, of course, false and we shall so inform Karadzic).

Gorazde

.... 20. The attached note served as a basis for our discussion. In summary:

- (i) on the withdrawal of BSA forces and militia, he agreed to convince his military and militia commanders that all armed and uniformed men had

to withdraw to the external edge of the 3-kms zone (he was told that, according to our information, there were between 200 and 250 militiamen within the south-eastern part of that zone). UNPROFOR, however, would carry the heavy responsibility of ensuring security in that area. I replied that our effectiveness would entirely depend on the full cooperation from both sides.

(ii) on the return of Muslim DPs to the Zupcici/Krsnica villages, he dismissed that possibility. Serbs forcibly displaced in 1992 from Gorazde and its surrounding areas had now settled in those villages and the arrival of Muslim DPs would inevitably lead to bloodshed. He and Koljevic suggested that the problem of displaced persons be addressed in a comprehensive manner and in the context of peace negotiations. "If Muslims go back to Zupcici, then Serbs should be allowed to return to the left bank".

(iii) on heavy weapons in the 20-kms exclusion zone, I informed him of continued allegations of hidden BSA HWs in the zone and requested that our teams be given freedom to investigate - as agreed near Gorazde with Koljevic and General Gvero on 26 April - in the Serbs' own interest. I noted that such freedom was suffering the usual restrictions around Sarajevo, which certainly did not increase the credibility of our reports in the eyes of "other protagonists". He again promised to raise this with his "Supreme Command".

17 March Agreement on routes in and out of Sarajevo

21. At my request, Karadzic agreed that an early meeting be held between Mr. Krajisnik and Minister Muratovic to evaluate the implementation of the 17 March Agreement. He expressed satisfaction at the arrangements and heavy traffic on the Lukavica-Ilidza road but agreed there was room for improvement on other routes, especially the Sarajevo-Visoko-Zenica corridor.

22. On Sunday, Muratovic welcomed such a meeting at the earliest opportunity. He also indicated that the BH Government would be prepared to offer to the Serbs the shared use of the road and railway from Ploce to Mostar - Jablanica - Hadzici/Ilidza - Sarajevo/Zenica and to discuss the possible use by the Serbs of the railway from Zvornik to Tuzla, Doboj and Banja Luka.

23. It may also be interesting to note that during this discussion, Karadzic indicated on the map his present thinking on what Sarajevo should look like in future: the present inner city would remain "Muslim", would be linked by a wide corridor to central Bosnia (including possibly Ilijas and the western part of Vogosca), with the "Serbs" creating "their Sarajevo" from Ilidza to Lukavica, including the airport, which would be urbanised, and Butmir (new airports could be built in Visoko and Sokolac). "Two cities, side by side, communicating and cooperating", he said.

Muslim Pilgrims

24. Following Mr. Akashi's telephone calls, Karadzic confirmed that he would issue instructions to his military commanders to ensure the safety of Saudi Arabian aircraft offered by King Fahd for the transportation of Bosnian Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. A request for UNPROFOR's assistance in facilitating this pilgrimage was received some time ago from the BH Presidency. Karadzic also suggested that pilgrims coming from central Bosnia travel to Sarajevo Airport via the Visoko-Sarajevo corridor. He requested, however, that advance notice of the day and time of such flights be provided to him personally, which I agreed to do.

Première Urgence

25. At the end of the meeting and recalling the episode involving, in January 1994, a convoy of Scouts from Cluses (France) and the advice I had then provided on how to de-escalate the incident, I raised - on a strictly personal basis - the problem of the Première Urgence NGO team presently detained, together with its

convoy, under the accusation of transporting military supplies for the "Muslims".

26. I strongly recommended that they be released and that their trial continue in absentia. Taking them to public trial would be extremely damaging to the Serb image. Without prejudging either their innocence or guilt, it appeared to me that it would be in the interest of all parties to set them free. Karadzic said he was contemplating to pardon them after their trial but agreed to reflect on my suggestion. He said, however, he would have to consult with his judiciary authorities and establish whether such a release prior to their trial was legally possible. Koljevic, with whom Col. Duburg and myself had spoken in private at Brcko, was very supportive.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC

27. On Sunday 8 May, I met in Sarajevo with President Izetbegovic who was accompanied by his Adviser Skalijs. After listening carefully to my briefing on the questions of the transit of tanks, the alleged presence of HWs in the Sarajevo and Gorazde 20-kms exclusion zone and the action we had taken or were taking on each of these problems, Izetbegovic made a long, calm but extremely critical and bitter statement on the decision to allow the transit of tanks

28. I repeated to him the explanations given the previous day to Silajdzic. They did not seem to soften his position. At the end of this most unpleasant exchange, he regretted having had to convey that position as strongly as he did and assured me that his harsh comments were in no way addressed at UNPROFOR and did not question its impartiality, which he had always recognized and praised.

Gorazde

29. Unfortunately, Izetbegovic confirmed in no uncertain terms Silajdzic's reservations concerning even temporary restrictions to the return of DPs to the Zupcici strip of land. In addition to the total withdrawal of Serb forces, "all DPs -

including Serbs - should be allowed to return to their homes". Acting otherwise within the 3-kms zone would be "an injustice, ethnic cleansing under UN protection". I replied that we were not in any way suggesting a permanent arrangement but simply an interim formula whereby UNPROFOR would enforce security in a small area that was clearly the potential source of renewed military confrontation. This, we hoped, would make it possible to move forward to negotiations on a general cessation of hostilities. Our proposals, therefore, did not prejudice the final status either of that or any other territory or of the civilian population in or from that or any other area in BH.

30. Izetbegovic, however, remained inflexible on this issue, which is not surprising given the general context in which this discussion took place. We seem, therefore, to be facing an impasse in Gorazde and I propose to consult again with Silajdzic by telephone on a possible way out.

Muslim Pilgrims

31. Izetbegovic was grateful for our efforts to enable hundreds of pilgrims to visit Mecca for the first time in three years.

32. At the end of our meeting, I requested Izetbegovic to exercise moderation in his comments to the press - which, as usual, was avidly awaiting us - regarding the affair of the transit of tanks. He obliged.

ENDALL.

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**NOTE ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS
IN AND AROUND GORAZDE**

4 May 1994

1. Nothing in the proposals below prejudices in any way the final status of affected territories or displaced persons, which will be determined through political negotiations.
2. As soon as its deployment on the ground permits, UNPROFOR will establish an observation and monitoring presence along the present confrontation line around the entire Gorazde enclave, with a view to preventing the resumption of hostilities. In particular, UNPROFOR will ensure that:
 - (a) all Bosnian Serb forces respect the 3 kms radius exclusion area around the centre of Gorazde town (centre of the main bridge);
 - (b) all Bosnian Serb heavy weapons remain outside the 20 kms radius zone from the centre of Gorazde (but inside the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina);
 - (c) all B-H Government heavy weapons are placed under UNPROFOR control (res. 913);
 - (d) both sides refrain from undertaking any offensive military action.
3. As regards the 3 kms area:
 - (a) the Bosnian Serb side will pull back all its forces - including militia - therefrom;
 - (b) both sides agree, as an interim measure, that UNPROFOR military units and civilian police will be solely responsible for security in the area of the right bank of the Drina river lying between the 23 April cease-fire line and the edge of the 3 kms zone. Any offenses committed within that area will be reported to both sides. When necessary and possible, offenders will be transferred to the appropriate authorities;
 - (c) both sides agree not to challenge UNPROFOR in the performance of the temporary tasks outlined in paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) and 3 (b) above. In particular, they shall refrain from any armed infiltration or from transferring civilians to the area defined in paragraph 3 (b) above, until agreement has been reached on its final status.
4. As soon as the provisions listed above have been implemented, the two sides will enter into negotiations, with UNPROFOR assistance, with a view to concluding an early and comprehensive cessation of hostilities as well as a pause of the movement of troops and of military supplies and equipment, the duration of which would be of no less than three months. During that period, efforts will be intensified towards achieving an overall political settlement agreed by all parties.

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 7 MAY 1994

NUMBER: Z-707

SUBJECT: LETTER TO DR. HARIS SILAJDZIC

Please find the attached letter to Dr. Haris Silajdzic,
Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Regards.

Y. Akashi

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Special Representative of
the Secretary-General

6 May 1994

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to our meeting of 3 May 1994 and to a number of matters which were discussed at that meeting. Over the last few days, I have focused attention on two areas: compliance with existing agreements; and improving UNPROFOR presence in sensitive areas. To accelerate progress in the field, I decided to involve the Head of Civil Affairs of UNPROFOR and thus sent him to both Goradze and Breko on important missions. In addition, NATO civilian and military leaders have visited UNPROFOR Headquarters and BH Command in Sarajevo for discussions concerning UNPROFOR/NATO cooperation and coordination.

I am pleased to inform you that UNPROFOR is now deploying a significant number of military observers in the Posavina 'corridor'.

With regard to Goradze, in my meeting with Dr. Karadzic on 3 May 1994, I stressed the importance of full compliance with his undertakings at our Belgrade meetings. With the completion yesterday of the deployment of UNPROFOR military units, we are in a position to continue stabilizing the situation there and providing humanitarian assistance to the population. It is essential that the 20-kilometre exclusion zone around Goradze be kept free of heavy weapons.


Also at that meeting, Dr. Karadzic referred to the Sarajevo exclusion zone and requested that seven tanks be permitted to pass through that zone in transit from the Goradze area because there were no alternate routes. I entertained that request in the context of facilitating early and final removal of heavy weapons from the Goradze area. In consultation with the Force Commander, I decided to agree to the request for the transit of seven tanks through the zone over a two-day period on condition that: there

His Excellency
Dr. Haris Silajdzic
Prime Minister
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sarajevo

must be prior notification of any attempt by such tanks to enter the zone; that such notification be followed by coordination with UNPROFOR with regard to routing; that such tanks would be disabled throughout their transit through the zone so as to pose no threat whatever; and that transit through the zone would be conducted with full UNPROFOR escort and under UNPROFOR control.

Subsequently, five Bosnian Serb Army tanks were moved into the zone for purposes of transit but without prior notification. While UNPROFOR was able to place these tanks under its full control as soon as it became aware of their existence in the zone, I consider that the failure to notify UNPROFOR as per our agreement to be a serious breach thereof and have accordingly informed Dr. Karadzic that it will no longer be possible to allow transit by Bosnian Serb tanks through the Sarajevo exclusion zone.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Yasushi Akashi
Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

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'94 MAY -6 18:01

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TO: MR STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

Y. Akashi

DATE: 6 MAY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-701

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC

Please find attached for your information a copy of a letter sent today to Prime Minister Silajdzic.

Regards.

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Special Representative of
the Secretary-General

6 May 1994

Dear Excellency,

I have the honour to send to you, the attached letter from General Bo Pellnäs addressed to you. You will find that General Pellnäs states clearly that he has never been to Gornj Vakuf, contrary to the information at the disposal of your excellency which you were good enough to share with me during our meeting of 3 May 1994.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Yasushi Akashi'.

Yasushi Akashi

His Excellency
Dr. Haris Silajdžić
Prime Minister
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sarajevo

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SSN-856

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

BrigGen Bo Pellnäs

Geneva 5 May 1994

Dear Mr Silajdzic,

In a conversation with Mr Akashi on 3 May you have expressed concern about my "operations in Gornj Vakuf" and you asked on whose behalf I was there.

Please let me assure you that I have never been to Gornj Vakuf!

As you may be well aware, I have on behalf of the International Conference assisted the European Union with their preparations to administer Mostar. For the Conference I negotiated in December last year and in January in Mostar, in Medjugorje as well as in Geneva, trying to reach an agreement on the delineation of the administrative area

On 15-16 March I also assisted EU in their talks with your representatives and the Croats in Brussels. Because of this I was asked to assist the German Ambassador Metscher, when he started up his work with the EU advanced party in Mostar. I subsequently spent two days in Mostar and participated in his meetings with your local representatives and with Mr Zubak.

All this, however, is well known to you, and I left Mostar already on 21 April. I therefore fail to explain the rumours about my being in Gornj Vakuf.

Warmest regards

Bo Pellnäs

Bo Pellnäs

The Prime Minister of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mr Haris Silajdzic

Copy to
Mr Akashi UNPROFOR
Mr Stoltenberg, ICFY

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UNUC Telegram Unit

Balkan Operations

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -1740Z
GAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
DE LA PRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 5 May 1994

MOST IMMEDIATE

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-687

CODED CABLE

SUBJECT: The Impact of Air Strikes and CAS on the Bosnian Serbs

The following analysis has been prepared by the Analysis and Assessment Unit:

1. The relation between CAS and air strikes:

There is a sharp difference between the perception of Bosnian Serb leaders (both political and military) and the population in general toward air strikes. It seems fairly clear that the leaders know well the difference between CAS and air strikes, but it is politically very useful--particularly with their own public--to talk about all "NATO attacks" in the same breath. In the collective psyche of the Bosnian Serbs, however, there is no distinction. Their collective perception as a people--and in this they are joined by Serbs in all regions--is to see all use of air power by NATO as unjust and to react with great anger and defiance.

They do make a distinction between UNPROFOR, which they see as more friendly, and NATO. Due also to the heritage of the Yugoslav People's Army, which was constructed around NATO as the enemy, NATO is perceived as more of an inherent threat. Therefore, they perceive NATO air strikes as a kind of declaration of war against them. This does not mean, of course, that they will not retaliate against UNPROFOR in case of NATO strikes: quite the contrary.

2. The collective psyche of Bosnian Serb attitudes toward air strikes:

(1) The basic attitude of the population toward the issue is **emotional** rather than rational; this has a direct impact on the leadership as well.

This approach is shaped by a strong and commonly felt sense of security in their position and in their political and territorial gains. They feel the victors, and their self-confidence is as strong as ever. They have territory, they feel they can effectively defend it, and they attach much importance to the process of building their own independent state (emphasizing the symbolic and practical value of having a parliament, a government, and especially a strong army).

The common perception among Serbs is that they have

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agreed to the greatest number of concessions throughout the negotiating process in the last year. Therefore, they perceive the fact that UNPROFOR-NATO has singled them out as **deeply unjust**. This strengthens their sense of self-righteousness, and their **spirit of resistance**.

(2) Their basic attitude is **defiance**, or at least scepticism, toward the strategic, global (not tactical) effectiveness of such measures against them.

After seeing what they perceive as the relatively low effectiveness of previous air strikes on the ground, seeing the reaction of several eastern European countries, especially Russia, and knowing the overall constraints on any outside intervention posed by the nature of Bosnia's terrain, they do not fear air power.

They believe that the fate of any eventual outside intervention will be ultimately decided on the ground, and that high technology cannot play a decisive role. They see themselves as being at least equal, if not superior, to any foreign contingent that may get involved in the fighting.

3. The possible reaction of further use of air power against the BSA:

The emotional reaction of anger and injustice, extending into most families (from taxi driver to intellectual) even in Serbia, will most likely influence the behavior of individuals.

What is generally said by individuals is that they would "go after" any international presence in their area. Seeing it as war, and in full support of the BSA and their military leadership, they would feel justified in retribution.

Military leaders would most likely choose a target and do all that was necessary to take it, most likely Tuzla and Doboj, because this would solve their problem of routes and securing the northern territories.

If the war escalated, then Serbs in the "RSK" and Serbia would have to decide how to execute their agreements that if one Serb is attacked, all are. Volunteers would flow in, but the Yugoslav army would be hard pressed to mobilize. At the same time, this escalation could draw in outsiders, such as Russian volunteers (with pressure on the Russian government), and the support of Romania, Greece, and others.

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Ref 1/12

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

J. Akashi

DATE: 5 MAY 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-671

SUBJECT: REPORT ON MEETINGS OF 3 MAY 1994

CODED CABLE

1. Please find attached the summary of my meetings yesterday with the Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and with Dr. Karadzic of the Serb side. As you see many issues on the current agenda have been discussed.

2. In particular we are making further efforts on the Gorazde police situation. We have today resolved the Bosnian pilgrim issue with Dr. Karadzic. Furthermore, we have reached an agreement with the latter on the dispatch of a small UNPROFOR civilian/military team to Brcko tomorrow.

3. Regards,

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NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING BETWEEN THE SRSG, MR AKASHI AND PRIME MINISTER SILAJDZIC, SARAJEVO, 3 MAY 1994.

1. Mr Akashi opened the meeting by briefing the Prime Minister on the situation in Gorazde. He noted that the crisis in Gorazde was almost over and thanked the Bosnian side for the forbearance they had shown in not responding to provocations by the BSA in the area. He said that he intended to raise the outstanding unresolved issues with the Serb side that afternoon, particularly those concerning the presence of Serb policemen in the pocket, freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and other elements and the total withdrawal of the BSA from the 3 kilometre zone. UNPROFOR proposed to ensure that any Serb police in the pocket were legitimate policemen, would only carry side arms, work under the supervision of UNCIVPOL and would only total some 15 in number.

2. With regard to issues involving the BiH side, there was a need to address the following questions:- the placing of the Armija's heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control as a step towards normalization of life in the pocket, regulation of procedures to address ownership property claims by Bosnians and Serbs and the resolution of the difficult and emotional issue of POWs.

3. Turning to Sarajevo, Mr Akashi expressed his concern over the discovery of BSA heavy weapons in the total exclusion zone not under UNPROFOR control. He said that UNPROFOR intended to insist on the withdrawal or placing under its control of these weapons and also noted that there were seven BiH Armija weapons also in contravention of the Sarajevo agreement. He requested the Bosnians' cooperation in ensuring that these weapons were put under UNPROFOR control.

4. On the situation in Brcko, Mr Akashi informed Mr Silajdzic that UNPROFOR would be deploying UNMO's and increasing its observation posts in the area in order to monitor troop movements and, hopefully, calm down the situation. However, the overriding question that needed to be addressed was where to go from

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here. UNPROFOR believed that the time had come to examine medium-term steps to resolve the conflict in BH and was ready to discuss any proposals for a cessation of hostilities, fully aware that the fundamental problem would have to be resolved through diplomatic and political means.

5. Prime Minister Silajdzic thanked Mr Akashi for his assessment of the situation but said that he had hoped that the situation in Gorazde would have been resolved by this time. The lack of a solution to the crisis made it difficult for the Bosnian side to discuss any other issues at this juncture. The Bosnian Serbs had, once again, he believed, succeeded in imposing their views on the international community at a time when there were only two choices:- peace or war. Unfortunately, negotiations had been blocked by a loss of credibility of the United Nations due to its inability to enforce even one ultimatum on the BSA. Stating that if the BSA were appeased now there would be problems in all other areas, Mr Silajdzic said that while the Bosnian side wanted a rule of law, the BSA sought a rule by force. Consequently, it was difficult for the BiH "to deliver", to tell their people to disarm if the BSA did not meet their part of the bargain.

6. On the specific issues in Gorazde, Mr Silajdzic said that although the BiH desired peace, they could not "make it" if the 150 Serb police were not removed from Gorazde. Maintaining that "little inconsistencies have always been our downfall" and that they represented "small holes in the credibility of the international community", he said that the Serb police should be withdrawn in the next two days if the BiH side was to continue negotiations. The Bosnian side would not accept any other solution, including the UNPROFOR proposal, and would not talk until their withdrawal was complete. On this, Mr Silajdzic was adamant, despite all attempts by Mr Akashi to arrive at a temporary compromise solution that would also address the Serb civilian fears of reprisals by the Armija in Gorazde.

7. Addressing the issue of the settlement of Serbs in Gorazde, Mr Silajdzic said that this was a deliberate ploy by the BSA

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intended to influence future negotiations on the area, during which they would claim that because Serbs had always lived there, they were entitled to a 50/50 territorial settlement. These "petty small obstacles to the peace process" would not work as locals were well aware of who had lived in the area before the war began. To illustrate his point, he referred to one village in which two Serbs had lived, one of whom remained - an old woman - who the Bosnians had no reason to take reprisals against as they did "not kill old women like they [the BSA] do".

8. Continuing, Mr Silajdzic said that once the situation in Gorazde had been resolved, the next step could be to agree on a three month cessation of hostilities during which time negotiations could take place. He also proposed that the Security Council pass a resolution creating an exclusion zone around the length of the confrontation line in BH in order to prevent aggression, and expressed support for the French proposal to make Brcko a safe area. In relation to the latter, he further recommended that UNPROFOR secure the Konjic/Mostar line, stating that if these two things were done, the outbreak of major hostilities could be prevented in the future.

9. Responding to the comments of Mr Akashi on the situation in Sarajevo, Mr Silajdzic said that the BSA had enough time to comply with their obligations and that the lack of punitive measures had only encouraged them to disrespect the Sarajevo agreement. He acknowledged that the Bosnian side had some weapons outside of UNPROFOR control but stated that this was only to be expected if there was a lack of respect for agreements by the other side. He said that it was difficult to maintain credibility if women, watching television, saw Serb tanks being taken out of garages and stressed the need to ensure the credibility of both UNPROFOR and the Government in the coming months.

10. On the question of POWs, Mr Silajdzic said that this would be one of the most difficult issues to resolve and he did not believe that conditions were conducive for discussions at this juncture. He further believed that only time could solve the

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issue but, in the meantime, every effort should be made to ensure that POWs were kept alive. Unfortunately, he suspected that many of the missing were already dead and asked rhetorically "how do you tell people that?".

11. On general issues, Mr Silajdzic expressed concern at the lack of knowledge of the activities of General Pellnas in Gornj Vakuf and asked under whose authority he was operating in the area. Mr Akashi assured the Prime Minister that he would transmit the Bosnian government's concerns to Mr Stoltenberg in Geneva and ensure that all future activities of General Pellnas would be coordinated with UNPROFOR. Mr Akashi further assured the Prime Minister that UNPROFOR would do all possible to ensure the facilitation of the travel of 500 Bosnian Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.

12. Responding to Mr Silajdzic's proposal for an exclusion zone around the whole length of the confrontation line, General de Lapresle said that while the idea was feasible, there would be a need to define how such a zone would be monitored and the resources required for such a task. He believed, however, that the transformation of the whole confrontation line into a buffer zone would be unrealistic. On the issue of the lack of firmness on the part of UNPROFOR in responding to the BSA, the General noted that the Nordic battalion in Tuzla had responded in a very firm manner to a recent BSA incident as had the British battalion in Gorazde.

13. Mr Silajdzic acknowledged and expressed appreciation for the firmness demonstrated by UNPROFOR in the incidents referred to but said that, on the whole, the local population did not see UNPROFOR as being neutral and could not distinguish the finer points of peacekeeping operations, for example the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking or the rules of engagement. Thus resolving the "final missing touch" on the Gorazde situation became all the more important.

14. At this point, Prime Minister Silajdzic was called out of the meeting. He expressed his regrets at being unable to

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continue discussions and proposed meeting later in the day. Due to unavoidable commitments in Zagreb, Mr Akashi could not remain in Sarajevo. It was agreed that the two would get together at a later date.

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NOTE FOR THE FILE

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MEETING BETWEEN THE SRSG, MR AKASHI AND DR KARADZIC, PALE, 3 MAY 1994

1. Opening the meeting, Dr Karadzic said that President Izetbegovic was currently out of Sarajevo preparing for the Bosnian offensive on Brcko. He welcomed the presence of Mr Akashi and noted the importance of continued dialogue between UNPROFOR and the BSA.

2. Mr Akashi concurred with the necessity to continue dialogue and to take preventive rather than responsive action to crises. He said that he intended to address a number of concerns with the Bosnian Serb side, including the issues of Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Brcko and a general cessation of hostilities. On the issue of Gorazde, he raised the question of the presence of Serb police in the pocket and indicated that, at the moment, the best solution to the problem would be to bring the local professional police of both sides under the control of UNPROFOR. The Serb police, who would number 15, would be supervised by UNCIVPOL and operate in primarily Serb areas of Gorazde. UNPROFOR would also do all possible to ensure the safety of all civilians in the pocket. Other outstanding issues in Gorazde were the current blocking of the British company at Rogatica and the discovery of some BSA heavy weapons in the exclusion zone. Mr Akashi also noted that UNPROFOR had, under the terms of SCR 913, requested the BiH to put its heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control.

3. Dr Karadzic noted that the heavy weapons had been removed from the area the previous day and that the delay in their withdrawal had been due to the fact that they had been damaged. Continuing, he said that it was in the interest of the BSA to calm the situation in Gorazde and, as a result, they had complied with the Gorazde agreement. However, he wished to make it clear that had it not been in their interest, they would not have complied, regardless of the NATO ultimatum. In this regard, they could not agree to any move to make Brcko a safe area, based on the fact that it was historically a Serb area.

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4. On the specific issues raised on Gorazde, Dr Karadzic said that after the London Conference and the resultant BSA withdrawal from Gorazde, many Serbs in the area had been killed. The international community's failure to treat both sides equally, particularly in regard to disarming of both sides, threatened to unravel the Gorazde agreement as it was impossible for the BSA to demobilize and leave its people unprotected from BiH aggression. In addition, Gorazde could not be considered a safe area under international law as there was no agreement between the military commanders making it so. There was a need, therefore, to ensure that a military agreement was signed which ~~Kilometre zone. Thus, the situation of both sides within the three~~ should be genuine policemen and their activities coordinated by UNCIVPOL, if even one Serb civilian were killed in Gorazde, the people would lose trust in the authorities, making it difficult to conclude future agreements. In any event, there would need to be equal treatment of Serb and Muslim policemen in the pocket.

5. On the issue of the British company detained at Rogatica, Dr Karadzic said that the company was found to be in possession of excessive and suspicious equipment. They had 26,000 more bullets than notified and every soldier appeared to have a video camera and other electronic equipment. Stating that "Muslims have rifles, British have bullets and Serbs are going to be killed", Dr Karadzic, supported by General Milovanovic, finally agreed that if the 7.26 calibre ammunition present in the convoy was returned to Sarajevo, the British company would be able to proceed to Gorazde. It was also agreed, on the suggestion of the Force Commander, that 10 UNPROFOR liaison officers would be stationed at BSA HQ in the area in order to avoid such incidents in the future. A list of the names of the officers was given to General Milovanovic.

6. Turning to the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Gorazde exclusion zone, Dr Karadzic requested that the BSA, under UNPROFOR monitoring, be allowed to transit this equipment through the Sarajevo exclusion zone as they were expecting a BiH attack

in the Foca area. General Milovanovic on the same point said that UNPROFOR was not assisting the BSA in removing its heavy weapons from Gorazde and he expressed anger at having such weapons impounded by UNPROFOR when they attempted to transit them through the Sarajevo area.

7. Mr Akashi said that the transit of the heavy weapons from Gorazde should be done outside of the Sarajevo zone as UNPROFOR would be compelled to place them under its control if they entered the Sarajevo exclusion zone. General de Lapresle also noted that while UNPROFOR could monitor such a movement, it would not be in accordance with the concept of a safe area and that the Force would be subject to accusations of transporting heavy weapons for the BSA. In addition, such a movement would be of great concern to NATO.

8. Dr Karadzic responded by stating that such weapons would be in transit and not in a combat position, as could be confirmed by UNPROFOR. In addition, it was their country and they had not committed themselves to any agreement on transportation. With regard to the concerns raised over NATO's response to such a movement, Dr Karadzic responded by saying "Let them attack and we will attack them. The decision is theirs." General Milovanovic echoed this sentiment, stating that he was not happy with the way UNPROFOR was always taking into account the views of NATO. He stated that "if they are above you, its up to you but the Republic Srpska has no relations with them."

9. Mr Akashi said that it was important to recognise that NATO and UNPROFOR were different organisations and that UNPROFOR believed that decisions on air strikes had to be taken carefully and seriously. He felt it unwise for the BSA to provide unnecessary pretexts for air strikes, particularly as UNPROFOR had managed to avoid them over Gorazde, despite enormous pressure to do otherwise. He appealed for cooperation from the BSA.

10. Dr Karadzic said that there were limits to the humiliation that the BSA would put up with and it would not allow NATO to humiliate it any longer. While they would not provoke NATO, the

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latter would attack if it wanted to. If it did, the BSA would retaliate and its response would not be limited, as before, to the shooting down of only one plane. The BSA would deal with UNPROFOR and not NATO whose decisions it did not recognise. In response to Mr Akashi's comment that NATO could also feel humiliated by the BSA defiance, that their support was on the request of the Secretary-General and that they felt obliged to come to the defence of innocent civilians, Dr Karadzic said that NATO was committing crimes against humanity "for which they will pay". He further stated that someone was responsible for NATO's actions, either themselves or the United Nations, and if UNPROFOR prevented the BSA from defending itself then it too would become a party to the war.

11. After some discussion, it was agreed that UNPROFOR would monitor and escort the transit of Serb heavy weapons from Gorazde through the Sarajevo exclusion zone. This exercise would be confined to a total of two convoys over a period of two days and no weapons from Sarajevo would be included in the convoy.

12. On the issue of some 20 heavy weapons identified in the Sarajevo exclusion zone not under the control of UNPROFOR, Dr Karadzic, Mr Krajisnik and General Milovanovic gave their assurances that instruction would be given for their immediate withdrawal. Mr Krajisnik also requested that UNPROFOR enhance its control and monitoring of the Sarajevo/Visoko blue route in order to calm down tensions in the area. He said that the BiH had that day attacked a bus load of Muslims on the road with the intention of blaming it on the BSA, closing the route and thereby disrupting the Sarajevo agreement.

13. On Tuzla, Mr Akashi briefed Dr Karadzic on the current situation at the airport and provided some clarification on concerns raised by the Serbs with regard to the Serb minority in Tuzla and allegations of German commandos landing at the airport. He noted that it was hoped that the air operations in Tuzla would become fully operational in the near future, particularly with regard to humanitarian flights. General de Lapresle briefed the Serb delegation on the recent incident involving the Nordic

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battalion and the BSA in the Tuzla region. He pointed out that the response of UNPROFOR was in legitimate self-defence and had, indeed, been restrained and limited, given that close air support was the only other option in such a situation. While accepting the explanation of the Force Commander (General Milovanovic had earlier maintained that there was no excuse for the killing of BSA soldiers), Dr Karadzic implied that the Muslims had been the ones who had attacked UNPROFOR and that they used such attacks for their own purposes. He stated that it had been a "useless" incident and that, as proposed by the Force Commander, the BSA would study the question of placing an UNPROFOR observation post on the BSA side in order to avoid a repeat of such incidents in the future.

14. Following a break for consultations, the Bosnian Serb side returned to discuss the issue of Brcko. Dr Karadzic said that from the beginning of the war the area of Brcko had been under Serb control and was 100% Serbian, a fact recognised in boundary negotiations in Geneva. The area was vital to the Serbs and they would not make any offensive from the area, despite the Muslim intention to do so and the concentration of 45,000 Croatian troops on the Croatian side of the border. However, the Serbs would not, as stated earlier, accept any designation of the area as a safe area nor withdraw their forces. They would be willing to sign an agreement on the freezing of combat activities but would defy any UN or NATO decision on anything outside of this. By the end of the meeting, Dr Karadzic stated his intention to declare a unilateral cease-fire in the area in the hope that the Muslim side would respond likewise.

15. Mr Akashi assured Dr Karadzic that he had conveyed the concerns of the Bosnian Serbs to New York and that UNPROFOR was aware of the strategic importance of the area to the BSA. In order to monitor and calm the situation, UNPROFOR was ready to deploy UNMO's and establish observation posts in the area but would require full freedom of movement if it were to do its job effectively. The Force Commander also pointed out that agreement had been reached with the Croatians to increase the UNMO presence on the Croatian side of the border, which would enable an overall

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monitoring of troop activity in the area. It was agreed that while approval for the deployment of UNMOS had been given at the political level, technical details relating to their deployment would be worked out by the Generals.

16. Mr Akashi took the opportunity to raise the need to aim at a more general cessation of hostilities in BH and said that he was anxious to hear the proposals of the sides on how this should be effected. Dr Karadzic said that while the BSA agreed in principle with this approach, they were not too enthusiastic for the following reasons:-

- if the BSA agreed to a cessation of hostilities, the Muslims would feel that they must be gaining something to the detriment of the Muslim side. The Muslims had, furthermore, never respected agreements in the past, a good example being that on POWs, and the BSA felt it important that any cease-fire agreement include an exchange of prisoners.

- the BSA did not agree to the three month time limitation of the Muslim side, believing that it would be used to consolidate their positions and train their army. The BSA was willing to consider a 5 to 6 month cease-fire, with the possibility to cancel it one month in advance with prior notification. A non-cancellation of the agreement would result in its automatic renewal.

17. On general issues, Dr Karadzic reiterated a request for UNPROFOR to provide the Serb side with 10,000 tons of bitumen to repair roads or, alternatively, to allow the Serb side to import the material. Regarding the issue of the Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, Dr Karadzic said that the issue should be discussed between Prime Minister Silajdzic and Mr Krajisnik. While he did not foresee major problems, he felt that it would be better to have a POW exchange first. He also had no objection to the visit of President Tudjman to Sarajevo but noted that if the Federation signed a cease-fire agreement first, President Tudjman's "coming would be triumphal".

UNITED NATIONS



Office of the
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

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Page 1 of 5

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE/TIME: 2 May 1994
TO: FORCE COMMANDER HCA	FROM: JOHN ALMSTROM SENIOR POLITICAL OFFICER OFFICE OF THE SRSG
FAX NO:	FAX NO: 1/6 709
ATTN:	FILE NO.: DRAFTER: TITLE:
INFO: COMMANDER BH, CAC BH COMMAND FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT: CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN BH to SRSG's CC.	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: HAAU, SPO	

Please find attachments to my fax of 30 April 1994, apologies for omission.

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STABILIZATION OF HOSTILITIES
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

- A. Recognizing that unsubstantiated allegations and misinformation have resulted in an increase in the level of tension between parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and have contributed to difficulties in bringing parties together for substantive discussions on a ceasefire;
- B. Remaining committed to deploying elements on both sides of the confrontation lines with the two-fold goal of improving information reporting and assisting the building of confidence between the two parties.
- C. Acknowledging that by being in a position to report activities to the international community in a timely and accurate manner, it will be able to dispel unsubstantiated allegations and inaccurate reports which only lead to a deterioration in the situation.
- D. Taking note of the efforts of the international community to bring together the parties and in preparation for the resumption of negotiations leading to a comprehensive ceasefire and subsequently to a lasting peace agreement.

UNPROFOR:

- 1. Proposes an immediate cessation of military activity on all confrontation lines in BH, which, coupled with increased access and freedom of movement, will assist the parties in creating conditions suitable for ceasefire discussions. This cessation, to take effect 1200hrs local, 2 May 94, would be the precursor to the substantive discussions on a ceasefire agreement.

2. Reiterates its desires to deploy its elements to the areas which include, but are not restricted to:

- a. Brcko/Posavina Corridor;
- b. Olovo/Dastansko region;
- c. the entire Maglaj salient; and
- d. the Bihac.

3. Expresses its hopes that this action will assist in bringing together all parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

D-day + 14

I Arrangements for Gorazde

- Ceasefire
- Separation of forces, monitored by UNPROFOR
- Defining of the safe area by UNPROFOR
- Beginning of the process of the release of POW's on an all-for-all basis in accordance with the process defined by ICRC
- Withdrawal in stages of all forces in the UNPROFOR safe area of Gorazde to the lines of 30 March 1994

D-day + 15 - until August 31, 1994

II Verified implementation of overall cessation of hostilities in Bosnia Herzegovina

- Cessation of hostilities monitored by UNPROFOR
- Disengagement of forces and interpositioning of UNPROFOR between these forces
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons calibre 12.7 mm and above to beyond a distance of 20 km from the conflict line or placed under UNPROFOR control
- Establishment of a Joint Commission to define the lines of separation, weapon collection sites and other modalities
- Continuation of release of POW's on an all-for-all basis in accordance with the ICRC programme to be done over a period of
- Unrestricted freedom of movement for all UNPROFOR elements, including helicopters
- Introduction of liaison officers from both parties in UNPROFOR headquarters, and of UNPROFOR liaison officers in the headquarters of both parties down to Brigade level
- This agreement on a cessation of hostilities is to be without prejudice to the final political or territorial solution

III Political negotiations on Peace Accord (SRSG, ICIFY, US, Russia, European Union) - to be completed in 15 days.

To commence on 31 August 1994 with the progressive lifting of sanctions, following the completion of the verified implementation process.

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Page 1

UTC Time: 94-04-27 15:47:58

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TO: AKASHI
ZAGREB

FROM: VIERA DE MELLO
GORAZDE

INFO: AUGER, ZAGREB
MORRIS, UNHCR, ZAGREB
ANDREEV, SARAJEVO
ROSE, SARAJEVO

DATE: 27 APRIL 1994

SUBJ: LAST MEETING WITH BOSNIAN AND SERB SIDES PRIOR TO
DEPARTURE FOR SARAJEVO.

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UNMO'S: PLEASE PASS THIS TO SRSG'S OFFICE IMMEDIATELY

GENERAL SOUBIROU AND I MET TODAY WITH GENERAL GVERO, VICE-PRESIDENT KOLJEVIC, COLONEL TOLIMIR AND COLONEL MASAL. WE EXPRESSED OUR SATISFACTION THAT WE SUCCEEDED IN OVERCOMING THE GORAZDE CRISIS, AND THAT, AS WAS THE CASE ON 21 FEBRUARY, TODAY "WAS JUST ANOTHER DAY".

WE OBSERVED THAT THE IDEA AGREED TO IN BELGRADE TO HAVE A HIGH-LEVEL CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM ON THE GROUND OUTSIDE OF GORAZDE PROVED TO BE OF GREAT BENEFIT, AND ENABLED US JOINTLY TO RESOLVE THE NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES THAT EMERGED IN RECENT DAYS IN A SUCCESSFUL MANNER.

WE RAISED, HOWEVER, TWO PROBLEMS THAT NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED IN ORDER TO AVOID PUTTING THIS "MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT" AT RISK:

1. THE PRESENCE OF SOME BSA INFANTRYMEN ON THE HILLS TO THE EAST OF GORAZDE;
2. THE PRESENCE OF SOME SERB MILICIJA, PARTICULARLY AT ZUPCICI, ON THE RIGHT BANK, SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE 3 KM. EXCLUSION ZONE.

IT WAS POINTED OUT TO THE SERBS THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE NUMBER OF BSA TROOPS ON THE HILLS WAS LIMITED, THEIR PRESENCE STILL THREATENED THE FRAGILE PEACE ON THE GROUND AND COULD SERVE TO PROVOKE THE BIH. AS FOR THE MILICIJA, GENERAL SOUBIROU HIMSELF YESTERDAY ENCOUNTERED A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 40 ARMED SERBS WITHIN THE 3 KM. ZONE WHO BEHAVED AGGRESSIVELY TOWARD UNPROFOR. TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS, WE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING:

1. AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL BSA FORCES FROM THE EXCLUSION ZONE;
2. ON THE ISSUE OF THE "MILICIJA"
A) THE SERB SIDE MUST AVOID LARGE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES;

B) A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATIC OP'S ON THE OUTER EDGE OF THE 3 KM. ZONE, MANNED IN SMALL NUMBERS, COULD BE ESTABLISHED;

C) UNPROFOR WILL ENSURE AN ENHANCED PRESENCE IN THE AREA TO PROVIDE THE SERB POPULATION WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY;

C) WHEN THE SITUATION FURTHER IMPROVES, A FULL DEMILITARIZATION OF THE AREA SHOULD TAKE PLACE.

FURTHERMORE, WE INFORMED THEM THAT WE HAD FIRMLY STRESSED UPON THE BOSNIAN SIDE THAT IT SHOULD PROVIDE TO UNPROFOR A LIST OF HEAVY WEAPONRY (INCLUDING LOCATION) AND PUT THE WEAPONRY UNDER OUR MONITORING; THAT IT MUST NOT RE-OCCUPY LAND THAT IT HAD RELINQUISHED; AND MUST AVOID ALL PROVOCATIONS.

GENERAL GVERO NOTED THE SUCCESSFUL JOINT MANAGEMENT OF THE CRISIS. ON THE TWO PROBLEMS RAISED, HE SAID THAT THEY HAD EITHER ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED, OR WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING SETTLED. HE GAVE ASSURANCES THAT ALL BSA FORCES HAVE EXITED THE 3 KM EXCLUSION ZONE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT SERB MILICIJA WOULD NOT CONCENTRATE IN LARGE NUMBERS INSIDE THE EXCLUSION ZONE. HOWEVER HE POINTED OUT THAT MILICIJA WERE OFTEN FROM THAT AREA, WERE THERE TO PROTECT THEIR PROPERTY AND PREPARE FOR THE RETURN OF THEIR FAMILIES. PATIENCE WAS REQUIRED.

GVERO RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AT DONJA SOPOTNICA A FEW HUNDRED METERS INSIDE THE EXCLUSION ZONE. HE REQUESTED THAT THE CHURCH AND ITS GRAVEYARD BE CONSIDERED AS RESTING OUTSIDE THE ZONE. HE STRESSED THAT THIS ISSUE COULD LEAD TO LARGER PROBLEMS AFTER SOUBIROU'S AND MY DEPARTURE. A MODUS VIVENDI WAS REACHED WHEREBY THE UNPROFOR CHECKPOINT WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE GORAZDE SIDE OF THE CHURCH, THOUGH THE GEOGRAPHICAL DELINEATION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE WOULD OF COURSE REMAIN AS STIPULATED IN THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS.

WE ADDRESSED TWO OTHER ISSUES. FIRST, WE OBSERVED THAT, THE SECURE SITUATION AROUND SARAJEVO HAD BEGUN TO ERODE, AND REQUESTED THAT ALL PARTIES STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE TERMS OF THE SCR'S AND AGREEMENTS REACHED. WE PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT THE SERBS NOT TRY TO REACQUIRE HEAVY WEAPONRY ALREADY TURNED OVER TO UNPROFOR, AND THAT A FULL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SERBS AND UNPROFOR BE EXPEDITIOUSLY REACHED.

SECOND, WE BRIEFED THEM ON OUR EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF SERBS IN GORAZDE, FOLLOWING A REQUEST TO THIS EFFECT FROM DR. KARADZIC TO THE SRSG. IN ESSENCE, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED MANY SERBS LIVING IN GORAZDE. WE WILL EXPEDITE THE MEDEVACS OF THOSE WHO REQUIRE THEM [16 SERBS WERE "MEDEVACED" TODAY]. WE SIGNALLLED OUR INTENTION TO DO ALL WE CAN TO PROVIDE THE REMAINING SERBS WITH A SENSE OF SECURITY, BUT SAID THAT WE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO FACILITATE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM GORAZDE ON ETHNIC GROUNDS.

WE INFORMED OUR COUNTERPARTS THAT UNPROFOR, INCLUDING HCA, HAD VISITED 10 SERB POWS IN GORAZDE, AND CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE IN GOOD CONDITION; AS FOR THE OTHER 12, WE RECEIVED LITTLE INFORMATION. WE WILL PASS ON ALL INFORMATION TO ICRC, WHOSE DELEGATES RETURNED TO GORAZDE TODAY, AND WHO WILL FOLLOW-UP THE CASE.

PROFESSOR KOLJEVIC WELCOMED THE NEWS ON MEDEVACS, BUT STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE GORAZDE AUTHORITIES FOR THEIR POLICY TOWARD THESE "ETHNIC HOSTAGES", INSISTED ON THE RIGHT OF ALL SERBS NOW IN GORAZDE TO DEPART OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL, AND INDICATED THAT AN ABROGATION OF THIS RIGHT BY THE BH IN GORAZDE, AND A FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE POW ISSUE, COULD WELL LEAD TO A RENEWAL OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN THE AREA. [THESE PROBLEMS ARE, AS YOU KNOW, EXTREMELY DELICATE, AND ONES TO WHICH VERY CLOSE ATTENTION MUST BE PAID AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL].

Soubirou informed the Serbs that, following his departure, Ukrainian Colonel Telezhenko would be the commanding officer of UNPROFOR forces in the region. Gvero informed us that Colonel Masal would be the BSA counterpart.

To close the meeting, I conveyed to the Serb side the primary message that I would be taking back with me to Sarajevo and Zagreb: the SRSG and UNPROFOR can not continue to manage one crisis after another (an offensive, a withdrawal, an exclusion zone...); the severity of the Gorazde crisis, and its still tenuous resolution, rendered it absolutely imperative that the parties concerned reach agreement on a comprehensive cease-fire, and immediately restart political negotiations aimed at a global settlement. We were too close to a very dangerous escalation of the conflict this time, and must avoid a repeat of such a crisis at all costs.

Professor Koljevic expressed his full concurrence with this sentiment.

After this meeting, I met with Gorazde civilian officials, including the President of the City Council (Rijad Rasic), in the presence of ICRC. I briefed them on the current situation, and the nature of my discussions with the Serb side, including the two main issues of the presence of BSA and Serb Milicija within the exclusion zone, and how we proposed to resolve them. I informed them as well of the main message I intend to pass to my superiors. I assured them of the full cooperation of the UNPROFOR team that will remain after Soubirou's and my departure, and that I would remain personally accessible to resolve any serious problems.

I discussed with them the importance of allowing without any hindrance medical evacuations based on objective medical criteria, without regard for ethnic background. I received their assurances that NORD MEDCOY could make final decisions in this regard.

Rasic shared with me his serious concern over future cooperation after Soubirou's and my departure which I will share with you and Rose.

I reminded them that SCR 913 and NATO Decision #2 (PAR. 10) stipulate that a list of BiH heavy weaponry in the Gorazde pocket should be provided to UNPROFOR. Finally I stressed again the importance of avoiding any provocative action whatsoever, as a renewal of fighting here could be catastrophic for the peace process throughout Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia.

BEST REGARDS.

IN. 905

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010/9

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E2G=287

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UNPROFOR

MOST IMMEDIATE

CODE RESTRICTED

SSN=757

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 23 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 630

SUBJECT : MEETING IN BELGRADE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERB
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. 22 APRIL 1994

T. Akashi

1. Please find attached for your information a copy of a record of my meeting in Belgrade with Dr Karadzic and General Mladic ; as well as with President Milosevic.
2. Regards.

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CZ N 582

CZG 285

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'94 APR 23 13:46

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SSN 755

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
ROSE, FWD HQ, BH COMMAND

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB / *AKASHI*

DATE : 23 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 626

SUBJECT : AGREEMENT WITH BOSNIAN SERB CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY AUTHORITIES

1. Please refer to our Code Cable UNPROFOR Z - 625 of 23 April on the above subject.
2. Please note that there is a typographical error in Paragraph 2, line 4, regarding the date of the withdrawal of Serb forces from the three kilometre zone. The line should read ".... forces will withdraw by mid-night 23 April 1994....".
3. Regards.

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'94 APR 23 13:58

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CZ N 581

CZ 284

1/2

010/9

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BOROVAN

'94 APR 23 13:18

MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE

SEN 754

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORKINFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
ROSE, FWD HQ, BH COMMAND

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 23 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 625

SUBJECT : AGREEMENT WITH BOSNIAN SERB CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY AUTHORITIES

1. Please find attached for your attention the final text of the agreement reached between myself and Dr Karadzic in Belgrade this morning.
2. Paragraph 2 of the text has been revised to take into account the NATO Council decisions.
3. Regards.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

'94 APR 23 13:58

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FINAL AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE SRSG, MR AKASHI AND THE BOSNIAN SERB CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, BELGRADE, 23 APRIL 1994.

GUIDED BY THE SPIRIT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 913 OF 21 APRIL 1994, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BOSNIAN SERB CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:-

1. AN IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL CEASE-FIRE IN AND AROUND THE AREA OF GORAZDE FROM 1200 HRS, 23 APRIL 1994.
2. AS A FIRST STEP, URGENT DEPLOYMENT OF AN UNPROFOR BATTALION IN AN AREA OF THREE KILOMETRES FROM THE CENTRE OF GORAZDE, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DRINA RIVER, FROM WHICH BOSNIAN SERB FORCES WILL WITHDRAW BY MID-NIGHT ON 23 APRIL 1994, TO CLOSELY MONITOR, SUPERVISE AND REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY BOTH PARTIES. IN ADDITION, IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, AND NOT LATER THAN MID-NIGHT 26 APRIL 1994, HEAVY WEAPONS WILL BE WITHDRAWN OUT OF A 20 KILOMETRE RADIUS OF THE CENTRE OF GORAZDE (BUT INSIDE THE TERRITORY OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA) AND OUT OF RANGE SO AS NOT TO CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE GORAZDE SAFE AREA, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROCEDURES TO BE SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 913, PARAGRAPH 3.
3. GUARANTEE OF SECURE CONDITIONS FOR IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EVACUATIONS FROM GORAZDE.
4. COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ALL PERSONNEL OF UNPROFOR AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS.
5. IMMEDIATE START OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON ALL MILITARY MATTERS IN ORDER TO REDUCE TENSIONS, ACHIEVE DISENGAGEMENT, CREATE SECURE AND PEACEFUL CONDITIONS AND PROVIDE FOR HUMANITARIAN NEEDS FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.
6. IT IS INTENDED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE MEASURES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO INTENSIFYING EFFORTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AGREED BY ALL PARTIES.

CODE RESTRICTED

C2N-586 P2
010/9

UNPROFOR

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : MR AKASHI, SRSG

FROM : E T SHITAKHA

DATE : 23 APRIL 1994

SUBJECT : MEETING IN BELGRADE WITH BOSNIAN SERB CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES

DISTRIBUTION:
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1. The meeting, chaired by President Milosevic, was attended by Dr Karadzic, Generals Mladic and Gvero, 'Vice-President' Koljevic, 'President of the National Assembly' Krajisnik and 'Foreign Minister' Buha. UNPROFOR's delegation included the SRSG, Mr Akashi, the Force Commander, General de Lapresle and the Head of Civil Affairs, Mr Sergio de Mello.

2. Opening the meeting, President Milosevic proposed that the agenda focus on the following three items:-

- normalisation of relations between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs
- solution to the Gorazde crisis
- discussion on elements for an agreement on an overall cessation of hostilities in BH.

3. In view of the importance and urgency to reach a concrete agreement on the Gorazde crisis, Mr Akashi suggested that this item be addressed first. Dr Karadzic, in addressing the issue, said that the fundamental problem of the safe areas was that they did not meet the criteria of safe areas, as defined in international conventions. Of the six designated safe areas, only two - Srebrenica and Zepa - had been delineated but still remained un-demilitarized. The others served as strongholds for the BiH Armija. Consequently, there was a need to solve not only the issue of Gorazde but the status of other safe areas as well. Stating that the BSA "had heard" that the next BiH offensive would start in Tuzla and that this would be the "next hot spot", Dr Karadzic complained of the Muslim exploitation of the Gorazde crisis to suit their own needs. As a result, the BSA would not implement any cease-fire agreement in the enclave without the prior presence of UNPROFOR to observe and report on violations by either side. In addition, Dr Karadzic recommended that advantage be taken of the situation, as done in the case of Sarajevo, in order to achieve a global cease-

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fire agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

CODE RESTRICTED

4. Mr Akashi stressed the critical need to resolve the crisis in Gorazde and outlined in detail the provisions of Security Council resolution 913 on the issue. Stating his frustration at the inability to arrive at an acceptable formula for an immediate cease-fire in the enclave and the lack of respect for previous agreements on the issue, Mr Akashi said that the deterioration of the situation had led NATO to take decisions which could have tragic repercussions all around. While he had initially shared the optimistic hope that the resolution of the crisis could have beneficial results, as with Sarajevo, he was less confident that this could now be the case. Continuing, Mr Akashi said that there should be no illusions on any side of the seriousness of the present situation and of the international community's revulsion towards it. Thus, while the general issue of safe areas could and would be addressed in the near future, the immediate concern was the human and humanitarian tragedy in Gorazde, a tragedy out of proportion to any provocation that the BSA may have initially had from the BiH. Referring to the unacceptably high civilian casualties of the previous day, almost 100, Mr Akashi again stressed the need for an immediate cease-fire in order to allow for the insertion of UNPROFOR troops in the enclave and for the immediate medical evacuation of injured civilians. There was a heavy responsibility for the Bosnian Serb leadership to take control of the situation before others did so, with resultant severe consequences for the Serb people.

5. Responding to the comments of Mr Akashi, Dr Karadzic reiterated that the quickest way to achieve a cease-fire was to have an UNPROFOR observer presence in Gorazde for swift and accurate reporting on the situation in the enclave. He recommended that the convoy presently at Rogatica immediately proceed into the enclave.

6. Mr Akashi expressed his dissatisfaction with the way the soldiers of the UNPROFOR convoy had been prevented from entering Gorazde on one pretext or another. He noted that, as a result of the delays, some troop contributing countries were insistent that their personnel on the convoy return to Sarajevo. Notwithstanding this complication, he was happy to note that there appeared to be general agreement on the desirability of sending troops to Gorazde and suggested that UNPROFOR's original proposal to dispatch one battalion to Gorazde be revived. This battalion, comprising some Ukrainian troops, could be sent the following

morning.

CODE RESTRICTED

7. Dr Karadzic said that the revival of this proposal was an item that fell under the original item 1 of the agenda proposed by President Milosevic. It was a very 'delicate matter' due to the poor relations currently existing between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb people, with the latter being unhappy with the biased attitude of UNPROFOR towards the Muslims. This was, Dr Karadzic maintained, not always the case as originally the Serbs had trusted UNPROFOR but now saw it as serving the interests of the BiH. Time would be needed for the people to regain confidence in the force's impartiality and the first step should be to insert a small UNPROFOR unit into Gorazde, followed by discussions on the use of a model similar to Sarajevo in the enclave. The sequence of events envisioned by Dr Karadzic was to have a UN presence on both sides of the river, a cessation of all military activity and then an agreement on the withdrawal of heavy weapons for a distance of at least three kilometres from the city of Gorazde.

8. Noting that there would be a need to have a firm agreement on the centre of the zone for Gorazde, Mr Akashi suggested that the bridge north of the town, close to the hospital, could serve this purpose. However, any agreement on the three kilometre zone would be temporary as there would be a need to enlarge the circle to as much as 20 kilometres to take into account the range of various heavy weapons.

9. At this point, President Milosevic sought confirmation from the Force Commander that the convoy blocked at Rogatica had been 'deblocked'. The Force Commander indicated that he had just been informed that the convoy was still unable to proceed and desired to return to Sarajevo. Mr Akashi said that if full guarantees could be given that the convoy would not be subject to further problems and full freedom of movement were granted to UNPROFOR and other agencies, he would ensure that another larger convoy would be sent to Gorazde the following day. However, the BSA would have to honour a cease-fire agreement in the enclave and this should, ideally, be in place before the convoy was dispatched. In addition, the modalities of deployment of UNPROFOR troops in the enclave must be left to UNPROFOR to decide.

10. Dr Karadzic gave his assurances that the convoy would not have any further problems

and said that the Bosnian Serb police had be instructed to ensure that women blocking the convoy were removed. While he agreed also on the need for a cease-fire, he insisted that it could only be established with a UN presence in the enclave, firstly on the BSA side, in whose best interest it was to establish a cease-fire, and then on the BiH side. He recommended that the details for the deployment of UNPROFOR forces be worked out by UNPROFOR and BSA military representatives.

11. President Milosevic proposed that the meeting be adjourned to enable the Force Commander and General Mladic to work out the details of the deployment of an UNPROFOR unit in Gorazde and that a decision on the same be made 'today (rather than) wait for another meeting while people are dying.' He expressed disappointment at any decision to turn back the convoy at Rogatica, stating that such a move would be interpreted as being the result of BSA intransigence while, in actual fact, all obstacles to the convoy's movement had been removed. He strongly recommended that the convoy not return to Sarajevo but remain the night in Rogatica, to be joined the following morning by additional troops. He further proposed that the meeting between Generals de Lapresle and Mladic focus on agreement on the following:-

- the identification of a three kilometre zone around Gorazde
- the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the outer ring of the circle around the town
- monitoring of the cease-fire and related agreements by UNPROFOR

12. Following the rejection of the proposals put forward by General Mladic in the meeting with General de Lapresle, President Milosevic requested the SRSG to put forward UNPROFOR's proposals for a resolution of the Gorazde crisis. These proposals, agreed upon on 22 April and further refined on 23 April, are attached.

13. On the resumption of the plenary meeting, the discussion was focused on preliminary ideas discussed by Mr Akashi and Mr Churkin on the cessation of hostilities in BH. President Milosevic indicated his interest in pursuing discussion on the points raised. Mr Akashi noted that these ideas were very preliminary in nature and had been aimed at having a broad perspective on the general process towards a durable and real peace in BH. The ideas sought to view the peace process as a package of solutions to various problems, with each stage inter-locked with others and requiring the involvement of all sides to the conflict.

FINAL AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE SRSG, MR AKASHI AND THE BOSNIAN SERB CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, BELGRADE, 23 APRIL 1994.

GUIDED BY THE SPIRIT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 913 OF 21 APRIL 1994, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BOSNIAN SERB CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:-

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3. GUARANTEE OF SECURE CONDITIONS FOR IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EVACUATIONS FROM GORAZDE.
4. COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ALL PERSONNEL OF UNPROFOR AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS.
5. IMMEDIATE START OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON ALL MILITARY MATTERS IN ORDER TO REDUCE TENSIONS, ACHIEVE DISENGAGEMENT, CREATE SECURE AND PEACEFUL CONDITIONS AND PROVIDE FOR HUMANITARIAN NEEDS FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.
6. IT IS INTENDED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE MEASURES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO INTENSIFYING EFFORTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AGREED BY ALL PARTIES.

These inter-locked stages could, for example, be as follows:-

- resolution of the immediate and urgent question of Gorazde.
- a general cease-fire on all confrontation lines in BH, exchange of POWs etc.
- political negotiations leading to a permanent solution, possibly under the auspices of ICFY but also including the European Union, the United States and Russia.

14. Dr Karadzic noted that the preliminary ideas were in principle acceptable to the Bosnian Serbs, despite some reservations on details. However, it remained to be seen if the Muslims would find them acceptable. Notwithstanding this, he recommended that the SRSG be 'in touch more often' for discussions on such issues.

15. Mr Akashi reiterated that these were tentative and preliminary suggestions that required further refinement before future discussions could be held.

16. The meeting was adjourned until 0900hrs the following morning.

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MSC 790/4

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK — 10582

INFO: ROSE/ANDREEV, UNPROFOR SARAJEVO
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 19 APRIL 1994

NUMBER:

SUBJECT: MY LETTER TO PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC

Please find attached for your information my urgent letter to President Milosevic, which was sent by fax at 12.00 hours local time.

Regards.

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UNITED NATIONS



Office of the
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

19 April 1994

Dear President Milosevic,

I thank you for your kind invitation for a meeting in Belgrade with yourself and Dr. Karadzic.

I do believe in a dialogue, particularly in a crisis situation like the one in which we find ourselves. However, our personnel in Gorazde has reported this morning that the town of Gorazde is still being shelled very heavily, and that the UN premises in the town appears to be deliberately targeted, despite Dr. Karadzic's repeated public commitments to an immediate cease-fire. Furthermore, there have been no developments in the release of UN personnel detained by the Bosnian Serb authorities.

In light of the situation, you will understand me if I believe that any meeting with Dr. Karadzic at this particular moment would not be fruitful. I will be glad to meet with Dr. Karadzic with your excellency, only when an immediate and total cease-fire in and around Gorazde has been fulfilled and all of our detained personnel have been released. The list of the detained UN personnel has been given to Dr. Karadzic himself.

I thank you again for your kind assistance in our attempt to achieve peace, which is imperative and to which I am totally dedicated. I am looking forward to meeting you and Dr. Karadzic as soon as possible when the above conditions are met.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Yasushi Akashi', written over the typed name.

Yasushi Akashi
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General

His Excellency
President Slobodan Milosevic
Republic of Serbia
Belgrade



010/9

Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
to the United Nations Office at
Geneva

Geneva, 18 April, 1994

Respected Sirs,

Please find attached a letter from Prof. Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Serb Civic Council.

Yours sincerely,


Mustafa Bijedic,
Ambassador

International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
Lord David Owen and Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg
G E N E V A

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SERB CIVIC COUNCIL
SARAJEVO

14 April, 1994

Excellency.

As on March 31, 1994, we informed you on successful completion of the Assembly of the Citizens of Serbian Nationality of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Attached to that letter we furnished a copy of the Declaration of the Assembly of the Citizens of Serbian nationality and of Serb ethnic origin, as well as the Appeal to the citizens and peoples of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to summon a Convention of Confidence.

We are free to remind you that in the Declaration, among other things, a standpoint has been taken that, in peace process, the Serb Civic Council should represent, before the international factors, the will and the interests of the citizens of Serbian nationality and origin who live on the territory under the control of legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In that sense, we should appreciate your personnel support and engagement with the view of including the representatives of the Serb Civic Council in further activities in achieving political solution and, within that frame, in forthcoming international peace talks.

Please, Excellency, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.



Prof. Dr. Mirko Pejanović

The President of the Council
and the member of the Presidency of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

H.E.
Mr. THORVALD STOLTENBERG
Co-Chairman of the
International Conference
on the former Yugoslavia
GENEVE

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB FOR FC/DFC/HCA
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
OGATA, UNHCR, GENEVA

FROM: *for* AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

DATE: 15 APRIL 1994

NUMBER:

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH DR. KARADZIC

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1. I had a meeting with Dr. Karadzic (and Messrs. Klaisinik, Koljevic, and Mrs. Plavsic) this afternoon as planned. I was accompanied by Mr. Stoltenberg, and Mr. Churkin was also present at the meeting. While I was in Pale, the situation in Gorazde deteriorated rapidly, resulting in two UN casualties and their urgent medical evacuations. I also met with President Izetbegovic later this evening. (A separate cable to follow.) The following are the highlights of my meeting with Dr. Karadzic.

Meeting with Dr. Karadzic

2. Dr. Karadzic started the meeting by explaining that the suspension of communications with UNPROFOR had been decided by their "supreme command" following the NATO air actions against Serb positions. He however informed me that he is now authorized to resume the communications with UNPROFOR at the highest level of civilian authorities, in order not to "close the door to peace": he stated that it would take time to normalise relations with the military side of UNPROFOR in the current circumstances. Dr. Karadzic emphasized that the Bosnian Serbs are no longer sure about UNPROFOR's impartiality. He also raised the issue regarding the concept of safe areas, pointing out that as far as the Bosnian Serbs are concerned Gorazde is not a safe area but is a "Muslim strong-hold", as demilitarisation of the area has never been achieved.
3. I welcomed the resumption of dialogues between us, and explained to Dr. Karadzic the details of course of events and procedures applied in calling for self-defensive close air support in Gorazde. I emphasized to him the impartial and non-combatant nature of UNPROFOR's activities in BiH, and that we were unfortunately obliged to call for CAS as the last resort in our self-defense. Regarding the concept of safe areas, I explained to Dr.

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Karadzic our appreciation of the problem, and gave him a copy of the Secretary-General's report on UNPROFOR's mandate renewal with a particular reference to its paragraph 30.

4. Dr. Karadzic was particularly in concerned with the delegation of authority to call for CAS, and repeatedly stated that SRSG should be fully in charge to avoid any further escalation of military situations on the ground.
5. Regarding the "way ahead", Dr. Karadzic revised his earlier position of comprehensive approach, and said that the first step towards and their precondition for cease-fire in Gorazde and overall cessation of hostilities should follow the exchange of prisoners between Tarcin and Kula, some 450 of prisoners in each location. [The exchange of prisoners has not materialised due to the BiH insistence on linking it to obtaining information on missing persons.] I promised that I would look into the matter urgently, and will work closely with ICRC. I stressed that we need to achieve immediate cease-fire in and around Gorazde and cessation of hostilities leading to a political solution. Dr. Karadzic indicated his willingness to discuss the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities, but only on the condition that the prisoners are exchanged.
6. In connection with the Serb relationship with the military side of UNPROFOR, Dr. Karadzic stated that humanitarian convoys can no longer be escorted by UNPROFOR in BSA territory. Concerning the detained UN personnel in BSA territory, he guaranteed the safety of those in their custody, but did not promise anything on restoring their freedom of movement. He was not aware of any information regarding the missing UNMOs, but promised that he would look into the matter urgently. He felt confident that the Canadian soldiers will be safe.
7. While I was still in Pale after the meeting, I was informed by General Rose on the rapidly deteriorating military situation in Gorazde, who requested my approval for CAS. While I delegated the authority to the Force Commander and Gen. Rose to judge on the military situation and react to save the lives of our personnel, I took advantage of my presence in Pale with Dr. Karadzic and attempted to achieve an immediate cease-fire for the medical evacuation of our casualties by helicopters. Dr. Karadzic appeared genuinely surprised at the news that the UN personnel were targeted by BSA (he claimed that BSA could not have known the presence of UN personnel during the BSA attack in the area outside of the town of Gorazde), and immediately ordered the cease-fire to General Mladic by telephone. The cease-fire came into effect shortly afterwards, which saved us from calling for CAS. Dr. Karadzic appeared to be fully controlling Gen. Mladic.
8. In view of the seriousness of the military situation in

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FROM BHC FWD SARAJEVO

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Gorazde, ICRC and UNHCR (also probably MSF) wish to evacuate their staff. Dr. Karadzic agreed to an evacuation of humanitarian workers by helicopters for tomorrow. I am not planning to withdraw UNMOs from Gorazde at this stage. Regards.

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MOST IMMEDIATE

CZG--252

CZS--270

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APR 12

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UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: ROSE/ANDREEV, SARAJEVO -
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 12 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z--565

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC

1. This morning I met with President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo with a view to re-launch the peace process in BiH, in particular reference to the situation in and around Gorazde. Prime Minister Silajdzic and General Delic were also present. The following are some of the salient points raised in the meeting.
2. The President Izetbegovic clarified his position as follows: 1) the first step should be the immediate cease fire in/around Gorazde, 2) then as a precondition to cessation of hostilities, the Serbs should withdraw to the positions held on 30 March, 3) then the geographical limits of Safe Area of Gorazde should be defined (Izetbegovic stated that he would accept UNPROFOR defining the area), 4) following the Serb withdrawal, the BiH side would be ready to accept the complete cessation of hostilities throughout BiH for a duration of time (we proposed until August). This was to be worked out in a way that would not freeze the situation and result in "another Cyprus." This could be done with a time limit on negotiations resulting in a Serb withdrawal from the territories they have taken, 5) the BiH side would be prepared to enter immediately into political negotiations towards overall settlement. Each phase should have a clear time frame, and the withdrawal of Serb forces around Gorazde to 30 March position should be completed as quickly as possible. Provided that the Serb withdrawal is completed, President Izetbegovic also agreed to cease-fire elsewhere in BiH while talks regarding modalities on the above steps are being negotiated.
3. I also met with Messrs. Redman and Churkin, the US and Russian special envoys, in Sarajevo. Churkin was rather pessimistic and told me that the Serbs have hardened their position, and there would be difficulties in obtaining Serb agreement to the above-mentioned steps. He said that 1) the Serbs do not believe that the

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cessation of hostilities, with limited duration of time, would be in their interest, 2) the Serb side also wants the lifting of sanctions to be tied to the agreement on cessation of hostilities. He added that, because of their highly emotional state now following the NATO air support, the Serbs are hostile to UNPROFOR to some extent if not excessively so, and therefore would be reluctant to withdraw to the 30 March position at this time.

4. Mr. Redman, on the other hand, seems to consider that the comprehensive solution, though desirable, is perhaps beyond our reach in view of the BiH adamancy, and we should therefore aim at a partial solution focused on the Gorazde situation. My view is that since the Serb strategy is presumably to use the crisis on Gorazde to seek an overall political solution, we should endeavour to win the adherence of both sides to a package, without however excluding a partial Gorazde solution if the Serbs accept it.
5. My plan now is to proceed to Belgrade tomorrow morning to meet with President Milosevic at 10.00 am, and return to Sarajevo tomorrow afternoon if I am able to have a meeting with Dr. Karadzic, who is apparently in Gorazde today with Gen. Mladic. Regards.



Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
to the United Nations Office at
Geneva

Copied to: TS
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Geneva, 8 April, 1994

Honourable Sir,

Please find attached a letter from Prof. Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, President of the Serb Civic Council and the member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina relating the recent meeting of the Assembly of Citizens of the Serbian nationality.

Yours sincerely,


Mustafa Bijedic,
Ambassador

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg,
Co-Chairman
G E N E V A
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SERB CIVIC COUNCIL
SARAJEVO

31 March, 1994

Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you that the Assembly of the Citizens of Serbian Nationality of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on March 27, 1994 in Sarajevo, with the participation of 428 delegates and a great number of the distinguished guests, H.E. Mr. Charles Redman, Special Envoy of the U.S. President Bill Clinton for former Yugoslavia being one of them, successfully completed its work with the adoption of the two documents:

Declaration of the Assembly of Citizens of Serbian Nationality and of Serb Ethnic Origin; and

Appeal to the Citizens and Peoples of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Summon Convention of Confidence

On this occasion I attach hereto the above mentioned documents.

The Assembly has elected the Serb Civic Council that is to represent the will and interests of the citizens of Serbian nationality and of Serb ethnic origin, who live in the territory controlled by the legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the international factors, particularly relating to the activities of peace process.

We are certain, Excellency, that we shall have your full support for our efforts in establishing of just peace and free, independent and sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within its internationally recognized borders to the benefit of all its constituent peoples, Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, and all others who live in it.

Please, Excellency, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Prof. Dr. Mirko Pejanović
The President of the Council
and the member of the Presidency of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Thorvald Stoltenberg
Co-Chairman of the
International Conference
on the former Yugoslavia
GENEVE

The Assembly of Citizens of
Serbian Nationality

A P P E A L
TO THE CITIZENS AND PEOPLES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO SUMMON
CONVENTION OF CONFIDENCE

Aware of the unprecedented evil caused by the aggression, war and genocide, we appeal upon all the peace-loving, democracy oriented citizens, political organizations, cultural institutions, associations of citizens, religious communities, humanitarian and other organizations and associations to organize jointly the CONVENTION OF CONFIDENCE of all the citizens and all the peoples of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CONVENTION OF CONFIDENCE is the expression of our will and desire to initiate the process of re-establishing, cherishing and developing mutual confidence among the citizens and peoples, though it is not our intention to forget and ignore the necessity to identify and punish the perpetrators of the war crimes and genocide;

CONVENTION OF CONFIDENCE is the expression of our desire to live together - in peace and freedom - in the sovereign, internationally recognized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

CONVENTION OF CONFIDENCE is also the expression of our resolution to achieve a democratic state which would meet the needs of all its citizens, the state of equal peoples;

CONVENTION OF CONFIDENCE is the expression of our joint stance on the condemnation of the war crimes that have been committed as well as of every form of violence perpetrated against men and our joint resolution to provide conditions for all the expelled and refugees to return home;

CONVENTION OF CONFIDENCE will reconfirm our resolute stance that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the joint and lasting - equally responsible - task for all of us.

The Assembly would like to initiate the submitting of the request to carry out the prosecution of all the war crimes perpetrated in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the gathered proofs and facts.

Sarajevo, March 27th, 1994

The Assembly of Citizens of
Serbian Nationality

DECLARATION
OF THE ASSEMBLY OF CITIZENS OF
SERBIAN NATIONALITY AND OF SERB ETHNIC ORIGIN

Citizens of Serbian nationality and of Serb ethnic origin in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of various political convictions, both believers and atheists, condemn the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, demand peace, without any delay, and negotiations as the civilized way of resolving conflicts and disputes.

The Assembly emphasizes that no political objective whatsoever can justify the suffering of innocent population, genocide and ethnic cleansing committed against all the citizens, against Bosnian Muslims in particular, and destruction of huge material and spiritual assets.

Therefore, we voice our protest again, in order to bring to trial all those who inspired and perpetrated war crimes based on the principle of individual responsibility and guilt and against every form of imposing collective responsibility.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the historical fact and its future lies in its independence and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders. It is only the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who have the inalienable rights to arrange their country the way they want it.

We plead for the Republic constituted on the principles of parliamentary democracy and political pluralism in which human rights and freedoms will be guaranteed equally to all its citizens.

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be arranged as federal state, on the principle of regional and local self-governance, without ethnic connotations and dominations. Federal authority should be established on the parity basis, while regional and local ones should be established on the proportional participation of citizens of all ethnic groups. Mechanisms should be established on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to prevent every form of majorization, hegemony and domination based on ethnic or religious grounds.

We plead for the social and economic system which would be founded on the market economy, equality of all forms of ownership, free enterprise and openness to new ideas, know-how and knowledge.

It is in such solutions that we see the fulfillment of the interest of Serbian people - on the equal grounds, together with Bosniacs and Croats as well as other ethnic groups.

The Assembly particularly underlines that the crucial prerequisite for peace and for stable development of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reciprocal recognition of all the states originating from former Yugoslavia, the restoration of mutual confidence and cooperation and, eventually, joining on the basis of full equality.

The Assembly insists on the complete recovery of human and civic rights. These are the presumptions of modern and democratic society within which the full appreciation and fostering of specific ethnic traits, heritage and culture, the full national equality within and outside the government institutions and bodies, would be realized.

The Assembly calls upon all the citizens, particularly those of Serbian nationality and Serb ethnic origin to commit themselves to the building of confidence among people based on the tradition and mutual understanding, respect and appreciation of national, political, cultural, religious and other specific traits.

Today, the citizens of Serbian nationality and Serb ethnic origin, those who have always declared themselves in favour of peaceful settlement of the existing problems, are looking for a fair peace, freedom and democratic society.

They have endeavored and will continue to do so, despite all temptations, in order to build the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, jointly and equally with its other citizens.

We deny anyone, particularly the Serbian democratic party (SDS) that is the principal culprit of the ethnic conflict and aggression, to claim to represent all the citizens of Serb ethnic origin. The same we deny to any political subject who could cause ethnic conflicts and suffering of the citizens.

We underline the importance of the struggle against every nationalism within its own people. Because, besides causing damage and evil to its own people, it generates nationalism with other peoples. We also oppose all the individuals who, through their secret and open actions, provoke ethnic hatred and conflicts for the sake of their selfish interests which they promote as national interests and even as the interests of the state itself. They provide ground for fascism and pose lethal threat to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens.

The Assembly rejects every attempt of creating a new demographic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina and strongly condemns the methods of ethnic cleansing and forcible displacement of people. We demand from the international community and all the authorities to create necessary conditions for the safe return of all citizens to their homes and also to provide the compensation for all their hardships.

The Assembly considers that the will of the citizens of Serbian nationality and origin who live on the territory under the control of legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be represented by the Serb Civic Council before the international factors and in the peace process.

Fully aware of the evil caused by the war, national - fascism and ethnic divisions, we appeal upon all the political parties, civic associations, cultural institutions and religious communities to convene jointly Convention of Confidence of the Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We want to live in peace and freedom and to share it with all the others.

Our lasting objective and task is to struggle for the integral, democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina, the community of free and equal citizens and peoples.

Sarajevo, March 27th, 1994

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Palais des Nations

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TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -1530Z
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 7 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 538

SUBJECT : MEETINGS WITH DR KARADZIC AND PRESIDENT
IZETBEGOVIC

DISTRIBUTION:	
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1. General de Lapresle and myself yesterday held meetings with Dr Karadzic in Pale and President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo. Present at the meeting with Dr Karadzic were Vice President Koljevic and General Mladic while Prime Minister Silajdzic and General Delic attended the meeting at the Presidency. Both meetings were held in a congenial and constructive atmosphere.
2. In the meeting with Dr Karadzic, a number of issues were addressed:- Gorazde, Turkish troops for UNPROFOR, Tuzla airport, the overall peace process and Close Air Support.
3. On the question of Gorazde, I expressed the Security Council and my deep concern over the current situation. Although Dr Karadzic has given me his assurances that the BSA will not attack Gorazde town and that General Rose may visit the enclave in the next few days, I stressed the importance of having accurate UNPROFOR information on what was happening in order to allay the fears of the international community and prevent the situation from reinforcing the negative image of the BSA.
4. Dr Karadzic maintained that the situation in Gorazde was a result of a Muslim attack

on BSA forces in the area and a natural Serb response to the attack. His analysis of what he perceived to be a common Muslim strategy was "they attack, we defend ourselves, they cry". However, both he and Professor Koljevic felt that the situation could be used as "a weapon of peace" in forcing the Muslims to agree to a global cease-fire in BH and in bringing Generals Mladic and Delic to the negotiating table. For Dr Karadzic, a global cease-fire would prevent situations like Gorazde from occurring again, a situation which he believed was a direct result of the failure of the Sarajevo agreement to monitor troops freed from combat in the city. He said that there was a need to freeze all military activity in BH, particularly in Doboj. He stressed that if the Muslims felt that they could acquire more territory by force, they would not stop fighting. Professor Koljevic went one step further in stating that the Muslims were using UNPROFOR to gain their objectives, and being successful in this ploy, they had no incentive to reach a peace agreement. To illustrate his point, he used the example of the BSA occupation of Mt Igman, "the one moment in the war in which we were successful", and UNPROFOR's reversal of their victory as an incident which had encouraged the Muslims to reject a peace offer as the UN were "doing their job for them". He thus felt it important that the Muslims be put to the test on Gorazde to see if they would sign a peace agreement if they feared that the enclave would fall.

5. Later in the meeting, Dr Karadzic claimed to have received information that the Muslims had killed an unknown number of Serbs some two kilometres from Gorazde. It was their intention, he said, to pretend that the dead bodies were those of Muslims killed by the Serbs and he requested that a doctor be dispatched to verify whether or not the victims had been circumcised.

6. On the issue of troops, Dr Karadzic said that the Serbs were considering the viability of a scenario which would allow for a reduction in the number of UNPROFOR troops in BH after a peace agreement. This scenario would envisage Croatia and Yugoslavia being responsible for ensuring the non-violation of a peace agreement in BH, with only approximately one thousand military observers to verify compliance. He stressed, however, that peace in BH would have to be achieved by an international treaty with guarantees and involve the United States if it were to succeed.

7. I concurred with Dr Karadzic that, following a peace agreement, the number of

UNPROFOR troops required might lessen and that there was a requirement for immediate reinforcements in order to stabilize the current situation. I also stressed that there was an need to involve the Serbs in the peace process, particularly at this crucial moment, and urged that they use their next meeting with Ambassador Redman to put forward their basic minimum demands, particularly those relating to territory.

8. With regard to the use of Turkish troops, Dr Karadzic reiterated his objection to their inclusion in UNPROFOR, noting that they "were where the problem started hundreds of years ago." He further dismissed my attempt to link their objection to the Turks to the Muslims objection to Russian troops and said that if the Turks were to be brought in they should be balanced with troops from Yugoslavia and Greece, if only on a symbolic basis. His two major concerns over the Turkish troops were that their presence would escalate the war in BH and that they would provide support to the Muslims in their war effort. He believed that Serbs living in Muslim controlled territory, already subject to abuses by the Muslims, would be further abused by the Turks. He proposed, therefore, that Serbs in such territories must be given the freedom to move elsewhere before the deployment of Turkish forces.

9. I stressed to Dr Karadzic that the Turkish forces would serve as a part of UNPROFOR and would, therefore, be subject to its control and impartiality. Any breach of their mandate would result in immediate disciplinary action by the Force Commander. I further assured him that the troops would, in the first instance, be used in a logistical and engineering rôle and, in the future, would be deployed on the HVO/BiH confrontation line in order to minimize as much as possible any direct contact with the Serbs.

10. In response to my request that the ICRC be allowed to evacuate Muslims from Prijedor, Dr Karadzic said that the situation in Prijedor was an unfortunate development for the Serbs. While he accepted that the situation could have been predicted, (he noted that civilians in the town had, at the beginning of the war, slaughtered each other), he maintained that the present situation had been prompted by a Muslim massacre of six Serb policemen from the town. Currently, additional forces had been sent to the town to stabilize the situation and he had initially agreed to the ICRC request to evacuate individuals who feared for their lives, based on the belief that the numbers concerned were minimum. However, the

ICRC had then indicated they intended to evacuate 80 truck loads of people at one go and this was unacceptable. He had no objection to them evacuating up to five trucks of people a day (approximately 100 people), as this would allow those left behind to reconsider their situation in light of the stabilized conditions in the town. In addition, while the Serb leadership accepted that the ICRC did not accept linkages, the population could not understand why there was no move to evacuate endangered Serbs from towns such as Tuzla, Zenica, Tarcin and Travnik.

11. I informed Dr Karadzic that I was fully aware of the sensitivity and urgency to reach some overall agreement on the evacuation of all people and the release of POW's. It was an issue which I would follow up with the relevant agencies. However, I urged him to show some flexibility on the evacuations from Prijedor and suggested that, as a start, agreement should be given for the evacuation of 10 truck loads of people a day from the town, subject to the agreement of ICRC. To this, he readily agreed.

12. Turning then to the issue of ethnic cleansing and the violation of human rights in Banja Luka and the need to halt this practise, I suggested that I visit the area towards the end of next week. I further requested that UNPROFOR be permitted to increase its UNMO and Civil Affairs presence in the area and to install CIVPOL elements to reassure the population.

13. Dr Karadzic said that he would welcome my visit to Banja Luka and proposed that the Deputy Prime Minister of the Interior, based in Banja Luka, be the host for my trip. If possible, and if he were available, he would also accompany me on my visit. However, the issue of an increased UNPROFOR presence in the area would have to be ratified by the Serb Parliament and he was doubtful that they would agree. He further noted that the extremists in Banja Luka were difficult to control and he hoped that my visit would discourage them from future abuses in the area.

14. I again raised with Dr Karadzic the issue of Tuzla airport and asked if he had reconsidered my compromise solution on the stationing of BSA LO's at Ancona and Zagreb. Dr Karadzic indicated that he was unwilling to compromise as any backing down on the agreement they had reached with the Russians would ruin the trust of the Serb population in the good faith of President Yeltsin. As a result, Russia would become a non-player in the

Yugoslav situation. Professor Koljevic maintained that Tuzla was a "pseudo problem" which would disappear once peace was achieved, hopefully in the coming week if the Gorazde incident was "used correctly".

15. General Mladic, in his one substantial intervention, spoke of the lack of an equitable approach to all sides in the BH conflict. He said that the Serbs were not permitted to defend themselves or to have their own state. In addition, they were forbidden from importing medical supplies and were always making concessions in vain. Stating that this was not the way to stop the war, General Mladic said that it placed the political and military arms of the Bosnian Serbs in an unpleasant and untenable situation. I assured General Mladic that UNPROFOR was, and would be, totally impartial in its work and that I would endeavour to ensure that equitable concessions were made by all sides in resolving the conflict.

16. General de Lapresle and myself also briefed Dr Karadzic on the use of Close Air Support in defence of UNPROFOR troops under attack and requested BSA cooperation in ensuring that there were no actions that could lead to its use. Dr Karadzic said that the BSA had no intention to attack UNPROFOR troops and that the unfortunate incident surrounding the Maglaj convoy was an aberration that had been dealt with. He did not foresee any misunderstandings between UNPROFOR and the BSA provided that our soldiers were conscious of the BSA "dignity and sovereignty". I emphasized the distinction between Close Air Support as an act of self-defence and air strikes as an offensive or punitive action.

17. During a luncheon in Pale, Dr Karadzic expressed interest in the inclusion of Serb areas in the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts of the international community in BH. He believed it was important that the local communities involved identify their own priority projects for rehabilitation and reconstruction. He also indicated that the Serbs were considering a new approach to the question of Sarajevo - this would entail two separate cities rather than their current demand that the present Sarajevo be split in two. The Serb Sarajevo would be built from satellite Serb towns in the Sarajevo area and could have common utilities with the Muslim Sarajevo (except for electrical power which was already separate).

18. In my meeting with President Izetbegovic at the Presidency, I briefed him on the substance of my talks with Dr Karadzic. On the issue of the peace process as a whole, I

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indicated the agreement of the Serbs for their involvement in the process and their eagerness for a global cease-fire. I stressed the need for early negotiations between all military chiefs in order to reach agreement on a cease-fire which would include elements such as the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the interposition of UNPROFOR troops.

19. While President Izetbegovic agreed that the points covered were of pressing concern, he believed that one issue had been omitted - the problem of the "frozen" situation in Sarajevo. He said that the city still lacked freedom of movement for people and goods and this was delaying reconstruction efforts within the city. He requested UNPROFOR assistance in ensuring the opening up of roads and railways for the import of raw materials. With regard to the railway, he has requested UNPROFOR control of some 10 - 15 kilometres of track near the city in order to enable the opening of the Ploce/Sarajevo route.

20. On Gorazde, he expressed concern that the reports of the UNMO's in the pocket did not tally with Presidency reports of mass destruction and killing and requested clarification on this discrepancy. He also said that it was time for the Security Council to take more decisive action on the opening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian flights.

21. Prime Minister Silajdzic noted that the BiH had received information that some 22 Muslim POW's had been taken from Kula prison by the Serbs to be used as human shields in Gorazde. Noting that the BiH had confirmed figures of 13,369 missing people and that the Serbs only acknowledged some 285, he feared that what had happened in Kula could become a practise elsewhere. If this were to happen, and if the Muslim population was aware of it, it could lead to incidents of revenge against Serbs.

22. General Delic, in his intervention, said that the recent Croatian/'RSK' agreement had set a bad precedent for the Bosnian situation due to the model it had applied. The Armija feared that heavy weapons which had not been put under UNPROFOR control in the UNPAs would be used against Bihac and other areas of BH in the near future. In addition, he did not agree that the Sarajevo model should be applied elsewhere in BH as weapons which had been withdrawn from the exclusion zone were being used in the BSA attack on Gorazde. If a similar exclusion zone were drawn around Gorazde, the Serbs would move their weapons to Olovo and so on. The current UNPROFOR approach, however unwittingly, General Delic

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maintained, enabled the BSA to manoeuvre their weapons. He further dismissed the idea of a global cease-fire, stating that it would recognize the actual situation on the ground, as the BSA wanted, and that there could be no real peace anyway without the return of displaced persons to their homes.

23. In response to the concerns raised, I informed President Izetbegovic that I was aware that the current situation in Sarajevo was far from satisfactory and that UNPROFOR would work closely with the Presidency and other concerned parties to ensure that freedom of movement was a fact rather than a blue print. I also assured him that I would take a flexible and broad approach to the mandate of Mr Eagleton in order that his work not be restricted to Sarajevo. However, there was a need to prepare a plan of action and list of priorities for the reconstruction of BH. In this regard, I proposed the organisation of an international donor and financial institution meeting to raise the necessary funds for this endeavour. On the issue of the railway, I assured him that UNPROFOR would do its best to ensure the opening and security of routes in and out of the city.

24. On the issue of POW exchanges and the return of refugees and displaced persons, I informed the President that I intend to work closely and immediately with ICRC and UNHCR on these issues. Prime Minister Silajdzic has recommended, and I agree, that the return of refugees should be done in an organised manner and on a priority basis in order to avoid confusion, chaos and bloodshed. I shall raise the issue with the Secretary-General and Mrs Ogata when I meet with them in Geneva this weekend.

25. General de Lapresle, responding to the comments on UNPROFOR reporting from Gorazde assured President Izetbegvic that the UNMO information had been confirmed by an air recce by NATO planes over the enclave. The BiH side accepted this information with no response.

26. Regards.

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TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

CODE RESTRICTED

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
ROSE, BH COMD, SARAJEVO

FROM : DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 4 April 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z-528

SUBJECT : BIH OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY/BSA REACTION

IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
Palais des Nations
Unit

1. I have attached a copy of an assessment, prepared at the staff level in BH Comd, of the possible BiH/HVO spring offensive. I am, in general terms, in concurrence with this assessment in all but one aspect.
2. There has been an increase in localized offensive military activity on the part of the BiH in the areas of BUGOJNO, TESANJ/TESLIC/MAGLAJ and in the eastern enclaves. In the area of SREBRENICA, it is assessed that the BiH may be operating fighting patrols out of the enclave; essentially using the safe area status as a haven from which to operate. The aim of this activity is likely to be two fold: firstly, to seize territory and, secondly, to provoke a BSA retaliation.
3. There are clear indicators that the BiH are launching limited offensive attacks on the BSA using forces freed up from their prior confrontation line with the HVO. The actual role of the HVO appears to be dependant upon local conditions and relationships and varies from active participation to passive acquiescence.
4. It is also clear that these BiH provocations are causing the level of frustration within the BSA to rise. Retaliation in the form of artillery shelling has been witnessed during the past weeks in many areas (BUGOJNO, MAGLAJ/TESANJ, GRADACAC, OLOVO and the eastern enclaves).

Internal: SRSG, FC, HCA, DFC, COS, G2

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5. The one area in which I am not in total agreement with the attachment is that I think the offensive, if it may be labelled as such, has already begun and will continue to be comprised of ongoing low level activity. At the same time it is UNPROFOR's assessment that the BSA does not have sufficient strength to launch a major offensive action in reply. The present situation, which is deemed to be destabilizing, may well continue in the near term.

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ASSESSMENT ON A POSSIBLE BiH/HVO SPRING OFFENSIVE

1. Politically, the BiH have intimated that there will be a spring offensive and that the war is not over: they have told their people not to attend football matches, sit in cafes or celebrate the end of the war which Delic maintains '... is still going on'. Izetbegovic has spoken out against 'unnecessary romanticism' regarding the BiH/HVO accord, which was a marriage of convenience simply to avoid continuing the war on 2 fronts. The Bosnian Government feels that the Washington Agreement has greatly strengthened its hand and tipped the strategic balance against the Serbs, resolving the problem of access to the sea and neutralising the extreme forces within the Croat national community. However, with their controlling only 15% of BH territory, any stabilisation of the current situation would represent an enormous political and military victory for the Serbs, who control 70% of the country. On the other hand, the BH government are aware that the appetite for the Bosnian public for further fighting is waning rapidly and if they are serious about nation building acting to redress the balance, they must move offensively now.
2. From the Serb point of view, their assembly in Pale rejected any form of federation with the Bosnians and Croats (24/25 March), and remains fiercely belligerent towards them (vide the current offensive in Gorazde) and fearful of the peace process; the BiH would not, in any case, expect the BSA to join them.
3. Dr Karadzic has said that the BiH spring offensive against them has already started and that if it doesn't stop, he will seek further support from Belgrade. He continues to have internal problems with General Mladic, who, militarily, doesn't seem focused on any one place or plan. This is unusual: for the first time, the BSA seem to be on the defensive both politically and militarily, and their mood seems pensive. In contrast, morale within the BiH is at an all-time high.
4. After the spring planting is over, 7 to 10 April, the BiH economy will not be able to support all their people of military age. The BiH have been able to shift some of their ~~forces~~ from Sarajevo and away from their previous defensive positions against the HVO - and these resources are probably being re-grouped, whilst re-arming and training continues. The new freedom of movement, coupled with reduced fighting, has enabled the BiH General Command to further plan and communicate operations reasonably freely amongst 2 million of their people, previously they were concentrating on survival. This is the first time since the war started that they have been able to do this.
5. Except in isolated areas such as Usora, north of Tuzla and in Konjic, HVO troops have not been supporting BiH offensives. However, the HVO can now, for the first time, provide the BiH with a secure rear link for supplies and good lines of communication. It is likely that the HVO will be used as a

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'commodity' to support operations rather than to provide front line troops in coordinated attacks. That true integration is still far off is indicated by the fact that mosques continue to be blown up in BiH territory, and fuel is still not flowing freely to the BiH.

6. In conclusion, with the current bullish and confident leadership, current military and political indicators point towards a spring BiH offensive. If the Muslim people do not quickly identify and speak out for an alternative leadership, the trend towards this offensive against the BSA will continue to gain momentum and be launched no later than mid April.

7. Serbskas concept of hindering UNPROFORs freedom of movement continues to keep us blind to the BSAs plans to counter such an offensive. However, the BSA remain frustrated by the recent accords, the Sarajevo cease-fire and the tipping of the strategic balance in BR against them. Their choice is difficult: either they can offer further territorial concessions and lose in the 'peace' what they gained during a hard and bloody war, or fight on against a uniting and increasingly well equipped enemy.

The Next Steps in Bosnia and Herzegovina

SUFFOCATE THE WAR & FEED THE PEACE

As a consequence of several factors including:

1. the greater projected international, including NATO, resolve;
2. the improving capacity of the defense forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to defend;
3. the improved humanitarian conditions in some Bosnian cities and a movement to return to normalcy; and
4. most significantly, the new opportunities and realities created by the recent Bosnian and Croatian agreement and cooperation that deliver partial peace and deal a direct blow to the politics of ethnic purity and partition.

there is a momentum flowing in the positive direction for the first time in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although a quick overall solution would be desirable, we must be prepared to maintain the positive momentum if, which seems most likely, the Serbians fail to grasp the new opportunities and instead continue down the same dead-end road. This can be best accomplished by "suffocating the war and feeding the peace."

SUFFOCATE THE WAR

The objectives should be to simultaneously choke-off the Serbian war machine, confront new and existing acts of aggression, deny and challenge the results of exercised aggression.

I. Deny the Serbians the option to continue and/or initiate acts of aggression. Confront any attacks against "safe areas". Create "new safe areas" under UN Security Council Resolutions 824 and 836, to minimize potential targets. Interdict Serbian supply lines by placing border monitors (as already mandated by Resolution 838) or by other necessary measures. These actions will choke off the Serbian military machine by denying it new or existing targets and will maximize the areas that are returning slowly from sieges and shelling to peace and normalcy. Failure to undertake this fundamental step would encourage further Serbian militarism, extremism and intransigence and undermine Croatian and Bosnian support for the New Federation and Confederation agreements.

II. Do not allow the status quo and current confrontation lines to become entrenched. The Serbians must not be encouraged to believe that their grasp on existing territories would be solidified under their control by the de-facto recognition of "green lines" that incorporate Serbian conquests. De-facto recognition of old realities created by force and ethnic cleansing would encourage new realities to be created by the same tools.

III. Allow the defensive forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the unhindered exercise of their responsibilities and rights (including the termination of the de-facto arms embargo). This will facilitate the realization of the goals enumerated in paragraphs I and II above, as well as the long term defensive needs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under any durable peace agreement.

IV. UNPROFOR's presence should be enhanced to fit a more robust role. Troops from all NATO members and other responsible nations should be encouraged to maximize the deterrence impact.

V. Maintain and enhance the economic and political sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro and Serbian controlled territories. This action chokes off the Serbian War Machine and denies it legitimacy.

VI. Encourage moderate elements within Serbia proper. This can be achieved by enhancing the independent media within and broadcasting into Serbia.

FEED THE PEACE

Redevelopment and economic assistance (in addition to ongoing humanitarian aid) should be initiated even before an overall peace is achieved not only to ameliorate living conditions and prompt a return to normalcy, but also to encourage the warring Bosnian Serbs to join the peace agreement. A new mind set must be encouraged within the warring Bosnian Serbs. Redevelopment, economic and cultural factors can be relied upon as peacemaking as well as peacekeeping tools.

I. Initiate agreements and implementation of bilateral, multilateral and internationally managed assistance for redevelopment including:
infrastructure, essential services, industry, education, healthcare, and environment.

II. The creation of jobs is needed to occupy a generation too accustomed to war.

III. Rehabilitate the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina's status within the various international financial organizations including the World Bank and IMF.

IV. Initiate the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Associate Membership in the European Union as well as its membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

V. Encourage private investment and assist in the pursuance of privatization programs.

VI. War crimes must be pursued. Extremists and their philosophies and politics will be weakened and a new moderate mind set will be encouraged.

VII. Relocate offices of various agencies (such as UNICEF and UNHCR) responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina from neighboring countries to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo). This action will improve coordination, provide additional economic benefits to the local economy and have significant symbolic value.

VIII. Provide direct assistance to educational, cultural and social programs within the country and for multinational exchanges. Encourage cultural events that display the religious and ethnic diversity of Bosnia and Sarajevo over the past centuries.

IX. Lift the de-facto sieges, de-militarize, and open transportation and communications within and with the outside for as many Bosnian cities as practical. Facilitate road, rail, air, telephone and mass media links.

X. Maintain humanitarian assistance where needed by convoys and air drops and using all necessary measures where appropriate.

Periodically, updates will be provided to this memorandum including exhibits which will detail some of the points alluded to above briefly.