

UNAMIR

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

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**RWANDA - UNAMIR:**

**PARTNERS FOR PEACE**



**UNAMIR**

**MINUAR**

1.

MINUAR II et le Gouvernement Rwandais  
"Partenaires pour la Paix"  
Allocution du Commandant des Forces de la MINUAR II  
Avril 5, 1995

Mesdames et Messieurs recevez mes chaleureuses et cordiales salutations.

Je voudrais commencer cette allocution par vous remercier de votre présence ici ce matin. Votre présence constitue pour moi un encouragement. En effet, c'est un signe positif du niveau élevé de l'intérêt tant international que national qui continue d'exister puisque la MINUAR II et le Gouvernement Rwandais - "Partenaires pour la Paix"- travaillent ensemble et avec succès vers cette tâche noble de la réconciliation pacifique et la reconstruction du Rwanda.

Cette semaine rappelle le début du chapitre sombre dans l'histoire du Rwanda et je voudrais exprimer mes sincères condoléances à vous tous qui avez perdu les membres de famille, les amis et tous ceux qui vous étaient chers au cours de ces derniers douze mois. Je voudrais également reconnaître la frustration de certains d'entre vous concernant le comportement de la MINUAR I dans les événements de l'année passée. Souvent il n'est pas compris que les actions de la MINUAR I étaient régies par un mandat spécifique, ce qui signifiaient que la tragédie de l'année passée ne pouvait pas être empêchée. Nous partageons votre frustration. Cependant, l'on ne devait pas oublier que nonobstant les limites de ce mandant, la MINUAR I a aidé à sauver beaucoup de vies humaines.

Il importe cependant de reconnaître maintenant le bon travail que la MINUAR II a accompli au cours de ces derniers 7 mois et d'attendre le future puisque nous continuons à faire de nouveaux progrès en collaboration avec le Gouvernement Rwandais. La MINUAR II s'est engagée à contribuer sans relâche dans la sécurité et la stabilité du Rwanda et à assister le Gouvernement Rwandais dans la réconciliation pacifique et le processus de reconstruction.

Durant mon stage, comme Commandant des Forces de la MINUAR II, nous avons travaillé étroitement avec le Gouvernement Rwandais et ensemble avons réalisé des progrès remarquables dans ce secteur. De concert, nous avons créé et promu un climat de paix et de sécurité dans le pays et maintenant nous avons entamé le travail, combien difficile, de reconstruire le Rwanda. Bien plus, dans ce que je crois être l'initiative sans précédent dans l'histoire du maintien de la paix, la MINUAR II et le Gouvernement Rwandais ont aidé à coordonner et à faciliter les efforts humanitaires d'un large nombre des agences onusiennes et non-gouvernementales oeuvrant toutes vers un but commun. Le succès de cette initiative historique a joué un rôle important dans notre progrès au Rwanda.

Je félicite le Gouvernement Rwandais et le peuple Rwandais pour s'être engagés à collaborer avec la MINUAR II en vue de faire face aux multiples défis quotidiens, quand ensemble nous ramenons la paix, la vie et l'espoir au pays. Il y a une année, le Rwanda était une nation déchirée mais actuellement la renaissance et la reconstruction ont commencé et nous sommes en train de faire des progrès sensibles dans la guérison de ce pays. Comme preuves tangibles de nos réalisations, je vous invite à regarder la ville

florissante de Kigali, la croissante économie nationale, et les infrastructures dont le gouvernement dispose maintenant. Ce succès et ce progrès témoignent des éléments les plus importants de ce processus - la volonté ferme du peuple Rwandais d'en finir avec le passé et d'affronter le futur sur la voie de la réconciliation pacifique. Même s'il reste beaucoup à faire, je suis confiant que nous sommes sur une bonne voie et que nos efforts seront toujours couronnés de succès.

Nous pouvons citer deux grands défis pour le Rwanda, le retour paisible des réfugiés Rwandais et celui des personnes déplacées dans leurs communes d'origine ainsi que l'incorporation d'un système juridique stable et juste. Ensemble, la MINUAR II et le Gouvernement Rwandais sont en train de faire face à ces défis et les progrès réalisés jusqu'à présent sont encourageants. Je garde confiance que si nous continuons à travailler ensemble, nous allons répondre à ces défis. Quand nous aurons accompli cela, nous nous retrouverons alors, et j'en ai l'espoir, en train de commémorer l'anniversaire marquant non pas le début de la tragédie mais plutôt celui de la renaissance de cette nation.

Je voudrais, avant de conclure, réitérer la nécessité d'une collaboration positive entre le Gouvernement Rwandais, le peuple Rwandais et la MINUAR II qui est la clé du succès de la réconciliation pacifique et la reconstruction du pays. Soyez assurés du soutien et de la coopération de la MINUAR puisque nous travaillons ensemble comme "Partenaire pour la Paix" pour accomplir cet important objectif.

Je vous remercie.



# FORCE COMMANDER

## MAJOR-GENERAL G.C. TOUSIGNANT, OMM, CD

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)

Major General Guy Tousignant was born on April 19, 1941 in Sherbrooke, Québec. He enrolled in classical studies at Séminaire Saint-Charles, and then at the University of Sherbrooke, Faculty of Educational Science where he completed his formal education. In 1962, he commissioned with the Canadian Officers Training Corps at the University of Montreal.

In January 1963 he became a member of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. During his early years of service, he instructed at the Royal Canadian Ordnance School in Montreal. In 1966 he went to Trois-Rivières Recruiting Centre where he was a recruiting officer and then Detachment Commander. This was followed by a posting to Germany as a logistics officer with 4 Service Battalion and 1st Battalion 22e Regiment from 1968 to 1971.

In 1971 he returned to Canada. He served as an instructor at the Canadian Forces School of Administration and Logistics at Borden, Ontario until he was promoted to the rank of Major in 1973. After his promotion, he continued to serve as the Administration Company Commander at the School until he went to the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in 1974 where he continued his military studies. A posting to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa followed as a career manager until 1977, when he became Deputy Commanding Officer of 1 Service Battalion in Calgary.

He was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in 1979

and became the Senior Staff Officer (Administration) of 5 Canadian Brigade Group in Valcartier, Quebec. A year later, he was appointed Commanding Officer, 5e Battalion des services du Canada. While in this appointment he assumed the functions of Base Technical Services Officer for Canadian Forces Base Valcartier. In 1982 he returned to NDHQ in the Directorate of Procurement and Supply Services. In May 1983 he was made an officer of the Order of Military Merit.

On July 11, 1983 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. A month later, on August 15, he was appointed Commanding Officer, 25 Canadian Forces Supply Depot in Montreal where he remained until 1986. He then returned to his military studies at the National Defence College. In July 1987 he was appointed Command Comptroller at Land Force Command in St-Hubert, Québec.

On June 22, 1990, he was promoted to Brigadier-General and on July 19, 1990 he returned to the Canadian Forces Base Borden as Base Commander. He was promoted Major-General and appointed Commandant of the National Defence College in Kingston, Ontario in 1993. On August 15, 1994 he takes command of the military force of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Major General Tousignant is married to Shirley Haddock of Pender Harbour, British Columbia. He has two children; a son – Sylvain, who is an officer in the Royal Canadian Artillery, and a daughter Michelle.

UNAMIR II and The Rwandan Government:  
"Partners For Peace"  
UNAMIR II Force Commander's Statement  
April 5, 1995

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to begin by thanking you for being here this morning. I am encouraged by your presence because this is a positive indicator of the high level of international and national interest that continues to exist as UNAMIR II and the Rwandan Government - "Partners For Peace" - successfully work together towards the important task of the peaceful reconciliation and rebuilding of Rwanda.

This week marks the beginning of a dark chapter in the history of Rwanda and I would like to offer my sincere condolences to all of you who have lost family, friends and loved ones over the past twelve months. I would also like to acknowledge the frustration felt by some of you about the role that UNAMIR I had in regards to last year's events. Often, it is not understood that the actions of UNAMIR I were dictated by a specific mandate, which meant that the tragedy of last year could not be prevented. We share your frustration. However, it should not be forgotten that, given the specifics of its mandate, UNAMIR I did help to save many lives.

What is important now however, is to recognize the work that UNAMIR II has done over the past seven months and to look to the future, as we continue to make new progress in cooperation with the Rwandan Government. UNAMIR II is committed to a continued contribution towards the security and stability of Rwanda and to assisting the Rwandan Government in the peaceful reconciliation and rebuilding process.

During my time as Force Commander of UNAMIR II, we have worked closely with the Rwandan Government and together we have made remarkable progress in this regard.

Working in consultation, we have helped to create and promote a climate of peace and security in the country and we are now moving on with the challenging task of the rebuilding of Rwanda. Furthermore, in what I believe to be an unprecedented initiative in the history of peacekeeping, UNAMIR II and the Rwandan Government have helped to coordinate and facilitate the humanitarian efforts of a large number of United Nations and non-governmental agencies, all working together towards a common goal. The success of this historic initiative has played an important part in our progress in Rwanda.

I commend both the Rwandan Government and the people of Rwanda for their committed efforts in working with UNAMIR II to meet the many challenges which are faced everyday as together, we bring peace, life and hope back to the country. A year ago, Rwanda was a broken nation, but now the rebirth and rebuilding have begun and we are making steady progress towards the healing of the country. You can see tangible evidence of our initiatives by looking at the thriving city of Kigali, at the growing national economy and at the governmental infrastructure that now exists. This success and progress is testimony to the most important element of the process - the willpower of the Rwandan people to come to terms with the past and to move forward into the future on the road to peaceful reconciliation. While it is true that there remains much work to be done, I am confident that we are on the right path and our perseverance will continue to be rewarded.

The two main challenges that lay ahead for Rwanda include the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons back to their home communes as well as the incorporation of a sound and fair judicial system. Together, UNAMIR II and the Rwandan Government are addressing these challenges and I am encouraged by our progress so far and am confident that, by continuing to work together, we will successfully meet these challenges. When we have done



so, we then will hopefully find ourselves not commemorating the anniversary marking the start of a tragedy, but instead we will find ourselves celebrating the rebirth of a nation.

In closing, I would like to once again thank the Rwandan Government and the people of Rwanda for their positive cooperation with UNAMIR II which has been integral to the success of the peaceful reconciliation and rebuilding of the country. I can assure you that you have the support and cooperation of all of us who make up UNAMIR II as we work together as "Partners For Peace" in achieving this important goal.

Thank you.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

# ***RWANDA***

*Humanitarian Situation Report*  
*15 June 1995*

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Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator

This Humanitarian Situation Report has been compiled from information gathered from the Government, UN Agencies, UNAMIR, ICRC, IOM, NGOs and Donors. It will be produced once a month and will seek to give an up-to-date picture of the progress or constraints in key areas of humanitarian interventions in Rwanda. The report will also highlight and analyse political and socio-economic trends in the country to the extent that they may have implications for on-going humanitarian activities. The Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator welcomes contributions from its humanitarian partners.


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# Overview

- After considerable debate between the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the Government of Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council has voted to renew the mandate of UNAMIR but with a substantial reduction in troop levels. The current level of 5,550 troops will be cut to 2,330 over the next three months and further reduced to 1,800 by the end of September 1995.
- The Government of Rwanda has said that the country no longer needs so many foreign troops and that their continued presence is a threat to its sovereignty. The decision to decrease the level of UNAMIR troops in Rwanda comes at a time when insecurity due to robberies and banditry, particularly in Kigali and Butare, has increased. In addition, night movement of UN and NGO vehicles has been drastically curtailed as a result of almost daily car thefts. There have also been reports of increased incursions by former Rwandan government forces along the border areas to the northwest and southwest of the country.
- Two separate reports - *Human Rights Watch* and *Amnesty International* - have highlighted the serious implications of the arms build up by former Rwandan government troops in neighbouring Zaïre. The reports accuse France, Zaïre, South Africa, the Seychelles and China of providing weapons or other military support to the former Government. The Government of Rwanda has expressed its deep concern at the lack of action on the part of the international community to prevent militarisation in the refugee camps, as well as the delivery of arms to the exiled former army.
- Elsewhere in the region, instability and insecurity also continues to be a major concern. In Burundi, there have been violent skirmishes between the army and militias which has led to a mass exodus from part of the capital, Bujumbura, and of Rwandese refugees out of a camp in northern Burundi. The Prime Minister of Rwanda and the Vice-President and Minister of Defence have both recently visited Burundi to discuss regional security matters.

## MAP OF RWANDA



#### Overview (cont'd)

- In the north of the country, concern continues for the hundreds of thousands of cattle who have moved into the Mutara area with returning refugees many of them in exile since 1959. A task force has been set up under the direction of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration with representation from UN agencies and NGOs to look into ways of alleviating what could be a potential crisis.
- On the economic front, preparations for the Mid-Term Review of the Geneva Round Table scheduled for early July are progressing well. However, six months after the Round Table Conference, actual disbursements to the Round Table represent a disappointing 10% of the total amount pledged, seriously inhibiting the implementation of essential programmes.
- Rehabilitation activities, meanwhile, continue to be undertaken alongside relief and recovery assistance programmes. The food pipeline situation has stabilised and will enable food aid organisations to cover planned programmes for the coming months. Furthermore, Harvest B of 1995 is expected to produce even higher crop yields than the last harvest season.
- Within the Great Lakes region, an outstanding issue is still the safe and voluntary return of the over 2 million Rwandese refugees in neighbouring countries. It is recognised that the stability and security of Rwanda is significantly dependant upon the early repatriation of those outside the country. The continuing violence in Burundi has raised some fears of possible population outflows into surrounding countries including Rwanda. Significant steps are, however, being taken by the Organisation of African Unity to seek reconciliation in Burundi.

## I. Main Developments

### Political

Key concerns have been raised in reports by *Human Rights Watch* and *Amnesty International* concerning the continued flow of arms in support of the former Rwandan government forces. As mentioned in earlier DHA reports, the reports accuse France, China, South Africa, Seychelles and Zaïre of involvement in the sale of arms to the former Rwandese army.

Despite denials from the Government of Zaïre, the reports also point at Zaïre for complicity in military training of the former troops. The Government of Rwanda has expressed frustration about the deteriorating security situation along its borders and has appealed to the international community to halt further arms shipment and military training.

In Resolution 997, passed on 9 June, the UN Security Council clarified that "the arms embargo imposed on Rwanda also applies to the sale or supply of arms and material to persons in the states neighbouring Rwanda if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or materiel within Rwanda." The Security Council, under the resolution, also called upon states neighbouring Rwanda to take actions to put to an end factors contributing to the destabilisation of Rwanda and to ensure that arms and materiel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories.

The mandate of UNAMIR was revised in June following a period characterised by mixed signals from the Government on the continued need for the peace-keeping force. In some areas of the country, anti-UNAMIR demonstrations were planned within the last week of May to press for the departure of UNAMIR upon the expiry of its mandate. The Vice-President and Min-

ister for Defence, Major-General Paul Kagame, however, said that although Rwanda should be allowed to operate as a fully sovereign state, it also needed the assistance of the international community in reconstruction. The Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorized a reduction of the force level to 2,300 troops within three months and to 1,800 troops within four months of the resolution.

Under its revised mandate, UNAMIR will help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement; assist the Government of Rwanda to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through monitoring throughout the country with military and police observers; support the provision of humanitarian aid including demining, assist in the training of a national police force and contribute to the security in Rwanda.

Responding recently to the findings of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on the April 1995 events at Kibeho, the Government vowed to carry out the recommendations of the Commission. These include an independent Government investigation into the events in the IDP camps. In the meantime, the European Union has decided to resume its US\$ 55 million worth of development assistance to Rwanda suspended following the April events in Kibeho IDP camp.

Progress on the justice front remains slow. Despite the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 978 that urges states to arrest and assist in bringing to justice sus-



pects of genocide as well as the transmittal of lists of alleged criminals, many of those responsible for the genocide remain free in countries abroad. An encouraging step, however, was taken by Belgium in early June when a warrant of arrest was issued for Colonel Theonaste Bagosora, the former Directeur de Cabinet in the Ministry of Defence. Colonel Bagosora is believed to have ordered the killing of the late Prime Minister, Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian peacekeepers.

### **Security**

In recent weeks, the Government has made considerable effort to secure border areas, particularly to the north-west and south-west of the country. These areas have witnessed low scale but relatively well organised incursions by former government troops in Zaïre. One recent example that occurred on 18/19 May resulted in the destruction of a transformer that ensures power supply to Ruhengeri and parts of Byumba and Gisenyi. Plastic explosives were recovered from the site. Repair work at the site was subsequently disrupted when a worker stepped on a mine.

In other parts of the country, the government is taking firm action to enhance security. In mid-May, due to increasing acts of banditry in Gitarama Prefecture, a cordon and search operation was carried out in the town and some arms and ammunition, including hand grenades were recovered. A similar operation was carried out in Butare Prison in response to a tip-off that prisoners were planning a break-out.

Within the communes, deployment of RPA soldiers has enhanced security. Military observers, however, report that where there is no RPA presence in communes, insecurity has increased. Isolated cases of clashes

between RPA soldiers and local populations have been reported. In a Radio Rwanda report, the Vice-President emphasised the need for soldiers to be brought into barracks.

Within the urban areas, particularly Kigali, theft of UN vehicles has become a near-daily occurrence despite a strong advisory, largely followed, discouraging night movement of UN vehicles. Armed house robberies have also continued, mainly in Kigali and Butare. In one incident, a UNAMIR expatriate was kidnapped by armed men as part of an attempted burglary at UNAMIR headquarters. NGOs have expressed growing concern over security, particularly in view of the planned reduction of the size of UNAMIR formed troops.

In June, the Vice-President and Minister of Defence officiated at the closing of a 6 month course for 300 Rwandese gendarmeries who were trained by UNAMIR. This brings the total number of gendarmeries in the country to 400.

### **Economic Activities**

The slow delivery of economic assistance pledged at the Geneva Round Table has continued to curtail the implementation of planned projects. As at 18 May, disbursements by donors was estimated at US\$ 72 million, equivalent to only 10% of the pledged total of US\$ 702 million. Commitments as at 18 May by donors were estimated at US\$ 293 equivalent to 42% of the pledged total. Disbursement rates are presumed to depend upon the absorption capacity of the Government and to the rate of implementation. Both factors are assumed to be closely linked to the security conditions in the country.

Preparatory work for the up-coming Mid-Term Review has progressed well. A focal point in each relevant Ministry has been identified to prepare a report describing the progress made in the implementation of the Round Table programme to date. The focal point will also be responsible for outlining the plan of action for the period July 1995 - June 1996. The information produced by the various ministries will be compiled for presentation at the Mid-Term Review scheduled to take place on 6 - 7 July 1995. In addition, the Minister of Planning has requested a comprehensive inventory of all externally-financed activities conducted in Rwanda by UN agencies and NGOs since the end of the war. This information will also be presented at the Mid-Term Review.

UNDP consultants are working with MINIPLAN, MINIREISO, UNHCR and the World Bank to prepare a plan of action for the reintegration of and specific projects for refugees that will be submitted to the donors during the Mid-Term Review of the Round Table.

#### Trust Fund Programme Activities

Total contributions received to date by UNDP under the UN Secretary-General's Trust Fund for Rwanda have totalled US\$ 12,832,531.

Two new projects have been submitted through the Ministry of Planning to UNDP headquarters for final approval. These are:

- I. **Phase II of Emergency Assistance Programme for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the City of Kigali and other Urban Centres.** It is expected that over a period of nine months some 20 public buildings located in Kigali and other

main towns will be rehabilitated under this project. The project implementation cell already established for Phase I will also serve for the Phase II project. The executing agency, Habitat, also remains unchanged.

- II. **Financial Support to the Functioning of the National University of Rwanda budgeted at US\$ 1.4 million.** Of this amount, US\$ 1 million will be used for university operating costs with US\$ 400,000 set aside for the repair of university buildings and facilities. The project will be executed jointly by the Ministry of Finance and the National University of Rwanda

US\$ 2.2 million of Trust Fund money has been disbursed to pay the salaries of Rwandese civil servants for the months of April and May. This is part of a project that aims to give financial support to the functioning of the Rwandese Administration.

Implementation of Phase I of UNDP's **Framework Programme for Support to the Reintegration of Returnees and Rehabilitation of Communes** continues. A local company has been selected to provide urgently needed office equipment. Bids for the supply of necessary vehicles are now being reviewed.

#### **Justice**

Delays in setting into motion the national judicial system continue to be experienced. Due to a lack of consensus on the suitability of some of the 12 candidates presented to it by the Government, the National Assembly was unable to proceed with the selection of six judges to the Supreme Court. Although the appointment of these judges remains urgent, the matter was

deferred until the Government can review the nominations.

In related activities, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued its support for the training project of *Inspecteurs et Officiers de Police Judiciare* through Citizen's Network and is providing US\$ 157,000 for the project.

In the meantime, The UN General Assembly elected on 24/25 May, by secret ballot, the judges who will serve in the trial chambers of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. Those elected are from South Africa, Senegal, Bangladesh, Sweden, the Russian Federation and Tanzania. At the same time, a UN mission recently visited Arusha, Tanzania, the seat of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, to assess the technical and logistical needs for the establishment of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is scheduled to hold its inaugural meeting in the Hague on 26 June 1995.

#### Prisons

Considerable attention has been paid to the situation in prisons in the course of the month. A cabinet meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Rwandese President to discuss the report submitted by the Commission appointed to locate buildings which could be used as temporary detention places. The Commission found 7 buildings which can house 26,600 detainees.

Currently there are over 42,000 prisoners incarcerated in some 168 prisons and detention centres country-wide. Over 10,000 are in Kigali Central Prison which had been built to hold 2,000 prisoners. The continued rise in the numbers of detainees, may however, be stemmed by a Government decision to limit arrests, especially those related to genocide, to only those cases for which there is sufficient evidence.

Work is also underway on the construction of permanent housing at the new Nsinda prison and the expansion of Butare, Cyangugu, Kibuye and Kigali prisons. Construction work at the Nsinda prison is expected to be completed within the next three months.

#### Human Rights

The Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR), established under the auspices of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, presently consists of 118 Human Rights Field Officers (HRFOs) comprising 47 UN Volunteers, 33 European Union officers, one expert seconded to the Operation by the Government of Switzerland for the purpose of investigation, and 17 officers recruited by the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs has also seconded an officer to head the Field Coordinating Unit (FCU) of the HRFOR.

The HRFOR currently has 11 field offices: 9 prefectural headquarters (Butare, Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Gisenyi, Gitarama, Kibungo, Kibuye, Kigali and Ruhengeri), two additional offices in the southwest (Rwamagana and Rilima) and one sub-office at Nyamasheke in Cyangugu Prefecture. After the last IDPs left Kibeho camp and large numbers of IDPs had returned to their home communes, HRFOR terminated its emergency coordination structure in the affected areas in Butare, Gikongoro and Bugesera. The 20 additional HRFOs who were transferred there to strengthen the presence of HRFOR during the emergency period, have since been redeployed to other field offices.

In mid-May, the HRFOR established a Field Coordination Unit (FCU) to direct operations and create more efficient systems to collate, analyse and process infor-

mation from the field. The FCU is also compiling and developing operational methodology and providing field coordination and support services for outposted teams.

As part of its on-going activities, the HRFOR's Technical Coordination Unit (TCU) has continued to address the question of arbitrary arrests, grassroots needs of judicial investigators, systems of transferring prisoners and their dossiers as well as the urgent need to expand the prison capacity in the country. The TCU has

appointed one expert to help promote the rights of women. In addition, the TCU has held meetings with members of the Transitional Legislative Assembly which include members of the Assembly's Human Rights Commission to determine the needs of the commission.

Planned TCU activities include a four-day seminar on Human Rights and the future of journalism in Rwanda to begin on 19 June. The seminar has been organised by HRFOR in cooperation with UNESCO and UNICEF.

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## II. Humanitarian Assistance

Despite improvements in the overall situation in Rwanda since July 1994, it is recognised that there remains a wide range of humanitarian issues for which the Government, with the support of the UN agencies, needs to prepare. It is in this respect that a contingency planning exercise is being undertaken allowing agencies to review the overall humanitarian situation throughout Rwanda, as well as to constitute a Disaster Management Team. On 2 June, a meeting of all Heads of Agencies was held to finalise matters pertaining to the composition of the DMT as well as procedures that should govern its operation.

Relief and recovery assistance continues to be provided in support of home communities and includes assistance to those who have recently returned from the IDP camps. Firm statistics on the numbers of

people received by communes, following IDP camp closure are difficult to establish due, in part, to the reduced capacity of the local administration to carry out any comprehensive registration of returnees and also due to the current mobile nature of the population in the south-west.

Phase I of the Government of Rwanda/ UNDP Commune Rehabilitation programmes is underway and targets 59 communes in prioritised areas in the country. Initial assistance under this programme includes the distribution of essential office supplies to commune offices. Assessments of needs in the communes continue to be carried out with the assistance of the Commune Rehabilitation Committee in the Integrated Operations Centre, (IOC). Meanwhile, consultations are being held between the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration and UN agencies to determine

the future role of the Integrated Operations Centre.

Government Ministries and UN Agencies continue to monitor closely the developing situation in the northeast of the country, where the onset of the dry season, coupled with last year's large influx of people and cattle, threaten to stretch local resources to their limit. A task force led by the Chef de Cabinet in the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration has been formed to create a comprehensive development plan for the region. The task force meets weekly, and includes representatives from ministries and UN agencies.

UNHCR has funded several NGOs which are addressing the pressing need for water in the area through the rehabilitation and construction of piped water systems and installation of wells. The Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration with FAO is conducting a census of cattle in the area and investigating viable means to reduce the cattle population.

### **Food Assistance**

The food situation in the country is stable. Substantial vegetable crops have been harvested in recent months and Season B of 1995, comprising primarily sorghum and beans, is expected to produce even higher crop yields than the last harvest season, which was approximately 65% of an average pre-war year. The food pipeline situation has also improved. The main food aid distributors (WFP, ICRC and CRS) report that they have sufficient quantities of food in stock to cover planned distribution programmes.

In May, most of the international community's attention was focused on feeding

projects for returnees, particularly the former IDPs, who returned to their communes of origin in large numbers with little means of support. Distribution to this category of beneficiaries has already been concluded in most parts of Rwanda. Distribution continues in a few communes in Gikongoro, Butare and Byumba prefectures.

Other food assistance programmes to returnees - both the "old and new caseload" - have proceeded as planned. In May, through the provision of food to collective accommodation centres and way-stations, WFP assisted 118,000 returnees while an additional 60,000 received food following their arrival in communes of origin. WFP also provided food for 16,000 unaccompanied children, hospital and nutritional centre patients, 30,000 other vulnerable beneficiaries and 7,000 public secondary boarding-school students. In addition, through several Food-for-Work schemes, WFP assisted 110,000 workers and their families with food.

In May, therefore, through general, food-for-work and nutritional programmes, WFP distributed a total of 3,275 MT to 316,000 beneficiaries.

In June 1995, WFP will continue all existing programmes. These include targeted assistance to vulnerable groups which will be increased as some of those previously catered for under returnee programmes will be incorporated into this beneficiary group. It is estimated that some 40,000 vulnerable persons will be provided food assistance. WFP, in cooperation with UNICEF, will also provide food for demobilised child-soldiers.

In related programmes, WFP will restart food distribution to 18,000 secondary boarding-school students in 6 prefectures in cooperation with the Ministry of Education,



ICRC and an NGO, Rwandan Education 2000. In addition, due to the irregular payment of salaries of primary school teachers, WFP will re-initiate Food-for-Work programmes for this category of workers for a period of two months to begin in June to assist some 18,000 teachers and their families. The programme will benefit a total of 80,000 people.

In June 1995, WFP anticipates to distribute 3,438 MT of cereals, 1,650 MT of pulses, 355 MT of oil, 47 MT of CSB, 38 MT of biscuits and 9 MT of milk powder - a total of 5,537 of food covering an estimated 385,000 beneficiaries.

In addition to feeding programmes, WFP and FAO have begun a nationwide assessment of the crop and food security situation. In cooperation with other aid organisations and donors, WFP will continue to study possibilities for a long term evaluation of vulnerable groups and ways to best target food aid over the coming months.

At present, WFP World Food has 11,031 MT of food in stock in Rwanda, while an additional 16,736 MT has already been pre-positioned in WFP regional warehouses in Mombasa, Kampala, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. These stocks, depending upon the particular commodity, are expected to cover 10 - 25 weeks of projected requirements within Rwanda. Considering the stocks, food currently being purchased or transported to regional ports and donor pledges, WFP does not foresee any serious disruption of its feeding programmes in the next six months.

### **Agriculture and Livestock**

An FAO/WFP team is currently in Rwanda to assess the 1995 - B season's harvest. Although results of the harvest look prom-

ising, the total area sown is still below normal has because of absentee farmers especially in the southern zones closer to the former IDP camps. Rainfall has been timely and adequate throughout the country. In preparation for Season 1996 - A (Sept. 95 - Jan 96), FAO with World Bank funding has embarked on a programme of seed multiplication with the collaboration of MINAGRI, selected NGOs, and 500 farmers. Some 50 hectares of land are being used for the programmes. Initial emphasis for seed multiplication has been on beans in the Kigali region and sweet potatoes and cassava in the Butare region.

FAO's seed multiplication programmes will be greatly expanded and concentrated on Rwandese bean varieties in the 1996 - A season. These programmes will be conducted in close cooperation with international research centres supporting Seeds of Hope and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Within the livestock sector, renewed emphasis on animal disease control has been facilitated by a Swedish funded project through FAO. The core of concern with livestock at present still revolves around the imbalance of numbers of cattle. An estimated 400,000 cattle are on about 375,000 hectares of land in the Mutara region alone and an unconfirmed 300,000 head are elsewhere in the country seeking forage and water in the dry season.

The fragility of the Mutara region itself is such that a maximum of 100,000 head could possibly be sustained with unusually careful husbandry. It is the current pressure of excess cattle that endangers future sustainability of the area even for minimal numbers. Aside from that, environmental aspects in terms of soil compaction with consequent abnormal run-off, deforestation, lowering of water table levels and denuding the region of forage and wildlife

might well come into sharper focus earlier than expected.

Within the country as a whole, a major task remains that of repopulating farm holdings with healthy sedentary cattle (Zero grazing), small ruminants and poultry.

### Health

An immunisation campaign as well as several training programmes were carried out during this reporting period. An anti-polio campaign launched on 27 May aims to vaccinate some 800,000 children under the age of five. A training programme on epidemiological surveillance, organised by WHO in collaboration with UNICEF, for 300 health personnel from all functioning health centres country-wide was carried out from 8 - 17 May.

At the same time, two seminars on STD/HIV/AIDS awareness were organised with the help of UNICEF, WHO, AIDSCAP as well as the National Aids Control Programme (NACP). As a result of the workshop organised on 30 - 31 May, a permanent IEC Commission has been established, a national IEC policy drafted, guidelines for collaboration between all partners and sectoral plans of action created. All activities will be coordinated by the NACP through the Commission. In other related programmes, supplementary feeding programmes benefiting some 1,200 families of victims of AIDS are being supported by WFP through Caritas.

WHO, jointly with the Ministry of Health, carried out a countrywide assessment of the pharmaceutical system from 2 May - 15 June. Essential equipment including communications equipment, computers and other office material has been delivered to the Central Medical Stores (OPHAR). WHO is also supporting the

national programme for the training of *auxiliares de sante*. Other support to the health ministry has been given by WFP who is providing food for work rations for health committee volunteers in Gisenyi.

UNHCR continues to support five district hospitals and 42 health centres in various regions throughout Rwanda through the provision of medical supplies and equipment, training of and payment of incentives to local medical staff and rehabilitation of buildings. The activities are centred upon areas to which returnees are expected to resettle in large numbers - specifically, Kibungo, Byumba, Kigali rural, Cyangugu and Gisenyi. The UNHCR medical warehouse remains open to limited distributions of medical equipment and medical supplies.

### Education

Training for teacher prisoners in the use of Teacher Emergency Packages (TEPs) was carried out by UNICEF/UNESCO in Kigali Central Prison on 15 - 17 May. Six teacher-prisoners received TEP training and were also given a demonstration on basic literacy and numeracy along with a class of 25 boys. With UNICEF/UNESCO's help in providing five kits, the teacher-prisoners will continue the education of minors pending their transfer to the Gitagata detention centre. The joint UNESCO/ UNICEF education programme for child prisoners has now been expanded and will extend to all 13 major prisons in the country.

A Water-Borne Diseases Awareness Campaign was launched on 15 May. In the first stage of the campaign, UNICEF/ UNESCO's team of trainers is training selected primary school teachers and school inspectors who will in turn train the teachers of over 900,000 primary school chil-

dren country-wide on the prevention and treatment of water-borne diseases. Among other skills, the children will be taught to make Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS). Out of a targeted 1,361 trainees, 411 have been trained so far in Cyangugu, Kibungo and Gisenyi prefectures.

Commencing 22 May, the Ministry of Higher Education with the support of UNICEF/UNESCO, convened a four-day national workshop on Tolerance attended by over 60 participants drawn from Ministries, human rights groups, the National Assembly, religious denominations, the national university, local NGOs, the mass media and UN agencies. The seminar was held at the Centre Christus in Kigali where the first massacre of Jesuit priests and others took place on 7 April last year. The meeting was held to mark the UN Year of Tolerance, the promotion of which UNESCO has been given special responsibility. The final conference report is expected to propose practical steps to promote tolerance through schools, the church and the media.

In related activities, UNHCR has provided support for a human rights seminar for teachers and education inspectors in Gisenyi prefecture. In Kigali, some 130 female heads of households from Gitega sector attended a four-day training programme in general business management and credit schemes. The training is part of a non-formal education programme being supported by UNHCR.

Other UNHCR support to the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education has included the provision of 15 light trucks to the Ministry for use in various secondary schools throughout the country and assistance in the distribution of food items to secondary schools that have recently reopened. In addition, UNHCR has repaired 16 out of the 25 schools it plans to rehabili-

tate in Gisenyi and has also provided furniture to Camp Kigali Primary School in Kigali.

### **Water and Sanitation**

In the process of repairing Kigali Central Hospital's sewage system, a local contractor has come across additional mass graves on the hospital grounds. UNICEF has distributed gloves and plastic sheeting to the workers who are exhuming the bodies.

Within Kigali, support for water and sanitation activities is being given by UNICEF through the supply of materials for ongoing repair and improvement works at the Yanze Intake. This facility is the source of water for the Kimisagara Water Treatment Plant which supplies water to over 450,000 residents in Kigali.

UNICEF has continued to provide fuel for various activities including the provision of 40,000 litres of diesel oil to ELECTROGAZ for operation of their Karege Treatment Plant in Kigali Rural and approximately 30,000 litres for water tankers and for trucks used in solid waste collection and disposal. At the same time, the Agency is supporting the rehabilitation of wells in Kibungo and has provided equipment to assist in the testing of the newly-constructed pipeline between Rwampasha and Nyagatare in north-east Rwanda.

Additional support to activities in the water and sanitation sector is being given by WFP who are providing food-for-work rations for workers in three different sites in Byumba and Kibuye where water and sewage systems are being reconstructed. UNICEF continues to supply water to health centres, transit camps and children's centres in the southwest part of the country. In May, UNICEF delivered a total of 3.8 million litres of water.



Within the overall objective of facilitating the reintegration of returnees, UNHCR has continued to support water and sanitation activities particularly in transit centres and reception centres all over the country. Water is tankered to these centres as work continues on sustainable permanent water supply systems. Assistance is also being given at the commune level particularly at resettlement sites.

Through implementing NGO partners, UNHCR continues the rehabilitation of the only three existing water supply systems in Mutara region in the north-east. The systems under rehabilitation will supply potable water to an estimated 140,000 people. In addition, UNICEF through implementing NGOs has also drilled four boreholes out of a planned seven in the north-east. An exploitable amount of ground water found in each case.

In response to the massive repatriation of old caseload returnees, UNCHR is working on the rehabilitation and development of springs in various locations particularly in the rural areas along the Rwanda/Uganda border. Plans have been finalised to rehabilitate and extend the water supply system of Rwabegeyu spring catchment system which may provide water to some 40,000 people along the southern tip of the Domaine de Chasse.

UNHCR, in collaboration with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration (MINIREISO) and an implementing NGO, is also constructing eleven boreholes and valley tanks in the Mutara region. Through Quick Impact Projects (QIPS), UNHCR is responding to the various urgent needs in the water sector to facilitate the reintegration of both the old and new caseload returnees particularly in the prefectures of Kibungo, Kigali Rural, Cyangugu, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.

## Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances

### Unaccompanied Children

To date, 21,298 children are living in 124 unaccompanied children centres in Rwanda, Zaïre, and Tanzania:

- \* 12,361 children are living in 81 centres in Rwanda
- \* 8,614 children are living in 42 centres in the countries of exile

Following the closure of the displaced persons camps in April, there are 12 new sites catering for unaccompanied children. Of this recent caseload, 1,834 have been placed in institutional care.

WFP is currently providing food for 31 unaccompanied children's centres throughout the country. In addition, WFP has started a programme in Gisenyi to support 70 street children.

### Trauma Recovery Programme

The nation-wide baseline survey of trauma among children is well underway. Three hundred children have been interviewed in Gitarama and Butare. Researchers conducting the interviews say that the children are eager to tell their stories. As a small token, each child is given a UNICEF notebook and is encouraged to continue expressing his or her experiences in the form of stories or drawings.

UNICEF is producing a psycho-social trauma pamphlet in Kinyarwanda called *What Causes Bad Memories*. The baseline survey on trauma in children shows that many are haunted by disturbing memories and nightmares. A pilot survey on trauma, conducted in December 1994 - January 1995, revealed that two-thirds of the 64 children interviewed saw other people being killed.

### Children in Prison

The Ministry of Justice and ICRC confirmed that the number of child prisoners has increased by 91 individuals between 10 April and 31 May. The current figure stands at 1,100. Some 155 children aged 7 - 14 years who have been held in 13 prisons in the country were on 17 June transferred to a newly opened rehabilitation centre in Gitagata.

### **Nutrition/House-hold Food Security**

Data collection and data entry for the country-wide nutritional survey was completed. Results are expected at the end of June 1995. The UNICEF nutrition team continues with its weekly visits to nutritional centres to monitor activities, assess new needs and provide technical advice.

UNICEF and WFP have reached an agreement with an Italian NGO-CINS to fund

and provide food for the agency's income-generating activities in Kibungo prefecture. A variety of projects centred around agricultural activities, livestock rearing, fishing, handicrafts and small businesses will be set up, mainly for women's groups in the district.

Seven women's associations in Gitarama were given sweet potato cuttings to plant by a UNICEF-funded agricultural research centre. Once the plants are mature, the women will sell new cuttings to other women's groups. In this way local varieties of crops will be multiplied in identified sites. UNICEF plans to finance the crop multiplication operation for the next two years. WFP has also started a seeds multiplication project in Kibuye and Gisenyi. 312 workers employed on the project are being paid through food for work programmes.

### **Demining activities**

Following a bi-lateral agreement between the U.S Government and the Government of Rwanda, a national demining programme will be established by the beginning of July. An advance team from the U.S Defence Department was in Kigali late May. Under the terms of the agreement, a national demining office will be established to set up a mine data-base as well as to act as the focal point for a mine awareness programme and demining training. The US Government hopes to begin the training of an initial 80 RPA soldiers by July 1995.

### III. Regional Issues

The Organisation of African Unity has voiced grave concern at the continued violence in Burundi's capital, Bujumbura. Amidst the violence, a mission led by the OAU Secretary-General arrived in Bujumbura in early June seeking to promote reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis in a bid to avert what some observers feared would be a massive bloodbath. This was the second visit since April by the OAU Team.

In the second week of June, clashes between Hutu militia men and Government soldiers in Kamenge, a suburb in Bujumbura resulted in the death of an estimated 50 people. Deteriorating conditions in the country have raised fears of possible population movements into neighbouring countries, adding further strains to a very fragile regional situation.

The issue of security along the common borders of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaïre was examined in a meeting held by the Defence Ministers from the three countries, among them Major-General Paul Kagame. An agreement has been reached to set up joint patrols to secure the common borders and to take other measures to eliminate armed gangs as well as to prevent the proliferation of arms in the region.

#### Refugees and Returnees

During the month of May, more than 23,000 Rwandese returned home from neighbouring countries, the vast majority of whom were 'old caseload'. The return of people who fled after the genocide last year has not yet picked up sufficiently. Since the killings at Kibeho IDP camp, only a few convoys of voluntary returnees have been

organised from Burundi. Recent trends in the region seem to be towards the closure of borders and the denial of asylum much to the dismay of UNHCR. Due to reduced foreseeable funding, UNHCR programme budgets for Rwandese/Burundian refugees and returnees in the region have likewise been considerably reduced; donors seem unlikely to pledge more than \$200 million out of the \$300 million required for the region.

#### i) Burundi

The refugees in northern Burundi appear to be showing the most interest in returning home, an outlook influenced by the current level of insecurity there. Numbers of spontaneous returnees are still, however, at a low level. The Government of Burundi has concluded the first phase of its campaign of visits to the interior of the country. In the first week of June, the Prime Ministers of Burundi and Rwanda and representatives of UNHCR visited northern Burundi and addressed some of the refugee leaders. The leaders made a series of politically-oriented demands at odds with the general sentiments of the camp population.

UNHCR has stepped up confidence building visits to enable refugees to see for themselves conditions inside Rwanda. As of the end of May, the camp population in Burundi had stabilised at around 195,000. Around half of them originate from five communes in southern Butare prefecture.

#### ii) Zaïre

Food distribution in the Goma camps varied between 1,100 to 1,200 cal/person/day through May. For the last three months,

UNHCR in Goma has only been able to hand out around half the minimum basic requirements for refugees. The transfer of refugees from Kituku and Tschondo camps to the new site at Lac Vert has been completed. Staff in Goma are continuing to look at ways of moving Kibumba camp away from the immediate proximity of the border. The Zairean Camp Security Contingent, now at full strength and fully deployed, has had notable success in improving law and order in the refugee camps. UNHCR Bukavu notes increased tension on the Zaïre/Rwanda border with both sides complaining that the other has illegally arrested its citizens who normally cross the frontier to engage in small-scale trade.

Despite a severe cut in the food ration over the last few months a survey found that malnutrition in the camps stood at 3 per cent, a level considered negligible. Generally, the health indicators in the Bukavu camps are satisfactory.

The influx of Burundi refugees into Uvira from Cibitoke came to a halt at the end of

May and as of the end of the first week of June there had been no fresh outflows from Bujumbura just across the border. On 5 June, the Governor of Sud-Kivu announced the closure of the Burundi/Zaïre border to asylum seekers. For reasons of security, Kamanyola camp is being closed and the refugees transported to other camps. There are now approximately 61,000 Rwandese refugees in Uvira camps.

### iii) Tanzania

The Tanzania/Burundi border remains firmly closed to asylum seekers. UNHCR staff are not allowed to monitor the frontier. The decongestion of Benaco continues; the population is now down to 190,000. Musuhura has grown to just over 100,000. In the last week of May, UNHCR reported only two suspected cholera cases and held out the hope that the battle to bring the disease under control may have at last been won. A new registration is planned for later on in June. 13 semi-permanent school buildings are being built.

## **IV. Rwanda Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal**

Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Rwanda and the sub-region continues to be slow, but has improved during the reporting period. Of the total US\$ 219,490,162 requested for programmes inside Rwanda, as of 6 June 1995, US\$ 83,027,702 has been received, representing some 42% of the request. Included in the Appeal for Rwanda is 116,466 metric tonnes of food aid, requested by WFP.

Of this total, 72,518 metric tonnes, representing 78.5% of the WFP request, have


been received or pledged.

From the regional perspective, cash contributions have met some 52.7% of the total funding requested by UN Agencies and NGOs. Food aid contributions and pledges for conflict victims in Burundi and refugees in Tanzania and Zaire have met on average some 60.8% of the total needs.

**Please see Annex 1 - 8 for full breakdown of cash and food contributions by country and by Agency.**

## *Annexes*

**1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency**



## Annex 2

**Table I: 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for  
Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda (Rwanda and the Sub-Region)  
Summary of Requirements and Contributions - By Appealing Agency  
as of 6 June 1995**

*Compiled by DHA (FTS/CESU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organizations.*

Appealing Organizations	Adjusted Requirements (US\$)	Pledges/ Contribution (US\$)	Carryover Funds (US\$)	Total Funds Available (US\$)	Shortfall (Surplus) (US\$)	% of Needs Covered (%)
FAO**	18,531,700	908,893	11,411,173	12,320,066	6,211,634	66.5%
UNICEF	66,812,000	10,257,447	23,800,000	34,057,447	32,754,553	51.0%
UNHCR	289,078,450	65,316,259	25,700,000	91,016,259	198,062,191	31.5%
UNDP	1,370,000	0	---	0	1,370,000	0.0%
UNESCO	6,629,540	0	---	0	6,629,540	0.0%
UNHCHR	10,153,050	4,182,815	---	4,182,815	5,970,235	41.2%
UNIFEM	1,350,000	0	---	0	1,350,000	0.0%
UNV	1,327,064	119,048	---	119,048	1,208,016	9.0%
WFP (Food & Non-Food)*	378,105,944	190,689,958	92,262,986	282,952,944	76,563,437	79.8%
WHO	11,469,927	3,238,850	---	3,238,850	8,231,077	28.2%
UNREO/DHA	2,003,900	947,904	---	947,904	1,055,996	47.3%
IOM	10,539,800	461,641	---	461,641	10,078,159	4.4%
NGOs	4,124,913	0	---	0	4,124,913	0.0%
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>801,496,288</b>	<b>276,122,815</b>	<b>153,174,159</b>	<b>429,296,974</b>	<b>353,609,751</b>	<b>55.9%</b>

\* Note that for WFP, the shortfall may not equal adjusted requirements less income as WFP has chosen to reflect the accurate outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc. of food) for the region until the end of the year. Note also that due to regional loans reallocations of food, a difference of US\$ 5.5 million exists between this Table and Table III and V (donor breakdowns).

\*\* In 1995, minima needs in terms of seed and tools (US\$ 11.4) have been covered by the European Community and carryover pledges channelled through FAO.



## Annex 3

Table II: 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency  
as of 6 June 1995

Compiled by DHA (FTS/CESU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organizations

Appealing Agency	Total Requirements (January - December 1995)	Adjusted Requirements (US\$)	Income (Pledges, Contributions, Carryove (US\$)	Shortfall (Surplus) (US\$)	% of Needs Covered %				
A. THE RWANDA PERSPECTIVE									
UNHCR *	44,275,500	44,275,500	3,994,265	40,281,235	9.0%				
UNICEF **	55,650,000	55,650,000	***	24,537,447	44.1%				
WHO	7,482,835	7,482,835	1,020,000	6,462,835	13.6%				
FAO	18,531,700	18,531,700	****	6,211,634	66.5%				
UNESCO **	6,629,540	6,629,540	0	6,629,540	0.0%				
UNHCHR	10,153,050	10,153,050	4,182,815	5,970,235	41.2%				
UNIFEM	1,350,000	1,350,000	0	1,350,000	0.0%				
UNV	1,327,064	1,327,064	119,048	1,208,016	9.0%				
IOM*****	10,539,800	10,539,800	461,641	10,078,159	4.4%				
NGOs	4,124,913	4,124,913	0	4,124,913	0.0%				
UNREO/DHA	2,003,900	2,003,900	947,904	1,055,996	47.3%				
WFP FOOD SUMMARY *****	MTs	US\$	MTs	US\$	%				
CEREALS	86,892	33,974,772	86,684	33,893,444	53,475	20,908,881	22,465	8,783,659	74.1%
PULSES	24,825	17,799,525	24,825	17,799,525	16,456	11,798,952	1,499	1,074,783	94.0%
OIL	4,137	4,827,879	3,962	4,623,654	2,454	2,863,818	402	469,134	89.9%
SALT	0	0	0	0	60	28,020	0	0	0
CORN SOYA BEAN	0	0	0	0	223	130,901	0	0	0
SUGAR	252	165,564	231	151,767	0	0	231	151,767	0.0%
DRIED SKIM MILK	360	654,120	330	599,610	0	0	231	419,727	30.0%
HIGH PROTEIN BISCUITS	0	0	0	0	(150)	(286,050)	150	286,050	0
Subtotal for WFP	116,466	57,421,860	116,032	57,068,000	72,518	35,444,522	24,978	11,185,120	78.5%
TOTAL - RWANDA PERSPECTIV	116,466	219,490,162	116,032	219,136,302	72,518	83,027,708	24,978	125,670,236	42.7%

Note that UNHCR is appealing for resources to fund activities to meet the needs of Rwandese/Burundese refugees on a regional level. Contributions/pledges not specifically earmarked to the Rwanda Programme and made in response to the Consolidated Appeal will be recorded against the UNHCR Sub-Regional budget until a percentage of these funds has been obligated to the Rwandan returnees and IDPs programme within Rwanda.

For Primary and non-formal education, requested funds will be channelled through UNICEF for subsequent reallocation to UNICEF/UNESCO activities.

UNICEF has determined an estimated carryover of US\$ 23.8 million of which 40% of this amount is set aside for programmes in the Sub-Region pending specific contributions.

In 1995, minima needs in terms of seed and tools (US\$ 11.4 million) have been covered through the European Community and carryover pledges channelled through FAO.

A new agreement for the amount of US\$ 1.4 million has been signed between UNHCR and IOM, for the implementation of transport operations in support of UNHCR Operations in the Goma Area by IOM. In connection with this new agreement, UNHCR has funded IOM in the amount of US\$ 500,000 to date.

Note the following for WFP:

1) Revised Requirements: A standardisation of ration rates and rationalisation of WFP Programmes within Rwanda, which took place after the finalisation of the Appeal document, led to a revision of the total food aid requirements to 116,466 MTs (US\$ 57.4 million). Note also that for WFP, food requirements are adjusted constantly depending on the monthly food availability and distribution rate in the region.

2) Contributions: Most of the commodities represent contributions announced in 1994, scheduled for delivery to the final destination in 1995. Note also that due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected in this table, in order to provide the most accurate picture of requirements/shortfalls, totals will not match with the donor breakdowns indicated in Table III and V.

3) Shortfalls may not equal adjusted req. less income, as they reflect the accurate outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc. of food) determined by WFP for commodities in the region until the end of the year.



Table II: 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency  
as of 6 June 1995

Compiled by DHA (FTS/CESU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organizations

Appealing Agency	Total Requirements (January - December 1995)	Adjusted Requirements (US\$)	Income (Pledges, Contributions, Carryover) (US\$)	Shortfall (Surplus) (US\$)	% of Needs Covered
A. THE RWANDA PERSPECTIVE					
UNHCR *	44,275,500	44,275,500	3,994,265	40,281,235	9.0%
UNICEF **	55,650,000	55,650,000	***	31,112,553	44.1%
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FAO	18,531,700	18,531,700	****	6,211,634	66.5%
UNESCO ***	6,629,540	6,629,540	0	6,629,540	0.0%
UNHCHR	10,153,050	10,153,050	4,182,815	5,970,235	41.2%
UNIFEM	1,350,000	1,350,000	0	1,350,000	0.0%
UNV	1,327,064	1,327,064	119,048	1,208,016	9.0%
IOM *****	10,539,800	10,539,800	461,641	10,078,159	4.4%
NGOS	4,124,913	4,124,913	0	4,124,913	0.0%
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WFP FOOD SUMMARY *****					
CEREALS	86,892	33,974,772	53,475	22,465	74.1%
PULSES	24,825	17,799,525	16,456	1,499	94.0%
OIL	4,137	4,827,879	2,454	402	89.9%
SALT	0	0	60	0	0
CORN SOYA BEAN	0	0	223	0	0
SUGAR	252	165,564	0	231	0.0%
DRIED SKIM MILK	360	654,120	0	231	30.0%
HIGH PROTEIN BISCUITS	0	0	(150)	150	0
Subtotal for WFP	116,466	57,421,860	72,518	24,978	78.5%
TOTAL - RWANDA PERSPECTIVE	116,466	219,490,162	72,518	24,978	42.7%

Note that UNHCR is appealing for resources to fund activities to meet the needs of Rwandese/Burundese refugees on a regional level. Contributions/pledges not specifically earmarked to the Rwanda Programme and made in response to the Consolidated Appeal will be recorded against the UNHCR Sub-Regional budget until a percentage of these funds has been obligated to the Rwandan returns and IDPs programme within Rwanda.

\*\* For Primary and non-formal education, requested funds will be channelled through UNICEF for subsequent reallocation to UNICEF/UNESCO activities.

\*\*\* UNICEF has determined an estimated carryover of US\$ 23.8 million of which 40% of this amount is set aside for programmes in the Sub-Region pending specific contributions.

\*\*\*\* In 1995, minimal needs in terms of seed and tools (US\$ 11.4 million) have been covered through the European Community and carryover pledges channelled through FAO.

\*\*\*\*\* A new agreement for the amount of US\$ 1.4 million has been signed between UNHCR and IOM, for the implementation of transport operations in support of UNHCR Operations in the Goma Area by IOM. In connection with this new agreement, UNHCR has funded IOM in the amount of US\$ 500,000 to date.

\*\*\*\*\* Note the following for WFP:

1) Revised Requirements: A standardisation of ration rates and rationalisation of WFP Programmes within Rwanda, which took place after the finalisation of the Appeal document, led to a revision of the total food aid requirements to 116,466 MTs (US\$ 57.4 million). Note also that for WFP, food requirements are adjusted constantly depending on the monthly food availability and distribution rate in the region.

2) Contributions: Most of the commodities represent contributions announced in 1994, scheduled for delivery to the final destination in 1995. Note also that due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected in this table, in order to provide the most accurate picture of requirements/shortfalls, totals will not match with the donor breakdowns indicated in Table III and V.

3) Shortfalls may not equal adjusted req. less income, as they reflect the accurate outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc. of food) determined by WFP for commodities in the region until the end of the year.

Appealing Agency	Total Requirements (January - December 1995)	Adjusted Requirements (US\$)	Income (Pledges, Contributions, Carryover) (US\$)	Shortfall (Surplus) (US\$)	% of Needs Covered		
B. THE SUB-REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE							
UNHCR *	244,802,950	244,802,950	87,021,994	157,780,956	35.5%		
UNICEF	11,162,000	11,162,000	--	9,520,000	85.3%		
WHO	3,987,092	3,987,092	2,218,850	1,768,242	55.7%		
UNDP	1,370,000	1,370,000	0	1,370,000	0.0%		
WFP Regional Cash Projects	35,723,074	35,723,074	18,821,901	16,901,173	52.7%		
WFP FOOD SUMMARY ***	MTs	US\$	MTs	US\$	%		
BURUNDI CONFLICT VICTIMS							
CEREALS	77,718	28,444,788	74,676	22,211,954	19,802	7,247,532	73.5%
PULSES	24,384	18,214,848	23,921	17,868,987	15,223	11,371,581	77.1%
OIL	4,086	4,396,536	4,086	4,396,536	2,251	2,422,076	56.8%
SALT	876	400,332	774	353,718	200	91,400	28.4%
CORN SOYA BEAN	9,762	5,086,002	9,762	5,086,002	4,402	2,293,442	72.3%
SUGAR	222	143,634	222	143,634	86	55,642	0.0%
DRIED SKIM MILK	282	503,934	249	444,963	0	0	12.9%
HIGH PROTEIN BISCUITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%
Subtotal for WFP	117,330	57,190,074	113,690	55,625,256	82,850	38,446,095	74.9%
REFUGEES IN TANZANIA							
CEREALS	100,920	33,202,680	100,158	32,952,048	82,759	27,227,579	81.3%
PULSES	28,840	18,861,360	28,840	18,861,360	24,222	15,841,188	88.7%
OIL	4,928	5,120,192	4,928	5,120,192	4,397	4,568,483	89.3%
SALT	1,202	473,588	1,202	473,588	180	70,920	24.5%
CORN SOYA BEAN	14,174	7,441,350	13,909	7,302,225	9,081	4,767,525	66.4%
SUGAR	118	702,100	109	64,855	15	8,925	13.8%
DRIED SKIM MILK	0	0	0	0	20	34,900	0.0%
HIGH PROTEIN BISCUITS	0	0	0	0	500	922,500	0.0%
Subtotal for WFP	150,182	65,169,380	149,146	64,774,268	121,174	53,442,020	87.0%
REFUGEES IN ZAIRE							
CEREALS	185,883	90,710,904	180,206	87,940,528	143,895	70,220,955	85.0%
PULSES	53,115	46,900,545	51,706	45,656,398	43,445	38,361,935	88.5%
OIL	9,180	11,777,940	9,048	11,608,841	7,349	9,428,767	84.9%
SALT	2,223	1,162,629	2,200	1,150,600	943	493,189	53.3%
CORN SOYA BEAN	24,129	16,962,687	23,220	16,323,660	17,884	12,572,452	71.6%
SUGAR	375	242,625	358	231,626	40	25,880	30.1%
DRIED SKIM MILK	402	777,066	383	740,339	40	77,320	25.8%
HIGH PROTEIN BISCUITS	0	0	110	0	2,762	5,617,908	0
Subtotal for WFP	275,307	168,534,396	267,231	163,651,992	216,358	136,798,406	84.0%
Total for WFP (Food)	542,819	290,893,850	530,067	284,051,516	420,382	228,686,521	82.9%
TOTAL - SUB-REGIONAL PERSP	542,819	587,938,966	530,067	581,096,632	420,382	346,269,266	60.8%
* Requirements for UNHCR have been revised to reflect additional needs of US\$ 9,598,850 for the Zairean Camp Security Arrangements for the period Feb-Jun95. Income incl. a carryover of US\$ 25.7 million.							
** UNICEF has determined an estimated carryover of US\$ 23.8 million of which 40% of this amount is set aside for programmes in the Sub-Region pending specific contributions.							
*** Note the following for WFP:							
1) Revised Requirements: A standardisation of ration rates and rationalisation of WFP Programmes within Rwanda, which took place after the finalisation of the Appeal document, led to a revision of the total food aid requirements to 542,819 MTs (US\$ 290.9 million). Note also that for WFP, food requirements are adjusted constantly depending on the monthly food availability and distribution rate in the region.							
2) Contributions: Most of the commodities represent contributions announced in 1994, scheduled for delivery to the final destination in 1995. Note also that due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected in this table, in order to provide the most accurate picture of requirements/shortfalls, totals will not match with the donor breakdowns indicated in Table III and V.							
3) Shortfalls may not equal adjusted requirements less income, as they reflect the accurate outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc. of food) determined by WFP for commodities in the region until the end of the year.							
GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	659,285	807,429,128	646,099	800,232,934	492,900	429,296,974	55.8%

Annex 4		Table III : Donor Breakdown of Contributions/Pledges in Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda as of 6 June 1995	
Compiled by DHA (FTS/CESU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organisations.			
Donor	Channel	Sector/Activity	Amount US\$
Australia	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	729,927
Australia	UNHCHR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	146,000
Australia	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Refugee pro	729,927
Belgium	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/UNHCR sec. op. for refugee camps in Zair	1,000,000
Canada	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	1,569,286
Canada	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N05 - Health	1,428,571
Canada	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N14-A - CEDCs	1,821,179
Canada	UNREO	RWA-95-11/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	248,227
Canada	UNHCHR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	68,376
Cyprus	UNREO	RWA-95-11/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	1,000
Denmark	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	207,000
Denmark	IOM	RWA-95-1/N20 - Trans/logis., reception, mgmt. of camps for IDP	92,593
Denmark	UNICEF	Multisectoral	925,926
Finland	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	117,925
Finland	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	900,000
Finland	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Refugee pro	353,774
Finland	UNICEF	Multisectoral	106,071
France	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/for repatriation	580,271
France	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Burundi/for repatriation	193,424
Germany	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	729,927
Ireland	UNHCHR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	76,923
Ireland	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	245,098
Italy	UNICEF	Multisectoral	935,673
Italy	IOM	RWA-95-1/N20 - Trans/logis., reception, mgmt. of camps for IDP	250,000
Italy	WHO	RWA-95-1/N04 - Health	510,000
Italy	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	350,000
Italy	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Tanzania/for displaced Rwandese	350,877
Japan	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N14-A - CEDCs	1,000,000
Japan	WHO	SRP-95-1/N06 - Health	800,000
Japan	UNHCHR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	300,000
Luxembourg	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	424,028
Mauritius	UNREO	RWA-95-11/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	15,697
Netherlands	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/UNHCR sec. op. for refugee camps in Zair	636,943
Netherlands	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	4,117,647
Norway	UNICEF	Multisectoral	394,459
Norway	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/security prog. in refugee camp	153,846
Norway	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Refugee pro	153,846
Norway	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	480,957
Spain	WHO	RWA-95-1/N04 - Health	510,000
Spain**	UNHCHR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	217,880
Sweden	UNREO	RWA-95-11/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	30,998
Sweden	FAO	RWA-95-1/N03-E - Agriculture	273,972
Switzerland	UNHCHR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	113,636
Switzerland	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	403,226
Switzerland	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/refugees and IDPs	877,193
Thailand *	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/purch. of family package for ret. & IDP	49,800
United Kingdom	FAO	RWA-95-1/N03-B - Agriculture	634,921
United Kingdom	IOM	RWA-95-1/N20 - Trans/logis., reception, mgmt. of camps for IDP	119,048
United Kingdom	UNV	RWA-95-1/N25 - Inter-Agency Coordination/Programme Support	119,048
United Kingdom	UNICEF	Multisectoral	1,428,571
United Kingdom	UNHCHR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	3,200,000
United Kingdom	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	1,587,301
United Kingdom	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/for cost of International Liaison Group	793,651
United Kingdom	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	873,016
United Kingdom	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for airport service charges	5,350
United Kingdom	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/Rwanda-Burundi operation	793,651
United Kingdom	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Burundi/Rwanda-Burundi operation	793,651
United Kingdom	UNREO	RWA-95-1/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	154,450
United Kingdom	WHO	SRP-95-1/N06 - Health	788,250
United Kingdom	WHO	SRP-95-1/N06 - Health	630,600
United Kingdom	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	500,000

\* This amount forms part of a contribution made in 1994 of US\$ 80,160 to DHA to be reallocated to UNHCR and to NGOs for assistance to IDPs.

\*\* This includes payment of US\$ 208,000 to UN Volunteers (8 UNV Monitors) for 3 weeks.



**Table III : Donor Breakdown of Contributions/Pledges in Response to the 1995  
UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
as of 6 June 1995**

Donor	Channel	Sector/Activity	Amount US
USA	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	20,000,000
USA	UNREO	RWA-95-11/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	177,520
USA	UNREO	RWA-95-11/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	320,012
USA	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	5,000,000
EU	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	31,887,755
UNICEF NatCom/Andorra	UNICEF	Multisectoral	7,752
UNICEF NatCom/France	UNICEF	Multisectoral	961,605
UNICEF NatCom/Germany	UNICEF	Multisectoral	51,200
UNICEF NatCom/Greece	UNICEF	Multisectoral	345,566
UNICEF NatCom/Israel	UNICEF	Multisectoral	16,000
UNICEF NatCom/Japan	UNICEF	Multisectoral	550,539
UNICEF NatCom/Slovenia	UNICEF	Multisectoral	4,218
UNICEF NatCom/United Kingdom	UNICEF	Multisectoral	230,159
UNICEF NatCom/USA	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N10 - Water and Sanitation	10,000
UNDP	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/Rwanda-Burundi Operation	20,745
ACCT	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	60,000
ACPR (FRA)	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for reconstruction of one school	9,191
Asso. for Famine Relief (CYP)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	20,000
Deutsche Stiftung (FRG)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/Refugees	19,231
Deutsche Stiftung (FRG)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/Refugees	13,699
Girl Guide Assoc. (UK)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwandese refugees	4,688
BHP Minerals (AUL)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Tanzania/Rwandese refugees	99,935
Dem Lib Party (KOR)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/Rwandese refugees	30,000
Bea & Urs Hauser (SWI)	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for rehabilitation of a primary school	11,364
Soroptimist Int. (JPN)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Operation	38,967
Private, Greece	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	7,407
Private, INS	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	5,000
Private, Ireland	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/purch. of school equip. for refugee childr	398
Private, Ireland	UNICEF	Multisectoral	2,294
Private, Italy	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	112,502
Private, Ivory Coast	UNICEF	Multisectoral	20,449
Private, Japan	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Operation	19,049
Private, RSA	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	371
Private, Switzerland	UNICEF	Multisectoral	7,781
UN Womens Guild	UNICEF	Multisectoral	9,434
UN Association (JPN)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	3,172
<b>Sub-Total for Cash Contributions</b>			<b>98,121,614</b>
Carryover Funds	UNHCR	Multisectoral assistance to UNHCR Rwanda/Burundi Operation	25,700,000
Carryover Funds	UNICEF	Multisectoral assistance / 40 % set aside for Sub-Region	23,800,000
Carryover Funds	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	6,133,144
Carryover Funds **	FAO	RWA-95-1/N03-A - Agriculture	11,411,173
<b>Sub-Total for Carryover Funds</b>			<b>67,044,317</b>

\*\* In 1995, minima needs in terms of seed and tools (US\$ 11.4 million) have been covered through the European Community and carryover pledges channelled through FAO.

The following contributions have been reported to DHA by the Donor but not yet confirmed as final by the Agencies concerned:

08-Mar-95-Netherlands-UNHCR-Cash for secondment of a Dutch team (16 persons) for sec. operations in r	756,098
18-Apr-95-Australia-UNICEF-Cash for immediate relief for unaccompanied and traumatised children in Rwa	218,978
11-May-95-Netherlands-UNHCR-Cash for UNHCR component of UN Inter-Agency Appeal for Rwanda (SR	6,493,506
11-May-95-Netherlands-UNICEF-Cash for UNICEF component of UN Inter-Agency Appeal for Rwanda (R	909,091
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$8,377,673</b>

**Table III - Donor Breakdown of Contributions/Pledges in Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda (Cont.)**  
as of 6 June 1995

WFP Food Contributions *	Food (MTs)		Amount US\$		Grand Total	
	1995	1994	1995	1994	Food (MTs)	Amount (US\$)
<b>Burundi Conflict Victims (SRP-95-1/N02-A - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Austria	1,000	—	367,000	—	1,000	367,000
Denmark	170	—	126,990	—	170	126,990
France	4,130	—	1,515,710	—	4,130	1,515,710
Germany	11,242	3,545	4,125,814	1,301,015	14,787	5,426,829
Japan	—	13,894	—	5,099,098	13,894	5,099,098
Netherlands	4,256	5,343	1,963,232	2,288,821	9,599	4,252,053
Switzerland	—	500	—	260,500	500	260,500
United Kingdom	500	—	183,500	—	500	183,500
USA	14,368	18,196	8,418,778	9,102,338	32,564	17,521,116
EU	9,000	586	3,739,000	239,142	9,586	3,978,142
Others	—	4,938	—	3,613,448	4,938	3,613,448
<b>Sub-Total for Burundi</b>	<b>44,666</b>	<b>47,002</b>	<b>20,440,024</b>	<b>21,904,362</b>	<b>91,668</b>	<b>42,344,386</b>
<b>Rwanda Conflict Victims (RWA-95-1/N01(A-F) - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Canada	3,250	—	1,274,000	—	3,250	1,274,000
Denmark	—	1,800	—	705,600	1,800	705,600
Germany	10,000	222	3,920,000	159,174	10,222	4,079,174
Japan	—	3,533	—	1,384,936	3,533	1,384,936
Netherlands	—	404	—	158,368	404	158,368
Sweden	—	950	—	681,150	950	681,150
USA	38,892	9,242	19,596,817	4,894,273	48,134	24,491,090
EU	—	632	—	370,100	632	370,100
CFG	—	435	—	311,895	435	311,895
Others	—	3,339	—	2,630,387	3,339	2,630,387
<b>Sub-Total for Rwanda</b>	<b>52,142</b>	<b>20,557</b>	<b>24,790,817</b>	<b>11,295,883</b>	<b>72,699</b>	<b>36,086,700</b>
<b>Tanzania - Refugees (SRP-95-1/N02-B - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Austria	2,000	—	658,000	—	2,000	658,000
Belgium	—	2,000	—	658,000	2,000	658,000
Denmark	4,500	—	1,480,500	—	4,500	1,480,500
Germany	1,200	6,201	394,800	2,812,004	7,401	3,206,804
Italy	—	1,759	—	1,136,801	1,759	1,136,801
Switzerland	940	—	309,260	—	940	309,260
United Kingdom	11,354	—	4,663,016	—	11,354	4,663,016
USA	60,511	2,285	28,641,044	1,356,947	62,796	29,997,991
EU	16,195	9,966	5,701,345	4,986,652	26,161	10,687,997
<b>Sub-Total for Tanzania</b>	<b>96,700</b>	<b>22,211</b>	<b>41,847,965</b>	<b>10,950,404</b>	<b>118,911</b>	<b>52,798,369</b>
<b>Zaire - Refugees (SRP-95-1/N02-C - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Belgium	—	227	—	291,241	227	291,241
Canada	—	13,907	—	8,329,486	13,907	8,329,486
Denmark	—	1,701	—	835,338	1,701	835,338
Germany	13,492	5,617	6,584,096	2,741,096	19,109	9,325,192
Netherlands	2,488	4,334	2,098,549	3,144,710	6,822	5,243,259
Switzerland	—	626	—	440,078	626	440,078
United Kingdom	2,000	941	976,000	1,913,994	2,941	2,889,994
USA	107,111	4,580	67,351,733	3,844,140	111,691	71,195,873
EU	14,060	19,573	7,582,300	14,626,707	33,633	22,209,007
CFG	—	3,284	—	3,173,772	3,284	3,173,772
Others	1,000	4,902	883,000	2,638,631	5,902	3,521,631
<b>Sub-Total for Zaire</b>	<b>140,171</b>	<b>59,692</b>	<b>85,475,678</b>	<b>41,979,193</b>	<b>199,863</b>	<b>127,454,871</b>
<b>Subtotal - Food Contributi</b>	<b>333,679</b>	<b>149,462</b>	<b>172,554,484</b>	<b>86,129,842</b>	<b>483,141</b>	<b>258,684,326</b>
<b>Grand-Total</b>	<b>333,679</b>	<b>149,462</b>	<b>172,554,484</b>	<b>86,129,842</b>	<b>483,141</b>	<b>423,850,257</b>

\* NOTE FOR WFP:

Due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected by WFP in Table I, in order to provide an accurate picture of the food requirement shortfalls, a difference of US\$ 5,446,717 exists between this Table and Table I and II. Furthermore, 1994 reflects contributions announced in 1994 and carried over to 1995.

09-May-95-Denmark-IOM-Cash to IOM programme in Rwanda.(confirmed)	92,583
18-Apr-95-Australia-UNHCHR-Cash for monitoring programme in Rwanda(confirmed)	145,985
05-May-95-Denmark-UNICEF-Cash for relief aid to children in difficult circumstances in Rwanda.(confirmed)	370,370
05-May-95-Denmark-UNICEF-Cash for multisectoral assistance to Zaire refugees areas (confirmed)	---

Annex 5					Table IV: 1995 Pledges/Contributions to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency (Outside of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Framework)	
as of 8 June 1995					Note that this report is comprehensive to the extent that decisions have been reported to Department of Humanitarian Affairs by Donors.	
Date Reported	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$	Page 1 of 3	
18-Apr-95	Australia	Compassion Australia	Cash to train Rwandan counsellors working with unaccompanied children	61,533		
18-Apr-95	Australia	World Vision/Australia	Cash to WV programme in Kanazi province, south of Kigali, trauma counselling, etc. for unaccompanied children	229,927		
16-Feb-95	Belgium	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	75,000		
22-Feb-95	Canada	RC/Burundi	Cash to undertake ICRC protection/tracing activities and to carry out relief/medical activities in Burundi	709,220		
21-Feb-95	Canada	CARE/Canada	Cash to construct gravity water systems in Ngozi, Kayanza, Bujumbura, etc.	486,454		
22-Feb-95	Canada	MSF/Canada	Cash to support the hospital in Butare, the health centres and hospital in Gisenyi and Kigali	248,227		
21-Feb-95	Canada	World Vision/Canada	Cash to improve health status of unaccompanied children, returning refugees/IDPs and to improve living conditions through the provision of shelter supplies	354,610		
15-May-95	Canada	ADRA	Cash to facilitate the resettlement in the Southwest Communes of Gisozi and Gishita through the provision of land, basic health programs, tools for agriculture activities	135,662		
15-May-95	Canada	Salvation Army	Cash to assist in rebuilding the local community in partnership with the local government structure, to create the kind of environment conducive to refugee return and post-war re-settlement (agriculture, health, water/san and reconstruction)	73,529		
07-Apr-95	Finland	World Vision/Finland & Int'l	Cash	47,619		
03-Jan-95	Germany	HELP	Cash for medical assistance for displaced persons	140,256		
08-Apr-95	Germany	HELP/Johanniter Unfallhilfe	Cash for medical assistance (3 doctors, 1 project coord., 3 nurses, 1 medical assist. medicines and hospital equipment)	174,433		
19-Jan-95	Italy	DHA (Pisa Warehouse)	Airlift for in-kind contributions through Pisa Warehouse in favour of the Rwandese population	232,357		
05-Apr-95	Luxembourg	RC/Luxembourg	Cash for medical aid for refugees and displaced persons	86,505		
05-Apr-95	Luxembourg	Guiden a Scouten Mat der 3.Welt	Cash for reintegration of refugees	34,802		
08-Mar-95	Netherlands	Disaster Relief Agency, Netherland	Cash for "community services" projects for Rwandese refugees in Tanzania (Benaco)	75,000		
16-Feb-95	Netherlands	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	30,882		
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office, Kigali	Cash for a "Relief and Rehabilitation Fund" in Rwanda (small scale projects in the field of rehab. activities)	274,390		
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office, Kigali	Cash for a "Special Health Support Fund" (aiming to increase quality of health sector by purch. of medical equip.)	182,927		
15-Feb-95	Netherlands	SCF/United Kingdom	Cash for secondment of a Health Advisor to work within the MOE in Kigali and the provision of support for training, workshops and studyvisits	385,845		
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office-Kigali	Cash for aiming to increase to quality of health sector by purchase of medical equipment	182,927		
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office-Kigali	Cash for small scale projects in the field of rehabilitation activities	274,390		
26-Mar-95	Netherlands	UNDP	Cash to UNDP Trust Fund for Rwanda, aiming to support the Government of Rwanda's Programme of National Reconciliation, Socio-economic Rehabilitation and Recovery presented at Geneva Round Table Conference in Jan. 1995	11,737,804		
12-Apr-95	Netherlands	UNHCR	Cash for regional conference in Bujumbura (12-17 February 1995)	31,707		
11-May-95	Netherlands	RC/Netherlands	Cash to an emergency food programme (maize and beans) for Rwandan and Burundian refugees in camps in the region	1,298,701		
11-May-95	Netherlands	ICRC/Geneva	Cash to ICRC protection and assistance programme for Rwandan detainees in prisons (1995 ICRC Emergency Appeal)	324,675		
11-May-95	Netherlands	ICRC/Geneva	Cash to ICRC relief programme for refugees and displaced in Burundi (1995 ICRC Emergency Appeal)	649,351		
11-May-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Min. of Foreign Affairs	Cash for financing of maximal 21 experts to be seconded to the UN International Tribunal for Rwanda, for 12 months	4,080,909		
11-May-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Min. of Foreign Affairs	Cash to fund the participation of two Dutch Experts in the International Investigation Committee, investigating the recent violent incidents in Kibeho in Rwanda	35,584		
11-May-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Min. of Foreign Affairs	Cash for extension of 16 Security Liaison Officers, seconded to UNHCR to improve the security situation of Refugee Camps in Zaire	805,195		
31-Mar-95	Norway	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	1,224,960		
07-Mar-95	Sweden	PMU Interlife	Cash for resettlement of Burundese IDPs/refugees	177,534		
15-Feb-95	Sweden	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	67,295		
15-Feb-95	Switzerland	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	21,280		

**Table IV: 1995 Pledges/Contributions to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency  
(Outside of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Framework)  
as of 8 June 1995**

			Page 2 of 3	
Date Reported	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$
27-Feb-95	United Kingdom	UNHCHR	Cash for Human Right activities in Burundi	158,730
21-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNICEF	Cash for UNICEF operat'l needs in Burundi, health, waitsan, CEDCs (UNICEF Appeal for Burundi - 01/10/94 - 31/12/95)	793,651
28-Feb-95	United Kingdom	ACORD	Cash to provide seeds and tools for families affected by the October 1993 war in Burundi	95,238
28-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Action Nord-Sud/Belgium	Cash for provision of seeds and tools in Kigali prefecture to allow approx. 22,000 households (mainly farmers) to start agricultural activities for planting season	172,971
17-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Christian Aid	Cash to provide 19,823 families (mainly farmers) with one hoe per family plus beans, potato and vegetable seeds for planting after the rainy season	168,349
15-Feb-95	United Kingdom	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	47,619
28-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Merlin	Cash for rehabilitation of health centres in Gisenyi region and to assist MOE in Rwanda	362,043
28-Mar-95	United Kingdom	ICRC	Cash for the ICRC's 1995 Rwanda Emergency Appeal	357,143
27-Mar-95	United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash for the IFRC's 1995 Emerg. Appeal for Rwanda/Burundi refugees in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire	396,825
27-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNDP Trust Fund	Cash to help meet immediate capital and recurrent costs	2,063,492
27-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNDP	Cash to help strengthen the Rwandan Gov. capacity in financial, economic and human resource management	3,174,603
31-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNDP	Cash contribution to UNDP Round Table Follow-up Appeal	317,480
01-Apr-95	United Kingdom	Christian Aid	Cash for rehabilitation of school buildings and secondary education for 140 girls in Kigali	70,462
01-May-95	United Kingdom	SCF	Cash to assist Rwandan Govt. in implementing policy of reuniting up to 100,000 unaccompanied children with their families	161,230
01-May-95	United Kingdom	Feed the Children (Europe)	Cash to provide emergency care to approx. 600 children in Butare Transit Centre affected by Kibeho displacement	121,418
01-Jan-95	USA	UNDP/UNV	Cash grant to assist with human rights in Rwanda (OTI Assistance)	750,000
03-Feb-95	USA	ADRA	Cash for food-for-work, road and well programmes in the North-West (OFDA Assistance)	499,609
03-Feb-95	USA	Direct	Cash for DART operations	400,000
27-Jan-95	USA	American Refugee Committee	Cash for health and water rehabilitation in North-East (OFDA Assistance)	755,174
01-Feb-95	USA	International Rescue Committee	Cash for relief and rehabilitation project in Cyangugu and Kibungo (OFDA Assistance)	999,594
01-Feb-95	USA	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	50,000
03-Feb-95	USA	World Relief	Cash for primary health care in Kibogor (OFDA Assistance)	230,036
01-Jan-95	USA	National Peace Corps	Cash to recruit and train human rights monitors (OTI Assistance)	110,000
01-Jan-95	USA	International Rescue Committee	Cash for refugees in Tanzania (State/PRM Assistance)	1,208,557
05-Apr-95	USA	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	3,500,000
17-Jan-95	EC	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	3,613,636
31-Mar-95	NS/Canada	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	66,569
31-Mar-95	NS/Liechtenstein	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	4,839
31-Mar-95	NS/Netherlands	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	915,726
31-Mar-95	NS/Norway	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	141,351
31-Mar-95	NS/United Kingdom	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	838,710



**Table IV: 1995 Pledges/Contributions to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency  
(Outside of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Framework)  
as of 8 June 1995**

Note that this report is comprehensive to the extent that decisions have been reported to Department of Humanitarian Affairs by Donors.					Page 3 of 3	
Date Report	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$		
27-Mar-95	RC/Austria	IFRC	In kind - water protect and personnel (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	508,772		
22-May-95	RC/Australia	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	75,175		
11-Apr-95	RC/Brazil	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	80,000		
18-Mar-95	RC/Canada	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	73,228		
10-Jan-95	RC/Denmark	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	75,758		
18-Apr-95	RC/France	IFRC	Cash for refugees in Zaire and Burundi (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	354,848		
22-Mar-95	RC/Germany	IFRC	Cash for food aid for March and April (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	2,564,103		
12-May-95	RC/Iceland	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	3,111		
19-Apr-95	RC/Japan	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	332,308		
15-Feb-95	RC/Malaysia	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	26,378		
03-Apr-95	RC/Malaysia	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	20,255		
12-Jan-95	RC/Monaco	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	2,784		
07-Mar-95	RC/Monaco	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	3,061		
27-Dec-94	RC/Netherlands	IFRC	Cash for food for refugees in Goma (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	448,500		
23-Feb-95	RC/Netherlands	IFRC	Cash for Kibumba Hospital (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	200,839		
17-Mar-95	RC/Netherlands	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	897,884		
12-Apr-95	RC/Norway	IFRC	In kind - medical equipment (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	61,104		
01-Mar-95	RC/Sweden	IFRC	Cash for health programmes (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	277,742		
20-Dec-94	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	765,152		
01-Mar-95	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	814,516		
08-Mar-95	RC/US	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	80,000		
13-Mar-95	RC/US	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	250,000		
01-Mar-95	UNHCR	IFRC	Cash for 2,000 mts of maize (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	7,000,000		
26-Apr-95	UNHCR	IFRC	Cash for refugees in Uganda (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	286,541		
26-Apr-95	UNHCR	IFRC	Cash for refugees in Uganda (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	169,455		
15-Mar-95	Private	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	1,590		
05-May-95	Various	IFRC	In kind - delegates up to September (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	3,947,368		
31-Mar-95	Others	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	937,481		
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>67,794,386</b>		



Annex 6

**Table V: Summary of Humanitarian Assistance to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency**

Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda January - December 1995			
Donor	Value US\$	% of Fundin	
1. USA	149,505,904	35.27%	
2. EU	48,910,400	11.54%	
3. UK	18,244,024	4.30%	
4. Germany	15,754,637	3.72%	
5. Netherlands	8,816,371	2.06%	
6. Canada	6,409,639	1.51%	
7. Denmark	2,833,009	1.76%	
8. Italy	2,396,550	0.57%	
9. France	2,289,405	0.54%	
10. Japan	2,100,000	0.50%	
11. Switzerland	1,703,315	0.40%	
12. Australia	1,605,854	0.38%	
13. Finland	1,477,770	0.35%	
14. Norway	1,183,108	0.28%	
Others (incl. Austria, Belgium, Luxemb., Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Cyprus, Mauritius, Thailand, UN Agencies, UNICEF, NatCom, NGOs/Private Org. and Carryover Funds)	180,620,271	37.90%	
<b>TOTAL ***</b>	<b>\$423,850,257</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	


  

Total Humanitarian Assistance *** to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency as of 6 June 1995			
Donor	Value US\$	% of Fundin	
1. USA	158,008,874	31.60%	
2. EU	52,524,036	10.50%	
3. Netherlands	37,365,353	7.47%	
4. United Kingdom	28,705,318	5.34%	
5. Germany	16,089,328	3.21%	
6. Canada	8,427,341	1.69%	
7. Denmark	2,833,009	0.57%	
8. Italy	2,628,907	0.53%	
9. Norway	2,418,068	0.48%	
10. France	2,289,405	0.46%	
11. Australia	2,116,292	0.42%	
12. Japan	2,100,000	0.42%	
13. Switzerland	1,724,575	0.34%	
14. Finland	1,525,389	0.31%	
Others (incl. Austria, Belgium, Luxemb., Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Cyprus, Mauritius, Thailand, UN Agencies, UNICEF, NatCom, NGOs/Private Org. and Carryover Funds)	183,286,423	36.88%	
<b>TOTAL ***</b>	<b>\$500,022,316</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	


\* Carryover funds amount to approximately US\$ 153.2 million

\* Carryover funds amount to approximately US\$ 153.2 million

## Humanitarian Assistance in Response to '95 UN Consolidated Appeal



## Total Humanitarian Assistance as Reported to DHA



Values in Million US\$



# ***RWANDA***

*Humanitarian Situation Report*  
*15 May 1995*



Cover Photo: UNICEF/Maggie Murray-Lee

Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator

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
This Humanitarian Situation Report has been compiled from information gathered from the Government, UN Agencies, UNAMIR, ICRC, IOM, NGOs and Donors. It will be produced once a month and will seek to give an up-to-date picture of the progress or constraints in key areas of humanitarian interventions in Rwanda. The report will also highlight and analyse political and socio-economic trends in the country to the extent that they may have implications for on-going humanitarian activities. The Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator welcomes contributions from its humanitarian partners.

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## MAP OF RWANDA



## Overview

- The consequences arising out of the forced closures of the remaining camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) dominated much of the work of the humanitarian community since 18 April. The UN Secretary-General as well as other international organisations condemned both the forcible camp closure and the loss of life in the operation. However, through the coordinated efforts of the humanitarian community, relief assistance was provided to returning IDPs en route and upon arrival in the home communes. This assistance will continue to be provided through intensified rehabilitation programmes in these areas of return.
- In the wake of the Government camp closure operation, some countries suspended non-humanitarian aid to Rwanda. An independent commission was established on 24 April to analyse the circumstances surrounding these events and the commission's findings may have a bearing on future direct aid to the country. (See Annex 1 for the commission's conclusions and recommendations.)
- Significant steps to improve conditions in prisons have been taken but the high rate of arrests, particularly in the period following camp closures, has further exacerbated the overcrowded conditions in prisons as well as detention centres. On 26 April, 28 prisoners died in a *cachot* in Rusatira, Butare Prefecture further underlining prison conditions and the urgent need for a functioning national judicial system to expedite the processing of cases.
- In north-east Rwanda, large herds of cattle, estimated at 600,000 head, returning with the "old" caseload refugees continue to place great strain on the area's resources. As the rainy season draws to a close, it is becoming more urgent that action be taken to address problems arising from the cattle over-population. The exact number of cattle needs to be established to allow for accurate planning. Meat markets in the area need to be supported through the rehabilitation of abattoirs in the region. However, the long term solutions lie in the substantial reduction in the number of cattle in the area.

- The level of general security in urban as well as in rural areas, particularly in communes that have received returnees, has declined. The sudden return of large numbers of people has placed considerable strain on the infrastructure and the stability in some home communes. Reports that some returnees have been beaten, stoned, tortured and killed either en route or in their communes have, in several instances, been confirmed. In urban areas, particularly Kigali and Butare, overall security has deteriorated significantly with reports of theft of UN vehicles and robbery on the rise. Acts of banditry, particularly along the border areas in Gisenyi and Cyangugu also continue to be reported.
- On the economic front, the Government has registered higher than expected revenue in the first quarter of 1995 which has enabled the government to pay a good portion of public sector salary arrears. The current positive economic trends will enable the Government to meet 40% of its budgetary needs in 1995. However, in order to carry out projects which will ensure adequate access to social services including health care and potable water as well as access to the means to resume agricultural activities, substantial funding from the donor community is still required.
- Donor funding to the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Rwanda and the sub-region remains disappointing and continues to hinder progress in the initiation of important activities and places in jeopardy on-going programmes. As of 15 May 1995, only US\$ 80.9 million had been pledged against a total requirement of US\$ 219 million for Rwanda.
- Within the region, the recent refoulement of 310 Rwandese asylum seekers from closed IDP camps raises great concerns about the respect for the principles underlying conventions relating to the treatment of refugees and displaced persons. There are also fears that the recent forcible closure of IDP camps could create further obstacles to the voluntary return of Rwandan refugees from neighbouring countries.

## I. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS

### Closure of IDP camps

The forcible closure of the IDP camps, in particular Kibeho, has strained relations between the Government and many within the international community. Although the Kibeho event dominated over-all IDP operations, it is important to note that only the closure of Kibeho resulted in any confirmed, large-scale violence.

By the time all camps were declared officially closed, an estimated 2,000 IDPs remained holed up in a compound in Kibeho - some firm in their resolve not to return home. On 9 May, however, the last group of some 546 IDPs, mainly women and children, finally left the camp with transport assistance to their home communes provided by IOM/UNHCR and UNAMIR. Others left on foot.

Despite the lack of warning that the IDP camps were to be closed beginning 18 April, the reaction of the humanitarian community to the resulting emergency was quick and well-coordinated. The Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) in Kigali and the temporary coordination office set up in Butare coordinated a swift and large injection of relief assistance by agencies and NGOs to the Butare area which received the majority of returnees.

Over one hundred trucks mainly from UNHCR/IOM, UNAMIR as well as others from ICRC and NGOs were pooled enabling the transportation by truck of up to 70,000 IDPs back to home communes. Many others left the camps on foot. Medical organisations set up emergency facilities, mainly in Butare, to attend to the sick and wounded. Mobile medical teams ensured that assistance was also

available in the waystations and Open Relief Centres (ORCs) which were managed and supported by NGOs. These waystations and ORCs served as first aid points and distribution sites for food, water and some non-food items.

Although the initial phase of the emergency is now over, the problem of resettling people in home communes is far from solved. Concerns continue to be expressed over the whereabouts of many former camp populations. Large numbers of people are believed to have left the camps just prior to the RPA operation and many are believed to be in hiding. There are increasing reports of pockets of displaced persons resurfacing in areas predominantly within Butare Prefecture.

Massive returns in communes have inevitably heightened the level of needs in the communes. Assessment teams comprising Government officials, UN personnel and NGO representatives are visiting communes to determine pressing needs and priority areas of intervention. Sectoral cells to coordinate assistance in the various sectors have been reactivated in Kigali, through the IOC, and in Butare, through the Prefecture.

A plan of action on the rehabilitation of home communes has been prepared at the IOC by the Committee on the Rehabilitation of Home Communes. At the same time, UNDP has made available US\$ 1 million from the Secretary-General's Trust Fund, of which US\$500,000 has already been disbursed to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration for initial assistance to the communes. Part of these funds will be used



to strengthen the local administrative and judicial structures.

Monitoring of the situation in the communes by the government and the international community indicates that in some communes returning populations have been able to settle peacefully. However, in others there has been harassment, beatings and killings. A large number of people from the camps are reported to have also been arrested on charges of genocide.

Fifteen *Inspecteurs de la Police Judiciaire* (IPJs) have been deployed to Butare communes and will be part of Special Commune Committees to oversee and monitor arrests in the communes. These committees will comprise IPJs, local authorities, representatives of the RPA, Human Rights and UNAMIR. The presence of Human Rights field officers in the communes to which most IDPs are returning has been reinforced with an additional 20 field officers and the establishment of a coordination structure to cover the principally affected areas in Gikongoro, Butare and Bugesera.

### Political Developments

The political scene during the reporting period was dominated by events related to the forced closure of the IDP camps in southwest Rwanda and the ensuing loss of life in Kibeho camp. The international community's reaction to the closures included statements of condemnation and the suspension of non-humanitarian assistance on the part of Belgium, the Netherlands and the European Union. The UN Secretary-General sent a special envoy to Rwanda, Mr Aldo Ajello, with a personal message to the Government regarding the April events.

Some international organisations, however, have protested that the suspension of non-humanitarian aid is "short-sighted and potentially counter-productive". The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Rwanda has also argued against these suspensions. The United States through the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose, who visited Rwanda in mid-April stated that while the US was not inclined to curtail or cut off aid to Rwanda it was deeply concerned over the violence in Kibeho camp.

The Government has responded with a number of statements by high level officials claiming that the camps represented a threat to its national security and that the Government had decided to close the camps due to lack of progress in encouraging the camp populations to go home voluntarily. In a press conference held on 24 April, President Bizimungu said that the events in Kibeho had resulted from armed elements in the camp opening fire on the RPA. The President accused the international community of failing to disarm the militia in the camps and continuing to feed and provide other assistance to them.

Following disputes over the numbers of people killed in Kibeho, an Independent Commission of Inquiry was established. The Commission under the chairmanship of the OAU, comprised representatives of the Governments of Belgium, France, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, USA and Rwanda, as well as officials from UNAMIR. The Commission investigating the level of consultation with UNAMIR prior to the closure of the camps, the method of closure and the role of the RPA and the militia in the operation presented its report to the President of Rwanda on 18 May. (See Annex 1 for the

commission's conclusions and recommendations).

Prior to the Kibeho incident, worsening relations between the Government of Rwanda and some countries in the region were brought to the fore with the expulsion from Kenya of the Rwandese Charge d'Affaires. Zaire's National Assembly is also reported to be discussing the fate of Rwandese refugees in Zaire, following a parliamentary recommendation that they should be sent home. Refugees in Mugunga camp in Zaire have, in the meantime, announced that they have formed a political party, "The Rally for the Return and Democracy in Rwanda". In Uganda, a bill may be passed obliging all persons, including Rwandese refugees who went to Uganda after 1926, to return to their countries of origin.

### Security

The massive and sudden return of camp populations to home communes has led to grave concerns over the security situation in many areas. Numbers of IDPs were attacked, beaten and killed by local inhabitants as they walked from the camps to their home communes or upon arrival home. It is estimated that during the operation to close the camps, some 2,000 people were arrested and placed in detention centres. Several hundred, however, have now been released.

Following reports of attacks on returning IDPs, RPA troops were deployed along the routes and in communes to enhance security in these areas. Representatives of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration (MINIREISO) visited communes to sensitise local populations to the need for a positive reception of returnees. At the same time, the presence of Human Rights field officers in the Butare communes was strengthened.

In other incidents around the country, sixteen civilians were shot dead on 14 April, reportedly by RPA soldiers, on the banks of the Rubiro River, twenty kilometres south-east of Cyangugu. The killings were reported to have taken place in an RPA retaliation to an earlier attack on two soldiers during which one soldier was killed and the other wounded. An investigation into the killings was immediately launched by UNAMIR Military Observers and Human Rights representatives.

In North-west Rwanda, former Rwandan government soldiers are said to have infiltrated the country from Goma, Zaire and clashed with RPA troops on 26 April. One RPA soldier and two of the infiltrators were killed. In a recent meeting held between Zairian military officials, UNHCR and refugee camp leaders, Zairian military officials declared that firm action would be taken against Rwandese refugees making incursions into Rwanda. In another incident in early May, people believed to be *Interahamwe* raided a detention facility in Cyangugu Prefecture in a bid to free detainees. One RPA soldier and 3 prisoners were killed in the ensuing fire-fight. Several prisoners escaped. Other incursions into areas around Cyangugu continue to be reported.

Within the urban areas, especially in Kigali and Butare, UNAMIR and UN Agencies have taken measures to tighten security following a spate of armed robberies targeting the international community. Increasing incidents of car theft as well as armed robbery in homes of international staff by people in military uniform have been reported. UNAMIR has increased the number of night patrols and has advised on minimised movements of UN vehicles after dark.



## Economic Aspects

The higher than expected revenue registered by the Government of Rwanda in the first quarter of 1995, as a result of profits generated by the Central Bank (Frw 450 million) and taxes paid by the brewery, BRALIRWA, has enabled the Treasury to pay a good portion of public sector salary arrears. Projects in the rural sector have also yielded significant results. Based on current general trends, budgetary revenue is expected to reach US\$ 60 million (Frw 15 billion) in 1995, which would be significantly higher than the US\$ 49 million projected.

The Ministry of Finance has presented the national budget for 1995 which was prepared with the assistance of an IMF mission. The budget is estimated at Frw 39 billion of which the Government is expected to raise Frw 16.5 billion from taxes and custom duty. The remaining Frw 22.5 billion is expected to be covered through foreign aid.

At the same time, however, the Central Bank has recently discovered repayment arrears to the tune of US\$ 38 million incurred by the former government. This is in addition to the already existing arrears in external debt repayment. In order to accommodate these higher than expected repayment arrears, the Government is further pursuing possibilities of accessing IMF funds. The Government has already liberalised the foreign exchange market and has also taken initial steps towards the process of privatisation of state corporations.

### (i) UN Secretary-General's Trust Fund for Rwanda

As of 15 May, contributions totalling approximately US\$ 18,350,000 had been pledged to the Trust Fund. Of this

amount, US\$ 12.8 million had been received by UNDP. The US\$ 16 million pledged by the Netherlands has already been allocated to various programmes with provision made for a reserve of US\$ 2 million for unforeseen needs. Discussions continue with the Minister of Planning and the UK concerning the allocation of the US\$ 2 million pledged by the latter Government. Canada has also announced a contribution of approximately US\$ 350,000 to the Trust Fund.

### Trust Fund Programme Activities

#### ***Emergency Assistance for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the city of Kigali and other urban centres (RWA/94/001)***

- The Nyarutarama site, north-east of Kigali, is to be developed for the resettlement of returnees.
- Additional repairs are being made to the Assembly Hall of the parliament building following the completion of repairs to the hall roof.
- Emergency garbage collection began in Kigali Prefecture on 18 April.

#### ***Emergency Assistance to the Operation of the Rwandese Administration (RWA/95/001)***

- The final list of equipment to be purchased for the Government under this project has been drawn up. A first group of items immediately needed such as cars and office equipment is being procured

under emergency rules for delivery in June 1995, while a second lot of equipment is being procured under regular rules for delivery in July or August

### ***UNDP Framework Programme in Support of the Rehabilitation of the Rwandese Justice System (RWA/95/003, RWA/95/007)***

(See section on Justice below)

#### ***Assistance to the Programme of Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced Persons (RWA/95/006)***

- The RWA/95/006 project signed on 23 April aims to meet the basic needs of returnees in the home communes, especially their water, sanitation and housing requirements and will reinforce local administrative capacity.

#### ***Financial Support for the Functioning of the Rwandese Administration (RWA/95/008)***

- This project, now being reviewed by UNDP's regional Bureau for Africa for final approval is intended to cover the payment of salaries of public servants working in the health, justice and education (teachers) sectors for the month of April. The total cost of the project is US\$ 2.2 million.

A similar project costing US\$ 1.4 million is being formulated to cover part of the rehabilitation and operating costs of the National University

### (ii) Round Table Updates

The Round Table Mid-Term Review will be held in Kigali on 6 - 7 July. UNDP, in conjunction with the Government, UN agencies and donors has begun preparing for the meeting. The agenda and terms of reference are now being finalised. The Government will shortly issue a letter of invitation to participants.

**See Annex 2, 3 and 4 for pledges and commitments to the Geneva Round Table as at 22 May 1995 (Source: UNDP/Ministry of Planning)**

## Justice

### International Tribunal for Rwanda

A meeting to discuss financing for the International Tribunal for Rwanda was held in Kigali by the Rwanda Operational Support Group and was attended by 20 member states. Discussions at the meeting yielded US\$ 6 million as well as 32 investigators for the Tribunal which now has a total of US\$ 7.8 million as well as 36 investigators enabling it to quickly become operational.

On 2 May 1995, 24 Human Rights activists in Rwanda wrote to the UN Secretary-General protesting the slow progress of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the Tribunal's delay in trying perpetrators of the genocide. In the meantime, the UN Security Council has forwarded a list of 12 candidates (out of 21 nominations) for judges of the Tribunal. From this list, 6 judges will be elected by the UN General Assembly to sit on the Tribunal's Trial Chambers for 4 year terms.

### Rehabilitation of the National Judicial System

Efforts to rehabilitate the national judicial system continue to be undertaken by the Government of Rwanda, UN agencies

and international organisations as well as through bi-lateral donors. The governments of Belgium and of the Netherlands have indicated that despite the suspension of direct aid to the Government of Rwanda, their pledged funds for the rehabilitation of the judicial system will not be affected. Consequently, Belgium has approved a second programme for the training of judicial police. The Government of the Netherlands has further stated that its suspension of aid will not affect the US\$ 11 million pledged but undisbursed to the UN Trust Fund for Rwanda. A key component of the Trust Fund Programme of activities is the rehabilitation of the national judicial system.

The Ministry of Justice and UNDP with the cooperation of UNHCHR have finalised arrangements for a US\$ 5,265 million project, RWA/95/007), comprising three main components:

- (1) The rehabilitation of basic judicial infrastructure (*Inspecteurs de la police Judiciaire* (IPJs), prosecutors offices and Courts of First Instance);
- (2) The training of local judicial and administrative personnel;
- (3) The recruitment and deployment of 50 foreign legal professionals.

With respect to the third component, UNHCHR and UNV have already identified 50 legal professionals for possible deployment in Rwanda. However, the Rwandese Parliament is yet to debate and pass a bill repealing a law that will allow foreign judicial personnel to operate in Rwanda. The bill is presently in committee and is facing some opposition. If it is not passed into law the

proposed appointees will, nonetheless, be able to carry out valuable technical work by assisting in the formulation of an investigation strategy as well as improving overall methodology.

At the same time, the Rwandese Parliament is set to select 6 judges out of 12 nominations proposed by the Government. The selected judges are to preside over the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the Cessation Court and the Public Accounts Court.

A project aimed at providing advisory services in the administration of justice is already in the implementation phase. The project cost is US\$ 200,000 and is funded by the Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. Recruitment of this advisory services personnel was done by the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) in cooperation with the United Nations Volunteers (UNVs). Two UNVs have already been deployed in Rwanda, while another four will soon join the Ministry of Justice.

In the meantime, arrangements are underway to train local judicial personnel in the application of international norms and standards in the administration of justice and related infrastructure support. The trained personnel will be deployed throughout May, June and July 1995. The training project is expected to cost more than US\$ 5 million. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also contributed approximately US\$ 153,000 for the training of *inspecteurs* and *officiers de police judiciaire*.

#### Prisons

Serious overcrowding continues to grow in Rwandan prisons and detention facilities.

ties. There are an estimated 42,000 prisoners in detention centres nationwide, of which over 8,400 (as of 8 May) are in Kigali prison which was built to hold 2,000. During the IDP camp closure operation, it is estimated that over 2,000 returning IDPs were arrested on suspicion of participation in the genocide. While some of those arrested have been released, the incarceration of these new prisoners has exacerbated the already chronic overcrowding in prisons.

On 26 April, 28 prisoners died in a detention centre in Rusatira commune of Butare Prefecture. While some deaths may have been due to injuries received prior to incarceration, such as violence in Kibeho camp and attacks on returnees en route to the commune, many are said to have died of asphyxiation due to overcrowding.

The rehabilitation of existing detention centres and the construction of a new centre continues under Phase 1 of the UNDP Framework Programme for Support to the Rehabilitation of the Rwandese Justice system. The rehabilitation of Kibuye and Gisenyi prisons has been completed, while that at Nyanza and Byumba prisons should be finished shortly. In addition, renovations to a building at Gitagata intended to house 200 child detainees have been completed.

In preparation for the construction of a new detention centre at Nsinda, the site has been prepared and the foundations laid. A contractor has now been identified and will shortly start work on the perimeter of the centre. UNDP has also drawn up plans for the construction of two new detention centres each capable of housing 5,000 detainees.

Efforts to rehabilitate existing prisons and construct new ones have been aimed at alleviating the overcrowding in these facilities. However, increased capacity has already been used up by new prisoners arrested in the wake of the forcible closure of the southern IDP camps.

#### Military Court

The Rwandan military court has started to try soldiers of the RPA. The first 14 accused have been charged with aggravated murder and robbery. On 11 May, two soldiers were sentenced to death after being found guilty of robbery with violence and the murder of two guards at the Tanzanian High Commission.

#### Human Rights

As of 5 May 1995, there were 124 members of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) including 49 United Nations Human Rights field officers, 36 UN volunteers, 32 Human Rights field officers contributed to the HRFOR by the European Union and 3 experts provided by governments (at present, Norway and Switzerland) for the purposes of investigation, particularly into the genocide. At the same time, HRFOR has received voluntary contributions to enable it to continue operations until the end of August 1995.

An important part of the HRFOR's mandate has involved investigations into violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly in relation to the genocide. The Special Investigations Unit (recently renamed the Legal Analysis and Coordination Unit) has conducted numerous investigations and gathered information on alleged violations. The evidence gathered from the Unit's enquiries has been made available to the Inter-

national Tribunal for Rwanda with which it will continue to liaise and share information gathered on the genocide. The HRFOR is also providing back-up support for the Special Rapporteur's investigative mandate into the causes of the genocide.

HRFOR's mandate for technical cooperation is becoming increasingly important. The Technical Cooperation Unit (TCU) will provide the necessary technical assistance to the Government in its review of existing legislation as well as assist in the drafting of legislation in order to ensure that new laws are compatible with international human rights standard. The Unit will also facilitate the work of the 50 legal professionals and locally recruited staff as well as liaise with the Ministry of Justice and other relevant organisations.

The work of the Human Rights Education Component of the TCU has continued throughout the country. An expert from

the Human Rights Centre is now on mission in Rwanda to finalise a training programme to be carried out by the HRFOR for the military forces. Training on the technical aspects of policing is also being given to the gendarmerie.

Several human rights training programmes for Government ministries have been organised in partnership with all Ministries including those of Interior, Defence and Justice. These programmes aim to build a sustainable human rights capacity within each of the ministries.

UNHRFOR's Technical Cooperation Unit has successfully organised two human rights seminars for women as part of the programme of human rights education for the general population which will involve support to women's groups, youth groups and NGOs, and which will use the mass media for human rights promotion. Other training needs are currently being assessed and relevant programmes will be developed.

## II. Humanitarian Assistance

Within the reporting period, following the closure of the remaining IDP camps and the subsequent massive return of IDPs into communes, extensive efforts by the Government of Rwanda and the humanitarian community have been focused on the re-integration of IDP returnees and the rehabilitation of communes. The Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) has also focused its activities on commune rehabilitation. As an initial step, an inter-agency survey, led by the Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, to determine the situation and needs in communes is being undertaken.

### Food Assistance

As the next planting season and subsequent harvest is several months away, the vast majority of IDP returnees will, in the coming months, depend on food aid. Returning IDPs will, thus, represent an additional group of food aid beneficiaries.

In anticipation of camp closure, WFP prepositioned some 3,500 MT of food in southern Rwanda. In the immediate wake of the camp closure, communal kitchens were established in some waystations to provide cooked meals for beneficiaries. However, as the great majority of IDPs were on the move for several days, the only food commodity feasible for immediate distribution was high protein biscuits. In addition to other distribution of biscuits by NGOs, WFP provided 40 MT of biscuits distributed with the assistance of ICRC, UNHCR and some NGOs. In addition, UNICEF gave 5 MTs of high-energy powdered milk to Butare for children affected by the closure of Kibeho camp.

Upon the arrival of IDPs in their home communes, WFP, ICRC and CRS divided the food assistance responsibilities geographically by commune and started the distribution of a 15-day ration comprising 6 kg of cereals, 3.6 kg of pulses and 1.6 kg of oil to all returning IDPs, the majority of whom returned to Butare prefecture. In some communes, due to logistical constraints, a 30-day ration was distributed to the returnees. This is an initial emergency distribution due to last only one month before the returnees are incorporated into other beneficiary groups for distribution such as those that target the vulnerable or returnees.

Food-aid agencies have not found any justification - nor do their pipelines allow - to undertake a general distribution to

whole populations in the receiving communes. Besides, a massive general distribution would certainly affect the current fragile Rwandan agricultural market. As discussed above, returning IDPs will, therefore, be incorporated into a more general beneficiary group. Possibilities for food-for-work programmes will also be explored. Meanwhile, UNHCR, ICRC, CRS and some NGOs will carry out seed distribution to prepare the returning IDPs for the next planting season in September.

Emergency food distribution to returning IDPs in Rwanda has not disrupted WFP programmes in the region. The country office will continue all the existing programmes for returnees - "old" and "new" caseload refugees, targeted assistance to the vulnerable, hospital patients, unaccompanied children, food-for-work projects and selective supplementary feeding in nutritional centres.

During the month of May 1995, WFP is planning to distribute 3,046 MT of cereals, 1,214 MT of pulses, 244 MT of oil, 42 MT of CSB and 29 MT of biscuits and 14 MT of milk to a total of 420,000 beneficiaries in the country comprising the above mentioned beneficiary groups.

WFP in-country stocks of food currently stand at 10,548 MT (as of 8 May 1995) representing a 6-8 week requirement. In addition, there are 9,789 MT of food in the region also allocated for Rwanda.

### Agriculture

It is estimated that more than 60% of tillable land has been seeded in the current season B 1995 (Feb - July). With rainfall continuing at adequate levels, crops are in good condition and harvest prospects remain encouraging. FAO con-



firms the following quantities of seeds and tools to have been distributed with the collaboration of NGOs and MINAGRI.

Commodity	Total distributed	Amount in MT
Beans	3,090	(480)
Vegetables	3.5	( - )
Maize	625	( - )
Soya	480	(400)
Green Peas	445	(360)
Sorghum	1060	( - )
Wheat	304	(300)
Fertilizer	304	(304)
Hoes	700,000	(287,000)

\* Figures in brackets represent the amounts distributed by FAO.

Inputs of seeds, tools and fertilizer for Season A 1996 (September 1995 - January 1996) will depend to a large extent on stocks reserved for planting from the current season, resumption of farming activities by returned internally displaced persons (IDPs), and any influx of refugees from camps outside Rwanda by the end of August. A parallel concern is the immediate rehabilitation of areas formerly occupied by IDPs where the environmental degradation is a notable priority.

Seed multiplication work is underway with farmers under contract through selected NGOs and in cooperation with MINAGRI. Under the FAO/World Bank project, multiplication is being carried out with 5 ha of cassava, 10 ha of sweet potatoes and 20 ha of beans, both bush and climbing varieties.

Beans, cassava and sweet potatoes were selected for the seed multiplication programme as beans are the staple food

while cassava and sweet potatoes have the capacity to remain conserved in the soil for many months - a factor that contributed to available food supply during and after the genocide. In the case of both cassava and sweet potatoes, multiplication work is confined to the south-west region where shortages exist and high transportation costs can be avoided.

### Health

During the reporting period, various health training programmes were organised. These included a two-week intensive training programme for 20 health workers in epidemiological surveillance and epidemic control supported by WHO as well as another training programme for 32 trainers elaborated jointly by the Government, UNFPA and WHO on HIV/AIDS prevention and safe motherhood. UNICEF also completed the training of 454 health educators in its *Operation Clean Hands* campaign. In the second phase of the campaign to begin in June, 50 educators will be trained to train others on the essentials regarding nutrition, MCH, malaria, diarrhoea and HIV/STD prevention.

UNICEF jointly with the Government, Rotary International, WHO and other partners, is preparing for World Health Day, whose theme is "A World without Polio." UNICEF has ear-marked US\$ 200,000 for a polio vaccination programme to be launched after the observation of World Health Day on 27 May. Traditionally celebrated on 7 April, World Health Day was postponed because it coincided with the commemoration of last year's genocide.

Under its programmes of assistance to refugee-returnee areas, UNHCR is assisting in the rehabilitation of 8 district hospitals and 42 health centres in areas

where returnees have settled in great numbers. In addition to physical repair and provision of basic drugs and medical equipment to these health facilities, UNHCR provides, through its implementing partners, medical training to professional staff and health outreach training to community workers. In certain instances, supplements to Government-paid salaries are met by UNHCR.

In other health programmes, WHO has donated to the Ministry of Health, drugs and other medical supplies for use in Ndera Psychiatric Hospital.

### Nutrition

As part of on-going activities to improve the household food security of the Rwandese population, UNICEF will give 300 MT of bean seeds to farmers in the south-east of the country. The seeds will be distributed to 150,000 people during the next season (June-September).

On 3 May, a coordination meeting attended by WHO, UNICEF, CARITAS and the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Commerce, and Family and Women's Promotion was held to plan for a workshop on Micronutrients. The workshop will be held on 23 - 24 May to relaunch a national programme to combat vitamin A, iron and iodine deficiencies.

Strategies to deal with deficiencies include supplementation of diets by vitamin capsules or consumption of vitamin and mineral-rich food. In Rwanda, 85% of imported salt is iodised. A laboratory to test quantities of iodine in the salt will be rehabilitated at the Ministry of Commerce with UNICEF's support.

In preparation for a nation-wide nutrition survey, UNICEF, in coordination with the Ministry of Health, on 8 May began the

training of 20 field enumerators to collect nutrition-related data.

### Water and Sanitation

UNICEF is supporting the rehabilitation of water supply systems in prefectures in north-east Rwanda, an area to which many old caseload refugees have returned with large herds of cattle. Existing water schemes have not been able to cope with the increased use of water and have needed strengthening.

Through various agreements with private contractors and NGOs, UNICEF will be financing the construction of 27 wells in Byumba prefecture. A potable water plant has been installed in Kaborogota, Byumba.

In other rehabilitation efforts, over 150 springs to benefit some 50,000 people in Kigali rural and Gitarama Prefectures will be protected by UNICEF through its implementing partners. In Sake, Kibungo Prefecture, a 26.5 km water pipeline will be constructed to augment and extend the existing gravity scheme.

This system, when complete, will provide water for approximately 40,000 beneficiaries. The present system in Sake is in disrepair and the population is currently using untreated lake water for domestic use. As a result, there have been numerous cases of water-borne diseases in the area. WHO has delivered equipment to the Ministry of Health and Electrogaz for water quality control, as part of the National Programme for Water Quality Control.

### Education

From 24 - 27 April, a conference on post-emergency needs of Rwanda's educational sector was organised and spon-

sored by UNESCO, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and the Ministry of Higher Education with UNICEF's support. The conference, attended by over 100 participants, set out to build a consensus on national policy and planning in the education sector.

A consolidated report, Policy and Planning of Education in Rwanda, was used as a working document for the conference. The three main elements discussed were the merging of the two education ministries, decentralisation of the educational system and the formulation of an appropriate language policy.

As part of support efforts to the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, (MINIPRISEC), UNICEF is supplying the Ministry office equipment for all prefectures as well as school supplies for some 800,000 children. In addition, UNHCR, in collaboration with its implementing partners, is repairing and providing school furniture and blackboards for approximately 125 primary and secondary schools in areas where returnees are settling. Teachers at some of these schools are also being given advanced pedagogical training. In collaboration with UNESCO and UNICEF, Teacher Emergency Packages (TEPs) are being delivered at some of these facilities. UNHCR is also providing to the Ministry of Education office equipment and vehicles to allow it to carry out school inspections nationwide.

In other school programmes, UNICEF has reached an agreement with MINIPRISEC on the implementation of a Water-Borne Diseases Awareness Campaign which started on the week beginning 15 May. The nation-wide campaign will target primary school teachers and pupils.

### Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances

#### Trauma Recovery Programme

UNICEF's Trauma Recovery Programme started a baseline survey on the effects of war on children. In addition to being an evaluation tool for the trauma programme, the survey will attempt to identify the present magnitude of trauma in children and to seek culturally-appropriate methods of trauma alleviation. As part of the survey, a total of 2,200 children, ranging from ages 8 - 18, selected from unaccompanied children centres as well as from foster or substitute families will be interviewed from all prefectures. The results of the interview are expected to be ready by mid-August 1995.

The UNICEF trauma unit completed the first one-month intensive training on trauma theory and alleviation methods to four trauma advisors in Kigali, Gitarama and Butare prefectures. A large part of the advisors work will be in spreading the knowledge and techniques they have gained from UNICEF training to other social agents in their communities. They will also be involved in direct counselling of severely traumatised children and referring them to the National Trauma Recovery Centre which is to open in Kigali.

#### Child Soldiers

UNICEF, in collaboration with NGO partners, launched the demobilisation of child soldiers project in Goma. The aim of the project is to move the child soldiers from the military camp at Lac Vert and resettle them in small independent family-like units made up of 8 - 10 children. The first eight units have already been set up, constructed by the boys themselves. The project, funded by UNICEF, includes provision of medical care by the British NGO, Merlin, and registration and tracing by ICRC.

### Unaccompanied Children

Out of a total 12,700 unaccompanied children living in centres in Rwanda, 7,627 have been photographed for identification and family-tracing purposes. The photo reunification programme, started in February 1995 has been a joint UNICEF, ICRC, SCF-UK effort. Unaccompanied children centres in all prefectures were covered except for Kibungo due to procedural constraints.

As an emergency response to the closure of Kibeho camp on 22 April, Teacher Emergency Packages (TEPs) to cover 800 children have been provided to unaccompanied children's transit centres in Butare. In addition, a study will be carried out in the Southwest to assess the educational needs arising out of the new population movements back to home communes.

### Children in Prison

In Kigali Central Prison, the legal briefs of the 247 children imprisoned for legal infractions have been prepared by lawyers retained by UNICEF, in order to allow legal proceedings to continue. Of this group, 14 children who are not accused of genocide are being given priority for their hearings.

As of 13 May, Kigali Central Prison housed 435 children who have been accused of criminal activities and genocide. The youngest among this group was seven years old. The total number of children prisoners in Rwanda stands at 1,092 (this figure includes children who are accompanying their detained mothers.)

With the approval of the Ministry of Justice, a pilot project for the use of Teacher Emergency Packages (TEPs) in Kigali Central Prison started on 15 May.

A member of the UNICEF/UNESCO education programme will train 6 teachers who are themselves prisoners. Once trained in TEP methodology, the teachers will conduct classes for approximately 300 children inside the prison. This project has been arranged in association with UNICEF. If successful, the project will be extended to other prisons. It is hoped, however, that more suitable and humane conditions in alternative detention centres will become available to these children prisoners in the near future.

UN Human Rights Monitors confirmed that an estimated 15 children from the closed IDP camps were arrested in the Kigali commune of Ngenda. In order to assist unaccompanied children and female-headed households as they return to their communes of origin, the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Rehabilitation and Social Integration, with the support of UN agencies and NGOs, are planning a social and legal protection system at the home communes.

### Transport

A fleet of 139 vehicles from IOM/UNHCR, UNAMIR and LWF were used in the transportation of IDPs from the IDP camps back to their home communes. The fleet made an average of 400 movements a day in the transportation of IDPs to way-stations and home communes as well as food and non-food items to key locations. During the loading of IDP returnees, IOM emphasised the importance of keeping families together during transportation. In the initial phase of the crisis, a number of children got separated from their guardians during the loading process. IOM is currently undertaking an overall assessment of Rwanda's transport capacity in the event of an emergency.

### Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance

The International donor community in October/November 1994 decided to evaluate the total assistance provided in 1994 to the victims of the emergency in Rwanda. Twenty-one evaluation experts met in Geneva between 22 - 24 January to finalise preparations for a comprehensive evaluation of the Rwanda Emergency Operation.

The evaluation, comprising four studies, aims to draw lessons from the experience in Rwanda that will be relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for current operations in Rwanda and the region. Furthermore, the donor community needs to account for the relevance, impact and effectiveness of the substantial share of overall aid. Donor assistance in 1994 to the Rwanda Emergency alone amounted to approximately US\$ 1 billion representing 2% of Overseas Development Aid.

Since mid-April, three teams of evaluation experts have visited Rwanda to carry out Study III and IV of the evaluation. These studies aim to assess the activities of various agencies that were involved in the provision of emergency aid and protection assistance to victims of the Rwanda Emergency in 1994.

### III. Regional issues

The period has been marked by a number of events that have rendered the task of providing humanitarian assistance more difficult and have raised concerns about the respect for the principles that underlie conventions relating to the treatment of refugees.

At the end of March, the Tanzanian authorities ordered their border with Burundi closed to asylum seekers, irrespective of whether they were Rwandese refugees leaving their camps in Burundi in search of

better security or whether they were Burundi nationals fleeing localized disturbances in their own country.

In Rwanda, the border crossing at Cyangugu has been closed to all relief traffic, including food, destined to refugee camps in the Bukavu area of Zaire. Coming after months of difficulties at the Gisenyi/Goma crossing, this decision has further complicated an already difficult supply and logistics chain, particularly for food. WFP is currently going through Uganda to

transport food for refugees in Goma. Plans are underway to rehabilitate roads in Uganda to enhance their capacity to deal with the relief traffic. In both Goma and Bukavu, food distributions have been as low as 50% of normal ration requirements.

There are also indications that some of the IDPs from the forcibly-closed camps in southern Rwanda were not allowed into Burundi or were *refouled* to Rwanda after entering that country. (See Section (ii) on Burundi below)

#### Refugees and Returnees

##### (i) "Old" caseload refugees

UNHCR continues to provide assistance to the "old caseload" returnees. This assistance consists of transport, distribution of a survival pack, temporary accommodation in reception facilities in Nyagatare East, Gisenyi and Kibungo pending Government allocation of land to the group of returnees. UNHCR plans to assist in the resettlement of some 30,000 families on land earmarked for this purpose by the Government. However, UNHCR assistance will be limited to the provision of building materials, water supply and to a lesser extent education and health facilities. Settlement programmes are already underway at Nyagatare in Byumba, Mutura in Gisenyi and Rwinkwavu in Kibungo Prefectures.

##### (ii) Burundi

Some 10,000 Rwandese refugees have crossed into Burundi in the aftermath of closures of the IDP camps. There are now 7,000 refugees in Mabayi and an estimated 2,000 in the Rutabu area of Cibitoke Province among them many women and children. Small groups of

new arrivals from Rwanda have also been reported in Kirundo and Muyinga Provinces. Among the people who fled to Burundi, 310 people were refouled back to Rwanda via the Kanyaru Bas on 9 May 1995.

Elsewhere, the estimated 55,000 Rwandese refugees who had left their camps and were heading towards Tanzania prior to the closure of that border have now returned to their camps inside Burundi. UNHCR held discussions with the Government of Burundi in order to obtain a better security coverage for these camps and to find ways of improving coordination between the army and UNHCR on issues related to camp security.

##### (iii) Zaire

Organized voluntary repatriation from camps in Goma has further decreased in the wake of events in Kibeho and other IDP camps in Rwanda. Altogether, only some 800 refugees from the 1994 caseload returned to Rwanda during the month of April.

The "Contingent Zairois pour la Securite dans les Camps" (CZSC) has now reached its full strength of 1,500 men. Deployment to South Kivu is currently taking place while the military camp in the Uvira area is being prepared. Discussions are taking place with the Zairian authorities on the possibility of relocating those camps which are located right next to the border.

##### (iv) Tanzania

Since the decision was taken by the Government to close the border with Burundi, UNHCR has intervened at various levels, including with the Head of State in an effort to find a solution that would preserve humanitarian principles and be compatible with Tanzania's impeccable tradition of asylum.

#### IV. Rwanda Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal

In spite of last year's generosity, funding for activities detailed in the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal - launched in January 1995 - has been disappointing. Against a total of US \$ 219,490,162 requested for humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons, returnees and populations affected by the Rwandan conflict, US\$ 80.9 million has been pledged or received to date, including carryover funds.

For the sub-region, more than half (US\$ 346 million) of the total of US\$ 587,938.966 required mostly for care and maintenance programmes for refugees and conflict affected persons in neighbouring countries, has been funded. Out of a total request for Rwanda and the sub-region for 659,285 MTs of food supplies, the food shortfall till the end of the year is estimated

at 112,207 MTs. In view of the precarious conditions in the region, and the critical funding situation, UN agencies are reviewing programmes for 1995 as outlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal. In order to highlight the most critical shortfalls, a number of UN agencies in mid-April determined priority activities which must be undertaken as a matter of urgency.

The funding requirements as outlined by agencies (See Annex 4) reflect what can realistically be carried out over a three month period so as to make maximum use of limited donor resources. All of these activities are included in the Consolidated Appeal and have either not yet been funded, or only partially funded.

See Annex 6 - 10 for an up-dated financial summary of contributions. The breakdown is given by Appealing Agency and by Donor Country.

## *Annexes*



Annex 1. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the events at Kibeho.

Conclusions

1. In the opinion of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, the tragedy of Kibeho neither resulted from a planned action by Rwandan authorities to kill a certain group of people, nor was it an accident that could not have been prevented.
2. The Commission recognises the legitimate interests of the Rwandan Government and of the international community to have the displaced persons camps closed as quickly as possible, both for reasons of national security and in order to remove an important obstacle to the country's efforts to recover from the devastating effects of last year's genocide.
3. The Commission recognises the efforts made by the UN Special Representative, UNAMIR, the Government of Rwanda and other organisations to keep the situation at Kibeho under control.
4. The Commission regrets that UN Agencies and NGOs were not able to contribute more efficiently to the speedy evacuation of IDPs from the camp.
5. There is sufficient reliable evidence to establish that during the events at Kibeho camp between the 18th and the 23rd April 1995, unarmed IDPs were subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm in violation of human rights and humanitarian law committed by RPA military personnel.
6. There is sufficient reliable evidence to establish that during the events at Kibeho camp between the 18th and the 23rd April 1995, unarmed IDPs were subjected to serious human rights abuses, including arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm, committed by armed elements among the IDPs themselves.

Recommendations

1. The Commission welcomes the initiative taken by the Rwandan Government to carry out an investigation at the national level.  
  
The Commission calls upon the Rwandan authorities to carry out an analysis of mistakes which occurred in the preparation and handling of the closure of the camps as well as a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of individual responsibilities within its armed forces and any other factors which may have contributed to the event.
2. In the future, high priority should be given to improving the capability of the Rwandan State and local authorities to react adequately and within the internationally recognised framework of human rights and of humanitarian law to situations of social tensions and emergency.
3. The Commission recommends to the international community to continue encouraging and assisting the Rwandan Republic in its efforts to achieve justice, national reconciliation and reconstruction.
4. The Commission calls on the United Nations system to review its chain-of-command and its operation procedures to make sure that in the future an entire operation is not held hostage or bogged down by one or several agencies and organisations with limited mandates and responsibilities.

Annex 2:

**PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION**

**A. FUNDS PLEDGED BY DONORS**

(million of US dollars)

UPDATED ON 18 MAY 1995

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
<b>BILATERAL</b>					
Austria			2,0		2,0
Belgium	13,0		21,8	1,2	36,0
Canada	7,5	1,9	15,2	0,6	25,2
France					to be determined
Germany	20,4	10,6	43,0	41,4	115,5
Ireland	0,6	N.A.	N.A.		1,6
Italy		0,3			0,3
Japan		19,3	1,3	1,4	22,0
Netherlands	16,5	1,5	14,9		32,9
New Zeland					to be announced
Russia					to be announced
Spain		2,5	4,2	0,3	7,0
Sweden	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.		3,0
Switzerland	0,8		12,0		12,8
United Kingdom	0,8	2,0	5,1	0,2	8,1
USA	6,5		32,0	17,8	56,3
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>66,0</b>	<b>38,1</b>	<b>151,5</b>	<b>62,9</b>	<b>322,6</b>
<b>MULTILATERAL</b>					
African Development Bank	30,0	28,3	32,4	17,2	107,9
European Union Commission	28,0		49,3	48,9	126,2
Intern. Fund Agricultural Dev.			30,4		30,4
International Monetary Fund	13,0				13,0
Org. Petroleum Exp. Countries				12,9	12,9
United Nations Agencies			14,0		14,0
World Bank	45,0		30,0		75,0
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>116,0</b>	<b>28,3</b>	<b>156,1</b>	<b>79,0</b>	<b>379,4</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS PLEDGED</b>	<b>182,0</b>	<b>66,4</b>	<b>307,6</b>	<b>141,9</b>	<b>702,0</b>

- MEMORANDUM -

<b>FUNDS REQUESTED</b>	189,6	273,7	300,9		764,1
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Notes:

This table indicate the value of the pledges made by the donors since the Conference.

Figures in italics represent the changes occurred since the last update.

Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support (including Balance of Payments)

Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced

Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development

N.A.: not allocated. Pledges by Ireland and Sweden remain to be allocated into specific sub-programmes.

Thus the sum of funds allocated to sub-programmes does not add up to the total.

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Annex 1. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the events at Kibeho.

Conclusions

1. In the opinion of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, the tragedy of Kibeho neither resulted from a planned action by Rwandan authorities to kill a certain group of people, nor was it an accident that could not have been prevented.
2. The Commission recognises the legitimate interests of the Rwandan Government and of the international community to have the displaced persons camps closed as quickly as possible, both for reasons of national security and in order to remove an important obstacle to the country's efforts to recover from the devastating effects of last year's genocide.
3. The Commission recognises the efforts made by the UN Special Representative, UNAMIR, the Government of Rwanda and other organisations to keep the situation at Kibeho under control.
4. The Commission regrets that UN Agencies and NGOs were not able to contribute more efficiently to the speedy evacuation of IDPs from the camp.
5. There is sufficient reliable evidence to establish that during the events at Kibeho camp between the 18th and the 23rd April 1995, unarmed IDPs were subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm in violation of human rights and humanitarian law committed by RPA military personnel.
6. There is sufficient reliable evidence to establish that during the events at Kibeho camp between the 18th and the 23rd April 1995, unarmed IDPs were subjected to serious human rights abuses, including arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm, committed by armed elements among the IDPs themselves.

Recommendations

1. The Commission welcomes the initiative taken by the Rwandan Government to carry out an investigation at the national level.  
  
The Commission calls upon the Rwandan authorities to carry out an analysis of mistakes which occurred in the preparation and handling of the closure of the camps as well as a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of individual responsibilities within its armed forces and any other factors which may have contributed to the event.
2. In the future, high priority should be given to improving the capability of the Rwandan State and local authorities to react adequately and within the internationally recognised framework of human rights and of humanitarian law to situations of social tensions and emergency.
3. The Commission recommends to the international community to continue encouraging and assisting the Rwandan Republic in its efforts to achieve justice, national reconciliation and reconstruction.
4. The Commission calls on the United Nations system to review its chain-of-command and its operation procedures to make sure that in the future an entire operation is not held hostage or bogged down by one or several agencies and organisations with limited mandates and responsibilities.

Annex 2:

PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION

A. FUNDS PLEDGED BY DONORS

(million of US dollars)  
UPDATED ON 18 MAY 1995

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
<b>BILATERAL</b>					
Austria			2,0		2,0
Belgium	13,0		21,8	1,2	36,0
Canada	7,5	1,9	15,2	0,6	25,2
France					to be determined
Germany	20,4	10,6	43,0	41,4	115,5
Ireland	0,6	N.A.	N.A.		1,6
Italy		0,3			0,3
Japan		19,3	1,3	1,4	22,0
Netherlands	16,5	1,5	14,9		32,9
New Zealand					to be announced
Russia					to be announced
Spain		2,5	4,2	0,3	7,0
Sweden	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.		3,0
Switzerland	0,8		12,0		12,8
United Kingdom	0,8	2,0	5,1	0,2	8,1
USA	6,5		32,0	17,8	56,3
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>66,0</b>	<b>38,1</b>	<b>151,5</b>	<b>62,9</b>	<b>322,6</b>
<b>MULTILATERAL</b>					
African Development Bank	30,0	28,3	32,4	17,2	107,9
European Union Commission	28,0		49,3	48,9	126,2
Intern. Fund Agricultural Dev.			30,4		30,4
International Monetary Fund	13,0				13,0
Org. Petroleum Exp. Countries				12,9	12,9
United Nations Agencies			14,0		14,0
World Bank	45,0		30,0		75,0
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>116,0</b>	<b>28,3</b>	<b>156,1</b>	<b>79,0</b>	<b>379,4</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS PLEDGED</b>	<b>182,0</b>	<b>66,4</b>	<b>307,6</b>	<b>141,9</b>	<b>702,0</b>

- MEMORANDUM -

FUNDS REQUESTED	189,6	273,7	300,9		764,1
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Notes:

This table indicate the value of the pledges made by the donors since the Conference.

Figures in italics represent the changes occurred since the last update.

Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support (including Balance of Payments)

Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced

Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development

N.A.: not allocated. Pledges by Ireland and Sweden remain to be allocated into specific sub-programmes.

Thus the sum of funds allocated to sub-programmes does not add up to the total.

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## Annex 3:

## PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION

## B. FUNDS COMMITTED BY DONORS

(million of US dollars)

UPDATED ON 18 MAY 1995

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
<b>BILATERAL</b>					
Austria			0,5		0,5
Belgium	5,1		14,6	1,2	20,9
Canada	7,2	1,9	9,2	0,2	18,5
France					
Germany	6,3		14,3	9,5	30,1
Ireland					
Italy		0,3			0,3
Japan		1,0	1,3	1,4	3,7
Netherlands	10,9	0,5	2,6	0,5	14,5
New Zeland					
Russia					
Spain				0,2	0,2
Sweden					
Switzerland	0,8		1,3		2,1
United Kingdom	0,8	1,0	3,8	0,2	5,8
USA	6,5			13,9	20,4
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>37,6</b>	<b>4,7</b>	<b>47,6</b>	<b>27,0</b>	<b>116,9</b>
<b>MULTILATERAL</b>					
African Development Bank		18,3	12,8	17,1	48,2
European Union Commission	28,0		13,1	6,5	47,6
Intern. Fund Agricultural Dev.			25,4		25,4
International Monetary Fund					
Org. Petroleum Exp. Countries					
United Nations Agencies			4,4		4,4
World Bank	45,0		5,0		50,0
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>73,0</b>	<b>18,3</b>	<b>60,7</b>	<b>23,6</b>	<b>175,6</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS COMMITTED</b>	<b>110,6</b>	<b>23,0</b>	<b>108,3</b>	<b>50,6</b>	<b>292,5</b>

## - MEMORANDUM -

FUNDS PLEDGED	182,0	66,4	307,6	141,9	702,0
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## Notes:

The "commitments" indicate the value of the projects approved by the donors and the Government.

Figures in italics represent the changes occurred since the last update

Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support (including Balance of Payments)

Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced

Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development

N.A.: not allocated

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## Annex 4:

## PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION

## C. FUNDS DISBURSED BY DONORS

(million of US dollars)

UPDATED ON 18 MAY 1995

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
<b>BILATERAL</b>					
Austria			0,3		0,3
Belgium	5,0		13,3	1,2	19,5
Canada	5,5		1,8	0,2	7,5
France					
Germany			1,0	3,1	4,1
Ireland					
Italy		0,3			0,3
Japan		1,0	1,3	1,4	3,7
Netherlands	4,2	0,2	0,6		5,0
New Zeland					
Russia					
Spain					
Sweden					
Switzerland	0,8		0,1		0,9
United Kingdom	0,8	1,0	0,6	0,2	2,6
USA	6,5			13,9	20,4
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>22,8</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>19,0</b>	<b>20,0</b>	<b>64,2</b>
<b>MULTILATERAL</b>					
African Development Bank					
European Union Commission	5,0				5,0
Intern. Fund Agricultural Dev.					
International Monetary Fund					
Org. Petroleum Exp. Countries					
United Nations Agencies			3,1		3,1
World Bank					
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>5,0</b>		<b>3,1</b>		<b>8,1</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS DISBURSED</b>	<b>27,8</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>22,1</b>	<b>20,0</b>	<b>72,3</b>

## - MEMORANDUM -

FUNDS PLEDGED	182,0	66,4	307,6	141,9	702,0
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## Notes:

The "funds disbursed" indicate the value of the funds effectively transferred in the country.

Figures in italics represent the changes occurred since the last update

Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support (including Balance of Payments)

Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced

Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development

N.A.: not allocated

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**Annex 5:**

**UN CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY APPEAL FOR RWANDA:  
MOST IMMEDIATE NEEDS**

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**

<b>1. SUPPORT TO CHILDREN:</b>	<b>Total:</b>	<b>US\$ 5 million</b>
<b>Unaccompanied children inside Rwanda</b>		US\$ 2 million
- Tracing activities and technical support		
- Support to centres (non-food, water, transport and NGOs)		
- Foster family support programme		
<b>Unaccompanied children in camps (Zaire and Tanzania)</b>		US\$ 1.5 million
- Family mediation programme/tracing		
- Support to centres (non-food, water, transport, supplies, NGOs)		
<b>Removing children from Prisons</b>		US\$ 500,000
- Rehabilitation of buildings		
- Non-food items		
- Technical Assistance (with MSF and ICRC)		
<b>Demobilisation of Child Soldiers</b>		US\$ 500,000
- Supplies, rehabilitation of buildings		
- Technical assistance		
<b>Trauma recovery programme</b>		US\$ 500,000
- Training of Advisors		
- Technical assistance		
- Materials and supplies		
<b>2. IMMEDIATE RELIEF FOR REFUGEES/IDPs</b>	<b>Total:</b>	<b>US\$ 1.0 million</b>
- Water Supply, cooking sets, soap and blankets		
- Emergency medical supplies		
<b>3. EMERGENCY WATER SUPPLY RWANDA</b>	<b>Total:</b>	<b>US\$ 2.0 million</b>
- Tankers, supplies and equipment		
- Support to Electrogaz		
- Technical Assistance		
<b>4. SUPPORT TO EDUCATION</b>	<b>Total:</b>	<b>US\$ 2.0 million</b>
- School in a box (refugee areas)		
- Textbook support		
- Technical assistance		
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>US\$ 10.0 million</b>

**Department of Humanitarian Affairs:  
United Nations Rwanda Emergency Operation**

Facilitation and Coordination	<b>Total:</b>	<b>US\$ 460,000</b>
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**United Nations Human Rights Field Operation (HRFOR)**

1. Human Rights Education	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 1 million</b>
2. Studies, Conferences, Support for the development of traditional judicial initiatives	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 1.5 million</b>
3. Human Rights Field Officers - salaries and support costs	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 2 million</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>US\$ 4.5</b>

**Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)**

1. Emergency Supply of Essential Agricultural Inputs for Returning refugees and IDPs	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 2,179,430<sup>*1</sup></b>
2. Provision of Logistic and Other Assistance, including Training for the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 470,000</b>
3. Emergency Assistance for Disease Control	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 641,204<sup>*2</sup></b>
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>US 3,290,634</b>

<sup>\*1</sup>/Project was originally for US \$ 2,814,350. A pledge of US\$ 634,920 has been received from the United Kingdom

<sup>\*2</sup>/ Project was originally for US\$ 915,000. A pledge of approximately US\$ 273,796 was received from Sweden.

**International Organisation for Migration**

1. Resettlement and Transport of Internally Displaced Persons	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 2 million</b>
- includes provision for way stations, primary health care en route		

**United Nations Development Programme**

1. To reduce the risk and impact of HIV/AIDS among Rwandese refugees and surrounding local populations	<b>Total</b>	<b>US\$ 500,000</b>
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Annex 7: Table II: 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency  
as of 15 May 1995

Compiled by DHA (FTS/CESU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organizations

Appealing Agency	Total Requirements (January - December 1995)	Adjusted Requirements (US\$)	Income (Pledges, Contributions (US\$))	Shortfall (Surplus) (US\$)	% of Needs Covered
A. THE RWANDA PERSPECTIVE					
UNICEF *	44,275,500	44,275,500	3,150,328	40,825,172	2.8%
UNICEF **	55,630,000	55,630,000	23,265,269	32,364,730	41.8%
WFP	7,482,835	7,482,835	1,185,556	6,297,279	15.8%
FAO	18,531,700	18,531,700	12,320,066	6,211,634	66.5%
UNESCO **	6,629,540	6,629,540	0	6,629,540	11.0%
UNICEF *	10,153,090	10,153,090	3,818,935	6,334,155	37.6%
UNEP	1,350,000	1,350,000	0	1,350,000	11.0%
UNV	1,327,064	1,327,064	119,048	1,208,016	9.0%
IOM	10,539,800	10,539,800	369,048	10,170,752	3.5%
NGOs	4,124,913	4,124,913	0	4,124,913	0.0%
UNREO/DHA	2,003,900	2,003,900	0	2,003,900	0.0%
WFP FOOD SUMMARY ****					
WFP	ATV	US\$	MTN	US\$	%
CEREALS	86,892	33,974,772	86,884	33,887,888	19.140
PELUS	24,825	17,799,525	24,825	17,774,700	861,834
OLE	4,137	4,827,879	3,962	4,823,917	402
SALT	0	0	0	0	0
CORN SOYA BEAN	0	0	0	0	0
SUGAR	252	165,561	231	151,767	231
DRIED SKIM MILK	360	654,120	330	599,610	227
HIGH PROTEIN DISCUTS	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal for WFP	116,466	57,421,860	116,032	57,305,828	81.6%
TOTAL - RWANDA PERSPECTIVE	116,466	219,450,162	116,032	218,334,130	41.4%

Note that UNICEF is appealing for resources to fund activities to meet the needs of Rwandan refugees on a regional level. Contributions/pledges not specifically earmarked to the Rwanda Programme and made in response to the Consolidated Appeal will be recorded against the UNICEF Sub-Regional budget until a percentage of these funds has been allocated to the Rwanda refugees and IDPs programme within Rwanda.

\*\* For primary and non-formal education, regulated funds will be channelled through UNICEF for subsequent reallocation to UNICEF/UNESCO activities.

\*\*\* UNICEF has identified an estimated carryover of US\$ 21.8 million of this amount is set aside for programmes in the Sub-Region pending specific contributions.

\*\*\*\* In 1995, within needs in terms of seed and tools (US\$ 11.4 million) have been covered through the European Community and carryover pledges channelled through FAO.

Note the following for WFP:

1) Revised Requirements: A re-evaluation of food needs and ration rates of WFP Programmes within Rwanda, which took place after the finalization of the Appeal document, led to a revision of the total food and requirements to 116,466 MTN (US\$ 57.4 million). Note also that for WFP, food requirements are adjusted constantly depending on the monthly food availability and distribution rate in the region.

2) Contributions: Most of the commodities requested contributions announced in 1994, scheduled for delivery to the final destination in 1995. Note also that due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected in this table, in order to provide the most accurate picture of requirements/shortfalls, totals will not match with the donor breakdowns indicated in Table III and IV.


3) Shortfalls may not equal adjusted req. less income, as they reflect the accurate outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc. of food) determined by WFP for commodities in the region until the end of the year.

Annex 6: Table I: 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda (Rwanda and the Sub-Region)  
Summary of Requirements and Contributions - By Appealing Agency  
as of 15 May 1995

Compiled by DHA (FTS/CESU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organizations

Appealing Organizations	Adjusted Requirements (US\$)	Pledges/Contributions (US\$)	Carryover Funds (US\$)	Total Funds Available (US\$)	Shortfall (Surplus) (US\$)	% of Needs Covered
FAO	18,531,700	908,893	11,411,173	12,320,066	6,211,634	66.5%
UNICEF	66,812,000	8,985,260	23,800,000	32,785,260	34,026,740	49.1%
UNHCR	289,078,450	64,400,438	25,700,000	90,100,438	198,978,012	31.2%
UNDP	1,370,000	0	0	0	6,629,540	0.0%
UNESCO	6,629,540	0	0	0	6,629,540	0.0%
UNHCR	10,153,050	3,818,935	0	3,818,935	6,334,115	37.6%
UNIFEM	1,350,000	0	0	0	1,350,000	0.0%
UNV	1,327,064	119,048	0	119,048	1,208,016	9.0%
WFP (Food & Non-Food)*	378,105,944	191,777,920	91,702,998	283,480,918	76,563,437	79.8%
WHO	11,469,927	2,773,806	0	2,773,806	8,696,121	24.2%
UNREO/DHA	2,003,900	900,209	0	900,209	1,103,691	44.9%
IOM	10,539,800	369,048	0	369,048	10,170,752	3.5%
NGOs	4,124,913	0	0	0	4,124,913	0.0%
GRAND TOTAL	801,496,288	274,053,557	152,614,171	426,667,728	356,766,971	55.5%

1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency



Note that for WFP, the shortfall may not equal adjusted requirements less income as WFP has chosen to reflect the accurate outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc. of food) for the region until the end of the year. Note also that due to regional borrowings, loans, reallocations of food, a difference of US\$ 5.6 million exists between this Table and Table III and IV (donor breakdowns).



**Annex 8: Table III: Donor Breakdown of Contributions/Pledges in Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda**

as of 15 May 1995

Compiled by DHA (FIM/CESU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organisations.

Donor	Channel	Sector/Activity	Amount US\$
Australia	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	
Australia	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Refugee prog.	729,927
Belgium	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/UNHCR sec. op. for refugee camps in Zaire	729,927
Canada	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	1,000,000
Canada	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N05 - Health	1,569,286
Canada	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N14-A - CEDCs	1,428,571
Canada	UNREO	RWA-95-1/N17 - Facilitation and Coordination	1,821,179
Canada	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	248,227
Denmark	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	68,576
Finland	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	207,000
Finland	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	117,925
Finland	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Refugee prog.	900,000
France	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/for repatriation	353,774
France	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Burundi/for repatriation	580,271
Germany	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	193,424
Ireland	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	684,932
Italy	UNICEF	Multisectoral	76,923
Italy	IOM	RWA-95-1/N20 - Trans/logis., reception, mgmt. of camps for IDPs	935,673
Italy	WHO	RWA-95-1/N04 - Health	250,000
Italy	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	555,556
Italy	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Tanzania/for displaced Rwandese	350,000
Japan	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N14-A - CEDCs	350,877
Japan	WHO	SRP-95-1/N06 - Health	1,000,000
Japan	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	800,000
Netherlands	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/UNHCR sec. op. for refugee camps in Zaire	300,000
Netherlands	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	609,756
Norway	UNICEF	Multisectoral	4,117,647
Norway	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/security prog. in refugee camps	394,459
Norway	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Refugee prog.	153,846
Norway	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	153,846
Sweden	EAO	RWA-95-1/N03-B - Agriculture	480,957
Switzerland	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	275,972
Switzerland	WFP	SRP-95-1/N05 - Transport and Logistics	113,636
Switzerland	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/refugees and IDPs	403,225
Ireland *	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/purch. of family package for ret. & IDPs	854,701
United Kingdom	FAO	RWA-95-1/N03-B - Agriculture	49,800
United Kingdom	IOM	RWA-95-1/N20 - Trans/logis., reception, mgmt. of camps for IDPs	634,921
United Kingdom	UNV	RWA-95-1/N25 - Inter-Agency Coordination/Programme Support	119,048
United Kingdom	UNICEF	Multisectoral	119,048
United Kingdom	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	1,428,571
United Kingdom	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	3,200,000
United Kingdom	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaire/for cost of International Liaison Group	1,587,301
United Kingdom	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for returnees and IDPs	793,651
United Kingdom	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for airport service charges	873,016
United Kingdom	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/Rwanda-Burundi operation	5,350
United Kingdom	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Burundi/Rwanda-Burundi operation	793,651
United Kingdom	UNREO	RWA-95-1/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	793,651
United Kingdom	WHO	SRP-95-1/N06 - Health	154,450
United Kingdom	WHO	RWA-95-1/N04 - Health	788,250
United Kingdom	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	630,000
			500,000

This amount forms part of a contribution made in 1994 of US\$ 80,160 to DEA to be reallocated to UNHCR and to NGOs for assistance to IDPs.

UNICEF *		244,802,950		244,802,950		86,650,110		**	9,520,000		1,642,000		35.4%
UNICEF		14,162,000		11,162,000		3,997,092			1,370,000		2,398,842		39.8%
WFP		3,987,092		1,370,000		35,723,074			0		1,370,000		0.0%
UNDP		1,370,000		1,370,000		0			0		1,370,000		0.0%
WFP Regional Civil Projects		35,723,074		35,723,074		18,821,901			16,901,173		16,901,173		32.7%
WFP FOOD SECURITY ***													
	M7W	US\$	M7W	US\$	M7W	US\$	M7W	US\$	M7W	US\$	M7W	%	
BURUNDI CONFLICT VICTIMS													
CEREALS	77,718	28,444,758	77,443	28,344,138	65,077	23,618,328	19,037	6,967,542	75.4%				
POULTRY	24,384	18,214,848	23,921	17,868,987	15,973	11,531,831	6,076	4,501,422	74.8%				
OIL	4,086	4,396,536	4,086	4,396,536	2,231	2,422,076	591	633,916	85.5%				
SALT	876	400,332	774	353,718	200	91,400	574	260,318	25.8%				
CORN SOYA BEAN	9,762	5,086,002	9,762	5,086,002	4,402	2,293,442	3,692	1,923,532	62.2%				
SUGAR	222	143,634	222	143,634	86	53,642	0	0	0.0%				
DRIED SKIM MILK	282	503,934	249	444,963	0	0	249	444,963	0.0%				
HIGH PROTEIN DISCUTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%				
Subtotal for WFP	117,330	57,190,074	116,487	56,637,978	87,989	40,612,719	30,169	14,735,693	74.9%				
REFUGEES IN TANZANIA													
CEREALS	100,920	33,202,680	100,920	33,202,680	82,759	27,227,579	5,085	1,672,899	91.0%				
POULTRY	28,340	18,861,360	28,340	18,861,360	22,722	14,860,188	4,725	3,090,150	83.6%				
OIL	4,928	5,120,192	4,928	5,120,192	4,397	4,568,483	308	320,012	93.8%				
SALT	1,202	473,588	1,202	473,588	180	70,920	906	356,964	24.6%				
CORN SOYA BEAN	14,174	7,441,350	13,909	7,302,225	9,081	4,767,325	5,085	2,669,625	71.3%				
SUGAR	118	70,210	109	64,855	13	8,925	94	53,930	13.8%				
DRIED SKIM MILK	0	0	0	0	20	34,900	0	0	0.0%				
HIGH PROTEIN DISCUTS	0	0	0	0	500	922,500	0	0	0.0%				
Subtotal for WFP	150,182	65,169,380	149,908	65,024,800	119,674	53,461,020	16,105	8,165,586	87.4%				
REFUGEES IN ZAIRE													
CEREALS	185,883	90,710,904	180,206	87,940,528	142,095	69,342,555	29,152	14,226,078	81.9%				
POULTRY	53,115	46,990,545	51,706	45,656,398	43,695	38,582,665	6,744	5,994,952	87.0%				
OIL	9,180	11,777,940	9,048	11,608,831	7,349	9,428,767	1,230	1,578,090	86.4%				
SALT	2,223	1,162,629	2,200	1,150,600	943	493,189	1,043	545,698	52.6%				
CORN SOYA BEAN	24,129	16,962,687	23,200	16,323,660	17,884	12,572,452	5,743	4,037,329	75.3%				
SUGAR	375	242,625	358	231,626	40	25,800	272	176,049	24.0%				
DRIED SKIM MILK	402	777,066	383	740,339	40	77,320	299	573,967	21.9%				
HIGH PROTEIN DISCUTS	0	0	110	0	2,762	5,617,908	0	0	0.0%				
Subtotal for WFP	275,307	168,534,396	267,231	163,651,992	214,008	136,140,756	44,483	27,096,163	83.4%				
Total for WFP (Food)	542,819	290,893,850	533,596	285,314,670	433,471	229,214,495	90,855	49,997,436	83.3%				
TOTAL - SUB-REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE	642,819	587,938,966	633,596	582,359,986	423,471	345,794,756	90,855	220,462,291	60.4%				
** Regular income for UNICEF has been revised to reflect additional needs of US\$ 3,998,810 for the Zaïre Camp Security Arrangement for the period Feb-Jun 1995. Income that is a carryover of US\$ 21.7 million.													
*** UNICEF has identified an estimated carryover of US\$ 21.8 million of which 40% of this amount is set aside for programmes in the Sub-Region pending specific contributions.													
*** Note the following for WFP:													
1) Revised requirements, a standardization of ration rates and rationization of WFP programmes within Rwanda, which took place after the finalization of the Appeal document, led to a revision of the total food aid requirements to 542,819 MT (US\$ 290.9 million). Note also that for WFP, food requirements are updated constantly depending on the monthly food availability and distribution rate in the region.													
2) Contributions: Most of the commodities represent contributions announced in 1994, scheduled for delivery to the final destination in 1995. Note also that due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected in this table, in order to provide the most accurate picture of requirements, the table will not match with the donor breakdowns indicated in Table III and IV.													
3) Shortfalls may not equal adjusted requirements less income, as they reflect the accurate outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc of food) determined by WFP for commodities in the region until the end of the year.													
GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	639,285	867,422,128	649,628	801,496,288	494,989	436,667,718	112,107	356,766,971	55.5%				

**Table III - Donor Breakdown of Contributions/Pledges in Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda as of 15 May 1995**

Donor	Channel	Sector/Activity	Amount US\$
USA	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	20,000,000
USA	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	177,520
USA	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N27 - Facilitation and Coordination	320,012
USA	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	5,000,000
USA	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	31,887,755
EU	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	7,752
UNICEF NatCom/Austria	UNICEF	Multisectoral	961,605
UNICEF NatCom/France	UNICEF	Multisectoral	51,200
UNICEF NatCom/Germany	UNICEF	Multisectoral	345,566
UNICEF NatCom/Greece	UNICEF	Multisectoral	16,000
UNICEF NatCom/Israel	UNICEF	Multisectoral	550,539
UNICEF NatCom/Japan	UNICEF	Multisectoral	4,218
UNICEF NatCom/Slovenia	UNICEF	Multisectoral	10,000
UNICEF NatCom/USA	UNICEF	RWA-95-1/N10 - Water and Sanitation	20,745
UNDP	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/Rwanda-Burundi Operation	60,000
ACCT	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N22 - Human Rights Monitoring, etc.	9,191
ACFR (FRA)	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for reconstruction of one school	19,231
Deutsche Stiftung (GER)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaïre/Refugees	13,699
Deutsche Stiftung (FRG)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaïre/Refugees	4,688
Girl Guide Assoc. (UK)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwandese refugees	99,935
BEP Minerals (AUL)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Tanzania/Rwandese refugees	30,000
Dem Lib Party (KOR)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaïre/Rwandese refugees	11,364
Bea & Urs Hauser (SWI)	UNHCR	RWA-95-1/N19 - Rwanda/for rehabilitation of a primary school	38,967
Scoutpioneer Int. (IPN)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Operation	12,308
Private, Japan	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/Rwanda-Burundi Operation	12,712
Private, Ivory Coast	UNICEF	Multisectoral	398
Private, Ireland	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Zaïre/purch. of school equip. for refugee children	7,781
Private, Switzerland	UNICEF	Multisectoral	9,434
UN Womens Guild	UNICEF	Multisectoral	3,172
UN Association (IPN)	UNHCR	SRP-95-1/N01 - Great Lakes Area/for refugees and returnees	94,964,394
<b>Sub-Total for Cash Contributions</b>			
Carryover Funds	UNHCR	Multisectoral assistance to UNHCR Rwanda/Burundi Operation	25,700,000
Carryover Funds	UNICEF	Multisectoral assistance / 40 % set aside for Sub-Region	73,800,000
Carryover Funds	WFP	SRP-95-1/N03 - Transport and Logistics	6,133,144
Carryover Funds **	FAO	RWA-95-1/N03-A - Agriculture	11,411,173
<b>Sub-Total for Carryover Funds</b>			67,044,317

\*\* In 1995, minimum needs in terms of seed and tools (US\$ 11.4 million) have been covered through the European Community and carryover pledges channelled through FAO.

The following contributions have been reported to DHA by the Donor but not yet confirmed as final by the Agencies concerned:

08-Mar-95 - Netherlands - UNHCR - Cash for secondment of a Dutch team (16 persons) for sec. operations in refugee camps in Zaïre	756,098
18-Apr-95 - Australia - UNHCR - Cash for monitoring programme in Rwanda	145,985
13-Apr-95 - Australia - UNICEF - Cash for immediate relief for unaccompanied and traumatized children in Rwanda	218,978
09-May-95 - Denmark - IOM - Cash to IOM programme in Rwanda	92,593
05-May-95 - Denmark - UNICEF - Cash for relief aid to children in difficult circumstances in Rwanda	370,570
05-May-95 - Denmark - UNICEF - Cash for multisectoral assistance to Zaïre refugee areas	555,556
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>52,139,580</b>

**Table III - Donor Breakdown of Contributions/Pledges in Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda (Cont.) as of 15 May 1995**

WFP Food Contributions *	Food (MTs)		Amount US\$		Grand Total	
	1995	1994	1995	1994	Food (MTs)	Amount (US\$)
<b>Burundi Conflict Victims (SRP-95-1/N02-A - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Austria	1,000	—	367,000	—	1,000	367,000
Denmark	170	—	126,990	—	170	126,990
Germany	11,242	3,545	4,125,814	1,301,015	14,787	5,426,829
Japan	—	13,894	—	5,099,098	13,894	5,099,098
Netherlands	4,256	6,358	1,963,232	2,756,326	10,614	4,719,558
Switzerland	—	500	—	260,500	500	260,500
United Kingdom	500	—	183,500	—	500	183,500
USA	15,368	20,520	8,785,778	10,145,246	35,888	18,931,024
EU	9,000	586	3,739,000	239,142	9,586	3,978,142
Others-ICRC	—	3,950	—	3,098,700	3,950	3,098,700
Others	4,130	988	1,511,580	514,748	5,118	2,026,328
<b>Sub-Total for Burundi</b>	<b>45,666</b>	<b>50,341</b>	<b>20,802,894</b>	<b>23,414,775</b>	<b>96,007</b>	<b>44,217,669</b>
<b>Rwanda Conflict Victims (RWA-95-1/N01(A-F) - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Canada	3,250	—	1,274,000	—	3,250	1,274,000
Denmark	—	1,800	—	705,600	1,800	705,600
Germany	10,000	222	3,920,000	159,174	10,222	4,079,174
Japan	—	3,533	—	1,384,936	3,533	1,384,936
Netherlands	—	404	—	158,368	404	158,368
Sweden	—	950	—	681,150	950	681,150
USA	38,892	9,242	19,596,817	4,894,275	48,134	24,491,090
EU	—	632	—	370,100	632	370,100
Others-ICRC	—	2,634	—	2,086,567	2,634	2,086,567
Others	—	1,140	—	801,884	1,140	801,884
<b>Sub-Total for Rwanda</b>	<b>52,142</b>	<b>20,557</b>	<b>24,790,817</b>	<b>11,242,052</b>	<b>72,699</b>	<b>36,032,869</b>
<b>Tanzania - Refugees (SRP-95-1/N02-B - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Austria	2,000	—	658,000	—	2,000	658,000
Belgium	—	2,000	—	658,000	2,000	658,000
Denmark	4,500	—	1,480,500	—	4,500	1,480,500
Germany	1,200	6,201	394,800	2,812,004	7,401	3,206,804
Italy	—	1,759	—	1,136,801	1,759	1,136,801
Switzerland	940	—	296,100	—	940	296,100
United Kingdom	11,354	—	4,663,016	—	11,354	4,663,016
USA	60,511	2,285	28,641,044	1,356,947	62,796	29,997,991
EU	16,195	8,466	5,650,730	4,005,652	24,661	9,656,382
<b>Sub-Total for Tanzania</b>	<b>96,700</b>	<b>20,711</b>	<b>41,784,190</b>	<b>9,969,404</b>	<b>117,411</b>	<b>51,753,594</b>
<b>Zaïre - Refugees (SRP-95-1/N02-C - Emergency Food Aid)</b>						
Belgium	—	227	—	291,241	227	291,241
Canada	—	13,907	—	8,329,486	13,907	8,329,486
Denmark	—	1,701	—	835,338	1,701	835,338
Germany	14,257	5,617	6,957,416	2,741,096	19,874	9,698,512
Netherlands	2,488	3,319	2,098,549	2,550,640	5,807	4,649,189
Switzerland	—	626	—	440,078	626	440,078
United Kingdom	2,000	941	976,000	1,913,994	2,941	2,889,994
USA	106,111	4,080	66,865,685	3,402,640	110,191	70,268,325
EU	14,080	19,573	7,415,513	14,626,707	33,653	22,042,220
Others	2,000	8,186	1,766,000	5,812,403	10,186	7,578,403
<b>Sub-Total for Zaïre</b>	<b>140,936</b>	<b>58,177</b>	<b>86,079,163</b>	<b>40,943,623</b>	<b>199,113</b>	<b>127,022,786</b>
<b>Subtotal - Food Contributions</b>	<b>335,444</b>	<b>149,786</b>	<b>173,457,064</b>	<b>85,569,854</b>	<b>485,230</b>	<b>259,026,918</b>
<b>Grand-Total</b>	<b>335,444</b>	<b>149,786</b>	<b>173,457,064</b>	<b>85,569,854</b>	<b>485,230</b>	<b>\$421,035,629</b>

\* NOTE FOR WFP:

Due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected by WFP in Table I, in order to provide an accurate picture of the food requirements/shortfalls, a difference of US\$ 5,632,099 exists between this Table and Table I and II. Furthermore, 1994 reflects contributions announced in 1994 and carried over to 1995.



# Annex 9 Table IV: 1995 Pledges/Contributions to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency (Outside of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Framework)

as of 15 May 1995

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Note that this report is complementary to the extent that decisions have been reported to Department of Humanitarian Affairs by Donors.

Date Reported	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$
18-Apr-95	Australia	Compassion Australia	Cash to train Rwandan consultants working with unaccompanied children	61,533
18-Apr-95	Australia	World Vision/Australia	Cash to WW programme in Kasezi province, south of Kigali, trauma counselling, etc. for unaccompanied children	229,927
16-Feb-95	Belgium	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	75,000
22-Feb-95	Canada	RC/Burundi	Cash to undertake ICRC protection/relief activities and to carry out relief/medical activities in Burundi	709,220
21-Feb-95	Canada	CARE/Canada	Cash to construct gravity water systems in Ngozi, Kayanza, Bujumbura, etc.	496,454
22-Feb-95	Canada	MSF/Canada	Cash to support the hospital in Butare, the health centres and hospital in Gicumbi and Kigali	248,227
21-Feb-95	Canada	World Vision/Canada	Cash to improve health status of unaccompanied children, returning refugees/IDPs and to improve living conditions through the provision of shelter supplies	344,610
07-Apr-95	Finland	World Vision/Finland & Int'l	Cash	47,619
03-Jun-95	Germany	HELIP	Cash for medical assistance for displaced persons	140,256
06-Apr-95	Germany	HELIP/Johanniter Unfalldhilfe	Cash for medical assistance (3 doctors, 1 project coord., 3 nurses, 1 medical assist. medicines and hospital equipment)	174,433
19-Jan-95	Italy	DHIA (Pisa Warehouse)	Airlift for in-kind contributions through Pisa Warehouse in favour of the Rwandese population	232,357
05-Apr-95	Luxembourg	RC/Luxembourg	Cash for medical aid for refugees and displaced persons	86,505
05-Apr-95	Luxembourg	Children's Services Mat der 3. Welt	Cash for resettlement of refugees	34,602
08-Mar-95	Netherlands	Disaster Relief Agency, Netherlands	Cash for "community services" projects for Rwandan refugees in Tanzania (Donors)	75,000
16-Feb-95	Netherlands	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	30,882
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office, Kigali	Cash for a "Relief and Rehabilitation Fund" in Rwanda (small scale projects in the field of rehab. activities)	274,390
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office, Kigali	Cash for a "Special Health Support Fund" (aiming to increase quality of health sector by purch. of medical equip.)	182,927
15-Feb-95	Netherlands	SCU/United Kingdom	Cash for secondment of a Health Advisor to work within the MOE in Kigali and the provision of support for training, workshops and study visits	395,845
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office-Kigali	Cash for funding to increase quality of health sector by purchase of medical equipment	182,927
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office-Kigali	Cash for small scale projects in the field of rehabilitation activities	274,390
26-Mar-95	Netherlands	UNDP	Cash to UNDP Trust Fund for Rwanda, aiming to support the Government of Rwanda's Programme of National Reconciliation, Socio-economic Rehabilitation and Recovery presented at Geneva Round Table Conference in Jan. 1995	11,737,804
12-Apr-95	Netherlands	UNHCR	Cash for regional conference in Bujumbura (12-17 February 1995)	31,707
31-Mar-95	Norway	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	1,234,900
07-Mar-95	Sweden	PMU Interlife	Cash for resettlement of Burundese IDPs/refugees	177,534
15-Feb-95	Sweden	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	67,295
15-Feb-95	Switzerland	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	21,260
27-Feb-95	United Kingdom	UNHCR	Cash for Human Rights activities in Burundi	158,730
21-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNHCR	Cash for UNHCR operational needs in Burundi, health, welfare, CEDCs (UNHCR Appeal for Burundi - 01/10/94 - 31/12/95)	793,651
28-Feb-95	United Kingdom	ACORD	Cash to provide seeds and tools for families affected by the October 1993 war in Burundi	95,238
28-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Aston Nord-Stud/Belgium	Cash for provision of seeds and tools in Kigali prefecture to allow approx. 22,000 households (mainly farmers) to start agricultural activities for planting season	172,971
17-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Christian Aid	Cash to provide 19,929 families (mainly farmers) with one loo per family plus beans, potato and vegetable seeds for planting after the rainy season	168,249
16-Feb-95	United Kingdom	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	47,619
16-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Merlin	Cash for rehabilitation of health centres in Gicumbi region and to assist MOE in Rwanda	362,043
28-Mar-95	United Kingdom	ICRC	Cash for the ICRC's 1995 Rwanda Emergency Appeal	357,143
27-Feb-95	United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash for the IFRC's 1995 Emerg. Appeal for Rwanda/Burundi refugees in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire	357,143
26-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNDP Trust Fund	Cash to help meet immediate capital and recurrent costs	2,063,492
26-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNDP	Cash to help strengthen the Rwandan Gov. capacity in financial, economic and human resources management	3,174,603
16-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNDP	Cash for UNDP Round Table Follow-up	117,460

## Table IV: 1995 Pledges/Contributions to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency (Outside of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Framework)

as of 15 May 1995

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
Date Reported	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$
01-Jan-95	USA	UNDP/UNV	Cash grant to assist with human rights in Rwanda (OTI Assistance)	750,000
03-Feb-95	USA	ADRA	Cash for food-for-work, road and well programmes in the North-West (OFDA Assistance)	499,009
03-Feb-95	USA	Direct	Cash for DART operations	400,000
27-Jan-95	USA	American Refugee Committee	Cash for health and water rehabilitation in North-East (OFDA Assistance)	753,174
01-Feb-95	USA	International Rescue Committee	Cash for relief and rehabilitation project in Cyangugu and Kibungo (OFDA Assistance)	999,294
03-Feb-95	USA	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	50,000
01-Jan-95	USA	World Relief	Cash for primary health care in Kibogor (OFDA Assistance)	230,036
01-Jan-95	USA	National Rescue Corps	Cash to recruit and train human rights monitors (OTI Assistance)	110,000
01-Jan-95	USA	International Rescue Committee	Cash for refugees in Tanzania (State/PRM Assistance)	1,208,517
31-Mar-95	USA	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	66,569
31-Mar-95	NS/Liechtenstein	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	4,839
31-Mar-95	NS/Netherlands	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	913,726
31-Mar-95	NS/Norway	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	143,351
10-Jan-95	RC/Denmark	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	838,710
12-Jan-95	RC/Morocco	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	75,738
27-Dec-94	RC/Netherlands	IFRC	Cash for food for refugees in Goma (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	2,784
20-Dec-94	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	448,500
31-Mar-95	Others	ICRC	Cash (ICRC Emergency Appeal)	765,152
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>34,845,926</b>

Annex 10 Table V: Summary of Humanitarian Assistance to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency

Compiled by DHA (FIS/CESU) on the basis of information reported by donors and appealing agencies.

Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda January - December 1995		
Donor	Value US\$	% of Funding
1. USA	149,386,816	35.48%
2. EU	48,692,998	11.57%
3. UK	18,243,424	4.33%
4. Germany	16,082,962	3.82%
5. Netherlands	8,789,184	2.09%
6. Canada	6,409,639	1.52%
7. Italy	2,442,106	0.58%
8. Japan	2,100,000	0.50%
9. Denmark	1,814,490	0.43%
10. Switzerland	1,667,663	0.40%
11. Australia	1,459,854	0.35%
12. Finland	1,371,699	0.33%
13. Norway	1,183,108	0.28%
14. Austria	1,025,060	0.24%
Others (incl. Belgium, France, Ireland, Sweden, Thailand, UN Agencies, UNICEF NatCom, NGOs/Private Org. and Carryover Funds)	160,366,646 *	38.09%
<b>TOTAL **</b>	<b>\$421,035,629</b>	<b>100.00%</b>


\* Carryover funds amount to approximately US\$ 152.6 million



\*\* Note that due to regional borrowings, loans, reallocations of food reflected by WFP, a difference of US\$ 3.6 million exists between this Table and Tables I and II.

Total Humanitarian Assistance *** to the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency as of 15 May 1995		
Donor	Value US\$	% of Funding
1. USA	154,389,826	33.71%
2. EU	48,692,998	10.63%
3. UK	26,311,866	5.74%
4. Netherlands	22,731,154	4.96%
5. Germany	16,397,651	3.58%
6. Canada	8,218,150	1.79%
7. Denmark	2,833,009	0.62%
8. Italy	2,674,463	0.58%
9. Norway	2,418,068	0.53%
10. Australia	2,116,277	0.46%
11. Japan	2,100,000	0.46%
12. Switzerland	1,688,923	0.37%
13. Finland	1,419,318	0.31%
14. Belgium	1,075,000	0.23%
Others (incl. Sweden, Ireland, Thailand, France, Austria, Luxembourg, UN Agencies, UNICEF NatCom, NGOs/Private Org. and Carryover Funds)	164,954,432 *	36.01%
<b>TOTAL ***</b>	<b>\$458,021,135</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

\* Carryover funds amount to approximately US\$ 152.6 million



\*\*\* Total Humanitarian Assist. calculated as follows - Contributions in direct response to the Appeal plus additional contributions outside of the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal framework (i.e. IFRC, ICRC, NGOs, Bilateral, etc.) or still to be confirmed by UN Agencies.





# ***RWANDA***

*Humanitarian Situation Report*  
*15 April 1995*



Photo: UNICEF/Maggie Murray-Lee


Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator

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This Humanitarian Situation Report has been compiled from information gathered from the Government, UN Agencies, UNAMIR, ICRC, IOM, NGOs and Donors. It will be produced once a month and will seek to give an up-to-date picture of the progress or constraints in key areas of humanitarian interventions in Rwanda. The report will also highlight and analyse political and socio-economic trends in the country to the extent that they may have implications for on-going humanitarian activities. The Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator welcomes contributions from its humanitarian partners.

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## Overview

A week of national mourning was observed in Rwanda from 6 to 13 April in memory of those killed in last year's genocide and massacres. While new graves are still being found, it is believed that as many as one million Rwandese may have died. Rumours of ethnic reprisals for the genocide were rife during the period, leading to some displacement of populations.

In the period following the week of mourning, ten people were reported killed and an unknown number injured during a cordon and search operation launched by the RPA in Kibeho and Ndago camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) in south-west Rwanda. The two camps were the largest IDP camps, with an approximate population of 160,000. The operation preceded the launch of increased efforts by the humanitarian community to assist IDPs to return voluntarily to their home communes. Although estimated numbers of people remaining in the two camps vary, it is believed that as many as 60% of the former populations have scattered into the surrounding countryside.

The Government has announced that all seven camps for displaced persons are officially closed, but have agreed to allow aid agencies and the UN to provide emergency relief assistance, including food, water, and medical attention for populations remaining in Kibeho and Ndago. The Government has repeatedly stressed that they see the camps as a threat to national security.

In neighbouring Zaire, armed gun-men in military uniform crossed Lake Kivu, on 11 April, and attacked Birava camp for Rwandese refugees. The attack on the camp, which has a population of around 10,000, left 31 people dead, including two Zaire nationals. Over 50 people were injured. The attack has led to increased tensions between the Governments of Rwanda and Zaire. Major concerns over reports of armament and training of former government military and militia in the camps in Zaire have already been expressed by the Government of Rwanda and the international community. The Government of Zaire has denied these reports in a written statement to the UN Security Council.

Upheavals have continued in neighbouring Burundi, leading to mass population movements within the country and across the border into Tanzania. Reports of ethnic cleansing in the northern parts of the country are being investigated.

In north-east Rwanda, the resettlement of the old 1959 caseload of Rwandese refugees, mainly from Uganda and Tanzania, continues to be a major cause of concern due to the large number of livestock which have returned with the people. Overgrazing and lack of water threaten to develop into a major humanitarian emergency unless urgent actions are taken. A number of options to alleviate the problems are being explored with the Government.

Concerns over severe food aid shortages in-country have been alleviated by major improvements in the food pipeline, mainly as a result of diversions from other parts of the region. Food rations in refugee camps in neighbouring countries however, continue to be cut by as much as half due to difficulties in transporting

food into Zaire. The Government has closed the border with Zaire blocking the passage for food supplies as well for other humanitarian assistance destined for Zaire.

Although some steps have been taken to help decongest Rwanda's overcrowded prisons and detention centres, currently some 30,000 people are incarcerated, most on charges of genocide. Twenty-four prisoners died in one night due to asphyxiation in a detention centre near Kigali. The Government is now reviewing plans, with the assistance of the humanitarian community and UNAMIR, to improve conditions in the prisons and increase their capacity. National trials for genocide, meanwhile, scheduled to start on 6 April, were postponed.

General security in Kigali and other areas of the country has continued to deteriorate. Human Rights Field Officers have reported an increasing number of people killed in attacks during incursions into Rwanda from neighbouring Zaire. Armed robberies targeting offices and residences of international personnel have also increased and a number of UN vehicles have been stolen.

On a positive note, further strides have been taken during the month in the economic sector, including the revival of the private sector. Agricultural activities continue to be intensified and there is evidence of a partial recovery of a cash crop market. The resumption of academic programmes in schools and at the University are also positive steps towards the return to normalcy.

## I. Main Developments

### Political

Ceremonies to commemorate the first anniversary of last year's genocide were held country-wide beginning on 7 April. The day was designated for the reburial of, amongst other people, the late Prime Minister, Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and a number of Cabinet Ministers killed in the genocide. Flags, including that of the UN, were flown at half mast throughout a week-long mourning period.

The international community in Rwanda expressed its solidarity with the Government and the people of Rwanda through messages delivered on behalf of the UN Secretary General by his Special Representative during the official commemorative ceremonies, and through a signifi-

cant presence at the ceremonies. Similar messages of solidarity had earlier been expressed by the OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, and by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala-Lasso, who both visited Rwanda prior to the national ceremonies.

Against the solemn background of the ceremonies was the call, amongst others, for "reconciliation between the international community and the people of Rwanda" over the former's abandonment of the Rwandese people in their greatest hour of need. Speeches at the ceremony underscored the urgent need to bring to justice perpetrators of the genocide. On national security, concern was raised over the issue of the arms



build-up in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, the continued arms embargo on Rwanda and the resultant threat to national security.

The period leading to 7 April was characterised by tension in the country due to widespread rumours of retaliatory killings to occur around the time of the anniversary of last year's genocide. In areas around Gitarama and Gikongoro, there were reports of people fleeing their home communes. The Government responded firmly by dispelling the rumours and by tightening security. Some rumour-mongers were arrested.

The recent negative shift in government attitude towards the international community has been the subject of informal debate at the UN Security Council. As part of activities organised to mark the first anniversary of the genocide, some 1,000 people demonstrated outside UNAMIR Headquarters on 11 April accusing the UN force and the international community of "complicity" in the genocide. Of deep concern to the UN in Kigali and in New York, was the involvement of some government officials who, during the anti-UNAMIR demonstrations, made inflammatory speeches. The SRSG has complained to the Government about the content of the speeches.

Criticism against the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) by the Government and the local press has also continued, with accusations to the effect that the human rights mission in Rwanda "has strayed from its original mandate". However, following the visit of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and protests from HRFOR, the recent strident tone of criticism on the national radio has lessened.

Meanwhile, as part of efforts towards national reconciliation, recent public meetings have been held by local and national authorities at which national reconciliation continues to be advocated. Recent appointments of several returnees as bourgmestres are seen as a positive sign not only for national reconciliation, but also for building the confidence of potential returnees.

### Security

In addition to concerns surrounding the build-up to the anniversary of the genocide, serious concerns have been expressed over the recent reports of arms build-up and military training in Rwandan refugee camps in neighbouring countries, possibly, in preparation for an armed invasion of Rwanda. Of great concern to the Rwanda Government is the continued arms embargo imposed on Rwanda by the UN Security Council.

There are reports of increased incursions into the country by armed "bandits" in large well-organised groups with growing military characteristics. Increased mine explosions have also been reported. While many of these mines are said to have been dislodged by recent heavy storms, some are believed to have been freshly laid. The US Government and the Government of Rwanda are holding bi-lateral talks on an effective demining programme. A seven-member demining site survey team will be in Kigali between 20 - 26 April to look at possible training programmes.

Robberies targeting the international community have further added to security concerns. The offices of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Kigali were robbed on 31 March during which

time valuable property and staff salaries were taken at gun-point. As a result, the organisation suspended its operations for nearly ten days. The offices of the Belgian Red Cross and the residence of the UNICEF Resident Representative have also been robbed in the last few days.

### Economy

There have been positive indicators of progress towards recovery in the economic sector characterised by higher than expected agricultural production and enhanced state revenue-earning capacity. Opportunities for cash income have improved through

- i) public sector employment, although not totally dynamic;
- ii) increased trading activities and farm labour;
- iii) heavy international presence which has stimulated economic activity by offering employment in relief and rehabilitation programmes.

There has been a partial recovery of the cash crop market, for example, rehabilitation of coffee production and marketing of tea, and even small scale banana export. 37 factories, 12 of them state-owned, have resumed operation, further opening up the employment sector.

### Follow-up on Round Table

On 25 March, the Permanent Technical Secretariat for Round Table Follow-up (PTS), established within the Ministry of Planning, held its first meeting with donor country representatives. The meeting was designed to enable participants to take stock of progress made in following up on the pledges made at the Round Table Conference, held in Geneva in January 1995, and to discuss ways of

improving co-ordination and co-operation between donor countries and the Rwandese Government. This meeting was followed by an expanded meeting of the Steering Committee on 30 March under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

The Round-Table Mid-term Review has been tentatively scheduled for 6 and 7 July 1995 in Kigali following a meeting between the Minister of Planning and UNDP representatives.

A total of US\$ 630.3 million has now been pledged by donor countries for the Programme for National Reconciliation and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery, presented by the Government in January. This represents an increase of US\$43.5 million over the total amount pledged in Geneva. Donor countries have concluded specific agreements with the Government for the disbursements of US\$ 195.2 million worth of assistance (funds committed), while US\$ 53.3 million has now been disbursed.

**See Annexes 1, 2 and 3 for pledges and commitments to the Geneva Round Table as at 17 April 1995.**

### Secretary-General's Trust Fund

The UN Trust Fund for Rwanda recently received US\$ 4.3 m from the Netherlands as a second instalment of funds pledged by the Dutch Government to the Trust Fund. The United Kingdom has also recently contributed US\$ 2 million to the Trust Fund. The Trust Fund programme of activities include Emergency Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Kigali and other urban centres as well the rehabilitation of the Judicial system.

The Minister of Planning will soon present to UNDP a list of projects the Ministry

proposes to fund from the Trust Fund. A reserve of US\$ 2 million will be set aside for urgent, but presently unascertained needs.

### Justice

The first national trials in Rwanda of people accused of having participated in last year's genocide were scheduled for 6 April 1995. However, the trials were postponed *sine die* for reasons including incomplete investigations. The announcement that the national courts would start trials on the 6 April had been received with great enthusiasm.

Many human rights groups criticised the Government's decision to start national trials, given the absence of a fully operational judicial system. Many feared that precipitated trials would banalise the judicial procedures and by extension, the genocide itself.

Within the national judicial system, nine out of eleven courts of the First Instance have a functioning prosecutor's office. Courts of the First Instance require a legal quorum of 3 judges in order to try cases. A large majority of prefectures with the exception of Butare do not meet this requirement.

UNDP is now finalising the second phase of a US\$ 3.45 million framework project for the rehabilitation of the judicial system. Intended as follow-up to the rehabilitation of prisons and the judicial system project, it comprises three main components:

- (1) the training of Rwandese judicial personnel
- (2) the recruitment of 50 expatriate judicial personnel
- (3) the establishment within the

Ministry of Justice of a structure for the coordination of external assistance and the management of project implementation.

UNHCHR and UNDP have concluded an agreement, in principle, for the joint implementation of Phase II, the programme for the rehabilitation of the Justice System.

UNHCHR will be responsible for the recruitment and fielding of 50 foreign magistrates, prosecutors, investigators, and defence lawyers and for the provision of the necessary logistical support and other infrastructure that will ensure the efficient deployment of personnel.

The Ministry of Justice, with the assistance of UNDP, has drawn up terms of reference for the expatriate personnel. The *Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique* (ACCT) has said it is prepared to send 20 foreign magistrates to Rwanda once an operational plan is in place and necessary amendments to Rwandese law have been made.

The International Tribunal for Rwanda has reported that it has identified 400 suspects for possible prosecution by the Tribunal. These suspects are currently located in countries within Africa, including Rwanda, and in Europe. The Tribunal has appealed to countries harbouring the suspects to assist in bringing them before the Tribunal when called upon.

The OAU Secretary-General, during his visit to Rwanda, stated that a similar appeal will be made at the OAU summit later this year. He expressed confidence

that member states currently giving refuge to these suspects, will comply with the UN Resolution 978 urging states to arrest those persons within their territory for whom there is sufficient evidence that they were implicated in the genocide.

### Prisons

Concerns regarding the situation in prisons have been heightened following the continued high rate of arrests and the recent death of 24 prisoners from asphyxiation due to overcrowding in a detention facility near Kigali. As part of efforts to alleviate this problem, UNAMIR, in conjunction with the Government of Rwanda, has commenced work on a project to move prisoners to less crowded facilities and to improve existing prison facilities. In this respect, 120 prisoners were moved on 10 April from Gitarama prison to Gisenyi. It is expected that 2,400 prisoners will have been relocated from the Gitarama prison by the end of the project.

Phase I of the UNDP Framework Programme in support of the rehabilitation of the Rwandese justice system, currently being implemented, includes a component for the rehabilitation of prisons and the construction of new detention centres. Four sites for new detention centres have been identified. The site at Nsinda is now being prepared with the assistance of UNAMIR and ICRC. Work undertaken at the Nyanza prison to create space for an additional 1,500 prisoners is nearly complete.

The expansion of prisons and the improvement of conditions in these facilities are seen as an immediate temporary solution. The long-term goal, however, remains that of expediting the national and international judicial process. It is

believed that at least 20% of the prisoners held nationwide may be innocent.

There are currently 30,000 prisoners in Rwandan jails and detention centres. It is estimated that 1,500 people are arrested per week. It is, however, worth noting that a small percentage of those arrested are released for lack of sufficient evidence.

### Human Rights

The Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda (HRFOR) may have to close down by May 1995 due to lack of funds. The mission currently has 115 field monitors. In an urgent appeal to the international community the High Commissioner for Human Rights called on Governments around the world to urgently make funds available in order enable the Operation to implement its programmes of assisting in the re-establishment of the system of justice in Rwanda.

The UNHCHR Technical Cooperation programme proposes the formation of a Governmental Commission on Accountability which will study the alternatives available to the Government in the elaboration of a judicial policy. It also proposes a systematic information gathering effort that will not only bring together various government bodies but will also provide sufficient facts to facilitate policy-making.

The HRFOR's Special Investigation Unit has recently turned over all the evidence it collected over a six-month period to the International Tribunal. From this point on, all criminal investigations related to the genocide will be conducted by the International Tribunal.

The Human Rights Education compo-



ment of the Technical Cooperation continues to gain momentum. At present, a lawyer or a teacher is carrying out programmes for Human Rights education in every prefecture in the country. At the same time, various projects for human rights education are being finalised with

8 Government ministries. In the meantime, HRFOR will hold a seminar on human rights for ministry officials at the end of April. Another seminar for senior officers in the Ministry of Defence is also scheduled for the same period.

## II. Humanitarian Assistance

### Food

The decision to allocate food on a regional basis, under the Burundi Regional Project, has significantly alleviated the food shortages that affected Rwanda last month. Food has been diverted from other countries in the region to Rwanda and recent donor contributions have also served to strengthen the Rwanda food pipeline. WFP currently has enough stock in-country to continue its programmes at the current level of 6,000 MT per month for the next two months. The pledging situation appears secure enough to continue this level of distribution until September 1995.

According to the recently concluded FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment, the total number of food aid beneficiaries in Rwanda for the first semester of 1995 stands at 1.4 million. The total emergency food aid requirement is estimated at 112,000 MT cereals and 35,000 MT of pulses. Some 8,000 MT of cereals will be used to meet needs in pulses due to lower availability of the latter.

For WFP, the priority area of intervention continues to be the provision of food aid to returnees: the "new" caseload who have missed the planting season, and

the "old" caseload who have recently been allocated land as well as those still awaiting land allocation.

Food aid in Rwanda is principally provided by WFP, ICRC, Caritas and CRS. In the first semester of 1995, WFP intends to provide some 40,000 MT of food assistance. In the same period, CRS intends to distribute some 18,000 MT while ICRC will distribute a total of 38,000 MT.

Overall, the food security situation in Rwanda is currently considered to be satisfactory. However, certain areas such as Gisenyi, Kibuye, Cyangugu and Kibungo still require attention and close monitoring. The nutritional status of populations in areas such as Kibungo and Cyangugu has been the subject of concern. Assessments are being carried out to identify the most vulnerable in the community so that distribution can be prioritised to those groups who will suffer the most during the "hunger gap" that precedes the June-July harvest.

In conjunction with FAO and the European Union, WFP is currently discussing the possibility of setting up a Joint As-

essment Unit which will work on establishing data bases for food aid as well as for the distribution of agricultural implements. The Unit will also formulate proposals to implement distributions to vulnerable groups.

In the meantime, WFP trucks destined for Zaire have for the past two weeks been prevented from crossing the border from Cyangugu into Zaire. The trucks carrying a total of 2,000 MT of food for more than 300,000 Rwandan refugees in Bukavu, Zaire, have been off-loaded in different stores within Rwanda.

Following the Government's decision to close the border, all supplies to Bukavu and Goma will be delivered via southern Uganda, by-passing Rwandan territory. However, road conditions have to be improved for regular and more consistent traffic.

### Agriculture

UN agencies, Government and NGOs have intensified their efforts to rehabilitate the agricultural sector with a view to restoring self-sufficiency in staple food production. An extensive seed multiplication programme has been undertaken by FAO in close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) and international research institutes. Together with NGOs, FAO is coordinating seeds and tools distribution for the current season (February-July 1995). This distribution comprises 2,286 MT of beans, 3.5 MT of vegetable seeds, 486 MT of sorghum, 300 MT of wheat, 232 MT of fertilizers and 514,000 hoes, benefitting almost 3 million people.

The Joint FAO/WFP crop assessment carried out in February 1995 points out some promising signs in prospects for the 1995 Season B yield. These signs

can be discerned in the increase in the settled farming population comprising mostly returning populations.

Cultivation of abandoned holdings by returnees has been permitted officially on condition that settlers give back the land upon the return of the *bona fide* landowner. In some prefectures, the policy is to allow the settlers to harvest their crops even after ceding occupied land to the rightful owners. This policy will allow the resumption of food production, especially that of cereals and pulses in Season B, thus, promoting food self-sufficiency.

The cash crop market also shows signs of a partial recovery. Tending of coffee has recommenced in parts of Gitarama while production and marketing of tea has resumed with the re-opening of several tea factories. Logging, a traditional cash income-earner has also resumed in Cyangugu.

The livestock population concentrated in the north-eastern part of the country estimated at 750,000 head of cattle poses a major humanitarian concern and threatens the 1995 Season B. There is a strong possibility of the cattle moving southwards towards the crop growing zones as grazing land becomes scarce around the National Park and especially in the Mutara region.

As efforts to address the livestock problem continue, livestock disease control is being rendered ineffective by the daily arrival of new herds. Proposed options to remedy the livestock situation in the area include the rehabilitation of abattoirs, the redistribution of selected cattle to farms in other parts of the country and the promotion of meat-processing and marketing initiatives by private entrepreneurs. The coming dry season (July-August)

will pose an ominous catastrophe with virtually no forage and water for the cattle.

### Health

WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA have continued to support the rehabilitation of priority health programmes in the country and to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Health in health management and coordination. The Health Policy document elaborated by the Ministry of Health (MINISANTE) with WHO support, is expected to be adopted by the government by the end of May. WHO, with the support of World Bank, is assisting MINISANTE in the procurement of essential drugs and in the reorganisation and reactivation of a drugs distribution system in the country. WHO is also assisting in the revision of pharmaceutical procedures.

Through a sophisticated database system, WHO is enhancing its capacity for epidemiological surveillance in particular in health screening and follow-up of populations moving from IDP camps to home communes. The WHO database is now linked to that of the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC).

The Ministry of Health, UNICEF and WHO are currently focusing on the re-establishment of EPI services at the grassroots level. So far, a total of 211 EPI facilities out of a pre-war total of 307 have been reopened. In addition, UNFPA, in collaboration with UNICEF and WHO, continues to support the National Maternal and Child Health/Family Planning Programme.

The first phase of "Operation Clean Hands", launched in January as part of the health promotion programme, is now complete with a total of 450 health

animators trained countrywide in the prevention and control of diarrhoeal diseases. The aim is to establish a countrywide network of some 3,000 health animators by June 1995.

### Nutrition

With the decrease in food production, coupled with an increase in the number of families returning with limited or no food supplies, large numbers of families continue to face difficulties in providing for basic nutritional needs. Aggravating this situation, is the increase in family size per household due to families taking in those rendered destitute by the war, in particular, unaccompanied children and orphans. WFP, in conjunction with CRS continues to supply food assistance to a supplementary feeding centres and inpatient hospital programmes countrywide.

UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Family and Women Affairs is intensifying efforts to "empower", in particular female-headed households, with a view to making these households self-reliant in ensuring nutrition and household food security.

Efforts aimed at empowering the female headed households include the relaunching of a programme that offers credit facilities to women's groups, as well as some support by UNICEF for income-generating projects, an example of which is the 2-year seed multiplication programme in Gitarama involving some 185 women in 10 groups.

UNICEF has appealed for US\$ 730,000 in 1995 for the rehabilitation of rural based economic activities and infrastructures, including women projects and cooperatives.

### Population

In order to assist the Ministry of Planning (Department of Statistics) to meet urgent population data needs pending the organisation of the 1997/98 Population and Housing Census, UNFPA has been working with the Ministry of Planning in finalising a project document for a Socio-Demographic Survey and in elaborating the survey questionnaire. The principal objective of the project, which should be underway in May 1995, is to contribute to the development of a reliable population database, necessary for the implementation of emergency/rehabilitation programmes, as well as socio-economic development planning.

### Water and Sanitation

On the occasion of the World Water Day on 22 March, UNICEF, the lead agency in this sector, launched a country-wide awareness campaign on water conservation. According to UNICEF's estimation, 50% of the treated potable water in urban systems is wasted due to broken distribution pipes and wasteful habits in homes. This, and a high influx of returnees, has caused a shortfall in water supplies. With the opening of schools, UNICEF has focused on the provision of water and sanitation facilities to schools and children's centres country-wide. UNICEF will also provide a 45-cubic metre water reservoir for the Kigali Central Hospital and a 10,000 litre bladder tank to the Kanombe Hospital in Kigali which will allow the hospitals greater independence from the city water supply.

The Agency is now finalizing agreements with the relevant ministries and several NGOs for the capping of some 450 springs in the prefectures of Gitarama and Kigali Rural, and for the relocation of a water plant from Kigali Rural to Kaboroyota Commune in Byumba Pre-

fecture. Repairs to the generator at Karege Water Treatment Plant which provides water for five communes in Kigali Rural, an area that has received significant numbers of IDP returnees, is also complete.

Exhumation of bodies from the mass burial site at the Kigali Central Hospital has been completed. UNICEF is now negotiating with a contractor for the repair of the hospital's sewage line which was damaged when the site was used for mass burial. UNICEF has worked closely with WHO, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health for both the reburial of corpses and the repair of the sewage system.

Procedures for the procurement of materials worth US\$ 500,000 for the rehabilitation of the national electric grid line have been finalised. This a joint endeavour involving Electrogaz, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), ECHO and UNICEF.

### Education

Educational programmes have been expanded with the re-opening of some private secondary schools and the National University of Rwanda. National Examinations for Primary schools were held on 20 March for 65,000 sixth grade pupils with logistical support in printing and transportation of the exams given primarily by the German Embassy, UNICEF, UNESCO and UNAMIR.

For the first time in Rwanda's educational history, the primary school examination was sat in four languages namely, Kinyarwanda, French, English and Kiswahili thus acknowledging the newly-emerged language diversity. It is esti-

mated that 10% of those who sat the examination will qualify to proceed to state-supported secondary schools, while another 10% will enter private secondary schools. UNICEF/UNESCO, in conjunction with the relevant government ministries, will seek ways of providing a range of non-formal educational programmes to those children and youth who do not qualify to attend secondary schools.

The Ministry of Education hopes to re-open state-supported secondary schools on 18 April. However, only a small percentage of the schools is expected to re-open as many facilities still need rehabilitation work. WFP has agreed on a three-month programme to provide food aid to boarding schools. The programme will benefit 12,900 students.

A number of faculties at the National University have opened, among them those of medicine and law. The Ministry of Higher Education has, however, not yet outlined a plan that would ensure a sequential opening of the universities given the scarcity of resources and has, instead, accepted support on an *ad hoc* basis.

Makerere University, Uganda, will provide lecturers to teach English at the University while WHO is to give assistance to the School of Medicine and the School of Nursing. In a meeting with donors and international organisations, the Ministry made a request for support in the areas of repayable student loans and the rehabilitation of university equipment and buildings.

The Ministry has stated its commitment to assuring greater access to university education by removing all non-meritocratic criteria of admission such as

ethnic/regional quotas. The Ministry intends to confine its programmes to University of Butare thus shutting down its programmes in Ruhengeri to allow for savings on rehabilitation, operational and administrative costs. In the meantime, the Ministry has agreed to make available an inventory of the expertise and skills possessed by the teaching staff of the University.

### ***Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances***

Recognising the trauma suffered particularly by children and women during the war, UNICEF, in close collaboration with the Ministries of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, and Family and Women Affairs, held a two-day National Seminar on Trauma and Grief. The seminar was aimed at sensitising government, local community leaders and NGOs on the impact of war on children and their families.

The Trauma Recovery Programme is currently recruiting and training eleven regional trauma advisors and plans to open a National Trauma Recovery Centre in Kigali. The Centre, which is to have an outpatient clinic for severely traumatised children and their families, is to benefit from UNICEF's financial and technical support and is expected to become a focal point for training, documentation and research in the field of trauma.

### ***Unaccompanied Children***

Due to the slow flow of pledged donor funds, UNICEF may be forced to cut back its programmes for unaccompanied children in Zaire and in Rwanda. In a recent report, UNICEF expressed an urgent need for US\$ 2 million for unaccompanied children inside Rwanda and for US\$ 1.5 for unaccompanied children in refu-

gee camps. As of 10 April, a total of 8,500 children inside and outside Rwanda had been reunited with their families through the joint efforts of international agencies. In addition, spontaneous family reunifications are taking place.

### ***Children in Prison***

UNICEF is spearheading the advocacy efforts for children and women. At the request of the Ministry of Justice, the Agency has supported the creation of a new special Division for Women and Children in Prison. This division has employed at least 3 lawyers to investigate cases of children accused of infraction of common law.

The number of children in prison has increased. According to the latest information from the Ministry of Justice, a total of 1,019 minors are detained in the 13 major prisons and over 145 detention centres in Rwanda. Of these children, some 200 are in prison with their detained parents. Most of the rest are accused of genocide. The first trial of a juvenile accused of genocide was opened on 6 April and adjourned along with all current cases.

The Ministry of Justice has now agreed to the transfer of 200 imprisoned children under the age of 14 from prisons throughout the country to a youth detention centre in Gitagata, some 40 kilometres south of Kigali. The children will be moved before the end of April. The rehabilitation of the Gitagata centre will be undertaken by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)-Belgium and is scheduled to begin on 12 April. UNAMIR is also supporting the rehabilitation of the centre by fencing the premises and by providing manpower to speed up the transfer of the children.

With a view to providing basic education

to children in prison, one TEP kit has been provided to the Gitarama Prison where UNHCHR is seeking to support the basic education programmes which adult inmates have already begun for children and minors.

### ***Child soldiers***

The Ministry of Defence has identified a site in Butare, previously used as Ecole des Sous-Officiers, as a rehabilitation centre for child soldiers. UNICEF will provide some financial and material assistance for the reconstruction of the centre in Butare as well as educational materials and projects in family tracing and trauma alleviation. Particular attention will be paid to the adolescent group of 500 youths, providing them with apprenticeship training.

In Goma, Caritas has developed an education-oriented approach to support reintegration of at least 65 children who were attached to military groups in Goma. These children were primarily involved in support tasks rather than in actual combat. Furthermore, UNICEF and a partner NGO, Jeunesse Action et Environnement has completed an assessment of the situation of the child soldiers in the camps and will endeavour to resettle them in a "regular" refugee living arrangement. In Bukavu, a demobilisation project for child soldiers living in three centres is also being supported.

Table 1: Children Affiliated with Military Forces  
(Source: Ministry of Defence/UNICEF)

Location	Number/age
Rwanda	1,650 (10 - 14 yrs) 500 (13 - 17 yrs)
Bukavu	190 (5 - 10 yrs) 250 (10 - 15 yrs) 260 (16 - 18 yrs)
Goma	500 - 800 (10 - 17 yrs)



### Internally Displaced Persons

On 18 April, RPA soldiers encircled the camps of Kibeho and Ndago in south-west Rwanda as part of a search for weapons and criminal elements. During the operations, shots were fired and populations fled in panic to UNAMIR bases in the camps. Ten people are reported killed in Kibeho and an number of people were injured. It is believed that most were crushed by the crowds or trampled on. Although the camp population calmed down the same day, large numbers of people have fled. The military operations preceded the start of the revised humanitarian strategy to improve conditions in home communes in the hope of encouraging people in the camps to return home voluntarily.

The Government has announced that all seven camps in the southwest are now officially closed and that people should leave for their home communes within the next few days. Emergency relief assistance, however, is being provided to populations who remain in Kibeho and Ndago camps, as an interim measure, but lack of shelter, particularly in Ndago camp, remains a major concern. The situation in the other five camps is not yet clear, but it is believed that at least one

of these camps has been burned. Humanitarian efforts are now focused on assisting those who can return to their home communes as quickly as possible.

Arrangements are being made with the RPA and UNAMIR to provide foot escorts for those living near enough to walk home. Transport for those living longer distances from the camps is being provided by UNHCR, IOM and UNAMIR. Poor road conditions in the vicinity of the camps, however, are hampering transport and the RPA and UNAMIR are undertaking road repairs so that the trucking operation can be accelerated.

Since February, "Operation Retour", commune committees, comprising representatives of local authorities and Human Rights Field Officers are being formed to address issues such as security, including arrest procedures, in home communes. The Government has repeatedly said that the camps, which are known to contain large numbers of people involved in last year's genocide and massacres, are a threat to national security. Earlier in the month, RPA troops closed another displaced persons camp, Kivugisa, and ordered the 4,000 population to leave.

### III. REGIONAL ISSUES

Burundi has continued to teeter on the brink of an all-out ethnic war that could be similar to the one that left nearly one million people dead in Rwanda. Efforts towards conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-keeping in Burundi met with frustration when UN Member states failed to respond to the Secretary-General's request to send troops to that coun-

try in order to avert fresh ethnic strife. The disinterest of member states has been seen to reflect the international community's lack of political will.

Sharp criticism has been levelled at the international community for being ready to allocate billions of dollars to clean up after the event, mainly through post-

strife humanitarian intervention and not through preventive intervention. While many "preventive diplomacy missions" have been sent to Burundi, reports of increased tensions underline the still potentially-explosive nature of the crisis.

As a result of attacks in refugee camps in northern Burundi, panic ensued within the Rwandese refugee population and many of them chose to cross into the United Republic of Tanzania. An estimated 50,000 refugees were reported to be on the move. To encourage the refugees to go back to the camps, Tanzanian authorities closed the border between Burundi and Tanzania. On 6 April, the Government of Rwanda issued a written statement urging all Rwandese refugees at the Burundi/Tanzania border to return home to Rwanda rather than choose a second exile in another country.

#### Refugees and Returnees

During the month of March, some 30,400 refugees returned to Rwanda bringing the total number to 91,245 for the first three months of the year. Of these, approximately 60,000 were refugees who fled Rwanda in the early sixties and returned mainly from Uganda. The rest comprises refugees who left in April 1994.

##### i. The "old caseload" refugees

A vast majority of "old caseload" refugees is coming from Uganda and settling in the areas in the north-east of the country. They are arriving with hundreds of heads of cattle which are causing serious problems to the environment. The World Bank, UNHCR and USAID have just completed a mission whose objective was to review the Government of Rwanda's programme on the reintegration of returnees. An *aide memoire* has been submitted to the Gov-

ernment. Among other issues, the Mission recommended urgent actions which include support for the following:

- resettlement of the old caseload (cattle keepers) in Mutara region and in urban centres such as Kigali and Butare;
- information campaigns inside and outside Rwanda which are likely to enhance voluntary repatriation;
- assistance to vulnerable groups and women;
- strengthening of the judicial system.

##### ii. Burundi

The registration by commune of origin of the estimated 243,000 Rwandese refugees in Burundi has been completed. However, the prospects for their voluntary return are bleak in light of the recent attacks on refugee camps. In March, 700 refugees returned, mainly to Kibungo and South Kigali.

##### iii. Zaire

Unconfirmed reports of arms shipment to Goma destined for soldiers of the former Government who are said to be training in camps in North Kivu for a possible invasion of Rwanda render the atmosphere in camps tense. In the mean time, militia and "refugee leaders" continue to exert pressure on the camp population not to return to Rwanda. The presence of the UNHCR-assisted Zairian Camp Security Contingent (ZCSC), now standing at 762 troops and operational in Kibumba, Katale/Kahindo and Mugunga/Lac Vert, has improved the security situation in the camps making the choice to return less

dangerous. Acute food shortages are still a major concern.

Repatriation from camps in Goma and Bukavu has decreased during the reporting period. The number of people boarding UNHCR/IOM trucks has stabilised at 50 persons per day, compared to a peak 500 per day in late January and early February.

#### iv. Tanzania

In refugee camps in western Tanzania, there are reports of refugees engaging in acts of violence, including armed robberies, against the neighbouring local communities. In response, the Government of Tanzania has declared that the army could intervene and make arrests. Those found to be guilty of any offence will be tried according to the Tanzanian law. A Tripartite Agreement was signed on 12

April among United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Rwanda and UNHCR for the voluntary return of Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.

In March, a total of 433 refugees returned from Ngara camps in western Tanzania. Cross border consultations between UNHCR Ngara, the authorities in Kibungo and UNHCR Kibungo are taking place regularly. There are unconfirmed reports from UNHCR Karagwe that indicate that some Rwandese are now crossing the border to seek asylum in Tanzania.

#### v. Other countries of asylum

There is a growing demand for voluntary repatriation from various countries, including Zimbabwe, Senegal and Russia. A set of guidelines has been issued to facilitate their return to Rwanda.

## Annexes

### IV. Rwanda Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal

Although the food pipeline for the region has improved, pledges and receipts for the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Rwanda remains disappointing. Out of the US\$ 219,490,162 requested for Rwanda in February 1995, less than US\$ 149 million has been funded. This represents under 30% of the total food aid and cash contributions requested.

For the sub-region, under half of the total US\$ 586 778,007 required for programmes for refugees in neighbouring countries and conflict-affected persons, has so far been received.

The slow rate of contribution has reduced Agencies' ability to start some planned programmes. UNICEF warns that without urgent funds, the Agency will be forced to cut back services for unaccompanied children in Zaire and Rwanda, as well as essential health, water and educational programmes.

See Annex 4, 5 and 6 for an updated financial summary of contributions. The breakdown is given by Appealing Agency and by Donor Country.

## PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION

## FUNDS PLEDGED BY THE DONORS

(million of US dollars)

UPDATED ON 17 APRIL 1995

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
<b>BILATERAL</b>					
Austria			2,0		2,0
Belgium	13,0		21,8	1,2	36,0
Canada	7,5	1,9	15,2	0,6	25,2
France					to be determined
Germany	20,4	10,6	54,4	29,8	115,3
Ireland	0,6	N.A.	N.A.		1,6
Italy		0,3			0,3
Japan		19,3	1,3	1,4	22,0
Netherlands	16,5	1,5	14,9		32,9
New Zealand					to be announced
Russia					to be announced
Spain	N.A.		4,5		9,5
Sweden	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.		3,0
Switzerland	0,8		12,0		12,8
United Kingdom	2,8	1,0	4,1	0,2	8,1
USA	6,5		32,0	17,0	55,5
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>68,1</b>	<b>34,6</b>	<b>162,2</b>	<b>50,2</b>	<b>324,2</b>
<b>MULTILATERAL</b>					
African Development Bank	20,0		30,0		50,0
European Union Commission	28,0		49,3	48,9	126,2
Intern. Fund Agricultural Dev			15,0		15,0
International Monetary Fund	13,0				13,0
Org. Petroleum Exp. Countries				12,9	12,9
United Nations Agencies			14,0		14,0
World Bank	45,0		30,0		75,0
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>106,0</b>		<b>138,3</b>	<b>61,8</b>	<b>306,1</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS PLEDGED</b>	<b>174,1</b>	<b>34,6</b>	<b>300,5</b>	<b>112,0</b>	<b>630,3</b>
<b>FUNDS REQUESTED</b>	<b>189,6</b>	<b>273,7</b>	<b>300,0</b>		<b>764,1</b>

## Notes:

Figures in italics represent the changes occurred since the last update.

Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support (including Balance of Payments)

Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced

Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development

N.A.: not allocated

Pledges by Austria, Ireland, Spain and Sweden remain to be allocated into specific sub-programmes.

Thus the sum of funds allocated to sub-programmes does not add up to the total.



## Annex 2

## PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION

## FUNDS DISBURSED BY THE DONORS

(million of US dollars)

UPDATED ON 17 APRIL 1995

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
<b>BILATERAL</b>					
Austria			0,3		0,3
Belgium	2,0		1,4	0,2	3,6
Canada	5,5		1,8	0,2	7,5
France					
Germany			4,1		4,1
Ireland					
Italy		0,3			0,3
Japan		1,0	1,3	1,4	3,7
Netherlands	3,5		0,5		4,0
New Zealand					
Russia					
Spain					
Sweden					
Switzerland	0,8		0,1		0,9
United Kingdom		1,0	0,6	0,2	1,8
USA	6,5			13,1	19,6
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>18,3</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>10,1</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>45,8</b>
<b>MULTILATERAL</b>					
African Development Bank					
European Union Commission	5,0				5,0
Intern. Fund Agricultural Dev.					
International Monetary Fund					
Org. Petroleum Exp. Countries					
United Nations Agencies			2,5		2,5
World Bank					
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>5,0</b>		<b>2,5</b>		<b>7,5</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS DISBURSED</b>	<b>23,3</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>12,6</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>53,3</b>
<b>FUNDS PLEDGED</b>	<b>174,1</b>	<b>34,6</b>	<b>300,5</b>	<b>112,0</b>	<b>630,3</b>

## Notes:

Figures in italics represent the changes occurred since the last update  
 Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support (including Balance of Payments)  
 Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced  
 Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development  
 N.A.: not allocated

## Annex 3

## PROGRAMME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION

## FUNDS COMMITTED BY THE DONORS

(million of US dollars)

UPDATED ON 17 APRIL 1995

DONORS	SUB- PROGR. 1	SUB- PROGR. 2	SUB- PROGR. 3	OUTSIDE ROUND TABLE DOCUMENT	TOTAL
<b>BILATERAL</b>					
Austria			0,5		0,5
Belgium	5,2		4,1	0,2	9,5
Canada	7,2	1,9	9,2	0,2	18,5
France					
Germany	6,3		20,1	3,6	30,0
Ireland					
Italy		0,3			0,3
Japan		1,0	1,3	1,4	3,7
Netherlands	5,5	0,5	1,4		7,4
New Zealand					
Russia					
Spain					
Sweden					
Switzerland	0,8		1,3		2,1
United Kingdom	0,8	1,0	0,6	0,2	2,6
USA	6,5			13,1	19,6
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>32,3</b>	<b>4,7</b>	<b>38,5</b>	<b>18,7</b>	<b>94,2</b>
<b>MULTILATERAL</b>					
African Development Bank					
European Union Commission	28,0		13,1	6,5	47,6
Intern. Fund Agricultural Dev.					
International Monetary Fund					
Org. Petroleum Exp. Countries					
United Nations Agencies			3,5		3,5
World Bank	45,0		5,0		50,0
<b>SUB-TOTAL</b>	<b>73,0</b>		<b>21,6</b>	<b>6,5</b>	<b>101,1</b>
<b>TOTAL FUNDS COMMITTED</b>	<b>105,3</b>	<b>4,7</b>	<b>60,1</b>	<b>25,2</b>	<b>195,2</b>
<b>FUNDS PLEDGED</b>	<b>174,1</b>	<b>34,6</b>	<b>300,5</b>	<b>112,0</b>	<b>630,3</b>

## Notes:

Figures in italics represent the changes occurred since the last update  
 Sub-Programme 1: Financial Support (including Balance of Payments)  
 Sub-Programme 2: Reintegration of Refugees and Displaced  
 Sub-Programme 3: Rehabilitation / Development  
 N.A.: not allocated

## Annex 4

Table I: 1995 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
Updated Financial Summary - By Appealing Agency  
as of 12 April 1995

Compiled by DHA (RTS/CISU) on the basis of information provided by the respective appealing organizations

Appealing Agency	Total Requirements (January - December 1995)	Adjusted Requirements (US\$)	Income (Pledges, Contributions, Carryover) (US\$)	Shortfall (Surplus) (US\$)	% of Needs Covered %
A. THE RWANDA PERSPECTIVE					
UNICR *	44,275,500	44,275,500	3,332,403	40,943,097	7.5%
UNICEP **	55,650,000	55,650,000	***	34,628,974	37.8%
WHO	7,482,835	7,482,835	1,185,556	6,297,279	15.8%
PAO	18,331,700	18,331,700	908,893	17,422,807	4.9%
UNESCO **	6,629,540	6,629,540	0	6,629,540	0.0%
UNHCR	10,153,050	10,153,050	3,818,935	6,334,115	37.6%
UNIFEM	1,350,000	1,350,000	0	1,350,000	0.0%
UNV	1,327,064	1,327,064	119,048	1,208,016	9.0%
ICM	10,539,800	10,539,800	369,048	10,170,752	3.5%
NGOs	4,124,913	4,124,913	0	4,124,913	0.0%
UNREO/DHA	2,003,900	2,003,900	900,209	1,103,691	44.9%
WFP FOOD SUMMARY ***					
CEREALS	86,892	33,974,772	33,642	29,742	58.3%
PULSES	24,825	17,799,525	12,566	7,550	68.0%
OIL	4,137	4,827,879	1,779	740	73.6%
SALT	0	0	60	0	0
CORN SOYA BEAN	0	0	223	0	0
SUGAR	252	163,561	0	168	0.0%
DRIED SKIM MILK	360	634,120	0	240	0.0%
HIGH PROTEIN BISCUITS	0	0	(150)	0	0
Subtotal for WFP	116,466	57,421,860	48,120	38,440	60.8%
TOTAL - RWANDA PERSPECTIVE	116,466	219,490,162	55,767,926	148,865,692	29.3%

Note that UNHCR is appealing for resources to fund activities to meet the needs of Rwandese/Burundese refugees on a regional level. Contributions/pledges not specifically earmarked to the Rwanda Programme and made in response to the Consolidated Appeal will be recorded against the UNHCR Sub-Regional budget until a percentage of these funds has been obligated to the Rwandan refugees and IDPs' programmes within Rwanda.

For Primary and non-primary education, requested funds will be channelled through UNICEF for subsequent reallocation to UNICEF/UNESCO activities.

UNICEF has determined an estimated carryover of US\$ 23.8 million of which 40% of this amount is set aside for programmes in the Sub-Region pending specific contributions.

Note the following for WFP:

1) Revised Requirements: A standardization of ration rates and rationalization of WFP programmes within Rwanda, which took place after the finalization of the Appeal document, led to a revision of the total food aid requirements to 116,466 MTs (US\$ 57.4 million). Note also that for WFP, food requirements are adjusted constantly depending on the monthly food availability and distribution rate in the region.

2) Contributions: Most of the commodities requested contributions announced in 1994, scheduled for delivery to the final destination in 1995. Note also that due to regional reallocations of food reflected in this table, in order to provide the most accurate picture of requirements (shortfalls, totals will not match with the donor breakdowns indicated in Table II.

3) Shortfalls may not equal adjusted requirements, as they reflect the accounts outstanding needs (depending on borrowings, loans, etc. of food) determined by WFP for commodities in the region until the end of the year.

Table II - Donor Breakdown of Contributions/Pledges in response (Continued)  
to the 1995 UN Consolidated Appeal for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
(As of 12 April 1995)

WFP Food Contributions *	Food (MTs)		Amount US\$		Grand Total	
	1995	1994	1995	1994	Food (MTs)	Amount (US\$)
Burundi Conflict Victims (SRP-95-UNU2 - Emergency Food Aid)						
Austria	1,000	—	367,000	—	1,000	367,000
Germany	1,242	3,545	4,125,314	1,301,015	14,787	5,426,329
Japan	—	13,394	—	5,099,093	13,394	5,099,093
Netherlands	4,106	6,338	1,351,182	2,756,326	10,464	4,507,508
Switzerland	—	500	—	260,500	500	260,500
United Kingdom	500	—	133,500	—	500	133,500
USA	1,758	20,196	7,202,918	10,925,333	33,954	18,128,256
EU	—	736	—	631,352	736	631,352
Sub-Total for Burundi	20,506	45,229	13,730,414	20,974,169	75,535	34,704,583
Rwanda Conflict Victims (RWA-95-UNU1 - Emergency Food Aid)						
Canada	1,250	—	1,274,000	—	3,250	1,274,000
Canadian Food Grain Bank	—	165	—	118,305	165	118,305
Denmark	—	1,300	—	705,600	1,300	705,600
Germany	12,000	222	3,920,000	159,174	10,222	4,079,174
Japan	—	3,533	—	1,384,936	3,533	1,384,936
Sweden	—	950	—	681,150	950	681,150
United Kingdom	500	—	133,500	—	500	133,500
USA	15,480	3,742	9,015,335	4,335,773	24,222	13,351,108
EU	—	(54)	—	(40,125)	(54)	(40,125)
Sub-Total for Rwanda	29,230	15,358	14,445,035	7,544,310	44,688	21,989,345
Tanzania - Refugees (SRP-95-UNU2 - Emergency Food Aid)						
Austria	2,000	—	658,000	—	2,000	658,000
Denmark	4,500	—	1,430,500	—	4,500	1,430,500
Germany	1,200	6,201	394,800	2,512,004	7,401	3,206,804
Italy	—	1,400	—	763,300	1,400	763,300
United Kingdom	10,233	—	4,464,962	—	10,233	4,464,962
USA	25,134	3,285	17,596,309	2,138,947	38,569	19,735,256
EU	—	5,119	—	2,905,631	5,119	2,905,631
Sub-Total for Tanzania	53,737	16,005	24,595,071	3,620,382	69,742	28,215,453
Zaire - Refugees (SRP-95-UNU2 - Emergency Food Aid)						
Canada	—	13,907	—	3,729,436	13,907	3,729,436
Canadian Food Grain Bank	—	3,292	—	3,184,036	3,292	3,184,036
Denmark	—	1,701	—	335,338	1,701	335,338
Germany	13,335	4,466	6,614,340	2,179,402	18,021	8,793,742
Netherlands	1,259	1,903	1,199,997	1,695,512	3,262	2,895,509
Switzerland	—	626	—	440,078	626	440,078
United Kingdom	1,300	791	578,400	1,508,394	2,591	2,486,794
USA	50,057	4,450	39,334,471	3,929,250	64,487	43,263,721
EU	—	17,134	—	11,555,322	17,134	11,555,322
Sub-Total for Zaire	75,731	48,270	48,027,708	23,357,284	125,021	71,384,992
Subtotal - Food Contributions	190,424	124,862	100,798,228	70,996,645	315,286	171,794,873
Grand-Total	190,424	124,862	100,798,228	70,996,645	315,286	171,794,873

## \* NOTE:

Due to regional borrowings, loans and regional reallocations of food reflected by WFP in Table I, in order to provide an accurate picture of the food requirements shortfalls, a difference of US\$ 4,920,887 exists between Table I and Table II.

Table III: Pledges/contributions for Persons Affected by the Crisis in Rwanda  
(Outside of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal Framework)

As of 12 April 1996

This report is comprehensive to the extent that decisions have been reported to Department of Humanitarian Affairs by Donors

Date Reported	Donor	Channel	Description	Value US\$
16-Feb-95	Belgium	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	75,000
22-Feb-95	Canada	MSF/Canada	Cash to support the hospital in Butare, the health centres and hospital in Gisenyi and Kigali	248,227
21-Feb-95	Canada	World Vision/Canada	Cash to improve health status of unaccompanied children, returning refugees/IDPs and to improve living conditions through the provision of shelter supplies	354,610
03-Jan-95	Germany	IBLP	Cash for medical assistance for displaced persons	140,256
19-Jan-95	Italy	DITA (Pisa Warehouse)	Aid for in-kind contributions through Pisa Warehouse in favour of the Rwandan population	232,357
16-Feb-95	Netherlands	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	30,882
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office, Kigali	Cash for a "Relief and Rehabilitation Fund" in Rwanda - small scale projects in the field of rehab. activities	274,390
18-Mar-95	Netherlands	Netherlands Field Office, Kigali	Cash for a "Special Health Support Fund" (aiming to increase quality of health sector by purch. of medical equip.)	182,927
15-Feb-95	Netherlands	SCP/United Kingdom	Cash for secondment of a Health Advisor to work within the MOB in Kigali and the provision of support for training, workshops and study visits	395,845
15-Feb-95	Sweden	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	67,295
15-Feb-95	Switzerland	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	21,260
28-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Action Nord-Sud/Belgium	Cash for provision of seeds and tools in Kigali prefecture to allow approx. 22,000 households (mainly farmers) to start agricultural activities for planting season	172,971
17-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Christian Aid	Cash to provide 19,929 families (mainly farmers) with one hoe per family plus beans, potato and vegetable seeds for planting after the rainy season	168,349
15-Feb-95	United Kingdom	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	47,619
28-Feb-95	United Kingdom	Merita	Cash for rehabilitation of health centres in Gisenyi region and to assist MOE in Rwanda	362,043
28-Mar-95	United Kingdom	ICRC	Cash for the ICRC's 1995 Rwanda Emergency Appeal	357,143
27-Mar-95	United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash for the IFRC's 1995 Emerg. Appeal for Rwanda/Burundi refugees in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire	357,143
27-Mar-95	United Kingdom	UNDP	Cash to help strengthen the Rwandan Gov. especially in financial, economic and human resource management	3,174,603
01-Jan-95	USA	UNDP/UNV	Cash grant to assist with human rights in Rwanda (OTI Assistance)	750,000
03-Feb-95	USA	ADRA	Cash for food-for-work, road and well programmes in the North-West (OFDA Assistance)	499,609
03-Feb-95	USA	Direct	Cash for DART operations	400,000
27-Jan-95	USA	American Refugee Committee	Cash for health and water rehabilitation in North-East (OFDA Assistance)	755,174
01-Feb-95	USA	International Rescue Committee	Cash for relief and rehabilitation project in Cyangugu and Kibungo (OFDA Assistance)	999,594
01-Feb-95	USA	UNHCR	Cash for costs of regional OAU/UNHCR Conference on assist. to refugees/returnees/IDPs in Great Lakes Region	50,000
03-Feb-95	USA	World Relief	Cash for primary health care in Kibogor (OFDA Assistance)	230,036
01-Jan-95	USA	National Peace Corps	Cash to recruit and train human rights monitors (OTI Assistance)	110,000
01-Jan-95	USA	International Rescue Committee	Cash for refugees in Tanzania (State/PRM Assistance)	1,208,557
10-Jan-95	RC/Denmark	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	75,758
12-Jan-95	RC/Monaco	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	2,784
27-Dec-94	RC/Netherlands	IFRC	Cash for food for refugees in Goma (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	448,500
20-Dec-94	RC/United Kingdom	IFRC	Cash (IFRC Emergency Appeal No. 01.04/95)	765,152
TOTAL				12,958,884

REPORT ON THE COORDINATION  
OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN

# RWANDA



# RWANDA:

## LESSONS LEARNED: A REPORT ON THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

*Prepared for the United Nations  
Department of Humanitarian Affairs by:  
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November 1994*



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Rwanda represents a complex emergency of unprecedented magnitude. The humanitarian needs generated by this crisis tested the capacity and resourcefulness of the relief community. It also highlighted the importance of humanitarian agencies working together to achieve common objectives.

The pressure of humanitarian work is such that it risks being overwhelmed with the day-to-day realities of responding to massive needs. However, as this report points out, humanitarianism is not simply about providing assistance and a modicum of comfort to disaster victims; it also implies a questioning of the root causes and of the long-term impact of assistance and of the manner in which it is provided.

Indeed, a key feature of effective humanitarian organizations is their ability to learn from experience and to respond to changing requirements. The dramatic new demands placed on relief agencies in recent years underline the importance of constantly reviewing the overall impact of humanitarian assistance. It is equally important to ensure that the limited resources available for emergencies are used to maximum effect.

This report, a first for DHA, has much in common with the relief programme in that it was initiated at short notice and with limited resources. However, notwithstanding the many difficulties of undertaking such an exercise in the midst of a fast-moving emergency, it was considered important to document and record the insights and experiences of those tasked

with the responsibility of generating a coherent and coordinated response. Few will disagree with the importance of learning from the hard lessons of experience. This is the purpose of this report.

This report was prepared for the internal use of DHA. Not everyone will agree with its findings and many will, undoubtedly, have different perspectives. However, few will contest that the overall tone is frank and that the report highlights a number of issues which need to be addressed. I welcome this. There is need for greater dialogue and sharing of experiences within the humanitarian community. Improving our overall performance means a greater capacity to save lives. It is this reality which motivates and governs the preparation of such reports. I intend to review the recommendations of the report and to initiate the necessary measures to strengthen our future co-ordination capacity.

DHA is fully cognizant of the need for research and analysis which adds to a common reservoir of knowledge. To this end I intend to work closely with academic institutes and relief agencies involved in reviewing particular crises while encouraging similar studies in the future.

Peter Hansen  
Under Secretary General for  
Humanitarian Affairs

# 1.

## Introduction

*"April is the cruellest month..."*

*T. S. Eliot*

### I. THE CONTEXT

The situation in Rwanda remains extremely volatile.<sup>1</sup> The country is slowly emerging from one of the most horrific seasons of killing witnessed this century. In a terrifying three-month period a significant proportion of the minority Tutsi population, and many Hutus perceived as moderates, were massacred. There are varying estimates of the combined death toll of genocide, war and displacement but it is indisputable that an unprecedented proportion - perhaps even 95% - of victims were civilians, thus setting a new record in the annals of brutality.

As there is relatively little visible evidence of physical destruction the scale of this tragedy is not easy to comprehend. A thin veneer of calm presents an illusion of a slow return to normalcy but the collective trauma of genocide has rent the social fabric. It haunts the families of the victims as well as the hundreds of thousands of people who participated directly, were coerced into, or haplessly witnessed, mass killings.

It is unrealistic to assume that Rwandan society can be patched together simply through the provision of assistance by the international community to overcome the physical devastation of warfare and to revive the pre-existing economy and infrastructure. Rehabilitation of essential facilities and a functioning government are definitely a priority. However, a viable process of recovery and reconciliation will not be possible until the reality of genocide and its effects on society have been addressed.

For the outsider, what has occurred in Rwanda defies explanation in conventional terms. Civil society has been shattered and the very possibility of the coexistence of its diverse elements is now in jeopardy. The

forces that bound the social fabric together - albeit with intermittent bouts of violence - have been severely eroded if not completely destroyed. It is difficult to see how a healing process and a culture of peace could emerge in the near future if the societal mechanisms which made the recent tragedy possible are not understood and addressed.

Whether the causes of the conflict are traced to ancestral fears, power, class, identity or ethnicity - or a subtle mix of these - or to the economy and a struggle for resources, there is an obvious need to identify the underlying sources of tension and the realities which exacerbated them. For the international community this will mean answering some difficult questions on the way in which "development" - the external appearances of which were clearly visible and measurable by conventional standards in Rwanda before the war - has been a factor in not mitigating, or worse in contributing to, the catastrophe.

Given the violent political culture that thrives in the refugee camps and in certain segments of the population inside Rwanda, and the apparent lack of guilt on the one side and of willingness to compromise on the other, further outbursts of violence cannot be ruled out. Already, there is concern that acts of retribution or the inclination to "take the law into one's own hands" will spread. The risk that this will become unspoken policy cannot be excluded, especially if formal judicial procedures, which demonstrate that genocide is unacceptable, are not introduced urgently.

The present situation has major implications for the United Nations and for the manner in which assistance is provided. The Rwandan Government is in a precarious position. There is concern that it will be obliged to rely on its military arm to

maintain control and to protect itself from guerrilla incursions if the international community does not move quickly to support it. The Government's survival as a relatively moderate and broad-based entity, and consequently the conditions for some measure of stability, economic recovery, and the eventual return of refugees are likely to depend on the following:

(a) whether or not the genocide issue is addressed. The Government has called, so far with scant success, for the mobilization of the international community both for the investigation and documentation of massacres and for the monitoring of the human rights situation on the ground. Little has been done and the credibility of the United Nations - both in the eyes of the Government and of the NGO community - is dangerously low. Unless a tangible and visible presence of human rights staff is deployed in the next few weeks, the new leaders are likely to conclude that the international community is not serious in addressing the genocide issue and may be tempted to abandon openness for authoritarianism.

(b) whether or not the Government is provided with the wherewithal to establish itself. At present, Ministries are empty shells; there is no staff and no money to pay salaries. Ministers have neither cars nor telephones and sometimes not even chairs for a constant stream of foreign visitors. The traditional bilateral donors are balking. The European Union is waiting to see what the World Bank does and the World Bank is asking the government not only to pay 4 million dollars (which will grow to 5.5 by the end of 1994) of arrears in loan reimbursements immediately, but also to present

a (balanced?) budget, and a stabilization plan with numerous other conditions, if 240 million dollars of currently frozen project funds are to be released. The only structured force, with some cash and some capacity to administer and control territory, is the battle-hardened victorious army. Failure by the international community to support the formation of a functioning Government and the regeneration of civil society adds to the risk of authoritarianism.

(c) whether or not the festering reality of some two million refugees in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi becomes the breeding ground for armed expeditions or terrorist campaigns inside Rwanda. The fact that the former Rwandan leadership is still essentially intact, is endowed with important assets (having looted most of the country's banks, including the Central Bank, before leaving) and controls the refugee population, through a combination of administrative structures and sheer terror tactics, is obviously not without consequence for the evolution of the situation. The authorities in Kigali must be encouraged to pursue confidence-building measures which are essential if repatriation is to occur. Equally, the manner in which the humanitarian community provides assistance - and protection - to the refugees, and the strategic choices which need to be made concerning the displaced (e.g. stabilization of displaced populations versus assistance to areas of origin and receiving communities) may have dramatic implications on the evolution of the overall situation.

(d) whether or not humanitarian and human rights personnel will be allowed to operate, both in the refugee camps and inside the country, in conditions of relative

security. The presence of a large expatriate community - several hundred UN humanitarian personnel and probably close to one thousand NGO staff - is an indication of the international community's concern for Rwanda. The deployment, hopefully soon, of international human rights monitors will reinforce the perception, within the Government and among the leaders of the fallen regime in the camps, that the situation is being closely watched. The visibility of UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) blue helmets and the omnipresence of the UN flag also have an obvious stabilizing effect. This international presence acts as a deterrent against human rights violations. Should the security situation deteriorate, and there are disquieting signals of this already, the work of the humanitarian agencies will become difficult, if not impossible. This could have dramatic implications not only for Rwanda but for the stability of the whole region.

(e) whether or not the issue of property and land-ownership is addressed in an equitable and transparent way. Should returning Tutsis, despite the assurances given by the Government, be allowed to permanently occupy land and homes abandoned by fleeing Hutus, this would inevitably lead to a further polarization of the situation. Similarly, if it wishes to enhance its credibility, the Government will have to dispel current rumors about plans to establish Tutsi safe-havens or zones of concentration in the North-east and in certain areas of Kigali.

## 2. THE UNITED NATIONS' RESPONSE TO THE RWANDAN CRISIS

An analysis of the events leading up to the decision of the international community, as expressed in various Security Council Resolutions, not to take action to stop the killings as the situation deteriorated in April 1994 was not part of the Terms of Reference of the Study Team. It did, however, note a strong perception in many NGO and some United Nations circles that the international community, and therefore the UN, failed Rwanda once by letting genocide occur and that a second failure would be unpardonable.

The most urgent needs of the refugee and displaced populations are now being met. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is meeting the challenge with determination by providing a framework in which relief agencies, including NGOs, can do their job. Other UN operational players, notably UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP), have also mobilized vast resources to provide assistance to the most rapid and large-scale population movement of recent decades.

While immediate needs are undoubtedly being addressed, it is legitimate to ask whether, overall, the United Nations system is addressing the Rwandan crisis in a coherent manner both institutionally and operationally. Here the picture is mixed. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) does not have the authority to orchestrate a system-wide UN response. There is a dramatic imbalance of funding between relief and development programmes; only a minuscule amount of technical and financial support has been provided to the new Government. Although UNAMIR has a visible presence

in the principal towns and along the main routes, for all practical purposes its interaction with the rest of the UN system is limited to exchanging information and providing logistical support. Also, the fact that the Resident Representative is also the Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda is beginning to create a problem of double allegiance, especially as the focus of coordination work is shifting from relief to rehabilitation.

Moreover, the large UN community in Goma, Bukavu (and, we suspect, Ngara) is not functioning as part of a coherent UN effort to address the Rwandan crisis, its spillover into neighbouring countries, and the shock-waves it causes. There are "Goma biases" and "Kigali biases", reinforced by the absence of a communication network between the various operational theatres and by the lack of interaction with the local leadership/population.

The team is of the opinion that much has been lost by the absence of a comprehensive regional approach to the Rwandan crisis which would have included events inside the country and in the spillover areas.

## 3. REASONS FOR THE STUDY

The Rwandan tragedy is of an unprecedented magnitude. In terms of numbers of victims, the suddenness with which it occurred, and its logistical dimensions it is not comparable to any other crisis in recent memory. As in other complex emergencies the humanitarian dimension of the crisis is inextricably linked with the political and military dynamics which shaped it. Responding to the humanitarian imperative in such a context poses particular challenges. Developing a response that

safeguards the "humanitarian space" essential for the provision of relief assistance in contested and volatile situations requires careful analysis, sound planning, and a capacity to act in a flexible and coordinated manner. In addition, the scale of the disaster adds weight to the importance of ensuring that humanitarian assistance is not provided in a vacuum but contributes to an easing of the crisis and its eventual resolution.

Humanitarian assistance, however effective, cannot be a substitute for action necessary to address the root causes of conflict. Confidence-building measures are essential both in terms of overcoming the current crisis and in generating a recovery process. It is equally important to ensure that relief does not become an end in itself nor contribute to a stalemate which works against a process of healing and reconciliation.

It is against this background that the current study was undertaken. As outlined in the Terms of Reference (Annex I) it was intended as a preliminary review which, ideally, should initiate a process of reflection and dialogue within DHA and the wider humanitarian community on measures which would facilitate future action in other settings. The basic purpose was to review the role of DHA in facilitating an overall response and to identify the major lessons which can be gleaned from the experience of addressing an emergency of such magnitude and complexity.

It was clear from the outset that there were major limitations to undertaking such an exercise in the tumultuous environment of a fast-changing complex emergency. Equally, there was concern not to add to the burden of colleagues coping with on-the-ground realities nor to impose on overstretched resources. In this respect it was

also considered important to ensure that this rapid two-week review was not perceived as an evaluation but rather as an opportunity to capture the reflections and insights of those involved in the "breaking-days" of the crisis while they were still available and active in the relief programme.

Given the short time available, the team made no attempt to assess the overall capacity of the UN relief agencies involved in the Rwandan crisis. Regrettably, because this would have certainly yielded lessons of interest to future emergencies, it was not possible to study in any detail the military dimension of UNAMIR and of its constituent contingents nor to assess in any meaningful way how the use of military assets, whether UNAMIR or bilaterally provided, had facilitated the humanitarian response. Some general issues relating to the role of UNAMIR are, however, briefly discussed, as is the innovative use of military contingents in support of NGOs. The military-humanitarian interaction in the Rwandan crisis certainly warrants a proper evaluation which could perhaps be undertaken jointly by the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and DHA at a later stage.

The team travelled to Rwanda on 5 September and spent twelve days in-country. It visited Kigali, Gisenyi, Ciangugu, Gikongoro and Butare, as well as Goma and refugee camps nearby. It also visited camps for the internally displaced in Rwanda. Its findings are based on extensive interviews with staff of all UN system organizations present in the area, including UNAMIR and the SRSG. Meetings were also held with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), some 20 NGOs, and a number of Donors. The team was able to

attend several inter-agency coordination and information-sharing meetings. It spent considerable time with the UNREO (UN Rwanda Emergency Office, DHA) staff in Kigali and in the three UNREO field offices. On the return trip to New York, two days were spent in Geneva for discussions with DHA, UNHCR and ICRC staff. The team was also fortunate to link up, in Kigali and in New York, with Ambassador Dillon's mission which was studying the regional dimensions of the crisis at the request of the Secretary-General.

The team would like to thank all those who made time available to meet with it and for the valuable insights and concerns that were expressed. The team members know from experience how disruptive the presence of visitors can be when urgent tasks need to be addressed. The team was able to appreciate the difficult and often stressful conditions in which their UN and NGO colleagues were working and the dedication with which they were meeting the challenge. The responsibility for the conclusions reached in this report, however, is entirely that of the authors.

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<sup>1</sup> This report was drafted in October, following a visit to Rwanda in September; it was finalized in November 1994. During this three month period, the situation and the resulting analysis have not changed significantly. In the absence of early remedial action the Rwandan situation is likely to deteriorate.

## 2.

# *Coordination in Complex Emergencies*

### I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In its conversations in the field, within and outside UN system organizations, the team was repeatedly struck by the lack of understanding of the role of DHA in the Rwandan emergency. While most felt that, overall, the role of UNREO had been positive, there was a general impression that this was more the result of a happy mix of personalities than of a clear mandate, terms of reference, and clear-cut set of activities to be performed. Some of the most extreme examples of this conceptual confusion were to be found within UNREO itself: several staff members were unaware that UNREO was part of DHA. A clearer profile, and some sort of a recognizable brand name for DHA in the field, are clearly necessary. A specific recommendation on this is made in Chapter III.

More importantly, the perceptions and expectations of what the UNREO office was or should have been doing varied widely. There is no clear nor common understanding of what "coordination" means. The team suspects that DHA staff in New York, Geneva and Rwanda would give quite different definitions of the Department's role and functions, if pressed to do so. In essence, however, the staff on the ground seemed more preoccupied with getting on with whatever they perceived as the most urgent task at hand than with reflecting on the nature and finality of their work.

Having observed the functioning of UNREO, the team's conclusion is that it was doing a good job, perhaps in spite of itself. Three main factors seem to have put the UNREO office at the cutting edge of "coordination" and have helped to maintain it there:



- the personality of its key staff member who managed to "anchor" the NGO community, and to some extent the UN agencies, around the UNREO office. His intellectual leadership, strategic thinking and positive interaction with all the actors effectively provided the backbone for the coordination effort;

- the role of the office in providing general and strategic information on the evolution of the humanitarian situation in the country and its ability to mobilize the international community in Rwanda around specific objectives (e.g. the successful containment action in the South-West);

- the "turn-key" communications facilities and logistic support provided by the Swedish Support Team (SST) to UNREO itself as well as to NGOs. This proved to be an important and most visible asset which became "operational" the moment it got off the plane. The resources available to the Swedish Team - staff, vehicles, state of the art communications, basic office supplies, even food and medical support—substituted for DHA's lack of resources and cash.

The mission feels that if any of the above components were to be withdrawn the role of the UNREO office would be rapidly marginalized. Without the SST, and in the absence of a back-up, UNREO would immediately be crippled. With regard to information, it should be made clear that, as time passes, UNREO's capacity to be ahead of all other actors on information gathering and dissemination is being quickly eroded.

At present, UNREO is still at the crossroads between diverse and sometimes conflicting interests and priorities. Most of the NGO traffic and a significant quantity of the UN traffic still travels through this

crossroads and stops there to collect information, in particular information on traffic conditions on the roads ahead. However, some of the actors in Rwanda are starting to perceive UNREO as a bottleneck or a traffic jam: the value added may no longer be worth stopping for. In fact, the construction of alternative routes - by the key UN agencies who have now beefed up their staff and their information gathering mechanisms - is well under way. The questions that DHA must ask, therefore, are: when will the point of diminishing returns be reached? At what point will the UNREO structure become neither necessary nor viable? This consideration must be weighed with another which is equally important: what level of contingency presence should be maintained in case the situation should deteriorate either in Rwanda, and its spillover areas, or in Burundi?

*The above reinforces the team's conclusion that if DHA is to make a difference in coordinating the UN system's response to emergencies, and in particular to complex emergencies, it must operate under a clear and accepted conceptual framework. The absence of such a framework hinders both the credibility and effectiveness of DHA as a whole and the quality of its work in the field.*

Agreeing on the definition of the term "coordination", as applied to humanitarian emergencies, is a complex undertaking which can probably occur only through inter-agency consultations. Nonetheless, it would seem that the modalities of coordination could more easily be identified as follows:

- **coordination by command** i.e. coordination with some sort of authority, whether carrot or stick, attached to it,

- **coordination by consensus,**

- **coordination by default.**

Given the present state of play in the UN system, carrots and sticks are not acceptable propositions for a coordination mechanism. Donors and UN Agencies appear to be hostile to the notion that the coordination body should have at its disposal any sizeable amount of un-earmarked funds as well as the authority to disburse or redistribute them to other implementing partners. The team would note, however, that a small, even minimal, amount would go a long way in facilitating the work of DHA in the field. Coordination cannot rely solely on personalities, goodwill and intellectual leadership. The availability of resources, and in particular locally usable funds, would provide some necessary oil for the coordination process. These limited funds could be utilized for such tasks as the opening of field offices or local staff recruitment, i.e. for services which would be perceived as being of benefit to the entire UN community as well as to NGOs and local authorities.

DHA's role in Rwanda is best described as coordination by consensus. It should be pointed out that the quantum of consensus seems to vary over time: it was high at the breaking stages of the crisis when all turned to DHA for information and advice, but started decreasing shortly thereafter as agencies established their presence on a surer footing. Coordination by consensus may therefore be a process of diminishing returns. It is assumed that some coordination by default would occur even if DHA did not exist.

Perhaps the best way to describe the role of DHA in Rwanda - and this presum-

ably is also the case elsewhere - is as **an advocate and a facilitator**. It is the view of the team that "advocacy" implies the ability to provide a global vision of the problem, intellectual and strategic leadership, and the capacity to engage in humanitarian diplomacy. This means that at the international, national, and local levels DHA should provide the linkages and the necessary interaction with the political and, where relevant, the peace-keeping, human rights and other components of the UN effort. DHA should, in particular, ensure that the various actors within and outside the UN system fully understand the mandates of the humanitarian agencies and that in all but extreme circumstances (i.e. Chapter VII) assistance is provided on the basis of a humanitarian consensus of all parties involved. Obviously, even under Chapter VII operations, DHA must ensure that the victims are the priority and that humanitarian space is safeguarded.

Being a "facilitator" implies that DHA, while it has no direct operational responsibilities, provides a framework and a range of services (outlined below) which allow humanitarian relief agencies to operate under the best possible conditions.

The team's impression is that despite its unclear mandate UNREO did by and large perform these functions in a more than adequate manner. Several interlocutors commented that if it did not exist UNREO would have had to be invented. Details of the activities and performance of UNREO on the ground and of the lessons to be learned therefrom are given in Chapter 3.

## 2. THE NEED FOR A "PACKAGE APPROACH" TO COORDINATION.

*In order that DHA is in a better position to address the shortcomings mentioned above, it is recommended that it develop a "package" or "turn-key" approach to coordination by clearly identifying the functions and services that it can and should provide and developing the capacity to make these available.*

*This would entail:*

- a clear definition of the mandate of DHA and of its interactions with the other humanitarian and political actors involved in emergencies. Ideally this should be written up in a booklet for wide distribution, contain the standard terms of reference of the UN Humanitarian Relief Coordinator, the standard terms of reference of SRSGs and a narrative description of how the two functions interact (Annex II contains TORs for Humanitarian Coordinators);

- a clear definition of the key essential services that DHA and its field offices can provide. Typically, this might comprise (activities would vary from situation to situation):

- overall advocacy (including humanitarian diplomacy at the political and human rights level)
- strategic planning in cooperation with other actors both humanitarian and political
- consolidated appeals
- interagency coordination at the HQ level, liaison with donors and other actors
- consolidated reporting on the use of pledged funds
- monitoring and *ex-post facto* evaluation
- operational coordination in the field (see below)

- a clear definition of the "coordination package" of services to be made available in the field. Typically, the main functions and services to be performed by DHA in-country, so that the wheel need not be reinvented each time, are:

- information gathering and dissemination, situation analysis.
- a capacity to remain "one step ahead" in understanding what is going on in the country and to ensure that the humanitarian dimension forms part of a comprehensive unitary UN approach to the problems of the country and its "spill-over".
- liaison with the Government at the central and local levels in order to facilitate the work of UN agencies and NGOs; liaison with *de facto* authorities;
- focal point for security clearances/security information in liaison with the Designated Official for Security (D.O.)
- a forum for information-sharing, strategic planning and, where appropriate, crisis management for UN Agencies and NGOs.
- a forum for joint programming on specific sectoral and geographical issues.
- monitoring and reporting, e.g. preparation of "consolidated reports" every 3 or 6 months.
- a network of field offices in the key areas of the country where a local liaison and coordination presence is required.
- a state-of-the-art communications capability for the UN agencies and NGOs.

- a clear understanding of how these services can/will be provided (i.e. in-house vs. turn-key SST type).

- a clear definition of the type of staff, mix of UN and non-UN staff, including model job descriptions for the functions and tasks to be performed on the ground.

It should be noted that if an UNREO-type operation is to function effectively it must be understood by all concerned as a two-way street. Its credibility can be easily undermined if the other actors do not accept the principle of information sharing

## 3. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

### *(a) Role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)*

Rwanda is a typical example of institutional confusion and lack of clarity on the roles of, and relationship between, the humanitarian-development and political-military arms of the UN. The human rights component in Rwanda is more clearly defined but the slow pace of deployment, lack of visible action, and the negative implications of this for Rwanda's overall recovery, also point to the need for stronger linkages and synergy between the various UN components.

The SRSG, who, at least theoretically, has overall responsibility for UN action in-country is, in reality, the titular head of an operation which is not grounded in any clearly defined institutional framework which would give him the authority to decide on a particular course of events. While he probably enjoys greater prestige, and thus leverage, than a DHA Humanitarian Coordinator, he does not have the clout of HCR which has a well established mandate, history and capacity to generate the

resources necessary to meet its responsibilities. In any setting this is a debilitating and frustrating set of circumstances for an SRSG. In the Rwandan context the impotence, or perceived impotence, of the SRSG's office is compounded by a lack of understanding of how the UN operates (i.e. in the sense of the real limitations inherent in the role of a SRSG who tries to act but cannot operate as a Pro-Consul or Lord Viceroy) and by the obvious need to quickly forge ahead and generate the conditions vital for peace.

Some of the confusion can be attributed to the rapid evolution of events between April and end-July and to the fact that UNAMIR's mandate did not keep pace with events, or changed substantially, in this period. Originally set up as a peace-keeping operation, and then dramatically reduced when the events of April and renewed hostilities invalidated its mandate, UNAMIR assumed an important role in providing protection to a small but significant number of besieged people and assisting in the provision of relief. (Major constraints, including lack of security and resources, limited the reach of this humanitarian endeavour. However, it was a noteworthy achievement both in terms of lives saved and in maintaining a semblance of respect for humanitarian principles.)

Massive population movements, including refugee flows to neighboring countries, the launching of Operation Turquoise, and the cessation of hostilities in mid-July directly affected the role of UNAMIR. It became increasingly marginalized as a major player on the humanitarian front as regular relief agencies swung into action.

The foregoing also mirrors the changing role of the SRSG. Resumption of all-out warfare, and the effective disintegration of the Arusha Accords, essentially annulled the SRSG's role in shepherding a fragile peace process to fruition. Relief activities, however constrained, were a major preoccupation during the April-July period. But as the humanitarian dimension of the crisis moved center stage, and the reality of a victorious army minimized the significance of political negotiation, the role of the SRSG became increasingly unclear. Even as the focus now moves to post-conflict recovery, and there is consensus on the importance of reconciliation and rehabilitation to political stability and the consolidation of peace, the SRSG has a limited capacity to bring about the realization of confidence-building measures.

The team's view is that the Office of the SRSG is best suited to nurturing the political process, as generally defined by the Security Council, and lacks the capacity and operational authority to identify and prioritize needs or to oversee the allocation of resources in spheres of activity beyond the immediate political arena. The SRSG can also play an important role in ensuring harmony between the different components of a peace-consolidation package and use the influence of his Office to push for prompt action on key programmes. Examples of positive interaction between the political, military and humanitarian aspects in Rwanda include the collaborative effort of all in the Southwest upon the departure of the French forces. Examples of unilateral and un-coordinated action which have impacted negatively on other UN programmes include the airdrop over Goma by UNAMIR of leaflets recommending refugee return and the handling of the findings of the "Gersony Report" by UNHCR.

*The Rwandan experience highlights the importance of the SRSG having clearly defined Terms of Reference and being fully familiar with UN system mandates and capabilities. In this connection, it is important that the SRSG is fully cognizant of the particular mandates of individual agencies, the type of advice and support such agencies can provide to his Office, and the need to safeguard the humanitarian integrity of relief agencies. All SRSGs should be briefed by DHA prior to field assignments and receive a packaged briefing kit which highlights the necessity of respecting and upholding humanitarian principles in the realization of political objectives.*

The issue of the extent to which the SRSG and his Office should be involved in the day to day coordination of humanitarian activities was unresolved at the time of the team's visit. As stated above, the SRSG, as the most senior UN official in the country, should be a powerful advocate on humanitarian as well as human rights issues. A primary function of the SRSG in the relief sphere is to ensure that humanitarian considerations receive equal billing with political and military concerns. The team feels that the SRSG and his office **should not be operationally involved** in the day to day functioning of UNREO. Indeed, there are distinct advantages in maintaining the DHA "brand name" operationally separate from that of the SRSG, it being understood that on policy issues involving the UN as a whole the SRSG will continue to act as the SG's spokesperson. As explained in paragraph (b) below, contiguity with the military tends to cordon off the possibility of accessing the local population. It is therefore the team's considered view that it would be a mistake to move the UNREO premises to the fortified UNAMIR compound. The appointment of

the humanitarian coordinator as the SRSG's deputy would also give a similarly wrong signal.

Moreover, while the placement of UNAMIR humanitarian liaison officers in the UNREO office and the regular participation of the UNREO deputy coordinator at the UNAMIR briefings have served a useful purpose, the same cannot be said for the Humanitarian Cell in the SRSG's office. The rationale for having half a dozen civilian humanitarian officers in the SRSG's office is not self evident given the high risk of duplication or of giving conflicting signals as occurred for example, when the SRSG's office undertook to prepare a Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan (RENP) with little or no consultation with UNREO and other UN Agencies.

Conversely, the personal participation of the SRSG in coordination meetings, whether interagency or with NGOs, is seen by all as positive. It ensures not only that he is perceived as the overall UN leader in the country but also that his concern for humanitarianism and for joint strategic planning is backed up by facts.

#### **(b) Interaction with UNAMIR**

The team did not have the mandate nor the time to explore the relationship between UNAMIR and the humanitarian community in Rwanda in any detail. It did not meet with the Field Commander; its contacts with UNAMIR were limited to interviewing the UNAMIR humanitarian liaison officers (who were actually posted part-time in the UNREO premises) and to hitching a ride in a military vehicle from Cyangugu to Gikongoro. However, the UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is in many ways an important feature in the day to day life of the humanitarian community. At the

time of the visit, the military was providing essential services to UN agencies, bilaterals, NGOs and even to the media ranging from security to logistics (transport of humanitarian commodities, fuel, communications, medical support, free access to UNAMIR air services, etc.), information sharing and even the direct delivery of assistance.

While these services were generally appreciated, there were mixed feelings in the humanitarian community as to the profile to be adopted, and the degree of proximity to be maintained, in dealing with the UN military. On balance, the team feels that extreme caution should be exercised by humanitarian organizations in placing themselves under a military umbrella except when overwhelming security considerations dictate otherwise. The team would further argue that it is to the military's advantage to keep its profile and image distinct from those of the humanitarian agencies.

For reasons which are self evident, the military is not the best suited to deal with the civil society. In fact, UNAMIR, in common with all military establishments whether at home or abroad, tends to cut itself off from society by setting up heavily fortified compounds wherever it goes. Razor wire is enough to intimidate the local population even if the blue flag and helmets provide a reassuring presence. Therefore, too close an association or, co-location with the military will definitely not facilitate information gathering.

Conversely, the military should do its job and not impinge on the humanitarian sphere unless there is a clear understanding of what has to be done and how (e.g. the "psy-ops" initiative to drop leaflets on Goma encouraging refugee return without prior consultation with HCR or DHA).



*In sum, the distinct roles and mandates of the UN military and humanitarian components should be clearly understood. DHA should take the initiative in ensuring that SRSGs and UN Field Commanders are fully briefed on the specificity of humanitarian mandates ("priority to the victims") and that this information is widely disseminated along the chain of command.*

**(c) The UNDP Factor**

Many agency personnel and others commented on the process used to identify a Humanitarian Coordinator. As this has been thoroughly reviewed at a recent IASC meeting (September 1994), and formal procedures approved, it is unnecessary to comment here on this particular aspect of field coordination.

However, it is important that such positions have clearly defined Terms of Reference which reflect the nature of the task that needs to be accomplished. For example, requirements of coordination will vary depending on whether a UN or Regional Peace-keeping Mission is involved and on the nature of the humanitarian situation (e.g. whether it is "silent" or "violent").

In any event, coordination of a major emergency is a full-time job. The Rwandan crisis illustrates the impossibility of combining coordination functions with other responsibilities: it is unrealistic to expect that the Humanitarian Coordinator of a complex emergency can also assume the functions of a UNDP Resident Representative. This is equally relevant in a transition phase when the focus moves from acute emergency to rehabilitation and capacity building. While emergencies are often understood in terms of phases these do not

generally occur in a sequential manner. This is particularly obvious in situations where there are large numbers of internally displaced, as the task of attending to their needs, and the problems which arise in relation to this, are invariably time consuming.

Apart from the time factor there is also the element of "allegiance". UNDP, which does not have a long tradition in coordinating relief, is perceived by many as being primarily committed to its development role which may have negative implications for the day to day coordination of humanitarian programmes.

Coordination which facilitates a smooth transition from relief to sustainable development was not an issue which the team reviewed in any depth. At the time of the visit development agencies were just beginning to get reestablished in Rwanda. In general, it would appear important that the Humanitarian Coordinator takes a strong lead in generating a recovery programme which is linked to a larger development plan. Equally, the Humanitarian Coordinator must have the necessary resources, including personnel, to mobilize and liaise with development agencies to ensure adequate continuity both in terms of programme planning and implementation.

# 3.

## Lessons from the UNREO Experience

### I. PHASES

The rapid evolution of the Rwandan crisis stipulates that it is understood in terms of phases which are not necessarily linear; currently, for example, programmes need to be developed to encourage and facilitate a return movement from both internally displaced and refugee camps while simultaneously responding to a continued exodus of refugees from Rwanda.

The main "phases" which can be identified with specific events that shaped the response of the humanitarian community include:

- **pre-April 1994.** Humanitarian and other agencies were operating within the framework of the Arusha peace process while addressing on-going relief needs.

- **the immediate post-6 April period** which saw the launching of the Advance Humanitarian Team, the Flash Appeal and the re-activation of a humanitarian presence in Kigali.

- **May - June** was marked by continued acts of genocide and escalation of warfare, reduction in force of UNAMIR, contingency planning and preparation of a Consolidated Appeal. UNREO activities were coordinated out of Nairobi while Field Offices were opened in Kabale, Bujumbura and elsewhere in response to relief needs in the north of Rwanda and massive exoduses to Tanzania and Burundi.

- **Mid June - mid July.** Killings continue and Operation Turquoise is launched as a humanitarian operation by the Security Council.

- **Mid July - late August.** The RPF is victorious. As a new government is announced in Kigali world attention is focused on Goma which is overwhelmed by the arrival of an estimated one million people,

the most vulnerable of whom quickly succumb to cholera. Late July/early August saw the launching of the Consolidated Appeal, a review of overall strategy and a division of labour which included HCR responsibility for coordination of relief activities in border camps and DHA responsibility for in-country coordination. Effective strategic planning and follow through by humanitarian agencies, UNAMIR and the RPF in the South-West succeeded in defusing a potentially explosive situation; as French forces withdrew a feared massive exodus did not occur.

- **Post-August.** The need for rapid action on genocide, rehabilitation, and measures aimed at fostering a moderate functioning government became increasingly obvious. Personnel on the ground expressed concern that the opportunity to help stabilize a volatile situation would be lost and that this would give way to an embattled hardline government surrounded by antagonistic border camps, a reality which would undermine stability in the region.

Notwithstanding the delineation of these loosely demarcated "phases", and given that the overall objective of a coordination structure does not change over time, observations on UNREO's experience will focus on specific issues and themes rather than on activity-linked phases.

## 2. PREPAREDNESS

It was not possible during the visit to garner any dramatic insights into the preparedness or mitigation strategies enunciated prior to April. It would appear that the predominant focus was the Arusha process and the preparation of a Round Table to promote

and consolidate a revitalized development plan. It may be helpful to organize a review at some later stage with the personnel involved in the Humanitarian Unit (UNDP/Rwanda), and in the initiation of a Disaster Management Team, to determine how they now view the situation with the benefit of hindsight.

For example, at an operational level, it would be useful to know whether it would have been helpful to have made advance arrangements for safeguarding communication and other facilities vital to the maintenance of relief activities in a deteriorating environment. It may also be helpful to review how the presence of UNAMIR might have been better utilized both in relation to protecting personnel (expatriate and national) essential to maintaining a humanitarian presence and to ensuring continuity in programme delivery.

In this connection, the team noted that there had been less than optimal communication between the military (UNAMIR) and the development components of the UN (the Designated Official - DO) on security matters in early April. Institutional confusion on the issue of evacuation - in particular evacuation of national staff and their families - was compounded by the lack of proper interface between the UN "military" and "civilian" walkie-talkie networks. The team understands that the issue of evacuation of nationals was addressed at a recent ACC (Administrative Committee on Coordination) meeting and that, hopefully, a clearer policy will soon be enunciated on this matter. However, the importance of transparent and commonly understood procedures on security matters cannot be over emphasized.

*DHA and the Office of the UN Security Coordinator should take the lead in ensuring (through appropriate training, systematic pre-deployment briefing and the dissemination of a security information booklet to all field staff) that UN system security procedures are understood and adhered to. The relationship between the SRS/FC and the DO should also be reviewed to ensure that avoidable security lapses do not occur. More generally, the military and civilian components of UN peace missions should acquire a better understanding of the mandates and modus operandi of the humanitarian agencies and especially of the impact of military/security decisions on humanitarian programmes and on the security of humanitarian (UN and NGO) personnel.*

In general, it would appear useful for DHA, in collaboration with relevant humanitarian partners, to review the overall level of preparedness in all at-risk countries. As a preliminary measure it would be helpful to have a profile of available resources which can be utilized by relief agencies in the event of a sudden-onset catastrophe (political or otherwise). In this connection, DHA, in collaboration with other agencies, may wish to review ways and means of augmenting national capacities with particular emphasis on the coping capabilities of indigenous groups and mechanisms which would enhance their protection in conflict situations. In situations where an Early Warning Alert system indicates the possibility of a crisis with major humanitarian implications, DHA and the humanitarian community should have a mechanism whereby contingency planning and stand-by capacities, including availability of appropriate personnel, are reviewed and appropriate action taken.

## 3. COORDINATION STRUCTURE; DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK

The downing of the plane which killed the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda on 6 April unleashed a reign of terror which put Rwanda at the centre of the world's headlines. However, while this constituted an unexpected turn of events that effectively derailed the Arusha Peace process, in terms of crisis management it needs to be noted that a humanitarian programme with its attendant infrastructure and resource base - including knowledge of local realities - already existed in-country with back-stopping by DHA New York.

The deteriorating security situation, evacuation of expatriate personnel, death of UNAMIR peace-keepers and withdrawal of its largest contingent, and the widespread violence which ensued, created a dramatically changed environment which posed new demands and challenges to the humanitarian community.

Agencies such as ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) maintained a presence in Kigali throughout. Even though operational activities were severely constrained by fighting, the decision of these agencies "not to evacuate" is generally seen as a positive and important factor in providing a sense of succour and external concern during the most terrifying days of violence.

The decision of DHA to reinstate a UN humanitarian presence is universally regarded as positive although some question why other options, for example "digging in" and maintaining a presence within the relatively secure UNAMIR compound, were not considered so as to avoid the necessity of withdrawing all staff only to immediately commence negotiations to reinsert a humanitarian team.



With specific reference to the fielding of the DHA/Rwanda Team and the decision making framework which was put in place over the weekend of 9 April, a number of observations were made which are of interest for future scenarios.

Given the nature of the crisis, the ongoing presence of UNAMIR, and pre-existing channels of communication between New York and Kigali, the decision to transfer DHA Desk Officer functions relating to Rwanda from New York to Geneva was seen as confusing. It added to the complexity of coordination given the high political content of the crisis, the extent to which the Security Council was involved, and the implications of its deliberations and decisions on humanitarian realities. A subsequent DHA decision that future back-stopping of all complex emergencies would be based in New York was generally welcomed, although lines of communication with Geneva-based agencies and allocation of responsibilities on support activities handled out of DHA Geneva need to be much more clearly defined.

#### 4. NEED FOR A TASK FORCE APPROACH

Given the divergent and changing demands of a complex emergency, particularly as it is breaking, it is important that DHA acquires a Task Force approach and mentality so that it is constantly ahead of, and to the extent possible, shaping events.

A "Task Force mentality" refers to the need for a dynamic and proactive approach; an emergency cannot be seen as a routine or predictable affair. There is clearly a stronger sense of adrenalin in the Geneva "humanitarian capital" environment than in its counterpart New York "political capital".

*The organization of a Headquarters (Geneva and New York) Task Force to*

*pull together action and direction is strongly recommended. It should have a clearly defined composition, distribution of functions and responsibilities, lines of communication, chain of command and decision making mechanisms. It should be comprised primarily of DHA staff but could be enlarged to include representatives of other Departments on a regular basis or when appropriate - in particular DPKO when a peace mission is involved - in order to ensure that there is one coherent UN response and that a sound basis for joint planning is in place. It should meet regularly (including daily at the peak of a crisis) to ensure an effective overall strategy, prioritization and allocation of tasks, and a consistent message to, and clear interaction with field colleagues and other UN partners. While it would neither be desirable nor feasible for all members of the Task Force to meet on every aspect of the crisis, the Task Force should have a Team Leader responsible for ensuring that DHA has a well informed and coherent perspective and is able to deliver on its specific mandate to the larger UN system. Such a Task Force should also have a focal person who ensures continuity and flow of information between different sub-groups and inter-agency meetings.*

Thus, for example, in Rwanda an ultra important factor in confidence building is action on the issue of genocide. DHA should have been an active and aggressive advocate from the outset in pushing and helping the Human Rights arm of the UN to move on this issue. To undertake such a role it needs to be tuned in and up-to-date on realities impeding prompt action which may well necessitate a member of the Task Force being designated to focus on this particular topic. This Task Force member (who

would, presumably, have other non-Rwandan responsibilities within DHA) would keep on top of the issue, provide analysis and advice and keep other Task Force members updated.

In discussions with DHA colleagues it is easy to detect a certain ambiguity in the overall management of the DHA Rwanda operation. Administrative problems, particularly in Geneva, often delayed a quick response, information was unequally shared between personnel and offices, lines of authority and communication were sometimes informal and sometimes tortuous. It was often difficult to ascertain which staff member was in the driver's seat on a specific issue. Key staff members were allowed to be absent from their posts at crucial junctures without a suitable backup being appointed. It is expected that the clear delineation of responsibilities through a Task Force approach would help to obviate some of these difficulties in future emergencies.

#### 5. FIELD LEVEL COORDINATION

In terms of field level coordination, the decision to make Nairobi the initial hub of operations while maintaining a rotating presence in Kigali, where mobility was severely constrained, is seen as positive. Although time precluded any in depth discussion with donors it is understood that the UNREO presence as a backup to, and channel of communication with, Rwanda greatly facilitated the development of a consensus on priorities among donors and the humanitarian community.

Although the issue was not explored in depth it also appears that there are significant advantages in not locating the central coordinating office in a capital or

geographic area dominated by one of the warring parties. Equally, the presence of Field Offices in each "zone of operations" facilitates cross-border and cross-line communication and the provision of assistance.

*The Rwanda experience indicates that a field presence has obvious advantages not only in terms of facilitating day to day operations, and in maintaining an up to date review of developments which affect the provision of relief, but is also instrumental in safeguarding the image and concept of impartiality.*

The UNREO coordinating structure which came into being in April appears to have been highly effective in terms of generating a consensus on an overall plan of action and its implementation. The team does not have detailed knowledge of how the original division of labour between the Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda and the UNHCR Special Regional Envoy was foreseen. While it appears that this was originally envisaged as one structure, it is clear that once the UNREO office moved to Kigali, the reality of a somewhat artificial division of labour between an internal (DHA) and external (HCR) coordination structure gave rise to fragmentation and tunnel vision which worked against a comprehensive and coherent UN response.

The importance of the UN and its collaborating partners being committed to the same agenda, and the necessity of an institutional mechanism which enables the different components of the UN to form a common approach, is obvious. The Rwandan situation also demonstrates the importance of a coordination structure which clearly identifies the nature of the relationship between the different UN inputs and

the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator in relation to these. While the Rwandan operation is a constant example of good working relationships between UNREO, the office of the SRSG, UNAMIR and their individual and collective interaction with the humanitarian agencies, this happy situation can mostly be ascribed to the personalities involved and to the consensus they were able to develop on priorities and actions rather than to an unambiguous institutional structure.

*The need for unity of purpose is of critical importance. It is regrettable that a Humanitarian Coordinator was not appointed at the outset of the crisis to oversee all aspects of the Rwandan emergency including the exodus to neighbouring countries. In any future complex emergency it should be a given that the humanitarian response is seen as one operation and that it is coordinated by one entity geared to the realization of a common set of objectives.*

## 6. THE VALUE OF COORDINATION: GOMA AND THE SOUTH-WEST

Determining the overall impact of DHA's action on the ground was not the task of the study team. However, DHA's role in Goma and in the South-West are two striking examples which illustrate the additionality of a coordinating mechanism and are worth reviewing briefly.

### (a) Goma

There is general agreement on the ground that it would have been impossible to predict the pace and scale of the exodus to Goma and that even if this mass movement had been predicted, it is unlikely that the international community would have made

the necessary resources available to head off the impending disaster. Previous population flows out of Rwanda had moved to Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi and with the presence of Operation Turquoise in the South-West, it was anticipated that people would move in those directions. However, this is not to minimize the importance of early warning, prevention and standby capacity.

HCR, which was already preoccupied with recent outflows of some 600,000 Rwandans to neighbouring states, had contingency stocks for 50,000 refugees in the Goma area. Coupled with the inhospitable environment (hard volcanic surface, little vegetation, deficient water resources and poor local infrastructure), the minimal options available to the handful of relief personnel in Goma added to the daunting task of responding to the needs of one million people who arrived en masse in a 72-hour time period.

The study team spent two days in Goma and is in no position to comment on alternative scenarios which might have evolved. From all accounts – NGOs, donors, UN Agency personnel – those involved performed heroically as they struggled to put some semblance of order on a chaotic and nightmarish situation. As Goma unravelled, and cholera took its toll, HCR and others were already indicating that the magnitude of the crisis was beyond the capacity of regular relief agencies. With the crisis at the center of the world's attention, however fleetingly, bilaterals and others deployed or made available key resources. It appears that most actors acknowledged the necessity of coordination while a few were pre-occupied with spotlight and profile. (An unmistakable feature of the Goma relief endeavour is that practi-

cally all relief workers are clad in T-shirts which prominently display the logo and name of their agency. This can be attributed to the large media presence in the early days of the crisis and the funding possibilities implicit in TV coverage.)

DHA was fortunate in having a presence in Goma prior to the massive influx of mid-July. This was due to the launching of Operation Turquoise in June and to the need for liaison with this exercise which led the DHA Relief Coordination Branch to second a colleague, equipment, and a logistical team. HCR also had a presence and small office in Goma.

The role of DHA in the early days of the crisis was extremely helpful both to HCR and to the relief community in Goma in terms of defining an overall strategy and orchestrating a response. The DHA office was also useful in keeping UNREO and the wider world informed of unfolding events. It is felt that DHA could have played a more active role in forward-planning if it had more resources including a more stable presence in Goma. The closure of the DHA office in August was regretted by many including HCR and other agency staff. HCR staff themselves recognized that apart from massive needs and the desirability of obtaining assistance from all available resources, there were many issues, both in the early days of the crisis and subsequently, which transcended HCR's protection and assistance role. In addition to providing the sense of a broad unity of purpose, and reporting on the evolving situation, the DHA office performed useful political liaison functions on behalf of the system.

Clearly, one of the most difficult and contentious issues facing the relief community in Goma concerns the presence of the former political and military authorities and

their role in security incidents, distribution mechanisms, and camp management structures which is likely to impact negatively on tentative repatriation movements. Fear of consolidating the stranglehold of abusive camp elements, and the implications of this for Rwanda, was uppermost in everyone's mind during the team's visit to Goma.

Utilizing existing community structures for the provision of relief is an approach that is advocated in most refugee situations. However, given the ramifications of this approach in a Goma-like scenario, it is clearly important that relief agencies determine possible alternative options to avoid what is, essentially, a second disaster. The indirect use of relief programmes to support entities that are largely responsible for genocide, the massive displacement and the forced concentration of people in camps, are issues of concern to DHA and underline the importance of a global approach to the Rwandan crisis.

The initiation of the DHA presence in Goma, the difficulties encountered in establishing this office, both conceptually and administratively, and the role of the DHA Goma Team in relation to the refugee exodus, were reviewed separately by DHA.

### *Lessons drawn from this experience include:*

- from a strategic point of view, the closing of the DHA office resulted in a lost opportunity; it undermined DHA's ability to maintain an overall perspective and to mobilize and sustain support for a unified response to the Rwandan crisis. DHA had been "in" and operational before the other players. When it opened its office on 4 July it immediately became the focal point for the coordination of the relief effort: UN agencies, NGOs, diplomatic missions, the

Zairian authorities and even the defeated Rwandan leaders all flocked to it for information. The office also played a crucial humanitarian diplomacy role in the breaking days of the crisis. HCR naturally took over the coordination of assistance to refugees when it strengthened its presence, although the DHA office remained an acceptable focal point because of the added value it was bringing: information, satellite communications, a VHF and HF network and professional telecoms staff. It is the team's view that the Office's important dissemination of information, reporting, liaison and limited strategic planning functions were an asset which should have been maintained and which DHA should have been able to convince Donors to support.

• from a managerial point of view, the DHA/Goma experience illustrates ills which have been highlighted elsewhere in this report in particular the Department's failure to utilize and deploy its resources in a rational manner. It appears that communication between the two DHA/Geneva branches involved in the opening of the office RCB (the Relief Coordination Branch) and CEB (the Complex Emergency Branch) was less than optimal. Little guidance was provided from either DHA/Geneva or New York. Inadequate attention was given to the purpose and role of such an entity including the resources necessary to enable it to function as a coordination and liaison tool within a larger relief response programme. The absence of a clear chain of command and communication channels hampered the work of the Goma team. It is also important that necessary administrative and other arrangements are in place to help ensure adequate and prompt back-stopping of field personnel. For the most part, the DHA Goma Team

felt it was operating in a vacuum, and had to rely on its own resources which luckily it had insisted on taking with it when first dispatched to Zaire.

#### **(b) The South-West**

An assessment of Operation Turquoise, and its implications for humanitarian activities in Rwanda, was not part of the team's brief. However, fear about the consequences of the withdrawal of French forces from the South-West in August and the deployment of the Rwandan Patriotic Army, generated a response which highlights the value of a well-orchestrated humanitarian strategy in preventing a catastrophe that threatened to equal Goma.

In collaboration with the SRSG and UNAMIR, UNREO was instrumental in defining action needed to calm a jittery population, generating a consensus on this within the relief community, and mobilizing an international presence and support system which was a major factor in avoiding an exodus which would, undoubtedly, have had disastrous consequences.

The fact that UNREO had a presence in the South-West during the period of Operation Turquoise, and had a good overview of the situation, greatly facilitated its ability to strategize and pre-empt a westward movement. This again underlines the importance of a field presence and a good communications network. DHA's role was also facilitated by the US/OFDA DART Team (US Office of Federal Disaster Assistance, Disaster Assistance Response Team) which had \$10 million at its disposal and was able to make funds immediately available to NGOs.

The experience of relief agencies and others in the South West illustrate the importance of early warning which leads to

pre-emptive action. The development of an overall containment strategy with specific activities for different phases was instrumental in averting a massive population movement. First phase activities, included the concentration of relief assistance in the more vulnerable Prefectures, and strenuous efforts to reassure the population, including the delayed deployment of the RPA and an increased UNAMIR presence. Primary funnel points, for example forest exits, were used to disseminate information to people already on the move. In a second phase, it was planned to establish camps in Cyangugu on the Rwandan side of the border where the exodus to Zaire was most likely to occur. A good communication structure was also established to closely monitor events. The need to be flexible, innovative and to respond rapidly were major considerations throughout.

#### **7. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NGOS**

A universal and vocal theme was that UNREO constituted an extremely important and beneficial mechanism for the NGO community both in terms of facilitating NGO action and in enabling such agencies to coordinate their activities with the UN and other bodies. Logistical and other support provided by UNAMIR, and the role of UNREO in facilitating this, was seen to be helpful and, presumably, eased the task of coordination.

Regular bi-weekly coordination meetings, to which all NGOs, bilaterals, and UN agencies are invited, are convened by UNREO. These are well attended by the NGO community despite the fact that for many there is standing room only. The team was impressed both by the pleasant

and business like atmosphere (a welcome departure from more turbulent or fractious gatherings witnessed in other humanitarian emergencies) and by the fact that these meetings went well beyond information sharing. Priorities were being discussed and to a large extent informal decisions on load sharing or possible future areas of concentration were being taken. Although the team was not able to observe this in any detail, the local relationship between UNREO sub-offices and NGOs seemed to be equally productive.

The UNREO coordinating structure was appreciated and deemed effective by NGOs which viewed it as "light", supportive and participatory as it eschewed a "Big Brother" directional approach. The facilities (meeting place, rendezvous point, Bulletin Board, pigeon holes for all NGOs and access to satellite communication equipment) and welcoming atmosphere of UNREO were also major factors in both generating a positive relationship and facilitating a collective humanitarian endeavour. Obviously, such facilities, support and direction are doubly appreciated in the acute eye-of-the-storm period when resources are scarce and prompt action is required to save lives and avert further catastrophe.

The location and accessibility of the UNREO office was also congenial. Some UNAMIR personnel indicated to the team that it might have been preferable to have all UN emergency-related offices in one location. However, the open-house ambiance of the UNREO office would probably have been difficult to maintain in the heavily guarded UNAMIR compound. Physical distance from UN military compounds also helps in safeguarding the humanitarian identity of relief agencies.



It is unclear to what extent current UNREO structures, and coordination mechanisms, will continue to play such a significant role as the transition is made from acute emergency to ongoing care and maintenance and initiation of rehabilitation activities. But it is reasonable to assume that the significance and usefulness of UNREO will vary in relation to different actors namely NGOs, UN Agencies, the SRSG, UNAMIR and the Government.

While it is likely that a number of NGOs (100 were recorded at the time of the Mission) will depart the scene as funds dry up, it is probable that the services and facilities currently provided by UNREO will be less in demand by those NGOs which remain. This is not to minimize the continuing need for coordination but larger NGOs will rely increasingly on their own resources and develop stronger linkages with UN Agencies as they focus on particular sectoral and geographic areas.

*In sum, with the right approach, facilities, support and charisma - and the combination of these is important - DHA and NGOs can form a fruitful relationship which facilitates information-sharing, strategic planning and optimal use of resources. DHA and the NGO community can probably also capitalize on such synergy to mobilize public opinion on priority needs.*

While the overall contribution of NGOs to the humanitarian effort in and around Rwanda appears to be unquestionably positive — with the exception of a few instances of “cowboy” or “media-hungry” agencies — the longer-term impact of the delivery of an overwhelming proportion of humanitarian assistance through external NGOs needs to be better understood. Like

other relief actors, NGOs have varying degrees of professionalism and capacity. The commitment of less well-established agencies are often vulnerable to media and public opinion shifts “back home”. This may create problems of continuity and sustainability, especially as emergencies move into the rehabilitation and development phase.

However, the multiplicity of humanitarian (and development) actors creates a burden for fledgling government structures and, if proper safeguards are not introduced, breeds dependency. There is no easy answer to this problem. There is, however, a role for DHA in advocating that issues of self-reliance in the broadest sense are not pushed aside in complex emergencies.

## 8. THE EVOLVING CHALLENGE OF FIELD COORDINATION

At the time of the team's visit the nature of the interaction between the different agencies (NGOs, UN, other) was changing as programmes adjusted to post-conflict realities and to the need to focus attention on rehabilitation and repatriation. However, much of the comments and insights on the structure and role of UNREO as a coordinating mechanism were concerned with the conflict and immediate post-conflict period when the demands and implications of massive population movements were of major concern to the humanitarian community.

It was not easy to obtain an informed opinion of how UN agencies actually perceived the role of DHA or the extent to which they found the UNREO coordinating structure useful. At all levels there is much polite reference to the “importance of coordination” and appreciation of the role

played by DHA. Such comments are often coupled with statements on the need to ensure that DHA does not become “another layer” in the larger UN-system decision-making process.

In general, it appears that during the Nairobi-based phase of the operation UNREO was better-positioned to generate an overall consensus on a collective and mutually-reinforcing response. Equally, during the early days of the Goma crisis, the DHA presence and capacity to facilitate communication and provide an overall perspective was greatly appreciated.

However, now that UN Agencies are well-established in Rwanda the impression is that they are very much focused on their particular programme of activities and are less inclined to form part of an overall coordination structure. Indeed it appears that there is an automatic tendency for each Agency to assume a coordinating role in its particular sector or “sphere of influence”. This is not surprising given the need for more detailed planning as programmes become more structured. The challenge, therefore, for DHA is to be aware of the changing realities while simultaneously ensuring that decisions and strategies fit into an overall recovery plan.

While (some) Agencies continue to participate in information-exchange meetings and there is consultation on security and other issues of common concern, there is little joint planning on the humanitarian front within the UN system in any real sense. At best this is coordination by consensus in that agencies inform one another of what they are planning. Instances of agencies taking initiatives which affect the work of others without prior information-sharing often occur. Regrettably, a culture which puts a premium on a shared approach

to problem-solving is still lacking in the system. DHA, as advocate and facilitator, should take the lead in pointing out to its partners, including donors, the synergies that result from joint action and the repercussions of “going it alone”.

It was not part of the Terms of Reference, nor was there time, to review or make assumptions about the role of UNREO as humanitarian and other agencies move into a rehabilitation mode. However, it may be worth noting that there is a continuing need for a coordination mechanism which facilitates the transition both in terms of strategic planning focused on a recovery programme while simultaneously supporting on-going relief activities.

In a post-conflict scenario the UN system obviously has an important role to play in both facilitating interaction with government and local authorities while also assisting the government to develop the capacity to launch rehabilitation programmes and other activities essential for peace and stability.

Given the lead time required by development agencies to commence operations, and their inclination to focus on capacity-building programmes which do not necessarily address the immediate needs of dislocated and vulnerable groups, there is a role for a coordination mechanism which facilitates a transition and maintains momentum on a recovery trajectory. The presence of an operational peace-keeping force providing security, logistics or other support for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and the need to ensure harmonious interface between the military and the humanitarian community, also underlines the continuing need for an impartial coordination body.

Since DHA, unlike the major UN Agencies, has no authority or capacity to determine the most appropriate use of fund-

ing or other resources available to the humanitarian community, its coordination function, and thus the realization of its mandate, is dependent on its ability to be of service. To do so it must focus on activities which are not undertaken by others and it must ensure it has the necessary capacity to deliver.

*Thus, in terms of lessons which can be derived from this experience it is important that DHA is aware of, and responds to, the changing requirements of the humanitarian community as a crisis evolves. Structures and mechanisms which were useful at the peak of the crisis will need to be phased out or adapted as their utility decreases or becomes redundant.*

#### 9. VISIBILITY: NEED FOR A DHA "BRAND-NAME"

There is much unnecessary and unhelpful discussion as to whether or not DHA is "operational". It is unclear what is understood precisely by this term but it appears that much of the concern and discussion centers around the fear that DHA will start encroaching on the mandates, and will duplicate the activities of, existing UN "operational" agencies.

DHA's inability to articulate its role and to clearly define the non-passive nature of its coordinating function partly explains the hesitation and distrust of sister Agencies.

Given the types of tasks DHA is required to perform in order to meet its responsibilities it should be able to explain the necessity of activities such as monitoring and data collection, which are essential to its coordinating role, and the fact that it is not directly involved in the actual implementation of specific projects. In other words, it is "operational" in so far as the

coordination of complex emergencies is a dynamic activity but it is not an implementing arm of the UN in the sense that OPS (Office of Project Services) is.

*DHA's ability to have a positive impact is partly linked to its image and the confidence it inspires within the humanitarian community and the larger UN system. It needs to develop a profile that is consistent throughout all operations where it performs a coordinating function. This includes utilizing a standard acronym and logo that is easily recognizable (e.g. DHA-Rwanda).*

As in all emergencies, a high proportion of aid workers and media personnel are brand new to the relief scene and have minimal understanding of how the different components of the UN function. From this perspective alone it is important that DHA has an identity which explains its role and facilitates its task of coordination both at the ground level and globally in the sense of educating public opinion.

It is equally important that DHA operates as one programme and projects the same message and image at all levels of activity. The fact that even some UNREO staff were unfamiliar with DHA's "constitution", and the tasks it is required to perform at the inter-agency (IASC) and international level, is disquieting.

*As a first step, DHA should put together a concise, but brief, information package which is handed to all staff members however short-term. Such an information kit could also be used to brief personnel and colleagues not familiar with DHA but interacting with it on the ground.*

#### 10. INFORMATION

Essential coordination tasks in the early days of the crisis included the initiation and dissemination of Situation Reports. DHA's role in collecting and making up-to-date information available is widely appreciated particularly in the acute stage of the crisis when it is difficult to maintain an overview of fast-changing events.

*In the post-conflict setting when there are many agencies, bilateral donors, and media personnel on the ground it may be worthwhile to review the format, content and frequency of the SitRep so that it is more focused on analysis and future direction of the relief and rehabilitation effort.*

As explained above, UNREO's strength was to a large extent a function of its capacity to understand what was happening in the country and to relay this information to the other players. While this capacity seemed to be more than adequate with respect to the general political and security situation for determining opportunities for humanitarian action, relatively little effort was devoted to understanding the root causes of the conflict, its impact on civil society, reconciliation, and future development activities.

It is the view of the team that UNREO and DHA in general would have benefitted from the advice of an anthropologist or other specialist with expertise on Rwandan society. The presence of a competent "Rwandologist" would have been particularly useful in the first months of the emergency in order to shed some historical light and societal explanations on a seemingly irrational course of events. Similarly, the team feels that the substantive input of an anthropologist and/or of a specialist in

confidence-building measures should be considered essential for devising rehabilitation strategies and for addressing the crucial problem of the healing of the social fabric.

*It is recommended that in future complex emergencies DHA secure the services of a competent resource person with documented scientific experience in the country/area concerned - e.g. anthropologist, historian, political scientist. This specialist would be attached to the DHA field office and assist it in gaining a better understanding of the situation including the culturally-sensitive aspects affecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance.*

The team did not have the opportunity to review how the availability of a Public Information officer could have facilitated DHA's role but, in general, it can be assumed that relations and interaction with the media are important and can have a significant impact on the public's perception of, and Governments' response to, unfolding events. Public opinion can also have a major impact on the level of resources provided to an emergency and the way these are allocated. In other words, it is the donating public and donors which often define priority needs. Interacting with the media can also be an extremely time-consuming process. At the peak of the Goma crisis a Press Conference with 300 journalists was held daily.

*It would also appear worthwhile considering the automatic inclusion of a media/public information person in the field coordination team given the important role of the press and public opinion in defining the nature of, and response to, a crisis.*



## II. MANAGEMENT ISSUES

### (a) Resources

UNREO-type offices cannot be expected to operate on a string and a prayer and the hope that improvisation will somehow suffice. As any relief agency will point out there are some basic requirements essential to establishing an office and a programme of work. In addition to a good location, office premises including conference facilities, should be appropriate to the task. As outlined above, the UNREO operation was greatly facilitated by the availability of the Swedish "turn key" support capacity. Its communication facilities and office equipment were crucial and it is difficult to understand how UNREO could have functioned without them.

***It is strongly recommended that DHA develop stand-by arrangements to ensure the availability of such a capacity for all future DHA coordinated emergencies. Equally, it is important that DHA has standard arrangements for use of office facilities; this is particularly important in situations where UNDP, or other UN agency facilities, are not readily available for the duration of a crisis.***

Mobility and access to transport is often a contentious and soul-destroying issue for relief workers. While donors and others often make derogatory comments about the number of UN-labelled vehicles, it is a fact of life that field personnel need to be mobile in order to function. UNREO had at its disposal the sum total of one truck and was dependent on the sporadic availability of UNDP vehicles and those provided by the Swedish Team. There was no organized maintenance system or mechanism to ensure that all vehicles had radios

both of which are difficult to understand given the risk of security incidents. It is important that DHA finds a way of ensuring it has ready access to vehicles both at the onset of an emergency and throughout its duration.

It is also important to recognize that a coordination office (including, and especially, out-posted field offices) cannot function without a modicum of ready cash. In situations where there are no banking facilities, which tends to be the reality in most emergencies, a field office will need Petty Cash both to purchase local supplies and services (rent, salaries for local personnel including guards, vehicle running costs, etc.) and to respond to urgent unanticipated needs.

### (b) Management of UNREO Offices

One of the striking features of the UNREO operation was the lack of any structured management procedures in the sense of defined responsibilities, chain of command, regular staff meetings, procedures for field trips and security clearances, use of facilities, equipment and vehicles, a filing system and paper trail. At the time of the visit various steps were being taken to ensure optimal use of staff time, access to vehicles etc. and it is not the intention here to advocate a heavy bureaucratic and rigid approach. There are certain advantages in flexibility and in the ability of personnel to operate within a loose framework. However, given the rapid evolution of such operations and the need for continuity, it is clearly important to have a formula which allows for the innovative use of minimal resources while maintaining appropriate records and accountability.

One aspect of office management which deserves particular attention con-

cerns security procedures. In a war zone, or areas that are possibly mined, it is a *sine qua non* that some basic and system-wide procedures are adopted to avoid untoward incidents including the need for rescue missions. From all accounts, the operation in Rwanda has been extremely lucky in that there have been no serious security incidents to-date. From a security perspective alone, it is important that relief personnel use well-maintained vehicles equipped with radios and use a driver familiar with local realities; drivers are often helpful in explaining local customs, acting as an interpreter and undertaking minor repairs in the event of a breakdown. It is unusual not to have standardized procedures for keeping a Base Station informed of progress of itinerary, change or direction, etc.

An effective operation also demands the availability of standard office management expertise including the skills of an Administrative Officer and an international secretary (with prior UN field experience) both of whom should arrive with the first contingent of personnel.

***In conclusion, DHA needs to develop a standard formula and procedures for initiating and managing the day-to-day running of an office. This includes streamlined procedures for use of funds, hiring of local personnel etc. A slim booklet outlining rules and regulations applicable to emergencies should be available to guide all office managers.***

### (c) Personnel

Personnel — the ready availability of experienced and capable staff — is one of the most crucial factors in the effectiveness of any coordination endeavour. The Rwandan experience highlights the importance of

DHA developing a capacity which allows it to deploy qualified staff within hours of a sudden onset disaster. (Ideas on possible stand-by and deployment procedures are outlined in Annex III.)

In Rwanda, a variety of innovative methods were used to quickly deploy staff. An Irish NGO, GOAL, convinced the Irish government to assign some of its military (logisticians, engineers, etc.) with prior field experience to work under the authority of the organization for periods ranging from 2-6 months. Wearing civilian clothing those officers worked as regular members of relief teams. HCR also had the services of various military contingents who generally worked in collaboration with, but not under the direct authority of, HCR.

With a few notable exceptions, UNREO was staffed with personnel with limited prior experience of emergencies or the UN. A number of staff were recruited locally in Nairobi in April while others were seconded by NGOs. For the most part such personnel had limited knowledge of the UN, including DHA, which clearly handicapped their ability to interact with collaborating agencies and to provide the leadership and direction that is required of a coordinating body. While it is clear that DHA will never have the type of resources that allow HCR or UNICEF to redeploy staff from existing programmes there is, nonetheless, a clear need to have a core of experienced personnel who are familiar with the philosophy, principles, practices and procedures of the organization.

At a minimum, personnel responsible for coordination must be as knowledgeable and experienced as colleagues from collaborating agencies. It is unrealistic to expect that agency field representatives will participate in a coordination mechanism which

involves a chair or moderator who has never worked in an emergency or in the UN before. Too often, emergencies are perceived as merely logistical events where anyone with common sense and enthusiasm can play a useful role. But as more than one observer pointed out "cowboys" are no substitute for experienced professionals.

Personality, the ability to listen, liaise, communicate and generally exhibit good inter-personal skills are also important attributes for any coordination function.

Reference has been made elsewhere to the types of expertise, including public relations, administration and secretarial, that are automatically required in the early days of an emergency. The nature of each disaster will determine the number of staff and skills required but in general it would appear important to have a mix of expertise and experience which will facilitate interaction with the larger aid community and host authorities. In all major emergencies it is obviously important for the Humanitarian Coordinator to have a Deputy responsible for strategic planning, liaison, and programme coordination. In this respect, it is also important to ensure that the most experienced people are used on the "front-lines". Too often junior personnel are out-posted to the toughest areas which may well require the presence of seasoned practitioners.

In a disaster such as Rwanda it was helpful, for example, to have personnel who had prior experience of working with the military. (Personnel in the UNAMIR Humanitarian Cell had not previously worked on humanitarian activities.) All emergency coordination teams should have at least one staff member who is thoroughly familiar with the country's cultural norms, its social history, politics, etc. As an emergency evolves, so will the type of skills

required. Development-oriented people should be available during the recovery phase. It is axiomatic that selection of staff should be done in consultation with the field.

Speed in deployment is clearly important. Arriving after other agencies are already established, and programmes are already operational, will almost invariably complicate the task of coordination. Also, as Goma demonstrates, it is difficult to change a pattern of assistance after it has been established.

A pervasive reality throughout Rwanda and the border areas was the high turnover of personnel at all levels of operations. Undoubtedly, this was partly due to the suddenness and magnitude of the crisis but some agencies (NGOs in Goma) even had expatriate staff working on two-week stints. Rapid turnover works against continuity, coherence in programme design and implementation, and the formation of good working relations which are fundamental to effective coordination.

In the acute phase of an emergency time is at a premium and it is important that all available staff are fully utilized. This, in effect means that new colleagues should be fully briefed prior to, and upon, arrival. (It is assumed that all staff have Job Descriptions which clearly indicate their position within the coordination team.) This rarely happens and it inevitably gives rise to a lot of frustration as staff are essentially left to sink or swim. Poor recruitment, and deployment procedures are essentially bad management practices and need to be seen as such.

On the subject of training, it is equally important that locally-recruited staff are fully briefed and introduced to their respective responsibilities. It was disquieting to find in Kigali that little effort had been

made to train local staff on the use of communication equipment even though it was obvious that the Swedish Team was not a permanent fixture.

Finally, in relation to personnel, it is important that more attention is given to staff support issues. In addition to contracts that are appropriate to the task, and circumstances in which people are operating (e.g. adequate health and insurance coverage, built-in rest and recuperation leave) support services, such as assistance in finding accommodation, should also be available. (Two contrasting examples from Rwanda include UNAMIR personnel who were billeted in dorms without windows and living on military rations and a small amount of daily water and HCR in Goma where a regular staff member was dedicated to the task of organizing accommodation, including shower and laundry facilities, and arranging three healthy meals daily.) Ensuring staff are operational and not preoccupied with living arrangements should be a routine factor in all emergencies.

#### *(d) Geneva / New York Support to UNREO*

A foregoing section dealt with the importance of a common understanding of the role of a coordinating body in order that it is of value to the larger system. It is equally important that the internal components of DHA understand their respective roles and how they inter-connect and constitute a totality. In short, there is need for greater clarity, better defined lines of communication and a clear chain of command. Conceptually, there is confusion as to whether the Field Office is running the show or whether this is done out of Geneva/New York.

Based not only on the Rwandan experience, the team is of the view that the

coordination of an emergency can only occur on the ground. This requires decentralized decision-making with appropriate back-up and support from respective "Headquarters" offices. This is also true of complex emergencies but with the caveat that there needs to be joint and collaborative decision-making on political realities and, in particular, those which are determined by the Security Council. Decision-making in this sense refers to the need to articulate a position on given or potential realities and the development of a strategy which will be articulated by DHA at all levels.

Coordination in DHA terms includes joint assessments, integrated planning, fund-raising, monitoring and reporting, and advocacy on crucial issues. The latter should include DHA being the major interlocutor on, or the interface between, the political and humanitarian arenas.

The Consolidated Appeal process is generally well understood and it is unnecessary to comment at length here. In the Rwandan context it was appreciated that this was organized in Nairobi with assistance from Geneva colleagues. However, the unilateral fund-raising efforts of individual agencies was greatly decried by others and DHA was described as not doing its job when it "allowed" this to happen. Clearly DHA should take a stronger stand on this and likewise with donors who must be made aware of the contradiction in demanding improved coordination while simultaneously funding "separatist" action. It is not a new discovery that coordination is unlikely to work if a coordinated plan is not supported. However, the time factor involved in the organization of, and feedback to, Consolidated Appeals cannot be ignored. On the basis of the Rwandan experience, it may be helpful to again point to

the need to increase the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). In this connection, it may also be worthwhile for the DHA Financial Tracking Unit to do an analysis of programme expenditure, and source of funding, to better understand the relationship between resource allocation and coordination. If such an analysis is possible, it would also be interesting to know the amount of funding available to NGOs and the proportion available to internal management and over-head costs including staff travel and salaries.

In terms of advocacy, and DHA's role in providing leadership, there are inadequate linkages and communication channels between Kigali, Geneva and New York. This has serious repercussions for DHA's ability to act as a voice for the humanitarian community and to make a positive contribution to political and other arenas which impact on humanitarian work.

The team did not study in any depth collaboration between the different DHA offices and DHA's role in articulating a humanitarian perspective on Operation Turquoise. Genocide was another major issue on which many felt that DHA could have usefully played a more positive role by highlighting the need for prompt action and the implications of a tardy response. Overall, DHA is seen to have taken a passive stance and generally did not feel competent to comment either in-house or publicly. Within the NGO community, agencies such as HCR, ICRC and MSF are generally seen to speak with greater authority and conviction than DHA at the international level. There is a widespread feeling that DHA should use its "soap-box" more aggressively.

***To address this reality, it is recommended that DHA build in "humanitarian diplomacy" to the responsibilities of the in-***

#### ***house Task Force dealing with each specific Complex Emergency.***

In other words, this would be a regular item on the Task Force agenda and should act as a catalyst to generate insights from the field and Geneva while ensuring that non-New York based colleagues are fully informed of pending Security Council or other action which may impact on relief realities.

One of the problems repeatedly referred to by DHA staff involved in the Rwandan crisis is the apparent difficulty of keeping each other informed of their various activities and decisions made in relation to these. The lack of a proper paper trail, particularly in the field, was referred to above. Tighter procedures for Registry and dispatching of communications may also be necessary. While it is clearly important that all concerned personnel are up-to-date it is unrealistic to expect that communication can only occur through one individual in each location. The back-stopping of Complex Emergencies out of New York, and creation of a Task Force, should ease some of the present difficulties. However, it should be automatic that the Desk Officer is fully briefed on all decisions so that others are also brought up-to-date. Colleagues in the field were also concerned about the minimal feedback on various issues raised by them. The lack of understanding of DHA New York's role was alluded to earlier and highlights the necessity of improved lines of communication and the need for a more global team approach.

#### **12. OTHER ISSUES**

***Demining:*** The team was unable to look into the mine situation in any detail. How-

ever, there was a general feeling that the UN had been slow off the mark in developing a strategy and an appropriate institutional framework for mine clearance. Unless the problem is forcefully addressed, it is felt that this would complicate recovery and repatriation. At the time of the team's visit there were an estimated 2 casualties from anti-personnel mines and booby-traps every day in Kigali alone.

***The team strongly recommends that in order to show its determination to tackle the mine problem in Rwanda, DHA take immediate steps to deploy one mine survey team (headed by an expatriate) and two mine clearance teams from similar UN operations in Afghanistan (UNOCHA) or elsewhere to Rwanda for a 3 to 6 month period.***

# 4.

## Conclusions

*"It is necessary to cultivate the quiet art of disbelief. It is necessary to act quietly and disbelievingly, out of that compassion which is the only credible motive for any actions to change the world.*

*There is an obligation to remember, not in the memory cells of computers but in the heaviness of the heart."*

– Peter Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice*

### Whither the United Nations in Rwanda?

The team would like to think that peace is within reach in Rwanda. Regrettably, the warning lights of possible further violence are still flashing. In the best of circumstances it will take time for the Rwandan people to come to grips with the events of the Spring and Summer of 1994. It is unhelpful to postulate that, should a semblance of peace in the end prevail, the United Nations could return to a situation of "development as usual". The experience of thirty years of technical cooperation and infrastructural development shows only too clearly that in the case of Rwanda peace, development and democracy did not go hand in hand. A terrible lesson must be learned here: the international community was unable to prevent genocide. It is also necessary to ask ourselves whether the manner in which international aid was provided, and manipulated by a narrow-based regime, exacerbated divisions in Rwanda society.

Some fundamental issues are at stake here. The team feels strongly that the moral imperatives of compassion and solidarity extend beyond the mere provision of inputs to assist the victims of genocide, war and

displacement or to kick-start the economy so it can rapidly regain and exceed its pre-war levels. As a minimum, the international community must ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. As a maximum, durable, sustainable and regional solutions to the problems created by the politics of hatred must be sought.

The difficulty of the task, and the lack of political will to tackle it, cannot be underestimated. The team feels that the spirit if not the letter of humanitarianism makes it incumbent upon the Under-Secretary-General for DHA to become an advocate in the search for durable solutions to seemingly intractable situations, such as Rwanda. This, undoubtedly, calls for humanitarian and preventive diplomacy at the highest level. It also entails practical efforts at the local level to understand - with help from specialists on the history and culture of the country - what is happening on the surface and beneath the surface of society.

To give but one example, it could be argued that if systematic attention had been devoted to the ideology and propaganda of Hutu hardliners which could have been studied in the months which preceded the massacres through easily accessible written publications and the vicious broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines it might have been possible to heed the early warning signals of the impending catastrophe. Similarly, some anthropological research on the power structure of refugee and internally displaced communities and, specifically, on the reported absence of guilt among the perpetrators of genocide and their followers, would yield essential information on which to build response strategies for the humanitarian and political action of the international community.

Looking ahead, it may be worthwhile for DHA to take the initiative in launching a process of reflection and consultation on what should be done to facilitate a process of healing in Rwanda. Information on what has gone awry in the traditional mechanisms that knit Rwandan society together, and the emergence of a genocidal ideology, should be collected and studied with the assistance of key specialists on Rwanda and the area. More importantly, successful examples of conflict-resolution and confidence-building, particularly at the community level in societies torn by war, should be systematically sought and analyzed for possible application to Rwanda.

*A seminar bringing together anthropologists, historians, conflict-resolution specialists, and experienced practitioners who have served in Rwanda, including NGO, UN, and bilateral staff, etc., could be convened by DHA or an appropriate institution. The outcome of the seminar could be a paper on the policies of mercy in solving internal conflicts, confidence-building measures and ideas on the healing of the social fabric.*

DHA, in collaboration with relief agencies, should also come to grips with the thorny issue of relief distribution mechanisms which consolidate the power of an abusive political structure in camps which include militia and military in addition to refugees. Quite often this is presented as a "dilemma" which tends to indicate that it is an either-or situation. The team would argue that this perspective is defeatist in that it tends to move the focus away from the obvious implications of such distribution mechanism for stability and peace in Rwanda. This is not to minimize the difficulty of either avoiding existing camp struc-



tures and distribution mechanisms at the outset of an emergency or of dismantling them subsequently. The team has not had access to privileged information on this issue but considers it important to better understand existing power structures in the camps and the networks which uphold them. It is also important to understand the extent to which camp residents have access to unbiased information and the extent to which they are currently dependent on the international community - and not on camp warlords - for daily subsistence.

Another area which could usefully be explored by DHA relates to the regional, economic, and social dimensions of the Rwandan problem. Peace in this context is much more than the absence of war. While political compromises, and accompanying confidence-building measures, may possibly lead to a semblance of peace, it is unlikely that they would foster long term solutions to the problems of identity, on the one hand, and to those of demography, land and access to resources, on the other. It would be foolhardy of the international community to believe that the development strategies of the past would be sufficient to effectively tackle these issues. It is more likely that they would come back to haunt it. It may well be, however, that a regional development strategy might provide the most cost-effective long term solution, or at least the best insurance policy against another round of blood-letting.

The idea of an international conference to address the regional political aspects of the Rwanda-Burundi-Tanzania-Uganda-Zaire crisis is gaining momentum. It would be sensible preventive humanitarian diplomacy to strongly support this initiative and to ensure that the demographic, economic and social dimensions of the crisis are

addressed either in such a political forum or in a separate one. Perhaps the time has come to raise squarely the issue of boundaries and of voluntary population movements. This will undoubtedly be met by cries of anathema by some. It could be argued, however, that the international community cannot afford to keep putting band-aids on gangrened wounds. Surgery and transplants may be the only solution.

It may be worthwhile, therefore, to unearth plans which were vented in the early 1960s when the idea of a movement of populations from very-high density areas in the Great Lakes region to lower density areas was considered. Indeed, it seems that the World Bank had undertaken some studies on a possible "Marshall Plan" for the development of infrastructure in the recipient areas. The obstacles to this approach are of course enormous, but in the long term it may be the only viable one, especially if it were to be coupled with a process of economic integration of the countries of the region. Also, in purely economic terms, spending, say, \$1 billion a year on a 10-year resettlement and development programme, may well be ultimately less costly than continuing support to the time-bomb of 2-3 million refugees in Rwanda and Burundi's neighbouring countries. Not to mention the indirect costs of displacement, loss of agricultural production and of export earnings, destruction of the infrastructure, brain-drain, deterioration of health levels, absence of schooling for a whole generation of children, absence of law and order, general militarization of society, etc.

*DHA may therefore wish to consider the idea of launching an initiative on long-term solutions to the regional Rwanda-Burundi problem. Initially, a study could*

*be commissioned or a brain-storming session with specialists of the region organized. If interest is garnered in the donor community, as well as in the countries of the region a more formal initiative (international seminar or conference) could be launched.*

#### PUTTING THE VICTIMS FIRST

The Rwandan crisis, like many others of the post-Cold War complex emergencies, has shown once again how difficult it is for humanitarian concerns not to become pawns in a larger political game. The lack of consistency of the international community in addressing crises, whether political or humanitarian, and the institutional complexity of the United Nations system are realities with which DHA has to struggle and work. DHA often finds itself at the crossroads between politics and victims. While the brazen law of politics will sometimes overrule, DHA must nonetheless ensure that the voice of the victims is heard. When political mandates change or are incompatible with humanitarian objectives, it is incumbent on DHA, as part of its role in preventive diplomacy, and as advocate for the victims, to point this out. In particular, DHA should ensure, through active lobbying and dissemination of information, that the specificity of the mandates of the humanitarian agencies of the UN - but also of ICRC and the NGOs - is perfectly understood by all actors, whether at the level of the Security Council or at the level of the local warlord on the ground. In other words, in the quest for a UN unity of purpose in addressing complex emergencies, DHA should see to it that humanitarianism is not sacrificed on the altar of politics.

#### LESSONS LEARNED.

The first lesson of Rwanda is that complex emergencies are precisely that: extraordinarily complex. This should never be underestimated. Most observers would probably agree with the team's assessment that DHA's response to the Rwandan crisis was commensurate to its complexity and that, despite some lapses in management and in its internal chain of command, DHA was, broadly speaking, on top of things. This is especially the case if its performance is compared to other emergencies. One observer rightly pointed out that the first interagency meeting in Geneva to deal with the Iraq/Kuwait refugee crisis was convened three weeks after refugees started pouring into Jordan. In the case of Rwanda, DHA started "coordinating" three days after the presidential plane was shot down on 06 April 1994. DHA staff were quickly on the scene generating an on-the-ground coordination mechanism, UNREO, which was formally established on 18 April.

This, however, points to the **second major lesson**: DHA must tighten its managerial and institutional grip on the coordination of complex emergencies. Specific recommendations - the package approach, the need for a Task Force, transparent job descriptions for the main actors, a quick deployment mechanism for staff - are made in the body of this report and need not be repeated here. An area which requires immediate attention, however, is that of the management of DHA's own resources. Flexibility and creativity are required and the management culture needs to change in order to work toward the common objective of "one DHA - one pool of resources". Staff and other resources need to be concentrated rapidly where they are most necessary to meet the "breaking needs" of crises.



There follows another **major lesson**: DHA cannot be expected to coordinate effectively if it does not have access to a modicum of resources of its own in order to be able to hire local staff, open field offices, make local purchases and even engage the services of implementing partners in a limited way. DHA cannot rely on the UN bureaucracy for this. It should be granted the flexibility that only UNHCR has in the UN system - but that many such as ICRC, OFDA/DART, GTZ, countless NGOs have outside it - and which allows it to quickly divert personnel and funds (including cash) to breaking emergencies, move supplies and equipment, recruit staff locally, sign letters of understanding with implementing partners, etc., with a minimum of bureaucracy. DHA needs to lobby for, and obtain, a similar capacity based on *post facto* controls rather than on the fetishistic respect of outdated rules and regulations. More importantly, DHA needs a carrot, however small, to act as a catalyst and generate momentum on specific policy initiatives.

This leads to **another lesson**: this report has repeatedly stressed that coordination in the Rwandan scene has been mainly by consensus. The team would submit, however, that DHA's credibility would be well served by a limited dose of coordination by command, both in terms of some un-earmarked funds, which could be obtained through CERF or another mechanism, and in terms of leadership and authority on the ground. It is recognized that this is a particularly difficult and contentious area, but the donors (and the general public) cannot forever claim that the UN is ineffective in coordinating emergencies while at the same time refusing to give it the means and resources to do so. Pointing out this contradiction to donors is an essential task of DHA.

Many house-keeping issues are raised in the report. Most are self-explanatory and need not be referred to here. A few of the most important **lessons** deserve, however, to be recalled:

- when a crisis has a cross-border or regional dimension DHA should, as a rule, set up a regional coordination structure. This is particularly important to avoid differences of perception or biases among the relief community;
- the importance of having the right mix of staff at the right place and at the right time. A system needs to be developed putting the emphasis both on quick deployment and on quality. Skills, competence, prior UN experience and good judgement must be combined into one: the rare bird, the facilitator;
- the crucial importance of information gathering, analysis and dissemination, without which there can be no coordination. Much of UNREO's success was due to its sitreps. The need for proper reporting, in particular consolidated reporting on the use of funds, is also stressed.

Coordinators should not lose sight of **another lesson**: ultimately their objective is to work themselves out of a job. An "exit strategy" should be developed early on so that it can be carried out smoothly and understood by all actors on the ground. DHA should capitalize on its strengths - the services that it can provide to the relief community and local authorities at the field level, and to the international community including, in particular, donors - and not on its weaknesses, i.e. the perception that it is a redundant layer in the response system. DHA should be quick to recognize that coordination seems to obey, over time, the law of diminishing returns.

The **final lesson** relates to evaluation. It is well worthwhile, in the early stages of a complex emergency, to build in the idea of an evaluation study. In fact, it may well be necessary to plan for two distinct studies: a process or management review to be conducted a few months after the beginning of the emergency phase of a crisis (and subsequently if the crisis is long-term) and an in-depth ex-post evaluation. The systematic collection of "evaluation materials" should also be advocated by DHA, ranging from the completion of routine end of mission reports of all key staff involved in a coordination exercise to the preparation of structured questionnaires to elicit assessments from DHA, agency, NGO and local beneficiaries.

Given the extraordinary amounts of money that the international community has devoted to Rwanda, the importance of accountability and learning from this experience is self-evident. This is borne out by the fact that many studies on the Rwanda emergency have already been produced or commissioned (Oxfam, ODA/UK, African Rights; studies underway by the Watson Institute on the contributions of the military to humanitarian action, ICRC, University of Louvain etc., OECD/DAC is also planning a major evaluation). DHA should, therefore, build up its internal capacity to conduct at least one major evaluation study a year, either on its own or in collaboration with other interested donors or institutes, and 2-3 internal reviews similar in scope to the present report. There would also be obvious advantages in setting up an "early warning system for evaluations/studies" on humanitarian issues - preferably in the form of a bulletin board on the Internet - so that all interested research and humanitarian entities are kept informed and synergies rather than duplication occur.

# Annex I

## TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE STUDY

### PRELIMINARY REVIEW: RESPONSE TO THE RWANDAN CRISIS

#### *Background*

The humanitarian implications of the crisis which has provoked massive displacement and an unparalleled exodus from Rwanda pose challenges which stretch the capacity of the humanitarian community. The crisis, and the response it generated, is unique from many perspectives including being the most dramatic to hit the international community since the establishment of DHA. The scale and pace of this disaster demonstrates the necessity of preparedness, leadership, a rapid response capacity, effective co-ordination and flexibility in meeting fast-changing needs.

While this operation will need to be reviewed from different angles (eg prevention/preparedness, use of military sets, capacity, re-integration, etc.) at a larger stage, the current proposal is to undertake a "quick" review of DHA's overall role in co-ordinating and facilitating a response as fast-moving events dictated new needs and strategies.

This review is intended to serve as an initial base-line study which would feed into a larger and more comprehensive review to be undertaken later with more time to reflect on the ways in which events unfolded and the insights this has provided both in terms of prevention and on our ability to mobilize a rapid and effective response.

The purpose of this preliminary Review is to document and analyze DHA's role. Specifically, DHA's exercise of its role in developing and overseeing the implementation of an overall strategic plan, generating and maintaining a co-ordination structure including effective

exchange and dissemination of information, and mobilization and allocation of resources.

Notwithstanding the many unique characteristics which shape the Rwandan crisis there is a clear need to identify measures which facilitated the activities of relief agencies and others involved in responding to this crisis. It is equally important to understand constraints and to identify actions which could overcome or minimize obstacles which hinder an effective response. Such a review should help identify lessons which would be useful in organizing our response to emergencies.

#### **OBJECTIVES**

The overall objective is to determine how DHA impacted on the response of the international community to the crisis.

This includes focusing on key aspects of co-ordination, strategic planning, and mobilization and allocation of resources to determine the way in which the operation evolved in a fast-changing crisis, measures which facilitated overall programme delivery and to highlight insights which will be useful in the planning and implementation of future scenarios.

#### **METHODOLOGY**

It was planned from the outset that this would be a low-key in-house exercise that would be self-sufficient, sensitive to local realities including being ultra-sensitive to not adding to the tasks of field colleagues; the idea was to unobtrusively observe on-the-ground realities and consult with colleagues (UN, NGOs, Donors, local authorities, etc.) as they were available.

In general, and on the understanding that this is a two-person team, a minimum of two weeks would be required in Rwanda and 2-3 of the relief sites (Burundi and/or Zaire) to talk to UN, NGO, Donor and local

authorities as appropriate. (A more detailed structure and itinerary will be prepared after consultation with field colleagues.) It will also be necessary to meet with people in Geneva and New York; this can be done subsequent to field consultations.

A Report, which will be reviewed in draft before finalization, will look something like this:

- Introduction
- Purpose/scope of Review  
Brief Background/Context  
Co-ordination Arrangements
- Overall Response Plan/Objectives  
Level of Preparedness, etc.
- Organizational Structure and its Evolution
- Available Resources for Co-ordination  
Mobilization of Agencies/  
NGOs, Material Goods Transportation, Communication
- Factors which Shaped Response
- Lessons for Future Planners/  
Operations

## Annex II

### INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR

*(As approved by the Committee in its X  
Meeting on 9 December 1994)*

Upon the occurrence of a complex emergency in a country, the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, on behalf of the Secretary-General, will designate a Humanitarian Coordinator for that country. The Humanitarian Coordinator serves as the direct representative of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (and therefore of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs) for matters dealing with this complex emergency.

In all instances, the Humanitarian Coordinator will report directly to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. If a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is appointed for the country in question, the Humanitarian Coordinator will function under the overall authority of the SRSG, with the responsibility for coordination of UN humanitarian assistance for the complex emergency in question. If the Emergency Relief Coordinator has designated a lead agency for the provision of humanitarian assistance, with the in-country agency head also serving as Humanitarian Coordinator, this individual will also report directly to his/her agency headquarters.

The UN Resident Coordinator and the in-country Disaster Management Team (DMT) should serve as the first line of initial response to a new emergency, and should normally have established mechanisms of coordination prior to the onset of the complex emergency. Once appointed, the Humanitarian Coordinator will utilize and build upon these DMT mechanisms as required in the performance of his/her duties.

The primary function of the Humanitarian Coordinator is to facilitate and ensure the quick, effective, and well-coordinated provision of humanitarian assistance to those seriously affected by the complex emergency in question.

Within this context, the Terms of Reference of the Humanitarian Coordinator include:

#### **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Mechanism and Agreements**

1. Convening and serving as the Chair for meetings of the DMT in-country to deal with matters relating to the complex emergency in question, and providing the necessary secretariat support to the DMT. For purposes of dealing with the complex emergency in question, the regular DMT will usually be expanded to include other relevant entities, such as NGOs involved in related relief efforts.

2. Reaching agreement on the basic division of responsibility among the UN agencies, in accordance with their respective mandates and capacities, as well as working with the other relief entities to facilitate such agreements within the larger relief community.

3. Developing and maintaining a central registry of locally represented humanitarian assistance agencies and organizations, including information on their respective activities and expertise.

4. Ensuring that effective inter-agency coordination within specific sector areas is undertaken by the relevant agencies, and that coordination of the overall logistics needs of the relief operation is effectively undertaken.

5. Obtaining guidance from the Designated Official regarding the implementation of security procedures in support of humanitarian assistance activities, ensuring that this

is effectively communicated to the concerned agencies in the field, and facilitating their coordinated implementation.

6. Acting as a focal point for discussion within the relief community regarding policy issues of inter-agency concern (e.g., wage levels for local staff, difficulties with customs procedures and policies, government clearances for travel and passes, etc.) and as an interlocutor with the relevant parties (e.g., the host government) for resolution of such matters.

7. Facilitating the provision of key support services for the larger relief community, such as telecommunications, transportation (e.g., via vehicle or light aircraft operation), etc.

8. Ensuring consultation with government and national authorities on matters regarding the planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance.

9. Facilitating communications, and ensuring overall coordination, between the UN and other humanitarian aid agencies on the one hand and the relevant components of bilateral military forces and/or those of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations when such forces are present, including promoting resolution of matters of joint concern to the humanitarian aid agencies.

#### **Assessing and Addressing Humanitarian Needs**

10. Ensuring that the overall coordination of inter-agency, multisectoral assessments of needs, including the identification or priority needs, and ensuring that such assessments are quickly initiated, adequately supported, and effectively carried out.

11. Coordinating the preparation of an overall humanitarian assistance strategy and Plan of Action of UN agencies, including

the establishing of priorities for assistance and agreed collaborative approaches, and coordinating revisions and modifications as required by changing conditions and needs. The preparation and revision of this Plan should be done in close collaboration with the other relevant humanitarian assistance entities, including reflecting their activities and future plans in the Plan.

12. Coordinating the preparation of inter-agency consolidated appeals for humanitarian assistance for the complex emergency in question, including working with the agencies both in-country and at the headquarters level to ensure that the actions described in the IASC Consolidated Appeal Guidelines (currently being finalized) are implemented.

13. Monitoring the provision of resources against such appeals, bringing donor attention to important outstanding gaps, and facilitating inter-agency resource mobilization efforts both in-country as well as at the headquarters level (e.g., via local donor meetings and briefings, convening donor conferences if appropriate, etc.).

14. Monitoring humanitarian needs and identifying specific gaps in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Working with UN and other entities to ensure that such gaps are addressed before they reach the crisis point.

15. Facilitating ongoing strategic planning for the relief effort, including the provision of early warning of major changes in needs or delivery capacities, and contingency planning for such eventualities.

16. Monitoring and facilitating UN humanitarian assistance to special population groups (e.g., internally displaced persons, demobilized soldiers, etc.) to ensure that it is provided in an adequate and timely manner, and coordinating such UN efforts

(unless such coordination has been delegated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator to a specific agency).

17. Ensuring that the necessary support is provided to field staff assisting in local coordination of humanitarian assistance and in situation monitoring.

18. Ensuring that effective evaluations of the overall relief efforts, especially the coordination aspects, are undertaken, the lessons to be learned clearly identified, and appropriate follow-up actions taken.

19. Cooperating with entities responsible for planning and implementation of rehabilitation and development activities to ensure that rehabilitation actions begin as soon as they become feasible (which will often be simultaneous with relief efforts), and that relief actions are planned and undertaken with the perspective of their longer-term impacts.

#### ***Humanitarian Advocacy***

20. Serving as a focal point for the humanitarian community for ensuring the protection of humanitarian mandates in conflict situations, including by:

a. seeking acceptance by all parties to the civil conflict in question on the key principles that must underlie UN humanitarian aid efforts (e.g., neutrality, impartiality, access to those in need, accountability for aid provided, etc.); and

b. promoting, assisting, and if necessary, leading negotiations to obtain free, safe and unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to those in need.

#### ***Information Dissemination***

21. Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information regarding humanitarian needs and operations to the wider community (e.g., through the production of regular Situation Reports).

22. Ensuring the provision of timely, accurate and relevant information to media, and of briefing information to assist new agencies and NGOs, visiting missions and delegations, etc.

## Annex III

### SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STAFFING OF DHA FIELD OFFICES

**The problem:** How to identify and rapidly deploy experienced staff in complex and other emergencies?

Given its small size, DHA, unlike organizations such as UNHCR, cannot draw on a large pool of its own staff to respond to breaking emergencies. The Rwandan experience has shown that it was even difficult for DHA as an entity to agree that all of its staff - whether working on natural disasters or emergencies, whether in New York or Geneva - were part of the same resource pool. This has led DHA to resort to three types of stop-gap measures which proved to be less than satisfactory:

- local recruitment of staff in Nairobi many of whom were unsuitable to work for the UN;
- excessive reliance on staff seconded from NGOs without prior UN or field experience; and
- a revolving door approach of sending DHA staff to the field for short periods of time.

If DHA's credibility and effectiveness are to be maintained, or enhanced, this issue needs to be addressed in a structured manner.

**Options:** Short term and long term strategies are required. The following avenues might be explored:


(a) In the short term, consider DHA staff resources (and of course the equipment to go with them, in particular communication facilities) as one pool. This should be made clear to managers and staff in DHA New York and Geneva. As emergencies occur, the principle that resources are diverted from lesser priority areas to higher priority areas should become the norm. Managers

should incorporate this necessary flexibility into their programmes. The task force approach recommended in this report should facilitate this process. A computer roster showing which DHA staff member has gone where, for how long, and in what position should be established and kept up-to-date.

(b) In order to facilitate deployment in emergencies, all DHA staff who have previously been involved in the coordination of emergencies in the field (ideally this should be the near totality of DHA international professional staff and some experienced GS staff) should be placed on call for pre-set or specified periods each year (e.g. 4 months). This would mean that each staff member and his/her supervisor would know that, say, from 1 January to 30 April he/she could be called upon at 24/48 hr. notice to set up, or participate in, a coordination operation. It would also be understood that the staff member would be expected to remain at the field duty station for up to 4 months. Unless they volunteer, staff who are not on call at any particular time would not be asked to take up field assignments. To the extent possible, an effort should be made to compose the three clusters of DHA staff which would be on call for 4-month periods in such a way as to have a mix of skills/functions from which to choose self-contained Teams for immediate deployment (e.g. Deputy Coordinator, senior international secretary, admin officer, programme officer(s), communications officer). Ideally, the Teams should know each other in advance and undergo basic refresher training at the beginning of the 4-month period. The system would be based on transparency and on the principle of load-sharing. Satisfactory completion of tours of duty in the field might be linked to promotion/career development or to other perks (access to training, special leave, R&R).

(c) In the longer term, the on-call system should be extended to other UN Departments and entities which routinely have to assign staff to emergencies/missions. DHA should take the lead in developing a system for the identification, training and deployment of pre-set Teams to perform coordination functions in disasters and emergencies or to support peace and other civilian missions. The underlying rationale for this approach is the fact that a number of similar key functions need to be performed in all such missions. All missions need to open an office in order to become operational. This requires, in addition to the Head of the Office (which in many cases will be a political appointee), administration (i.e. office management, personnel, accounting), programme, information-gathering and dissemination, field officer, communications and on occasion logistical functions. Standard job descriptions can be drawn up and staff with the requisite qualifications and proven field experience can be identified in advance. Core "early response Teams" can be pre-assembled and placed on call. As in (b) above, an objective element leading to career development should be built into the system so that service in the field is adequately rewarded. It is of course recognized that the establishment of a system which would cut across UN Departments would not necessarily be easy to implement and might even lead to bureaucratic resistance by some. It can be argued, however, that an integrated field personnel structure for UN field operations - whether peace-keeping, election monitoring, human rights or humanitarian, or as is increasingly the case, a complex mix of these - and a powerful training system in support of this effort would go a long way in enhancing the unity of purpose, effectiveness and overall credibility of the Organization in the field.





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