

57 [8. CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

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BOX 103

FILE 4

ACC. 1998/0283

**UN SECRET**

To: Distribution List

From: Col H. Osae-Addae, COO, TAC HQ Butare

Date: 29 September 1994

Subject: **OPERATION HOMEWARD**

References: A. Estimate prepared by LCol P Desnoyers dated 16 September 1994  
B. Fragmentary Order to Operation Order No. 18 Op Homeward dated 18 September 1994

### **Background**

1. On 16 September, LCol Desnoyers, newly appointed as Deputy Chief HAC created reference A to take advantage of a temporary surplus of UNAMIR vehs. The intent was to use these vehicles to assist NGO's in the return of IDP's to their homes before the rains render the camps difficult/impossible to support. The stated aim was "to propose a military option to assist relief agencies" in the relocation of IDP's. HQ UNAMIR adopted this proposal and issued reference B two days later. LCol Desnoyers called and chaired a meeting of NGO's and UN agencies at TAC HQ Butare on 29 September at which it was obvious that the civilian attendees had no prior knowledge of the initiative. At subsequent working meetings at TAC HQ it was obvious that the same individuals/agencies were both suspicious and unclear about what was perceived as a military solution foisted on them by UNAMIR: much laborious and repetitive explanation was required to reinforce the concept that UNAMIR was merely to help facilitate their actions. Further, it was obvious that they could not make themselves ready at the speed envisaged in the original estimate.

2. Preliminary meetings were held on 20 and 21 September and working/coordination conferences on 23, 24, and 25 September. Op Homeward began 26 September. Coordination meetings are held at TAC HQ every night except Fridays. They are meant to include all NGO's and UN agencies as well as RPA and Prefecture reps and of course TAC HQ which includes Brit MovCon.

### **Aim**

3. To examine Op Homeward to identify lessons learned and recommend a way ahead.

### **Factors**

4. The factors considered at reference A will be re-assessed in light of practical experience as follows:

*2605 OPS*

*This is the report I spoke about. See my annotations. This report was not copied to me and I don't know why. Please read the whole report and let us have your views. Meanwhile I think we should refrain the HQ at Butare whilst we contemplate a re-org and re-assign meet.*

*10-10-94  
DFC/W*

a. Will to Return Home:

- (1) Security. The perception of safety is as important as the reality. Rumours of RPA retribution and, at the least, RPA harshness, abound. They come from various sources but share the common feature that they are easier to start than to stop. From the outset TAC HQ has vigorously pursued rumours and dubious/incomplete reports of all natures from all sources but TAC HQ's resources are not equal to the task. The lack of a massive, high-level counter-propaganda campaign is crippling, at best. Further, the NGO's and agencies will have no part of any such campaigns and resist so strongly that it may reasonably be argued that their lack of active support for relocation is perceived by the Rwandese as tacit support of the stay-put attitude. Since UNAMIR assists relief agencies and since the agencies control, in one way or another, the movement, the perception of safety as portrayed by the agencies outweighs the reality;
- (2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The view from TAC HQ is that the IDP's are already dependent on the relief effort. More to the point, as long as a lack of safety is perceived, the indignity of a refugee camp is the lesser of two evils. It is noteworthy that if the rainy season will reduce/curtail the relief effort to some camps, it will at the same time reduce security within those camps by reducing the hours and randomness of observation by both UNAMIR and the relief agencies. It is argued by some that this is part of the RPA hidden agenda;
- (3) Propaganda. Discussed above; and
- (4) Deduction. The IDP's presently lack the will to return home as they perceive themselves better off where they are. This situation must deteriorate with the onset of the rains by which time the task of relocation/support will be more difficult and resources less plentiful. The desire to return home must be injected now if the status quo is to be avoided.

b. Health Conditions. Medical screenings are not always done and are usually cursory at best. They should be considered desirable not mandatory;

c. RPA Verifications. The RPA steadfastly refuse to conduct screenings in camps. To date they have been somewhat intransigent about improving their system to increase throughput. Cooperation is improving in some areas but high-level pressure must be applied to gain full cooperation and maximum efficiency in the verification process. As a start, direction from the RPA Chief LO that the local LO attend all coordination conferences and be available 7/24 (assignment of assistants?), would be most useful;



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- The prefects cannot.
- d. Final Destinations. Attendance of the receiving Prefects at coordination conferences is sporadic. Further, their ability to project themselves into the receiving commune/sector either personally or through their subordinates is either lacking or not being pursued aggressively. Prefects must place more emphasis on and effort into the positive reception of returnees: this must include positive control of the RPA garrison;
- e. Road Conditions. The assumption made by LCol Desnoyers remains valid. However, see staging;
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. We have avoided overnight staging where possible. As 90% of the population live away from urban centers, so they also live well off surfaced roads. This means that military-type vehicles are required for both ends of a trip although not necessarily in the middle. Overnighting, therefore, reduces available lift and should be avoided. We have developed alternate methods of providing the essential start-up ingredients;
- g. Mass Population Effect. No impact yet observed as relocation effort is in the hands of relief agencies who will not be seen to encourage return;
- h. Location of Camps. Although most are in Sector 4 as stated, the estimated population is questioned for several reasons. Airborne/satellite sensing devices should be employed to accurately identify the dimensions of the problem including internal migration on a regular and frequent basis;
- i. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. Assumption correct but not necessarily pertinent. See Staging; and
- j. Available UNAMIR Resources. Assumption was optimistic. A more reasonable assumption is 30-50 vehicles.
- Which are they?
- from what source.

Other Factors

5. Other factors worthy of consideration are:

- a. Will to Walk. Considered by LCol Desnoyers under Mass Population Effect as the willingness to walk home once the migration had started. This view is not shared by TAC HQ. The Rwandese walked for their lives and, given the degree of support available in the camps, will probably not walk home unless forced to;
- b. Reception on Return. One aspect overlooked is the return of refugees from previous conflicts. They now live in the homes of the current IDP's and bear a grudge;



- c. RPA Hidden Agenda. The RPA are intransigent to an almost inexplicable degree. Assurances given at national level in Kigali are not translated into action on the ground. One argument advanced is that the RPA are as well-behaved as they are because they know their turn is coming when the rains isolate the camps from prying eyes. This is perhaps reinforced by an often-stated RPA point of view (local) that those in Sector 4 probably have something to hide. The status quo in Sector 4 can thus be perceived as a target of opportunity. While this hypothesis is not necessarily supported, its' potential implication are too great to be overlooked; and
- d. Appropriate Agencies. The initial meeting and the subsequent coordination conference included the agencies from Butare area. It became clear later that the Gikongoro area reps of those agencies must also be included in the operation as they are almost separate entities and communications between different offices of the same agency is not what we are accustomed to in the Army. Including them in the coordination Conferences however is cumbersome and problematic. For the time-being it is sufficient that the Butare rep coordinates with the Gikongoro rep after a TAC HQ conference but this is potentially a weak link. Care must be taken to ensure coordination between different Sector reps of agencies is effected.

### Conclusions

#### 6. It is concluded that:

- a. Op Homeward, while disappointing to date, is probably the best available option albeit in a modified form. It enjoys the advantage of being in place so that relief agencies don't have to be reconvinced;
- b. current UNAMIR capability will achieve at best a limited result;
- c. the agencies and NGO's must either positively support Op Homeward and BBGNU resources employed to a much greater degree for best results;
- ✓ d. more UNAMIR resources should be dedicated to counter-propaganda;
- e. rumour quashing must receive higher priority;
- will? f. the RPA must be compelled to effect closer liaison with TAC HQ;
- will take to g. local civil authorities must be more closely integrated;
- h. overnighting should be avoided; and
- j. the number of IDP's must be more accurately identified.

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Options

7. There appear to be three options:

- a. maintain status quo. Op Homeward will, at best, achieve extremely limited results;
- b. cancel Op Homeward. While this would avoid a very heavy resource bill for minimum return this option is unconscienable; or
- c. adopt a more vigorous approach to Op Homeward.

Recommendation

8. It is recommended that Op Homeward continue (Option C) with the following modifications:

- These local govt auth should be incorporated*
- a. the relief agencies or the BBGNU be coopted to pursue a vigorous relocation propaganda campaign;
  - Do they have?* b. every effort be made to maximize transport resources, perhaps employing RPA vehicles;
  - c. counter-propaganda be emphasized to include rumour quashing as a high priority;
  - ✓* d. the RPA and local civil authorities be directed by their central command to participate fully;
  - e. the number of IDP's be more accurately identified using airborne sensors; and
  - In any case it will be improper stopping it* f. TAC HQ continue to conduct Op Homeward focused on Sector 4 and incorporate the other refinements mentioned above.

H. Osae-Addae  
Col  
Comd TAC HQ

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Distribution List

Action

FC  
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Information

DCOS Ops  
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ANNEX A TO  
TAC HQ  
OP HOMEWARD DATED  
29 SEPT 94

RPA ATTITUDES AND COOPERATION IN OP HOMEWARD

1. The first organizational meeting for OP HOMEWARD on 20 Sep 94 was well attended by the RPA and the civil authorities; the Prefects for Gikongoro and Butare were present as were the Sous-Prefect and the RPA LO to TACHQ. Arriving late for the meeting were two representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation and of the Interior. Unfortunately these officials did not get a chance to address the meeting regarding the Government's position towards OP HOMEWARD. Nonetheless Capt Zegara, the Prefect for Gikongoro assured the meeting that the Government fully supported the operation although lacking the resources to take a major part. He emphasized however that security measures would not be compromised for the sake of speed in moving people.
2. Following the meeting, the representatives from Kigali spoke with the Prefects but it is not known what was discussed nor whether their discussion carried on after leaving the OP HOMEWARD meeting.
3. A second organizational meeting was held on the evening of 21 Sep 94 where again the RPA and civil authorities from the previous meeting were in attendance. The position of the government was again reiterated and their concern emphasized that action had to be taken to return people to their homes as soon as possible. At all times it was stressed that the operation was a cooperative venture between UNAMIR, the NGO and the Government of Rwanda.
4. The first coordination conference was held on 23 Sep with the Sous-Prefect for Butare and the RPA LO in attendance. It was identified that the Kizi checkpoint would become a bottle neck to the operation unless additional personnel were assigned to the search of baggage and registration of individuals. The RPA LO in addition to saying that he would be present at the checkpoint also agreed to provide additional personnel and it was suggested to him that two searchers and one register be assigned to each truck load of people arriving at Kizi so as to minimize delay. It was forecast that the convoy packets would likely be 10 vehicles in size however no specific numbers of vehicles could be determined at this point and thus the actual number of people necessary to man Kizi checkpoint could not be given. This detail would only have been available at the Sunday night, 25 Sep, conference.
5. The problem with the physical layout/separation of the security check and registration points was identified and an offer was made by an NGO group to set up a mass processing site at Kizi to handle large numbers of people quickly and with security. It appeared that the RPA LO would not entertain any suggestion of

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changing the layout of the checkpoint nor any explanation of what was envisioned. Consequently, he rejected the offer of resources to process people. Several subsequent attempts by both the military and NGO to explain what was being offered were rejected as was an offer to recce Kizi checkpoint on Saturday afternoon 24 Sep. The reason given for not wanting to recce Kizi checkpoint is that the RPA LO knew what the site looked like.

6. There was no representation at the 24 Sep coordination conference by either the civil authority or the RPA LO; although the LO was at TACHQ several hours before the meeting for 30-40 minutes and did not advise that he would be absent from that night's meeting nor the one scheduled for the following evening.

7. The coordination meeting on 25 Sep 94 was the final coordinating meeting for the lift scheduled on Monday 26 Sep. It was a critical meeting as all tasks were finalized and/or confirmed except those of the RPA at Kizi checkpoint. The only representation from the civil authority was the Sous-Prefect who could not comment upon the manning of Kizi.

8. The operation commenced at 0800 hrs, Monday, 26 Sep and the RPA LO was not available nor was Kizi checkpoint manned with sufficient people to handle the volume of transported persons envisioned. The lift went faster than expected and the first truck arrived at about 0900 and there was only one person searching baggage and one person at the registration point. Attempts to find that RPA LO, Prefect or a responsible individual at RPA Brigade Headquarters (the Commander or a Duty Officer) proved unsuccessful. The LO eventually appeared at about 1030 hrs saying that he had come from Kigali. He was surprised that there was a problem as personnel had been detailed for the checkpoint. Eventually the personnel were found and the problem resolved. It was fortunate though that only half the displaced persons registered for the move in fact showed up for the vehicles.

9. The atmosphere in the following three nightly meetings slowly degenerated between the RPA/civil authority and the NGOs because of a divergence in attitudes regarding the perceived security situation in Sector 3 and who OP HOMEWARD was serving; the people of Rwanda as typified by the displaced people or the Government of Rwanda. This was a situation which had not existed previously as the reluctance of people to return was not known. No senior member of the civil authority was present hence the RPA dominated what was largely a civil affairs matter. The RPA maintained that the NGOs were responsible for spreading rumors/not supporting the legal authority of the Rwanda government including straying beyond their (NGO) mandate if they question people on their state of well being and/or report any suspicions to UNAMIR. The NGOs countered that the RPA were insensitive to the rights of individuals and being purposely difficult to work with.

10. As a result of the friction between the RPA and NGOs, the Prefect Security officer and Maj Wilson (suspected of being the

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Brigade Information Officer) attended the last coordination meeting for the first week's task of OP HOMEWARD. Maj Wilson requested a meeting with the UNAMIR staff following the conference and in a purely military audience confided that the RPA consider the NGOs as a subversive element and asked that UNAMIR be cognizant of hidden agendas on the part of the NGOs. This meeting was also used to air some outstanding local grievances on the part of UNAMIR forces from TACHQ and MILOB sector 4A:

- a. the availability of the RPA LOs at TACHQ and Gikongoro was discussed in that their attendance was irregular and that they had conflicting priorities. A suggestion was made for the RPA to assign more LOs to each location so that there would be someone available whenever they were needed.
- b. the denial of access to non-military facilities and restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNAMIR troops. It was explained that such actions hamper the ability for UNAMIR to gather evidence to refute rumors and in fact add to the problem the RPA are experiencing with distrust by the populous.
- c. the unwillingness of civil authorities to visit camps in Sector 4A so as to appease the inhabitants request for information on what the government is doing and what the people can expect if they return home.
- d. the lack of direct face to face communications between senior RPA officers and senior UNAMIR officers to resolve problems rather than passing messages among intermediaries.

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ANNEX B TO  
TAC HQ  
OP HOMEWARD DATED  
29 SEPT 94

PSYOPS ASPECTS OF OP HOMEWARD - RECOMMENDED TACTICS

ASSUMPTIONS

- \* That a large proportion of IDP's believe that they are guilty of a crime committed during the recent war. They are currently unaware of the scope of the RPA's intentions to apply the process of law to those returning to their home locations.
- \* That the IDP's are better provided with food, shelter, water, health care and security in the refugee camps than in their home locations.

STRATEGY

- \* Any PSYOPS effort must be coordinated at the highest level.
- \* PSYOPS will not be effective unless it is seen as clear Government policy with the support and involvement of UNAMIR.
- \* NGO support of a PSYOPS campaign is fundamental to it's success. They need to be convinced that the concept is sound in terms of the Government's commitment to the provision of both a secure environment for returnees and a legal process which is open to public scrutiny.
- \* The sources of current anti RPA propaganda need to be identified.
- \* The RPA must be persuaded that there is a need for the investigation of both actual incidents and rumours of same. Subsequent dissemination of the findings of these investigations is necessary.
- \* NGO effort be redirected to regional centers to facilitate the transition from refugee camps to home locations.

METHODOLOGY

- \* Monitoring of radio transmissions carrying anti RPA/Government propaganda.

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- \* Jamming of illegal transmitters.
- \* Radio broadcasts of government policy including:
  - a. Method of resolution of house and land ownership disputes;
  - b. explanation of Government's intentions regarding prosecution of alleged criminals; and
  - c. continuing support of NGOs and presence of UNAMIR forces in home locations.
- \* Leaflet campaigns supplementing radio broadcasts.
- \* Use of transportable loud speaker systems to disseminate information and detail of Op Homeward timings, destination, reception arrangements, etc.
- \* A concerted effort by UNAMIR and other UN agencies to investigate reports of any incidents which suggest subversive activity, anti-government action, RPA activity which falls outside stated Government policy and any other incidents which impact on the security situation. Freedom of movement for UNAMIR forces and the candid passage of information between the RPA and UNAMIR are critical to this aspect of operations.
- \* Use of both radio and transportable loud speaker system to provide results of investigations into both illegal radio broadcast and specific rumours effecting individual camps or areas.
- \* Ensure that NGO presence in rural areas is coordinated to provide adequate coverage for returned persons.

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CNR 468 P1/1

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE  
PLEASE DELIVER TO SRSG  
AND FC AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE  
FRIDAY MORNING

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 11 AUGUST 1994  
NUMBER: **2528**  
SUBJECT: Refugees in Goma

1994 AUG 11 P 8:32

US Mission informs us this evening that their seismological authorities have detected strong signs of imminent eruption of volcano near Goma. If this occurs, lava would reach refugee locations within hours.

Hansen is taking whatever contingency measures are feasible and will be in contact with agencies and other institutions concerned.

You should, as an urgent contingency measure, intensify whatever preparations UNAMIR is making for return of refugees in view of the possible influx that would result if eruption does occur.

Added already  
H/L  
12/8  
DFC

SRSG (FC)



CNR 456 P1/2

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 9 August 1994  
NUMBER: 2493  
SUBJECT: Humanitarian concerns

Please find attached a self-explanatory note on our conversation with Mr. Alain Destexalle, Secretary-General of MSF (Belgium).

Best regards.

①  
DLC  
Dekokwa / Di 12/8  
a good start.  
they need protection  
in the camp.  
②  
ac  
11/8

1994 AUG -9 P 109  
RECEIVED  
UN OPERATIONS

RECEIVED  
OASG/DPKO

ACTION:

AUG - 8 1994

CNR 456 P2/2

Note to Mr. Annan


## SITUATION IN RWANDA

Mr. Alain Destexalle, Secretary-General of Médecins sans Frontières (Belgium), telephoned today to follow up on his meeting with you and Major-General Baril which took place in late July.

He stressed that, having recently reviewed the situation in Rwanda, he was even more convinced of the need to deploy human rights monitors throughout the country. Of course, the focus of the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Rwanda should be on military/security arrangements as provided for in recent Security Council resolutions. However, he believed that there was a necessity to deploy United Nations civilian staff/monitors in every large community in the country. The number of monitors currently planned for Rwanda (21) was not sufficient.

Mr. Destexalle also wanted to draw your attention to the security problems in the refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire. According to his information, the camps were still run primarily by Hutu leaders. He stressed that this was unacceptable on both ethical and political grounds. He wondered whether a number of United Nations police observers could be deployed, perhaps no more than 10 to each of the two major camps. Their presence could be very useful in helping the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to manage these camps and to return the population to Rwanda.

I gave Mr. Destexalle an explanation about the limitations of the current mandate of UNAMIR, and promised to convey his message to you.



Dmitry Titov  
5 August 1994

cc: Mr. Riza ✓  
Maj.Gen. Baril  
Lt.Col. Martin  
Ms. Stamatopoulou-Robbins



HUMAN/  
MB

MILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ

Date : 20 Jun 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : MILOB/6464/OPS

SUBJECT : SUMMARY OF NGO'S MEETINGS HELD AT KABALE  
ON 19 JUNE 1994

1. Two separate meetings were held at KABALE on 19 June 1994.
2. The first meeting was attended by the US Ambassador to Rwanda. He briefed the delegates on US involvement in Rwanda crisis as follows:
  - a. Stopped the killings.
  - b. Protect the civilians.
  - c. Assist to work out a cease-fire plan.
  - d. Speed up humanitarian programme.
3. The US Ambassador explained to the delegates that the French decision to intervene in the Rwanda conflict is mainly for the purpose of brokering a cease-fire.
4. UNICEF representative stated that they were currently carrying out assessment of non-food items assistance which they hope to start distributing in RUHENGARI area soon.

Seen  
HJH  
2/6  
DFC



UNRESTRICTED

5. The LUTHERAN World Federation assured the meeting that they were prepared to assist all NGOs with transport.
6. WFP indicated that they do not want to use the KAGITUMBA border post. The reason for their decision was not stated.
7. NGOs also said that they would want daily SITREP UNAMIR not RPF.
8. A second NGOs meeting was held by UNREO. They said that they were initially conducting recce and later carry out their operations in RPF controlled area.
9. The meeting also discussed means for providing food and water in affected areas.
10. Other issues discussed were:
  - a. Assisting in the Agriculture by providing seeds for the people to stare planting.
  - b. Establishing social services, infrastructure especially for women and children.
  - c. Provision of health services and establishment of OPDs carrying out immunization of people especially women and children.
11. The Humanitarian Rep also said that UNAMIR assured them that they will provide teams with vehicles to escort humanitarian teams.
12. The NGOs complained about the bad state of roads, particularly between BYUMBA and RUHENGARI and BYUMBA to KIZIGURO.
13. The LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION pointed out that it is working out plans for re-unification of displaced families.

INFO: FC  
DFC ✓  
HAC  
MR. FLETCHER

HUMAN  
MGSMILOB GP HQ

TO : FHQ

Date : 20 Jun 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : MILOB/6464/OPS

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UN RESTRICTED

INFO: FC

DFC ✓

HAC

MR. FLETCHER





MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE  
ARMEE RWANDAISE  
ETAT-MAJOR  
G3

**SECRET**

/NT. J/

KIGALI, le 11 JUIN 1994

N° 0727 /G3.3.0

Au Commandant de la Force MINUAR

K I G A L I

O B J E T : Plainte contre FPR

Mon Général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire part des exactions du FPR commises dans ses attaques dans la région de GITARAMA et de NYANZA où il est monté à l'assaut sur Hôpitaux emportant avec lui les Civils et Militaires malades qui s'y faisaient soigner. J'insiste pour que ces Militaires et autres malades soient traités selon les conventions de GENEVE. Le Représentant du Comité International de la Croix Rouge (CICR) qui me lit en copie est prié de suivre de près cette situation.

Veillez agréer, Mon Général, l'assurance de ma franche collaboration.

BIZIMUNGU Augustin  
Général-Major  
Chef d'Etat-Major de  
l'Armée Rwandaise

Copie Pour Information :

- Monsieur le Représentant du  
Comité International de la  
Croix Rouge

K I G A L I

**SECRET**

*MPA*  
*Thank you for the interpretation.*  
*The FC needs to see on his return*  
*A.S.*  
*12/6*  
*DFC*

UNAMIR

194 JUN 10 19 37

UNITED



NATIONS

1994 JUN 10 P 2:44

CNR 311 P1/3

MA  
HAS the HAC  
its copy?  
12/6  
DTC

Yes

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO : DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE : 10 JUNE 1994  
NUMBER : 1893

HAC  
Please provide  
elements of reply  
to this code  
cable ASAP.  
Thanks.  
PS/PC  
11/6/94

1. Attached you will find two requests for evacuation assistance received from the Permanent Mission of France.
2. One relates to M. Jean Aimable NSHIMIYIMANA (15 years of age) and known as "Titi", who could still be in Nyanza with his grandfather, M. Andre NDABARORA, of the Anglican Church and known as Hanika; or following the RPF advance into Kaduha (Gikongoro), with his sister whose husband is called Thadee NDUTIYE. The young man is ready to move out of the country with an NGO which is attempting to evacuate children and young Rwandese out of the country.
3. The other case refers to a request for the location of Father André SIBOMANA, a moderate Hutu, who was arrested on 2 June in Butare by militias. Father Sibomana was the Director of the Kinyamateka News Journal and was a well-known human rights activist in Rwanda.
4. The Permanent Mission of France is fully aware of prevailing conditions in Rwanda.

Thank you and best regards.

CNR-311 P2/3

**MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA FRANCE  
AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES**

**TELECOPIE N° 665**

**7 JUIN 1994**

**URGENT**

**DESTINATAIRE(S)**

**MONSIEUR HEDI ANNABI ✓  
SECRETARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES  
FAX NO 963.9222**

**OBJET**

**DISPARITION DE M. JEAN AIMABLE NSHIMIYIMANA**

Comme suite à notre conversation téléphonique, nous aimerions recueillir des informations au sujet de M. Jean Almable (dit Titi) NSHIMIYIMANA, 15 ans, de nationalité rwandaise.

D'après nos informations, l'adolescent se trouverait à Nyanza, chez son grand père, M. André NDABARORA, chanoine de l'église anglicane locale Hanika. Il ne serait pas impossible que la famille ait quitté Nyanza devant l'avancée du FPR pour se réfugier à Kaduha, dans la sous-préfecture de Gikongoro, chez une soeur aînée dont le mari s'appelle Thaddee NDUTIYE.

Le père de l'adolescent, M. NSHIMIYIMANA, indique qu'il serait prêt à se joindre au convoi d'une ONG qui se rendrait dans la région pour faciliter l'évacuation du jeune rwandais. Il est demandé également à la MINUAR de faire ce qui est en son possible pour assurer la protection de l'intéressé.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir transmettre ces informations à Kigali.

Bien respectueusement,

**BRUNO FOUCHER**

**UNE PAGE.**



**MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA FRANCE  
AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES**



**Date : 09/06/94**

**Expéditeur : M. Bruno FOUCHER**  
From Tel. (212) 702 4956

**Destinataire(s) :** M. Heidi ANNABI  
to Mme RIBEIRO  
**Numéro de télécopie :** 983.8460  
fax #

**Nombre de pages y compris celle-ci :** 1  
Number of pages including cover sheet

**Objet :**  
Subject *Disparition du père Sibomana*  
Réf. :

L'association "Reporters sans frontières" a appelé l'attention du Ministre Délégué à l'Action Humanitaire français sur l'arrestation le 2 juin à Butare du père André Sibomana, hutu modéré, par des milices. Ce dernier, président de l'association des journalistes rwandais et directeur du journal "Kinyamateka" est une personnalité de premier plan, connu comme défenseur des droits de l'homme dans son pays.

La France est extrêmement préoccupée par le sort qui pourrait être réservé à M. Sibomana.

Pour cette raison, la Mission française vous serait reconnaissant de bien vouloir solliciter de la MINUAR, dans la mesure de ses possibilités, une enquête et si possible d'assurer la protection de l'intéressé.

Bruno FOUCHER

DRAFT PSE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 14 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER:

WE REFER TO YOUR OUTGOING <sup>(CODE</sup> CABLE NUMBER 1116 DATED 13  
APRIL 1994 ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ESCORT OF ICRC  
MEDICAL SUPPLIES BEING HELD AT THE KIGALI AIRPORT.

PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAD BEEN  
TRANSPORTED SAFELY TO KING FAISAL HOSPITAL <sup>UNDER</sup> BY UNAMIR ESCORT.

SUPPORT OF NATIONAL STAFF OF OTHER UN AGENCIES IS AT THE  
MOMENT NOT POSSIBLE AS THE FINANCIAL STAFF OF UNAMIR WERE  
EVACUATED TO NAIROBI DURING THE CRISIS.

BEST REGARDS

MA  
why the reply so late  
let us get it out without  
further delay  
# J 18/5

#### HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE - COMMENTS

1. The medical supplies (belonging to ICRC and MSF) which are being held at KIGALI Airport were escorted by UNAMIR today 14 April 1994 to King Faisal Hospital.

2. It is impossible to offer any financial assistance to the national UN staff members in Kigali because the Division of Management and Administration moved to Nairobi with the UNAMIR cash. Food assistance is possible if available but UNAMIR is currently on limited ration for survival and no food is on the open market. *Their identities and locations are not even known.*

3. With the current sporadic firing around the city of Kigali the UN agencies responsible for distributing relief aid may not be willing to return to Rwanda to continue this important humanitarian duty/assignment. UNMO Escorts have started moving round the city and a few outside the city. It is hoped that the two sides will agree soon to a cease-fire so that the agents can return to the city to function.

4. UNAMIR presence in parts of the city where the youth are killing with machets indiscriminately will put some fear in them and at least minimize the killing if not stop it completely. But this can only be achieved if the indiscriminate firing stops on realization of the cease-fire between the two parties. This is a crucial humanitarian assistance which has to be pursued relentlessly.



SRSG (FC) CNR 92

P1/5

①

UNITED



NATIONS

13 APR 1994 A 12:48

②

DFC

*Use should start to make real gestures of humanitarian nature. See attached*

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK.  
DATE : 13 APRIL 1994  
NUMBER : 1116

ATTACHED YOU WILL FIND BAKER'S MEMORANDUM TO RIZA CONVEYING THE REQUESTS FROM THE HEADS OF UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES IN GENEVA REGARDING POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES WHICH UNAMIR COULD UNDERTAKE IN KIGALI.

YOU WILL ALSO NOTE RIZA'S REPLY TO BAKER. IF FEASIBLE, UNAMIR COULD PROVIDE ESCORT TO THE KING FAISAL HOSPITAL TO ICRC VEHICLES IN THE TRANSPORT OF THE 24 MTS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES WHICH ARE BEING HELD AT THE AIRPORT.

THE ABOVE IS TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

BEST REGARDS.

RECEIVED  
OASG/DPKO

United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

ACTION:

13 1994

TO: Mr. Iqbal Riza  
A: Assistant Secretary-General, DPKO

DATE:

13 April 1994

REFERENCE:

RWA413A.AMK

THROUGH

S/C DE:

FROM:

Jim Baker

DE:

Officer-in-Charge, DHA-New York

SUBJECT

OBJET:

RWANDA

I call to your attention the attached message received from DHA Geneva which, in effect, transmits a request from the Heads of UN Agencies now evacuated from Kigali for UNAMIR assistance with respect to (1) the transportation of medical supplies from the airport to the hospital, (2) support of national staff, and (3) information on humanitarian needs and the possibility for providing aid.

I would appreciate if you could give this your urgent attention.

P2/5

NATIONS UNIES  
DEPARTEMENT  
DES AFFAIRES HUMANITAIRES



UNITED NATIONS  
DEPARTMENT  
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

PAROLE 4 EP

A - TO: Mr. Jim Baker  
Director  
Regional Monitoring Division

APR 13 1994

Fakus des Nations  
CH-1211 GENEVE 10

Facsimile No: 212 963 3630

DE - FROM: Charles H. Lamontagne  
for Director and Deputy to the  
Under-Secretary-General

Facsimile: + (4122) 917-8823  
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In case of emergency ONLY: + (4122) 917-2010

Date: 13 April 1994

OBJET - SUBJECT: RWANDA - COORDINATION OF RELIEF RESPONSE

Ref: DEHAGVA FK -

94/500

Account:

Total No. of pages: 2

File(s):

Over the course of the past week, it has become clear that with regard to our current and future involvement with the Rwanda emergency our relationship to DPKO is crucial. In this regard, I would like to raise a number of specific questions for your urgent attention:

1) Ahmadou Ly has informed that at today's Nairobi meeting of the Heads of UN Agencies evacuated from Kigali, DHA was asked to urgently approach DPKO regarding the predicament of medical personnel and supplies situated at the Kigali airport and prevented from moving to hospital due to security concerns. The ICRC and MSF have 24 MTs of medical supplies and a surgical team that are being prevented from moving from the airport to the King-Faisal Hospital in Kigali. Meeting participants have requested that DHA contact the Office of the Secretary General and DPKO in order to secure UNAMIR's support in convincing the relevant parties to allow for movement from the airport to the hospital; and in order that UNAMIR can be positioned to secure the transportation of the materials and the medical team to the hospital. After our talk of this morning I am not sure that this is still a valid proposition but if UNAMIR is still there, their support would be essential.

2) Today's Nairobi meeting also produced a request from evacuated Heads of Agencies that national UN staff members in Kigali be provided with emergency rations and resources (money) to meet immediate emergency needs. Those national staff that have not been killed are without food or resources of any kind as both the UN offices and their homes have been looted. It was rightly pointed out that if operations are to start up again in the near future, the support of national staff will be essential. The only group capable of providing assistance of this sort at this stage would again be UNAMIR. The agencies would of course re-imburse these advances directly

OK

hmr



P4/5

through DPKO or other channels.

Both of the above points were also raised by Jim Grant during today's IASC meeting. USG Hansen took note of this, and subsequent to the meeting, directed that we should endeavour to provide a response on these points to the Heads of Agencies in Nairobi by their meeting Thursday morning at 0800 hrs Nairobi time. I would therefore be grateful if you could follow-up on these requests as a top priority and fax to Lance by COB today the information so that we can convey it to the Agency heads in Nairobi tomorrow morning.

3. Finally, in addition, the Heads of Agencies in Nairobi made two further requests from DHA. The first is that a daily information exchange be formalized between DHA and DPKO regarding the situation in Rwanda. Given that DPKO personnel, i.e., UNAMIR, are the only UN people on the ground (except the SRSG staff), the Agency Heads are especially interested in any information available regarding humanitarian needs, and possibilities for providing aid (including via UNAMIR flights and on the ground operations). On discussing this with Peter Hansen, he was especially interested to know how this discussion with DPKO goes, and whether they are receptive to providing such information and liaison, or whether he needs to take this up directly at the USG level, to ensure that the necessary linkages are established.

Thank you for your help in trying to answer these rather different questions. I think it is a positive development that Agencies see DHA-NY as their link with DPKO. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Best Regards.

United Nations



Nations Unies

p 5/5

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Jim Baker  
A Officer-in-Charge  
Department of Humanitarian Affairs  
THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

DATE 14 April 1994

REFERENCE.

FROM: Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General  
DE: for Peace-keeping Operations  
SUBJECT: Rwanda  
OBJET: Rwanda

1. Thank you for your memorandum of 13 April 1994.
2. I have requested UNAMIR that, if feasible, they look into the possibility of escorting ICRC vehicles transporting the 24 MTs of medical supplies out of the airport.
3. Regarding support for national staff or information on humanitarian needs, UNAMIR is at present heavily taxed and understaffed. As you are aware, only eleven civilian staff remain in the mission area, the rest having been evacuated.
4. UNAMIR has and continues to provide all the assistance it is capable of providing within a broad interpretation of its mandate, given the present violent circumstances prevailing in Kigali.