

UNAWDR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - STANDARD OPERATING  
PROCEDURES (SOP)

[Oct 1993 - 31 Dec 1993]

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

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SERIES	<u>51002</u>
BOX	<u>130</u>
FILE	<u>6</u>
ACC.	<u>1993/0283</u>

- Observation must be maintained from protected positions while non-essential personnel are in shelters;
- Dead ground adjacent to the ICA should be observed from mobile patrols in APCs;
- A reserve of sufficient strength should be kept in immediate stand by to demonstrate a show of force and prevent incursions;
- Mobile patrols in APCs should be sent to the villages which are assessed to be threatened by retaliatory actions;
- The medical teams and ambulances should be put on stand-by to give assistance to the injured persons if needed.
- The protection for local population inside UNIFIL positions should be given if requested.

21. In making the assessment as outlined in paragraph 20 above, information from local sources as to the origin of the incident or where it was planned would provide a valuable indication as to where the retaliatory fire might be directed and from where such fire might come.

#### READINESS STATUS

1) General. As a result of the uncertain situation inside ~~UNIFIL~~ AO with continuing rapid changes and ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>RGT RPF</sup> and AEs activities, it is extremely important for ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNAMIR</sup> to have a uniform alert system. This will enable units and

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UNAMIR  
UNIPIL HQ to initiate actions when needed for the security of  
UNAMIR  
UNIPIL personnel or to react to difficult situations. The  
system will enable both units and UNAMIR HQ initiate a gradual  
stepping-up system as a situation develops. It can be used by  
a unit in its own AO or by UNAMIR HQ for actions in a specific  
unit or the whole AO. Where a unit initiates an alert above  
normal (GREEN), UNAMIR OPS will be informed. UNAMIR OPS will  
then decide if it is necessary to extend status to other unit  
AOs.

2.2) The system is based on certain levels of alert  
dependent on intensity of threats of attack, infiltration,  
hostility etc., arising against/inside UNAMIR AO and the  
threat of heavy fighting against UNAMIR AO as apart  
of/preparation for a major operation. The readiness status can  
be changed only on the decision of the Force Commander.

2.3) Degree of alert and actions

Status	Units	Actions
Green Alert	All	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Normal activity in unit AOs according to SOP</li> <li>- Normal security/guard/OPs/CHPs/patrols according to SOP.</li> </ul>
Yellow Alert	All except FMR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Double the number of guards in camps and CHPs.</li> <li>- All unnecessary traffic to be called back/stopped. No traffic out of unit AOs.</li> <li>- Checking of shelters, weapons and equipment.</li> <li>- BMR on half hour notice to move</li> </ul>



Status	Units	Actions
Yellow Alert	FMR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Two platoons on one hour notice to move.</li> <li>- All unnecessary traffic to be called back/stopped.</li> <li>- Double the number of guards in camp. Checking of shelters, weapons and equipment.</li> </ul>
Red Alert	All except FMR  FMR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Half of the unit in firing position, the second half with weapons and personal equipment, ready to move in positions within five minutes.</li> <li>- Units main weapons to be manned.</li> <li>- No traffic except for strict operational reasons.</li> <li>- All patrols to be ordered back</li> <li>- CHPs and OPs still operational</li> <li>- BMR on 15 min notice to move.</li> <li>- Three platoons on half hour notice to move.</li> <li>- No traffic except for strict operational reasons.</li> <li>- No patrols to be ordered back.</li> </ul>
Alarm Alert	All except FMR  FMR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The whole unit in firing posns.</li> <li>- All CHPs to be closed.</li> <li>- OPs to be manned only on order.</li> <li>- BMR on immediate stand-by.</li> <li>- The whole unit on immediate standby.</li> </ul>

4) Threat of heavy firing into <sup>J.FAMIR</sup> UNIFIL AO

Order	Units	Action
Prepare Shelters	All	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Helmet and flack jacket to be worn</li> <li>- All traffic to be called back</li> <li>- All patrols to be called back</li> <li>- All CHPs and OPs still to be manned</li> <li>- Shelters, weapons and equipment to be controlled.</li> </ul>
Shelter-Shelter-Shelter-	All	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All personnel in shelters</li> <li>- All CHPs to be closed.</li> <li>- Only a minimum of observation to monitor the situation.</li> </ul>



## LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT

SL	STATUS	UNITS/HQ	MEANING/ACTION
1.	GREEN	All	Normal everyday status.
2.	YELLOW	HQ	a. Planning for next higher status commences. b. Liaison increased. c. VIP visits postponed. d. No leave granted except on compassionate ground.
		Units	a. Precautionary stage. b. Double duties of sentries. c. Night movements restricted. d. Test shelters. e. Stand to/Local alarm practice. f. No leave granted except on compassionate ground. g. Backup comm units/weapons. h. Reserves put on 3 hours notice to move.
3.	RED	HQ	a. General alert. b. VIP visits cancelled. c. No leave granted. d. Emergency movements only. e. Special sitreps to UN HQ. f. Civilian evacuation if situation warrents.
		Units	a. Troops in defensive position. b. Troops in stand to position. c. Reserves put on 1 hour notice. d. No leave granted. e. Troops on duty outside to be with flak jacket on.

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A local commander should rather follow  
a chain of command and submit his  
complaint to his superior. Finally  
complaints should ~~be~~ be officially handed  
over to our LO and ~~be~~ investigated  
by MILOBS.

+

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~~DRAFT-I~~

~~SECRET~~  
p. COMPLAINTS

GENERAL

1) In the course of carrying out its function, the Mission will receive complaints by one side or the other alleging activities contrary to the agreement or declaration which the Mission is charged with observing. Detailed action to be taken on the receipt of various types of complaints must be determined in relation to the terms of reference of the mission. Generally, complaints should be made in writing by the local commander and receipt acknowledged by the liason officer. When an investigation is indicated, all essential assistance should be requested from the complaining side including guides, map references, witnesses, interpreters and physical evidence.

ACTION ON RECEIPT OF COMPLAINT

2) On receipt of a complaint, the liason officer receiving the complaint will allot a complaint serial number and complete the form at Annex J which should then be forwarded to the Force HQ together with a copy of the original complaint.

3) Liason Officers may also report by radio, relaying the same information that is contained in Annex J. In this situation the Force HQ Duty Officer will record the information on the form at Annex A.

COMPLAINTS REGISTER

4) To ensure that action is taken on all complaints received, the Force HQ will maintain a COMPLAINTS REGISTER with the headings shown on the sample to Annex J.

RESPONSIBILITY

5) The Force HQ will be responsible for completing all action on the complaints.

INVESTIGATIONS

6) When incidents are observed by military observers or other members of UNAMIR, Force HQ will decide whether or not an investigation is warranted. When complaints are received and an

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in 7 days period  
of time.  
COO is OPI in  
dealing with complaints.



investigation is warranted, Force HQ must comply unless the complaining side fails to provide sufficient information or to give assistance as may be required to complete the investigation.

#### CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS

~~14.7~~ 7) Having decided to conduct an investigation the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) should proceed as follows:

~~14.7.1~~ 1) Check the complaint to ensure all the necessary information has been given, e.g. locations, details of alleged action, dates and times;

~~14.7.2~~ 2) Arrange for any assistance required from the formation making the complaint, e.g. guides, interpreters and witnesses;

~~14.7.3~~ 3) Notify any other section or branch concerned with the investigation and request any necessary assistance; and

~~14.7.4~~ 4) Assign military observers to conduct an investigation patrol. Particular attention in briefing the patrol should be given to the following:

(1) ~~a~~ Military observers must know and understand the aim of the investigation;

(2) ~~b~~ Military observers must know of the assistance to be provided by all parties and other sections or branches in conducting the investigation;

(3) ~~c~~ They must be aware of any special administrative arrangements required for the investigation;

(4) ~~d~~ Watch over the progress of the investigation and offer any assistance or advice which may be necessary;

(5) ~~e~~ Supervise the completion of the investigation report; and

(6) ~~f~~ Forward the completed report, including comments to the Force HQ

~~14.8~~ 8) Having been detailed to conduct an investigation patrol, military observers should proceed to the area of the incident, collect evidence, and prepare their report. For the purpose of an investigation, evidence can be considered as being of three types as follows:

~~14.8.1~~ 1) Material Evidence. This type of evidence forms the basis of the investigation. When it is possible to obtain material evidence, conclusive findings can often be made.

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~~140.8~~.8) Verbal Evidence. Verbal evidence can only be considered reliable when it is given by a completely impartial witness, e.g. military observer, or when it is corroborated by witnesses from the opposite side. In all other cases, verbal evidence by itself cannot be considered conclusive.

~~140.9~~.9) Circumstantial Evidence. This type of evidence can only be considered conclusive when it is corroborated by reliable verbal or material evidence. It should however be included in the investigation report.

#### PREPARATION OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS

~~140.9~~.9) Investigation reports must be clear, concise, and accurate. They should include:

~~140.10~~.10) The aim of the investigation, specifically what must be proved or disproved should be stated clearly;

~~140.11~~.11) The time and date of the investigation of the incident must be included;

~~140.12~~.12) Locations visited in the area of the incident should be listed;

~~140.13~~.13) Evidence should be arranged in chronological order where possible;

~~140.14~~.14) Witnesses' statement should be attached where applicable;

~~140.15~~.15) Opinions and assumptions must not be included in the body of the investigation report;

~~140.16~~.16) Sketches should be used to clarify difficult or confused situations. The scale of the sketch and the direction of North must always be indicated on the sketch;

~~140.17~~.17) Findings must be based on facts established during the investigation. Avoid opinions based on evidence not included in the investigation report. If a fact is pertinent, it must be stated in the evidence; and

~~140.18~~.18) Reports should be prepared with the events in proper (normally chronological) sequence and end with a summary of important facts and findings.

NOTE: Sample report form at Annex j.

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WORK ORDER NO: 006648 P. O. NO.: 4-20-00620  
P. S. PART NO: 02686005004850J  
DESCRIPTION: 00500 ACETATE 48" X 50'

LENGTH: 50 FT MACHINE NO: 102  
MILL ROLL NO: 392900000000001 TAK930916-01  
CONVERTED ROLL NO: 010308941051461



010308941051461



- Liaison Support. When committed to the AO of a BATT, FMR will receive liaison support from the field liaison team attached to the relevant AO. The BATT is responsible for fixing and RV between field liaison team and CO FMR. The field liaison team will come under the command of FMR.
- Fire support. CO FMR will request the use of 120mm mortar support fire from <sup>UNAFIL</sup> UNAFIL OPS, if necessary, and in accordance with the <sup>UNAFIL</sup> UNAFIL Fire Support Plan.

3.10 Reporting. Through any FMR operation, CO FMR will submit to <sup>UNAFIL</sup> UNAFIL OPS an operations readiness report at 0400Z daily. The report will cover:

- FMR
- Engineer support team
- Field liaison team

#### GUIDELINES FOR SPECIFIC TACTICAL OPERATIONS

- .1) General: The purpose of this sub-section is to:
- Improve co-ordination during special operations;
  - Make very quick reaction possible;
  - Avoid misunderstanding
  - Improve reporting and ordering systems.

.2) The relevant paragraphs of this SOP and the relevant Operations Directives should be read in conjunction with this sub-section. Commanding officers will make their own procedures and training programmes based on these guidelines.

6.11.3) This sub-section is in twelve annexes:

- ANNEX M-1 - Reinforcement
- Annex M-3 - Tightening Area
- Annex M-5 - Tightening Line
- Annex M-7 - Blocking
- Annex M-9 - Tracking
- Annex M-11 - Hijacking
- Annex M-13 - Deception
- Annex M-14 - Area of Responsibility
- Annex M-15 - Reserve
- Annex M-16 - Reporting
- Annex M-17 - Temporary Checkpoints

#### 6.11. OPERATIONAL INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS

6.11.1. The operational readiness of the troops is the responsibility of the unit commanders. However, operational inspections are carried out by UNFICIL HQ, Operations Branch to ensure the standardization of the operational activities of the units. Inspections are made on a regular basis as follows:

- Operational inspections preceding FC's pre-summer and pre-winter inspections (see Volume 2 Part 2 Section 18); and
- Operational inspections carried out by the Force Duty Officer on weekly basis (see Section 2 of this Part).

SECTION 15

Re

VOLUNTARY DISARMING OF MILITARY, PARAMILITARY,  
SELF -DEFENCE AND CIVILIAN FORCES

GENERAL

1) Given the current situation in Rwanda, as both the RGF and the RPF attempt to hold as much of the country as possible, it is inevitable that UNAMIR will become involved with individuals from all factions that have had enough of the fighting. As a result, UNAMIR will encounter individuals who wish to give themselves up to our forces either at UNAMIR installations, Humanitarian aide stations or to UNMO's.

AIM

2) The aim of this SOP is to describe the UNAMIR policy and procedures regarding the disarming of individuals and the control of all weapons seized.

DEFINITIONS

3) The following definitions will be used:

a) ~~15-3-1~~ Armed Forces. The organized armed forces are considered to be the RGF, Gendarmerie and the RPF.

b) ~~15-3-2~~ Paramilitary Forces. Paramilitary forces (or commonly referred to as Militia) are groups organized like but not part of the official armed forces. Current examples are:

(1) Interahamwe (Militia) including fighting squads from the following parties:

(a) MRND;

(b) CDR party youth; and

(c) MDR;

c) ~~15-3-3~~ Self- Defence Groups. Generally, self-defence groups are loosely organized, possessing little training and are usually formed to protect their village or town.



d) ~~15-2-88~~ Armed Civilians. Civilians armed with either, stolen or officially issued weapons. They have received little or no formal training. They have taken up arms to protect themselves, their families and their homes.

e) ~~15-2-88~~ Displaced Persons. Rwandese citizens who have been forced or who have fled from their normal place of residence. They remain displaced persons as long as they remain within the borders of Rwanda.

f) ~~15-2-88~~ Weapon. Any lethal object which can be used to cause physical harm to an individual. This includes fire arms, grenades, machetes, bows and arrows, knives, swords, bayonets, spears, batons, clubs etc.

g) ~~15-2-88~~ Force. Force is the use of physical means to impose one's will. It must be understood that the whole ethic of peace-keeping is that the mandate be achieved with the minimum use of military force.

h) ~~15-2-88~~ Self-Defence. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use their wpns in self-defense only. Self-defense includes resisting attempts by forceful means to prevent UNAMIR from discharging its duties:

(i) Accordingly, UNAMIR pers are authorized to use their weapons to defend themselves against direct attacks or threats on their lives; and

(j) To resist attempts such as disarming of UNAMIR personnel, forcing of UNAMIR positions, forced entry into UNAMIR positions.

i) ~~15-2-88~~ UNAMIR Installations. All UNAMIR military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfil its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted and access is conditioned by separate UNAMIR regulations.

k) ~~15-2-88~~ Check Points. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicles and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations pertinent to the cease-fire agreement. These may be static or mobile.

l) ~~15-2-88~~ Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for veh movement. A road block must have signs reading "Road block" in English, French and Kinyarwanda and also be clearly visible from a distance by an approaching veh.

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POLICY

104)

UNAMIR policy is:

~~15.4.1~~ a) All individuals or groups who approach a UNAMIR installation or checkpoint with the stated intention of giving up themselves and their weapons, or are found to have weapons on their persons shall be treated in accordance with Protocol I, Part III of the GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR which states:

(1) any member of the armed forces of a conflict is a combatant and any combatant captured by the adverse Party is a prisoner of war;

(2) To be recognized as such, the armed forces of a Party to a conflict must be organized and under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or other authority not recognized by the adverse Party; and

(3) The status or treatment of prisoner of war is extended to various categories of persons who do not come under the definition given above, or who are not combatants. The following are thus also entitled to the status of prisoner of war:

(a) those taking part in a levy en masse, that is, when the inhabitants of a non-occupied territory spontaneously take up arms on the approach of the enemy to combat invasion without having had time to organize themselves as laid down under point b) above, if they carry their arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war; and

(b) persons authorized to follow the armed forces without directly being part of them.

~~15.4.2~~ b) For the purposes of the UNAMIR mandate, all groups and armed civilians taking part in the conflict in Rwanda are considered to fall into the definitions listed above. Therefore, those individuals found with weapons will be considered to be combatants and after appropriate negotiations will be turned over to the faction that claims them as prisoners of war.

(c) In all cases these persons or groups will be kept separate from the general population to ensure the safety of those found with weapons and to ensure the safety of the general population of unarmed displaced persons.

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Speak to  
Fam. to get  
Concerned.  
Asst. Guidance.  
UNAMIR  
instead X

PREPARATION

15.6.5) It is expected that all individuals or groups ready to hand-over their weapons will likely approach UNAMIR Installations or to other locations where UNAMIR troop presence is visible such as at Checkpoints, and Road Blocks.

15.6.6) It is imperative, therefore, that all UNAMIR commanders responsible for the security of their assigned compounds and all team leaders appointed to man checkpoints or roadblocks be prepared to conduct this operation. The following prior preparation is required: a)

15.6.1 To find an appropriate area that can be guarded. It should be separated from the general population of displaced persons as far as possible and out of sight;

15.6.2 To select and train individuals in the procedures regarding the handover of weapons;

15.6.3 To have all necessary forms for handover available, (Annex N, ~~Annex B and Annex C~~); and

15.6.4 To have reserve forces on stand-by for emergencies or if help is required to guard the compound.

SECURITY

15.6.7) For security reasons, it is imperative to be vigilant and to take appropriate precautionary measures, in proportion to the number of people still armed in the vicinity of the UN Installation. Individuals or groups still waiting to be disarmed must be under observation for all times.

PROCEDURE

15.6.8) Make Contact with Group Leader. It is important to come into contact with a leader/comd of individuals to be disarmed. He should be used to keep the group waiting to be disarmed, informed regarding the necessary procedures to be followed and to keep them under control throughout the procedure. If a leader cannot be identified, at least one soldier must be designated to keep the group informed and to maintain order.

15.6.9) Conduct Disarmament Outside the UNAMIR Installation. If it is possible, the disarmament process must be carried out outside of the UNAMIR Installation;

15.6.10) Reception. An appropriate number of reception points must be set up. The number of reception points will depend on how many people are waiting. Such reception points must be well

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organized in order to maintain high efficiency. At least three soldiers should be appointed to one reception point;

1011) Displaced Persons. The main body of displaced persons must stay sufficiently far away from the UNAMIR Installation to ensure that the reception point does not become over crowded. (the necessary orders should be given by comd/leader of the group);

1012) Approach. All individuals must approach the reception point by one by one. The soldiers responsible for registry must write in all the necessary information on the **CONFISCATION FORM** (Annex N-1). An official **RECEIPT** must then be given to the individual who has given up his weapon (Annex N-2). The **DETAINEE LIST** (Annex N-3) must be completed. After completion of the registration and handover of the weapon, the individual must be escorted to the guarded area. He must not be allowed to rejoin the other armed individuals or the unarmed displaced persons; and

a) ~~15-12-92~~ Completed Annex A. The completed confiscation forms will be delivered to UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian Cell).

b) ~~15-02-92~~ Completed Annex C. The completed list of detainees will be delivered to UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian Cell).

1013) Weapons. The soldier responsible for checking weapons must inspect the weapon carefully, removing the magazine and clearing the chamber. The soldier will then give the weapon data to be registered. Finally, the weapon is to be secured in a guarded location. Weapons, ammunition, grenades etc. must be stored separately.

#### PROCEDURE FOR THE HANDOVER OF PRISONERS

1014) Faction Claiming Prisoner. The faction claiming the prisoner must provide in writing the following assurances:

a) ~~10-04-92~~ That Protocol One, Part III of the **GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR** will be followed;

b) ~~10-04-92~~ They will provide the location at which the prisoner of war will be held; and

c) ~~10-04-92~~ Permit the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to monitor the Prisoner of War camp.

1015) UNAMIR Responsibilities. UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian Cell) will ensure that the following actions take place:

a) ~~15-02-92~~ Ensure that an armed guard is provided during the handover;

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b)  
~~15.10.02~~ Ensure that a representative from the ICRC is present during the handover;

c)  
~~15.15.03~~ Ensure that, if available, there is media coverage to cover the handover;

d)  
~~15.20.04~~ Ensure that the ICRC and the Humanitarian Assistance receive a copy of the **CONFISCATION FORM** (Annex <sup>N-1</sup>);

e)  
~~15.25.05~~ Ensure that the ICRC and the Humanitarian Assistance Cell receive copies of **DETAINEE LIST** (Annex <sup>N-3</sup>); and

f)  
~~15.30.06~~ Arrange a location for the handover that is agreeable to both UNAMIR and the faction claiming the prisoner.

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-Role of UN in Maintaining of Law and Order  
in Rwanda

AIMS

0.1) The aim of this SOP is to clarify goals and mode of Maintaining of Law and Order in Rwanda after cease-fire implementation.

GENERAL

0.2) Rwanda is a signatory of most of international conventions but current situation is enough obvious that practically nobody comply them with.

0.3) It must be presumed that even after cease-fire implementation all these problems regarding with observance of law shall not be easier.

0.4) Therefore it is imperative to engage UNAMIR Bns in this process.

0.5) New UNAMIR structure foresee five sectors to be established all over the Rwandese territory.


a) - It makes good opportunities for particular Bns to come in contact with local authority such as:

(1)- Prefectures, Communes, Sectors and Cellules.

0.6) For better understanding there is a structure of a former administrative authority in Rwanda;

Level:

Authority:



a) - If it would be impossible because of no representative of former authorities could not be found anywhere, joint military-civilian committees under the UNAMIR auspices must be set up;

1

**ACCORD DE CESSEZ-LE-FEU ENTRE LES COMMANDANTS  
MILITAIRES DE LA FORCE GOUVERNEMENTALE RWANDAISE  
ET LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS**

Nous, les représentants des Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises et ceux du Front Patriotique Rwandais;

Grandement concernés par les massacres et les actes insensés de violence qui ont été faits depuis la mort du Président Juvenal Habyrimana dans un écrasement suspect le 6 avril, 1994.

Sérieusement concernés par la reprise des hostilités entre les Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises et celles du Front Patriotique Rwandais;

Réaffirmant nos engagements aux principes d'accord de paix signé à Arusha le 4 août, 1993;

Attentif au fait qu'un cessez-le-feu immédiat facilitera:

- a. la fin des massacres et les tueries des civils;
- b. la distribution de l'assistance humanitaire des personnes déplacées et autres civils affectés dans toutes les parties du Rwanda; et
- c. les discussions pour la reprise du Processus de Paix Arusha.

Nous en ce \_\_\_\_\_ jour de mai, 1994, sommes d'accord et acceptons de prendre les dispositions pour assurer le cessez-le-feu

1. Il doit y avoir un cessez-le-feu immédiat entre les Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises et celles du Front Patriotique Rwandais à travers tout le territoire de la République Rwandaise qui doit prendre effet à partir de \_\_\_\_\_ 1994;

2. Les deux Forces devront maintenir les positions tenues au moment où le cessez-le-feu prendra effet. Ils ne devront pas utiliser la force pour changer ces positions, les termes et les moments du retrait de ces forces à leurs positions normales de temps de paix seront convenus dans des négociations subséquentes;

3. Le cessez-le-feu doit être précédé d'une trêve c'est-à-dire l'arrêt des hostilités qui doit entrer en vigueur à minuit le \_\_\_\_\_;



b)- The local highest rank comd shall have assigned responsibilities of a Prefect,

c)- This level of local authority shall be responsible for reconstruction of all remaining levels of local authority till to a commune;

d)- All appointments to be reconstructed shall depend on current and future needs of the particular local administrative unit in terrain.

0.7) Foreseeable urgent tasks for Local Authorities.

a)- To disarm locals not entitled to carry on wpns taking, an advantage from cooperation with UNAMIR unit deployed on the same area;

b)- To begin patrolling the area in administrative boundaries of newly established authority's area of responsibility;

c)- To start recruitment and detailed selection of volunteers for needs of future police, which along with peace process progress should step by step replace military structures in the matters of public security.

d)- To begin registry of all inhabitants who declare to remain on the place in particular communes, villages, towns and cities including all the area of new authorities' responsibility outside above mentioned places;

e)- To reconnoitre all Safety Havens (SH) and Refugee Camps (RC) and also structure the best suitable for this purpose - only on the prefectural level of authority;

f)- To start build up administrative organization of SH and RC namely consisting of at least:

(1)- Two-person Management Cell: RC manager and his deputy;

(2)- Two-person Reception Cell: experienced clerks keeping detailed registry of all refugees and prepared for elaborating of necessary periodical statistic reports, which will simplify assessment of total needs;

(3)- Four-person Medical Cell comprising two physicians and two nurses;

(4)- Store keepers, their number of shall depend both on quantity and type of stores and warehouses;

g)- To start mains reconstruction everywhere where it is feasible, engaging for this purpose military and civilian specialists;

h)- Based on agriculture specialists to enforce a rapid food production program comprising both plant and stock production to eliminate undernutrition problem in the population and

4. Les modalités du cessez-le-feu doivent être discutées par la commission militaire conjointe, les commandants des Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises et ceux du Front Patriotique Rwandais sous les auspices de la MINUAR;

5. Jusqu'à l'entrée en force du cessez-le-feu, qui doit être supervisé et vérifié par la MINUAR, dont les actions ne doivent pas être entravées ou empêchées par les deux parties. Les points de contrôle sur les chemins et les grandes voies doivent être maintenus seulement par les forces régulières de chaque côtés;

6. Jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu, les deux côtés doivent s'entendre pour arrêter, dans les prochains 96 heures, la violence contre les civils et de contrôler la violence à l'intérieur de leur secteur respectif de contrôle. De même, ils doivent contrôler les activités des civils armés et des groupes auto-défenses, arrêter toutes diffusions diffamatoires radiophoniques et initier un programme de récupération des armes illégales;

7. Les deux côtés s'accordent à respecter le statut de l'aéroport international de Kigali comme zone neutre sous supervision MINUAR;

8. Les deux côtés réaffirment leurs engagements des principes du Processus de Paix Arusha et discuteront, avec les représentants de la

MINUAR, des modalités pour la reprise du processus de paix dont l'objectif est un accord politique sur la situation présente au Rwanda;et

9. Les deux parties sont d'accord pour l'établissement d'une commission d'enquête internationale pour enquêter sur les tueries et les massacres d'avant et après la mort du Président Habyarimana et aussi des circonstances de sa mort, et demander aux Nations Unies de proposer les étapes pour l'établissement d'une telle commission.

Fait à Kigali le \_\_\_\_\_ mai, 1994.

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour les FPR

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour les FGR

Témoin  
\_\_\_\_\_

thus reduce necessary help from outside (from NGOs);

j)- Meanwhile jurisdiction reconstruction shall be started including both protection and collection of crime's evidences.

0.8) Bn involvement. Sector's Comds must be aware that public security problem in their AO can not be solved without stabilization of average people life.

0.9) This is why it is necessary to have part of Bn's most experienced staff ready to fulfill some tasks in crucial positions foreseen for monitoring by UNAMIR forces.

0.10) Bn's staff must participate at least in the following tasks;

a)- Patrolling, initially using only own sources, but gradually with some local police forces engagement and finally this job should be carried out by locals;

b)- Disarmament of locals unauthorized to carry wpns, initially themselves but later with local police involvement;

c)- A police coordination cell set up to assist and monitor its routine tasks;

d)- Provision of security and assistance in reconstruction of police structure;

e)- Recce of places most suitable for Safety Havens/Refugee Camps and their reliable protection;

f)- Confiscated wpn warehouse set up on the UNAMIR military compound and maintained by Bn pers.

4. Les modalités du cessez-le-feu doivent être discutées par la commission militaire conjointe, les commandants des Forces Gouvernementales Rwandaises et ceux du Front Patriotique Rwandais sous les auspices de MINAR;

5. Jusqu'à l'entrée en force du cessez-le-feu, qui doit être supervisé et vérifié par la MINUAR, dont les actions ne doivent pas être entravées ou empêchées par les deux parties. Les points de contrôle sur les chemins et les grandes voies doivent être maintenus seulement par les forces régulières de chaque côtés;

6. Jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu, les deux côtés doivent s'entendre pour arrêter, dans les prochains 96 heures, la violence contre les civils et de contrôler la violence à l'intérieur de leur secteur respectif de contrôle. De même, ils doivent contrôler les activités des civils armés et des groupes auto-défenses, arrêter toutes diffusions diffamatoires radiophoniques et initier un programme de récupération des armes illégales;

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8. Les deux côtés réaffirment leurs engagements des principes du Processus de Paix Arusha et discuteront, avec les représentants MINUAR, des modalités pour la reprise du processus de paix dont l'objectif est un accord politique sur la situation présente au Rwanda; et

9. Les deux parties sont d'accord pour l'établissement d'une commission d'enquête internationale pour enquêter sur les tueries et les massacres d'avant et après la mort du Président Habyarimana et aussi des circonstances de sa mort, et demander aux Nations Unies de proposer les étapes pour l'établissement d'une telle commission.

Fait à Kigali le \_\_\_\_\_ mai, 1994.

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour les FPR

Signé \_\_\_\_\_  
pour les FGR

Témoin

\_\_\_\_\_  
pour MINUAR



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7

## Section - Sector Operational Guidance

### AIM

8.1) The aim of this SOP is to clarify goals and mode of operational tasks performance by particular sectors.

### GENERAL

8.2) UN Security Council Resolution 918 (17 May 94) precised a role and concept of tasks to be carried out by UNAMIR forces in Rwanda and UNAMIR is given an expanded mandate.

8.3) An overall concept of operation is to deploy five inf bns to monitor cease-fire and to assist and provide security to the enormous humanitarian effort that will soon commence in Rwanda.

8.4) Two mechanized and three motorized bns are scheduled to be used in particular five sectors:

- a) GITARAMA/BUTARE
- b) KIGALI
- c) BUGESERA and the KIGALI AIRPORT area
- d) RUHENGARI/GISENYI
- e) BYUMBA/RWAMAGANA/KIBUNGO

8.5) They will all be structured with four line coys each, a combat support coy to include a mortar pl, an assault pioneer pl, a recce pl, and a HQ /Logistics coy.

8.6) The bns will in turn deploy their coys in company sites throughout their respective sectors.

8.7) Such sites will be aligned with protective tasks for displaced persons, refugees and persons in danger.

8.8) Concurrently they are to be prepared for peripheral security of convoys and distribution localities.

### TASKS

8.9) UNAMIR functions on the basis of full co-operation with all the parties concerned. This requires that the Force combines firmness in carrying out its mandate with sensitivity to local attitudes. Every effort must be made to ensure that the various parties and the local community in general understand the way in which UNAMIR functions and co-operate willingly with it. The aim should be to solve problems in practical manner to avoid confrontations whenever possible. Complete impartiality is essential.

8.10) UNAMIR also operates in order that the local inhabitants should lead normal lives as possible. The Force limits any restrictions it has to impose on the population to those necessary to carry out its tasks. UNAMIR will assist the local authorities whenever possible in the execution of its tasks.

Col Mugambage

He mentioned again the term commitment because of past experience. He said that every agreement finalized so far had ended in massacres being conducted against minorities, therefore that commitment should come from the heart. Massacres and genocide were orchestrated programs. The world knows that the Rwandese army trained and armed the Interhamwe and that there were also members of the army who were involved in those massacres. This delegation has all the means to stop these massacres and to stop RTLM from inciting the population to violence. It is a must that the evacuation process continue, that the RTLM stop and that the Government stops propaganda about massacres. These are the basis of the preconditions for continuing the discussion regarding a ceasefire.

LCol Rwigambe

He emphasized that the RAF are responsible for killing and the world knows that they can stop the massacres. As a sign of good will it is required that they let the displaced persons held behind the lines against their will be released. The government asks for a ceasefire when RTLM and the official radio continue to use propaganda to incite violence and at the same time they distribute weapons to civilians. He indicated that the Nyamicambo is threatened by massacres. It is illogical to ask for ceasefire when there are still massacres continuing. It is a basic requirement to stop these massacres to demonstrate the commitment of the RAF to a ceasefire. For those who use propaganda must stop and the armed forces must take on these responsibilities to permit the discussions to continue.

Gen Gatsinzi

He indicated that the observations raised by the RPF are contained in the ceasefire document. The inability of the RAF to stop the massacres is because all of their troops are engaged in the fighting. The propaganda problem is included in the ceasefire document, but also the FPR radio uses propaganda to incite violence. Therefore, we should return to the document at hand. If there is an implementation of the ceasefire there will be a decrease in the suffering of the population and allow the RAF to restore law and order.

Col Mugambage

He confirmed that they are open to negotiations but not with their eyes closed. It is true that all the key points are in the document but, we want basic conditions such as the transfers of displaced persons, the RTLM radio to stop inciting violence by use of propaganda. These points constitute the

9.11) The UNAMIR AO is not small, has difficult mountainous terrain and is densely populated in places. Ensuring security in such an area will require greater resources than UNAMIR possesses.

The general concept of operations is therefore based on concentrating resources and control where they are needed most, utilizing various categories of check points and observation points.

Check points will cover the main traffic arteries while observation posts will cover the assessed infiltration lanes. The other tracks and smaller roads which can not be covered by permanent check points will be the subject vigorous patrolling and mobile checkpoint policy utilizing, among others, armored vehs.

9.12) In fulfilling their mission, UNAMIR soldiers can be deployed in:

- Observation Posts,

- Check Points,

- Road Blocks, and

- UN Installations.

9.13) Observation Posts. Specially selected points throughout the country which allow for the best visibility of surrounding area in terrain held by one or both opposing forces and used primarily to monitor any military troop movements, reinforcing of positions or cease-fire violations. The distance between individual OPs should be not greater than 10 km. Ops are to be manned on permanent basis. OPs should be equipped with binoculars, night-vision devices, maps compass and radio and line comms with HQ. UNAMIR OPs must also have the capability for patrolling and reacting to the observed threat.

9.14) Type of OPs. There may be the following types of OPs, depending on terrain conditions and intensity of operation:

- a) Permanent,

- b) Temporary, and

- c) Unmanned.

9.15) Check Points. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking veh and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations pertinent to the cease-fire agreement and prevent the infiltration of arms. These may be static or mobile.

- a) Static Check Points. Troops/UNMOs are permanently located at fixed points. These will be normally on important road junctions, at the entrances/exits to controlled area etc. A static check point is manned on a permanent basis. It must have both radio and line comms with a HQ.

- b) Mobile Check Points. Static check points may not be enough to cover an area of operation. In this case, mobile check points are necessary. It will have a minimum of a section strength (10 men) with two UN vehicles. It is established at varying times and at varying places based on



necessary basis for the continuation of discussions regarding a ceasefire.

DFC

He stated that the suffering of the population must stop and that goodwill must be shown by both parties.

LCol Rwigambe

He indicated that a ceasefire is impossible unless the massacres stop.

Gen Gatsinzi

The RAF agree that there should be an international enquiry into the massacres in both zones. Can the RPA deny that massacres also took place in their areas? The RAF admits that a few members of the army may have taken part, but certainly not the majority.

Col Mugambage

The ceasefire is not an end by itself. Instead of the signature of a ceasefire document, we should look for the reasons that caused the massacres.

Gen Gatsinzi

The RAF is firm in its commitment to stop massacres, but they must have the availability of their troops to do this.

DFC

The DFC recommended a lunch break. The meeting reconvened at 1530. He reemphaized the importance of the document and requested both parties to anylize this document. Concepts and modalities could be discussed later.

Gen Gatsinzi

He indicated the FAR's commitment to the process.

Col Mugambage

He once again indicated that the pre-conditions must be met before any further discussions can take place.

Col Rwabalinda

He underlined that the evacuation process is on going but that there is a need to accelerate the process. Massacres and propaganda should be the concern of both parties. He believes that mechanisms should be put in place to relieve the tension. UNAMIR and RPA should contribute towards finding these mechanisms.

Gen Gatsinzi

He indicated that he would take these pre-conditions to his high command for their action. The army is concerned and committed to stopping the killings. They will contact the RTLM and other radio to work towards decreasing the tensions in the country.

DFC

He reminded all present of the FAR's last statement, indicating their commitment to stop the massacres and to stop the propaganda on the radio.



an irregular schedule. It must have radio comms with a base/unit's HQ.

16) Road Block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement. A road block must have signs reading "Road Block" in English and Kinyarwanda and be clearly visible from a distance by an approaching vehicle.

17) UN Installations. All UNAMIR military and civilian camps and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfill its mandate. The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR assigned elements. Access to these areas is restricted and access is conditioned by separate UNAMIR regulations.

18) Among of other foreseeable tasks for UNAMIR secs there are the following:

a) Cordon. UNAMIR may have to carry out cordon operations to search for weapons, ammunition or explosives. Prior permission from UNAMIR FHQ is needed to carry out a cordon and search operation. Cordon must be done with sufficient troops and a reserve.

b) Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of the cease-fire. This will be done by UNAMIR forces, UNMOs, and local authorities.

(1). Types of patrols. There may be the following types of patrols depending on terrain conditions and the complexity of operation:

- (a) Foot patrol,
- (b) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol,
- (c) Air patrol, and
- (d) River/lake patrol.

(2). Aim of Patrolling.

- (a) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or ceasefire violation,
- (b) To obtain information about terrain, topography etc,
- (c) To locate and confiscate arms, ammo, expl etc.
- (d) To show a UN presence,
- (e) To provide protection for NGOs or the population, and in particular for displaced person, and
- (f) To prevent infiltration of unwanted elements into selected and controlled area/zone.

He indicated that UNAMIR would produce a Declaration of Commitment which will elaborate the points raised here today and forwarded for their review. If both parties agree that would sign. The next meeting was agreed to be held at 1000 hrs 2 June, 1994 at Unamir HQ.

(3). Strength. In no circumstances should a foot patrol be less than section strength (10 men), while a vehicle patrol or river /lake patrol should be no less than two vehicles or boats.

(4). Security. Security of UN patrols depends on how much they know about an area of their operation. However following aspects need consideration:

(a) Patrol routes should be free of mines. Only routes known to be absolutely free from mines may be patrolled.

DO NOT undertake patrolling in suspected mined areas.

(b) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag and UN head-gear are clearly visible during patrolling.

c) Escorting. In UNAMIR elements two types of escort will be used:

(1). UNMO Escort. This will be unarmed escort composed of military observers. In case of any suspicion of danger the escort shall be augmented by an armed escort from a UNAMIR unit. Unarmed escorts shall be normally provided to VIPs, NGOs and another visiting persons, provided that there is no threat.

(2). Armed Escorts. Armed escorts will be composed of soldiers from a UNAMIR unit. They will be provided to humanitarian relief operations' convoys, UN convoys or to VIPs of both factions.

(3). Authority of Detailing Escorts. FHQ shall have the sole authority to detail escorts.

d) UN Convoys. UN Convoys will be conducted for UNAMIR deployment and is necessary for fulfillment of its mandated tasks in an area of operation assigned.

e) Investigations. Investigation Teams are composed of UNMO and UN CIV POLs and will be employed to clarify all cases of cease-fire violations and will submit relevant reports to FHQ.

f) Establishment of Committees for Civic Matters. Committees comprising specially selected groups of staff personnel from UNAMIR components designated for humanitarian assistance forwarded mainly to townspeople and will work to solve important civic matters.

g. Humanitarian Recce Teams. Personnel of UNAMIR units and UNMOs which will be tasked for collecting all data regarding displaced persons' concentrations as well as refugee camps and road infrastructure to be used for food transportation purposes.

MINUTES OF THE CEASEFIRE MEETING  
BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE RAF AND THE RPA.  
30 MAY 1994

**Present**

**UNAMIR:** Brig Gen Anyidoho, Col Moen, Mr. Dessande, LCol Austdal,  
Maj Diagne, Capt Turgeon, Mr. Mactar Gueye.

**RAF:** Brig Gen Gatsinzi, Col Hakizimana, Lt Col Setako, Lt Col  
Rwabalinda, Maj Gakara.

**RPA:** Col Mugambage, Lt Col Rwigambe, Maj Kamanzi, Capt Kazura.

PURPOSE OF THE MEETING

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the draft ceasefire presented by UNAMIR.

On the 30th of May, 1994 at Force HQ, UNAMIR hosted a meeting between the delegations of the RAF and the RPF, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Force Commander of UNAMIR.

**DFC** After greeting both delegations, the DFC informed everyone of the purpose of the meeting was to discuss a draft ceasefire document that was the result of the visit of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General, Mr. Riza. He indicated the manner in which the meeting would be conducted and asked each side if they had received the documents. He then invited each side to make comment.

**Col Mugambage** After thanking UNAMIR for their efforts to bring both sides together in an effort to find a solution to the conflict. He indicated that a commitment by the two parties to resolve the conflict must be defined today. As an example of this lack of commitment, he gave as an example the transfers of the refugees. After starting out well, the transfers stopped, he asked for an explanation of why this happened before continuing the discussion.

**DFC** He indicated that he would make comments on this subject later and asked the other party if they had any comments to make.

**Gen Gatsinzi** He thanked UNAMIR for hosting this meeting and assured everyone of his delegations commitment to



h) Secured Area Establishment. An area such as a refugee camp/safety haven, where access of the opposing forces would be controlled and regulated by UNAMIR forces. Within the secured area there must be sufficient security for UNAMIR military and civilian components.

i) Refugee Camps/Safety Havens Protection. In order to provide protection to refugee camps against acts of lawlessness particularly acts of ethnic cleansing, UNAMIR units will be responsible for the required security arrangements.

these talks in an effort to find solutions. He indicated that they were ready to discuss the ceasefire document. Regarding the concern about the stopping of the evacuations, that the firing that caused the stoppage was from the RPF side. He indicated that the RPF had had a meeting the day before to discuss the problem and indicated that the the evacuations would resume today.

DFC

The DFC asked if the RPF had any comments.

Maj Kamanzi

He indicated that perhaps UNAMIR had either interpreted incorrectly or was misinformed. He wanted to say that that the proccupation of the RAF with the meeting regarding the stopping of the evacuations yesterday had resolved nothing. He felt perphaps there was another reason besides the shooting that had caused the stoppage.

Gen Gatsinzi

Concerning the problem of the number of displaced persons in the convoy he indicated that the convoys must start at the same time and end at the same time. He understands that the limited resources of UNAMIR poses problems throughout, paricularly regarding the displaced persons within the Amahoro Stadium.

DFC

He indicated that the committment mentioned by the RPA was very important for the people. This committment is absolutrly required. He also indicated that the evacuations were very important to UNAMIR and the reason they were stopped was because of the shooting at Khadafi crossing and the firing on the convoys.

Col Moeen

Confirmed that the evacuations were taking place as planned.

Col Mugambage

Concerning the problem of evacuation: these evacuations should reduce the suffering of those displaced persons. The committment to this is absolutely a must. He invited the other side to be clear on their position and to take a formal committment not to fire on the convoy. He emphaized the need for both sides to agree on this. It should be an committment and not a problem of numbers.

DFC

The evacuation should continue until all displaced persons who want to leave regardless of the total number on either side. He also confirmed that the evacuation was now happening in both directions and encouraged both delegations to return to the agenda at hand.

~~PART 1 - OPERATIONS~~SECTION 8 - SECURITY OF TROOPSGeneral

2.1. ~~Each~~. Each Commanding Officer is responsible for the security of personnel under his command. This includes members of other units who are attached. All Commanding Officers must ensure that an awareness of security is emphasized on all levels of the command and that all activities conducted by the unit take security measures into account early in the planning stage and not as an after-thought. The following will be taken into consideration and OPS Directive "Security of Posts and Personnel" - 306, must be read in conjunction with this section. Consideration must be given to:

- Security of the positions;
- Security of personnel;
- Recreation security;
- Movement in vehicles in the AO;
- Measures against HIJACK;
- Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD);
- NBC protection.

2.2. SECURITY MEASURES

a. ~~7.1~~ Security of the position. <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNFIL~~ positions should be tactically sited in order to enhance security and simplify engineering efforts. Annex A of OPS Directive 306 provides

✓ No recreation  
activity in UNAMPA  
this paper should be  
canceled



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a checklist and a proposed layout of a ~~UNIFIL~~ position. Basic security measures within base should be employed and fully integrated with engineer fortification resources (see checklist, Annex C to OPS Directive 306. Posts should have a coordinated plan for defence. (See design layout for fighting position, Annex D to OPS Directive 306. All positions should be constructed according to the instructions given in Operations Directive 315- Standardization of OPs and Positions. All ~~UNIFIL~~ positions and observations posts should provide protection to the personnel against direct fire of small arms, LMGs and HMGs and against splinters of heavy weapons. Positions should have adequate shelters for all personnel stocked with water and ration packs for ten days. Shelters should be equipped with line/radio communications.

7.2.2 Security of personnel. The Unit Commander should ensure that all personnel under his command are:

- Armed in accordance with their appointment;
- Wear fragmentation jackets and helmets when exposed;
- Move on foot in groups of not less than three outside camp;
- In possession of NBC protection equipment in times when there is an assessed risk.

7.2.3 Recreation security. Recreational trips to Tyre are covered by FC's Directive 88/4. As far as other recreational activities are concerned, general guidelines are:

- Personnel travelling to and engaged in sporting activity should, where they cannot provide it

themselves, have a separate armed escort travelling in separate vehicles. Armed escorts will not take part in activity but will deploy to protect the sporting participants, United Nations property and equipment;

- No jogging will be permitted on remote roads and should be confined to small groups within sight of sentries;
- Times and locations for after duty hour recreation such as shopping, dining out, visiting should be clearly defined;
- Known extremist localities or establishments will be placed out of bounds;
- Local orders should ensure that no United Nations personnel act in such a manner as to offend local customs, religion or cultural practices;
- Visitors to posts must be made aware of current standing orders in regard to recreational and after duty hour activity.

UNRESTRICTED  
8.3. MOVEMENT IN UNIFIL AO

8.3.1. General. Restriction and control of United Nations traffic in the AO and ICA is necessary to reduce the risk of hijack and other threats to United Nations personnel. The following directives and instructions should be read in conjunction with this section:



- Hijack - OPS Directive 109 (Revised)
- <sup>UNIFIL</sup> UNIFIL Communications Procedures - OPS Directive 304
- Movement in OGL AO for UNTSO and civilians only - OGL Operational Instruction 23/88
- Travelling in <sup>UNIFIL</sup> UNIFIL Area of Operation (for civilian staff) - Administrative Instruction 89/84
- Travelling in <sup>UNIFIL</sup> UNIFIL AO - OPS Directive 302 (Rev.2)
- Visits to Tyre - Force Commander's Directive 4/88

#### Basic principles

~~7.3.2.~~ While travel in a single vehicle is allowed, the convoy system (i.e. at least two vehicles) should be used, especially when travelling to and from the AO/Naqoura/Tyre Pocket.

~~7.3.3.~~ Internal travel within a BATT AO is the prerogative of the BATT CO. He is best positioned to assess particular threats and danger areas in his AO. He should, however, be guided in his decisions by these principles although the directive is not specifically aimed at BATT vehicles travelling within their own AO.

- ~~7.3.4.~~ Convoy travel (i.e. at least two vehicles)
- Each vehicle will carry at least two personnel.
  - Each convoy will have at least four armed personnel.
  - Each convoy will have at least one vehicle on

Motorola or Force Message Net. For internal travel by BATT vehicles within their AO, the ideal situation is that they should have a radio working on BATT net.

- Proper convoy procedures must be adhered to with each vehicle keeping the vehicle following in view.
- No predictable travel pattern will be established.
- Movement during hours of darkness will be for operational reasons only and will always be in APC or at least two vehicle strength. Actual size/strength will be decided by relevant authority.
- Convoys will report in person to the HQ controlling their movement. The convoy commander will inform HQ of the time of departure, the registration number of the vehicle, the route to be taken including stops and the approximate time of arrival at destination. When a radio check is made therefore none of this information will be given over the air for security reasons. On arrival he will indicate this fact to his controlling HQ by telephone.
- Where HQ of formations such as SWEDLOG/FRENCHLOG operate a report line system, codes should be used so that identification of individuals or individual units is not divulged by messages passed by radio.



2,  
~~7.3.5.~~ Single vehicle travel

- The vehicle will carry at least three personnel including driver.
- The vehicle will have three armed personnel including the driver.
- The vehicle will be equipped with Motorola or radio or Force Message Net. For internal travel within its own BATT AO, the ideal situation is for vehicle to have radio on BATT Net.
- No predictable travel pattern will be established.
- The senior officer travelling will report in person to the HQ controlling his movement. He will inform the HQ of his time of departure, his vehicle number, his route including stops and the approximate time of arrival at his destination. When a radio check is made therefore, none of this information will be given of the area for security reasons.
- Where his controlling HQ operates a report line system, codes will be used so as not to divulge identification of individuals.
- On arrival at his destination the senior officer travelling will report by telephone to his controlling HQ.
- Single vehicles will not travel during hours of darkness. APC excepted.

UNAMIR  
UNIFIL units

2,  
~~7.3.6.~~ Units operating a convoy system to the AO from

~~Nasoura/Tyre pocket~~ will abide by the principles at paragraph ~~7.3.4~~ above. Units with single vehicles travelling to and from the AO will abide by the principles at paragraph 7.3.5. above. Unit convoys may from time to time be required to incorporate other elements into their travel group for security purposes.

~~7.3.7~~ <sup>UNAMIR</sup> HQ military sections and staff. ~~UNIFIL~~ HQ personnel will report to their branch duty officers with an itinerary of their journeys. Branch duty officers (LOGS, A&P etc.) will coordinate these in convoys and log them. <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS will inform branch duty officers of an emergency in AO or ICA. When travelling by single vehicle they should abide by principles at paragraph 7.3.5. above.

~~7.3.8~~ <sup>UNAMIR</sup> Civilian personnel. Civilian personnel cannot conform to the principles outlined above. They are therefore at risk and will not travel by single vehicle unless accompanied by three armed military personnel. Where military personnel are not immediately available for escort, they will forward through SAO's office to LOGS Transport Cell by 1200 hour LT on the day before the journey and 1200 hours LT on Friday in respect of journeys planned for the following Monday, the following details:

- Vehicle number
- Number of personnel
- Route

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to be  
canceled.



UN RESTRICTED

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- UNAMIR
- Desired EDT from UNIFIL HQ
  - Desired ETA back to UNIFIL HQ

~~7.3.9~~ On receipt of requests, LOGS Transport Cell will co-ordinate the request with planned convoy movements and inform SAO by 1400 hours of travel arrangements.

~~7.3.10~~ Civilian travel to and from NORBATT should, if possible, be routed through Israel - Metulla and ICA, with NORBATT providing an escort to and from Metulla coordinated by LOGS Transport Cell.

~~7.3.11~~ Civilians travelling in ICA will be escorted and controlled by OGL. These procedures are covered in Administrative Instruction 89/04 dated 8 March 1989 and any amendments which may be issued to this document.

#### Control measures

- ~~7.3.12~~ Radio movement control will be exercised through:
- Motorola (CH 3, CH 4, CH 5, CH 6, CH 7). CH 8 in exceptional circumstances;
  - Force Message Net (important especially on coastal road due to 'black spots').
  - Unit nets.

~~7.3.13~~ LOGS Transport Cell will co-ordinate movement of civilian personnel which cannot conform to basic principles, with existing convoys.

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UN RESTRICTED



7.3.14. All convoys/single vehicles on the move will be prepared to obey instructions passed by radio from UNIFIL OPS by UNIFIL CHPs in reaction to a developing situation along their initially planned route.

#### Control system

7.3.15. All vehicles in the AO or ICA must be controlled by the relevant HQ. In the event of threatened hijack or other serious situation developing, UNIFIL OPS must be able to assure the safety of all United Nations personnel. Timely passage and receipt of urgent messages will depend on a good communication system and it is imperative that nets do not get choked with traffic.

7.3.16. In order to effect this, the following system will apply. UNIFIL OPS will only make contact with the under-mentioned HQ who in turn will make contact with the vehicles they control. The list of HQ and the personnel they control are contained in OPS Directive 302.

7.3.17. The controlling HQ have the responsibility to monitor the operational situation and to control their outgoing or incoming vehicles accordingly. They must make allowances for "black spots" where radio communication is poor. When as is the case of northern units communications is lost due to extreme range, then the controlling HQ must inform UNIFIL OPS and request relay facilities in any emergency. As a rule of thumb no vehicle should be out of communication for more than twenty minutes.

UN RESTRICTED

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7.3.18. In the event of serious incidents, information of impending operations or other events in the <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL AO/ICA which require a restriction of non-operational movement in the affected area, duty personnel will take the following action:

- Initiate an all stations call on Motorola Channel 6 restricting movement in the affected area by use of "Code Word".
- Phone Radio Room (Ext. 5245) asking them to pass the warning to all radio technicians working locally or in the AO/ICA. This message will then be passed by the Radio Room on Channel 4.
- Phone duty officer OGL (Ext. 5392) asking him to inform operational posts and teams operating in ICA.
- Phone FRENCHLOG (5362), SWEDLOG OPS (Ext. 5388 or switchboard 5334) to verify that they have picked up and transmitted message received on Channel 6.
- Phone CASO (Ext 5129) to ensure that he passes message ITALAIR.
- Contact MP (Ext 5232/5233). MP Coy will pass message to MP patrols on Channel 5.

Further details are contained in OPS Directives.

7.3.19. MP personnel, at regular intervals, will institute checks to ensure that the terms of SOP are being adhered to by both military and civilian personnel.

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 7.3.20. Exceptions. From time to time situations will arise where the terms of this SOP will prove too restrictive. In such cases ACOS OPS is authorized to give special instructions.

#### 7.4. HIJACK

a.  
 7.4.1. General. The risk of hijack is ever present in <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL AO. Events have demonstrated that United Nations personnel are potential targets. It is imperative that immediate action be taken by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL in the case of hijack. The keynote should be one of rapid reaction by all relevant personnel. This section covers such reaction and should be read in conjunction with OPS Directive "Hijack" - 189 and Annex <sup>6.15.6</sup> 8.12 of this Part.

b.  
 7.4.2. Initial alert. Reaction can only be efficient if it is initiated by a timely and accurate alert. This alert should be passed by the potential victim if the situation allows or by any witness to the incident. It should be passed by the fastest means available and this message and subsequent traffic pertaining to it will be given absolute priority by operations, duty officers etc. The following is the hijack message text:

- "HIJACK" "HIJACK" "HIJACK"
- Incident location: An AMR is the most useful indicator but this may not always be possible. Other simple indicators may be utilized (e.g. ....km N/S/W/E of UN posn....., road junction ....km west of .....village etc.

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- Information on hijackers: If available, details such as number of hijackers, vehicle colour/make/registration number, description of hijackers, if armed etc., direction of flight of hijackers etc.

~~7.4.3.~~ Emergency procedures. The following procedures will apply:

UNIFIL OPS Duty Officer:

- Initiate an immediate all stations call on radio to battalions/units/FMR/MP Tyre.  
Example: "ALL STATIONS, THIS IS UNIFIL OPS, HIJACK ! HIJACK! HIJACK! AT 1100Z ONE XXXX SOLDIER AT XXX TAKEN BY 4 AES IN A BROWN MERCEDES TOWARDS XXXX";
- The acknowledgement by all units as per normal procedure, Channel 6 directed net, is very carefully checked by UNIFIL OPS. The message will be repeated if there is any doubt that all units have not received and understood the full text;
- Alert HOTEL NOVEMBER on Channel 8 Motorola;
- Report to Liaison Branch or liaison duty officer after duty hours;
- Call ITALAIR requesting a heli on immediate standby;
- Call SWEDLOG/SWEDENGCOY/NORBATT requesting dog teams on immediate standby;
- Report to SOO (duty hours) or AFDO (after duty hours);
- Report to MIO duty officer.



All BATTs and units in AO:

- Repeat message through own means to all sub-units;
- Immediately close all CHP. CHP are prepared to open when ordered by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS. (Progressively as the location of the hijacked party becomes known);
- Put BMR on immediate standby;
- FMR goes on immediate standby;
- Contact local authorities;
- The BATT in whose AO the hijack has taken place sends immediately a mobile patrol to gain and maintain contact with the hijacked vehicle. Immediate hot pursuit is essential.

ITALAIR:

- Put a helicopter on immediate standby;
- If available, task a second helicopter as back-up.

SWEDLOG/SWEDENGCOY/NORBATT:

- Put one dog team on immediate standby;
- If available task other teams as back-up;
- Teams to be prepared for movement by road or helicopter as decided by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS.

Liaison:

- Alert ~~Lebanese~~ Army in Tyre Barracks;
- Alert Amal.

SDD/AFDO:

- Report incident immediately to FC, DFC, ACOS OPS, FDO, CPIO;

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- Draft initial "most immediate" cable to United Nations New York;
- Alert duty OPS mobile team.

CSO:

- Register all radio traffic on tape;
- Ensure that there are enough operators available to the OPS room.

~~2.4.4~~ Follow-up action. Follow-up action will be taken as outlined:

- ACOS OPS/FDO will be responsible for coordinating the search operations following instructions issued by the FC.
- SOO/AFDO:
  - Will be responsible for organizing a cordon line around the area in which the presence of the hijackers is suspected;
  - Will lift or decrease the traffic restrictions imposed under emergency reactions at CHPs outside cordoned area.
- BATTS/Units in the AO:
  - Once initial traffic restrictions are lifted they will conduct searches of all non United Nations vehicles (including Amal) at CHP. All CHP to be Category B until status is lifted by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS. Follow principles as laid down in <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL Tactics Manual;



- Set up new CHPs on roads and tracks not monitored by permanent CHPs;
- Continue flow of pertinent information to <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS.
- Keep close contact with local leadership (including Amal).

- Liaison Branch:

- Send a Liaison Officer to establish contact with the relevant parties;
- Continue flow of pertinent information to <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS.

2.5. MINES, BATTLEFIELD DEBRIS, EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RECONNAISSANCE (EOR) AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD)

<sup>a. UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ area of operations is contaminated with old mines and battlefield debris. Roadside bombs, car bombs and other kinds of improvised explosive devices are found almost daily. Personnel should take all necessary precautions to avoid injuries and casualties caused by explosive devices.

Troops should be made aware of mine safety as follows:

- Personnel will assume that only areas specifically cleared by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ engineers and checked regularly are mine-free;
- Personnel will only move in these areas which will be clearly marked;
- Any suspect object should be reported, not touched;

- Troops should be aware of the parties' mine-marking techniques;
- The collection of war souvenirs is strictly forbidden; and
- Personnel should be taught to recognize mines, RSBs, bombs, cluster-bombs and other battlefield debris.

~~7.5.2.~~ Collection of information. The battalions are responsible for collecting information on minefields in their areas of operation. OGL is collecting information on the ICA. Collected information will be sent to <sup>UNAFIL</sup> UNIFIL OPS, Plans Cell, who is responsible for distributing all necessary information to units.

Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Definitions Used within EOD

~~7.5.3.~~ Explosive Ordnance Disposal incident. An EOD incident is the suspected or detected presence of unexploded explosive ordnance or damaged explosive ordnance, which constitutes hazard to operations, installations, personnel or materials.

~~7.5.4.~~ Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR).

Reconnaissance involving the investigation, detection, location, verification, identification, marking and reporting of suspected unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) in order to determine further action.



2.  
7.5.5. Improvised Explosive Device (IED). An IED is an improvised device incorporating any chemical and/or explosive, which is designed to kill or injure personnel, or to destroy or damage property.

7.5.6. Access Procedure. The actions undertaken to accurately locate and gain access to a device. It includes the route by which you approach a device and the means by which you gain entry to the device.

7.5.7. Render safe procedures. Those procedures and techniques used to disrupt and separate the essential components of a device in order to prevent an unacceptable detonation.

7.5.8. EOD action can be considered under two headings:  
- Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD): Actions which are carried out to remove an EOD incident as described above, or the disposal of unsafe or unserviceable explosive ordnance.  
- Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) is the access and render safe procedures used to remove any IED as described in paragraph 7.5.5. above. All IEDD actions should use remote or semi remote means. Hand entry into and IED must never be used in IEDD. Paragraph 7.5.11 refers to the use of UNIFIL HOB0 remote handling equipment and EOD kits.

~~7.5.9~~ EOR action will be carried out by trained personnel under one of the following headings, depending on the threat analysis:

- Specialist Route Clearance Teams (SRCT): Such teams carry out clearance along routes before those routes are used by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL personnel or vehicles, when the risk is considered to be low. SRCT are made up of trained infantry personnel.
- Engineer Specialist Search Teams (ESST): These teams will carry out:
  - Route clearance where the threat has been identified as serious;
  - The clearance of incident control points for IEDD. They may also isolate devices and clear safe routes to IEDs for EOD personnel.

#### Explosive Ordnance Disposal And Improvised

#### Explosive Device Disposal Within <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL

~~7.5.10~~ <sup>UNAMIR</sup> Each BATT within UNIFIL is responsible for EOD and IEDD within its own AO. Trained personnel at Nagoura Camp will deal with devices found within the camp. ACOS OPS will nominate personnel/units from within Nagoura Camp for EOD/IEDD training.

~~7.5.11~~ <sup>L</sup> In addition to its EOD/IEDD tasks in IRISHBATT AO, IRISHBATT EOD team is responsible for:

- The maintenance and repair of <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL HOBO remote control vehicles and other EOD equipment for use in IEDD within <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL;

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- The training of personnel of all contingents in the use of the HOB0 remote control vehicle, and in IEDD techniques.

M  
~~7.5.12.~~ In addition to its search tasks within IRISHBATT AO, IRISHBATT EOD team is responsible for:

- The maintenance and repair of <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL HOB0 remote control vehicles and other EOD equipment for use in IEDD within <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL;
- The training of personnel of all contingents in the use of the HOB0 remote control vehicle and in IEDD techniques.

N  
~~7.5.13.~~ In addition to its search tasks within IRISHBATT AO, IRISHBATT ESST will assist <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL by conducting search training for personnel of other contingents.

O  
~~7.5.14.~~ All courses will be coordinated by the Plans Section of <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS. All personnel who are nominated for courses will be approved by them. All course reports will be submitted to them.

P  
~~7.5.15.~~ Upon finding explosive devices, the actions listed below will be taken when the unit is unable to clear the device through the use of their internal resources:

- Contact <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS and request assistance;
- Close off the area when necessary, to all personnel and traffic;
- Establish guards at safe distances and erect a



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warning sign stating "DANGER - UNEXPLODED  
DEVICE" in Arabic and English;

- Maintain security until arrival of an EOD team.

Q 7.5.16. Trained personnel from BATTs may draw <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ EOD remote handling equipment from ~~IRISHBATT~~ for use in rendering safe the device. Request for use of EOD kits will be forwarded through ACOS OPS at <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ HQ. The EOD kit request format is attached at Annex 7.1. ~~IRISHBATT~~ EOD personnel may go to an IED incident to provide advice on EOD operations

R 7.5.17. In order that EOD training is kept up to date, all IED incidents must be reported so that the practices, tactics and trends being used by various groups can be assessed. For this reason reports of all IED incidents within <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ should be forwarded to <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS with a copy to ~~IRISHBATT~~ EOD officer. Report format is attached at Annex 7.2. Letter codes are given in Appendix I to this annex.

#### 9.6. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DOCTRINE

a 7.6.1. General. In peace-keeping operations (PKO) where there is a threat of the use of unconventional weapons (NBC weapons) of mass destruction, the troops that are deployed into such a theatre of operations must be trained and properly equipped against the use of such weapons.

b 7.6.2. Responsibility of the troop-contributing country  
- NBC training. Prior to deployment into the mission

area, all ranks are expected to be fully trained on all aspects of survival, treatment and decontamination techniques following an NBC attack. In addition to this requirement, all ranks are to be issued with the following basic Individual Protective Equipment (IPE);

- Gas mask (respirator and filters);
- NBC clothing (complete set);
- Prophylax;
- Atropine;
- Detection agents for radiation and gas;
- Decontamination equipment;
- Vaccinations/inoculations against known biological agents.
- The units should be equipped with NBC-detection and decontamination equipment.

~~7.6.3.~~ <sup>UNAMIR</sup> <sup>UNAMIR</sup> Responsibility of ~~UNIFIL~~. UNIFIL is responsible for establishing a security alert and alarm system to coordinate the varying degrees of alerts against the NBC threat. This system should consist of at least three stages of warnings and should be coordinated with the alert system of the security and defence forces of the host country.

- Warning to the troop-contributing countries about the possible threat of the use of NBC weapons;
- Pre-warning (given in minutes) in which time-frame IPE is available;
- Alert (IPE is available and donned by individuals);
- Alarm (NBC weapons have been used in the area of

operations and contamination of environment is most likely).

The detailed alert system is given in Operations Directives.

<sup>d</sup>  
~~7.6.4.~~ When the alert is given to the units, they operate their national alert systems and protection procedures. If training in the use of equipment is required, requests are to be made to <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIPIL OPS Plans Cell, who will coordinate the training with other contingents.



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permissions, they will be guidance to commanders that certain specific actions may be taken if they are judged necessary to achieving the aim of the mission. Commanders at all levels are required to translate this directive and they are to ensure its dissemination to every soldier under their command. In addition, they are to ensure every soldier in their command understands this directive.

5. Amendments to this directive will be issued as required and as approved by the UN.

6. This directive will be classified UN RESTRICTED.

DEFINITIONS

7. The following key definitions must be clearly understood by all personnel in UNAMIR.

- a. Force. The use of physical means to impose one's will. Military force is the use of the physical means provided by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of troops under unified command to the same end and generally implies the use of significant levels of violence. However, the whole *raison d'être* of peace-keeping is that peace should be achieved without the use of military force. Peace-keeping is substantially different from peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN peace-keeping operations, including UNAMIR, will be carried out by unarmed military and police observers and armed forces only equipped for self-defence.
- b. Self Defence. Action to protect oneself or one's unit, when faced with an instant and overwhelming need, leaving no choice of means and no time for deliberation;
- c. Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is an action(s) which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against personnel or equipment of Peace-keeping Forces and/or property under their responsibility;
- d. Hostile Act. A hostile act is any aggressive action against personnel or equipment of Peace-keeping Forces and/or property under their responsibility;
- e. Minimum Force. The minimum authorized degree of force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances;

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- f. Collateral Damage. Damage to persons or property adjacent to, but not part of an authorized target;
- g. Positive Identification. Assured identification by a specific means can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, track behavior, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis or IFF procedures;
- h. Armed Force. The use of fire arms and other weapons (ie. batons, bayonets, CS Gas, etc) including warning shots;
- j. Unarmed Force. The use of physical force short of the use of firearms or other weapons (ie batons, bayonets, CS gas, etc).

matchetes,  
bows and  
arrows,  
spears!

AUTHORITY

8. The general guideline on the delegation of authority for use of different types of weapons is as follows:

- a. Force Commander or Commander officiating in his Absence:
  - 1) Heavy Support Weapons (ie. rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc);
  - 2) Heavy Machine Guns or Cannons (.50 cal, 20mm etc); and
  - 3) Medium Machine Guns (ie FN MAG, M60 etc).
- b. Sector Commanders:
  - 1) Light machine guns; and
  - 2) All personal weapons for automatic fire.
- c. Battalion Commander down to NCO level at the scene of a threat:
  - 1) Personal weapons for single shot fire.

9. Where the situation permits, the subordinate HQs must inform the higher HQs before resorting to armed force. Where this is not possible, the commander at the threatening incident must use

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his discretion, following this guideline.

CONCEPT

11. UNAMIR personnel may use their weapons:

- a. to defend themselves, other UN lives, or persons under their protection against direct attack, acting always under the order of the senior at the threatening incident;
- b. to defend possession of property of installations belonging to or under the protection of the UN from damage, theft or destruction;
- c. to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent this Force from discharging its duties, acting under the personal authority of the Force Commander or his authorized replacement only; and
- d. to resist deliberate military or para-military incursions into United Nations protected areas (ie the RPF compound).

PRINCIPLES

11. When an incident occurs, that requires the use of force, the following principles will be adhered to:

- a. only minimum force consistent with achieving the immediate aim will be employed;
- b. if possible, prevention by negotiation must be exhausted before any use of force is initiated;
- c. if possible, warning and an escalation of unarmed force must be exhausted before any use of armed force is initiated;
- d. if possible, warning shots should precede "fire for effect" (fire for effect is firing at the center of mass of the target);
- e. if a threatening situation develops where firing for effect seem the only option, it will be initiated only after all the warning procedures above have been exhausted, except if there is an immediate threat as per para 11 where a delay would cause casualties or destruction of property in which case fire for effect may be initiated under the order



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of the senior commander present without delay;

- f. in firing for effect, the guiding principle must be minimum force. Care must be taken to ensure that collateral damage is minimized (ie action which will cause collateral damage is prohibited) and that no escalation of the level of violence is initiated by UNAMIR. Retaliation is prohibited. Each action should be met with a like action from UNAMIR;
- g. fire must be controlled by the senior commander present and is to cease once the aim has been achieved; and
- h. after the firing incident, the senior commander present must transmit a full report at the earliest opportunity.

12. When possible, each escalation in the use of force should be authorized by the chain of command of UNAMIR. A request in clear by radio for authorization to fire can have a calming effect on its own. Permission to use higher level of force must be obtained from the appropriate commander as per para 9. The senior commander on the spot is responsible for assessing the situation and taking the action appropriate to the situation.

TYPES OF FORCE

13. There are two types of force: unarmed force and armed force:

- a. Unarmed Force. Unarmed force involves the use of all means, short of the use of fire arms or other weapons, to discharge the duties mandated to UNAMIR. Examples are use of physical means like wrestling, use of vehicles to block, etc. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use unarmed force:

- 1) when the safety of UN personnel is threatened with unarmed threats;
- 2) when infiltrations or envelopments are attempted without firing;
- 3) when UN premises are violated;
- 4) in self-defence from unarmed attack;

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5) when unarmed attempts are made to abduct or arrest UN civilians or military personnel;

6) when unarmed attempts are made to steal UN property or property under charge of the UN; and

7) when unarmed attempts are made to prevent UNAMIR personnel from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.

b. Armed Force. Armed force is the use of any weapon of fire-arm. Examples are the use of CS gas to deny entry into a UN premises, the use of bayonet to disperse a crowd, the use of aimed shots to defend a convoy from armed attack. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use armed force against armed persons:

1) in self defence;

2) against attempt to disarm UNAMIR personnel;

3) when other UN personnel are in mortal danger;

4) when other lives are in mortal danger;

5) in defence of UNAMIR premises or vehicles under armed attack;

6) when attempts are made to compel UNAMIR personnel by armed force to withdraw from a position they were ordered to occupy by their superiors;

7) when attempts are made with the use of armed force to penetrate a UN premises or cut off a UN force;

8) when attempts by force are made to prevent UNAMIR personnel from carrying out missions assigned by their commanders; and

9) when attempts are made to abduct

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or arrest UN civilians or military personnel using force.

CRIMINAL ACTS

14. The recent history of Rwanda is burdened with civil war, dislocation of large elements of the population, terrorism, ethnic and political violence, armed banditry and virtual economic collapse. The potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry during the UNAMIR mandate, due to the rapid demobilization of approximately 35,000 military personnel, high unemployment, over-population and mass desertion from the army, is very high.

15. For the most part, the maintenance of law and order, and therefore responding to control criminal activity, is the responsibility of the local police, monitored by the UNAMIR UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) monitors. However, during the period of demobilization, the ability of the local police may be severely taxed. As a very real possibility, UNAMIR military personnel may be required to assist UNCIVPOL and local authorities, in maintaining law and order. In these circumstances, these rules of engagement would be used in support of local authorities and UNCIVPOL. In these circumstances, military personnel or units would be placed in support of UNCIVPOL, who would act to support local police in the maintenance of law and order.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

17. There may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. Examples are executions, attacks on displaced persons or refugees, ethnic riots, attacks on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions, UNAMIR military personnel will follow the ROD outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

17. RULE NUMBER ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.

- a. STATE A: NO AUTHORITY.
- b. STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

18. RULE NUMBER TWO: STATUS OF WEAPONS.

- a. STATE A: WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED WITH LOADED MAGAZINES.



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- b. STATE B: WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED AND CHARGED AND MADE SAFE.
19. RULE NUMBER THREE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT WITHOUT THE USE OF FIRE.
- a. STATE A: OBSERVE AND REPORT BUT WILL WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OWN FORCE.
- b. STATE B: STAY IN PLACE. MAKE CONTACT AND ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH OPPOSING FORCE(S) AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED.
- c. STATE C: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS WITHOUT OPENING FIRE.
- d. STATE D: OBSERVE AND REPORT. STAY IN PLACE. WARN AGGRESSOR OF INTENT TO USE FORCE AND DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE BY APPROPRIATE MEANS. DEMONSTRATIVE USE OF FIRE IS AUTHORIZED.
20. RULE NUMBER FOUR: DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY OF CIVILIANS.
- a. STATE A: NO AUTHORIZATION GRANTED.
- b. STATE B: AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED. IN DOING SO, USE MINIMUM FORCE AND ESCALATE TO INCLUDE USE OF FIRE IF HOSTILE INTENT OF ACT IS COMMITTED. HAND OVER TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
22. RULE NUMBER FIVE: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS.
- a. STATE A: INTERVENTION IS PROHIBITED.
- b. STATE B: INTERVENTION BY FIRE FOR EFFECT AGAINST POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND DESIGNATED TARGETS ONLY AFTER WARNING SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED AS PART OF THE WARNING PROCESS.
23. RULE NUMBER SIX: CONTROL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
- a. STATE A: MANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT AND FIRING OF WEAPONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PROHIBITED.
- b. STATE B: DESIGNATED ACTIVITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PERMITTED BUT WILL BE SPECIFIED BY THE FOLLOWING NOTES:

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- 1) MAN (TYPE OF SYSTEM)
- 2) PREPARE (TYPE OF SYSTEM)
- 3) MOVE (TYPE OF SYSTEM)
- 4) FIRE (TYPE OF SYSTEM)

24. Normal Rules and States. In the normal, daily situation the following ROE status applies:

- a. Rule Nos One, State B (AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS);
- b. Rule Nos Two, State A (WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED AND CHARGED AND MADE SAFE);
- c. Rule Nos Three, State B (STAY IN PLACE. MAKE CONTACT AND ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH OPPOSING FORCE(S) AND/OR LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED);
- d. Rule Nos Four, State B (AUTHORIZATION IS GRANTED. IN DOING SO, USE MINIMUM FORCE AND ESCALATE TO INCLUDE USE OF FIRE IF HOSTILE INTENT OF ACT IS COMMITTED. HAND OVER TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY);
- e. Rule Nos Five, State A (INTERVENTION IS PROHIBITED); and
- f. Rule Nos Six, State A (MANNING, PREPARATION, MOVEMENT AND FIRING OF WEAPONS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES IN CONFLICT IS PROHIBITED).

25. Thus to recap normal status:

26. Changes in normal status of ROE as described in para 21 for the Force as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or in his absence by his designated replacement. Sector Commanders may request changes in normal status which will be authorized by the Force Commander or his designate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status for units or sub-units under their command if authorized by the Force Commander or his designate.

CHALLENGING PROCEDURE

27. The following challenging procedure is to be followed in all cases except where the immediate threat to self-defence dictates immediate firing:

- a. warn the aggressor to stop;
- b. repeat the warning as many times as necessary

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to ensure understanding;

- c. charge weapons if authorized;
- d. fire warning shots into the safe ground ensuring ricochet is impossible; and
- e. if warning shots are ignored, open fire, on order and under the control of a superior with single aimed fire for effect until the protection task is complete. escalate fire for effect with other weapons systems on order only of the appropriate commander.

OPENING FIRE WITHOUT CHALLENGING

28. The only circumstances under which it is permissible to open fire without challenging are if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that even a moments delay could:

- a. lead to death or serious injury to UN personnel
- b. lead to death or serious injury to persons who are under the protection of UNAMIR; and
- c. lead to the theft, damage or destruction of UNAMIR property or property UNAMIR has been mandated to protect.

ACTION BEFORE OPENING FIRE

29. On all occasions before opening fire, UNAMIR personnel will be guided by the principle of minimum force. Commanders will always give a warning before commencing to fire and warning shots should be fired before resorting to fire for effect, except in the circumstances outlined in para 27, where fire for effect will be opened immediately. In normal circumstances, the following sequence should be applied:

- a. Warning. Depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc). Warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;
- b. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, warning shots should be fired into a safe area where there is no danger of ricochet or collateral damage; and
- c. Fire for Effect. If the above measures have had no effect on the situation, UNAMIR



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personnel may, under orders and control, fire for effect.

ACTION DURING FIRING

30. Aimed fire will be fired for effect, ie. fired at the center of visible mass of the target. Fire must be controlled and will not be indiscriminate. Automatic fire and fire of support weapons will only be used as a last resort and only on the order of the appropriate commander in the chain of command. Fire for effect will only continue as long as it is necessary to achieve the immediate aim. Through fire control orders, the commander on the scene will indicate and control the fire, preferably directed at the leaders or instigators of the threat. Continual situation reports will be forwarded through the chain of command.

ACTION AFTER FIRING

31. After firing for effect, commanders should ensure the following actions are taken:

- a. Medical. Any wounded, including those fired upon by UNAMIR personnel will be given first aid, if such an action can be done without further endangering the lives of UN personnel;
- b. Recording. The incident will be recorded including:
  - (1) time of firing;
  - (2) the weapons fired;
- c. Reporting. The above information will be reported through the chain of command to Force HQ ATTN Force Commander and Chief Operations Officer:
  - (1) Who or what was fired on;
  - (2) Why UN personnel opened fire;
  - (3) Where the incident occurred;
  - (4) When the incident and all activities including firing occurred;
  - (5) What is the current situation;  
and
  - (6) How the situation developed.

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-dl-

CONCLUSION

32. No definitive directive can be created that can detail every possible action for every possible situation. The aim of the directive was to issue direction that would serve to guide commanders and soldiers at all levels in the use of force. It is critical and mandatory that all members of UNAMIR understand this directive and apply it to any situations that may develop that will require the use of force.

33. In conclusion, all commanders to ensure this directive is translated into their national language and that all soldiers under their command are completely familiar with its contents and intent.

ANNEX

Annex 1: Aide Memoire for Members of UNAMIR (not included, to be issued later)

DISTRIBUTION LISTAction

MILOB Group CMO (1)  
DMZ Sector Comd (3)  
UNOMUR Sector Comd (1)  
Kigali Sector Comd (5)  
CPS (2)  
CLHO (2)  
Clego (1)  
CMPO (1)

Information

CAO (1)

RR#2

Annex 6.12 - Hijacking ✓  
Annex 6.13 - Deception ✓  
Annex 6.14 - Area of Responsibility ✓  
Annex 6.15 - Reserve ✓  
Annex 6.16 - MEDEVAC ✓  
Annex 6.17 - Reporting ✓  
Annex 6.18 - Temporary Checkpoints ✓

Section

## 10 OPERATIONAL INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS

1.1) The operational readiness of the troops is the responsibility of the unit commanders. However, operational inspections are carried out by UNIFIL HQ, Operations Branch to ensure the standardization of the operational activities of the units. Inspections are made on a regular basis as follows:

- <sup>periodical</sup> Operational inspections preceding FC's pre-summer and pre-winter inspections (see Volume 2 Part 1 Section 10); and
- Operational inspections carried out by the Force Duty Officer on weekly basis (see Section 4 of this Part).

↑  
NO NEED  
SO FAR  
to be cancelled

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In addition to the regular inspections, the officers of the Operations Branch when travelling in the AO are to carry out inspections on irregular intervals in positions of the troops.

2) The subjects of the inspections are normally:

- Deployment of the position;
- Manning level;
- Surveillance equipment;
- Security
- Plans and orders;
- Operational procedures and drills; and
- Training

3) Operational Investigations. An operational investigation is one carried out by UNFIL HQ or units into any special operational occurrence. It will normally evolve from:

- A particular serious operational incident requiring further detailed appraisal;
- A request by one of the parties; or
- A complaint from one of the parties about the operational behaviour/reaction of UNFIL military personnel.

Such incidents may or may not be subject for boards of inquiry at a later stage.

4) Operational investigations are normally held against the background of a serious or potentially serious

incident. As such they are very important and, if properly handled, can defuse potentially explosive situations and maintain good relations between <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ and the parties.

5) A request for an operational investigation can be initiated by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ HQ or by unit. It can also be requested by one of the parties or offered to one of the parties by ~~UNIFIL~~ to defuse a potentially serious or threatening situation. If it is requested at unit level and involves a purely local incident, it may be carried out at that level, but only after the approval of <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS is sought and obtained. Normally the operational investigation can be instituted by FC, DFC or ACOS OPS, depending on the seriousness of the incident.

6) An operational investigation will be carried out by at least two suitably qualified officers of different nationalities. OPS Mobile Team can be tasked to carry out investigations (see OPS Directive 304). The investigation team must be properly briefed and be given written terms of reference. The parties may be asked for liaison Officers, material evidence and witnesses. The team must carry out the investigation with speed, efficiency, discretion and courtesy. They will be strictly impartial and will not accept any pressure from the parties concerned. Nor will they deliver any information on the results of the investigation to the parties without prior approval of <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS. The investigation will not be affected by personal opinions, but facts and professional conclusions.

6.7) The investigation will be carried out at the scene of the incident or as close to it as it is possible. The team will take notes, hear the witnesses, make sketches and maps, take photographs, tag material evidence items with serial number, DTG, AMR etc. The team will maintain communication with the headquarters throughout the investigation.

6.8) Report. At the conclusion of the investigation a written report will be submitted to the convening authority. This report will form the basis of reports (INCREPS) to United Nations, New York and, if necessary, to the parties. the report will include:

- Terms of reference;
- Broad description of the background to the investigation;
- Actions of investigation team;
- Statements of witnesses;
- Maps, physical evidence, sketches, photographs, etc.;
- Conclusions.



## SECTION II - CONDUCT OF THE MEETINGS

### GENERAL

1. As has been stated often, the two Rwandan Parties involved in the conflict see each other with suspicion and distrust. It was one of UNAMIR mandates to establish contact and liaison between the two Parties. In spite of the two Parties LOs deployed together with UNMO, there is rarely, if ever a direct dealing between the Parties. It is organized through the JMC. During the past, incidents of cease-fire violations and attacks by some of the Parties have been innumerable. In such an environment, it is quite likely that UNAMIR forces will have to organize and manage the transfer of personnel, goods and other items from one Party to the other or may be to arrange special meetings between the two Parties.
2. Such transfers or special meetings can lead to extremely sensitive situations, where suspicion and mistrust allow little leeway for bad planning. Where small incidents can escalate, and where lack of information on a continuing basis can quickly be misinterpreted. Such operations require a good and simple plan cleared in advance with both or all Parties involved, and liaison and passage of information throughout.
3. The SOP lays down a set of guidelines for conduct of such sensitive meetings by UNAMIR forces.

### OCCASIONS

4. Occasions where these operations may be required may include one or all of the following:
- a. Transfers of prisoners of war.
  - b. Transfer of bodies.
  - c. Transfer of voluntary returners.
  - d. Transfer of parcels or mail between the Parties.
  - e. Transfer of other items (eg property, stray animals).
5. Transfers can arise from bilateral talks between the Parties, from contacts through the Parties LOs deployed with UNMO/UNAMIR contingents, or brought about as a result of outcome of JMC meetings. It may also be brought about by a third party involvement (eg International Red Cross Committee, another UN agency, etc). Once the details have been agreed, the transfers will often become a UN-supervised operation.

### PLANNING

6. 23. The JMC meetings will form the nerve centre for planning of

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all such meetings, through the deployed Party LOs. Preplanning should be detailed and discussed with the Parties. The points which should be established mutually in planning discussion include the following:

- 4. Information. WHO/WHAT is involved? WHEN is the transfer to take place?
- 5. Location. WHERE is the transfer to take place? Ideally UN position or an area that can be easily secured?
- 6. Procedure. HOW is the transfer to be effected? Essentially the plan should be simple and carried out at the lowest possible level. High level operations tend to lead to complications.
- 7. Agreement on communications.
- 8. Liaison facilities established.
- 9. Security measures assessed, tasked and agreed.

#### EXECUTION

24. It is neither possible nor advisable to lay down specific procedures for execution as every situation will vary for innumerable reasons. The undermentioned aspects must be deliberately considered to execution of a meeting:

- 1. Place of actual transfer should be UN controlled areas or locations (ideally existing UN positions) interposed between the Parties.
- 2. POWs/bodies/mail should be brought forward by Party "A" to a waiting area in a location controlled by them.
- 3. When signalled forward, the POWs/bodies/mail should be brought to the central UN area. This can be done by Party "A" or UN. If Party "A", then personnel must be warned and those involved should be specifically marked (e.g. by wearing white arm bands). If UN, unarmed observers are the preferred option.
- 4. All the Central UN area checks and recording are completed prior to handover to Party "B".
- 5. If a POW exchange is involved, both Parties bring the prisoners to their respective waiting areas. On a signal they are simultaneously escorted, ideally by UN, to separate central areas, checked, recorded and then transferred.

25. Throughout the operation, liaison is maintained and there is a constant passage of information between the UN and the Parties.

26. If the operation requires the Parties to come into a relatively close contact, they must be unarmed, distinctively marked (e.g. white arm bands) and escorted by UN.

27. It should be noted that such meetings should be arranged for larger issues in contention. The media of JMC working group meeting provide ideal modus operandi both to solve minor irritants as well as to arrange a contact between leaders of the two Parties to iron out lesser issues.

28. After the operation, records and reports are compiled. There should be a final coordination between UNAMIR personnel and the third Party. UN personnel should be the last element to leave the scene where the meeting is arranged in areas out of UNAMIR forces premises.

#### SECURITY AND CONTROL OF CROSSING/LINES

29. Before the deployment of UNAMIR, a number of incidents and attacks have been reported. The probable intention was to bring more and more of economically or tactically important areas, villages, towns, under their control in spite of agreements to observe cease-fire.

30. In such cases, UNAMIR will have to undertake disengagement of conflicting forces by clearly defining easily recognizable geographical features/landmarks on ground, that would limit the freedom of manoeuvre of concerned Parties, thus creating conditions to prevent further clashes.

31. Lines, imprecise or not, whether on ground or on maps, will play an important part in accomplishment of the above. Some of these terms that would occur are given below:

32. Cease-fire lines (CFL). Literally the line held when the fighting stopped, normally defined as the "forward defended locations" (FDLs) held by each side at the time the ceasefire came into force.

33. Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL). A more formal and fixed line to which the Parties have agreed in an armistice agreement. It does not have the status of a recognized border but usually becomes a de facto border.

34. Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Areas usually between the forward lines of opposing the parties, into which they have agreed not to deploy military forces and which may be placed under the control of UNAMIR.



← Why?  
this means  
various levels  
understanding.

4. Area of Influence Lines. Drawn by various Parties (including UN) to clarify a situation for themselves. They do not involve an agreement and are seldom widely accepted.

5. Assembly Zones. Areas beyond DMZ where both Parties will assemble after the disengagement process.

30. These lines can pose many problems:

a. There is often argument as to the correct line on the ground.

b. The two Parties may use incompatible maps.

c. Although in agreement with a line in principle, a Party may be reluctant to give up a particular piece of good defensive terrain.

d. A Party may retain administrative control over a ground which is tactically important.

31. UNAMIR cannot escape these problems. Often their task is to try to ensure that the Parties honour agreements they have made about lines or zones. In some cases, UNAMIR may have to insist on its own interpretation of such agreements. UNAMIR also have to insist on the freedom of movement which they need to carry out their mandates. This will often require them to cross, as a matter of routine, lines and zones controlled by the Parties and of great sensitivity to them. Crossing procedures must, therefore, be worked out with the Parties in a practical way by each affected UNAMIR contingent.

32. In the majority of the incidents, the procedure would originate from UNAMIR HQ. In all likelihood serious incidents would be brought into discussion at Level I JMC meeting. Based on the outcome of the discussion at this level, the CFL, ADL, DMZ, ASSZ would be worked out on 1:50,000 scale maps at the level of JMC working group. The sector HQ would, therefore, come into picture in implementation of the decision taken. In incidents where it is less of this serious, the sector HQ may have to formulate and arrive at an agreement at their level. Whatever be the level or degree of seriousness of the problem, the undermentioned aspects must be considered while arriving at the procedure as it is applicable to troops on ground on ground enforcing the agreement:

a. Where are the approved crossing points?

b. What are the times of opening?

c. Restrictions (if any) on recreation movement.

d. "No go" areas near crossings.

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← To be cancelled

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- e. "No go" areas except on duty near crossings.
- f. Approved roads near crossings.
- g. Clearance procedures and documentation required by Parties for crossing.
- h. Policy on official visitors using crossings.
- i. Security searches and checks of UN personnel, vehicles, baggage (normally Parties will not carry out checks on UN personnel, vehicles and baggage, but will call on UN military police to carry out searches while the representative of the Party observes).
- j. Different crossing regulations for different national contingents in the UNAMIR might be imposed by Parties; should UN accept such interference (since all personnel are equal and should not be treated differently) or should it adopt a more pragmatic attitude?
- k. What are the procedures for vehicles crossing? e.g. operational vehicles only, special pass vehicles only?
- l. What are liaison arrangements with Parties re-crossings?

#### NGONDORE MEETING AREA

16. Village NGONDORE (0529) Map No. --- -- is 64 KM from Kigali on Kigali - Gatuna road. It takes normally 1h15 to reach. A sketch of NGONDORE attached with this paper as Annex A. KINIHIRA Sub-Prefecture will be used as alternative to NGONDORE considering the requirement.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES

17. **PLANS SECTION:** Chief Plans Officer is responsible for all activities related to the use of those two locations by any Section/Branch of UNAMIR or any other Agency. Plans Section is responsible to ensure the following:

- a. Arrangement of meetings as and when necessary or as and when ordered by the Force Commander.
- b. Informing concerned parties/agencies regarding the venue, date and time of the meeting.
- c. Preparation of the agenda/minutes of the meeting.
- d. Giving early warning and written information to all concerned UNAMIR military component HQs.
- e. Allocation of either of the sites for all levels of meetings.
- f. Informing DMZ HQ about the location, date and time of

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the meetings.

g. Ensuring security of the area prior to the start of the meetings.

h. Ensuring through DMZ HQ that local Prefecture has been informed.

i. Ensuring that public address system has been placed and is operational.

j. Ensuring that necessary furniture is in place.

k. Arrange for Translators/Interpreters.

l. Arrange for necessary press coverage in coordination with Press Secretary of the SRSG if required.

35. DMZ HQ: DMZ Sector will be responsible to provide physical security of the location. Their specific tasks are the following:

a. Security of either meeting places.

b. Ensuring that administrative and logistics arrangements as per check list are completed well in time to receive meeting participants.

c. Providing escorts to RPF as per escort SOP.

d. Ensure that no party enters the conference venue with any weapon/explosive or armed escorts. Security personnel may be tasked to courteously check and monitor this. Details of escorts and their weapons are given in escort SOP.

36. KIGALI SECTOR AND MILOB GP HQ: They will be responsible to provide escorts as per Escort SOP.

37. CHECK LIST: Check list on use of the meeting sites is given in Annex B.

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PART 12 - LIAISONSECTION 12 - REPORTINGGeneral

1.1. ~~General~~ Reports by field liaison teams consist of the following:

- Reports on incidents
- Reports on meetings
- Special reports
- Weekly reports

1.2. Weekly and special reports of the field liaison teams are designed to provide <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ battalions, ACOS LIAISON and <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS with information on incidents or developing trends.

1.3. All reports compiled by the teams are submitted to the battalion concerned and the <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ Liaison Branch.

1.4. To be of value, the accuracy and factual content of the reports must be beyond dispute. The facts are checked against OPS briefs, reports from units (INCREPS) and information ascertained through liaison teams' queries.

1.5. Reports on incidents. When an incident is reported (normally to <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS), the Liaison Branch is informed via the Liaison Duty Officer. A report is then compiled after the facts have been ascertained. The report may be the basis of a protest if the situation requires a protest.

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3. Reports on meetings. Meetings with parties such as the Lebanese Army, <sup>RGF</sup> ~~IDF~~ and <sup>RPF</sup> ~~Amal~~ are always attended by two team members. The report on these meetings will be issued in the form of minutes of the meeting.

4. Special Reports. Special reports including reports on verification of incidents and events will be submitted as required by battalions or team members.

a  
5. Format of the Special Report Form is displayed in Annex 3.1.

6. Weekly reports. Weekly reports are made to keep ACOS LIAISON informed of significant events within the teams' area of responsibility. A copy of the report is given to the unit concerned.

a  
7. Format of the Weekly Report Form is displayed in Annex

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~~DART 1 - OPERATIONS~~~~SECTION 1 - OPERATIONAL REPORTING~~~~1.6. Operational Reporting~~

1.6. ~~By its~~ By its very nature current operations deals with reports on operations being conducted by the parties in conflict or with events which may have a bearing on them. Such reports must be timely to be effective. It is stressed that reporting of operational incidents is everybody's business.

1.7. There are many potential reporting sources other than operational units. These include:

- ~~FRENCHLOG~~ escorts
- ~~SWEDLOG~~ escorts
- Unit convoys
- MP patrols
- SOs, etc. travelling in AO
- ~~Tyre Log Base~~
- Tyre MP Detachment

Such sources must initiate reporting on operational matters which they may witness. Very often these reports contribute vital information necessary for action at a higher level. Reports should be sent by radio if assessed as immediately important. A written report should be submitted on return to base. In addition to informing <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~UNIT~~ OPS, it can often be useful to also inform the unit on the ground.

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8. OPS Directive 309 - Reporting - must be read in conjunction with this section and sub-section 6.10.

9. Logging. All operational reports will be logged on a daily log sheet. The time zone for all operational reports will be ZULU (Greenwich Mean Time). When ready to submit reports the units concerned will call ~~UNITIL~~ OPS, request a logging time and state specifically the type of report it wishes to make:

- SHOOTREPS
- Firings Close
- INCREPS

10. Shooting Reports (SHOOTREPS) Firing with all types of weapons, except for firings close should be reported on the SHOOTREP format at Annex 11.1. Aircraft attack should also be reported on the SHOOTREP format. It is the reporting units' prerogative to decide what they should report as a SHOOTREP but ~~UNITIL~~ OPS will normally only include in their reports to United Nations, New York the following:

- |   |                  |
|---|------------------|
| - SA/LMG  | - over 75 rds    |
| - HMG   | - over 50 rounds |
| - Heavy calibre weapons/artillery/mortar/tanks etc. | - all rounds     |

11. While units can adopt the above "guidelines", they are reminded that depending on circumstances, a SHOOTREP of under 75 rounds SA may be very important and should be reported. If in doubt send a SHOOTREP and allow ~~UNITIL~~ OPS to decide whether to include it or not in SOI.

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10-1  
ACTION REQUEST SERVICE  
STOPPED  
here

<input type="checkbox"/> 1. Name of person	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Address	<input type="checkbox"/> 3. City
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. State	<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Zip	<input type="checkbox"/> 6. Phone
<input type="checkbox"/> 7. Date	<input type="checkbox"/> 8. Time	<input type="checkbox"/> 9. Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> 10. Initials	<input type="checkbox"/> 11. Title	<input type="checkbox"/> 12. Organization

Approved - true field hosp  
and all f  
passed. this will continue

12. On certain rare occasions (e.g. a major attack involving many shootreps and firings close), the normal reporting system may not be able to cope with the situation as it would block all other traffic. On such occasions concentrate on firings close reports in order to alert Liaison Branch. Combine relevant SHOOTREPS and send when the opportunity arises.

13. Firing close reports. When firings close occur from IDF/DEF or other sources, two red flares will be fired by UNIFIL target position to indicate that a firing close has taken place. The flares will be fired in the general direction from which the firing was initiated. The firing of such warning flares will be repeated. Firings close will be reported on the Firings Close Report format contained in Annex 1.

14. The following "guidelines" will be applied when assessing a firing close:

- All impacts on or within a position including the hitting of compound earth bank, T-walls etc.;
- Fall of shot under 25 meters of position/vehicle/personnel for SA, LMG, HMG.
- Fall of shot under 100 meters of position/vehicle/personnel for mortars up to 81mm;
- Fall of shot under 200 meters of position/vehicle/personnel for tank, heavy mortars, artillery;
- Aerial bombardment within 1000 meters of UNIFIL positions/vehicles/personnel;

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- For shooting passing by position/vehicle/personnel to another target (i.e. "passed within") rules two and three apply;
- For shooting over a post/vehicle/personnel by all weapons, low over is firing close. Attempts should not be made to assess how low over. Judgement and experience will be the keynote.

16. Incident Reports (INCREPS). Unlike SHOOTREPS and firings close, INCREPS should NOT be passed in clear over radio. When INCREP is ready for transmission, the unit concerned looks for a logging time for INCREP from ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAR</sup> OPS. Once given this, they transmit the logging time and say that INCREP will follow by TTY. (For INCREP format see Annex ~~Q.B.~~ <sup>UNIMAR</sup>). TTY is used in the interest of ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAR</sup> safety and confidentiality, however, there will always be a delay between the incident happening on the ground and the receipt of the INCREP at ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAR</sup> OPS. It is therefore of paramount importance that ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAR</sup> OPS be kept informed of the ongoing situation especially where serious incidents are occurring. This can be done by telephone or CH 8 national voice conversation. The INCREP can later confirm earlier message.

17. Special incident reports (SINCREPS). These are reports which cover major incidents and are sent to United Nations HQ, New York, by cable. Special reports are drafted by direction of the FC. Details of serious developing incidents in an AO which may affect other units will be notified to units by way of a special cable by (TTY).

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17. ~~OPS~~. Reports submitted by ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAP2</sup> OPS: ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAP2</sup> OPS will prepare the following reports:

- Briefing Sheet. Prepared by OPS Duty Officer and used as basic document at morning brief.
- Daily situation report (SITREP) to New York. Prepared in draft form by OPS Duty Officer. Final draft prepared by SOO or AFDO (on Saturdays/Sundays) for typing and submission to Radio Room by 1200 LT latest. Units receive a copy. SITREP format is attached as Annex ~~1~~ <sup>2</sup>.
- Monthly Summary (PERSUM). Extracts from daily SOI selected by SOO or DS00 daily. Statistics done monthly by SOO/DS00. Complete document to United Nations, New York by first Friday of each month. Info copy for units.

18. ~~OPS~~. Reports submitted to ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAP2</sup> OPS. The following will be submitted to ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>UNIMAP2</sup> OPS:

- Unit daily SITREP
- Overflight reports
- Routine and special vehicle movements
- Unit weekly and monthly information reports
- ~~UNIFIL~~ deployment details
- Communications returns
- Helipad conduction returns

For details on each of the above returns see OPS Directive 309.

20.00 INFORMATION

20.10 : GENERALITIES

20.20 : TRACING OF INFORMATION

20.21 : TRACING PASSIVE

20.22 : TRACING ACTIVE

20.23 : EXPLOITATION OF INFORMATION

20.30 : REPORTS

20.31 : SHOTREP

20.32 : INTREP

20.33 : PATROLREP

20.34 : SITREP

20.35 : HUMINTREP

20.36 : INTSUM

20.40 : FREQUENCY OF THE REPORTS

20.50 : GUIDELINES FOR BEHAVIOR

#### 20.10 GENERALITIES

##### Information Collection Plan UNAMIR

As we realize that it is very difficult to collect information in this mission we should have some priorities given on what we want to know.

Although we can use any information it is important to try to confirm the information at least by THREE sources...

##### What sources do we have?

- a. radio Rwanda , RTLM 106.4 FM
- b. newspapers
- c. pamphlets
- d. the man in the street
- e. NGO and religious organisations all over the country
- f. Own troops

##### What do we want to know?

Everything that can help us conduct the operations to be a success, such as planned ambushes, weapon caches, clandestine and subversive meetings, planned demonstrations, terrorist actions...

The pieces of evidence are also required

##### When do we need this Info?

As soon as available and preferably before it occurs

#### Information

- (1) By a continuous judgement provide Force Commander, his Staff and the different Sector Cdr with Information to:
  - (a) Milieu (terrain, civilians )
  - (b) Possibilities and vulnerabilities of parties in presence
  - (c) Maps, land- and air photo's
  - (d) Patrols
  - (e) Eavesdrop
- (2) Strain to get the information and co-ordinate it
- (3) Exploiting and evaluation of the information to analyze the information
- (4) Spread the information by the most suitable ways
- (5) Assist the OPS branch with the daily/weekly SITREP
- (6) Look after exploitation of PATROLREP  
SHOTREP  
HUMINTREP  
INTSUM
- (7) Write INTSUM and make the summary of incidents in town/over the country
- (8) After indicating all information on the maps, he informs the Force Commander and the COO about the possibility of actions.



#### 20.20 SEARCHING AND TRACING

Find out of information

#### 20.21 PASSIVE SEARCHING

Every information must be considered as useful.  
Every information must ASAP been controlled in order to confirm and explore the Information.  
Every patrol report must mention a Max of Information about:

- a. Suspects
- b. Localization
- c. Force/Unit number
- d. Weapons
- e. Means of transport
- f. Fraction or party
- g. State of the road

#### 20.22 ACTIVE SEARCHING

Every active tracing will be organized and coordinated according the orders of the FC and COO.  
The object will be principally to find out the confirmation of the information given by the UNMO teams, by patrols and/or heli recce.

#### 20.23 EXPLOITATION

The exploitation of the information shall be done by the MIO.

The aim is to inform correctly the commandment about the situation and to pass the necessary information to

react in a proper way .

Each CO can keep his personnel informed by using the Information in the INTSUM.

Every confiscation of weapons of what ever kind will be reported as following:

- a. Date:
- b. Weapon Nb:  
(or description)
- c. Ammunition: Yes / No
- d. Quantity:

Sheets shown in Annex will be fastened to the confiscated weapon on behalf of the second half to be handed over to the owner of the weapon.  
On the backside some miscellaneous can be mentioned.

## 20.30 REPORTS

### 20.31 SHOTREP

- a. Each SHOTREP will be send to the DUTY Offr
- b. Example

#### SHOTREP

- 1.a. Location of the observer :
- b. Seen of heard DTG :
- c. Direction (compass grids) :
- 2.a. Identification (callsign) :  
   own troops/others
- b. Type weapons (rifle/automatic):
- c. Nbr of rounds(shots/bursts) :
- 3.a. Damage :
- b. Wounded (MEDEVAC) :
- c. Left behind explosives (EOD) :
- 4. If bombs or missiles  
   Type, Nbr of rounds :

### 20.32 INTREP

The INTREP will be delivered in case of  
a remarkable occurrence.It will be transmitted to  
Duty Offr by the fastest means.  
Next questions will be answered:  
**WHO?**  
**WHAT?**  
**WHERE?**  
**WHEN?**  
**HOW?**

20.33 PATROLREP / ESCORTREP

1. PATROLREP or ESCORTREP will be made and delivered in Duty Offr room ASAP after any patrol ordered by Force HQ.

2. EXAMPLE

PATROL REPORT

- a. Strength and composition of the patrol
- b. Mission: (1) Sector  
(2) Map reference  
(3) Area covered
- c. Time of departure
- d. Time of return
- e. Route Pat (Go-Back)
- f. Terrain (description) State of the roads
- g. Faction: strength, location, activities
- h. Incidents observed/reported:  
(1) .....  
(2) .....
- i. Special observation/Other information  
(1) .....  
(2) .....  
(3) .....
- j. Results of contacts
- k. State of the Patrol
- l. Patrol chief name/unit

---

m. SEEN

---

Ops Officer

#### 20.34 SITREP

1. The SITREP is a report of the Ops situation of the Unit.  
It has to be delivered by each SubUnit.  
The SITREP will be delivered each day at Force HQ in Senior Duty Office before 1000Hrs.

2. EXAMPLE

- a. Parties: (1) Strength  
(2) Localization  
(3) Activities  
(4) Identification  
(5) Estimated intentions

- b. Situation of the Units  
(1) On active service  
(2) WIA, KIA, MIA  
(3) On active projects  
(4) State of the sub units  
(5) Intentions for the future



#### 20.35 HUMINTREP

1. The HUMINTREP is demanded each time a worth mentioning information has been gathered from a local source. The source must be revealed also the degree of reliability will be evaluated as follows :
  - a. Source :
    - (1) Completely reliable
    - (2) Usually reliable
    - (3) Fairly reliable
    - (4) Not usually reliable
    - (5) Unreliable
    - (6) Reliability cannot be judged
  - b. Info :
    - (1) Confirmed by other sources
    - (2) Probably true
    - (3) Possibly true
    - (4) Doubtful
    - (5) Improbable
    - (6) Truth cannot be judged
2. The HUMINTREP will be send to personnel on Duty in Force HQ or to MIO Force HQ.

#### 20.36 INTSUM

The INTSUM is a total summary of the last gathered information within the complete AOR. An overview of the incidents in KIGALI town / all over the country will be added if necessary. There is no fixed schedule.

20.40 FREQUENCY OF REPORTING

Report	When
SHOTREP	ASAP after incident
SITREP	before 1000 B
INTREP	ASAP after info
PATROLREP	ASAP after tasked patrol
HUMINTREP	ASAP after info
INTSUM	Once a week

~~VOLUME 3~~~~PARAS 2-12~~SECTION 14 - <sup>LIAISON</sup> INTRODUCTION

## INTRODUCTION

1. <sup>OPS</sup> General. The ~~Liaison~~ Branch is responsible for the following:

- Provide the machinery for maintaining communication, lodging protests and settling disputes with other military forces and for communication with public authorities in the AO, local militia and the civilian population;
- Carry out humanitarian activities in accordance with Security Council Resolution 511 (1982) and as prescribed in FC's Directive 16/88.

2. In performing its tasks, Liaison <sup>OPS</sup> Branch should be fully aware of and be guided by the principles contained in ~~UNIFIL's~~ mandate. <sup>VNPMIR</sup>

3. Liaison is the intercommunication maintained between the recognized parties/military forces. Contact is the more informal communication maintained between different elements in the field.

4. It is important to stress that for liaison to be successful, it must take place at all levels. One should aim for a structure with:

3-109

~~3-109~~

~~Page 2 of 3~~

- A high-level link;
- A medium working-level link; and
- A unit ground-level link.

~~4~~5. High-level link. This is established between the Force Commander or his immediate senior staff officers and military officers of the parties at the same level. Ideally they should have occasional social contact and should meet for liaison/negotiation only on matters of grave importance.

~~4~~6. Medium working-level link. This link provides the day-to-day contact and working arrangement between the peace-keeping HQ and the parties. Its normal work is on matters of routine but it can also be used for negotiating serious matters which do not require as yet to be raised at the higher level. Ideally, separate liaison officers should operate with each of the parties. This helps to develop a relationship based on trust and respect. Meeting at this level should occur daily or several days a week and there should be continuous telephone/radio contact.

~~4~~7. Unit ground-level link. This link at ground level is equally important. It can help to defuse problems at source rather than let them build up to major confrontations between the parties or between the United Nations and the parties. The unit commander organizes and structures this liaison link as he requires. As with the HQ liaison systems, he will probably keep himself in reserve, allowing most of the contact to be made by a staff officer nominated by him. Meetings at

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this level should be held approximately weekly and ideally a radio/telephone link should be available. Unit commanders should not normally liaise above the local level unless the meeting is arranged through HQ Liaison and a representative from UNFIL HQ be present.

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3 - 2

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US  
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~~PART 2 - LIAISON~~~~SECTION 2 - ORGANIZATION~~8. Organization9. UNIFIL HQ Staff (Liaison)

Assistant Chief of Staff Liaison (ACOS LIAISON)	- Colonel
Senior Liaison Officer (SLO)	- Lt. Colonel
Senior UNIFIL Representative in Beirut (SURB)	- Lt. Colonel
Staff Officer, Administration (SOA)	- Major
Clerk/Driver	- Sgt/WOII

10. UNIFIL HQ Staff (Humanitarian)

Chief Humanitarian Officer (CHO)	- Lt. Colonel
Deputy Chief Humanitarian Officer (DCHO)	- Major
Staff Officer Humanitarian Officer (SOHO)	- Major
Clerk/Driver	- WOI/SM

11. Field Liaison Team (FLT)

Each liaison team will consist of 2/3 Liaison Officers of mixed nationality who will normally be Lt. Cols. or Majors. ACOS LIAISON will appoint a team leader for each team who will normally be the most experienced liaison officer (in the team)

12. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY UNIFIL FLTS

Team 'B'	- Irishbatt, Nepba.
Team 'C'	- Tyre Pocket, Fijiba.
Team 'D'	- Norbatt.

3-176  
~~3-176~~

PART 2 / LIAISONSECTION 2 / LIAISON TASKINGAND DUTIESLiaison Tasking and Duties

12. Liaison tasking. Tasks may be initiated by COS, ACOS LIAISON, ACOS OPS, Battalion Commanders. Tasks will be of a liaison nature only. Tasks will not be of an operational or military information nature. No liaison with DFF (so-called South Lebanese Army (SLA)).

13. Liaison duties. Liaison duties include the following:

- Ensure that unstable situations are stabilized without delay and that ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>VNAMIR</sup> personnel are not endangered. Skillful negotiations, persuasion, tact and diplomacy are the means by which Branch members solve disputes. This aspect of liaison receives special emphasis and training during the in-briefing of officers newly appointed to the Branch;
- Ensure that the very good corporate image of ~~UNIFIL~~ <sup>VNAMIR</sup> by the ~~Lebanese~~ <sup>Quadrone</sup> population throughout the AO is maintained;
- ~~Maintain liaison with the Lebanese Army and Israeli Defence Forces (IDF);~~
- Establish and maintain contacts with local ~~Lebanese~~ <sup>Quadrone</sup> authorities (~~Mukhtars, Sheiks, etc.~~), ~~Lebanese Army,~~ <sup>RGA</sup> Gendarmerie and local militia, civil organizations

3-17B

No such  
structure  
of Liaison  
cell.

to be canceled



Page 2 of 5

- located in the battalion AOs to which they are assigned;
- Ensure that requests for assistance from civil population are followed through;
  - Monitor humanitarian needs of the local population within ~~UNIFIL~~ AO in accordance with humanitarian policy; *VNAMR*
  - Assist battalions in the AO in liaison matters as required;
  - Co-ordinate and co-operate with ~~OGC Team/ACOS OPS~~ *M/LVB* as required.
  - Evaluate all incoming information and suggest further liaison or contact in order to improve and maintain good relations between ~~UNIFIL~~ and the parties concerned. *VNAMR*

*14*  
*14* Duties of ACOS LIAISON. The ACOS LIAISON is the Branch Head and advisor to the FC on liaison matters.

*14* *a.* ACOS LIAISON is responsible to the COS for the efficient and effective functioning of the liaison staff by exercising direct supervision over the SLO, CHO and SURB. He is also responsible to the COS for the efficient functioning of liaison activities with parties, groups and individuals concerning ~~UNIFIL~~ mission. The Liaison Branch also carries out the humanitarian activities of ~~UNIFIL~~.

*14* *b.* As Branch Head, ACOS LIAISON has the following specific duties and responsibilities:

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3 - 2

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~~Page 3-149~~

- Define responsibilities of staff members, issuing internal branch orders and external directives;
- Maintain full knowledge of the current situation and the development of liaison branches in the mission area;
- Take appropriate action to solve current issues and improve efficiency within the branch;
- Keep the FC and COS informed of branch work and where appropriate, forward proposals for decisions;
- Ensure that reports and other returns for which the branch is responsible are accurate and submitted on time;
- Disseminate information, as required, to other branches and civilian sections of UNFICIL HQ and to units of the Force;
- Coordinate with other branches and civilian sections concerned and advise the COS immediately of any conflict;
- Submit drafts for efficiency reports on Staff Officers to the COS three weeks prior to the departure of those officers;
- Designate branch duty officers to be on call during non-office hours;
- Ensure security within the branch and designate branch security officers.

15. Duties of Senior Liaison Officer (SLO). The SLO has the following duties and responsibilities:

- Act as ACOS LIAISON as required;

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- Plan, co-ordinate and supervise liaison matters with the IDF through IDF Senior LO North and CO IDF Liaison-Rosh Hanigra;
- Brief and advise ACOS LIAISON on all matters that arise from meetings with IDF Senior LO North and CO IDF Liaison-Rosh Hanigra;
- Arrange and attend all meetings of unit commanders with IDF Senior LO North and record minutes from liaison meetings;
- Incidents with serious potential involving IDF/DEF will be dealt with by SLO direct to IDF Senior LO North to defuse the situation;
- Follow up all matters related to incidents and ensure that the incident is terminated;

16  
16

Duties of Staff Officer Administration to ACOS LIAISON (SOA). SOA has the following duties and responsibilities:

- Administer the office of the ACOS LIAISON;
- Screen all incoming mail for ACOS LIAISON;
- Draft correspondence as required;
- Arrange Liaison Branch conferences as required;
- Record minutes of weekly Liaison Branch conferences.

17  
17

Duties of Liaison Duty Officer (LDO). The LDO has the following duties and responsibilities:

- Submit protest of firing close as soon as possible by telephone to IDF/LO;

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- Contact IDF/LO to defuse the situation in the AO caused by IDF/DFF actions;
- Collect and record firing close caused by IDF/DFF in the AO from UNIFIL OPS;
- Liaise with IDF for other matters such as border crossings of a non-routine nature;
- Remain in contact with UNIFIL liaison teams to defuse the situation in the AO caused by personnel other than IDF/DFF;
- Keep ACOS LIAISON informed of all major incidents;
- Attend morning OPS briefing during his tour of duty and be prepared to answer any queries concerning liaison matters;
- Remain in constant contact with UNIFIL OPS and be aware of latest developments in the AO.

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3-100

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Page ~~1~~ of ~~2~~

~~PART 2 - LIAISON~~

~~SECTION 4 - LIAISON TEAMS~~

Q.18

~~Q.18~~ General. There are THREE liaison teams assigned to the AO and Tyre area. The liaison teams are headed by a Team Leader (TL).

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3-180  
~~174~~  
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~~Part 2 DELETED~~SECTION 5.7 SPECIAL TASK TEAMS

19. General. Special Task Teams may be instituted as directed by the FC/COS for any unforeseen or unusual circumstances which may require special liaison activity.
20. The team will be constituted from existing liaison team members and will be commanded by the Senior Liaison Officer (SLO) in the AO.
21. The responsibility of the Special Task Team will be defined on each occasion.

3-178  
~~3-178~~

~~PART 2 - LIAISON~~~~SECTION 1 - LIAISON WITH~~  
OFFICIAL PARTIES

22  
9.22. In Lebanon, liaison activities will be conducted with the following:

- HQ <sup>RWANDSE</sup> Lebanese Army
- Local <sup>RWANDSE</sup> Lebanese Army units
- <sup>RWANDSE</sup> Lebanese Police
- Gendarmerie and Internal Security Force (ISF)
- Local Government authorities
- Civil, political and religious leaders
- Civil, political and religious organizations
- Amal
- Interested parties and individuals in the AO and in Tyre area.

9.24. In Israel, liaison activities will be conducted with the following:

- IDF Senior LO - North
- CO IDF Liaison Rosh Haniqra
- IDF Liaison Officer - Metulla.
- IDF Liaison Officer in the AO/ICA as agreed on
- IDF-GOC (N) as requested by FC, UNIFIL. In attendance as required: ACQS LIAISON, IDF Senior LO-North

3-180  
2-3

~~PART 2 - LIAISON~~

~~SECTION 10 - CONTACT WITH~~  
~~NON OFFICIAL PARTIES~~

5.23  
10.1. The following parties are NOT recognized by UNFIL for the establishment of formal liaison links:

- DFF (so-called South Lebanese Army)
- Hezbollah
- PLO

5.24  
10.2. Nonetheless, if the situation warrants it, liaison officers and/or battalions are authorized to make informal contact with such groups.

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NO need  
to be cancelled.

~~PART 2 - LIAISON~~~~SECTION 1A - CONTROL~~  
~~AND SUPPORT~~

025  
102. Team Control. The command and control of UNIFIL liaison teams is exercised by ACOS LIAISON. However, during an operational incident, UNIFIL liaison teams may come under the control of UNIFIL OPS through the battalion to which they are assigned, for liaison duties only.

024  
103. ACOS LIAISON will ensure that the tasking of the teams is restricted to liaison duties. Liaison teams will not be tasked with operational or MIO missions.

Support021  
104. UNIFIL HQ:

- Provide vehicles and maintenance support as necessary.
- Provide signal equipment and support as necessary.

028  
105. UNIFIL Battalions:

- FINBATT, NEPBATT and NORBATT provide permanent accommodation.
- All battalions in AO provide messing and other support as required.
- Provide communications access to UNIFIL OPS, TTY and SDS systems, and battalion command radio nets.

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~~3-2~~

~~PART 2 - LIAISON~~~~SECTION 12 -~~ HANDOVER/SPECIAL MEETINGS

6.29  
~~12.1~~. General concept. ~~UNIFIL~~ will from time to time be utilized where there is no direct dealing between the parties on the ground. This requires ~~UNIFIL~~ to organize and manage the transfer of personnel, goods and other items from one side to the other, and sometimes to arrange special meetings between the parties. Such transfers and special meetings can lead to extremely sensitive situations where suspicion and mistrust allow little leeway for bad planning, where small incidents can escalate and where lack of information on a continuing basis can be quickly misinterpreted. Such operations require a good and simple plan, cleared in advance with both sides, and liaison passage of information throughout.

6.30  
~~12.2~~. Occasions where these operations are required can include:

- Transfer of prisoners of war;
- Transfer of bodies;
- Transfer of voluntary returnees;
- Transfer of parcels and mail; and
- Transfer of other items (e.g. property, stray animals etc.).

There may also be family meetings and funeral services held.

~~PAGE 2 OF 4~~

31

12. Transfers can arise either from bilateral talks between the parties, from contacts through the UNIFIL Liaison, or from third party involvement (e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, another United Nations agency etc.). Once the details have been agreed, a transfer often becomes a United Nations supervised operation.

32

12.4. Preplanning should be detailed and discussed with the parties in conflict (and with third party, if one is involved). The points which should be established in planning and discussion include:

- Information. Who/What is involved? When is the transfer to take place?
- Location. Where is the transfer to take place? Ideally a United Nations position or an area that can be easily secured.
- Procedures. How is the transfer to be effected? Essentially the plan should be simple and carried out at the lowest possible level. High level operations tend to lead to complications.
- Agreement on communications.
- Liaison facilities established.
- Security measures assessed, tasked, agreed.

33

12.5. Execution. Situations will vary greatly. However, the following procedures should be adhered to:

- Place of actual transfer should be the United Nations controlled areas or locations (ideally existing UN positions) interposed between the parties;

3-18A

~~3-18A~~



- POWs/bodies/mail should be brought forward by Party "A" to a waiting area in a location controlled by them;
- When signalled forward, the POWs/bodies/mail should be brought to the central UN area. This can be done by Party "A" or the UN. If Party "A", then personnel must be warned and those involved should be specifically marked (e.g. by wearing white arm bands). If UN, unarmed observers are the preferred option;
- At the central UN area checks and recording are completed prior to handover to Party "B";
- If a POW exchange is involved, both parties bring the prisoners to their respective waiting areas. On a signal they are simultaneously escorted, ideally by the United Nations, to separate central areas, checked, recorded and then transferred;
- Throughout the operation, liaison is maintained and there is a constant passage of information between the United Nations and the parties.
- If the operation requires the parties to come into relatively close contact, they must be unarmed, distinctively marked (e.g. white arm bands) and escorted by the United Nations.

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0.34

~~12.8~~ After the operation, records and reports are compiled. There should be final coordination between ~~UNIFIL~~ personnel and the third party (e.g. ICRC). ~~UNIFIL~~ personnel should be the last element to leave the scene.

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## Section 15-

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ORGANIZATION  
UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELLRESPONSIBILITIES

1. The UNAMIR Humanitarian Assistance Cell is a branch within UNAMIR HQ specifically organized to coordinate humanitarian relief to non combatants in Rwanda. Its responsibilities include the following:

- a. Ensuring that humanitarian aid is provided to displaced persons in camps under the control of UNAMIR.
- b. Coordinating on behalf of the Force Commander all humanitarian relief operations within Rwanda.
- c. Coordinating the transfer and/or relocation of displaced persons in Rwanda.
- d. Maintaining communication with both opposing forces with regards to humanitarian activities.
- e. Lodging protests against hostile acts against humanitarian activities.
- f. Arranging for the security of humanitarian relief agencies.
- g. Maintaining current locations of displaced persons and refugees inside Rwanda and in neighbouring countries.
- h. Maintaining records on missing persons both Rwandese and foreign nationals and arranging where possible for their evacuation.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELL COMMAND POST

2. The Command Post will be located with the Operations Cell of UNAMIR HQ and will be permanently manned by a duty officer during normal working hours. Depending on the situation the Command Post may be manned on a 24 hour basis.

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#### ORGANIZATION

3. The Humanitarian Assistance Cell is organized as follows:

CHO Colonel Yaache

DCHO Lt Col Doumbia

SSO Maj MacNeil

SO EDP Maj Stec

---

#### HAC OPS

#### HAC FD OFFR/LN

#### UN HA Team

#### MILOB

Maj Pazik (1)

Maj Mande (1)

eight teams

Maj Racine (2)

Capt Nakoura (2)

#### DUTIES

4. Chief Humanitarian Officer (CHO). The CHO commands the Humanitarian Assistance Cell. He is responsible to the Force Commander for coordinating all humanitarian activities within Rwanda. He is responsible for planning humanitarian operations and for tasking outside agencies to support such operations. He is the chief negotiator between both opposing forces with regards to humanitarian affairs.

5. Deputy Chief Humanitarian Officer (DCHO). The DCHO is responsible to the CHO for the effective operation of the Humanitarian Assistance Command Post. He will assist the CHO in planning humanitarian operations and he will replace the CHO and assume his responsibilities when required.

6. Senior Staff Officer (SSO). The SSO HAC is responsible to the CHO for the following:

- a. Screening all incoming mail for the CHO.
- b. The drafting of all correspondence as required.
- c. Arranging HAC conferences as required.
- d. Recording minutes of HAC conferences.
- e. Administration of the office of the CHO.
- f. When required, assisting at meetings with the opposing forces.

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- g. Be prepared to work in the Ops Cell as required.
- h. As a secondary duty he will work with the ADP officer in keeping records of requests for evacuation.
- i. Handling requests for security clearances from outside agencies.

7. Electronic Data Processing Staff Officer (EDP SO). The EDP SO is responsible for keeping records through the use of EDP equipment of all missing persons in Rwanda both nationals and foreign nationals. He is responsible for preparing an UNMO evacuation task table and for preparing a weekly report on evacuation progress for forwarding to UN HQ in New York. He will fill in for the SSO as required.

8. HAC Operations Cell (HAC Ops Cell). The HAC Ops Cell officers will work closely with their counterparts in the Field and Liaison Cell. Their duties include the following:

- a. Maintaining current locations of all displaced persons camps in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries.
- b. Recording all planned humanitarian operations in Rwanda.
- c. Providing a Senior Duty Officer.
- d. In conjunction with the Field and Liaison Cell providing a duty officer in the HAC CP and manning the MOTOROLA net.
- e. Collating all humanitarian requests.
- f. Preparing a daily SITREP.
- g. Assisting in the planning of convoy escorts.
- h. Preparing the CP for O Groups on behalf of the CHO.
- i. Submitting the necessary requests for UNMO teams in support of humanitarian operations.
- j. Remaining in constant contact with UNAMIR Ops.
- k. Assisting the Field and Liaison Cell in conducting operations as required.

9. Field/Liaison Cell (Fd/Ln Cell). The HAC Fd/Ln Cell officers will work closely with their counterparts in the HAC Ops Cell. Their duties include the following:

- a. Effecting liaison with the opposing forces as required.
- b. Maintaining communications with the opposing forces.

- c. Lodging protests on hostile acts against humanitarian activities.
- d. Contacting the opposing forces to defuse any situation caused by their actions.
- e. Liaising with the opposing forces concerning border crossings, route clearances, aid distribution etc..
- f. Assisting at meetings with the opposing forces as required.
- g. Acting as a duty officer in the HAC CP as required.
- h. Keeping the HAC CP aware of all major incidents.
- i. Attending Ops briefings and answering questions concerning liaison matters.
- j. Assisting in convoy operations as ordered by the CHO.

10. HA Team. The HA team members will execute the delivery of humanitarian aid on behalf of the organizations that they represent. They will execute this task based on advice given by the HAC. They are responsible for the following:

- a. Delivering humanitarian aid.
- b. Advising the HAC Ops Cell on security requirements.
- c. Producing SITREPs.
- d. Advising the Ops Cell of daily results.
- e. Maintaining a schedule which shows humanitarian assistance results to camps within UNAMIRS's area of influence.
- f. Effecting liaison with the ICRC and other humanitarian organizations.

11. UNMO Teams. UNMO teams will have the following responsibilities:

- a. Carry out tasks in support of humanitarian operations as ordered by CHO in close coordination with the CMO.
- b. Carry out liaison tasks on humanitarian matters in conjunction with the Fd/Ln Cell.
- c. Conduct investigations.
- d. Monitor humanitarian activities.
- e. Assist as ordered with convoy escort operations.

~~PART 1 OPERATIONS~~SECTION 16. OPERATIONAL TRAINING

~~1.1.~~ <sup>a</sup> Preparatory training. The training of the units at home prior to deployment to <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL AO is a national responsibility and should be completed before the unit departs to the mission area. It is assumed that all soldiers will be qualified in basic military skills and that the preparatory training will complement this and be directed towards the operational activity that the units will be expected to carry out in <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL.

~~1.2.~~ <sup>a</sup> The training in the mission area is the responsibility of the battalion commanders. The operational training is coordinated, however, by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS and includes:

- Familiarization training for newly arrived units;
- Tactical exercises;
- Specialised training of surveillance equipment, EDO, use of APCs and other special equipment used in <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL;
- Range practices and weapons testing

~~2.~~ <sup>a</sup> TACTICAL TRAINING

~~2.1.~~ <sup>a</sup> Familiarization training should be arranged by the contingent briefings and should include the history,



geography, political environment, culture and customs of <sup>UNAMIR</sup> ~~Lebanon~~ and neighbouring countries. <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL SOP will arrange operational briefings for the officers of new battalions.

These briefings include:

- The mandate and mission of <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL;
- The organization of the Force;
- Military information brief (different parties of the conflict);
- Concept of operations;
- Current operational situation.

<sup>b)</sup>  
12.2. The COs of the units are responsible for rehearsing the different operational/tactical procedures of the peace-keeping described in this SOP and in Operations Directives. <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS will arrange a tactical exercise for each battalion in the AO once in six months (in mandate). The purpose of these exercises are:

- To rehearse different operational/tactical procedures of peace-keeping as established in this SOP;
- To shorten the reaction time of the battalion in different incidents typical to the mission area;
- To exercise smooth co-operation between the battalion and FMR;
- To exercise <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL TAC HQ.

<sup>l)</sup>  
12.3. The exercises will be arranged in three separate phases.

Phase 1 - Exercise conference. The battalion will send scenarios for the exercise to <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL OPS, SPO, who will



arrange for the conference for discussion of the arrangements and scenarios of the exercise.

Phase 2 - Pre-exercise. This is a map exercise for the senior officers of the battalion and reconnaissance of the terrain.

Phase 3 - Live exercise (LIVEX). The actual living exercise with umpires is conducted by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIPIL OPS. Exercise report will be sent to the battalion.

<sup>a</sup>  
10.24. Specialized training will be arranged as follows:

- Surveillance equipment (NORMAINTCOY);
- EOR and EOD (IRISHBATT);
- Signals equipment and generators (NORMAINTCOY);
- SISU APCs (FINBATT);
- Mine clearing (SWEDLOG).

If necessary, <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIPIL OPS will coordinate operational training for other equipment. Requests should be made to ACOS OPS <sup>10.24</sup> through SPO.

### <sup>a</sup> 10.3. RANGE PRACTICES

<sup>a</sup>  
10.3.1. General. This sub-section outlines:

- The responsibility and minimum safety requirements for the conduct of live firing practice in small arms (SA) and crew served weapons;
- Procedure that must be followed.

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OPS Directive Range Practices - 308 (Revised) - must be read in conjunction with this section.

~~10.3.2.~~ <sup>8</sup> Responsibility. Unit commanders are responsible for the safe conduct of all range practices of troops under their command. Unit commanders are directed to prepare a written range instruction for ranges within their AO, to cover all aspects of the use of the range and necessary safety precautions.

~~10.3.3.~~ <sup>5</sup> Minimum safety requirements. In order to ensure the safe conduct of range practices, unit commanders will appoint the following:

- Range conducting officer
- Range safety officer

~~10.3.4.~~ <sup>a</sup> Range conducting officer. This will be an officer who is qualified to conduct the range practice on the weapons concerned. His responsibilities are given in OPS Directive ~~308~~ (Revised) and range instructions of the particular range in use.

~~10.3.5.~~ <sup>1</sup> Range safety officer: Normally an officer or senior NCO who is responsible to range conducting officer in all aspects of range safety.

~~10.3.6.~~ <sup>1</sup> Range safety. The highest possible safety standards and procedures will be maintained during the conduct of all range practices. Guidelines are set out in paragraph 6, OPS Directive 308 (Revised).

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10.3.7. Firing of indirect weapons. BATT commanders have the authority to conduct range practices in 60mm and 81mm mortars. The FC must approve requests to conduct range practices with 120mm mortars.

h  
10.3.8. Helicopter operations. All range practices in UNIFIL AO constitute a potential danger to own helicopter operations. Advance warning is therefore required by UNAMIR UNIFIL HQ prior to the conduct of any range practice. CASO will be informed by UNAMIR UNIFIL HQ of all range practices.

10.3.9. Range. Authorized ranges are listed in OPS Directive 308 (Revised).

#### Procedures

10.3.10. Requests. Request for usage of a range located in another AO must first of all be sought from the BATT HQ responsible for that range before request for range practices is submitted to SPO, UNIFIL OPS. The request should be made by using the range firing application form (see OPS Directive 308 (Revised) or by TTY. SPO requires requests before 1200 LT each Thursday. On receipt of request, SPO will check details and forward it to Chief Clerk, Current OPS to reach him on the Thursday prior to the week for which range practices are planned. The Chief Clerk records the details in the range book which is then taken to IDF LO, Rosh Hanqra before 1200 LT each Friday. The book is signed by the IDF LO who will transmit details to the relevant IDF/DEF forces. Units will be notified when requests are approved or not approved.



## PART 1 - OPERATIONS

Section

## 11 - PHOTOGRAPHY

General

2.1. ~~General~~. The use of cameras, videos in UNIFIL, falls into two broad categories:

- Use of cameras, videos for operational reasons
- Use of cameras, videos for personal reasons

2.2. Operational photography. Cameras and videos may be used for recording events or incidents of an operational nature for the purpose of providing evidence or clarification. Such use will be on the discretion from a higher authority.

2.3. Personal photography. In general, <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL personnel will be aware of the local sensitivities regarding the taking of photographs or videos. Photographs should not be taken in such a way that might offend or transgress local traditions. The following restrictions on the use of cameras and videos will be adhered to by <sup>UNAMIR</sup> UNIFIL personnel.

- It is forbidden to photograph or draw sketches of:
  - ~~IDF~~ <sup>both parties</sup> installations and non-military communication centres;
  - Military vehicles, aircraft or naval vessels of the IDF;
  - Arms or other equipment of the IDF; <sup>particular factions</sup>
  - Units of the IDF; <sup>particular factions</sup>
  - Fortification or posts;
  - Members of the IDF; <sup>factions</sup>

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~~Page 2 of 2~~

*Lebanese*  
Note: The same restrictions apply to ~~Lebanese~~ military installations, equipment and personnel.

- It is strictly forbidden to take photographs or use video from UNIFIL helicopters. Cameras will not be taken aboard ~~UNIFIL~~ helicopters unless secured with the personal baggage of the passenger.
- It is forbidden to carry openly cameras/videos when travelling in the AO, at CHPs, OPs and on patrol. The carrying of cameras/videos is restricted to military personnel proceeding on leave outside the AO. When entering Israel all cameras must be listed on personal "Attractive Items" card.


3-198  
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ANNEX M  
To Part IIIAREA OF RESPONSIBILITYBattalion CO leads the operation

- FMR is used in the battalion area
- It is under the command of the BATT CO
- Host BATT provides liaison officer to FMR.


CO FMR leads the operation

- CO FMR is executing an operation in a BATT area for a limited time.



- Host BATT provides liaison officer to FMR
- Host BATT is responsible for liaison to local authorities in FMR area.


- Host BATT unit permanently deployed in FMR area is temporarily under command of CO FMR in matters needed to solve the mission.

TAC HQ leads the operation

The same as above. CO FMR can be responsible in his own area for the operation until TAC HQ is deployed.

M-1A

3-1

RESERVE

Legend: APC  
 Command Post TAC HQ  
 Reserve Unit OC  
 Defence posn Reserve Unit

PurposeMissionUnits

1. Units with APC
2. Units with cars
3. Units prepared to go with helicopter.

Minimum strength is platoon.

Concept of operation

The reserve shall, if possible, be at the same place as CO HQ. The reserve always deploy so that it can defend itself and if possible at a location where it can be seen from the air. The OC of the reserve shall prepare his unit for different tasks/orders so that the unit can move out quickly.

The degree of alertness: (1) 5 mins; (2) 15 mins; (3) 30 mins; (4) 1 hour The degree of alertness is decided by CO.

Administration and logistics

The reserve unit should be equipped so that they:

- Can act independently for a minimum of 24 hours (water, food, ammo)
- Can solve their mission both day and night
- POL will be supplied by host unit.

Command and signals

- (a) Signals: The reserve shall have radio comms to CO HQ. If possible also a landline;
- (b) Liaison: A liaison officer from host BATT shall always be attached;
- (c) Location: The reserve shall be deployed so that they have communications to central HQ to ensure quick reaction.



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~~Page 1 of 1~~

ANNEX M

TO PART II

REPORTING

Reporting is vital in keeping everyone updated and to give the CO and OC enough information to act correctly.

All units shall report:

- When moving out
- When in place and ready
- When they encounter problems and during the task constantly inform/report
- When returning to base
- When back in base

Units should be prepared to give a full report on the incident as soon as possible. All reporting shall follow the chain of command.

Report by means of:

- Landline
- Radio TTY
- Orderly

If a message is important, two alternatives can be used to make sure that the message gets through. It is vital for ~~UNIPIL~~ that non-~~UNIPIL~~ forces do not get access to the message. Use the pro-word ~~LONG-KNIFE~~ and send a coded message.

UNAMIR

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ANNEX *11*  
To post *UP*.TEMPORARY CHECKPOINTPurpose


A temporary CHP is established to achieve a definite CHP mission.

Role

To observe, report and monitor specific tasks in a given period.

Function

- To show ~~UNIT~~ presence in the area;
- Supervise movements into and out of specific area;
- Detail search for wanted persons;
- Observe and report any activities in the assigned AO.

When to use

- to show force
- liaise standard CHP routine
- in connection with blocking and tightening.

A temporary CHP will only be established on the directive of ~~UNIT~~ OPS or by BATT TAC HQ. It will be under command of ~~UNIT~~ OPS/BATT TAC HQ as the case may be.

Attached as Annex 6.18.1. is a layout of a temporary checkpoint.

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ANNEX M  
TO PART IV

Page 2 of 2

Command and Signals

Same as tightening area

Remarks

The units executing this type of operation shall always be able to escalate it to a blocking line operation.

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11-4  
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Administration and logistics

Command and signals

- (a) Signals: All tracking units use the same tactical net. All tracking teams shall be equipped with radio (it is more important to start immediately than have a radio);
- (b) Liaison: A liaison team deployed together with tracking the leader;
- (c) Location: Tracking command post deployed so that they have secure communications with the trackers.


M-80

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ANNEX 1.1

To part III

HIJACKINGPurpose

To prevent the hijackers/thieves from leaving UNIFIL AO.

Mission

- Block
- Tighten
- Track
- Reinforce

Units

All units

Concept of operations

This concept is to be issued in incidents of:

- Hijacking of United Nations personnel or civilians living in AO
- Theft of UNIFIL property.

- (1) Quick reaction by all units
- (2) Tracking starts as soon as possible
- (3) A blocking line established
- (4) A tightened line established coordinated by UNIFIL HQ between the battalions
- (5) Reinforcements.

It is desired that one commander is responsible for the blocking and tracking.

Administration and logistics

No work done, as many as possible participate in the operation.

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ANNEX M  
To part III  
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Page 2 of 2

Command and signals


- (a) Signals: Blocking and tracking units use one battalion tactical net;
- (b) Liaison: One liaison team with blocking and tracking commander;
- (c) Location: TAC HQ will be dispatched.

Remarks

QPS Directive 109.

11-12

~~SECRET~~  
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DECEPTIONDeception in movement


To prevent non-UN forces predicting our destination.

Execution

As the picture shows

When to use

When it is not obvious what the destination is, e.g. the unit has got an order on radio... Block Kafr road.

Deception in strength

To misguide non-UN forces about ~~UNIFIL~~ strength.

UNAMIC


Execution

As the picture shows. Reshuffle the order of the vehicles at a suitable point.

When to use

When there is a need to show ~~UNIFIL~~ strength and when the ~~UNIFIL~~ vehicles are not easily recognized.

UNAMIC

Deception in loading

To prevent non-UN forces from predicting what road we are taking to transport cargo.

Execution

- Park the car so that you have an area which cannot be observed.
- Let all vehicles drive around and "mingle".
- All vehicles leave the area at the same time.

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ANNEX F  
TO PART IV

R E S T R I C T E D  
M E S S A G E F O R M

FOR COMMON USE.....

PRECEDENCE	ACTION	PRECEDENCE INFO	DATE	TIME	GROUP	MESSAGE INSTR.
------------	--------	-----------------	------	------	-------	----------------

FROM:.....						
------------	--	--	--	--	--	--

TO: .....						
-----------	--	--	--	--	--	--

.....						SECURITY CLASS.
-------	--	--	--	--	--	-----------------

INFO:.....						
------------	--	--	--	--	--	--

.....						ORIGINATOR'S NO
-------	--	--	--	--	--	-----------------

.....						
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TEXT:

.....

.....

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INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

FILE NO OR REFER.

REFERS TO A CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE.....

THIS MESSAGE (TICK APPROPRIATE BOX)

OF.....

DOES NOT REFER TO A CLASSIFIED MSG

.....PAGE.....

MSG DRAFTER'S RANK AND NAME IN CAP. LETTERS	BRANCH PH NO	RECEIVING OFFR'S SIGN. RANK AND NAME IN CAP. LETTER.
--	-----------------	---

FOR	S	DATE	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR
-----	---	------	--------	----------	---	------	------	--------	----------

OPS


USE

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PROPOSED UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN SECURITY FORCE  
MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE STR-5526

ANNEX A To oPo No 11  
DATED 18 MAY 94



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ANNEX D To  
UNAMIR SOPs Part III

CIVILIAN POLICE

1. MISSION UN CIVPOL

A. TO ASSIST THE GENDARMERIE AND LOCAL POLICE IN CONTROLLING AND MONITORING CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN THE KWSA.

B. TO BE PREPARED ALONG WITH THE GENDARMERIE AND LOCAL POLICE IN ASSISTING THE INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE KWSA.

2. GENERAL

A. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATIONS:

(1) EVERYONE BELONGING TO THE UNAMIR FORCES NEEDS TO RECORD ANY INFO ABOUT ANY SUBJECT WHICH COULD BE PROFITABLE TO THE MISSION AND IN PARTICULAR SUBJECTS REGARDING POLICE ACTIVITIES.

(2) TRANSMISSION OF INFO:

- a. UN CIVPOL WILL GET INFO BY DAILY CONTACTS WITH THE GENDARMERIE AND LOCAL POLICE.
- b. UNMO'S MISSION REPORTS WILL BE EXPLOITED BY SECTOR.
- c. EXPLOITATION OF THE BATTALIONS DAILY SITREPS.
- d. IMPORTANT AND URGENT INFOS NEED TO BE TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATELY TO THE INVOLVED HQ TO AVOID ANY ESCALATION OR DETERIORATION OF SITUATIONS.
- e. REPRESENTATIVE UN CIVPOL WILL ATTEND THE DAILY CONFERENCE AT THE KIGALI SECTOR HQ TO BE INFORMED ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BATTALION WITHIN THE AREA.
- f. KIGALI SECTOR HQ WILL DELEGATE A PERMANENT LO TO THE GENDARMERIE HQ.

B. ORGANISATION.

(1) ACCORDING TO THE ORGANISATIONS OF THE KWSA UN CIVPOL WILL DEDICATE ONE TEAM FOR EACH SECTOR (NORTH-CENTER-SOUTH) AND KEEP ONE TEAM IN RESERVE.

(2) MONITORING ACTIVITIES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE SECTOR HQ.

(3) INTERVENTION REQUEST WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATIONS: WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, REACTION, POSSIBLE EVOLUTION OF SITUATION AND INTERVENTION EMERGENCY LEVEL (NOT URGENT, ASAP, URGENT).

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