

ICFI

CROATIA

3 JUL - 8 SEPT 1993

[9 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

CONFIDENTIAL

12 AUG

12 SEP 1993

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>6-1635</u>
BOX	<u>33</u>
FILE	<u>1</u>
ACC.	<u>8011/0195</u>

TO: '93 SEFOLSTENBERG, GENEVA

INFO: SRSB, FC, HCA DIST. DONE

FROM: *W* VOLLEBAEK, ZAGREB *Eugene*

DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1993

NUMBER: _____

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR DEGORICIIA - 8 SEPTEMBER 1993

CODE RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

1. I met Mr Degoricija for an hour this morning. General Domazet was also present. This was a difficult meeting and there was a further development of the Croatian position.

2. I began by outlining our meeting yesterday in Knin and explained that there had been some difficulties. I said that we thought we could make progress on the preamble of the ceasefire agreement, because the reference to the Security Council resolutions was also in the interest of the Serbs, and presented the latest draft of paragraph four, referring to freedom of movement. Mr Degoricija flatly refused to consider "Serb held territory" as an alternative to reference to the UNPAs and 762 areas, which the Serbs find unacceptable. This implied recognition of the Serb occupation of the territory. However, Mr Degoricija said he would accept "Serb occupied territory" as he knew that would not be accepted by the Serbs.

3. I then explained that the Serbs had flatly refused to consider the agreement on removal of Croatian forces from the 802 areas if the Croatian police were to remain. Mr Degoricija said that this was not a subject he could discuss, as he and I were both bound by Security Council resolutions, and at no point was there mention of the need for Croatian police to leave the areas. The fact that resolution 802 and the Vance Plan were written before the Croatian police were in these particular areas did not concern him. He complained bitterly that Croatia was now pressured over its one weak point, the Erdut Agreement, when it had not been Croatia that broke the agreement.

4. On the question of a meeting of military experts, Mr Degoricija said that Generals Stipetic and Domazet were available to meet the Serb military at any time and any place, as long as it was in Croatia. Croatia would guarantee the security of UNPROFOR and Serb representatives at the meeting. He refused to move on this point too, despite my arguments that it was flatly refused by the Serbs. I suggested that a meeting might take place on a warship in the Adriatic. This was accepted, as long as the ship was in Croatian territorial waters.

5. I raised the matter of the alleged killing of 7 Serb civilians in the Miljevici area. Mr Degoricija admitted that some Serbs had been killed, but said that in fact it had been a team of Serb special forces who had been ambushed and killed. He said that the fact that they had a tank and anti-aircraft gun with them proved that they were not civilians. We later received information from Knin with names and years of birth of the killed which indicates that they actually were civilians.

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UNPROFOR ZAGREB

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6. Mr Degoricija then explained that the reason why there had been less shelling of the Maslenica Bridge recently was because the Croatian counter battery fire had been very effective. The Serbs had been reduced to driving tanks forward under cover of dark, then firing a few rounds at the bridge before withdrawing. The Croats had killed a number of tanks as they moved in, so the Serbs were now resorting to special forces. All the special forces came from Serbia. If UNPROFOR was not able to do something to move the special forces and other military back to Serbia and Bosnia very soon, then Croatia would have to use its military to do so. Mr Degoricija said that the Croatian army could fight through to the Bosnian border in eight days, but that at the moment they did not want to incur the casualties that would result. This was why they were going for a negotiated solution.

7. I intend to press forward with attempts to get a meeting of military experts, possibly chaired by the Force Commander, as I believe that this will resolve all of the outstanding technical questions and bring the two sides closer together. However, the decision by the Croatian government to make the withdrawal of Croatian police into a major issue is a stumbling block.

ENDALL

CNZ - 745 / CYZ 621 P1/4

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010/12

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

93 SEP -4 -3 :08

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 3 SEPTEMBER 1993
NUMBER: 1689
SUBJECT: Complaint by the Croatian Government



Attached for your urgent comments please find a self-explanatory letter from the Croatian Mission to the President of the Security Council.

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Security Council

Comments
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Distr.
GENERAL

S/26377
30 August 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 AUGUST 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the continuing violations of relevant Security Council resolutions by the Serbian insurgents in the Republic of Croatia, as well as to the deployment of Serbian troops from Serbia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, I have the honour to present pertinent information as well as the position of the Government of the Republic of Croatia.

According to the findings of the delegation of the Republic of Croatia for negotiations with local Serbian authorities which were presented to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in July and August of this year, Serbian insurgent forces in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) and "pink zones" in the Republic of Croatia were reinforced in men and military equipment from the territories of Serbia and the Serbian-controlled regions in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These units were deployed in the areas of northern Dalmatia, Lika, and partly in Banija and Kordun.

The newly arrived enemy forces consisted of the following:

- A battalion (approximately 600 fully equipped men reinforced with artillery) from the "2nd Krajina corps" of the "Republika Srpska army" which arrived in the area of Benkovac from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of July. This battalion was recently joined by another battalion in the same area;
- During the same time period, groups of volunteers from Serbia, numbering approximately 1,300 to 1,500 soldiers, arrived on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, especially in the area of northern Dalmatia, and were sent directly to the front lines;
- 150 to 200 officers and junior officers from the army of Yugoslavia are deployed in the so-called "15th Lika Corps" and the "7th Knin Corps" of the illegal Serbian armed forces on Croatian territory;

CN2 745 / C42 621 P3/4

S/26377
English
Page 2

- One battalion of the so-called "First Krajina Corps" from the Serbian-controlled region of Bosnia is on Croatian territory and is facing the Muslim- and Croat-populated region of Cazinska Krajina in western Bosnia;
- One brigade of Serbs from the Serbian-controlled region of Bosnia has crossed the Sava River on to the territory of the Republic of Croatia, where they occasionally invade the area of Western Slavonia in Croatia.

On the basis of these and other data in our possession, we estimate that some 6,000-7,000 armed men, along with artillery and one armoured battalion (40 tanks), have infiltrated the UNPAs in the Republic of Croatia from Serbia and Serbian-controlled regions of Bosnia. This intensified militarization in the UNPAs, Sectors North and South, is an indication of possible increased military activities which are being planned in Serbian political and military centres. This is further confirmed by the evacuation of civilians from certain Serbian-occupied regions of Croatia in order to create favourable conditions for military action.

Acts of armed aggression by Serbian insurgents and paramilitary units, operating in the Republic of Croatia, have intensified. The following is a chronological report of recent shelling of Croatian towns by Serbian insurgents:

23 August 1993: the towns of Vlačici, Kasic, Lakici, Novigrad, Gornji Planjani, Vodice, Kljuc, Dugeci, Islam Grcki, Posedarije, as well as the Maslenica bridge and Zemunik airport, were shelled;

24 August: the towns of Pavlici, Modruski Sabljaci, Josipdol, Unesic, Posedarije, Vlačici, Drinovci, Cavoglave, Nova Glava, Prkos, Suhovare, Senj, Smokovic, Donji Zemunik, Kasic, Drvenjak, Buzovi, Dubravice, Seline, Bila Vlaka, Stankovci, as well as the Maslenica bridge and Zemunik airport, were shelled;

25 August: the towns of Ivanovac, Komletinci, Ivanovac, Slana, Novigrad, Kasic, Otocac, Dubravice, Prispo, Jasenice, Islam Grcki, Rovanjaska, Potravljje, as well as the police station in Pakrac and the Maslenica bridge, were shelled;

26 August: the towns of Ivanovac, Tvrdjavica, Lipik, Novigrad, Kulusici, Nova Glava, Bristane, Dubravice, Plana, Stankovci, Jovici, Kasic, Gajine, Podgradina, Posedarje, Biograd, as well as the city of Zadar and the Maslenica bridge, were shelled;

27 August: the towns of Tvrdavica, Vurot, Sikovo, Nova Glava, Prkos, Filip Jakov, Veli Vrh, Posedarje Vrana, Smrdelj, Biograd, Donji Zemunik, Podgradina, Galpovac, Stankovci, as well as the city of Zadar, Zemunik airport and the Maslenica bridge, were shelled.

In the Serb rocket and tank attack of 26 August on Biograd and the ancient city of Zadar, two civilians were killed.

/...

CN2 745 / CY2 621 P414

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English
Page 3

These acts by Serbian insurgents operating in the Republic of Croatia, as well as the arrival of armed units from Serbia and Serbian-controlled areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, represent gross violations of Security Council resolutions 724 (1991), 740 (1992), 752 (1992), 762 (1992), 779 (1992), 802 (1993) and 847 (1993), in which, inter alia, the Council called for the disbanding and disarming of paramilitary formations in the UNPAs.

The above-mentioned acts demonstrate the unwillingness of the local Serbian authorities to resolve outstanding problems through discussions and represent direct attacks against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, a State Member of the United Nations. Therefore, these violations of internationally accepted norms of behaviour call for the strongest possible condemnation by the world community. They also make it all the more apparent that the United Nations and the United Nations Protection Force on the territory of the Republic of Croatia need to take stronger and more resolute action in the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would provide for the distribution of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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UNPROFOR
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'93 AUG 26 -8 15

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C2G-921

P1/2

IMMEDIATE

TO : STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB
FROM : COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
NUMBER : UNPROFOR 2-1037
DATE : 26 AUGUST 1993
SUBJECT : ASSESSMENT ON CROATIA.

1. Following my cable Z-1010 on Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would like to share my thoughts on Croatia with you.

2. Understandly ICFY was mainly focused on BH for the passing year but UNPROFOR has done what was possible to improve the situation on the ground in Croatia. As no sector as the some problem, I would like to assess the situation as I see it in each sector.

3. Sector East : the particularity of this sector is its geographical layout which will not allow the implementation of any future cease fire to be done. However, much progress has been accomplished over the last two months. Face to face meetings have begun again, which had not be the case since 22 jan 1993. But the Serbs had already stated that they see the border with Serbia along the confrontation line and not on the Danube. In such a situation, an agreement on the line of the Vance plan will be difficult to achieve.

4. Sector West : For obvious reasons this sector has most closely resembled the original idea of Vance plan implementation. The strength of its battalions has enabled tensions to remain low and weapons to be reduced. Prospects for full implementation of SCR 802 are good because of the geographical layout, but an agreement must be obtain perhaps first on use of the motorway.

5. Sector North : this sector has been proactive in seeking to come to several local agreements which have fastered a return to normal conditions pending a comprehensive peace. Because of the excellent record of the sector in different types of situations and the credibility it enjoys, a complete implementation of SCR 802 would likely be possible in this sector.

6. Sector South : 22 jan attack hold the events of that date as proof that UNPROFOR is powerless. The Erdut agreement helped UNPROFOR regain a great measure of credibility as a whole when the displacement of nearly 2000 troops in preparation for implementation was seen by all parties. This is likely why the Serbs have not yet taken away this new-found freedom of movement.

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UNOG Telecom Unit
Palais des Nations

UNPROFOR ZAGREB

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One area which the Serbs have neglected to agree to negotiate has been for a passage point in the south of the sector. The Croatian attitude has been intransigent, and the hard stances by both sides has led to shelling of civilian targets. Implementation of a lasting peace would require the most soothing of tempers in this sector compared to the others. Local efforts are still capable of achieving success, though, and attitudes will need to be adopted to find the areas most likely to achieve results. The change of one contingent due to be finish end of october could improve the situation.

7. It goes without saying that UNPROFOR's credibility has been, to a large extent, affected, as each side, for its own reasons, blames the peace-keeping force for failing to fulfil its expectations. As Force Commander, I believe that efforts towards reinstating UNPROFOR's credibility should constantly be pursued. It is equally true that despite the absence of a ceasefire, UNPROFOR had been seeking to explore all avenues to create conditions of normality.

8. Given the present circumstances, two course of action can be envisaged for the end of september. The first one is UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Craotia. This would not be advisable since it would most likely lead to resumption of hostilities. The second one is a prolongation of the mandate. In this case, I would appreciate receiving any guidance on your part in order to establish a long term strategy. You may also wish to consider organizing a meeting, chaired by you, at your early convenience to assess the present situation and discuss the issue of the mandate, prior to the secretary general recommendation to the security council due to be issued by end of september.

IMMEDIATE

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
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IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, ZAGREB, STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

P1/5

INFO: SRSG, FC, HCA

FROM: VOLLEBAEK, ZAGREB

DATE: 24 AUGUST 1993

NUMBER: _____

CODE RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR DEGORICIIA - 24 AUGUST 1993

1. I met Mr Degoricija and the full Croatian negotiating team, including Mr Lerotic, this afternoon. Once again there was a large contingent of press. The meeting lasted just over an hour and was conducted in a friendly atmosphere.
2. I briefed Mr Degoricija on the meetings that we had last week in Plitvice, and the points that we considered to be positive, including the statement by Mr Hadzic that there had to be a ceasefire before there could be a Croatian army withdrawal in Sector South, and the apparent dominance of the military under General Novakovic, with Mr Paspalj as the sacrificial lamb who had to sit for the cameras under the instructions of the military.
3. I explained that although the Serbs had said they were prepared to sign all elements of the draft that lead to a long lasting peace, we had asked them to give us written details of the parts that they could not accept. I said that they had done so in the form of a re-written draft, a copy of which I had only received on arrival in Zagreb this afternoon. I handed them a copy of the Serb translation into English and our annotated copy showing the changes, which is attached. Since I had not had time to study the proposals in detail and it seemed prudent to give the Croatian team some time, I suggested that we should meet again tomorrow, and expressed the hope the Croatian side would put forward constructive proposals so that we could bring the draft to the point where it could be signed.
4. In response Mr Degoricija agreed to meet tomorrow and then proceeded to brief me on events in Krajina as they are perceived in Zagreb. He said that changes were clearly taking place and cited the arrest of Mr Hadzic's Chief of Staff, which may soon be followed by the arrest of Mr Hadzic; the probable move of the Knin parliament from Knin to either Plitvice or Topusko, the evacuation of women and children from front line areas in Sector South and the influx of up to four brigades and some special forces from Serbia and the Bosnian Serb Army as indicators. He also said that the main players from Knin had been to Belgrade today for a briefing from Mr Milosovic. Mr Degoricija said that it was possible that the Serbs were preparing to annex Sector East for Serbia, and then either leave the remaining three Sectors to their own fate in negotiations with Croatia, or allow them to form an alliance with the Bosnian Serbs.

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5. It seemed that the military situation, which apparently included general Mladic recent visit to Knin, gave reason for concern in Zagreb. According to Degoricija the evacuation of civilians could indicate a preparation for a military attack by the Serbs. He admitted, however, that it could also mean that the Serbs feared a Croatian attack. Degoricija seemed convinced that the Bosnian Serbs, having settled their matter in Bosnia now were ready to assist their Serb brethren in Knin. The Croatian Government would launch a formal protest with UNPROFOR about the infiltration of military personnel over the borders claiming that UNPROFOR had not fulfilled its tasks. p2/5

ENDALL

DRAFT 12/08 1220

THE GENEVA AGREEMENT OF ** AUGUST 1993

The parties signing this document agree that all armed hostilities between the parties should end soonest and that a ceasefire on all confrontation lines existing between the parties on ** August 1993, hereafter referred to as the Confrontation Line, should be fully respected {Delete: from 0900 hours ** August 1993.}

In order to achieve and assure a lasting cessation of hostilities the parties have agreed to accept and comply with the letter and the spirit of the following paragraphs:

1. All armed hostilities will end soonest and a ceasefire on the Confrontation Lines will start at 0900 hours on ** August 1993.
2. As an initial step leading to completion of the ceasefire arrangements, the provisions of Annex A will start to be implemented immediately at 0900 hours ** August 1993 as stipulated in that Annex.
3. Not later than 0900 hours D + 1 August 1993, all indirect weapons {Insert: along the entire Confrontation Line} shall be deployed out of range from the Confrontation Line: mortars not less than 10km, artillery not less than 20km {Insert: and in Sector South the pulling out of the weapons shall be performed with respect to the Confrontation Line as of 22 January 1993}.
4. From the date of the signature of this Agreement, the tactical situation of the forces deployed on the Confrontation Line and within 10 kilometres of that line in either direction shall be frozen, and no movement of units shall take place within the area so defined except in execution of this Agreement or as authorised in advance by UNPROFOR.
5. The ceasefire will be monitored by UNPROFOR and ECMM. Members of UNPROFOR on duty, and members of ECMM for their tasks, shall be given full freedom of movement {Deleted: inside the United Nations Protected Areas and so called Pink Zones. On Croatian-held territory both UNPROFOR and ECMM shall also be accorded freedom of movement as agreed by the Croatian Government for the monitoring of the ceasefire, military units and facilities,} for UNPROFOR within a distance of 30 kilometres {Deleted: from the present Confrontation Line.} {Inserted: on both sides of the Confrontation Line as of 22 January 1993}
6. The freedom of movement required by Paragraph 5 includes the unrestricted right to visit and to monitor all military, paramilitary and militia units and facilities in the specified area.
7. Joint Commissions shall be established at all levels. Their primary task will be to investigate immediately any breach of the ceasefire. The aim of the investigation is to determine responsibility for the breach. The Commission investigating the breach will be informed by the party determined to be responsible for the breach about all disciplinary or other action taken with respect to the incident. These Commissions shall be established before the ceasefire starts. Each Commission shall be chaired by a representative of UNPROFOR who will issue convening orders to parties on its own initiative, or at the request of the parties. Meetings are to commence, {Deleted: with all parties present,} within 3 hours of the receipt of the convening orders by the

headquarters of the members. Details about membership, meeting places and documentation will be agreed upon between UNPROFOR and the participants in a special document.

8. Should any breach of the ceasefire or other provisions of this agreement occur, neither party shall retaliate, but shall rely entirely on the procedures foreseen in paragraph 7 above.

9. The participants agree to open up a number of crossing points along the Confrontation Line. These new crossings and existing crossings are listed in Annex A {Insert: C}. At all these crossings UNPROFOR will man a checkpoint. Any checkpoints or other positions of the two sides must be established as far away as needed from the United Nations checkpoint to ensure that small arms and heavy machinegun fire cannot target the UNPROFOR checkpoint. At the UNPROFOR checkpoints facilities will be established to hold meetings of the Joint Commissions. All crossings shall be opened by no later than 3 hours after the ceasefire starts.

10. Not later than 0900 hours on D {Deleted: + 7} August 1993, all units on the confrontation line shall be separated and both sides will be withdrawn not less than 1,000 metres {Inserted: except for Sector South where the Croatian Army and police are to withdraw according to Annex A}. Units should be withdrawn as far away as needed to ensure they can not target each other with direct fire weapons. The line to which they withdraw should be easy to define on the ground. (Preferably a geographic feature, such as a road, river, ridgeline etc). The line of withdrawal within and adjacent to the areas the Croatian armed forces and police will leave will be marked on the map in Annex B.

11. Not later than 0900 hours on D + 8 August 1993, tanks and AA-guns shall be deployed at least 10 kilometres away from the Confrontation Line {Inserted: as of 22 January 1993}.

12. Not later than 0900 hours on D + 15 August 1993, the parties will meet and negotiate the modalities for a reduction of forces in a 10 kilometre zone on either side of the Confrontation Line {Inserted: as of 22 January 1993}. This reduction shall be completed within 5 days after an agreement has been reached.

{Deleted: 13. The provisions of this Agreement shall be without prejudice to the full implementation of all Security Council Resolutions.}

- Annex:
- A. Complementary Agreement.
 - B. Maps of lines of withdrawal in areas according to paragraph 10.
 - C. Confrontation Line crossing points.

Witnessed by: _____

Geneva, ** August 1993

DRAFT 12/08 1220

ANNEX A TO
THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
OF ** AUGUST
DATED ** AUGUST 1993

COMPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

1. The armed forces and police of the Republic of Croatia shall commence not later than 0900 hours D + 5 August 1993 to return to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January 1993 and shall complete this return not later than 0900 hours D + 7 August 1993 in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR. No armed forces of the Serb authorities shall move into any area from which the Croatian Government armed forces and police thus withdrew, with the exception of what is stated in paragraph 2 below.
2. There will be no Croatian forces or police in the areas specified on the attached map at Sub Annex A1. In the villages of Islam Grcki, Smokovic and Kasic, UNCTV POL together with Serb police will be present. The Serb police will be allowed to pass the confrontation line and enter the villages not later than 0900 {Inserted: 0800} hours D + 7 August 1993. In each village there will be {Deleted: no more than five Serb policemen armed with sidearms only.} {Inserted: an appropriate number of policemen which will be agreed upon between the Serb side and UNPROFOR}. The areas left by the Croatian armed forces and police shall be under the control of UNPROFOR, whose forces shall enter the areas before the withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces and police begins.
3. Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam, including their associated facilities, as well as the roads from Zadar to the Bridge, that from Zadar to the Airport, that from the Bridge via Rovanjaska to Sceline, and that from Sinj to the Dam, are to be available for civilian use by all persons. In the areas referred to in paragraph 1 above, such use, as well as all necessary reconstruction, shall be under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR. {Inserted: The reconstruction and use of the above mentioned facilities will be made possible after the withdrawal of the Croatian forces according to the Erdut agreement.}
4. {Deleted: In parallel to the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces and police pursuant to paragraph 1 above and in accordance with a schedule established by UNPROFOR that may not extend beyond 10 days after the cessation of hostilities in accordance with paragraph 1 of the main document of this Agreement, all Serb heavy weapons shall be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan. All units of the Croatian army and of the Serb forces as listed in Sub Annex A2 shall commence to demobilise not later than 8 days after the cessation of hostilities. The demobilisation must be completed within 14 days after the cessation of hostilities.} {Inserted: Not later than D+8 the Serb and the Croatian sides will commence negotiations about demobilisation of the units specified in Sub Annex A2.}
5. The Croatian armed forces and police will start to withdraw from the area as described on the map attached in Sub Annex A3 not later than 0900 hours D + 10 August 1993. Parallel to this withdrawal, UNPROFOR will enter this area and will fully control the area from the time the Croatian withdrawal starts. The Croatian withdrawal must be completed not later than 0900 hours D + 11 August 1993.

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To: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

Info: SRSG, FC, HCA

From: VOLLEBAEK, ZAGREB

Date: 19 AUGUST 1993

NUMBER: Z-1001

Subject: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN AND KNIN SERBS

'93 AUG 19 17:25

1. Together with Ambassador Ahrens and General Pellnas I travelled yesterday to Brioni for a meeting followed by dinner with President Tudjman. This morning we were joined by Jeanie Petersen and Geert Muylle from ECMM and travelled to Plitvice for a meeting with a Serb delegation from Knin.

2. President Tudjman was accompanied by Ambassador Zuzul and Mr Degoricija. He started by asking what the problem was. We outlined the stages of the negotiations so far and the fact that from our perspective Croatia seemed to have two choices: a negotiated solution to the problems or a military solution. We explained in some detail what we thought of both solutions and the consequences for Croatia of following the second course, both in terms of possible military defeat and international condemnation and sanctions. We said that we believed the ceasefire package presented in Geneva was the best yet and that at this stage Croatia stood to gain a great deal by signing. The possible difficulties arising from the provisional withdrawal of Croatian forces in accordance with resolution 802 were far outweighed by the gains in terms of economic recovery and reconstruction.

3. President Tudjman responded very directly by stating that it was up to UNPROFOR to solve the problem by the end of the current mandate, or Croatia would not extend the mandate and would solve the problem in its own way. This did not necessarily mean force, but the threat was implicit. On the question of the reaction of the international community, President Tudjman was confident that this would not be serious since Croatia would only be exercising its right to regain what was its own territory. In particular the current high profile taken by the American Ambassador, Galbraith, was used as an example of how positive the international community could, and therefore we should, be towards Croatia. The final position, in reply to a direct question, was that there could be no withdrawal by Croatian forces from the 802 areas. This statement was later interpreted by Ambassador Zuzul to be that there could be no FORMAL withdrawal by the Croatian forces. It was suggested to him that a possible manoeuvre with the separation of forces during a ceasefire might allow the Croatian forces to actually withdraw without this being explicit in the agreement.

4. In Plitvice we were met by Mr Hadzic, General and Colonel Novakovic, Mr Bjegovic and Mr Petkovic. They seemed to be expecting a positive message from the meeting with President Tudjman. When we explained the position we had reached and invited them to comment in detail on the Geneva draft, they said that they would need 24 hours to think about it and consult. However, after the meeting and in his press interview Mr Hadzic said that he believed that the Croatian forces could not withdraw under fire, so clearly there had to be a ceasefire first. We treat this with a degree of optimism, but wait to see what they give us tomorrow when we return to Plitvice. ENDALL

ACTION INFO

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TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB FOR SRSG, FC AND HCA

FROM: *per* VOLLEBAEK, ZAGREB *[Signature]*

DATE: 17 AUGUST 1993

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR DEGORICICJA - 17 AUGUST 1993

1. I met Mr Degoricija at 1600 today. He had most of the usual negotiating team, less Mr Lerotic, and a large contingent of press waiting for us. The meeting lasted for one hour and was very friendly.
2. Mr Degoricija said that he was very pleased with the ceasefire agreement produced by us in Geneva last week, indeed it was the best document that had been produced so far, because it contained all the good points and fulfilled the UNSCRs.
3. He said that he was prepared to accept the whole document, with possibly some very small changes. He was also prepared to include the annex which was basically the Erdut agreement, either as an annex or as a separate agreement referred to in the ceasefire agreement itself. The only remaining problem was to work out the timing of the two parts. From the Croatian point of view, the ceasefire had to come first, and then a few days or hours later the other parts could be implemented. But in essence the ceasefire provided for most of the withdrawal required by Erdut anyway.
4. In view of the attitude taken in Geneva, this approach is interesting and could be positive, if taken at face value. However, if the Croatian Government sticks to the view that the ceasefire must come into force before the provisions of the Erdut agreement are fulfilled, then we are back to the same position that we had in Vienna.
5. General Pellnas and I will have dinner tonight with Mr Degoricija and will try to probe further into the Croatian position. I reserve judgement until we have met with President Tudjman, Ambassador Zuzul and Mr Degoricija on Brioni tomorrow evening, for a meeting followed by dinner.

ENDALL

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Palais des Nations

CYZ 542 CNZ 685 P1/1

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TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
INFO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK (191)
DATE: 13 AUGUST 1993
NUMBER: 1555
SUBJECT: Croatian démarche

Our 1547 should have been addressed

TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

and not the other way around. Please accept our apologies.

193 AUG 13 P 1 23

UNPROFOR
Palais des Nations



UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

United Nations Protection Force
Force de protection des Nations Unies

'93 AUG 14 15:08

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page 1 of 6

TO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: *jm* STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Eric Thoenig*
DATE: 13 AUGUST 1993
NUMBER:
SUBJECT: Reply from UNPROFOR to Mudrinic, with his letter

I attach our reply to Mudrinic and his initiating letter,
for your information.

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UNPROFOR

12 August 1993

Dear M. Mudrinic,

Thank you for your letter of 9 August on the subject of the Maslenica Bridge. I fully share your concern that this vital link should be made secure and operational again without any further loss of time. I know how important the link is for Croatia and its people.

Before this can be achieved, however, and even before repairs to the pontoons can be carried out in safety, an effective cease-fire must be agreed between Knin and Zagreb. Such a cease-fire appeared to be within our grasp only very recently in the context of a larger package, the "Erdut Agreement", which was signed by yourself on behalf of Croatia, and by the representatives of the Serb side, on 15 and 16 July. This would have made UNPROFOR responsible for the security of not only Maslenica, but Peruca Dam, Zemunik Airport and Miljeveci Plateau.

Since the signing of the Erdut agreement, intensive UN military and diplomatic activity has been invested in achieving its implementation. UNPROFOR deployed more than 2,000 troops to areas adjacent to those from which the Croatian forces were to withdraw before 1 August, as stipulated in its paragraph 1. On 17 July, following a round of negotiations with high-level UN officials and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, the Serb side agreed to implement a cease-fire in the areas concerned, and on 18 July President Tudjman was able to preside over the opening of Maslenica. Efforts to secure a general and permanent cease-fire continued at meetings held in Vienna on 20-22 July. Although progress was made, these proved unsuccessful at that time.

On 28 July, the Knin authorities drew up and signed a brief cease-fire document to come into effect upon withdrawal by the Croatian forces from the designated areas by midnight on 31 July. The Croatian Government, however, did not feel able to endorse this approach, even when the Security Council, on 30 July, demanded that it withdraw its forces in conformity with Erdut. The Croatian Government subsequently announced that the UN statement required withdrawal only from the Maslenica area -- an interpretation with which we are unable to concur.


On 1 August, the Serb side began shelling and one of the pontoons sank the next day. Subsequent attempts to repair the bridge have been prevented by shelling.

The United Nations continues to maintain that what has been agreed should be implemented, and urges the parties to show restraint and flexibility while means are found to accomplish this. Thus, both sides were invited to Geneva on 11 August to discuss, again, under UN auspices, the cease-fire and other related matters. These talks are now under way under the chairmanship of ICFY.

I wish to assure you, Mr. Minister, that in the context described above, UNPROFOR is sparing no effort to ensure that vital links such as the Maslenica Bridge are restored as soon as possible. I know how much you, yourself, are committed to achieving a positive outcome of this matter, and want to assure you, once again, of my own awareness of how important and urgent it is that our common efforts be fully successful.

With my best personal regards

Yours sincerely,


Cedric Thornberry
Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Ivica Mudrinic
Minister of Maritime Affairs
Transport and Communications

C26-858

Fax In-402

p4/c

EK Please
prepare draft
reply

MINISTRY OF MARITIME AFFAIRS,
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
Prisavlje 14, 41001 Zagreb CROATIA
Tel.: 041 612 017, Fax: 810 691

DATE: 9 August, 1993

FAX NUMBER: 170 199

FAX MESSAGE TO: General Jean Cot,
Force Commander

Cedric Thornberry,
Deputy Chief of Mission,
UNPROFOR, Zagreb

FAX MESSAGE FROM: Ivica Mudrinić,
MINISTER OF MARITIME AFFAIRS,
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

TELEPHONE AND FAX: Tel.: 041 612 017
Fax: 041 610 691

COPIES SENT TO: Mr. V. Šeks, Vice Premier of the Republic of Croatia,
Dr. B. Jakšić, Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia

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MINISTRY OF MARITIME AFFAIRS,
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Prisavlje 14, 41001 Zagreb CROATIA
Tel.: 041 612 017, Fax: 610 681

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P5/K

Zagreb, August 9, 1993

General Jean Cot,
Force Commander
UNPROFOR, Zagreb

Cedric Thornberry,
Deputy Chief of Mission
UNPROFOR, Zagreb

Dear Sirs,

On July 18, 1993 the Government of the Republic of Croatia, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 847 (1993), opened a pontoon bridge over the Maslenica strait. There is no doubt that this bridge is of strategic importance to the Republic of Croatia as a major road link between the Croatian coast-line and its mainland. At the time when the bridge was opened - despite a general alert, in effect on the bridge and the surrounding area due to continued periodic shelling by the Serb paramilitary forces in the UNPA Sector South - the number of vehicles crossing the bridge reached 4,500 daily. Approximately 40 % of that number were heavy transport vehicles, many of them carrying humanitarian aid for the neighbouring Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.


On August 1, 1993, the bridge was damaged due to Serbian shelling from their strongholds in UNPA Sector South and on August 2, one of the five pontoon elements sank. The Croatian engineers were not able to complete the necessary repairs on the bridge because Serbian rebels continued their unprovoked attack on the bridge site. I must emphasize the importance of accelerating the efficient repair of the bridge, particularly in light of the fact that the bridge between the island of Pag and the mainland will soon have to be closed for repairs. As I outlined in my letter of August 7, 1993, although damaged, this bridge has carried most of the road traffic to this area since the destruction of the original Maslenica bridge.

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We urge UNPROFOR to ensure the cessation of all military activities by the local Serb paramilitary forces in the UNPA South, thus enabling restoration of traffic across the Maslenica pontoon bridge. Immediate intervention with the view to put all the Serbian heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control, in accordance with SC Resolution 802 (1992) and other relevant SC Resolutions, is of paramount importance. No reason exists for allowing continued attacks on an object that has indisputable civilian purposes and that is open for use by all the citizens of the Republic of Croatia and for the benefit of many thousands of endangered civilians in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sincerely,



Ivica Mudrinic

MINISTER

ST

Zagreb, 12 August 1993

H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York

Your Excellency,

On behalf of my Government, I would like to state the position of the Republic of Croatia concerning unimpeded construction of Maslenica bridge and the undisturbed flow of traffic over it, which was provided in the Agreement of 15/16 July 1993 providing for the withdrawal of Croatian armed forces from the area of Maslenica, Zemunik and Peruca as soon as UNPROFOR takes effective control over these areas.

The signature of the Croatian Government resulted from a *bona fide* approach which includes participation of the local Serbs in the negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of all disputes within the political framework determined by the Security Council resolutions 802, 815 and 847. It was the understanding of the Croatian delegation that, in addition to the 15/16 July Agreement, an additional agreement would be signed on a comprehensive cease-fire affecting all the lines of confrontation. Yet, at the decisive moment, the delegation of local Serbs from Knin decided not to sign the text which had been preliminarily agreed upon, until the Croatian side had implemented the 15/16 July Agreement.

The pressure exerted in that way by the local Serbs from Knin was not acceptable to our delegation, which insisted that the signing of the cease-fire agreement - as called upon in para. 5 of the 15/16 July Agreement - is a prerequisite for any unilateral and temporary withdrawal of Croatian armed forces from any part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

After the attacks of the Serbian insurgents on the Maslenica bridge, the destruction of one part of the bridge and the continuing shelling that prevents the repair of this solely civilian object - my Government is compelled to consider the 15/16 July Agreement void, and to request the immediate and unconditional implementation of the measures that were proposed in the reports and their annexes of the Secretary General (S/23280, S/23592, S/23513, S/23353) and in the stipulations contained in Security Council resolutions 724 (1991), 740 (1992), 752 (1992), 762 (1992), 769 (1992), 779 (1992), 802 (1993), 815 (1993) and 847 (1993).

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The measures which are foreseen in the above-mentioned reports and resolutions include not only the taking control of heavy weapons but also the disbanding and demobilization of all paramilitary, irregular and volunteer units in the UNPAs, as well as the banning of the wearing of uniforms or carrying of weapons by the personnel from these units. Unfortunately, the present situation is in disturbing contrast to these provisions and attacks by local Serbs on Croatian civilian targets are continuing.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia is willing to continue its dialogue and promote confidence-building measure meant to demonstrate our desire to proceed with the reintegration of the UNPAs in a peaceful manner. However, it is difficult to do this as long as Serbian paramilitary forces continue to threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. In this context, I have to stress that the decision by the "government" of the "republic of Serbian Krajina", communicated to the diplomatic and consular missions in Belgrade, that they "will negotiate with the Republic of Croatia on an equal state-entity basis", is insulting and totally unacceptable to the Republic of Croatia. The UNPAs are an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia as emphasized in Security Council resolutions 815 (1993) and 847 (1993), and we consider that these negotiations have to be an entirely internal matter of the Republic of Croatia, in which UNPROFOR and the officials of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia are only unbiased mediators.

In our view, the reports of UNPROFOR regarding the situation in Croatia have become increasingly slanted in recent weeks, often disregarding information that would describe the hostile actions by the Serbian paramilitary units. While supporting the activities of peace-keeping forces on our territory until the expiration of the present mandate, we strongly believe that the members of the Security Council and the international community as a whole are entitled to have objective and unbiased information about the situation on the ground. We would like to see UNPROFOR finally acting in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially those that emphasize the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia over its entire internationally recognized territory.

We call once again upon the international community to exert pressure on the Serbian insurgents in the Republic of Croatia to obey its decisions which are stated in numerous resolutions, or face the necessary consequences. It is the firm belief of my Government that the relevant Security Council decisions contain all the provisions for restoration of a just peace in my country. My Government is committed to fulfill all its obligations, but we cannot agree with anything less than full implementation of all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

I would request your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest appreciation.

Dr. Mate Granic
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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CZN-1008
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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

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Page 1 of 4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
INFO : STOLTENBERG, UNOG
FROM : (H) COT, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *Adrian Thurnher*
DATE : 12 AUGUST 1993
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 973
REF : YOUR 1528 AND 1531 OF 11 AUGUST 1993
SUBJECT: INTERIM REPORT AND MANDATE IN CROATIA

A draft interim report was, as requested by you, prepared here last weekend; due to misunderstanding, it was not transmitted to the SRSG in Geneva on Monday as requested. It was sent this morning to Geneva. It has my full approval, and I should especially like to emphasise my endorsement of its draft paragraphs 15, 16 and 17. Draft paragraph 17 is especially relevant to the enquiry you have made in your 1531. We have not discussed the question with the Croats, who have not raised it with us.

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Palais des Nations
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Perspectives for the Future

15. The Vance Plan, which remains the matrix for UNPROFOR's mandate, was agreed by Croatia, the former Yugoslavia, and by the Serb authorities in Knin. Subsequently, the former Yugoslavia has largely desintegrated, and Croatia has become a Member of the United Nations in its own right. UNPROFOR's mandate has been expanded by successive resolutions of the Security Council to include such matters as the "Pink Zones", border control, the provisions of resolution 820 (1993) on control by Croatia of UNPA imports and exports, as well as the tasks associated with the ongoing conflict which began on 22 January 1993. Many of these additional mandates have, of necessity, been determined after consultation with Croatia only. While this has been the only proper course of action, it has also meant that UNPROFOR's position, in seeking to secure the necessary Serb agreement on their implementation, has at times been made rather difficult, and Croatia has also at times come to see UNPROFOR's role as being that of an agent to implement its approach to the situation. In this situation, UNPROFOR's credibility has been affected, as each side, for its own reasons, blames the peacekeeping force for failing to fulfil its expectations:- of protection, or implementation. Croatia seeks, in particular, the speedy implementation of resolution 815 (1993), whose fifth paragraph clarifies the position of the UNPAs as being "integral parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia". The Serb local authorities, for their part, reject this approach to the situation of the UNPAs. Each declares,

(C)

from time to time, its readiness to use force to achieve its territorial reintegration, or its territorial separateness. The Serb authorities do not, in fact, have a unified approach to their future:- some members seek independence; some, union in a greater Serbia; some might perhaps accept some kind of confederal structure in a nominal union with Croatian-controlled Croatia. But all are united in their determination to resist any use of force by Croatia. The continuing uncertainty over the future political shape and form of Bosnia-Herzegovina also affects, to a major degree, the solution to the problem. In this unresolved political deadlock, fighting continues, with more death and destruction; attitudes become more polarised; and peoples and economies on both sides of the confrontation line undergo increasing deprivation. Without a degree of political flexibility, which is not yet apparent, each side will continue to torture the other without having the capability of achieving any definitive solution.

16. It is in this context that the Government of Croatia has now made a number of suggestions for the reconstruction of UNPROFOR, most recently set out in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to myself. He asks that the operation in Croatia should have a new name, from which it would be apparent that the force is located on the territory of Croatia. He has likewise proposed that the force should be split up, through the creation of an independent office for fulfilling civilian tasks of the peacekeeping operation, including a Head of Civilian Affairs who would have the authority and responsibility only for Croatia. His letter also suggests that future mandates and related documents reflect the fact that the mandate in Croatia is separate from all others, and to that end sign a Status of Forces Agreement. These, he proposes, would be initial steps towards the establishment of a separation of UNPROFOR's mandate into three independent mandates.

17. However, there are many practical, political, logistical and financial reasons for maintaining a unified UNPROFOR, and there is

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already, within the UNPROFOR headquarters' structure at Zagreb, specialisation at all levels in regard to the specific problems of the mandate in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, with, in practice, a substantial degree of local autonomy in each area, reflecting its diverse circumstances. The Council's resolutions on former Yugoslavia have always made clear to which country within the area of operations they are specifically relevant. It is quite difficult to separate the political, and indeed military, factors which relate to Croatia and to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to the nature of contact which exists, for example, between Zagreb and Belgrade. The resources of the United Nations, including UNPROFOR, are already seriously overstretched, and I do not at this time see how it would be feasible to duplicate institutions and tasks which, after nearly 18 months of operation, are now reaching towards an adequate level of staffing and support. In this regard, it should also be mentioned that more than half of UNPROFOR's military component, more than 90% of its Civilian Police, and more than 80% of its civil affairs personnel, are located in Croatia. It might also be added that the Serb local authorities have for some time been pressing UNPROFOR to move a part of its central headquarters to Knin. Nevertheless, and in view of all the matters mentioned above, I propose to keep the suggestion of the Government of Croatia under active consideration.

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
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OUTGOING FAX NO.: COO 8049	DATE/TIME: 111630B AUG 93
TO: HQ SECTOR SOUTH ICFY GENEVA	FROM: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB COO 
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: COMMANDER ICFY FOR BRIG PELLNAS	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER : Col Maisonneuve Chief Ops Offr
INFO :	
SUBJECT: OPENING OF CROSSING POINT * SECTOR SOUTH	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE, FC, DFC, DCA, COS, ACOS O&I,
SOO, CMLO

MESSAGE:

Ref: A. HQ SS: T-0403 092045 Aug 93 (NOTAL)
B. Telcon Beaudot/Maisonneuve 11 Aug 93
C. Conversation CMLO/COO UNPROFOR 11 Aug 93

1. Attached, please find a letter of approval from Brig GOTOVINA, OZ Split Commander, for the reopening of a crossing point in Sector South. As discussed at ref B, Comd SS is requested to approach Serb authorities in Knin to solicit their approval. You will note that the crossing is not between Maslenica br and Zemunik airport at Suhovare as Comd SS had requested at ref A, but along the confrontation line due north of Biograd.

2. At ref C, it was confirmed that Croatian authorities have not been yet approached by CMLO about the Suhovare crossing as had been requested by Comd SS. Therefore, it is suggested that UNPROFOR could negotiate to open the crossing suggested in the attached instead.

3. For Brig Pellnas: Because most of the decision makers from the Serb authorities are presently in Geneva, please seek their approval so they can communicate it to Knin.

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Palais des Nations
UNOG Telephone Unit

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTER CA
MILITARY ZONE SPLIT

HQ ZADAR

Zadar, 10 August, 1993

UNPROFOR

HQ ZAGREB

General Jean Côté

UNPROFOR

HQ SECTOR SOUTH

General Bernard Baudet

Respected General,

On the basis of the request from the UNPROFOR HQ for the opening of crossing points in between temporary occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia and free territory of the Republic of Croatia, and for the UN necessities, HQ of Croatian Army has agreed with Your request.

Direction : KNIN - BENKOVAC - POLAČA - KAKMA - GORNJE RAŠTANE -
DONJE RAŠTANE - KRMCINA - ADRIATIC COASTAL ROAD ZADAR - and
viceversa.

With respect and salutation,




COMMANDER

Brigadeer

Ante GOTOVINA

In addition : Chart.



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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

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TO: AM 12 - STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
 INFO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 11 AUGUST 1993
 NUMBER: 1531
 SUBJECT: UNPROFOR MANDATE IN CROATIA

1993 AUG 11 P 10:00

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Please find enclosed a self-explanatory Note to the Secretary-General on the above subject. We would welcome your comments. Please advise as to whether this issue has been raised with you by the Croatian or other authorities.

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Note to the Secretary-General


UNPROFOR MANDATE IN CROATIA

I should like to draw your attention to the attached letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia reiterating a request made to you by his Foreign Minister to separate UNPROFOR into three distinct mandates, and in particular to rename the Force in Croatia.

DPKO has consulted Mr Goulding on the proposed arrangements. We wish jointly to recommend that you express your inability to accommodate the Croatian demand.

Our position is not based solely on the operational, practical and administrative considerations already described in our Aide-Mémoire of 21 June 1993 (copy attached for convenient reference). In addition to these, it is essential to point out that the name of the Force in Croatia embodies the very basis on which its deployment was accepted by the Serb side. To change the name "Protection Force" would immediately convey the signal that the United Nations no longer considers it has a mandate to protect the minority populations in the UN Protected Areas. It would justifiably be seen by the Serbs as a betrayal by the United Nations of promises made in the peace-making phase, when Mr Vance and Mr Goulding described to them the nature and mandate of the proposed UN peace-keeping intervention. As such, a change of this nature could end Serb co-operation with UNPROFOR in Croatia and precipitate the renewal of full-scale conflict there.

For this reason DPKO recommends, and Mr Goulding fully agrees, that the present arrangements for the Force in Croatia remain unchanged. The circumstances relating to the mandate in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are, however, somewhat different and thought may be given in due course to separating that operation from the others.


S. Iqbal Riza
11 August 1993

CYZ 525 CNZ 673 P3/8



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

201 East 42nd street; Suite 3108
New York, NY 10017 USA

Tel: (212) 986-1585
Fax: (212) 986-2011

New York, 30 July 1993

H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York

Your Excellency,

I would like to draw your attention to the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Mate Granic addressed to you on 18 June 1993 [S/25973] concerning the separation of the mandate of UNPROFOR into three independent mandates, for the Republic of Croatia, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Macedonia.

My Government still considers the said proposal and the arguments contained in the letter to be fully viable, and - in the spirit of your recent meeting with Dr. Granic - I have the honour to propose that the initial steps in the process of separation could be the following:

1. allocation of a new name for the operation in Croatia, from which it would be *prima facie* evident that the peace-keeping force is located on the territory of the Republic of Croatia;
2. separation of the civilian sector of the so-far unified operation by creating an independent office for fulfilling civilian tasks of the peace-keeping operation, including the Head of Civilian Affairs that would have the authority and the responsibility only for the territory Croatia;
3. in further reviews of revisions of the mandate of the peace-keeping force in Croatia, having the relevant resolutions or statements of the Security Council, as well as all the documents of the Secretariat, reflect the fact that the mandate in Croatia is *per se* separate, and that the documents deal with this mandate only, not including the mandates in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia;
4. signing the Status of Force Agreement between the United Nations and the Croatian Government that would be in effect for the territory of the Republic of Croatia within its international borders.


CYZ 525 CNZ 673 P4/B

- 2 -

It is the strong belief of my Government that these first steps would facilitate the mandate of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia. We have a full understanding of the financial and operational difficulties which the UNPROFOR operation is facing. In this regard Croatia is ready to cooperate with the United Nations, but I must once again emphasize the political and legal importance of the aforesaid measures.

I would ask for your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Ambassador Dr. Mario Nobilo
Permanent Representative



1993-08-12 02:19 5603

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CYX 383 CYZ 525 CNZ 673 P5/8
P 1/4

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TO: ABOULNAGA FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 21 June 1993

NUMBER: MSC-1175

SUBJECT: Division of UNPROFOR

1993 JUN 21 P 11 13

Please find enclosed, as requested, a self-explanatory Aide
Mémoire on the above subject.



Aide Mémoire

Division of UNPROFOR in three separate entities

1. In a letter dated 18 June, the Foreign Minister of Croatia has requested the division of UNPROFOR in three separate entities. He points out that with the recognition of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as states and their membership in the United Nations the geopolitical realities no longer justify the existing framework of UNPROFOR. He adds that UNPROFOR is performing three different mandates in the three states, i.e. peace-keeping in Croatia, delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and preventive deployment in the FYROM. Moreover, Croatia is not a signatory to the UNPROFOR status-of-forces agreement.
2. The Foreign Minister's letter stresses that the United Nations Protected Areas, as confirmed by Security Council resolution 815 (1993), are part of Croatia. A separation of UNPROFOR would be an important step to confirm Croatia's sovereignty and territorial integrity in this regard and would be conducive to finding an adequate political solution.
3. A similar démarche has been made directly to the Secretary-General by the FYROM which is requesting a separation of Macedonia Command from UNPROFOR in order to underline its newly attained sovereignty.
4. In his comments, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR argues in favour of a continued unified operation since the political, military and ethnic problems of the former Yugoslavia continue to cross the new national boundaries. This is also the approach taken by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and is fully endorsed by DPKO. Since certain actions by UNPROFOR in one area could negatively affect the security of its personnel in the entire area of operations, UNPROFOR needs to maintain a comprehensive structure through which it coordinates peace-making, peace-keeping and humanitarian efforts. In more general terms, it can be argued that the Security Council has addressed the conflict as a threat to international peace and security. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia transcends the national borders, and, in fact is being fuelled by the dissatisfaction with these very borders. The ongoing referendum among the Serbs in the UNPAs as to whether they should unify with the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina underlines this point.
5. The civil affairs structure of UNPROFOR is spread throughout the area of operations and includes, inter alia, a

2

military and civilian liaison office in Belgrade. Apart from the original mandate of the peace-keeping plan, which was not supposed to prejudge the outcome of an overall political solution, this deployment reflects the interrelationship of developments in the area, although they have, to a certain extent, their own particular national dynamics. The political and information function of this unified structure would be jeopardized if UNPROFOR were to be divided into three parts. UNPROFOR emphasizes the paramount importance of one headquarters with a general overview of developments to provide the necessary guidance and coordination. If the force were divided into three distinct operations, common political perspectives would be lost; such activities as liaison in Belgrade could become chaotic and unworkable.

6. Restructuring UNPROFOR into three separate and identifiable entities would inevitably require additional military and civilian staff for the headquarters of the divided operations as certain functions would have to be triplicated, such as Force Commander, Director of Civil Affairs, Commissioner of Civil Police, Chief of Staff, Chief Military Observer and Chief Administrative Officer. In addition, appropriate buildings would have to be identified and communications networks would have to be tailored to the new structure. UNPROFOR emphasizes the need to maintain common and integrated administrative and logistics structures in order to benefit from economies of scale.

7. Instead of dividing the Force into three operations, UNPROFOR suggests it be subdivided into three entities within one peace-keeping operation. This would involve the establishment of a "Theatre Commander" with appropriate headquarters and support staff. This headquarters could be located on neutral territory. In essence, the Theatre Commander would support the Special Representative in his oversight functions and coordinate the activities of the three "commands" under one operation.

8. In sum, DPKO holds that it would be politically and operationally unwise to separate the Force into three operations. The Secretary-General may wish to reply to the Foreign Minister along these lines without bringing the matter to the Security Council for decision.

9. However, the Council may not want to impose a unified structure of UNPROFOR against the express will of two of the three affected countries. UNPROFOR's original mandate in Croatia in Security Council resolution 743 (1992) was based on Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, under which the consent of the parties is required or can, once given, be withdrawn. In extending UNPROFOR's mandate in resolutions 807 and 815 (1993), the Council, however, has invoked Chapter

CYZ 525 CNZ 673 P8/8.
CYX 383 P 1

3

VII "to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and its freedom of movement for all its missions". Ultimately, only the Security Council can decide whether the invocation of Chapter VII also was meant to extend to the mandate as such and whether, therefore, UNPROFOR's presence and structure would not require the consent of the parties. In any event, the Council is likely to abide by the advice of the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

ST/PS/dg/21-6-93



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CZG '93 837 10:58

CODE CABLE

'93 AUG -8 10:31

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 1 of 2

To: Stoltenberg, ICFY Geneva
From: *fu* Cot, UNPROFOR Zagreb
Date: 8 August 1993
Number: _____
Subject: Croatian Government Request

Admir Thant

....

I attach copy of a letter from Mudrinic on behalf of the
Croatian Government. **ENDALL.**

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MINISTRY OF MARITIME AFFAIRS,
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Prisavlje 14, 41001 Zagreb CROATIA
Tel.: 041 612 017, Fax.: 610 691

CT

C2G-831 P2/2 MA
CCJP OK

Zagreb, 7 August, 1993

Brig. General Bernard Baudot,
Sector Commander - South,
UNPROFOR

Dear Sir,

Due to continued shelling of the Maslenica bridge area by the Serb paramilitary forces from 1 August, 1993, when they damaged one of the barges (pontoon elements), our efforts to repair the damage are being severely impeded. The most recent of these attacks took place earlier today at approximately 11:00 o'clock local time. We kindly request that UNPROFOR intervenes with the local Serb authorities in Knin and ensure that no further shelling takes place in this area. In addition, we reiterate our request to have UNPROFOR deployed in the area of the Maslenica bridge (including the bridge) and the Zemunik airport and we would welcome any technical assistance that you may be able to offer (divers, engineering support) in our rebuilding effort.

Let me emphasize the fact that the reopening of the Maslenica pontoon bridge is in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 847 and we expect your assistance in this effort.

In my letter to General Cot of 6 August, 1993 I have asked for an UNPROFOR representative to be nominated to a technical commission to examine the condition of the Pag - mainland bridge, which currently carries most of the road traffic to Southern Croatia (Dalmatia). Indications are that this bridge will have to be closed to all heavy traffic (over 2 tons). Should this happen the Maslenica bridge will become the only viable link to Southern Croatia for all heavy traffic including humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina that uses this route.

In closing, we expect that UNPROFOR will act on our request in accordance with the mandate and ensure that this effort can be realized so that this bridge can be available for use by all of the citizens of Croatia.

Please reply at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,


Mica Mudrić, dipl.ing.
MINISTER

1682
010/12

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

Page 1 of 4

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OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG/	DATE/TIME: 08 1525 Aug 1993
TO: STOLTENBERG - GENEVA	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: AMBASSADOR VOLLEBAEK	FILE REF. NO.: <i>J.L. Delaney</i> DRAFTER : CAPT P DELANEY ADC TO THE SRSG
INFO : MAJ. Karanovic. L.O.	
SUBJECT: Minutes of coordination meeting in Zagreb	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE ADC/SRSG.	

MESSAGE:

1. Attached please find minutes of the above mentioned meeting

Regards.

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Page 1 of 3 pages

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
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Outgoing fax no:	Date/time: 8 13:05 2 August 1993
To: JEANNIE PETERSON, CAC CIVIL AFFAIRS ZACREB HQ	From: ABDALLA MAHGOUB, OIC SECTOR SOUTH HQ, KNIN <i>A. Mahgoub</i>
Fax no.:	Fax no.:
Attn.:	Ref. no. : Drafter : KM Title : Releasing off. : Signature :
Info. : Fax no.:	
Subject: MINUTES OF COORDINATION MEETING IN ZADAR	

MESSAGE

ATTACHED PLEASE FIND A DRAFT ON THE ABOVE MENTIONED SUBJECT.

BEST REGARDS.

Evo 13 10 Vis

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in fo
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COORDINATION MEETING BETWEEN UNPROFOR AND
CROATIAN AUTHORITIES IN ZADAR - 7 AUGUST 1993

ATTENDANCE:

UNPROFOR- General Baudot	Sector Commander
Jeannie Peterson	CAC
Bob Noonan	Acting Chief- CivPol
Peter Halgunset	UNMO
Lt Col Herissier	Adviser to SC
Vitali Leplinsky	Civil Affairs Officer
Kabelo Makhetha	Humanitarian Affairs Officer

Croatian Authorities

Mr. Tomas	Rep. Office of Govt
Brigadier Gotavina	Commander- Dalmatian Corp
Mr Kovacevic	Adviser to the Govt
Mr Vranjes	Chief of milicija
Mr Prtenjaca	Zupan - Zadar
Navy Commander Lukovic	Liaison Officer with UNPROFOR
Brigadier Domazet	Information officer

Mr Tomas chaired the meeting. He explained that the purpose of the meeting was to obtain detailed information on the current situation in Sector South. A briefing on the situation in Sector South was given. (Military, CivPol, political, economic and humanitarian aspects). The Croatian side informed UNPROFOR about the events in the front in the last 3 days. The main point of the Croatian delegation was that the prerequisite condition for the solution of the whole problem is a ceasefire agreement. The Croats stressed that they are always ready to solve the problem peacefully and requested UNPROFOR officials to convey their position to the Security Council. The CAC informed the meeting that UNPROFOR delegation was not authorized to discuss any political issues which are within the overall competence of HQ in Zagreb.

The following points were raised by the Croatian delegation:

1. The Serb side was continuing to shell several areas including the Maslenica bridge. The last attack on the bridge was reported at 11:00 a.m. that morning. The Croatian side was left with no alternative but to defend itself.
2. In Vienna the Croatian side had proposed a ceasefire which was rejected by the Serb side. Their side had reported about 400 protests against Serb aggression to UNPROFOR in the past ten days but attacks had not stopped.
3. The Croatian/Krajina conflict was outside ICY mandate because Krajina was not a sovereign state. In their view, ICY had to deal with issues pertaining to states in the former Yugoslavia.
4. The Croatian side was ready to give complete freedom of movement along the confrontation line to UNPROFOR.

5. Water supplies have been interrupted in Zadar for almost one year and a half. This has caused a lot of hardship to the population.

6. They would like to have regular update of the condition of the remaining Croat population in SS.

7. The Chief of the milicija demanded regular meetings with Sector South CivPol.

8. They wondered when the return of the displaced Croats would occur in accordance with the Vance Plan.

9. Their delegation would only have talks with Krajina authorities once the latter accepted that they were an integral part of Croatia.

In response to the questions posed the SC stated that he welcomed the freedom of movement they have promised. He stated that if there had to be regular meetings in Zadar it would be necessary to open a crossing point to facilitate movement of UNPROFOR to attend such meetings.

The CAC mentioned that economic issues had been the main concern and in the past were dealt within the context of the Sub Commission on Economic Issues. There was a stalemate on economic discussions as a result of lack of progress on the political front.

Details of the condition and mode of protection of the remaining Croats were given. The CAC explained that in all cases UNPROFOR with UNHCR as a lead agency on humanitarian issues only facilitated the transfer of Croats from the Sector after receiving requests/demands from the Croatian side and ascertaining that the individuals concerned accepted their transfer.

UNPROFOR was providing protection in 9 villages for about 400 Croats. She informed the delegation that UNPROFOR was considering to have a Civil Affairs Liaison Office in Zadar to facilitate easy access to Zadar authorities.

The atmosphere in the meeting was far from hostile. There was a clear indication that the Zadar authorities wished to reestablish contacts with Sector South particularly on humanitarian issues. They promised to discuss among themselves the possibilities of opening a crossing point and would revert to UNPROFOR in due time.

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Palais des Nations

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IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 6 AUGUST 1993

NUMBER: 1508

SUBJECT: Interim Report to the Security Council pursuant to SCR 847

CODED CABLE

1. Thank you for your CGZ-092 providing an update on recent events in the context of the Erdut agreement. However, the request of the Security Council in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 847 demands a broader approach.

2. We would, therefore, appreciate your providing a further input covering "progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions", if any, "and taking into account the position of the Croatian Government". For your background, it should be noted that this paragraph was a concession by the Security Council to the Croatian Government which, at the time of the adoption of the resolution, had expressed its misgivings about the lack of progress in the implementation of the peace-keeping plan and had indicated it would withdraw its consent to the presence of UNPROFOR if its mandate was not made more "muscular". As to the position of the Croatian Government please find attached a letter from Croatian Permanent Representative dated 30 July.

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3. Since the Security Council has decided to reconsider UNPROFOR's mandate in the light of the Secretary-General's report we would appreciate your recommendations as to how UNPROFOR can or cannot continue its presence in Croatia, given the recent developments. In this context you may wish to refer to the position taken by the Secretary-General in previous reports, including S/25777 and S/25913.

4. In light of the position taken by the Croatian Government we would also need to address the suggested renaming of UNPROFOR. In this context, you may wish to know that the Secretary-General, in a meeting with the Croatian Foreign Minister, has indicated a certain willingness to consider this request, although it was left open whether the question should be dealt with now or by the end of September.



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

201 East 42nd street; Suite 3108
New York, NY 10017 USA

Tel: (212) 986-1585
Fax: (212) 986-2011

New York, 30 July 1993

H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York

Your Excellency,

I would like to draw your attention to the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Mate Granic addressed to you on 18 June 1993 [S/25973] concerning the separation of the mandate of UNPROFOR into three independent mandates, for the Republic of Croatia, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Macedonia.

My Government still considers the said proposal and the arguments contained in the letter to be fully viable, and - in the spirit of your recent meeting with Dr. Granic - I have the honour to propose that the initial steps in the process of separation could be the following:


1. allocation of a new name for the operation in Croatia, from which it would be *prima facie* evident that the peace-keeping force is located on the territory of the Republic of Croatia;
2. separation of the civilian sector of the so-far unified operation by creating an independent office for fulfilling civilian tasks of the peace-keeping operation, including the Head of Civilian Affairs that would have the authority and the responsibility only for the territory Croatia;
3. in further reviews or revisions of the mandate of the peace-keeping force in Croatia, having the relevant resolutions or statements of the Security Council, as well as all the documents of the Secretariat, reflect the fact that the mandate in Croatia is *per se* separate, and that the documents deal with this mandate only, not including the mandates in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia;
4. signing the Status of Force Agreement between the United Nations and the Croatian Government that would be in effect for the territory of the Republic of Croatia within its international borders.

- 2 -

It is the strong belief of my Government that these first steps would facilitate the mandate of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia. We have a full understanding of the financial and operational difficulties which the UNPROFOR operation is facing. In this regard Croatia is ready to cooperate with the United Nations, but I must once again emphasize the political and legal importance of the aforesaid measures.

I would ask for your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Ambassador Dr. Mario Nobilo
Permanent Representative



HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB

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


UNPROFOR OPERATIONS

Page 1 of 2

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OUTGOING FAX NO. OPS8028	DATE/TIME: 051530 B AUG 93
TO: UNNY UNPROFOR SITUATION ROOM STOLTENBERG(ONLY) GENEVA	FROM: HQ, UNPROFOR ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX : 
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER: MAJ DE LA CORTE, ODO
INFO:	
SUBJECT: UNMO DEPLOYMENT IN SECTOR SOUTH	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE,	

MESSAGE:

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED MESSAGE FROM UNMO IN SECTOR SOUTH TO HQ UNPROFOR.

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

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Page 1 of 3

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK- TOT 05 16 32 Z
 INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
 FROM : COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Edin Thantony*
 DATE : 5 AUGUST 1993
 NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 955
 SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CROATIAN MFA TODAY

1. Herewith, note to file for your information. We are looking once again at the question of who destroyed Maslenica.

ENDALL

ACTION INFO

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NOTE TO THE FILE

1. At the request of Mr. Granic, the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, DCM Thornberry, accompanied by Mr. Abdul-Aziz, called on the Minister, who conveyed Tudjman's dissatisfaction with certain reports from UNPROFOR to the Security Council yesterday on Maslenica Bridge and the question of the party responsible for its destruction. The Minister stated that there were two possibilities. One, local Croats might be responsible for such an act, or two, the local Serbs would be fully responsible, according to media pronouncements from Knin. He added that today, between 1058 and 1105 hours, the Serb side hit the bridge with two missiles, causing great damage to it. Public pressure on the President as well as on the Government was on the increase. There was also a pressure on Croatia, from certain Governments, concerning Maslenica bridge, particularly the United States and France, to exercise maximum restraint. The situation was difficult, deserving immediate attention. Croatia's main objective in the future would be to rebuild the bridge peacefully and pursue negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. He proposed that UNPROFOR monitors should be present to monitor what was happening on the ground. Maslenica bridge had far-reaching social, economic, political and humanitarian implications. He stressed the need for UNPROFOR to verify the party responsible for the destruction of the bridge prior to sending reports to New York.

2. In reply, Thornberry agreed with the Minister that it would be highly desirable to have clear evidence on who was responsible. It would also be desirable to ensure UNPROFOR's freedom of movement on the Croatian side, enabling the investigation to proceed in a satisfactory manner, and under same conditions.

3. Thornberry took the opportunity to brief the Minister on the efforts made by UNPROFOR and ICFY, during the last few days, to narrow the differences between the two parties and expedite the implementation of Erdut agreement. He expressed regret that

CZ N- 990

3/3

little progress had been achieved. He emphasized that both sides should show the maximum degree of flexibility in a very dangerous situation. The Serb side had expressed willingness to open a dialogue on economic issues of interest to both parties as soon as the Erdut agreement was implemented. Granic said that Croatia was showing maximum restraint at this time, but he may have been uninformed of the two instances of artillery barrages initiated last evening by the Croat side in Sectors North and South, of which DCM informed him.

4. In conclusion, the Minister reiterated once again his President's concern about the Maslenica problem and expressed his readiness to cooperate on humanitarian matters with the parties concerned not only in Knin, but also in BH, so as to promote economic cooperation/and confidence-building.

Mohamed Abdul-Aziz
5 August 1993

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

Page 1 of 2

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OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG/	DATE/TIME: 05 Aug 1993
TO: Stoltenberg - Geneva	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: Maj. Kromer	FILE REF. NO.: 2.1.1.1.1 DRAFTER : CAPT P DELANEY ADC TO THE SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: DEGORICITAS REPLY TO VOLLEBAEK	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE ADC/SRSG.	

MESSAGE:

1. Attached please find translated reply to Ambassador Vollebaek which was accidentally omitted from the earlier fax.

Regards.

TRANSLATION FROM CROATIAN

**REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Delegation of the Republic of Croatia
to negotiations with local Serbian authorities**

Zagreb, 4 July 1993

Mr. KNUT VOLLEBEAK
Assistant to the Chairman of the ICFY

Mr. Vollebeak visited me with his co-workers on 4 August 1993 and expressed a wish to continue with Vienna negotiations. In the same time, he informed me of the wish expressed by the Serbs from Knin to proceed with the negotiations.

During his visit, Mr. Vollebeak also informed me of the earlier talks in Knin and told me that the talks could proceed along the following three points:

1. The cease-fire agreement - based on the proposed draft agreement from Vienna;
2. The Erdut-Zagreb agreement would be discussed without timeframe;
3. If agreed upon, the cease-fire agreement would come into force six hours upon the implementation of the Erdut agreement.

The Croatian delegation accepts the proposal to continue with the cease-fire negotiations in the country and to have the draft cease-fire agreement from Vienna as a basis for the talks.

The Croatian delegation is ready, after the cease-fire agreement has been signed, to consider all the alternative separate agreements on specific activities in sectors implementing thereby all the relevant Security Council resolutions, and in particular the SCR 847.

Slavko Degoricija,
Head of Delegation

(SIGNED UPON ORIGINAL)

FROM: ANMO HQ Zagreb

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UTC Time: 93-08-04 17:20:06

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FROM UNMO HQ SECTOR SOUTH

TO UNMO HQ ZAGREB
ATTN: CMO

SUBJECT: UPDATE OF SITUATION IN SECTOR SOUTH

DTG 041030 B AUG 93

TEXT


1. IN UNMO ZONE BENKOVAC RECCE HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED FOR ALL ENTRY POINTS, AND THE UNMO'S ARE READY TO CROSS THE UN-FORCED INTO THE "ERDUT" AGREED AREAS.
THE ZONE HAS ONE OP MANNED AT NIGHT FROM WHICH THE UNMO'S ARE ABLE TO MONITOR THE AREA FROM ZEMUNIK AIRPORT TO MASLENICA BRIDGE. THE AREA OF MASLENICA BRIDGE IS ALSO MONITORED BY ONE FRENCH COY AND ONE CANADIAN COY. THE AREA ON SERB SIDE IS PATROLLED EVERY DAY. THE UNMO'S IN THE AREA HAVE TOTAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.
NO UNMO'S ARE IN ARTILLERY GUN POSITIONS. THE UNMO'S ARE ABLE TO MONITOR TOGETHER WITH FRENCH AND CANADIAN COY ANY OUTGOING SHELLING FROM THE AREA.
THE SERBS IN THE AREA ARE HOPEFUL OF A CA WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA.
2. UNMO TEAM DRNIS RECCE OF THE SERB SIDE OF "ERDUT" AGREED AREA MELIVICI PLATEAU AND PERUCA. RECCE FINISHED AND THE UNMO TEAM IS READY TO CROSS THE CANADIAN COY INTO PERUCA AREA AND KENYAN COY INTO MILIVICI PLATEAU AREA. ALSO IN THIS AREAS UNMO'S HAVE TOTAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.
3. IN UNMO ZONE ZADAR THE FINAL RECCE HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED. THE UNMO'S HAVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT TO GO TO THE FRONTLINE ESCORTED BY CA LO. ACCORDING TO THE MEETING THIS MORNING BETWEEN BRIG. GOSPIVINA AND SECTOR SOUTH WITHDRAWAL COMMITTEE THE BRIG. STATED THE ERDUT AGREEMENT IS HISTORY. SEE SPECIAL CASUALTY REPORT UNMO ZONE ZADAR.
4. IN UNMO ZONE GOSPIV AS UNMO ZONE ZADAR REGARDING RECCE AND MOVEMENT.
5. THE FINAL GROUND RECCE HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TODAY AND RESULTS WILL BE PASSED TO THE BATTALIONS AND SECTOR SOUTH.
ALL UNMO'S IN SECTOR SOUTH ARE READY TO FULFILL THE GIVEN TASK. THE SITUATION IS VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. SERB SIDE WARNED CROAT SIDE VIA ZONE ZADAR NOT TO REPAIR AND USE ZEMUNIK AIRPORT, MASLENICA BRIDGE AND PERUCA POWER PLANT.
6. BEST REGARDS GMO/SECTOR SOUTH
END MSG

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UNMO SECTOR SOUTH

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OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DTG :04 AUG 93
TO: UNMO HQ ZAGREB	FROM: UNMO HQ SECTOR SOUTH KNIN
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: COO	FILE REF NO : OPS DRAFTER : COMDT R DENYFT TITLE : RELEASING OFF: SIGNATURE : 
INFO : FAXNR:	
SUBJECT: WARNING TO CROATIAN SIDE.	

MESSAGE

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED LETTER FROM HQ 7 TH CORPS KININ.
2. THE WARNING FROM PARA 1 OF ATTACHED LETTER IS BEEN SEND TO UNMO ZONE ZADAR TO HAND OVER TO CA GOC BRIG GAL GOTOVINA.
3. BEST REGARDS.

DISTRIBUTION:

Passed on John Berke and David
Cudjoe at ~1900 hrs.

2/3

THE REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJINA
7TH CORPS HQ
No. 869/3
4 August 93

MILITARY TOP SECRET

TO: UNPROFOR HQ SECTOR SOUTH

Warning to the Croatian side

Dear Sir,

We request you to warn the Croatian side that we are not going to allow any works on the disputable facilities (Maslenica bridge, Zemunik airport and Peruca power station), neither their use until a complete fulfilment of the Erdut Agreement.

This position of ours, has already been defined and announced, and we are stating it again due to the current events.

Our repeated warning is in accordance with our firm decision to persevere in implementation of the Erdut Agreement's provisions.

We have received reliable information, on a countless number of times, that the Croatian Leadership keeps on deceiving its own people as well as the world public.

While the competent world and European institutions have been putting utmost efforts into cessation of hostilities and restoration of lasting peace between the Republic of Croatia and the RSK, we are, unfortunately witnesses to a real hypocritical conduct of the Croatian Leader.

New concentration of the CA in Lika and in the border area of the North-Dalmatian front, are speaking in favour of a fact that the Croatian President doesn't even think of a peaceful option.

In the course of 2 August 93, 2. Brigade, called "Tigers" (1500 men) arrived in Ogulin.

General mobilization is being carried out in the municipalities of Ogulin, Delnice and Vrbovsko. The addition of recruiters to 111. and 143. brigades is being carried out, as well as mobilization in Rijeka, where medical staff is restricted from moving.

3/3

2

According to the statements and behaviour of Tudjman and his associates, the Croatian Leadership has no intention to withdraw from the facilities of Maslenica bridge, Zemunik airport and Peruca power station. On the contrary, we can expect new conflicts and their escalation, in which sense psychological preparations of the Croatian Army and people are being made, as retaliation for the destruction of the Maslenica bridge.

We are especially warning you about the possibility of sudden Croatian attacks on many directions.

Their sabotage-terrorist groups are trained and well equipped for sabotage activities.

They are also planning some incidents, which would serve to the Croatian side as an excuse for serious conflicts along the entire confrontation line.

COMMANDER
Col. Milan Djilas

Sector South HQ

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04/08 '93 09:45

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UNPROFOR

Page / of 4

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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UNCLASSIFIED

UN RESTRICTED

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN SECRET ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE/TIME: 4 August 1993
TO: MR. BERTIE RAMCHARAN GENEVA	FROM: SRSG, ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER :
INFO :	
SUBJECT:	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE	

MESSAGE

1. Please find attached copy of President Tudjman's text to the media.

ENDALL

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	NA

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2/4

RWS REU0868 3 MIS 575 (RWS) FK0303444 BC-YUGOSLAVIA-BRIDGE 1STLD
(SCHEDULED) Croatia rules out withdrawal from key bridge

By Mark Heinrich

ZAGREB, Aug 3 (Reuter) - Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Tuesday tossed aside an accord signed by his government, declaring that Croatia's army would not evacuate a key coastal strip unless Serb rebels gave up their artillery.

He ruled out a unilateral Croatian army withdrawal from the Maslenica Bridge and Zemunik airport area and accused the Serbs of failing to stick to their agreement to simultaneously hand over heavy weaponry.

"We will no longer discuss any withdrawal of Croatian forces...but rather the implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions," he said day after Krajina Serb rebels bombarded the new Maslenica pontoon bridge.

A July 16 U.N.-mediated accord on opening the bridge called for Croatian troops to yield the bridge and Zemunik airport to U.N. supervisi by July 31. The text contained no provision for a concomitant Serb disarmament.

Tudjman said, however, that Zagreb signed the deal on the understanding that it was predicated on three Security Council resolutions stipulating simultaneous disengagement of forces.

"There is no need to dwell on (what was signed). The Erdut Agreement (of July 16) is history," declared Tudjman, who was taking a break between talks in Geneva on a Serb-Moslem-Croat peace settlement for neighbouring Bosnia.

"We are no longer going to discuss any kind of withdrawal of Croatian forces," he said.

Croatia would re-enter normalisation talks with Krajina's Serbs only the basis of Security Council resolutions stipulating Serb disarmament under U.N. supervision and the reincorporation of Krajina in Croatia.

Tudjman also dismissed a follow-up Serb deadline of midnight Tuesday for withdrawal as "not serious" and implied any further Serb assault would be countered with force.

Tension between Croatia and Serbs holding the breakaway Krajina resurfaced in the row over the bridge, which has fanned fears of renewed full-blown war recalling fighting in 1991 triggered by Zagreb's secession from Yugoslavia.

The original bridge stretching between cliffs over the Maslenica sea channel was blown up in 1991 by Krajina Serbs who seized the territory in rebellion against Croatia's secession from federal Yugoslavia.

The area was wrested back from the Serbs by Croatian troops after the stormed over a U.N. ceasefire line six months ago. But the Serbs remained within artillery range.

In Krajina's main city of Knin on Tuesday, a senior Serb political official denounced Tudjman for voiding the Erdut Agreement and said the self-declared "Republic of Serbian Krajina" had no intention of abolishing itself.

"We have existed for three years now and no one here is 'rebelling'. democratic referendum (in June) showed what our people want," said chief minister Djordje Bjegovic.

A brief Serb artillery barrage partially sank the Maslenica bridge in the Adriatic waves on Monday, three days after it was opened to reconnect Croatia's major north-south highway link destroyed in Serb-Croatian fighting two years ago.

In a letter to the U.N.'s top peace envoy on ex-Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Tudjman protested at the attack and said it was perpetrated despite renewed U.N. shuttle negotiations in Zagreb and Knin.

"If UNPROFOR fails to prevent such barbaric aggression against Croatia in the future, we shall be compelled to resist the aggressor on our own, with all means at our disposal, and to liberate the occupied parts of Croatia."

3/4

RWS REU0627 2 OVR 121 (RWS) FK0303444 BC-YUGOSLAVIA-BRIDGE-TUDJMAN =2
ZAGREB

"We will no longer discuss any withdrawal of Croatian forces but rather the implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions," he said a day after Serb rebels in the Krajina enclave of Croatia bombarded the new pontoon bridge.

An accord mediated by the United Nations on July 16 allowing Tudjman open the bridge called for Croatian troops to yield it and the airport to U.N. supervision by July 31. The text contained no provision for a Serb disarmament.

Tudjman said Zagreb signed the deal on the understanding that it depended on two Security Council resolutions stipulating a simultaneous disengagement of forces.

He accused the Krajina Serbs of a "barbaric attack" on the bridge, which partially sank it.

REUTER

1233 030893 GMT

RWS REU0558 2 MIS 73 (RWS) FK0303365 BC-YUGOSLAVIA-PRESIDENCY-TUDJMAN
Tudjman welcomes Croat defection from presidency

ZAGREB, Aug 3 (Reuter) - Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Tuesday welcomed the decision in Geneva by Croats in Bosnia's collective leadership to defect to the Croat team at peace talks.

"I think it will introduce more seriousness to the negotiations and lead (Moslem President Alija) Izetbegovic to stop offensive operations and ethnic cleansing against Croats," Tudjman told a news conference at his state residence in Zagreb.

MORE

1142 030893 GMT

RWS REU0610 2 OVR 60 (RWS) FK0303444 BC-YUGOSLAVIA-BRIDGE-TUDJMAN Croat refuses to demilitarise bridge zone

: ZAGREB, Aug 3 (Reuter) - Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, turning his back on an accord signed by his government, said on Tuesday his troops would not evacuate an important strip of Adriatic coast unless Serb rebel gave up their heavy weaponry.

He ruled out a unilateral Croatian army withdrawal from the Maslenica Bridge and Zemunik airport area.

MORE

1218 030893 GMT

RWS REU0572 2 MIS 132 (RWS) FK0303433 BC-YUGOSLAVIA-PRESIDENCY-TUDJMAN ZAGREB

"I think their step has clarified matters somewhat," said Tudjman, who has been called back to Geneva along with the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro to help salvage the faltering talks.

He said it was intolerable for the presidency's three Croats, including Prime Minister Mile Akmadzic, to remain in the body when the Moslem-led government army was focusing on attacking Croats "rather than the Serb aggressor".

He also accused Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic, a Moslem, of contemplating a secret alliance with Bosnian Serb nationalists to save Moslem skins.

"This is a stance against the interests of Moslems themselves," said Tudjman, who has sponsored and armed autonomous Croat militia forces in Bosnia and a peace plan to divide the republic into three ethnic mini-states.

REUTER

1150 030893 GMT

CZG-807

CODE RESTRICTED

Bericht: ONV1123 Afgedrukt op 04-08-93 (01:26 Z)

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TO157 040100

ZZ 040045D AUG 1993

FM: VOLLEBEAK, KNIN
SHQ SOUTH

TO: SHOLTENBERG GENEVA

ATTN: STOLTENBERG

I RAMCHARAN

PELLNAS

INFO: STOLTENBERG

ZAGREB FOR SRSG, FC, DFC, DCA

YSHQ 118

SUBJ: COMMUNICATIONS IN SECTOR SOUTH

C R Y P T O

BT

1. WE HAVE HAD A LONG MEETING FOLLOWED BY DINNER WITH THE SERB AUTHORITIES.

2. THEY HAVE PROPOSED THAT THEY WILL SIGN THE VIENNA DRAFT OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, AS SOON AS TOMORROW IF THAT WERE POSSIBLE, IN GENEVA. THEY WANT TO MAKE SOME TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT, WHICH THEY WILL PRESENT IN WRITING AT 1000 TOMORROW. THEY HAVE ALSO STIPULATED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WILL COME INTO EFFECT SIX HOURS AFTER THE ERDUT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED/ A STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PREAMBLE TO THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

3. THE SERBS THEN STATED THAT THEY WOULD ONLY COME TO GENEVA ONCE THEY KNEW THAT THE CROATS WOULD ACCEPT BOTH THE AMENDED DRAFT OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND THE CONDITION THAT IT WOULD ONLY COME INTO EFFECT SIX HOURS AFTER FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ERDUT AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD TRY HARD TO GET A RESPONSE ON THE QUESTION OF THE ERDUT AGREEMENT BY THE TIME WE MEET AGAIN AT 1000. I ALSO SAID THAT THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE THE FINE DETAILS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT IN GENEVA, AS ANYTHING ELSE WOULD ENTAIL FURTHER SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY, WHICH WOULD BE A WASTE OF PRECIOUS TIME.

4. THEY ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN IMMEDIATE AND CONCURRENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASEFIRE WHILE THE ERDUT AGREEMENT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED.

5. UNPROFOR IS BEING TASKED TO EXAMINE THE LOGISTICS OF MOVING A SERB DELEGATION TO GENEVA TOMORROW. THE SERBS HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO FLY FROM UDBINA, WHICH WILL SAVE A LOT OF TIME.

6. PLEASE PUT THIS NEW POSITION TO PRESIDENT TUDJMAN AND RECOMMEND TO HIM MOST STRONGLY THAT HE SHOULD FULLY IMPLEMENT THE ERDUT AGREEMENT AND SIGN THIS CEASEFIRE. HE SHOULD BE ASKED TO NOMINATE A CROATIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM WHO CAN COME TO GENEVA TO FINALISE AND SIGN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

'93 AUG -8 23:41

AUG -4 -4:00

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

DISTRIBUTION:

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	JVD

PS
JM

CZG-807

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ZZ 040045B-AUG-1993

C R Y P T O

BT

FINALISE AND SIGN THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. I REALISE THAT THE ERDUT AGREEMENT IS NOW A VSRY DIFFICULT SUBJECT FOR PRESIDENT TUDJMAN IN THE LIGHT OF STATEMENTS HE MADE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY.

ENDALL

SIGNED MCLEOD

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CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

010/12

LOOSE MINUTE

03 Aug 93

To: COO HQ UNPROFOR
From: HQ UNMO ZAGREB

Info: SRSG ZAGREB

ATT. KARONENUNMO DAILY SITREP SUMMARY FOR PERIOD 3100001-312359Z JULY 93NOTE

THIS DOCUMENT IS ONLY A SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES AND OBSERVATIONS RECORDED BY UNMOS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD IN THOSE AREAS WHERE UNMOS CONSTITUTE THE MAIN UNPROFOR PRESENCE, AND IN THOSE AREAS WHERE AN UNMO OBSERVATION/ACTIVITY IS SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO WARRANT SPECIAL MENTION. DETAILS OF SECTOR/COMMAND UNMO ACTIVITIES AND OBSERVATIONS ARE CONTAINED IN THE UNMO DAILY SIT REP.

1. BIHAC POCKET: Stable.
2. GORAZDE: Stable.
3. BRCKO AREA: Calm in the POSAVINA Corridor.
4. BiH SOUTH: MEDUGORJE calm, MOSTAR unknown, JABLANICA relatively calm.
5. SECTOR SOUTH:

(1) Situation. Sporadic shelling continued in the area of MASLENICA Bridge and ZEMUNIK Airport. One pontoon in the bridge sank at 1410 hrs. Cause cannot be verified by UNMOS but it is assumed that it resulted from damage sustained during shelling earlier in the day.

(2) Restrictions on UNMOS. Restrictions on the Serb side were lifted during the afternoon allowing final recce of routes and entry points into the ERDUT Agreement area (WEST) and enabling UNMOS to monitor Serb artillery positions. Restrictions were also lifted on the Croat side around ZEMUNIK Airport and the proposed Xing point for UNMOS at SUHOVARE village. Restrictions are still being applied to UNMO movement in the area N of MASLENICA Bridge.

(3) Meeting in KNIN late pm 02 Aug 93. CMO attended a meeting at KNIN last night. The KNIN authorities remain intransigent; either the CA withdraws from all areas specified in the ERDUT Agreement by 03235Z Aug 93 or a state of war will resume. The KNIN Authorities have written in this vein to the SC and are awaiting a reply.

6. SECTOR NORTH: Stable.
7. DUBROVNIK: Stable.

ACTION INFO

DISTRIBUTION:

PK



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen

CRYPTOFAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
NEW YORK

CC: GOULDINGS/ANNAN/GHAREKAN

FROM: THORVALD STOLTENBERG
ICFY, GENEVA

DATE: 2 August 1993

SUBJECT: MASLENICA BRIDGE

PAGE 1 OF 1

FAX NO:
(41-22) 917 0079

I have just been informed that at 14.10 today one of the five sections of the Maslenica pontoon bridge sank. The sinking was caused by earlier shelling and because of penetrated water. There was no shelling of the bridge when it sank. This information is confirmed by United Nations Military Observers.

I will inform you of any further details as soon as they are received.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
FAX

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: ANNAN Office of the Co-Chairmen
FAX NO: 1-212-963 9222

TO: GOULDING FAX NO: 1-212-963 4879

GHAREKAN FAX NO: 1-212-963 2155

EIDE FAX NO: 38-41 170 199

COT FAX NO: 38-41 170 199

FROM: THORVALD STOLTENBERG FAX NO: 41-22-917 0079
-TEL NO: 41-22 917 1200

DATE: 2 AUGUST 1993

SUBJECT: MASLENICA BRIDGE

1. The Croatian Permanent Representative came to see me at 9.45pm this evening and handed over the attached letter. He stated that the political response to the sinking of a part of the pontoon bridge was very acute in Croatia and he felt that the situation could not remain as it is. It would either have to go forward or backward...

2. I replied that I was endeavouring to encourage all sides to implement the agreement of 15/16 July and emphasised the need for Croatia to withdraw from all areas mentioned in that agreement, including the Miljeveci Plateau. I stated further that all sides should contribute to defusing the situation.

Regards.

Stalna misija Republike Hrvatske pri Ujedinjenim Narodima, Ženeva
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations Office, Geneva

Dear Sir,

As you must have been informed the rebell Serbs which have destroyed the Maslenica bridge a year and half ago today have destroyed part of the newly laid pontoon bridge on the same location. It happened without any cause from the Croatian side and during the time while the negotiations were conducted between representatives of UNPROFOR with the local authorities in Knin and whilst the peace efforts and a proposal for the cessation of hostilities were submitted by the Croatian side.

In todays official report of UNPROFOR it was stated that the said incident occured after the agreement which stipulates that the ceasefire will be in force until August 3 at 24.00 hours.

We protest most energetically for that barbaric act because the pontoon bridge is exclusively of the civilian character whose humanitarian importance is great, but also because of total inefficiency of the UNPROFOR forces.

If the peace keeping forces will not in future preven simmlar barbaric aggression against Croatia we shall be compelled to resist the aggressor and to liberate the occupied parts of Croatia.

We kindly ask you to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations and that you take personally everything within your power so that UNPROFOR undertakes efficient actions for the implementation of the plan in the spirit of the Security Council resolution 847, as we are not ready to tolerate any longer such destructive acts coming from the areas under protection of the peace keeping forces. We request that UNPROFOR places under its control the heavy weapons by which the rebel Serbs are threatening the bridge and the traffic through it. Should UNPROFOR fail to do that we shall be compelled to undertake measures by our selfs for securing this vital object for the communication between Northern and Southern parts of Croatia.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) President of the Republic of Croatia

Dr. Franjo Tudjman

010/12

OFFICE OF THE SRSG

Page 1 of 3

ROUTINE

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
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OUTGOING FAX NO.: SRSG	DATE/TIME: 1993 Aug 2
TO: STOLTENBERG GENEVA	FROM: OFFICE OF THE SRSG ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN: MAJ KROENEN	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER : MAJ J HARJA SO TO MA/SRSG
INFO :	
SUBJECT: AFTERNOON MAIL	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE	

MESSAGE:

Attached per first UNMO report

UNMO DEPLOYMENT AS AT 2 AUGUST 1993



010/12

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C2G-799

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
UNPROFOR

'93 AUG -2 15:08
'93 AUG -2 15:18

CRYPTO CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

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Page 1 of 4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

Col CHARLES CORBERAND
MA to Force Commander

DATE : 2 AUGUST 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 945

CODED CABLE

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH THE CROATIAN AUTHORITIES

Accompanied by DCM, FC met this morning with Susak, Radic and General Roso to convey latest position of Knin authorities, following our meeting with them yesterday evening. They listened very carefully to our exposé on behalf of the Serbian side, and we also underlined UNPROFOR's efforts to contain the situation and avoid a breakdown of hostilities. FC emphasized that the time was of the essence since Knin authorities had extended the deadline to 1800 hours, local time today, 2 August for the Croatian to withdraw from all four locations in accordance with Erdut Agreement. We emphasized that a reply had to be provided to the Serb side by 1800 hours today in order for UNPROFOR to initiate the timely deployment of forces in the areas from which the Croatian forces would withdraw.

2. Susak stated that Erdut Agreement should not be considered in isolation from other factors affecting the situation. The Agreement was a compromise but at the same time the Croatian Government made a number of concessions in order to achieve peace. He did not see a compromise on the Serb side. He reiterated, however, his Government's readiness to withdraw from Zemunik airport, Maslenica bridge and Peruca dam which would be under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR, provided that the displaced Croats who returned to those areas were not going

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UNPROFOR ZAGREB

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to be in jeopardy and allow other refugees to return. When asked about the Croatian withdrawal from Miljevoi Plateau, Susak reiterated Security Council resolution 762 on the Pink Zones, and stated that at this stage, Croatia was not considering withdrawing from the Plateau unless this question was discussed in the context of the negotiations on a complete cease-fire agreement. Radic seconded the views expressed by Susak and requested guarantees from UNPROFOR that the security of the population living in those areas would be ensured and the Serb forces would not penetrate. General Roso raised fundamental technical military questions related to the neutralization of arms, demilitarization and demining of certain areas. He saw no progress in deploying UNPROFOR troops without examining such issue and having realistic timeframe to implement what had been agreed upon.

3. FC and DCM had taken note of the concerns expressed by the Croatian side and confirmed that it would be the responsibility of UNPROFOR to ensure the security -- not only of the territory but also that of the local population. Other issues such as demilitarization and neutralization of arms which were of direct relevance to the situation had to be discussed in the context of the negotiations on a ceasefire agreement.

4. After extensive discussion on how to get out of the existing impasse, and our insistence to make concrete proposals the Croatian side offered the following:

a. Ready to negotiate on a complete ceasefire agreement which should start tomorrow, 3 August 1993;

b. Croatian forces will withdraw from Zemunik airport, Maslenica bridge and Peruca dam which will be placed under the total control of UNPROFOR;

c. Once a ceasefire agreement, based on Vienna draft, is signed, Croatia will withdraw from Miljevoi Plateau.

C76 - 177

- 3 -

3/4

4. Radic mentioned that during the period between the start of negotiations and the signing of a ceasefire agreement, UNPROFOR would be permitted to deploy its observers in the Plateau. He also demanded that the Croatian civilian authorities in the areas from which Croatia would withdraw, should remain in place and allow the reconstruction of Maslenica bridge and Peruca dam. He felt there was a need to request the Serb side to extend the deadline by one week, so as to allow the negotiations to proceed.

5. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the Croatian proposal should be put in writing, a copy of which is attached. Please note that the position of the Serb side in writing was also handed over to the Croats.

6. DCM, accompanied by CMO, will travel to Knin this afternoon to convey the position of Croatia. We will keep you informed of new developments.



4/4

1. Croatian military and police forces will hand over the area between Maslenica and Zemunik together with the Peruća dam to UNPROFOR control. UNPROFOR forces will start taking control over the stated areas on 2 August 1993. UNPROFOR will enable the functioning of the Croatian civil authorities in the same way it is being done in Sector West (e.g. Grubišno Polje and Daruvar) as well as the unobstructed construction of Maslenica bridge and Peruća dam.
2. The negotiations between the representatives of the Croatian Government and the local Serbs on the general cease-fire and the beginning of the implementation of SCR 847, based on the document prepared in Vienna, will continue from 3 August 1993.
3. The Miljevac plateau will be treated in the same way as the areas stated in Paragraph 1 after the Agreement mentioned in Paragraph 2 has been signed; until then, UNPROFOR will deploy its observers in the area.



010/12 ✓

Stalna misija Republike Hrvatske pri Uredu Ujedinjenih naroda
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations Office
Geneva

25, route de Ferney, 1209 Geneva, Tel: (022) 7403243, Fax (022) 7403251

Za/Att. _____ Datum/Date AUGUST 2, 1993
Fax br./Fax No. 9170096 Od/From _____
Predmet/Subject _____ Br. str./No. of pages 1+1

Poruka/Message:

VERY URGENT

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CO-CHAIRMAN
MR. THORVALD STOLTENBERG

Please find enclosed improved unofficial translation of the letter from President Tudman which we have delivered to you tonight.

PERMANENT MISSION OF
CROATIA

ACTION	INFO.
DISTRIBUTION:	
PK	KU
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Stalna misija Republike Hrvatske pri Ujedinjenim Narodima, Ženeva
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations Office, Geneva

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg
Co-Chairman of the London Conference
Geneva

Dear Sir,

As you have certainly been informed, rebel Serbs, who demolished the Maslenica bridge a year and half ago, today have again destroyed part of the newly constructed pontoon bridge on the same location. This occurred without any pretext from the Croatian side and during a moment when negotiations were conducted between UNPROFOR representatives and local authorities in Knin and during peace efforts and a proposal for a cease-fire from Croatian authorities.

Today's official UNPROFOR report states that this incident occurred during the period of the agreement which stipulates a lasting cease-fire until 3 August 1993 at 24.00 hours.

We strongly protest this barbaric act, since the pontoon bridge is exclusively a civilian facility with enormous humanitarian importance, but also due to the complete lack of efficiency of UNPROFOR forces.

Inasmuch as peace-keeping forces do not prevent similar acts of barbaric aggression against Croatia in the future, we will be forced to resist the aggressor and liberate the occupied areas of Croatia with all available means at our disposal.

We kindly request you to inform the United Nations Secretary-General about this and that you personally take all necessary measures so UNPROFOR undertakes efficient steps toward implementing the plan in the spirit of Security Council Resolution 847, since we are not any longer prepared to tolerate this type of destructive act from areas under the protection of peace-keeping forces. We request that UNPROFOR places rebel Serb heavy weaponry, that threatens the bridge and traffic across it, under its control. In the alternative, we shall have to take steps to protect this vital facility which is a link between Northern and Southern Croatia.

Sincerely yours,

Zagreb, 2 August 1993

President
Republic of Croatia
(signed)
Dr. Franjo Tudjman

Stalna misija Republike Hrvatske pri Ujedinjenim Narodima. Ženeva
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations Office, Geneva

Dear Sir,

As you must have been informed the rebell Serbs which have destroyed the Maslenica bridge a year and half ago today have destroyed part of the newly laid pontoon bridge on the same location. It happened without any cause from the Croatian side and during the time while the negotiations were conducted between representatives of UNPROFOR with the local authorities in Knin and whilst the peace efforts and a proposal for the cessation of hostilities were submitted by the Croatian side.

In todays official report of UNPROFOR it was stated that the said incident occured after the agreement which stipulates that the ceasefire will be in force until August 3 at 24.00 hours.

We protest most energetically for that barbaric act because the pontoon bridge is exclusively of the civilian character whose humanitarian importance is great, but also because of total inefficiency of the UNPROFOR forces.

If the peace keeping forces will not in future preven simmlar barbaric aggression against Croatia we shall be compelled to resist the aggressor and to liberate the occupied parts of Croatia.

We kindly ask you to inform the Secretary General of the United Nations and that you take personally everything within your power so that UNPROFOR undertakes efficient actions for the implementation of the plan in the spirit of the Security Council resolution 847, as we are not ready to tolerate any longer such destructive acts coming from the areas under protection of the peace keeping forces. We request that UNPROFOR places under its control the heavy weapons by which the rebel Serbs are threatening the bridge and the traffic through it. Should UNPROFOR fail to do that we shall be compelled to undertake measures by our selfs for securing this vital object for the communication between Northern and Southern parts of Croatia.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) President of the Republic of Croatia

Dr. Franjo Tudjman



REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA

PREDsjedNIK

Gospodin

Thorvald Stoltenberg

Supredsjedatelj Londonske konferencije

Geneve

Štovani gospodine,

Kako ste zasigurno već informirani pobunjeni Srbi koji su prije godinu i pol dana srušili Maslenički most, danas su ponovo uništili dio novouspostavljenog pontonskog mosta na istoj lokaciji. To se dogodilo bez ikakvog povoda s hrvatske strane i u vrijeme dok su trajali pregovori predstavnika UNPROFOR-a s lokalnim vlastima u Kninu i u vrijeme mirovnih napora i prijedloga za primirje od strane hrvatskih vlasti.

U današnjem službenom izvješću UNPROFOR-a navedeno je da se taj događaj zbio i nakon sporazuma po kojem primirje traje do 3.8. 1993. u 24,00 sata.

Energično protestiramo zbog tog barbarskog čina, jer ovdje je riječ o čisto civilnom objektu kojeg je i humanitarni značaj vrlo velik, ali i zbog potpune nedjelotvornosti snaga UNPROFOR-a.

Ukoliko i ubuduće mirovne snage ne budu sprečavale slične čine barbarske agresije na Hrvatsku, hit ćemo prisiljeni da se svim raspoloživim vlastitim sredstvima odupremo agresoru i da oslobodimo okupirane dijelove Hrvatske.

Molim Vas da o ovome obavjestite glavnog tajnika UN, kao i da osobno poduzmete sve da UNPROFOR poduzme djelotvorne korake za izvršenje plana u duhu rezolucije 847, jer ovakva rušilačka akta iz područja pod zaštitom mirovnih snaga više nisu spremni podnositi. Zahitjevamo da UNPROFOR stavi pod nadzor teško naoružanje kojim pobunjeni Srbi ugrožavaju most i promet na njemu, jer ćemo u protivnom morati sami poduzeti korake za osiguranje tog vitalnog objekta za vezu između sjeverne i južne Hrvatske.

Sa šovanjem,

Zagreb, 2. kolovoza 1993.

Predsjednik
Republike Hrvatske
Dr. Franjo Tuđman

UNPROFOR

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: SRSG, FC, DCA, CMO, COS

Info:

From: *f* DFC *SMBuy mss*

File: 3200-7(DFC)

Date: 31 Jul 93

Subject: REPLY TO CROATIAN WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL

1. Enclosed please find a copy of a letter received from General Bobetko detailing a Croatian proposal to withdraw their forces from the Maslenica Bridge. Also enclosed is the FC's reply, which in his absence, was signed by the DFC.

2. For info.

SRSG'S OFFICE

Date: 2/8-93

SRSG: _____

DSRSG: _____

SA: _____

DIR: _____

MA: _____

2nd copies of letters