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UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1002

BOX 121

FILE 6


ACC. 1995/003

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

CONFIDENTIAL

File : 3000.12
From : ADCOS(Ops) 
To : See Distribution List
Date : 13 Dec 95

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Subject : **DEFENCE SCHEME : AMAHORO COMPLEX**

1. The Defence Scheme of Amahoro complex containing six pages and one sketch as Annex "A" is forwarded herewith for your perusal and necessary action.
2. Request treat this matter as "confidential". Regards.

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DEFENCE SCHEME : AMAHORO COMPLEX (PLAN "JARGO")

GEN

1. The Defence Scheme of the Force HQ aims to provide a guideline for the employment of troops in the close-defence of the HQ building and the administrative backup required.

2. No major attack is visualised on the HQ. However, being the nerve centre of the Force, it provides a lucrative target to miscreants. In view of the anticipated pullout of UNAMIR/the reduction of formed troops there is a likelihood of the locals/FRGF intensifying their activities with an aim to steal cash/valuable equipment or sabotage the assets in the Force HQ.

LAYOUT

3. Please refer to Annex 'A' attached.

THREAT PERCEPTION

4. Keeping in view the deteriorating security situation in the country and the likely motives for attack on the HQ, the following threat is visualised.

- (a) Sabotage of critical equipment/communication facilities.
- (b) Sporadic firing/grenade attacks.
- (c) Sniper activity.
- (d) Targeting of senior officers/UN officials.
- (e) Thefts of valuable equipment/cash.

LIKELY TARGETS

5. The Force HQ is basically an office complex with no major lucrative targets. However, the following points may be targeted by miscreants.

- (a) Microwave dish antennae.
- (b) Communication antennae/equipment.
- (c) Generators.
- (d) Treasury office.
- (e) Vehicles.
- (f) Water tank.

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NICKNAMES

6. The following nicknames will be used for security reasons.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|---|--------------|
| (a) Amahoro Complex | - | HOME RUN |
| (b) Transit Camp | - | BIG HOUSE |
| (c) Soaltee | - | DEEP SEA |
| (d) Microwave / Comm eqpt | - | PATH FINDER |
| (e) Generators | - | BRIGHT LIGHT |
| (f) Treasury Office | - | FISH POND |
| (g) Rft ex Transit Camp | - | SHARP SWORD |
| (h) RRF ex Soaltee | - | FAST RUN |

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

7. The following security arrangements exist in the HQs.

(a) Approximately 450m of 8 ft high perimeter fence reinforced by double concertina coil all along the fence.

(b) Four wooden watch towers being used as observation posts which dominate the area all along the perimeter fence.

(c) Adequate security lights are located all along the fence as well as on the top of the HQ building to illuminate the complete area outside the building.

(d) A platoon worth of infantry is located in the HQ and is employed as under:

(i) Main Gate. Three persons round the clock with one LMG deployed at night to cover the entrance.

(ii) Treasury. One person by day and two persons by night.

(iii) Patrolling. Two persons to man the observation posts by day and perimeter patrolling by night.

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PROPOSED ADDITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

8. To cater for the close-defence of the HQ, the following additional security arrangements are proposed.

- (a) Existing watch towers to be reinforced with sandbags and overhead protection.
- (b) Additional bunkers with overhead protection to be constructed as per Annex 'A' attached.
- (c) One open Rocket Launcher pit to be constructed as indicated in Annex 'A'.
- (d) One 2" Mor pit on the roof to cater for illumination by night.
- (e) Trip flares to be employed along the northern and eastern perimeter.
- (f) The following areas to be reinforced with sandbags to provide protection against small arms fire.
 - (i) Southern end wall of the Ops Room.
 - (ii) The main entrance of Amahoro building.
 - (iii) Western walls of the Briefing Room.
 - (iv) Northern end walls of the Milobs Gp HQ.
 - (v) Northern end balconies of FC, DFC, SRSG, ED and the CAO offices.

REINFORCEMENT PLAN

9. In addition to the security guards employed on duty, there is an existing integral reaction capability of one section QRT in the Force HQ at any given time. Besides the above the following reinforcements will be on standby.

- (a) One platoon ex Transit Camp ex INDBATT.
- (b) Two sections RRF based on Mamba APCs ex INDBATT.
- (c) Two sections ex GHANCOY 2 will be earmarked and kept ready for this scheme.
- (d) MP coy will be responsible to provide escorts for VIPs / Rfts / CASEVAC and keep order in the complex during the operation.

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10. However, depending upon the threat, side stepping of forces would be carried out ex INDBATT and the defence can be built up to a company level. The M113 APCs available in the Transit Camp can also be employed if the situation warrants.

11. Various routes to be taken by the reinforcements will depend upon the direction of attack and the prevailing situation. However, the routes available to the reinforcements are as under.

(a) Route A. Transit Camp - North of Stadium - Amahoro Complex, nicknamed "HOT DOG".

(b) Route B. Transit Camp - Ghana Transit Camp - South of Stadium - Amahoro Complex, nicknamed "FULL STRETCH".

(c) Route C. Soaltee - South of Stadium - Amahoro Complex, nicknamed "COOL WALK".

(d) Route D. Soaltee - Chez Lando Crossing - Amahoro Complex, nicknamed "SOUTHERN TIP".

(e) Route E. Soaltee - South of Stadium - Ghana Transit Camp - North of Stadium - Amahoro Complex, nicknamed "MATCH BOX".

ADMINISTRATION

12. Arms. Besides the personal wpns the following additional wpns will be made available by INDBATT :-

(a) One Rocket Launcher.

(b) One 2" Mor

13. Amn. On wpn scale of amn as well as unit reserve of all wpns will be stocked at the HQs under arrangements of the Camp Commandant. In addition, extra illuminating bombs of 2" Mor will also be stocked. INDBATT is requested to stock the above amn in the HQ complex by 31 Dec 95.

14. Water & rations. 95 CMSG in consultation with the DCOS(SP) will cater for the stocking of 7 days compo rations as well as drinking water for all civil and military personnel in the Force HQs. 95 CMSG and DCOS(SP) are requested to arrange for the above rations and water to be stocked in the HQ complex by 31 Dec 95.

15. FOL. One Generator is available in the Force HQ. There is a requirement to place an additional backup generator with adequate FOL for both generators for 7 days under arrangements of DCOS (SP) and CCO. In the eventuality of failure of both generators, 95 CMSG will cater for the provision of approx 100 hurricane lamps with adequate fuel for 7 nights.

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DCOS(SP),CCO and 95 CMSG are requested to make the spare generator and FOL available by 31 Dec 95. Hurricane lamps may be procured at the earliest and stocked in the Warehouse.

16. Strength. The CMPO and CCPO are requested to provide the strength of all personnel who work within the complex to the DCOS(OPS),DCOS(SP) and the Camp Commandant by 20 Dec 95.

17. Tpt. Three Mazda vehicles with adequate FOL will be provided by INDBATT for transportation of the security guard, if required. Besides the above, integral/individual transport already available will be used for the transportation of personnel and equipment to the designated safe havens.

18. Medical. One medical detachment and one ambulance veh ex NORMED will be placed in the Force HQ under command of the FMO to cater for any minor medical casualties. Cas evac will be by road / hepctr. FMO is requested to earmark the medical detachment and the ambulance vehicle to be made available at short notice. G3 Air will be responsible for co-ordinating the cas evac by hepctr and will earmark and prepare a suitable helipad inside/near the Force HQ. G3 Air will select and discuss a proposed Helipad site which can be prepared once approved by the DCOS(OPS).

19. Fire fighting. The Chief Civilian Security Officer will be responsible for conducting fire fighting in the HQs in case of a requirement. Besides the integral fire extinguishers available in the HQ. 95 CMSG in consultation with DCOS (SP) will be responsible to provide two water trucks and additional fire extinguisher, if required. 95 CMSG is requested to earmark necessary resources for the above. The Chief Civilian Security Officer will earmark a fire fighting team and issue fire fighting instructions to all in consultation with the DCOS (OPS). CSO is requested to earmark the various teams and forward a detailed plan to the DCOS(OPS) by 31 Dec 95.

20. Misc items. In case of an emergency, the Force HQs staff will be required to dine/sleep in the HQ complex. In such an eventuality there would be a requirement to provide them with extra cots, linen, blankets, heaters, utensils etc. 95 CMSG in consultation with DCOS (SP) will work out the requirement and cater for the same.

CO-ORD INSTRS

21. Alarm scheme. The following alarms would be sounded depending on the situation.

(a) Air attack. A series of long sirens will be sounded in the Force HQ.

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(b) Armed intrusion/ground attack. A series of short sirens will be sounded in the Force HQ. The guard also will blow the whistle to alert the QRT and the rest of the guard.

22. On hearing the alarm the action to be taken at various levels are as under,

(a) Air attack.

(i) All civil and military personnel present in the Force HQ to run for shelter in the ground floor central lobby/briefing room of the HQ.

(ii) Guards on duty to take shelter in the respective bunkers/sentry posts. Rest of the guard will occupy the designated shelters as indicated in Annex 'A'.

(b) Armed intrusion/ ground attack.

(i) All civil and military personnel to run for shelter in the ground floor central lobby/ briefing room of the HQ.

(ii) The guards to occupy their respective fire trenches and prepare to fight back the attack.

(iii) The reinforcements to be informed by the Camp Commandant/Duty Officer to be on standby.

23. Conclusion. Although the security guards will play a major role in ensuring the security of the HQ, it is the responsibility of each and every individual to contribute towards it by abiding by the rules and catering for all contingencies at a personal level also.

24. This scheme will be activated on the code word "JARGO" and communication will be by the existing communication setup. Commitment of forces to this operation, if activated, will be on orders of the FC through the DCOS(OPS). Rehearsals may be carried out also on notification of all by the FC through DCOS(OPS).

Distribution


<u>Action</u> - SRSG	DCOS(SP)	FPM	<u>Info</u> - FSO
FC	INDBATT	GHANCOY 2	MP Coy
DFC/COS	95 CMSG	CAMP COMDT	
CAO	CSO	G3 AIR	
DCOS(OPS)	FMO		

LEGEND

- - WATCH TOWER
- - FIRE TRENCH
- - - FIRE TRENCH TO BE OCCUPIED BY RFT
- - SHELTERS WITH OVERHEAD PROTECTION

ANNEXURE 'A'
REFER TO PARA 2 OF
SECURITY PLAN OF
FORCE HQS UNAMIR

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TO : LIST A, B, C, D, E, F
FROM : COL KS SIVAKUMAR
COS
DATE : 16 Oct 95
SUBJECT : REMINDER - SECURITY GENERAL

1. For the past three weeks or so, a number of theft cases involving personal property, UNAMIR Vehs and Veh Tools, working Tools and POL especially from Brown and Roots premises have been reported.

2. The indications are that we (UNAMIR Personnel) and other workers of UN AGENCIES and NGOs are becoming a little too careless with the security of our property or the perpetrators of these thefts are becoming more aggressive and are outwitting our security systems.

3. As a reminder, security is every body's concern, and all are therefore being asked to be more security conscious.

4. All are to reinforce the underlisted measures forthwith.

- a. Safety of UN ID Cards.
- b. Use of Security Systems issued to vehs.
- c. Securing of safes, Cabinets and lockers at all times.
- d. Securing/Locking of all office and living accommodation doors and placing the keys with Guards or in key boxes.
- e. Thorough search and inspection of vehicles leaving UN/UNAMIR premises after work as well as personnel leaving work carrying large carrier bags or tool boxes.
- f. Enforcement of perimeter patrols to ensure that no perimeter fencing is breached through which items could be stolen.

5. It is envisaged that some of these measures will antagonize certain personalities, but it is hoped that all will understand the rationale behind the measures and Co-operate so as to lessen the incidents of thefts.

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