

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (1 ITEM)
CONFIDENTIAL (3 ITEMS)
PERSONAL (1 ITEM)
EL/WG MAR 2007

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1086BOX 132FILE 6ACC. 2002/0207

360
01 APR 1993

Yuzorlin



Alvaro ---

Have a look over the papers and tell me if modifications need to be made. I have integrated the two papers and inserted changes (highlighted) based on the assumption that:

- (a) there will be a theatre force commander in charge of three sector commanders;
- (b) the sector commander for B-H would come from NATO.

One weakness I detect is the fuzziness regarding current UNPROFOR troops and mandate vis-à-vis the new UN operation. I think this needs to be spelled out a bit more clearly, particularly since B-H would be under Chapter VII. The same applies to the humanitarian operation.

I have made a new chart to show the command structure.

Should I discuss with DPKO and DPA?

QL

AK/1 April 1993

Note to the Secretary-General

Working Paper on the Implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan



I. Mandate

The acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan would thrust upon the Secretariat major tasks. In addition to a massive military operation, with a force of approximately 50,000 all ranks, whose responsibility it would be to uphold the cessation of hostilities, separation of forces and supervision of heavy weapons, the force would carry out duties in the areas of human rights, political affairs, refugee return and rehabilitation, humanitarian aid, border-monitoring, etc.

Revised
order

II. Basic premises

- 1) The implementation of the Vance-Owen plan would be a United Nations operation, in conformity with Chapter VII. As such it would be mandated by the Security Council, funding would be through assessed contributions, and the forces would operate under the UN flag and wear "blue helmets".
- 2) The United Nations would have overall political and strategic control, which would be exercised by the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council.
- 3) Operational and tactical control would be provided by the Headquarters of a Theater Force Commander, assisted by three Sector Commanders (B-H, Croatia and Macedonia) and a Logistics Command.
- 4) The structure of the Force must be based on agreed principles, which are acceptable to the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the organization (or group of Member States) which will provide the majority of the military forces and finally, to all Member States of the United Nations. It is argued that the following principles must be respected:
 - a. The operation must be integrated. It should cover all aspects of the UN mandates in former Yugoslavia, as they are linked in view of overlapping political, geographical and population factors.
 - b. Unity of command. The military operation must have an overall command structure capable of coordinating all military assets and actions in former Yugoslavia.
 - c. Unity of efforts. A Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) must have the power to coordinate, on behalf of the SG and Security

Council, all United Nations efforts (political, military and humanitarian) in the former Yugoslavia.

- d. Those who plan must execute. Military personnel who will be asked to execute the operation must be involved in the planning process from the earliest possible stage.
- e. Political and strategic direction. This must come from, and be seen as coming from, the United Nations (from the Security Council through the Secretary-General).

III. Planning, execution and control

Given the scale of the operation, it is suggested to appoint a Theater Force Commander who would command the Sector Commanders (B-H, Croatia and Macedonia). In view of the high planning responsibilities for the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be wise to entrust these to a group of participating countries, preferably members of NATO. This "NATO core" would establish a Headquarters, initially outside the theatre of operations, for this purpose and associate the other participating countries in this endeavour. The Headquarters would also be responsible for the execution of plans thus developed. Existing UNPROFOR staff can be associated initially in co-ordination with NATO/SHAPE staff. Contributing countries (non-NATO) must be allowed to join the process at the planning level and request integration in the NATO command structure.

While the planners will concentrate on the major expansion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they will have to bear in mind that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are one theatre under an integrated UN command. It remains to be seen how the deployment and build-up of the force in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be co-ordinated. Our troops currently in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be part of the initial phase of the peace plan, and if contributing countries agree, integrated in the larger force to be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The overall **political and strategic control** would be exercised by the Security Council and the Secretary-General through a high-level Special Representative. When authorizing the group of Member States to establish the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security Council would specify that the Theatre Force Commander should keep the Secretary-General's Special Representative fully informed, on a daily basis, of the progress of the operation and of planned new activities. If the Special Representative judged that proposed operations were inconsistent with the Security Council's authorization, he would immediately inform the Secretary-General who, if he agreed, would bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council.

added
from CGMIA

The Special Representative would keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, about the course of the operation and would be the channel through which reports by the Theatre Force Commander would reach the Security Council. The Secretary-General would have the right to ask the Theatre Force Commander for special reports at any time he deemed necessary. The Secretary-General would also be authorized to take the initiative in recommending to the Security Council any measures he judged necessary to reorient, correct or even bring to an end the military operations.

In order to keep the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY abreast of developments in the theatre of operations, the Special Representative would copy all correspondence and information to them.

IV. Some planning assumptions

It is assumed that all the three parties will sign the agreement. The force may confront three possible scenarios:

- (a) a largely benign environment with isolated violations;
- (b) widespread local opposition; and
- (c) major breaches which could cause the agreement to unravel.

The planners would be advised to concentrate on scenarios (a) and (b) even though they may have to do some contingency planning in relation to option (c) which may entail the withdrawal of the force or its massive expansion. Based on these assumptions, the estimated initial size of the force would be 50,000 men, which would be decreased or increased as the initial experience warrants.

As the Force would certainly have to face some degree of local resistance, early and important consideration for planning purposes would have to be given to equipment, duration of deployment, logistics, rules of engagement, etc.

Since it has been determined that FOD does not have the capacity to support the expanded force, extraordinary measures would have to be taken to ensure that the force receives the necessary operational, logistical and administrative support. Early understanding on this point is crucial, as the Headquarters would have to factor it into their plans.

V. Budgetary and financial aspects

As the planning for the force in B-H would be carried out at NATO Headquarters and not necessarily according to United Nations specifications or standards, it would be advisable and indeed necessary to arrange an early

meeting between budgetary and logistical experts of the two organizations. The new UN Command could be entrusted with these tasks or other institutional contracting arrangements could be considered. This would ensure that the budgetary and financial statement which is eventually presented to the Security Council and the General Assembly could be defended and accepted by the Member States.


VI. Structure

A chart showing a proposed structure is attached.

VII. Timing

Another crucial factor is the timing of implementation. As a strict time-table is envisaged in the plan itself - with the intention of assuring the parties that action on implementation would be immediate - the dates may not be mutable. This offers yet another reason to press ahead immediately with contingency planning.

* * *



Ville de Huy




4500 Huy, Le

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Mr. Goulding
cc: Mr. Annas
cc: AS

URGENT - PERSONNEL

EXPEDITEUR A.M. LIZIN.....

DESTINATAIRE M. le Secrétaire Général

BOUTROS - BOUTROS GHALI

NBRE DE PAGES

REMARQUES

492

Yugoslavia
Ref: E.C.
SGBoutros Ghali
29 04 93 Central

NOTE A L'ATTENTION DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL M. BOUTROS GHALI.
BELGRADE 29.4.93

1. J'ai rencontré longuement ce mercredi le Président MILOSEVIC. Il cherche à obtenir une convocation urgente du Parlement des Serbes de Bosnie pour les faire revenir sur leur décision (consultations militaires en cours à ce sujet). Le Parlement de Belgrade pourrait le leur demander pour la forme.
2. Il m'a paru très préoccupé par la dilution de sa capacité d'influencer les militaires serbes bosniaques et dès lors de se trouver face à un incident incontrôlable. Il a demandé au Général WALLGRUN de placer des observateurs aux endroits les plus dangereux.
3. Le Président MILOSEVIC a également évoqué le fait que son action pour clôturer le débat en Bosnie devrait avoir leur contrepartie pour la levée des sanctions. Il a rappelé la promesse du Président MITTERRAND et le sentiment favorable d'OWEN. Mais il est conscient que ceci ne rencontre pas la volonté américaine. Il souhaite dès lors élargir ce débat le plus rapidement possible car les Etats-Unis seront la clé de la suite (il a à ce sujet parlé des perspectives au Kosovo).
4. Il m'a paru conscient du délai bref dont il dispose et, en fait est décidé à agir sur les Serbes de Bosnie.
5. Il espère rencontrer très rapidement Monsieur STOLTENBERG, qu'il tient en grande estime.
6. L'ambiance ici est très tendue. Les mesures pratiques sont préparées. Pour éviter les prises d'otages ou autres, l'autorisation de laisser atterrir les avions avec produits pharmaceutiques de première urgence devrait être donnée (le sentiment des diplomates en place est qu'ils seront rapidement menacés).

Anne-Marie LIZIN
Députée-Bourgeoise

S:G OFFICE

29/4

Yugoslavia
Semo

S



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25691
29 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 17 March 1993 (S/25426) which, inter alia, dealt with the bombing of the villages of Gladovici and Osatica in Eastern Bosnia on 13 March 1993.

In that statement, the Council requested that I ensure an investigation was made of the reported possible use of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to launch air attacks against the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In a note verbale dated 24 March 1993, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was requested to provide any information relevant to the incidents and, in particular, any results of an investigation the Government may have initiated as requested by the Security Council.

The only response received so far has been a note verbale dated 26 March 1993 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) conveying a statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This statement is already available to the Council as document S/25450 of 22 March 1993.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Yugoslavia
Bosnia

29 April 1993

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN FOR CYRUS VANCE AND LORD OWEN

Fred Eckhard, spokesman for Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, this afternoon told correspondents that the second round of talks on the situation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia began at 11 a.m. today when the Co-Chairmen met with the representative of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Stevo Crvenkovski, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister. Then at noon, the Co-Chairmen began meeting with the representative from Greece, George Papoulias, Special Envoy and former Foreign Minister.

Concerning Bosnia, Mr. Eckhard first spoke on the situation in Bihac, confirming yesterday's estimates that about 300 Serb troops took part in an attack that petered out eventually. He said the force's size confirmed yesterday's tentative analysis that the attack seemed to be "a local initiative with limited objectives" and not a major assault as had previously been reported.

In central Bosnia, the situation as of yesterday was generally calmer than at any time in the past week. There was some intensive small-arms fire near the town of Kiseljak, but that was the exception in the general situation. The top military commanders -- General Sefer Halilovic on the Bosnian Government side and General Milivoj Petkovic on the Bosnian Croat side -- met yesterday in the city of Jablanica to further solidify the agreement. Lord Owen had brokered in Zagreb over the weekend.

In Srebrenica, Mr. Eckhard said, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had reported that the situation was generally calm but for a slight increase in small-arms fire in some outlying areas.

The situation in Sarajevo was calm, Mr. Eckhard said, but for some slight increase in shelling concentrated around the area of Stup. However, airlifts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued, with 18 flights yesterday -- its usual daily average.

A correspondent asked when Mr. Vance started his term as Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee, when that term would officially end and if the mandate of his successor, Thorvald Stoltenberg, would be the same. Mr. Eckhard said he would check on the exact date when Mr. Vance started his duties, but pointed out that the work of the Conference began with the first meeting of the Steering Committee in Geneva on 2 September 1992, which had been preceded by the London Conference around 27 August 1992, when Mr. Vance's contract took effect. He added that Mr. Vance would step down at the end of April, and tomorrow would officially be his last day.

Mr. Vance expected to meet with Mr. Stoltenberg when the latter arrived in New York on Sunday, Mr. Eckhard said. Mr. Stoltenberg would remain in

(more)

New York for a few days into next week for meetings at the Secretariat, and Mr. Vance would be available to him. Mr. Stoltenberg's mandate was the same as his predecessor's. He added, in response to a correspondent's question, that Mr. Vance had been a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yugoslavia since October 1991, prior to becoming Co-Chairman of the Conference's Steering Committee.

Asked if he had clarified Lord Owen's comments of yesterday on ground troops, Mr. Eckhard replied that Lord Owen's remarks did not represent a significant change from what he had said previously: if sanctions failed to stop the conflict, the Security Council might contemplate the use of force in the form of interdiction of supplies by air. But Lord Owen had always emphasized that it would have to be in the context of the Security Council. Lord Owen had referred to United States ground troops for illustrative purposes, in the sense that American debates on air strikes should keep in mind that other countries had peace-keeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He added that Lord Owen was urging sensitivity to that point, particularly in the context of some talk of unilateral action from the air.

Had France informed the Co-Chairmen that it was withdrawing its troops from Bosnia? Mr. Eckhard said he was not sure if such a report was true, or if France had communicated with the Co-Chairmen.

A correspondent asked what signs the Co-Chairmen were looking for from the Belgrade Government on the actions it would take against Bosnian Serbs, such as closing the border. Mr. Eckhard said the Co-Chairmen had noted what President Dobrica Cosic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had stated yesterday. Their basic view was that the significant development was the very strong public stance taken by the Belgrade Government in support of the Vance-Owen plan. The kind of pressure they would exert on the Bosnian Serbs remained to be seen, he added.

However, one concrete measure would be to support an international border monitoring operation, which might be one of several actions that could be taken to change the position of the Bosnian Serbs.

Would the talks on the situation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia end tomorrow as planned? a correspondent asked. Mr. Eckhard said the parties hoped to reach an agreement, or framework for an agreement, before Mr. Vance stepped down, even if they had to continue the talks over the weekend.

Would the Co-Chairmen continue meeting each side separately or would they bring them together? Mr. Eckhard was asked. He said they could be brought together when they neared or reached an agreement. At the moment, he added, the two sides preferred to continue the talks separately, and this did not hamper the negotiating process.

* * * * *



AS

29-4
Yugoslavia

U.S.G.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

PRESS RELEASE


New York
29 April 1993

The Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, together with Co-Chairman-designate, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, have convened a meeting starting on Saturday, 1 May, in Athens, with the generous hospitality of Prime Minister Mitsotakis, which the following have agreed to attend:


- President A. Izetbegovic (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- President F. Tudjman (Croatia)
- President D. Cosic (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))
- President S. Milosevic (Serbia)
- President M. Bulatovic (Montenegro)
- Mr. M. Boban
- Dr. R. Karadzic

The meeting will begin on Saturday evening, 1 May, and will continue on Sunday, 2 May.

The Co-Chairmen have been influenced in their decision to call the meeting by the announcement that Dr. R. Karadzic and Mr. M. Krajisnik have agreed to reconvene the Bosnian Serb "Assembly" on Wednesday, 5 May, with the intention of re-examining its previous decision not to sign the two outstanding documents of the peace plan, namely, the map of provisional provincial boundaries and the agreement on interim arrangements.



S&G OFFICE
3/11



Yugoslavia

PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
854 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 Tel: (212) 879-8700/4 Fax: (212) 879-8705

*Mr. Goulding
cc Mr. Human*

AS

No. 430/93

29 April 1993

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to transmit, enclosed herewith, the letter of His Excellency, Mr. Dobrica Cosic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to you.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Dragomir Djokic
Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-general of
the United Nations
New York

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
THE PRESIDENT

Belgrade, April 29, 1993

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

My country is going through dramatic moments. Military intervention on the part of the international community appears to be imminent. Whether it will be directed against the Serbs in Bosnia or us makes little difference. We have the terrible feeling that we have been convicted with no right of appeal. I believe that it is of paramount importance for all of us together to find the strength to make a last-ditch peace effort with renewed vigour. My country is sincerely ready to contribute to a political settlement of the crisis on the soil of the former Yugoslavia. This we have proven by our full support of the Vance - Owen peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Please understand that it is the eleventh hour for a summit conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina to be convened. It is my conviction that such a conference would lend fresh impetus to the efforts to bring to fruition the peace process of which you are the protagonist. In my view apart from you, Mr. Secretary-General, the participants should include representatives of the three warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, India, Brazil, Egypt, Zimbabwe, and the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg.

Mr. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI
Secretary-General
The United Nations Organization
New York

Needless to say, Mr. Secretary-General, any suggestion on your part on a possibly different format and content of the Conference is welcome. One thing is certain - such a peace effort is essential at this time. Your support would be immensely appreciated, as becomes a politician and humanist of your renown.

Unless we do this, Mr. Secretary-General, misfortune will escalate to unfathomable proportions. Innocent civilians will be the victims and there will be more suffering than there already is in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I can understand the dissatisfaction of the international community at the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance - Owen Plan. But anger breeds hasty decisions which are hard to remedy. Yet I do hope that in the next few days the Bosnian Serbs will sign the Vance-Owen peace plan after all, even though it fails to meet their minimal existential requirements.

I appeal to you, true to your proven wisdom and fairness, to spare no efforts to help our shared objective of peace materialize.

Respectfully,

Dobrica Ćosić

Београд, 29. априла 1993.

Poštovani generalni sekretaru,

Moja zemlja prolazi kroz dramatične časove. Vojna intervencija međunarodne zajednice je iminentna. Svejedno je da li će biti usmerena na Srbe u Bosni ili na nas. Imamo užasan osećaj da smo osudjeni pre prava na žalbu. Mislim da je od životne važnosti da svi skupa nadjemo snage i učinimo poslednji mirotvorni napor obnavljajući energije. Moja zemlja je iskreno spremna da doprinese političkom rešenju krize na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije. To smo dokazali i punom podrškom Mirovnom planu za Bosnu i Hercegovinu gospode Vensa i Ovena.

Molim Vas da shvatite da je poslednji trenutak da se sazove konferencija na vrhu o Bosni i Hercegovini. To bi, po mom uverenju, bila obnova pristupa i energija za dovršenje mirotvornog procesa čiji ste Vi protagonist. Moje je uverenje da bi sastav učesnika, pored Vas, trebalo da bude sledeći: predstavnici tri zaraćene strane u Bosni i Hercegovini, Republika Hrvatska, Savezna Republika Jugoslavija, pet stalnih članica Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, Indija, Brazil, Egipat, Zimbabve i kopredsedavajući Konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji lord Oven i gospodin Stoltenberg.

Razume se, poštovani gospodine generalni sekretaru, da je dobrodošla svaka Vaša sugestija o eventualnom drugačijem formatu i sadržaju konferencije. Izvesno je samo jedno - ovakav mirotvorni napor je u ovim časovima nužan. Vašu podršku bismo neizmerno cenili. To bi bilo dostojno Vašeg ugleda političara i humaniste.

Bez toga, gospodine generalni sekretaru, rasplamsaće se nesreća teško sagledivih razmera. Stradaće ne-dužni civili i biće više patnji nego u postojećem građanskom ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Gospodin
dr BUTROS BUTROS GALI
generalni sekretar
Ujedinjenih nacija

N J U J O R K

Razumem nezadovoljstvo međunarodne zajednice zbog odbijanja bosanskih Srba da potpišu Plan Vensa i Ovena. Ali sam siguran da se u gnev prave ishitrene i teško popravljive odluke. Ja se iskreno nadam da će Srbi u Bosni u narednih nekoliko dana ipak potpisati Vens-Ovenov plan iako on ne zadovoljava njihove minimalne egzistencijalne zahteve.

Molim Vas da, svojstveno Vašoj dokazanoj razboritosti i pravičnosti, odlučno doprinesete ostvarenju zajedničkog cilja.

S poštovanjem,


Dobrica Ćosić



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Yugoslavia
Bosnia
Serbia



29 April 1993

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to inform you that the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, together with the Co-Chairman-designate, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, have convened a meeting starting on Saturday, 1 May, in Athens, with the generous hospitality of Prime Minister Mitsotakis, which the following have agreed to attend:


- President A. Izetbegovic
(Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- President F. Tudjman
(Republic of Croatia)
- President D. Cosic
(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro))
- President S. Milosevic
(Serbia)
- President M. Bulatovic
(Montenegro)
- Mr. M. Boban
- Dr. R. Karadzic

The meeting will begin on Saturday evening, 1 May, and will continue on Sunday, 2 May.

His Excellency
Mr. Jamsheed K. A. Marker
President of the Security Council
New York

The Co-Chairmen have been influenced in their decision to call the meeting by the announcement that Dr. R. Karadzic and Mr. M. Krajisnik have agreed to reconvene their "Bosnian Serb Assembly" on Wednesday, 5 May, with the intention of re-examining their previous decision not to sign the two outstanding documents of the peace plan, namely, the map of provisional provincial boundaries and the agreement on interim arrangements.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Boutros Boutros-Ghali". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name and last name clearly distinguishable.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/933
28 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 8

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK

Letter dated 28 April 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the President of the General Assembly

At its 3204th meeting, held on 28 April 1993, in connection with the item entitled "Participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the work of the Economic and Social Council", the Security Council adopted resolution 821 (1993), which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

"Considering that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,

"Recalling resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, which notes that 'the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted',

"Recalling also its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992, in which it recommended to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,

"Recalling further that the General Assembly, by resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992, considered that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore decided that the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,

"Recalling further that, in its resolution 777 (1992), the Council decided to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and that, in December 1992, the members of the Council agreed to keep the subject-matter of resolution 777 (1992) under continuous review and to consider it again at a later date (S/24924),

"1. Reaffirms that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that, further to the decisions taken in resolution 47/1, it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the Economic and Social Council;

"2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly."

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council

ORGANISATION DU TRAITE
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD



NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION

UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

1993 APR 28 P 1:42

BOULEVARD LEOPOLD III
1110 - BRUXELLES
TEL 728.61.11 - 728.69.17

FSM8472-04

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

From: PRIVATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
Secretary General

FAX NO. (02) 728 46 66

To: His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali

Attn: ..HX.... Secretary General..United Nations....

FAX NO. 0/00/1/212/963.48.79

No. of pages incl. cover sheet: ? Date: 28 April 93

Subject: UNSCR 82U implementation para 28 and 29

Remarks:



Released from XMT P.O.: *[Signature]*

NOTICE: This method of transmission cannot be used for
classified information or for official action,
reporting, policy proposals, decisions, and
identification of operational problems.

N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

central

W 28-04

Mr. Annan

cc Mr. Goulding

SEA/AS

20 APR 1993 17:23
PRIVATE OFFICE OF SG
ORGANISATION DU TRAITE
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD



02 7284555 P.02
NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

Yugoslavia
Misc. Govt. Orgs.

BOULEVARD LEOPOLD III
1110 - BRUXELLES
TEL 728.41.11 - 728.49.17
FAX 728.46.66

SG/93/323

28th April 1993

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

I have been authorized by the North Atlantic Council to inform you that the Council agreed today that NATO will support the implementation of paragraphs 28 and 29 of UNSCR 820, concerning the enforcement of maritime sanctions against the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Forces currently implementing Operation Maritime/Albanian Guard will be used. The concept of operations is being adjusted accordingly.

Operations will commence as soon as possible, in coordination with the WEU. I will of course keep you informed of progress.

Yours sincerely,

M. Wörner

His Excellency
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary General
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/821 (1993)
28 April 1993

RESOLUTION 821 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3204th meeting,
on 28 April 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Considering that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,

Recalling resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 which notes that "the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted",

Recalling also its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992, in which it recommended to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,

Recalling further that the General Assembly by resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992, considered that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore decided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,

Recalling further that in its resolution 777 (1992) the Council decided to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and that in December 1992 the members of the Council agreed to keep the subject-matter of resolution 777 (1992) under continuous review and to consider it again at a later date (S/24924),

1. Reaffirms that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that, further to the decisions taken in resolution 47/1, it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the Economic and Social Council;

2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

469
29 APR 1993

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

MARRACK GOULDING

Mr de Soto

You may wish to brief
the SG if it is not too late.

Another factor for caution
is uncertainty about what
policy the SG will recom-
end to the Council on the
future of UNPROFOR in
Croatia (which I am pro-
posing as an item for the SG's
Task Force on Monday).

MG
-28/4

Amuliel.
30 04 93
URGENT
SG

Note to Mr. Goulding

**Former Yugoslavia
Danish Foreign Minister phone call to Secretary-General
Update**

yugoslavia
Denmark

Background

1. Further to yesterday's note, this is to confirm that the Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen is expected to call the Secretary-General either later today or tomorrow in connection with the possibility of holding an expanded Steering Committee meeting of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) sometime in May. A letter by the Danish Mission in New York announcing the phone call has reportedly been sent to the 38th floor.
2. The holding of a large international conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina has been proposed this week by German Foreign Minister Kinkel. However, Denmark, currently holding the Presidency of the European Community, does not see any benefit in the holding of a large international conference at high level favouring instead the idea of an expanded Steering Committee meeting of ICFY, at Foreign Minister level, under the co-chairmanship of Lord Owen (EC) and Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg (UN) and excluding the participation of former Yugoslav republics. The possible venue could be either Geneva or Copenhagen.
3. The Danish Foreign Minister thus wishes to consult with (and possibly enlist the support of) the Secretary-General in his capacity as UN Co-Chairman of the International Conference before any substantial decision is taken on the issue.

Comment

4. Considering the current situation in and around former Yugoslavia and the multiplicity of actors already dealing with it, the holding of a new large international conference on the issue may well be a mere photo opportunity. In the current context, a meeting of an existing body (ICFY) would thus appear to make more sense.
5. However, it should be pointed out that the issues of the timing of the proposed meeting as well as its agenda would be of crucial importance. As of now, the outcome of various factors to be taken into consideration is still pending, inter alia, the recommendations of the SC fact-finding mission and the SC reaction thereof; the outcome of the US policy review on the issue; and the impact of the additional sanctions imposed on the FRY.

cc: DB

L. Vaccari - Europe Div.DPA

L.M 28 April 1993



Ukraine
Yugoslavia

S



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25682
28 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

On 23 March 1993, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine delivered a letter from the President of Ukraine to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning special economic problems arising from implementing mandatory sanctions established by Security Council resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) which was brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

On 19 April 1993, I had the honour to transmit to you, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, the text of the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on this issue, circulated as a document of the Council (S/25630, annex). Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on my request, circulated as document S/25636 the text of the Appeal by the employees of the Danube Shipping Company in connection with the grave economic problems arising from carrying out by Ukraine of the Security Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

It would be greatly appreciated if the attention of the members of the Security Council is once again drawn to the above-mentioned documents and the Government of Ukraine is informed of any measures the Security Council might be willing to take to mitigate the negative consequences of the sanctions against the FRY for the neighbouring States, including Ukraine, especially after the adoption of Security Council resolution 820 (1993).

(Signed) Victor H. BATIOUK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

280493



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/933
28 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 8

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK

Letter dated 28 April 1993 from the President of the Security Council to the President of the General Assembly

At its 3204th meeting, held on 28 April 1993, in connection with the item entitled "Participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the work of the Economic and Social Council", the Security Council adopted resolution 821 (1993), which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

"Considering that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,

"Recalling resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, which notes that 'the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted',

"Recalling also its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992, in which it recommended to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,

"Recalling further that the General Assembly, by resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992, considered that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore decided that the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,

"Recalling further that, in its resolution 777 (1992), the Council decided to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and that, in December 1992, the members of the Council agreed to keep the subject-matter of resolution 777 (1992) under continuous review and to consider it again at a later date (S/24924),

"1. Reaffirms that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that, further to the decisions taken in resolution 47/1, it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the Economic and Social Council;

"2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly."

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council



General Assembly

Distr.
LIMITED

A/47/L.57
28 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 8

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK

Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:
draft resolution

Recommendation of the Security Council of 28 April 1993

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992,

Having received the recommendation made by the Security Council in its resolution 821 (1993) of 28 April 1993 that, further to the decisions taken in resolution 47/1, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the Economic and Social Council,

1. Decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the Economic and Social Council;
2. Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to consider the matter again before the end of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

26-APR-1993 17:25
PRIVATE OFFICE OF SG

ORGANISATION DU TRAITE
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD



02 7284666 P.02

NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION

Yugoslavia
Misc. Govt. Orgs.

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SECRETARY GENERAL

BOULEVARD LEOPOLD III
1110 - BRUXELLES
TEL 728.41.11 - 728.49.17
FAX 728.46.66

SG/93/323

28th April 1993

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

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Operations will commence as soon as possible, in coordination with the WEU. I will of course keep you informed of progress.

Yours sincerely,

M. Wörner

His Excellency
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary General
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017

ORGANISATION DU TRAITE
DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORDNORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATIONUNITED NATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS
CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

FSM8472-04

1993 APR 28 P 1:42

BOULEVARD LEOPOLD III
1110 - BRUXELLES
TEL 728.41.11 - 728.49.17N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

From: PRIVATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
.....
Secretary General**FAX NO.** (02) 728 46 66**To:** His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali
.....**Attn:** ..HX.... Secretary General..United Nations....**FAX NO.** 0/00/1/212/963.48.79**No. of pages incl. cover sheet:** 2 **Date:** 28 April 93**Subject:** UNSCR 820 implementation para 28 and 29**Remarks:****Released from XMT P.O.:** **NOTICE:** This method of transmission cannot be used for
classified information or for official action,
reporting, policy proposals, decisions, and
identification of operational problems.N A T O U N C L A S S I F I E D

28-04

Mr. Annan

cc Mr. Goulding

JCA/AS



29-4
Yugoslavia

28 April 1993

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN FOR CYRUS VANCE AND LORD OWEN

Fred Eckhard, spokesman for Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, this afternoon informed correspondents that Lord Owen had arrived in New York this morning after stops in several European capitals, following his five-day tour of the Balkan region last week. Lord Owen had returned to Geneva from Belgrade on Monday, leaving almost immediately for Bonn, where he had met with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Following that meeting, Lord Owen continued on to Copenhagen to brief the Danish Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen, who, under the rotating presidency, is the current head of the European Community Council of Ministers.

Mr. Eckhard went on to say that, yesterday, Lord Owen had travelled to Paris, where he had met with French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, and Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, whereupon he had then separately briefed officials from the French Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the President's Office and the Prime Minister's Office. Lord Owen had gone to London late yesterday, prior to his arrival in New York this morning.

Concerning Bosnia, the most significant development of the last round of activities had been the endorsement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the Vance-Owen plan, Mr. Eckhard said. A letter sent by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Dobrica Cosic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic to the Bosnian Serb Bijeljina Assembly, had urged that body to sign the plan. (That letter would be made available to correspondents in an unofficial translation.) The Co-Chairmen would now be looking to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's leadership to back those words with concrete actions in order to bring meaningful pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to sign.

In central Bosnia, the overall level of fighting was down as of yesterday, although there had still been some "hot spots of military activity", Mr. Eckhard continued. Vitez itself was quiet. The two military commanders -- General Sefer Halilovic on the Bosnian Government side and General Milivoj Petkovic on the Bosnian Croat side -- had taken steps to carry out the agreement, reached late Saturday night in Zagreb, by nominating the senior officers from each side who would participate in a joint command. (The text of that agreement had been made available Monday afternoon.)

The situation in Bihac seemed less serious than originally reported, Mr. Eckhard continued. Earlier reports had spoken of an attack by a Serb force of 1,000 soldiers, while it now appeared that that force had consisted of 150 to 300 soldiers. Although there had been some artillery support, the attack seemed to have been "a local initiative with limited objectives". However, the situation was being watched closely by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

(more)

Mr. Eckhard said the talks on the situation between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would recommence this afternoon when the two Co-Chairmen, Lord Owen and Mr. Vance, met at 3 with the representative of Greece, the Special Envoy and former Foreign Minister George Papoulias. At 4:30 p.m., they would meet with the representative of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Stevo Crvenkovski, the Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister.

A correspondent asked if a "wire paraphrase" of a statement attributed to Lord Owen in the Paris newspaper, Libération, to the effect that Lord Owen did not think that American air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces were appropriate in the absence of the use of United States ground forces, had been accurate. Mr. Eckhard replied that Lord Owen had informed him this morning that there was no need to elaborate on or clarify what he had been reported to have said on the matter.

A correspondent said that, in the past, Lord Owen had called for the use of air power in the form of limited air strikes, "and now, a few weeks later, he's saying 'No air strikes without ground troops'. What's changed in the intervening period?" Mr. Eckhard said that, to be specific on the correspondent's first point, Lord Owen had called for interdiction of supplies by air, if authorized by the Security Council. As for today's comments by Lord Owen, he was not authorized to say anything beyond what Lord Owen was reported to have said, and by which he stands.

What percentage of land was now in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina? a correspondent asked. Mr. Eckhard said he did not have, on the part of the Co-Chairmen, an independent estimate -- UNPROFOR might be able to supply a "guestimate". Figures that had been used widely included that of 70 per cent of territory in Bosnia as controlled by the Bosnian Serb forces. He did not know whether the most recent military action in eastern Bosnia had modified that figure.

A correspondent asked for the Co-Chairmen's views on the proposal for "safe havens" -- was there any danger that safe havens could define political and military reality on the ground in Bosnia in such a way as to negate the Vance-Owen plan? Mr. Eckhard said that, in light of the discussions that were likely to take place regarding that subject, he was not sure the Co-Chairmen would want to pronounce themselves publicly on that subject. When that subject had first arisen in the context of relief operations some time ago, the Co-Chairmen had had reservations about the concept of safe havens, as had some military leaders, namely, that if a safe haven were created, it must be protected, which raised the question of the extent to which one would be willing to go to make it safe. The role assumed by the forces involved, and its compatibility with the original mandate concerning the escort of humanitarian convoys, were other important considerations in that regard.

Danish Foreign Minister Petersen had emerged from his meeting with Lord Owen talking of the possibility of convening a new European Conference on Bosnia, a correspondent said. Was that a notion coming from the Co-Chairmen? Mr. Eckhard said the matter was expected to be raised by the Europeans with

(more)

the Secretary-General, because the Conference was a joint Conference, and thus the Co-Chairmen were not going to make a recommendation one way or the other. It was a decision for the Europeans and the Secretary-General to make.

Would not such a new Conference "foul up" the negotiations which the Co-Chairmen had completed and handed over the the international community? a correspondent asked. Mr. Eckhard said the Conference had all of the former Yugoslavia as its mandate, not just Bosnia, so the Conference had a lot of unfinished work regarding those other areas. Correspondents should ask the sponsors of the idea of a new Conference what they could expect to accomplish.


Were the Co-Chairmen aware of General Lewis MacKenzie's attempts to involve himself in mediating the Bosnian conflict? a correspondent asked. Perhaps Lord Owen had met with General MacKenzie in Belgrade. Did the Co-Chairmen endorse the General's attempt to play a role? Mr. Eckhard said they were aware of the General's recent activities, which had been mentioned in one of the reports they had received from the region. Lord Owen had not met with General MacKenzie in Belgrade, and it was doubtful he even knew of General MacKenzie's presence in Belgrade, if in fact the General had been there.

* * * * *



Yugoslavia
Ref. E.C.

30 AVR. 1993



VISITE A BELGRADE - 27-28-29 AVRIL 1993
RAPPORT POLITIQUE

1. Rencontres avec S. MILOSEVIC, Président de Serbie.

Deux rencontres, le mercredi et le jeudi se sont révélées très fructueuses, évitant absolument les discours inutiles et montrant la très grande préoccupation de Milosevic à l'égard de la décision des Serbes de Bosnie de ne pas signer le plan V-O.

Il veut les faire revenir sur leur décision. Mercredi, il m'expose sa tactique : d'abord un appel du Parlement de Belgrade au Parlement des Serbes de Bosnie puis une nouvelle convocation de celui-ci. Il doit voir les militaires et les amener à agir en Bosnie. Il sait que ce sera très difficile pour lui visiblement et est préoccupé et très actif. Le jeudi il a obtenu la décision du Parlement de Belgrade, mais il est tout aussi inquiet de réussir à convaincre les Bosniaques. Tout son jeudi y sera consacré.

Sa tactique suppose s'il obtient la signature de l'accord de paix, qu'il y ait un espoir d'assouplissement des sanctions. Mitterrand le lui a promis, OWEN n'est pas opposé. Qu'en pensent les Etats-Unis et comment les convaincre ?

Il a vu Walhlgreen et lui a demandé de mettre des observateurs aux endroits de frictions possibles en Bosnie pour éviter les provocations dans les jours difficiles.

Rencontre amicale. Il espère ne pas être mis au ban de toutes les nations mais reconnaît l'erreur commise. Il est visiblement affecté à l'idée que ceci pourrait démontrer qu'il perd progressivement le pouvoir au bénéfice des militaires.

Il me dit sa grande confiance en Stoltenberg et son espoir de le recevoir à Belgrade.

2. Rencontre avec le parti socialiste (Percevic + Krijjanin + Dachnic).

Mêmes locaux qu'en décembre, même équipe de moins de trente ans qui visiblement n'a pas le pouvoir mais s'amuse avec un nouveau jouet: la mise sur pied d'un nouveau parti aux allures social-démocrates. Mais PERCEVIC (Vice-Président) participe à l'entretien avec MILOSEVIC sans

dire un mot (il ne parle d'ailleurs pas anglais). On "lance" visiblement ostensiblement la jeune génération pour faire oublier l'ancienne. Il faudra attendre qu'ils fassent leurs preuves politiques pour juger.

Le discours sur le fond est simple : nous soutenons MILOSEVIC mais le monde entier est contre nous à tort. Il faut revoir les sanctions. Les partis socialistes européens doivent nous comprendre. On va répondre positivement à Hens FISCHER, FASSINO est un ami, le PASOK est un parti ami. Nous souhaitons une Conférence des socialistes sur la situation en Yougoslavie. Je ne leur ai laissé aucun espoir dans le cadre actuel. Ils sont moins sûrs d'eux qu'en décembre.

3. Rencontre avec les syndicats (ex-officiels).
Madame GORORDANA MILANOIC et Monsieur KRJISKAYA.

Les sanctions pèsent très lourd, la situation est catastrophique partout. Un million de chômeurs forcés. Les salaires baissent (salaire moyen 27 DM par mois). Tout le monde vit grâce au marché noir. On ne peut plus tenir. Tout le monde les abandonne mais ils n'envisagent jamais de boycotter KARADZIC pour l'amener à accepter le plan. Ils ne font pas le lien avec le pouvoir, la politique en Bosnie et l'embargo. Ils regrettent les bonnes relations avec la FCTB qui a coupé les ponts.

4. Rencontre avec RADAMAN BOSOVIC, Président du Parlement serbe: il espère que les Bosniaques reviendront sur leur décision. Il a fait adopter l'appel au Parlement le mercredi. C'est visiblement MILOSEVIC qui a la suite en mains.

5. Rencontre avec l'Ambassadeur américain à Belgrade.

- .Il fait le point sur les mesures préparatoires décidées.
- .Il espère que MILOSEVIC va prendre ses responsabilités mais est déçu par le dernier contact entre lui et BARTHOLOMEUW.
- .Ce fut la langue de bois habituelle.
- .Intérêt pour les femmes serbes violées.
- .Excellent contact et homme constructif.
- .Il est d'accord d'essayer d'obtenir l'accès à Belgrade des médicaments de première nécessité.

Conclusions

1. Pour les contacts avec SI, la réponse négative a été clairement perçue.
2. L'embargo fait son effet. Ils ne résisteront pas à l'aggravation.
3. MILOSEVIC était préoccupé, très amical et stressé par ce qu'on attend de lui. Il a compris que c'était inévitable et connaît le risque avec exactitude.

Anne-Marie LIZIN

Ville de Huy



4500 Huy, Le

Tél. 085/21.78.21

Télex 59681 POLHUY

FAX 085/21.75.03



Mr. Goulans

cc AS

ali.

AK

EXPEDITEUR AM 112 INDESTINATAIRE M. le Secrétaire Général PROTHOS-GMANBRE DE PAGES 112REMARQUES : Pour information.

PERMANENT MISSION OF DENMARK
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

Mr. Jean-Claude Aimé
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary-General
Assistant Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

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Yugoslavia
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Denmark
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enclosure(s) J.nr.: Ref.:

5.E.Jugoslavien Dato Date 27 April, 1993

Dear Mr. Aimé,



Upon instructions from Copenhagen I should like to inform you of the following:

The Danish Foreign Minister, Mr. Niels Helveg Petersen, will in his capacity as Chairman of the EC Council of Ministers in the next couple of days telephone the Secretary-General in order to obtain the views of the Secretary-General on the possibility of convening an extraordinary meeting of the extended ICFY Steering Committee at ministerial level. This idea has come up following the informal meeting of EC Foreign Ministers last weekend in Denmark at which the situation in Former Yugoslavia was discussed.

Following my letter of yesterday concerning topics which the Danish Minister for Development Cooperation, Mrs. Helle Degn, will take up with the Secretary-General at their meeting on Thursday, April 29, 1993, I should like to add to the list the question of securing broad participation of NGOs in the Population Conference next year.

Sincerely yours,

Bent Haakonsen
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark
to the United Nations



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25672
27 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF ALBANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to attach herewith the letter that
Mr. Dr. Alfred Serreqi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania,
addresses to Your Excellency in relation with the grave situation in the
northern border of Albania, and in Kosova.

I would be grateful if Your Excellency could have this letter circulated as
a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thanas SHKURTI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Allow me to express to you, through this letter, the deep concern of the Albanian Government about the extraordinary situation created by the Serb military forces in the north border with the Republic of Albania.

On 25 April 1993, in the time interval between 20.30-21.30, in two border zones, near the region border sign D-11, in Morine-Kukes, and in the border region C-2/10, Padesh-Tropoje, the Serb forces opened fire and killed the Albanian citizens Bohar Aden Hafizi (23), Ethem Toti Sylja (24), Morsin Hysen Sylja (24), Hysen Asllan Sylja (31), Monsur Skender Sylja (17), Astrit Dyrmishi (20) - all of them residents of the Albanian villages near the border. On 26 April 1993, in the same border area were also killed two other Albanian citizens, not yet identified.

From the verification and expertise about the circumstances of these events, it comes out that the military Serb forces have shot with fire arms against the Albanian citizens from a close position, without warning. The number of victims killed in this manner in that border only this year reaches 12 (twelve) people.

These repeated and intentional acts have arisen a deep indignation among Albanians on both sides of the border. At the same time, they represent a dangerous prerogative, which might heighten the tension and breach the peace in this region.

Our concern about these tragic events becomes even greater if we have in mind the concentration of military Serb forces in the border regions, and especially the inclusion of the paramilitary forces to guard the border with Albania. After a series of such killings now it can't be spoken anymore of sporadic border incidents, but of provocative actions, which have dangerous intentions.

Being aware of the very tense situation created by the Yugoslav crises, especially the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the situation in Kosova, the Republic of Albania is trying continuously to give its contribution to prevent the escalation of the conflict in the south. The Albanian Government has demonstrated very clearly that it stands for stability and peace in our region. It has supported politically and is seriously committed to the implementation of the United Nations Security Council's resolutions related to Yugoslav crises.

But with regret we note that the universal principles of the human rights and those which regulate the relations between neighbouring States are brutally and openly violated by the Serb authorities. Such violations, as it seems, intend to provoke unnecessary conflicts in the territories inhabited by Albanians on both sides of the border, and probably further than that.


The Government of the Republic of Albania asks the United Nations Security Council to pay the due attention to these acts of the Belgrade authorities, and by denouncing them, take the necessary preventive measures. Consequences which derive by such an unreasonable conduct might create a dangerous situation for the region.

Hoping that our concern will meet the understanding of the Security Council which you preside.

(Signed) Alfred SERREQI

Mr. A. A. A. A.

Netherlands
Yugoslavia



26

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Hague, 27 April 1993

Dear Mr. Secretary-General

On 5 March 1993, an aircraft operated by the Palair airline crashed near the Macedonian town Skopje. The plane was a Fokker 100, built and registered in the Netherlands. Representatives of the Dutch civil aviation authority and of Fokker left immediately for Skopje to assist the emergency services and to investigate the cause of the accident.

The area in which the accident had occurred was extremely inaccessible, partly as a result of the weather conditions. The Dutch emergency and research teams were able to make use of the facilities of the UNPROFOR Norwegian and Swedish troops stationed in Skopje. These included the use of personnel and materials for the removal and transport of the wreckage and helicopters to carry victims and survivors to local hospitals.

I would like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of the Dutch teams to General Finn Saemark-Thomsen, Commander UNPROFOR Macedonia in Skopje, Colonel Jan Isberk, Commander Nordik Battallion HQ at Skopje-Airport and their troops.

Yours sincerely,



Dr P.H. Kooijmans
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands



Note to Mr. Goulding

Former Yugoslavia
Danish Foreign Minister Proposal

XRef: Denmark
JCA
cc AHS
in Mr
27/4
central

With reference to press reports on the proposal by Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen to convene an international conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the situation appears to be as follows:

1. the idea, which surfaced following the meeting between Mr. Petersen and Lord Owen on Monday 26 April, would be to convene an expanded meeting of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) without the participation of former Yugoslav republics (an expanded Steering Committee meeting along similar lines took place in Geneva on 16 December 1992);
2. it is expected that the proposed meeting could be convened sometime in May and would be at the Foreign Minister level. The agenda may possibly include an evaluation of the work of the Conference and possible options for future action, with special emphasis on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
3. the Danish Foreign Minister, in his capacity as Co-Chairman of ICFY, reportedly wishes to talk on the phone to the Secretary-General on the idea of convening such a meeting. The Danish Mission in NY would be contacting Mr. Aime for suggestions on a suitable time for such call.



Laura Vaccari
27 April 1993

cc: DB

Yugoslavia
Seco (memo only)

UNITED NATIONS



JCA
AK
LB

NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR



TO: Mr. Jean-Claude Aimé
A: Chief of Staff
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

DATE: 27 April 1993

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM: Benon Sevan
DE: Assistant Secretary-General
Department of Political Affairs

REFERENCE: *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:
OBJET:

Report on Activities in Security Council
Subsidiary Organs

..... Attached please find for the information of the Secretary-General a summary and assessment of the proceedings of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia at its 63rd and 64th meetings on 23 and 26 April 1993.

cc. Mr. Goulding



27 April 1993

63rd and 64th Meetings, Friday, 23 April and Monday, 26 April 1993
Summary and Assessment

1. Both meetings were devoted almost exclusively to the revision of the Guidelines for the conduct of the Committee's work in the light of the provisions of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), which envisages further, and significant, tightening of the mandatory economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
2. After three consecutive "brain-storming" sessions on Monday, the Committee turned out to be able to adopt the Revised Consolidated Guidelines at five minutes to midnight, 26 April 1993 (text attached).
3. A last-minute hurdle, caused by the idea put forward by the United States to differentiate between "basic foodstuffs" (rice, beans, sugar, wheat flour, cooking oil etc.) and "luxury" food items (chocolate, microwave popcorn, caviar, beer, wine, cheese etc.) to be imported into the FRY, was overcome after the direct appeal by the Committee Chairman (Brazil) to the U.S. Permanent Representative here. (It was agreed to address the issue later on.)
4. Otherwise, the new Consolidated Guidelines not only reflect the relevant provisions of resolution 820 (1993) but also develop them with a view to ensure more strict implementation and enforcement of the sanctions by States and international organizations. To this end, the Guidelines contain elaborate procedures to be followed in every case of prospective import into the FRY or transshipment through it. Aside from a requirement that States, under para.21 of the resolution, should report to the Committee on their actions concerning the freezing of funds, the Guidelines request States, as well, to inform the Committee by 28 May, 1993, on the detention, impounding or forfeiture by them of any FRY-owned or controlled vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft, or the cargo thereof.
5. Even more importantly, the Guidelines fix in writing the system of effective monitoring on the ground the way the sanctions are implemented in most of the States neighbouring the FRY. This system is linked to the Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) deployed, under EC/CSCE auspices, in seven countries of the region. The idea is that SAM personnel, in close coordination with 724 Committee and with the national authorities, should monitor all the allowed traffic with the FRY. In the special case of transshipments via the Danube river, it will be for SAMs to deploy their monitors on convoys passing the FRY portion of the Danube or to install special electronic monitoring

devices on such vessels. The meetings demonstrated that the Committee members are looking forward to pursuing further the relationship with the EC/CSCE Sanctions Coordinator and Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre (SAMCOMM) in Brussels, which was formally established after Amb. Napolitano and the Director of SAMCOMM addressed the 62nd meeting of the Committee on 20 April 1993.

6. The document, understandably, does not provide all the answers to a number of complicated legal problems stemming out, for example, of such requirements of resolution 820 (1993), as to freeze the FRY funds abroad or to impound its property. Nor does it address in a convincing way the more and more pressing issue of how to deal effectively with the sanctions violations, including those related to the arms embargo. The only substantial addition would seem to be the provision that the Committee shall submit such information to the Security Council. The members were not able, as well, to express themselves on such practical question, as what will be the status of those approvals and authorizations, already issued by the Committee, but not yet effected by the applicants. There is likely to be some confusion along the FRY borders for some time.

7. At the end of the 64th meeting the members approved the text of a statement to the press (attached).

8. On the whole, the meetings of the Committee reflect the hardening resolve of the Committee members, shared in many quarters of the international community, which probably would reflect realities in today's world decision-making with regard to the use of force, to make effective sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as one of the major peaceful means to stop the on-going tragedy in the Balkans. It is not concealed that the U.N. Secretariat, both in terms of human resources and intellectual input, is to be more and more relied upon in this effort.

REVISED CONSOLIDATED GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE CONDUCT
OF ITS WORK PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 713 (1991),
757 (1992), 760 (1992), 787 (1992) AND 820 (1993)

1. The Guidelines adopted by the Committee on 4 February 1992 for the conduct of its work with regard to the arms embargo established by the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991)¹ and as amended by the Committee on 26 April 1993 are in force and will be applied along with the following new Guidelines.²

2. The Committee expects to receive from States information relating to any violations or alleged violations of the mandatory measures established in resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993).

3. The Committee notes the request in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 757 (1992) to all States to report to the Secretary-General on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations contained in paragraphs 4 to 9 of the resolution.

4. The Committee may, when deemed necessary, seek cooperation from all States, as well as from other sources, including governmental and non-governmental organizations and individuals in order to receive the necessary assistance to fulfil its mandate according to resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993).

5. The Committee will, by means of a press release, encourage national or international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and interested individuals that may possess or come across any information relating to any violations or alleged violations of the mandatory sanctions established by the Security Council against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in paragraphs 4 to 9 of resolution 757 (1992), paragraphs 9 to 11 of resolution 787 (1992) and in

¹ The Guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work pursuant to resolution 713 (1991), adopted by the Committee on 4 February 1992 and amended on 26 April 1993, are herewith attached as an Annex.

² The new Consolidated Guidelines. References in succeeding paragraphs should be understood to include, where applicable, the relevant provisions of resolution 713 (1991).

paragraphs 12 to 30 of resolution 820 (1993) to turn such information over to the Governments of their domicile or to the Governments of the countries of origin of violations or alleged violations. The press statement is to include a request that copies of communications conveying such information to Governments, and the information itself, should be forwarded to the Committee by means of communications addressed to the Chairman in writing.

6. The Committee hereby authorizes the Committee's secretariat to scan, scrutinize and forward to it, for its information and proper action, if necessary, any information from published sources, including radio and television broadcasts, relating to violations or alleged violations of the sanctions imposed by resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

7. With a view to assisting Governments in their endeavour to implement the sanctions established against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) according to resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993) the Committee will turn over to the Governments concerned information forwarded to it, or information it may come across, relating to violations or alleged violations of the mandatory sanctions with a request for thorough investigations to be undertaken so as to prove or dispel the information thus received, or come across. The results of such investigations are to be forwarded to the Committee within a prescribed period (i.e., one month) for the Committee's consideration and further action, if necessary. In this respect the Committee herewith authorizes that in the absence of any response from any Government so approached, the Committee's secretariat will send an automatic reminder to the Government concerned. If still no response is received from the Government concerned within one month of the secretariat's automatic reminder, the Committee herewith authorizes its secretariat to publish, in coordination with the Chairman of the Committee, the name of the Government concerned indicating that the Committee has been unable to obtain a response from that Government and the Committee shall forward such information to the Security Council.

8. The Committee will require all sales or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to be notified to the Committee in writing by the State of the prospective supplier in reasonable time before deliveries are made. The Chairman of the Committee will communicate to the notifying State, before the declared date for delivery, that the Committee has been duly notified, and that prohibitions of financial transactions related thereto, as contained in resolutions 757 (1992) and 820 (1993), are no longer applicable. In order to help monitor compliance with the relevant resolutions, the Committee's secretariat will keep a running record of all notifications received and will circulate monthly cumulative reports to Committee members. If, on the basis of the above-mentioned reports, the Committee establishes the excessive

importation of luxury items, as determined by the Committee, the Committee shall consider the transfer of such items from the simple notification procedure to a "no objection" procedure.

9. States or international humanitarian agencies shall request that the Committee approve the importation of essential humanitarian supplies into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) other than those referred to in paragraph 8 above. Such requests, as well as the notifications referred to in paragraph 8 above, must specify, inter alia, the location of the road or rail border crossing point or port of entry into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). A standard form enclosed herewith should be completed in full and submitted to the Committee by the requesting or notifying State or international humanitarian organization. The Committee's secretariat is authorized to turn back requests not containing all the data specified thereon. The Chairman of the Committee will circulate such requests to the members and in the absence of objection within 72 hours, or 24 hours in the case of emergency, will so notify the requesting State or international humanitarian agency. Copies of the Chairman's letters of authorization or acknowledgement of notification will be sent to the Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre in Brussels (SAMCOMM), and will be valid only for three months after the date of its issuance, unless the Committee specifies a longer period of validity at the request of the notifying or requesting State or international humanitarian organization. Shipments notified to and authorized by the Committee shall be properly manifested and be in a form which permits direct physical verification of the contents by appropriate border control authorities immediately prior to entry into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including those in transit to the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia or those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces.

10. (a) In accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 820 (1993), no commodities or products may be transshipped across the land borders or through the maritime ports of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except for strictly limited transshipments authorized case-by-case by the Committee on an exceptional basis. Applications for such transshipments must state clearly the exceptional basis on which the request is being made, and shall be considered by the Committee in a formal meeting.

(b) In accordance with paragraph 15 of resolution 820 (1993), no transshipment of any commodity or product shall occur through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the Danube unless such transshipment is specifically authorized in writing by the Committee on a case-by-case basis under its no-objection procedure. Each vessel so authorized must be subject to effective monitoring while passing along the Danube between

Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs, and in each case the State requesting the transshipment should provide details of the proposed monitoring arrangements to be approved by the Committee. This should include the verification of authorizations from the Committee of the cargoes at Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs and the monitoring of the passage of the shipments through the Iron Gates at Turnu Severin. Wherever possible, shipments should be made in convoys. In this connection, the Committee encourages States to consult the Sanctions Assistance Missions or SAMCOMM. In the case of those strategic items and goods referred to in paragraph 9 of resolution 787 (1992), effective monitoring may require the presence on board for the duration of the voyage through the area restricted under paragraph 15 of resolution 820 (1993) of a person or persons selected by the requesting State and approved by the Committee or effective electronic device approved by the Committee. The requesting State will provide information to the Committee on the bona fides of the proposed monitor.

(c) The Committee's authorization for transshipment of any commodities or products must be requested in writing on a case-by-case basis by the State or international humanitarian organization which would receive the transshipment. In the particular case of transshipments on the Danube destined for onward transshipment, the Committee may receive applications from the State in which the export or transshipment originates.

(d) The request must specify the commodities or products to be transshipped, the quantity and approximate value of the transshipment, the company, agency, organization, body or individual originating the transshipment, the shipping company, and the company, agency, organization, body or individual which would receive the transshipment, the route, the location of the road or rail border crossing point or port before entry into and the first point or port of exit from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), date of the transshipment, the expected date of arrival, the means of transport, and an explanation of why the transshipment must pass through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Requests should be submitted at least one week in advance of the proposed shipment. A standard form enclosed herewith should be completed in full and submitted to the Committee by the requesting State or international humanitarian organization. The Committee's secretariat is authorized to turn back requests not containing all the data specified above.

(e) If the Committee decides to authorize the transshipment, it will so inform the requesting State or international humanitarian organization and the State from which the transshipment will enter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), at which time the transshipment may

proceed. A copy of the authorization duly signed by the Chairman of the Committee will be sent to the State in which the commodities or products originate and to the State in which the shipping company is located and must accompany the shipment during the transit through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) up to the destination point. A further copy of the Chairman's letter of authorization will be sent to SAMCOMM for onward transmission to the relevant Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAM). The authorization will be valid only for three months after the date of its issuance, unless the Committee specifies a longer period of validity at the request of the requesting State or international humanitarian organization.

(f) The State or international humanitarian organization which requested authorization for the transshipment must confirm to the Committee in writing within 30 days of the expected date of arrival reported in the original request that the particular transshipment was received in good order and in conformity with the particulars as restated in the Chairman's letter of authorization. The State/international organization and SAMCOMM should inform the Committee immediately of non-receipt of the transshipment, or of any irregularities in the transshipment. The SAMs are encouraged to work closely with local customs officials in the verification of the commodities or products to be trans-shipped and the receipt thereof after departure from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). SAMCOMM is encouraged to provide reports to the Committee reflecting this verification.

11. Arms and military equipment may not be authorized for transshipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), unless specifically excepted under authority of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

12. With respect to commodities or products approved by the Committee for transshipment pursuant to paragraphs 15 and 22 of resolution 820 (1993), the procedures as set forth below shall apply:

(a) the authorities of the State controlling the border posts or ports before entering the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), will be required to ensure and certify by means of an official stamp affixed thereon that such commodities or products carry valid customs documents showing the following:

- (i) the means of transportation;
- (ii) the transit route, including the border crossing points;
- (iii) the expected duration of the journey or the duration of any

stopover(s) in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

- (iv) the names and addresses of the consignors and consignees;
- (v) the quantities/volume/weight and approximate value of the commodities or products, and
- (vi) the means of effective monitoring, in the case of shipments along the Danube, including, as appropriate, the name(s) of the on-board monitor(s) to be approved by the Committee in accordance with paragraph 10 (b) (i), above.

(b) such commodities or products should be sealed before entering the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and remain so through the transit journey;

(c) in order to prevent the diversion of goods in transit, States, in applying the sanctions according to the provisions of this paragraph and pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 820 (1993) should not permit commodities or products to leave their territory for transit across the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in any case where there are well-founded grounds for doubt about the eventual destination of those goods.

(d) the authorities controlling the border posts or ports at exits from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will be required to reconcile the customs documents with the contents aboard the carriers. They will also be required to verify that the seals on any sealed commodities or products so indicated in the customs documents are still intact. In the case of shipments along the Danube, the authorities concerned shall take full account of the report of the monitors. In the event of any irregularities they shall impound the goods and the State concerned inform the Committee immediately.

13. States neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are required to notify to the Committee the locations of the strictly limited number of road and rail crossing points proposed to be used pursuant to paragraph 23 of resolution 820 (1993) for approval by the Committee. The list of those points approved by the Committee will be sent to States, international humanitarian agencies and to SAMCOMM. The Committee will approve no requests involving the passage of freight vehicles and rolling stock at crossing points that have not been notified to, and approved by the Committee.

14. The Committee, in determining the validity and authenticity of evidential documents issued in respect of commodities and products in transit through or from the territories of Member States that have agreements with the European Commission will seek the help and assistance of SAMCOMM and other regional groups, as appropriate.

15. In addition to the requirements of the other paragraphs of these guidelines, those applications to the Committee for imports to or transshipments through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which involve import to, export from or transshipment through the UNPAs in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies, including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies, must be accompanied by a letter of authorization from the Government of Croatia or the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as appropriate.

16. The Committee will draw on the content of the reports to be submitted to the Security Council under the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 787 (1992), for the purpose of determining if any violation of the sanctions had occurred, or if the reports contain sufficient information to necessitate requests for investigations by the Governments concerned into suspected violations of the sanctions. Accordingly, the Committee will seek the help and assistance of those States or groups of States acting under authority of paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 787 (1992) for the purpose of synchronizing the reporting procedures and consulting on other relevant matters. In this connection, the Committee draws the attention of States to the provisions of paragraphs 16, 17, 24, 25 and 29 of resolution 820 (1993).

17. In the event that any commodities or products may be determined upon interception and examination on the high seas or in international waters, or in any ports, to be in violation of the Security Council mandatory sanctions, the Committee draws the attention of States to the provisions of paragraph 29 of resolution 820 (1993) and to the relevant provisions of paragraphs 24 to 26 of that resolution.

18. To facilitate the implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993) States are requested to provide the Committee, if possible by 28 May 1993, with a list of vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft registered to them, as well as any commercial entities operating in their territory, in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Committee will disseminate such information to all States to facilitate implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 of resolution 820 (1993). To facilitate the implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993) States are also requested by 28 May 1993 and promptly thereafter to inform the Committee of:

(i) the detention of any vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock or aircraft suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or 820 (1993);

(ii) the impounding of any vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock or aircraft that (a) is owned or controlled by a person or undertaking operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (b) has been determined to have violated resolutions 713 (1992), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or 820 (1993); and

(iii) the forfeiture of any vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock or aircraft, or the cargo thereof, pursuant to paragraphs 24 or 25 of resolution 820 (1993).

19. States are required to report to the Committee on actions taken pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 820 (1993), concerning the freezing of funds.

20. In accordance with paragraph 27 of resolution 820 (1993), no services, either financial or non financial, to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be provided, the only exceptions being (a) telecommunications, postal services, legal services consistent with resolution 757 (1992) and (b) services whose supply may be necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes. In the case of (b), the State from which the proposed service is to be provided shall apply to the Committee for approval in a formal meeting on a case-by-case basis.

21. States are requested to report to the Committee, if possible, by 28 May 1993, on the measures they have taken to authorize their authorities to implement fully resolution 820 (1993) and should include a copy of the relevant implementing legislation, order or regulation. The Committee intends to report to the Security Council on which countries have provided the requested information.

22. The Committee will make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to the Committee regarding alleged violations of the relevant Security Council resolutions, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations.

23. For dealing with exemptions for flights to and from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for delivery of supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs, as referred to in paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 757 (1992), or for humanitarian purposes, or for flights of or related to the Conference on Yugoslavia, the Committee will apply a "no objection" procedure, on a case by case basis. The Committee may decide to extend the "no objection" approval procedure to other types of flights, if necessary.

24. Requests for approval by the Committee of such flights shall be submitted in writing, in reasonable time before the schedule of the flights, to the Chairman of the Committee by the State concerned. The Chairman will immediately circulate the request among the members of the Committee. The members will communicate to the Chairman, within 72 hours, or as may be required in emergency circumstances, their objection, if any, to the particular request. The Chairman will immediately inform the State concerned of the decision of the Committee.

25. Requests for approval by the Committee of flights for purposes other than those referred to in paragraph 23 above shall be considered at formal meetings of the Committee, if necessary at short notice. Such requests should likewise be submitted in writing, in reasonable time, to the Chairman of the Committee by the State concerned and should contain a clear explanation as to the reasons and necessity for the flights.

26. The Committee hereby gives general approval for flights of or related to UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitoring Commission, as well as the Office of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, to and from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The schedule of the above-mentioned flights will be notified to the Committee on a periodic basis; such notification may be made after the fact.

27. The State whose request has been approved by the Committee shall take the necessary measures, if appropriate, in conjunction with the United Nations, to inspect the aircraft in order to ensure that it is operating exclusively for the declared humanitarian or other purposes and in accordance with the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 757 (1992).

28. States requesting flights for medical, foodstuffs and other purposes should indicate in their requests, wherever possible, the scheduled routes and stopovers and other pertinent information relating to the requested flights and, after the approval of their request by the Committee, should also inform the countries concerned accordingly.

29. In the event that a flight authorized by the Committee to fly to or from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should make an intermediate stopover or stopovers, the Government requesting approval for the flight will be required, in addition to taking the necessary inspection measures described in paragraph 27 above, to so indicate; the Committee will then request the Government of the country of the stopover, or the last stopover, or destination to take appropriate measures in conjunction with the United Nations in order to ensure that the aircraft is operating exclusively for the declared purposes and no prohibited cargo is, or was,

loaded on board the aircraft.

30. The applicants whose requests have been approved or whose notifications have been received by the Committee (paras. 24, 25 and 26) shall apply for the necessary overflight permits required by the States to be overflown, if possible at least 72 hours prior to the flight. Such applications for overflight permits shall make a reference to paragraph 26 of the present Guidelines, if the flight falls within paragraph 26.

31. The Committee shall review these Guidelines in 60 days in the light of their practical implementation, taking into account the necessity to ensure their strict compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, the interests of legitimate international trade and humanitarian considerations.

**SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION
724 (1991) CONCERNING YUGOSLAVIA**

REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO SHIP GOODS UNDER PARAGRAPH 22 (c) OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 820 (1993) THROUGH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
(page 1 of 2)

(TO BE COMPLETED BY THE SECRETARIAT)

COMM.

DATE:

DEADLINE FOR OBJECTIONS :

(TO BE COMPLETED IN FULL BY PROSPECTIVE RECEIVING COUNTRY/INT'L ORG.)*

1. MISSION OR INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION:

CERTIFYING SIGNATURE
AND OFFICIAL SEAL

2. DATE OF REQUEST
AND REFERENCE NUMBER

3. EXPECTED DATE
OF SHIPMENT

4. EXPECTED DATE OF
ARRIVAL OF SHIPMENT

5. GOODS TO TRANSIT THE FRY
(name and/or description)

6. QUANTITY OR VOLUME

7. APPROXIMATE TOTAL VALUE

8. ORIGINATING COMPANY
(agency, organization,
body or individual) -
NAME AND ADDRESS

9. RECEIVING COMPANY
(agency, organization,
body or individual) -
NAME AND ADDRESS

10. SHIPPING COMPANY
NAME AND ADDRESS

11. ROUTE OF SHIPMENT **

* In the particular case of transshipments on the Danube destined for onward transshipment, the Committee may receive applications from the State in which the export or transshipment originates.

** In the particular case of transshipments involving certain areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as specified in para.12 of resolution 820 (1993), proper authorization must be enclosed.

**12. BORDER POINT OR PORT BEFORE ENTERING
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA**

**13. BORDER POINT OR PORT UPON EXIT FROM
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA**

**14. PARTICULARS OF THE MEANS
OF TRANSPORTATION**

**15. REASON WHY THE SHIPMENT MUST PASS THROUGH
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA**

**16. MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSHIPMENT
VIA THE DANUBE**

**SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION
724 (1991) CONCERNING YUGOSLAVIA**

NOTIFICATION OR REQUEST TO SHIP GOODS UNDER PARAGRAPH 22 (a) or (b) OF
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 820 (1993) TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

(TO BE COMPLETED BY THE SECRETARIAT)

COMM.

DATE:

DEADLINE FOR OBJECTIONS :
FOR REQUEST

(TO BE COMPLETED IN FULL BY PROSPECTIVE EXPORTING COUNTRY/INT'L ORG.)

1. MISSION OR INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION:

CERTIFYING SIGNATURE
AND OFFICIAL SEAL

2. DATE OF NOTIFICATION/REQUEST
AND REFERENCE NUMBER

3. EXPECTED DATE
OF SHIPMENT

4. GOODS TO BE SHIPPED
(name and/or description)

5. QUANTITY OR VOLUME

6. APPROXIMATE TOTAL VALUE

7. ORIGINATING COMPANY
(agency, organization,
body or individual) -
NAME AND ADDRESS

8. RECEIVING COMPANY
(agency, organization,
body or individual) -
NAME AND ADDRESS

9. BORDER POINT OR PORT BEFORE ENTRY INTO
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

10. PARTICULARS OF THE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION

11. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION,
IF ANY

Annex

Guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work pursuant to resolution 713 (1991), adopted on 4 February 1992 and amended on 26 April 1993

(a) In order to perform its work efficiently and effectively the Committee will need the full cooperation of all States, particularly those States that have in the past been traditional suppliers of arms to Yugoslavia;

(b) The Committee will conduct its business behind closed doors; thus, it will hold its meetings in private, and will process its communications and all its other documents on a confidential basis, until, or unless, it may decide to hold open meetings or publicize any aspect of its work, as circumstances may so require;

(c) The Committee expects to receive from States information relating to any violations or alleged violations of the arms embargo against Yugoslavia. The Committee is to make an initial appeal to all States to that effect, advising them to submit their informations in communications addressed to the Chairman in writing, under assurance of confidentiality. The Committee may renew the appeal as occasion warrants;

(d) The Committee will, by means of a press release, encourage interested individuals and national or international governmental or non-governmental organizations that may possess or come across any informations relating to violations or alleged violations of the arms embargo against Yugoslavia to turn such informations over to the Governments of their domicile or to the Governments of the countries of origin of the violations or alleged violations. The press statement is to include a request that copies of communications conveying such informations to Governments, and the informations themselves, should be forwarded to the Committee by means of communications addressed to the Chairman in writing. The Committee may decide to reissue the press statement as occasion warrants;

(e) The Committee hereby authorizes the Committee's secretariat to scan, scrutinize and forward to it, for its information and proper action, if necessary, any information from published sources, including radio and television broadcasts, relating to violations or alleged violations of the arms embargo against Yugoslavia;

(f) With a view to assisting Governments in their endeavour to implement the arms embargo against Yugoslavia, the Committee will turn over to the Governments concerned informations forwarded to it, or informations it may come across, relating to violations or alleged violations of the arms embargo, with requests for thorough investigations to be undertaken so as to prove or dispel the informations thus received, or come across. The results of such investigations are to be forwarded to

the Committee within a prescribed period (say, one month) for the Committee's consideration and further action, if necessary. In this respect, the Committee herewith authorizes that, in the absence of any response from any Government(s) so approached, the Committee's Secretariat will send an automatic reminder to the Government(s) concerned. If no response is received from the Government(s) concerned within one month of the Secretariat's automatic reminder, the Committee herewith authorizes its Secretariat to publish the name of the Government(s) concerned, indicating that the Committee has been unable to obtain a response from that (or those) Government(s) and the Committee shall forward such information to the Security Council;

(g) Notwithstanding its decision as enunciated in sub-paragraph b, above, the Committee reserves the right to invite, or to accept requests from individual persons, representatives of national or international governmental or non-governmental organizations to appear before it for the purpose of providing or elucidating information relating to any violations or alleged violations of the arms embargo against Yugoslavia;

(h) In order to enhance and publicize the work of the Committee the Chairman will be authorized, with prior consultations with and approval of the Committee, to hold press conferences or to issue press briefings, if and when necessary;

(i) The rule of the Committee for reaching decisions will be by consensus. If consensus is not possible on a particular issue, the Chairman will undertake consultations as he deems appropriate to resolve the issue and to ensure the effective functioning of the Committee. Otherwise, the point at issue will be either reflected in a formal report, or forwarded in a formal communication, to the Security Council itself for a final decision.

United Nations

Press Release

Department of Public Information • News Coverage Service • New York

SC/5600
27 April 1993

SANCTIONS COMMITTEE ON YUGOSLAVIA ADOPTS REVISED CONSOLIDATED GUIDELINES,
GIVING EFFECT TO COUNCIL RESOLUTION 820 (1993) ON FURTHER SANCTIONS

The following is the text of a statement issued at 11:55 p.m. on Monday, 26 April, by the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg (Brazil), on behalf of the members:

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, today continued its consideration of the revised consolidated Guidelines for the conduct of its work in the light of the provisions contained in paragraphs 12 to 30 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), which have now come into force.

The Committee adopted the revised consolidated Guidelines at the conclusion of its sixty-fourth meeting tonight, and decided that the revised consolidated Guidelines should be transmitted immediately to all States and international organizations for their information and use, as necessary. The revised consolidated Guidelines, like resolution 820 (1993) itself, are now in force.

* * * * *

Yugoslavia
Bosnia

27 April 1993

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN FOR CYRUS VANCE AND LORD OWEN

At a press briefing held Monday afternoon, Fred Eckhard, spokesman for Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, updated correspondents on Lord Owen's activities over the last five days and summed up the current status of the negotiations.

Mr. Vance had been at Headquarters, Mr. Eckhard said, while Lord Owen began a five-day trip to the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Greece last Wednesday, 21 April. Lord Owen was accompanied by Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, who represented Mr. Vance; Ambassador Peter Hall, his own deputy; Ambassador Geert Ahrens, who with Ambassador Okun had chaired the Krajina talks and who also headed a working group within the Conference dealing with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Brigadier-General John Wilson, the Co-Chairmen's liaison with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); Brigadier-General Graham Messervy-Whiting, a military adviser to Lord Owen; and Jeremy Brade, the Co-Chairmen's representative in Sarajevo. It was a large group, with a broad agenda.

The meetings began on Wednesday morning, with a one-hour meeting at Zagreb airport with the Croatian Defence Minister, Gojko Susak, Mr. Eckhard said. Talks focused on the fighting in central Bosnia and Herzegovina between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Government troops. Brigadier-General Wilson and Mr. Brade were left behind in Zagreb to continue discussions, on the military level, on how to resolve the problem of joint command -- a core issue between the two allied forces.

Lord Owen went on to Belgrade that day for a two-hour meeting with the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic. The "main prop" for most of the trip, Mr. Eckhard continued, was a 12'x12' detailed map of Bosnia, used to discuss the "throughway concept". Lord Owen had elaborated upon that concept in the case of the north-east corridor -- the key map issue for the Bosnian Serbs. It was proposed that the throughway discussed in the Vance-Owen plan, which would connect the Serb-majority province of Banja Luka through the Croat-majority province of Posavina to the Serb-majority province of Bijeljina, could include a demilitarized zone of five kilometres on either side of the throughway.

Lord Owen then proceeded to meet with the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, on the issue of the map and corridors. That evening, Mr. Eckhard went on to say, there was a three and a half hour dinner meeting between Lord Owen, President Cosic and President Milosevic, who were joined by Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and his military adviser, General Ratko Mladic.

On Thursday, 22 April, Mr. Eckhard continued, Lord Owen's programme focused on the issue of Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

(more)

27 April 1993

Brigadier-General Messervy-Whiting was left behind in Belgrade, where he went over map issues with General Mladic in the course of a five and a half hour meeting. Meanwhile, Lord Owen and the rest of his party went on to Skopje. (A private plane was provided to Lord Owen by the Italian Government, facilitating his travels, Mr. Eckhard noted.) At Skopje, Lord Owen had a tête-a-tête with President Kiro Gligorov of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and they were subsequently joined by the rest of the delegation. That meeting lasted about five hours. Mr. Ahrens was left behind to continue with meetings in Skopje.

Lord Owen went on to Athens Thursday evening, Mr. Eckhard said, where he had about five hours of meetings, first with the Foreign Minister of Greece, Michael G. Papaconstantinou, and then with Prime Minister Constantin Mitsotakis. Lord Owen conferred privately with the Prime Minister, while his delegation continued a negotiating session with the Foreign Minister.

On Friday morning, 23 April, Lord Owen attended the Bildeberg Conference, a previously arranged engagement in Athens, where he delivered two addresses, Mr. Eckhard said. He first spoke on the future of Europe -- the focus of the Conference -- and its relationship with the United States; he delivered a second address, as requested by the Conference organizers, on Yugoslavia.

While Lord Owen was addressing the Conference, Mr. Eckhard continued, Ambassadors Okun and Hall had a second round of talks with Foreign Minister Papaconstantinou. Those talks would resume in New York at the ministerial level by the middle of this week, when Lord Owen was expected back.

Lord Owen left Athens on Friday for Skopje, picked up Ambassador Ahrens and had another hour-long meeting with President Gligorov, to brief him on the discussions in Athens, Mr. Eckhard said. The delegation then proceeded to Podgorica, capital of Montenegro, where they met with President Momir Bulatovic and members of Parliament, including the opposition. Lord Owen returned to Belgrade that evening and met privately with President Milosevic.

On Saturday, 24 April, Mr. Eckhard continued, Lord Owen had his principal meeting with the Bosnian Serbs. He had made it clear upon his arrival in the region that he had no desire to meet with Dr. Karadzic unless the Bosnian Serb leader would be more specific about his priorities on map issues and the interim arrangements. The Bosnian Serbs needed to sign the papers on both those issues to bring the Vance-Owen plan into effect.

President Milosevic had given assurances that the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to discuss details, Mr. Eckhard said. The session lasted over three hours, attended on the Bosnian Serb side by Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic and the Assembly President Momcilo Krajisnik. There was indeed a detailed discussion of the map but the session was ultimately "quite frustrating" for Lord Owen because Dr. Karadzic backed off from being pinned to specifics. In the end, there was no change in the Bosnian Serb position from the New York round of talks.

Lord Owen left Belgrade on Saturday afternoon, arriving in Zagreb at about 3 p.m., Mr. Eckhard said. A series of meetings was held, the first with Defence Minister Susak and the Croatian leader in Bosnia, Mate Boban. The

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problem of central Bosnia was discussed, along with the possibility of instituting a military arrangement to reduce the tension between the two allied forces.

Mr. Eckhard went on to say that Brigadier-General Wilson chaired a session later that afternoon with the two military commanders -- General Sefer Halilovic on the Bosnian Government side and General Milivoj Petkovic on the Bosnian Croat side. It was decided to let the military work things out by themselves, rather than involve politicians. That meeting produced an understanding and proposal for a joint command.

Lord Owen met at 5 p.m. that day with the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. Lord Owen then proceeded to the residence of the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, where he had a round of talks with Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Boban, the Croatian Defence Minister and other ministers. A second round of talks was held at 9 p.m., with the addition of President Izetbegovic. That session produced, at about 1 a.m., a cease-fire agreement (a copy of which was circulated to correspondents), including an agreement between the two military leaders on how they would coordinate efforts to eliminate conflict between the two forces in central Bosnia.

The agreement also discussed the move towards the implementation stage of the Vance-Owen plan, Mr. Eckhard continued. The interim arrangements paper provided for a "three-three-three presidency". The two parties that had signed the interim arrangements agreement had nominated the three people from each of their sides who sit on that body. As part of the agreement signed Sunday morning, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Government had designated people to form a coordinative group as a precursor to the interim presidency.

Press reports had indicated the following day that shelling continued around Vitez. However, that was not surprising, Mr. Eckhard said, given the communications problems in the region. Even as of today, fighting continued but to a lesser degree than before. The parties to the agreement hoped to make it stick.

On Sunday morning, 25 April, Mr. Eckhard continued, Lord Owen met with the UNPROFOR Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, to discuss the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. UNPROFOR was giving detailed thought to the implementation phase of the Vance-Owen plan, as the Secretary-General had been requested by the Security Council to put forward a plan on that process.

Lord Owen and General Wahlgren had also discussed the situation of the Krajina talks, which had not yet concluded, Mr. Eckhard said. The Krajina Serbs had not endorsed the agreement signed in New York and the situation on the ground was tense. The Krajina situation, over the next week, would be one of the barometers by which to gauge whether the situation in the region "was going to turn decidedly bad" or whether the principal actors would favour a political settlement. The general situation in Bosnia was also discussed at the meeting.

At midday Sunday, Lord Owen flew to Belgrade at the request of President Cosic and President Milosevic, Mr. Eckhard said. After the meeting with

27 April 1993

Dr. Karadzic the previous day had ended badly, the two Presidents had requested Lord Owen to return within 24 hours as they planned to have further talks with Dr. Karadzic themselves. President Bulatovic also joined the group, for a meeting that lasted six hours. Halfway through the meeting, the group was joined by Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. That set the stage for the Bosnian Serb meeting in Bijeljina, where the "so-called Assembly" was to consider and vote on the Vance-Owen plan.

There was some confusion over when the United Nations sanctions went into effect, Mr. Eckhard said. It was unclear whether the sanctions were effective midnight Sunday or midnight Monday, 26 April. The official view at Headquarters was that the deadline was midnight Monday. The question was academic, however, since there was no question about the position of the Assembly members. At 6 a.m. Monday, they unanimously rejected the Vance-Owen plan, although they decided, at the same time, to put the question to a referendum. Mr. Vance and Lord Owen had always believed that a referendum "made no sense", given the large displacement of populations due to the war and to "ethnic cleansing". What mattered to the Co-Chairmen was that the Bosnian Serb leadership sign the remaining two agreements to put the peace plan into effect.

After receiving the news Monday morning, Lord Owen met the press in his hotel just before he left for Geneva. (A transcript of his remarks was circulated to correspondents.) Mr. Eckhard said Lord Owen had emphasized that the Vance-Owen plan met the legitimate claims of the Bosnian Serbs. The thrust of his discussion with the Bosnian Serb leaders had been to explain in detail, and with line-by-line reference to the documents, how their concerns had been met. That had been particularly true at the six-hour session on Sunday in Belgrade.

"Is the Vance-Owen plan dead?" Mr. Eckhard raised the question. "Not at all in the eyes of the Co-Chairmen", he said. Lord Owen had pointed out that two of the three parties had signed on, and, significantly, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had endorsed the plan. Lord Owen also told the press that he had received the text of a letter from President Cosic's political adviser. The letter, which was issued by Presidents Cosic, Milosevic and Bulatovic to the Bijeljina Assembly, reflected the discussion the three Presidents had had with Lord Owen and the concept of the corridor. It also spelled out many of the clarifications Lord Owen had made at the meeting with the three Presidents. The letter concluded with concern about the latest round of sanctions (based on the assumption that the sanctions deadline was midnight Sunday).

Mr. Eckhard proceeded to read out the conclusion of the letter: "Your decision today does not have the same value as your decision tomorrow. Today it is no to sanctions, tomorrow a mere opening of a long and painful process of uncertain negotiations ... We avail ourselves as much as you are of the right to make important decisions. We therefore demand from you that you accept our firm decision to accept the plan."

That advice was ignored, but the Co-Chairmen did not think that was the end of the process, Mr. Eckhard continued. Lord Owen's message to the Serbs had been to sign now -- the international pressure was considerable but it

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would get a lot stronger on Monday. Mr. Eckhard said there was talk about lifting the arms embargo although he could not predict how the Council would act. However, there had been such discussions in capitals. Lord Owen's advice had been ignored and Monday morning he had emphasized the risk the Bosnian Serbs were taking not only for themselves, but for all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was the focus of the sanctions.

Mr. Eckhard went on to say that it was significant, in Lord Owen's view, that the three Presidents from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had taken the strong public stand that they had. This was a pivotal moment in the peace process, and the Co-Chairmen would be looking for signs that things might yet turn for the better. The Bosnian Serbs had reversed their positions suddenly in the past, as on the issue of the Constitutional principles. "So, I guess 'it isn't over till it's over', is the bottom line", Mr. Eckhard said.

A correspondent asked for more information on the sanctions and the kind of pressure that might be put on the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen plan. Mr. Eckhard said it was expected that the latest round of sanctions "will bite particularly hard". The leaders of Serbia and Montenegro were already on record as wanting to see a peaceful resolution to the crisis, and saw the Vance-Owen plan as the best solution. The Co-Chairmen were aware that, although the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not succeeded in convincing the Bosnian Serbs at the latest meeting, they had other pressure points to use with the Bosnian Serbs.

A correspondent asked if the letter from the three Presidents indicated that borders would be closed to the Bosnian Serbs or other steps would be taken against them. The letter, which had been broadly publicized in Belgrade on Monday, did not threaten anything specific, Mr. Eckhard said. It explained how the Vance-Owen plan met the major concerns of the Bosnian Serbs and was "the way to go", and should be signed. It was expected that such pressure would continue. Lord Owen did say, with complete support from Mr. Vance, that a sealing of Bosnia's borders with Serbia and Croatia, with the cooperation of those Governments, would be desirable. It would bring enormous pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serbs because it would affect their essential supplies.

What did the Co-Chairmen think of the idea that further Council action was not necessary as suggested in a letter to United States President Bill Clinton by the United States Permanent Representative, Madeleine K. Albright. The correspondent said Ms. Albright had pointed to Council resolution 770 (1992) as precluding the authorization of military action by the Council.

Mr. Eckhard said he would not interpret Council resolutions. However, when Lord Owen had talked about taking steps beyond sanctions, he always meant those steps should be consistent with the Charter and be executed through the Council. Mr. Vance felt the same way.

How much did Lord Owen think the Serbian Serbs controlled the actions of the Bosnian Serbs? Also, did it sound likely that President Tudjman ordered a house-to-house massacre in Vitez? a correspondent asked. There was enough evidence in the conflict to show that command and control was a problem all around, Mr. Eckhard said. As far as the Belgrade leadership went, Lord Owen

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27 April 1993

was convinced of the sincerity of the three Presidents in backing a political solution, specifically the Vance-Owen plan. More could be expected from Belgrade, and it remained to be seen what steps it might take in the weeks ahead.

To a question on whether air strikes would help the Vance-Owen plan succeed or kill it completely, Mr. Eckhard said it was difficult to say. In carrying out negotiations, Lord Owen and Mr. Vance had not had many levers to pull. Talk of dramatic actions by the international community had been helpful to them in focusing the minds of the Bosnian Serbs in the latest round of talks.

* * * * *

Albania
Yugoslavia

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25662
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
ALBANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to report to Your Excellency the following:

The Albanian Government has been watching with the utmost concern the development of the Balkan crisis resulting from the unprovoked and chauvinistic aggression of the Serbian forces against Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has consistently condemned the aggression and has warned against the spread of war in the area, with particular reference to the Albanian populated region of Kosova. Encouraged by the reluctance of the United Nations to concretely condemn the aggressor, and in defiance of world public opinion, Serbia has recently intensified its overt hostile acts against Kosova. The situation there has already become explosive, and the danger of the spill-over of the conflict is imminent. Recently, there has been an increase of the Serbian military forces in the region, intentional movements of troops, and low flights of Serbian planes over it, which are a clear signal of the breaking out of hostilities in Kosova. Mr. Qosic disclosed of late to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia that Serbia has drafted a plan providing for the partitioning of Kosova between Serbia and Albania, thus brutally disregarding the ethnically Albanian character and the undeniable integrity of that region. Moreover, everyday fresh evidence shows that the Serbian authorities intend to carry out in Kosova their plan of massive ethnic cleansing which, silently and in various hidden ways, has already begun.

Faced with such a situation which jeopardizes its national interests, Albania has made it clear to the Serbian authorities and to the international community that it will not remain indifferent.

Under these very grave circumstances, the Albanian Government asks the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures, such as the deployment of United Nations troops in Kosova, and all other measures which it deems necessary, to timely prevent the war in Kosova and ethnic cleansing there, with a view to avoiding unpredictable consequences.

I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council of the United Nations.

(Signed) Thanas SHKURTI
Ambassador

By DHH

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H.R.H. CROWN PRINCE ALEXANDER
OF YUGOSLAVIA



26.4.93

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
The United Nations
New York

Your Excellency,



It is with great concern that I am addressing you about the imposition of additional sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, which came into effect today. As a person deeply committed to the peaceful, just and lasting resolution of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and to the democratic transformation of Serbia itself, I am concerned that an ever-tighter sanctions regime will not contribute to either objective.

The sanctions have seriously hit the people rather than the regime. The hardest hit are those strata of the society which are most strongly committed to change, to democracy and free enterprise: the youth, the professional classes, the intelligentsia, and all successful, export oriented businesses. Many tens of thousands of educated young people, many of them deeply opposed to the policy of violence and hate, have left the country. This is an irreparable loss to the forces of democracy among the Serbs, and to all advocates of peace in the Balkans.

The Serbian side in this conflict has to bear a share of the blame for the continuing tragedy, but it is not the sole culprit. Recent scenes of horror in Vitez and elsewhere in central Bosnia testify to that. The UN effectiveness in the search for a durable cease-fire, and - eventually - a lasting political solution in former Yugoslavia is hindered by the fact that sanctions have been imposed against Serbia alone. The blame for the present tragedy is universal, and singling out one side as the main culprit only encourages the intransigence of other combatants.

May I reiterate additional three points, already made in a memorandum which I had the honour of personally presenting to you in New York last July:

a. Croatia has carved out a sizeable portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina for itself (over a quarter of the republic's territory), using regular Croatian troops, and sending huge quantities of weaponry to the combat zone in the process.

b. I have staunchly and repeatedly condemned the atrocious practice of "ethnic cleansing", favoured by all sides in the present conflict. I hope that all perpetrators of such crimes will be punished equally. The Serbs in Croatia, and in the Croat and Muslim controlled areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have been subjected to murder, pillage, and eviction. Over six hundred thousand Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have sought refuge in Serbia, but their plight goes unnoticed by the outside world. This creates an impression of bias and unequal treatment among many Serbs, which is not conducive to the peace process. It is also noteworthy that refugees from other ethnic groups, notably Muslims and Croats, have also found shelter in Serbia and Montenegro.

c. The government in Sarajevo also bears its share of responsibility for the conflict, by its single-minded determination to enforce political and constitutional arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina which had excluded one third of the republic's population from the proceedings. Bosnia's Serbs have to be a consensual party to any eventual settlement.


d. The sanctions against Serbia are hurting the people and ruining its economy, without seriously affecting the ruling political establishment which is primarily interested in the maintenance of its grip on power. Furthermore, the sanctions are continuing against Serbia proper, even though it is apparent that the real warring factions are Bosnia's Serbs, Croats and Muslims, and that an agreement among them is the key to peace in the area.

I am convinced, Mr. Secretary General, that a determined effort by the international community to recognise the importance of democratic transformation in Serbia would contribute to peace. No less important is an even-handed approach to all crimes and all obstacles to peace, regardless of who are the culprits. May I add that, in the opinion of an increasing number of my compatriots, a constitutional monarchy in Belgrade under a Crown committed to democracy and respect for everyone's human rights may provide the basic framework for an eventual solution that is proving so perplexing for the outside world right now.

With my very best personal regards,

Alexander

London, April 26, 1993

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DHL shall not be liable, in any event for any consequential or special damages or other indirect loss, however arising, whether or not DHL had knowledge that such damages might be incurred, including, but not limited to, loss of income, profits, interest, utility or loss of market.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

BY THE CONDITIONS SET OUT BELOW DHL AND ITS SERVANTS AND AGENTS ARE FIRSTLY NOT TO BE LIABLE AT ALL FOR CERTAIN LOSSES AND DAMAGES, AND SECONDLY WHEREVER THEY ARE TO BE LIABLE, THE AMOUNT OF LIABILITY IS STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT STATED IN CONDITION 5. CUSTOMERS ARE THEREFORE ADVISED TO PURCHASE INSURANCE COVER TO ENSURE THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE FULLY PROTECTED IN ALL EVENTS.

8. LIABILITIES NOT ASSUMED

While DHL will endeavour to exercise its best efforts to provide expeditious delivery in accordance with regular delivery schedules, DHL WILL NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BE LIABLE FOR DELAY IN PICK-UP, TRANSPORTATION OR DELIVERY OF ANY SHIPMENT, REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE OF SUCH DELAY.

Further, DHL shall not be liable for any loss, damage, non-delivery or non-delivery.

(a) Due to Act of God, force majeure, occurrence of any cause reasonably beyond the control of DHL; or

(b) Caused by:

(i) The act, default or omission of the Shipper, the Consignee or any other party who claims an interest in the shipment (including violators of any law or condition hereof), or of any person other than DHL, or of any Customs' or other Government Officials, including Postal Supervisor, forwarder or other entity or person to whom a shipment is consigned by DHL for transportation to any location not regularly served by DHL, regardless of whether the Shipper requested or had knowledge of such third-party delivery arrangement.

(ii) The nature of the shipment or other defect, characteristic, or inherent vice thereof.

(iii) Electrical or magnetic injury, erasure, or other such damage to electronic or photographic images or recordings in any form.

9. CLAIMS

(a) Any claims must be brought by the Shipper and delivered in writing to the office of DHL nearest the location at which the shipment was accepted, within 30 days of the date of such acceptance. No claim may be made against DHL outside of that time limit.

(b) No claim for loss or damage to the goods transported until all transportation charges have been paid. The amount of any such claim may not be exceeded by any transportation charges owed DHL.

10. APPLICABILITY

These terms and conditions shall apply to and inure to the benefit of DHL INTERNATIONAL LTD. and its authorized agents and affiliated companies, and their officers, directors and employees.

11. MATERIALS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR TRANSPORT

DHL will not accept any IATA restricted articles or any article which by its nature or characteristics are considered by DHL as being not acceptable for transportation for safety or legal reasons.

NO PARCEL OR ITEM EXCEPTING A CUSTOMS DECLARATION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR TRANSPORT OUT OF THE ORIGIN COUNTRY VIA DHL'S DOCUMENT EXPRESS SERVICE OR WORLDMAIL SERVICE. IN RELATION TO SUCH PARCEL OR ITEM, DHL'S WORLDWIDE PARCEL EXPRESS SERVICE MUST BE CLEARLY SELECTED AND UTILIZED BY THE SHIPPER.

12. WARSAW CONVENTION

If the transportation of any consignment involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and the Convention governs, and in most cases further limits the liability of DHL in respect of loss or damage to such consignment.

13. COLLECT SHIPMENTS

Where DHL has agreed to bill the consignee for the cost of the shipment DHL reserves the right to refuse delivery until all transportation and other charges have been paid. If the consignee refuses to pay, the shipper will be liable for all such charges, including without limitation, costs of returning the shipment if required.

14. INSURANCE

(a) At the request of the Shipper and upon payment therefor, DHL will arrange insurance on behalf of the Shipper in an amount not exceeding US \$25,000.

(b) The insurance coverage shall be governed by all of the terms and conditions contained in the policy of insurance issued by the insurance carrier.

(c) **CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AND LOSS OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM DELAYS IN TRANSPORTATION ARE NOT COVERED BY ANY SUCH POLICY OF INSURANCE.**

February 1990



Yugoslavia 34

PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
804 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 Tel. (212) 879-8700/4 Fax: (212) 879-8705

*For Consulting
Order Annex
LAS*



No. 416/93

24 April 1993

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to transmit, enclosed herewith, the Declaration of the Federal Assembly concerning the sanctions of the United Nations Security Council imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dragomir Djokic
Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
New York

On the basis of Article 77 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in reference to Article 113 of the Provisional Rules of Procedures of the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly and Article 110 of the Provisional Rules of Procedures of the Chamber of the Republics of the Federal Assembly;

On the basis of the expressed will of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in reference to the sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, The Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly and the Chamber of the Republics of the Federal Assembly, at their joint meeting of the first regular session held on 23 April 1993 adopted the following

D E C L A R A T I O N
OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE SANCTIONS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSED AGAINST
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

1. Decisions on sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represent an act which is in contradiction with the Charter of the Organization of the United Nations and constitute a direct attack on the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and gross violation of all international, legal and political documents on human rights and humanitarian norms - aimed at executing interests of foreign forces in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Such actions have brought dangerous precedents in the practice of international relations which could be applied to other states and their contentious issues.

2. At the Geneva Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community has established that inter-ethnic and civil war is being waged in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Belligerent parties in this war have been officially called for reaching an agreement, during the negotiations at this conference, on ending all forms of military actions and on restoration of peace. Thereby, the claim that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a belligerent party in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has lost any meaning, while sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has lost any reason and basis for their further existence.

3. When deciding to tighten the existing sanctions and to impose new ones, the Security Council of the Organization of the United Nations utterly neglected the continuing peace-finding efforts and concrete constructive contributions which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has made and is still making towards ending hostilities and reaching a sensible political compromise which would equally respect the legitimate interests and rights of the three constituent nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Notwithstanding the threats, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot be denied the right to solidarity with parts of the Serbian people living outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which has been manifested in rendering moral, economic and humanitarian support.

4. Firmly consistent to the policy of peace and political solution of the crisis by peace and not by war in the territories of former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federal Assembly considers that it is most important now to establish peace immediately and with no delay in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is to be achieved by full respect of the cease-fire agreement reached through mediation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is also necessary to end the negotiations on other open issues of the Vance-Owen Plan, with equitable respect of vital interests of Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well.

5. Emphasizing the irrevocable orientation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for peace and its vital interest in successful ending of peace-making process, the Federal Assembly wishes to assure all members of international order that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will organize decisively and by all means its defence if its territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity is endangered.

6. In view of all pressures which our country and its peoples are exposed to, the Federal Assembly calls for all political and other public subjects to express full responsibility and manifest maximum unity under the challenges we are facing.

In Belgrade, 23 April 1993

President of the Chamber
of the Republics

Prof.Dr.Milos Radulovic,signed

President of the Chamber
of Citizens

Prof.Dr.Radoman Bozovic,signed



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24900/Add.38
23 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Secretary-General presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council and, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 781 (1992), has the honour to bring to his attention further information received by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) regarding apparent violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Between 19 and 21 April 1993, there appear to have been two flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those exempted in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 781 (1992) or approved by UNPROFOR in accordance with paragraph 3 of that resolution. Details as to the itinerary of these flights are annexed to the present note.

Annex I

Information on flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina not authorized
by the United Nations Protection Force

(19-21 April 1993)

Serial No.	Date	Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
522	19 April	0520	0556	AWACS detected a track over the north-eastern part of the town of Banja Luka. A flight of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fighter aircraft visually identified one airborne MI-8 helicopter, with no distinguishable markings, approximately 2 nautical miles from Zaluzani airfield. The helicopter landed at Zaluzani airport. This violation occurred in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	Varying 50 knots 1,900 ft.
523	20 April	0449	0512	AWACS detected a radar contact over the airfield at Zaluzani and monitored the track until it terminated back over the airfield 23 minutes later. Fighter aircraft were vectored onto the contact and they also gained radar contact on their own equipment. The contact appeared to manoeuvre in the vicinity of Zaluzani and to land before visual interception and identification were possible. This contact originated in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	Manoeuvring 70 knots 1,500 ft.

[21 April: no violations reported]

Yugoslavia

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24900/Add.37*
23 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 19 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council and, in accordance with operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 816 (1993), has the honour to bring to his attention further information received by UNPROFOR regarding apparent or confirmed violations of the ban on flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Between 15 and 18 April 1993, there has been one flight of rotary-wing in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those exempted in accordance with operative paragraph 1 of resolution 816 (1993) or approved by UNPROFOR in accordance with operative paragraph 2 of that resolution. Details as to the itinerary of this flight are annexed to the present note verbale.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

ANNEX
INFORMATION ON FLIGHTS IN THE AIRSPACE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA NOT AUTHORIZED BY
THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
 (15 - 18 April 1993)

S/24900/Add.37
 English
 Page 2

SRL	DATE	START	END	REMARKS	HEADING SPEED ALT.
521	15 Apr	10.50	n/a	AWACS detected an aircraft 5 nautical miles North of Banja Luka heading South. A flight of Dutch F-16s in the Northern cap also detected the track at the same position. The track faded from AWACS and the F-16 radar coverage, soon after initial contact. This track was assessed as a probable helicopter and was in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	South Slow Low
				[16 - 18 April: no violations reported]	


Yugoslavia

Note for the Secretary-General
REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN

In adopting resolution 820 last Saturday the Security Council asked you to report, if possible within 9 days, on the preparatory work undertaken in respect of the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan. Since the 9-day deadline expires on Monday 26 April, I am taking the liberty of enclosing a draft report for your perusal over the weekend. I am sure the Council will accept a short delay, unless developments on the ground (e.g. if the Bosnian Serbs sign the Plan) create a new sense of urgency.

I should like to draw your attention to paragraphs 4 and 8, in which we have anticipated decisions that you have not yet confirmed. Your approval of the report would, of course, constitute your announcement of these decisions.




Kofi A. Annan
23 April 1993

- c.c. - Mr. Goulding
- Mr. Gharekhan
- Mr. Aimé
- Mr. de Soto ✓

SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/.....
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 820 (1993)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In operative paragraph 8 of its resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council containing an account of the preparatory work for the implementation of the proposals referred to in paragraph 28 of his report of 26 March 1993 (S/25479) and detailed proposals for the implementation of the peace plan, including arrangements for the effective international control of heavy weapons, based inter alia on consultations with Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements. The following report outlines the preparatory activities undertaken by the Secretary-General in regard to the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

II. PREPARATION OF MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS

2. The agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is reproduced as Annex IV to Security Council document S/25479 includes a wide range of measures requiring the deployment of additional peace-keeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These measures include the cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the restoration of infrastructure, the opening of routes, the separation of forces, the demilitarization of Sarajevo, the monitoring of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the return of forces to designated provinces.



Yugoslavia
Min. Gen. Sec.

Meeting with the Secretary-General of NATO
Dr. Manfred Wörner
22 April 1993

Talking points for the Secretary-General

United Nations - NATO Cooperation in the former Yugoslavia

"No Fly" Zone

1. At noon GMT on 12 April, the enforcement regime to ensure compliance with the ban on all flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina came into effect. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 816 (1993), Member States acting nationally or through regional arrangements under the authority of the Council and in close consultation with the Secretary-General are taking all necessary measures to enforce the "No-Fly" Zone. In a very cooperative dialogue which began in December 1992, NATO, UNPROFOR and the Secretariat worked out the rules of engagement, communications liaison arrangements and reporting procedures that meet the requirements of the resolution. NATO members France, the Netherlands and the United States have made available some 75 aircraft which are flying three orbits of combat air patrols over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. In addition to the above, Turkey and the United Kingdom have offered to participate in the enforcement. During the consultations with NATO and in talks with the Permanent Representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Secretariat at several occasions made it clear that while it was not for the Secretary-General to determine the participants, the contribution of Turkey or other states with a special interest could seriously jeopardize the credibility and impartiality of the operation. Greece and the Russian Federation already have raised serious reservations in this regard.
3. The Permanent Five in a meeting with Messrs. Annan and Gharekhan on Tuesday, 20 April, expressed the view that the matter preferably be resolved within NATO. France expressed concerns for the security of its troops on the ground if Turkey were to participate. Should Turkey insist on its participation, the matter would inevitably have to be raised in the Council. In this case, France and the Russian Federation, and possibly others, would raise their objections. The Secretary-General may wish to acknowledge the difficulties for NATO as an organization to exclude one of its Members from the operation. Nevertheless, the participation of Turkey could create unnecessary political problems for an otherwise widely supported operation. Taking into account the security of UNPROFOR and in order not to jeopardize NATO's acceptability in future joint arrangements with the United Nations, Secretary-General Wörner could be asked to use his influence to dissuade Turkey from direct participation in the enforcement operation.

4. During the earlier consultations with NATO, UNPROFOR requested the deployment of 26 NATO communications liaison teams in order to establish a real-time link at the battalion level and to improve the security of UNPROFOR personnel on the ground. At the time, NATO had been looking favourably into the deployment of Forward Air Control Teams needed to closely coordinate close air-to-ground support. Since resolution 816 (1993) excludes air-to-ground enforcement activities, NATO, pointing to mandate problems, did not pursue the matter further. This mandate problem would not, however, apply to the purely communications liaison teams now being sought. UNPROFOR is therefore disappointed and concerned that NATO has not yet responded to this need although the request has been reiterated on several occasions. The Secretary-General may wish to recall UNPROFOR's request and underline that these communications teams are essential for UNPROFOR's security.

Implementation of Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina

5. Since late 1992, NATO has been undertaking preliminary studies on the military requirements for the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan. Several informal meetings have been held between NATO teams, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and UNPROFOR. In these meetings, the NATO representatives have made it clear that NATO would only participate as part of a United Nations operation. There are no objections to the concept of appointing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would control the entire operation. However, NATO would insist on nominating the theatre commander who would exercise tactical control and also control the out-of-theatre air and sea assets. This NATO core could be augmented by troops from non-NATO countries, such as the Russian Federation. According to most recent NATO estimates, up to 75,000 troops would be required to implement the military tasks envisaged in the Plan. NATO would only become involved in an implementation operation if all three parties signed the Vance-Owen Plan. Even then, there are indications that NATO has not been able to identify a sufficient number of troop contributors, and that it would wish to include Member States who would not be acceptable in UN peace-keeping terms, such as Italy and Turkey.

6. With the adoption of Security Council resolution 820 (1993) which imposes stricter sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Secretary-General also was given an official mandate to consult with Member States acting through regional arrangements on the preparatory work for the implementation of the plan. Since the Secretary-General is required to report to the Council on these preparations, he may wish to request a summary of NATO's preparatory activities. He may further wish to seek information as to whether NATO will be able to muster sufficient troops for the implementation of the

Vance-Owen Plan without including neighbouring states or states with a special interest.

General Cooperation in the field of Peace-keeping

7. On 15 March, the North Atlantic Council approved a conceptual paper on future cooperation in peace-keeping. The paper envisages NATO's involvement in operations under the umbrella of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Secretary-General may wish to welcome this development and offer to share the United Nations experience in this field. He may also wish to suggest that NATO establish a small liaison presence at one of its member missions in New York to improve communications on the increasing number of issues on which the two organizations are cooperating.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
DEVELOPMENTS AS AT 20 APRIL 1993

INTRODUCTION

The main recent developments have included:

- The admission of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as a Member of the United Nations.
- The signing of an Agreement which, if confirmed by the Krajina Serbs, would lead to implementation of Security Council resolutions 802 and 807 on the situation in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia.
- In respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
 - The adoption of Security Council resolution 816 authorizing enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (implementation of which began on 12 April).
 - The adoption of Security Council resolution 820 providing for strengthened sanctions, which will come into force on 26 April.
 - The adoption of several recent statements in the Security Council reacting to urgent humanitarian situations. Resolution 819 declaring Srebrenica a safe area was particularly significant.
 - The achievement of 10 out of 12 signatures to the four agreements that constitute the peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina put forward by the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference.

Whether these developments lead to the achievement and consolidation of peace now seems to depend upon the following factors:

- The forcefulness with which the international community acts to implement the peace plan.
- The outcome of the political struggle in Moscow and its impact on the attitude of the Bosnian Serbs.
- The calculations of the Government in Belgrade: whether to tough it out even in the face of possible additional sanctions or to change course vis-a-vis its territorial ambitions in the Serb parts of Croatia and Bosnia.

- 2 -

I. ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

By its resolution 816, adopted on 31 March, the Security Council authorized Member States, seven days after the adoption of the resolution, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance with the ban on flights, and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the flights.

NATO planes began to patrol the skies of Bosnia and Herzegovina with effect from Monday, 12 April.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE PLAN FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 17 April, the Security Council adopted resolution 820 commending the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina and declaring its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist the parties in its effective implementation once it has been agreed by all of them. The Security Council ordered stringent new sanctions, which will take effect on 26 April. The resolution requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council if possible within 15 days a report on the preparatory work for the establishment of an international human rights monitoring mission and a boundary commission in relation to the provincial boundaries. The Secretary-General is also requested to provide detailed proposals for the implementation of the peace plan, including international control of heavy weapons. The resolution encourages Member States, acting individually or regionally, to cooperate with the Secretary-General in implementing the peace plan.

On Monday, 19 April, the Security Council began a general debate on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Non-Aligned caucus in the Security Council has circulated a draft resolution that would authorize Member States, pursuant to Article 51, to provide all necessary assistance to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enable it to resist and defend the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbian attacks.

- 3 -

III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 802 AND 807 REGARDING THE SITUATION IN CROATIA

In its resolution 802, adopted on 25 January in the wake of the 22 January military incursion by Croatia into part of a Pink Zone and a UNPA around the Maslenica Bridge, the Security Council demanded the immediate cessation of hostile activities by Croatian armed forces and the withdrawal of the Croatian armed forces from these areas. The Security Council also demanded that the heavy weapons seized by the Serbs from the UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas in the wake of the Croatian incursion be returned immediately to UNPROFOR.

By its resolution 807, of 19 February, the Security Council reiterated these demands and urged the parties and others concerned fully to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen in discussions to ensure full implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping mandate in Croatia.

At the conclusion of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen from mid-February, successively in New York, Geneva, Zagreb, Belgrade, New York and Geneva, on 6 April, an Agreement in Implementation of Security Council Resolution 802 (1993) was signed by a representative of the Croatian Government and a representative of the Serb local authorities. The Agreement provides for a cessation of hostilities four days after its entry into force. Within five days of the cessation of hostilities, the Croatian armed forces should start returning to the lines of confrontation existing before the outbreak of hostilities on 22 January and complete this return within a further five days. In parallel to the withdrawal of the Croatian Government armed forces, all Serb heavy weapons (i.e., not only those seized from UNPROFOR control after 22 January) are to be placed under the supervision of UNPROFOR in accordance with the Vance Plan. Maslenica Bridge, Zemunik Airport and Peruca Dam are to be placed under complete UNPROFOR control for the purpose of restoring them to general civilian use.

By the Agreement the parties undertake to commence talks under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen, no later than 15 days after its entry into force (i.e., just after the completion of implementation of the military provisions), and to implement the remaining provisions of the Vance Plan and of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 762 (1992).

The Agreement will enter into force when both parties have assured the Co-Chairmen that neither of them will station any police within any area from which Croatian Government armed forces withdraw; in those areas, UNPROFOR shall for the time being exclusively fulfil all police functions. The Croatians orally gave that assurance at the time of signature; the Serb

- 4 -

assurance requires the approval of their Assembly. The Assembly was scheduled to meet on 13 April, but then postponed its meeting to 20 April. On 20 April, it discussed the matter and decided to continue its deliberations on 24 April.

IV. SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN MACEDONIA AND GREECE

On 8 April, the General Assembly admitted the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as a Member of the United Nations. In its resolution recommending admission, the Security Council noted that a difference had arisen over the name of the State, which needed to be resolved in the interest of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region. It welcomed the readiness of the Co-Chairmen, at the request of the Secretary-General, to use their good offices to settle the difference and to promote confidence-building measures among the parties (Macedonia and Greece). The Security Council urged the parties to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen.

On 12 April, the Co-Chairmen wrote to the Secretary-General confirming their intention to help settle the difference between Greece and Macedonia and to report to the Secretary-General within two months at the latest.

The Co-Chairmen began talks with the parties at United Nations Headquarters on 12 April, meeting separately with their two delegations. They met in the morning first with the delegation from Greece, and then with the delegation from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the afternoon they met again, first with the Macedonian delegation and then with the Greek delegation. The discussions have as their objective the conclusion of a treaty between the two parties which would resolve their differences and would also provide for cooperation and confidence-building measures. The following items have been identified by the Co-Chairmen for discussion:

- The name of Macedonia.
- The Macedonian flag.
- Addressing Greek concerns with respect to the preamble, articles 3 and 49 of the Macedonian Constitution (Greece seeks to have these amended).
- The designation of coordinators/focal points to address potential problems in their bilateral relationships.
- Access to the sea.
- Transit and transshipment.

- 5 -

- Visas and work permits.
- Other confidence-building measures.

Technical discussions have been held with the legal advisers of the two sides and a draft treaty is being prepared for discussion with the two delegations at United Nations Headquarters, beginning on 26 April.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25651
22 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 APRIL 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I am referring to the letter of 21 April 1993 by the Bosnian Ambassador, Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, to Your Excellency, in which once again an attempt was made to put the blame on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for the new outburst of killings and ethnic cleansing between Muslims and Croats by invoking a non-existing outside aggression. It is to be regretted that yet another call was launched for lifting of arms embargo at the time when the international community is intensifying the efforts for bringing peace to the suffering peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The statement by the President of the Security Council on the outbreak of atrocities and killings between Muslims and Croats of 21 April, and its substance, cannot be sidetracked by the introduction of untrue statements and additional formulations at the expense of the Serbian people, however fashionable it might seem at the moment. Peace could only be achieved by peaceful means and negotiations, not by one-sided pressure and force.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Yugoslavia



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25648
22 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 APRIL 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning Security Council resolution 815 (1993) on the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has repeatedly stated that it supports the Vance plan and that in view of the safety and the security of the Serbs in parts of the territory of the former SFR of Yugoslavia, it is necessary to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for a longer period of time - at least one year.

Even though the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supports the extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR, as contained in Security Council resolution 815 (1993), we consider that some of its provisions are unacceptable, being contrary to the Vance plan, particularly those contained in the second preambular paragraph and paragraph 5.

The unresolved status of Krajina, which is being considered within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, was the main reason that, at the request of Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR was deployed in the present areas. The provisions contained in the above-mentioned paragraphs create possibilities for arbitrary assessment of the objectives of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and consequently of the mandate of UNPROFOR. Such provisions prejudge the overall political settlement and the final outcome of the Conference, being therefore unacceptable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

NB/

World Conf. H. Rights
Macedonia }
Yugoslavia (p.1)

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
CABINET DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL




21 April 1993

Dear General Wahlgren,

The Secretary-General would be grateful if you could arrange for the enclosed invitation to the World Conference on Human Rights to be delivered to the Acting Minister for Foreign Relations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in Skopje. A Permanent Mission has not yet been established in New York.

with warm regards

Yours sincerely,


Jean-Claude Aïmé
Chief of Staff

Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren
Force Commander
UNPROFOR
Zagreb


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UNITED NATIONS



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NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR



TO:
A:

Mr. Jean-Claude Aimé
Chief of Staff
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

DATE: 20 April 1993

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

FROM:
DE:

Benon Sevan
Assistant Secretary-General
Department of Political Affairs

SUBJECT:
OBJET:

Report of Activities in Security Council
Subsidiary Organs

per
Sevan

..... Attached please find for the information of the Secretary-General a summary and assessment of the proceedings of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia at its 62nd meeting on 20 April 1993.



cc. Mr. Goulding

20 April 1993

62nd Meeting, Tuesday, 20 April 1993
Summary and Assessment

1. The meeting was held exclusively for the purpose of seeing Ambassador A. Napolitano, EC/CSCE Coordinator for the implementation of sanctions against the former Yugoslavia and Dr. Richard Vork, Director of the Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre (SAMCOMM) in Brussels, both on a working visit to New York.

2. Amb. Napolitano apprised the Committee of the mandate and tasks (list attached) stemming out of his post, established this February. He shared with the members some observations from the activities he has undertaken since then. He stressed that in case of the former Yugoslavia the international community created for the first time a somewhat comprehensive mechanism when sanctions, after being imposed, are actively monitored - with the 724 Committee "at the political centre" - and enforced on the ground by international staff. It was clear from the presentation that his staff (to be increased from 71 to 174 officers, who are now deployed in seven countries) is currently in preparation for implementation of new measures, envisaged by Security Council resolution 820 (1993) against the FRY.

3. In the opinion of the Coordinator, the mere scope of the sanctions does require more coordination and interlink between the Committee and EC/CSCE sanctions structures. He suggested to this end that his office provide the secretariat of the Committee, at no cost to the UN, with necessary hardware and software so as to link it with a satellite-based communications computer network, which exists between SAMCOMM and Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) in the field. This idea was in principle approved by the Committee, provided its secretariat properly clears it, as prescribed under the relevant UN administration procedures.

4. Underlining the need for more interaction with the Committee and its secretariat, the Coordinator expressed his desire to invite the Committee Chairman and/or the Committee secretary to participate in the next meeting of a sanctions liaison-group to take place in Vienna this coming May (group discusses practical issues to be taken care of by the relevant European bodies and national enforcement agencies with regard to the implementation of the sanctions). He also raised a suggestion that one SAMCOMM

officer could be posted to the Committee's secretariat and one UN staff member to SAMCOMM in Brussels for specified periods of time for better coordination.

5. Dr. Vork informed the Committee that there are two major problems SAMCOMM and SAMs (established in October 1992) face in their efforts to increase the effectiveness of the sanctions, namely, diversion of goods and commodities to the FRY and forgery of the Committee documentation. The new problem, which will have to be addressed under resolution 820 (1993), are FRY-owned funds abroad and money flow in general. SAMCOMM Director was of the view that the existing procedures to authorize transshipments through the FRY have to be amended. Accordingly, the members authorized the secretariat to conduct working consultations with SAMCOMM, in the framework of their request at the same meeting that the secretariat prepare and submit to the Committee draft revised Guidelines, as necessitated by resolution 820 (1993).

6. Both the Coordinator and Director of SAMCOMM stated their unreserved satisfaction with the work of the Committee secretariat (in fact, they did not hide their amazement after having found out that the Committee has only four professionals working for it).

7. The United Kingdom, Hungary, the United States, Brazil and New Zealand praised the efforts of the Coordinator and SAMCOMM and were supportive of the need to have more link and coordination with them. Brazil drew the attention of the guests to the need to ensure that SAMs' activities would be in strict accordance with the Security Council resolutions and the Committee's Guidelines. Hungary indicated its unhappiness with some of the recent procedures, initiated by SAM Romania on the Danube, which, if implemented, would confine it to receive only one seventh of the amount of iron ore the country needs.

8. The importance of the meeting lies in the fact that it has established from now on a formal relationship between the Committee and the relevant European structures dealing with sanctions. It was agreed that the Coordinator and SAMCOMM would provide the Committee, on a monthly and weekly basis respectively, with situation reports concerning the implementation of the sanctions. Issues of accepting SAMCOMM hardware, of its subsequent link to the SAMCOMM computer network and of a despatch of one or two Committee staff members to the next meeting of the sanctions liaison-group, as specified above, seem to require necessary action.

**TASKS OF AMBASSADOR NAPOLITANO, EC/CSCE COORDINATOR FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

- To oversee the sanctions, in order to assess the application and the effects of the measures presently in force, and to suggest ways to improve their effectiveness;
- To provide the countries of the Region with the necessary advice and assistance;
- To provide legal advice, in order to enable bordering States and other States to fully enact their respective legislations, and, if necessary, to recommend new legislative measures;
- To establish a communication network with and among the monitoring missions, in order to assess their effectiveness and make proposals for their activities;
- To draw attention and to hold consultations with the bordering States and other States on the specific measures to adopt in order to improve the implementation of sanctions;
- To bring to the attention of the CSCE, as well as of the Sanctions Committee of the U.N, and other concerned States, cases of violations or suspected violations;
- To consult with concerned Governments on the investigations and on the reactions to ascertained violations of the sanctions;
- To report, if requested, to the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials, the Vienna Working Group, the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee, the Co-Presidents of the Geneva Conference, the EC Presidency, and other relevant Organizations;
- To chair the Vienna meetings of the CSCE Liaison Group.

Ukraine
Yugoslavia

S



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25636
20 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith, the text of the Appeal by the employees of the Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company addressed to you in connection with the special economic problems arising from the carrying out by Ukraine of the Security Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (see annex).

I kindly request Your Excellency to have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Victor H. BATIOUK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

200493

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Appeal

The sailors and other employees of the Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company have great respect for the United Nations and the Secretary-General.

The highly complex problems facing our company - the largest Ukrainian shipping company on the Danube - and the huge economic losses that it is incurring as a result of the tightening of the embargo against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have prompted us to make this Appeal.

Since the sanctions went into effect, the Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company has not once violated the embargo. Security Council resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) are being strictly implemented, a fact that can be attested by representatives of United Nations missions in Ukraine and other countries of the Danube.

While we support the decisions of the international community, we believe that the application of sanctions against one country should not result in heavy economic losses and moral suffering for other countries.

As a result of the increasingly stringent measures and the imperfect regulating and monitoring mechanism, our company's fleet has virtually halted its commercial shipping on the Danube. Ukrainian export and import shipping on the Danube in bilateral trade with Hungary, Slovakia, Austria and Germany are paralysed. Also paralysed is our company's traditional transport of cargo in transit from the aforementioned countries to ports of the Mediterranean and Red Seas, India and South-East Asia.

Our cruise line operating on the Danube "from the Alps to the Black Sea", which for 30 years has been popular among Europeans and Americans, has been halted.

Because of shipping delays, losses have been incurred not only by our foreign partners but by suppliers - Ukrainian metallurgical combines and coal mines.

The economic losses - both actual and those which will be incurred by the end of 1993 - from the halting of shipping on the Danube are estimated at US\$ 350 million. The current idleness of our fleet is leading to the bankruptcy of the company, whose fixed assets total over US\$ 2 billion, unemployment and the loss of livelihood for the 250,000 employees of the company and the more than 100,000 members of their families.

In the light of the foregoing, we demand compensation for our losses.

In its efforts to find optimal arrangements for implementing United Nations resolutions, our company has, on more than one occasion, initiated multilateral meetings with all interested parties. In the port of Izmail, the conditions necessary for the work of the United Nations mission were created.

/...

Unfortunately, all our hopes that it would be possible to ensure normal work on the Danube, under the supervision of the mission, have not been met.

The Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company urgently appeals to you to provide assistance, within the shortest possible time, in elaborating a rational and efficient mechanism for monitoring cargo in transit along the Danube through Yugoslav waters, and effectively coordinate the actions undertaken by all representatives of United Nations missions.

We sincerely hope that all countries Members of the United Nations will understand the extremely complicated situation in which the Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company finds itself as a result of the application and tightening of the sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

This Appeal was adopted at a collective meeting of the sailors and other employees of the Ukrainian Shipping Company on 13 April 1993.

(Signed) A. F. TEKHOV
General Director of the Ukrainian
Danube Shipping Company



Security Council

Yugoslavia
Distr.
GENERAL

S/24900/Add.37
20 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 19 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council and, in accordance with operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 816 (1993), has the honour to bring to his attention further information received by UNPROFOR regarding apparent violations of the ban on flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Between 15 and 18 April 1993, there appears to have been one flight of rotary-wing in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those exempted in accordance with operative paragraph 1 of resolution 816 (1993) or approved by UNPROFOR in accordance with operative paragraph 2 of that resolution. Details as to the itinerary of these flights are annexed to the present note verbale.

200493

ANNEX
**INFORMATION ON FLIGHTS IN THE AIRSPACE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA NOT AUTHORIZED BY
THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE**

(15 - 18 April 1993)

SRL	DATE	START	END	REMARKS	HEADING SPEED ALT.
521	15 Apr	10.50	n/a	AWACS detected an aircraft 5 nautical miles North of Banja Luka heading South. A flight of Dutch F-16s in the Northern cap also detected the track at the same position. The track faded from AWACS and the F-16 radar coverage, soon after initial contact. This track was assessed as a probable helicopter and was in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	South Slow Low
				[16 - 18 April: no violations reported]	



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25643
20 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1993* FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The President, the Prime Minister and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations have recently sent letters to the President of the Security Council in which they have arbitrarily, and without any evidence, accused Yugoslavia, the Serbian side and some leaders for events that have not taken place or for acts that have not been committed by them.

The fact that Croatia is increasingly resorting to such practice precisely at this moment - which is characteristic of its overall behaviour but which is not fitting in international diplomatic practice - and that this is done by its highest representatives can be understood only in the light of two elements. First, Croatia has no arguments to justify its aggression against the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), sector South, its continued armed provocations in sector North, its attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the border with Montenegro and its military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, Croatia has launched a propaganda offensive in order to cover up and warrant preparations for a major aggression against the territories of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Srpska and possibly against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In this context, I wish to call your attention to some of the facts.

In his letter dated 19 March 1993 to the President of the Security Council, the Croatian Prime Minister did not deny at all the true and substantiated information on armed attacks by Croatian troops against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on its border with Montenegro. The UNPROFOR monitors and their headquarters have received full information about these incidents. Therefore, he has used the old divide et impera trickery by mentioning the alleged differences of opinion among representatives of Montenegro, Serbia, the federal authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Army of Yugoslavia. The objective is to lead the international public to believe in the absence of unity in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e. in the aggressiveness of the highest federal authorities and the Army of Yugoslavia, allegedly dominated by Serbs.

* Received by the Secretariat on 20 April 1993.

Regarding the letter from the Croatian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in which he referred to an alleged interview by Col. Stojan Spanovic to the Slovene daily Delo on 22 March 1993, I have to recall that Col. Spanovic denied that he had ever been interviewed by any of its journalists. It is a sheer fabrication, unfortunately also referred to by Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman himself in his letter to the President of the Council dated 24 March 1993 (S/25468, annex).

President Tudjman's main intention is to persuade international factors that an aggression is under way in Croatia and that "the Belgrade authorities are involved" in it, and to urge an emergency Security Council meeting. In doing so, Croatia is clearly counting on a benevolent attitude of the Security Council and of some other international factors towards its past behaviour in flagrant violation of its decisions.

The reality, however, is quite the opposite. The Croatian aggression in sector South began on 22 January and is still on, and Security Council resolution 802 (1993) has not been implemented to date. The position taken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been clear and consistent. We have never taken and will never take steps that would disrupt the peace process and undermine the activities of the United Nations, although Croatia has flagrantly violated the Vance plan and all the commitments under this peace-keeping plan.

As I said earlier, the whole propaganda "scam" of the Croatian side is designed to play low key on their true intentions, namely on a massive offensive on the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the Republic of Srpska and on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We are in possession of credible information that Croatia has been amassing 50,000 troops or 15 brigades, in addition to five 15,000-strong brigades already engaged in the aggression in sector South, for its attack on the areas under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia.

Taking into account that Croatia has 45,000 to 50,000 regular troops in former Bosnia and Herzegovina, that Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegović recently signed a military agreement, that President Tudjman said that "the lost territories must be regained by force", as well as the statements by the Croatian soldiers who defected and some specific preparations that have been speedily undertaken, it is beyond doubt that both Croatia and the Croat-Muslim coalition in former Bosnia and Herzegovina are preparing for a massive aggression and an all-out war. Lt. General Lars-Eric Waahlgren, Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), has been more fully informed about the deployment and preparation of the Croatian forces.

I deplore that some Council documents and recent moves by other international factors have not helped bring about an end to war and a peaceful settlement of the problems in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but objectively bring in force and encourage the Republic of Croatia and the Muslim forces loyal to Alija Izetbegović to impose their will upon the Serb people by force. They ignore that the use of force is not the way to achieve a just solution to the problem and to ensure a lasting peace in this region. I am confident therefore that the Council will not fail to take urgent steps to make it clear to all factors concerned, in particular

the parties to the conflict, that the world Organization can only mediate a negotiated and peaceful settlement of problems.

Continuing to show great respect for the authority of the United Nations and for its Security Council, I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Council and have it circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Ukraine
Yugoslavia

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25630
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, the text of the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine dated 17 April 1993 addressed to you in connection with the special economic problems arising from the carrying out by Ukraine of the Security Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (see annex).

I kindly request Your Excellency to have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Victor H. BATIOUK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Annex

Letter dated 17 April 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine addressed to the President of the Security Council

I avail myself of this opportunity to sincerely congratulate you on the occasion of your being elected to the high post of President of the Security Council and express confidence that your broad international experience and high authority will provide new positive impetus to further enhancement of the constructive role played by the Security Council in the primary activity of the United Nations in safeguarding sound foundations of reliable peace and stability, development of friendly relations between all the States, promotion of universal process of mutual understanding among peoples of the world.

Being an original State Member of the United Nations, Ukraine has always offered substantial support to the United Nations mediatory and peace-keeping efforts aimed at settling dangerous conflicts in various regions of the planet.

This is confirmed by our country's active participation in the difficult process of peaceful settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, which has grave destabilizing consequences for all the countries of Europe. As it was noted in the letter of the President of Ukraine, Mr. Leonid Kravchuk, to the United Nations Secretary-General of 22 March 1993, "Ukraine considers the United Nations sanctions to be an integral part of the international efforts towards peaceful settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and confirms its resolve to strictly observe them".

During my recent visit to New York, I had substantial conversations at United Nations Headquarters with H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador T. O'Brien, your predecessor in the post of President of the Security Council, and Ambassador R. Sardenberg, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee on Sanctions against Yugoslavia, on that matter. As it might be known, particular issues concerning the possibility of reimbursement of Ukraine's heavy losses arising from its strict imposition of the United Nations sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, were discussed, inter alia, at these meetings.

Allow me, Mr. President, kindly to draw your attention to the fact that considering the present grave situation of the Ukrainian economy caused by well-known negative processes of the transitional period, the issue of reimbursement to Ukraine of the losses arising from enforcement of the United Nations sanctions against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia closely borders by now on the problem of protection of our economic sovereignty. It could also be added that in case of a possible further broadening of the United Nations sanctions regime against Yugoslavia, which has been recently insisted upon by some countries, the international trade lane by the Danube, vitally crucial for further build-up of Ukraine's state independence, will be practically blocked.

All this makes us file an urgent request with Your Excellency to raise as soon as possible for the consideration of the Security Council the issue concerning practical ways of implementation of Article 50 of the Charter in

order to use most promptly the international mechanism of compensation of losses to the States monitoring the implementation of sanctions, including Ukraine. At the same time, we deem it expedient that a simpler procedure of obtaining authorization letters for transshipment by the Danube be considered and that compulsory coordination with the Danube States of any issue concerning expansion of the list of articles, which need permission from the United Nations Security Council Committee on Sanctions for transit, be introduced.

The factor of considerable economic losses suffered by Ukraine because of its observance of the sanctions should, to our mind, be taken into account by other States Members of the United Nations in their relations with Ukraine, as well as by the United Nations in assessing Ukraine's contribution to the United Nations regular budget as well as for financing the United Nations peace-keeping forces.

We suppose that the system of sanctions itself should be more logical and streamlined, while economic losses arising from its enforcement should be equally distributed among the most developed Member States.

I hope, Mr. President, that Ukraine will receive your understanding and support in these important issues.

A. Zlenko
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Ukraine

UNITED NATIONS
COMM CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА КРАЈИНА

The Republic of Serbian Krajina
Ministarstvo za inostrane poslove
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

FSM 7518-04

Cable Address
FAX No:
TEL No:

1993 APR 19 P 12:13

Yugoslavia

Terazije 3/1
11000 BEOGRAD
S.R. YUGOSLAVIA
Beograd

19-04

No. 520/93

19.04.1993.

cc: Mr. Gouldin
cc: Mr. [unclear]
cc: JCA/ASMr. BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI
SECRETARY GENERAL
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

Your Excellency,

The untenable intentions of the Republic of Croatia to annex the Republic of Serbian Krajina are drawn from the fact that in the past the Serbian people have always been free from any Croatian political movement.

When the federal units of the former Yugoslavia were created in 1944. and 1945., the Serbs of the present Republic of Serbian Krajina consented on March 21, 1945, at their Congress in Šibenik to the administrative frontiers of Croatia, since these frontiers, according to the Constitution, did not dissipate the unity of the Serbian people in the Yugoslav Federation.

Since all archives centers for the Republic of Serbian Krajina are on the territory of the present Croatia, we are not in a position to transmit the minutes and decisions of the Serbian people from the mentioned Congress.

However, a sufficient document is the newspaper article of that Congress, printed in "Slobodnoj Vojvodini" ("Liberated Vojvodina") in Novi Sad, No. 120 of March 22, 1945, which states:

"THE FRONTIERS OF THE FEDERAL UNITS OF YUGOSLAVIA
DO NOT DISSIPATE THE INTEGRAL UNITY OF THE
SERBIAN PEOPLE".

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- 2 -

At the consultations of the Serbs in Šibenik of March 21, 1945, it was decided:

"The consultations of Serbs from all areas of Dalmatia were held on February 28, 1945, where the following decisions were rendered:

ARTICLE No. 2: The Decision of AVNOJ regarding the constitutional settlement of Yugoslavia on the federal basis and the Decision of ZAVNOH pertaining to the equality of Serbs and Croats, are tremendous attainments of the National Freedom Movement, which give full guarantees that the Serbs will have all possibilities of unhindered national development, regardless of the fact in which federal units they lived. These decisions also guarantee the Serbs total national unity, since the frontiers of the federal units do not dissipate the integral unity of the Serbian people.

Thus constitutionally arranged, a Yugoslavia, where each Yugoslav national group will have full possibilities for national life, will be more unified, and existing in accord than ever before, since its foundations will rest on the satisfaction and equality of its national entities.

ARTICLE No. 6: Acknowledgement is rendered to the Serbian klub of representatives in the ZAVNOH regarding their current endeavours, acknowledgements being emphasised in the rendering of decisions pertaining to the dissolution of acts of religious conversion of Serbs, to the equality in the use of the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, to the publishing of the Cyrillic Reader for elementary schools, to the founding of the Serbian Cultural Society "PROSVJETA", and the Serbian Choir Society "OBILIĆ".

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- 3 -

ARTICLE No. 7: Acquiescing to the necessity of creating a wider political organisation of Serbs in Croatia, the delegates have accepted the creation of a Main Committee of Serbs which will enter into the JNOF of Croatia, while the Initiative Committee will have the task of urgently organizing the preparations of a Congress of Serbs from all parts of Croatia, which will elect an Executive Committee of Serbs in Croatia".

"INDEPENDANT VOJVODINA"

No.120, Year IV,

Novi Sad,

March 22, 1945.



Yours sincerely,

Slobodan Jarčević

Slobodan Jarčević
Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Republic
of Serbian Krajina

19 April 1993

20/4
Yugoslavia
Bosnia

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN FOR CYRUS VANCE AND LORD OWEN

Fred Eckhard, spokesman for Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, this afternoon informed correspondents that Mr. Vance had cut short his vacation after two and a half days to return to New York for Security Council deliberations on Saturday evening, 17 April.

Mr. Vance and Lord Owen had welcomed the adoption of a resolution calling for economic sanctions, which they had been advocating for some time, Mr. Eckhard continued. Mr. Vance had spoken at the Council meeting on Saturday night and copies of his statement had been circulated to correspondents.

Mr. Vance had been in contact today with the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, who was visiting Washington, D.C. They planned to meet late tomorrow, 20 April, in New York. Mr. Eckhard noted that since he would be in Geneva tomorrow, Joe Sills would provide correspondents with information on the meeting.

Regarding Lord Owen's itinerary in Europe, Mr. Eckhard said the Co-Chairman was in Geneva today and would be leaving for the former Yugoslavia on Wednesday morning, 21 April. He had added Zagreb to his itinerary and would remain in the region through the weekend. Lord Owen would be in Zagreb on Wednesday and would then travel to Belgrade. He would be in Skopje on Thursday, 22 April, and in Athens late Thursday and Friday, 22 and 23 April.

Lord Owen's plans for the weekend remained open, Mr. Eckhard said. He would meet any party that indicated it was prepared to discuss the Vance-Owen peace plan -- particularly the Bosnian Serbs -- in the letter and spirit of the Constitutional Principles it had signed onto. The latter point was important since the Co-Chairmen had felt the Bosnian Serbs had not approached the last round of talks in that spirit. Their stance had seemed posited on the preservation of the Serb republic, which was not consistent with the Constitutional Principles.

On other matters, Mr. Eckhard reported that the Co-Chairmen were concerned about reports of fighting between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat troops, who were nominally allied in the civil war against the Serbs. The fighting had taken place around Vitez in central Bosnia. The Co-Chairmen had been informed that the Bosnian Croat military leader, Mate Boban, and the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, had agreed to a cease-fire. The Co-Chairmen's military liaison officer with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had indicated that the situation had calmed down as of yesterday and "the cease-fire seems to be taking hold".

With regard to the situation in Krajina, Mr. Eckhard said the Co-Chairmen had been informed that the Krajina Serbs would convene an assembly tomorrow to

(more)

debate final approval of a tentative agreement signed in New York nearly two weeks ago with the Croatian Government. If implemented, the agreement would result in the withdrawal of Croatian forces from areas occupied after 22 January and the return of Serb heavy weapons to UNPROFOR storage depots.

According to the agreement, no Serb or Croatian armed forces could occupy the areas from which the Croatian forces would withdraw, Mr. Eckhard continued. Only UNPROFOR would be allowed to patrol those areas. Most important, within 15 days of its approval, the agreement called for discussion of the full implementation of the Vance-Owen plan, which had been frustrated in the area of demilitarization of the protected areas of Croatia.

A correspondent said there had been a report on Saturday, before the sanctions resolution was passed, that Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serb community, had said he would return to the negotiations. Did Mr. Eckhard know anything more about that? "The door is always open", Mr. Eckhard replied. He emphasized that talks could only be productive if they were undertaken in the spirit of the Constitutional Principles. The Co-Chairmen were ready to talk to Dr. Karadzic whenever he was ready "to talk seriously".

Asked why Lord Owen was going to Belgrade, Mr. Eckhard reminded correspondents that the trip had originally been planned in connection with the talks between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That was still the core of the trip and the reason Lord Owen would be in Skopje and Athens. However, given the changing state of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the status of the Vance-Owen peace plan and the actions taken by the Council, Lord Owen had thought it might be helpful if he could touch base with parties in both Zagreb and Belgrade.

A correspondent inquired what the Co-Chairmen's views were on strengthening the UNPROFOR mandate, particularly in Srebrenica. Mr. Eckhard replied that he had no guidance on that question.

Mr. Eckhard noted that Mr. Vance's successor as Co-Chairman, Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway, would assume his office on Monday, 3 May. He would arrive in New York a few days prior to that for consultations with Mr. Vance.

* * * * *



General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/155
S/25627
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 79 of the preliminary list*
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 18 April 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding recently adopted Security Council resolutions 819 (1993) and 820 (1993) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 79 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Statement of 18 April 1993 by the Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding Security
Council resolutions 819 (1993) and 820 (1993)

At its today's session, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has considered the latest activities in the wake of the adoption of the Security Council resolutions concerning Srebrenica and the tightening of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia notes with regret that the Security Council, bowing to the pressure of some of its members and under the influence of one-sided information, decided to step up the pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In doing so, it has disregarded the reports of UNPROFOR and of the Secretary-General of the world Organization and ignored the information provided by the Serbs from Bosnia. In that way, an inaccurate picture on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is being projected and consequently one-sided resolutions are adopted at an accelerated pace.

The resolution continues to arbitrarily condemn the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for its alleged involvement in the crisis in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it is evident, from the official reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the reports of the UNPROFOR commanders, that for almost a year there is no soldier of the Army of Yugoslavia in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provides humanitarian not military assistance to the Serbs in Bosnia. On the other hand, the Republic of Croatia has been defying the United Nations for a year now, with impunity, by its failure to comply with the demands contained in the Security Council resolution 752 to withdraw its regular armed forces.

An inter-ethnic and civil war is being waged in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that fact has been acknowledged by the international community through the structure of participants in the Geneva Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, this war cannot be ended by finger-pointing at the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and by a hypocritical policy of tightening the sanctions against it.

Ever since the political solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina was first sought and this year in particular, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has invested and is still investing constructive efforts aimed at an immediate and unconditional cessation of military operations and at establishing a just and lasting peace. Such a constructive contribution on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was highly appreciated by many

factors involved in the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the Security Council, in this and other previous resolutions, has totally ignored the positive position of the FR of Yugoslavia by persistently treating it as a party to the conflict that should be punished. Should the Security Council continue to treat Yugoslavia in this way and as a result subject it to more punishment, the question arises whether the further involvement of the FR of Yugoslavia in overcoming the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina can have any meaning.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia particularly wishes to stress that the imposition of sanctions represents a gross violation of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations to all men and women and all nations. The international law does not recognize collective punishment of one nation - of innocent people and children - for political purposes.

An ultimatum deadline given to the Serbs in Bosnia to accept and sign the Vance-Owen peace plan in its entirety runs contrary to the conclusions of the Geneva negotiations and the adopted principles that the agreement would be sought on the basis of consensus of all three constituent peoples and that no solution will be imposed.

The question is now posed - what is the motive behind ignoring the adopted principles - seeking an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina or an alibi for the perpetuation and stepping up of pressure against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with a view to achieving other ends.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remains fully committed to the policy of peace and overcoming the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina by political means, on the basis of equal respect of legitimate rights of all three constituent peoples. In that regard, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue to closely cooperate with the United Nations and its representatives. However, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity if forced to do so.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/820 (1993)
17 April 1993

RESOLUTION 820 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3200th meeting,
on 17 April 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the peace talks held by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (S/25221, S/25248, S/25403 and S/25479),

Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all of the Bosnian parties,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and totally unacceptable, and insisting that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to their former homes,

Reaffirming in this regard its resolution 808 (1993) in which it decided that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report at the earliest possible date,

Deeply alarmed and concerned about the magnitude of the plight of innocent victims of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Expressing its condemnation of all the activities carried out in violation of resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) between the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serb-controlled areas in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Deeply concerned by the position of the Bosnian Serb party as reported in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993 (S/25479),

Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

A

1. Commends the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form agreed to by two of the Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993 (S/25479), namely the Agreement on Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles (annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);

2. Welcomes the fact that this plan has now been accepted in full by two of the Bosnian parties;

3. Expresses its grave concern at the refusal so far of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the Agreement on Interim Arrangements and the provisional provincial map, and calls on that party to accept the peace plan in full;

4. Demands that all parties and others concerned continue to observe the cease-fire and refrain from any further hostilities;

5. Demands full respect for the right of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the international humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access to all areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that all parties, in particular the Bosnian Serb party and others concerned, cooperate fully with them and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel;

6. Condemns once again all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, and reaffirms that those who commit or have committed or order or have ordered the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

7. Reaffirms its endorsement of the principles that all statements or commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to land and property, are wholly null and void and that all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be assisted to do so;

8. Declares its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist the parties in the effective implementation of the peace plan once it has been agreed in full by all the parties, and requests the Secretary-General to

submit to the Council at the earliest possible date, and if possible not later than nine days after the adoption of the present resolution, a report containing an account of the preparatory work for the implementation of the proposals referred to in paragraph 28 of the Secretary-General's report of 26 March 1993 (S/25479) and detailed proposals for the implementation of the peace plan, including arrangements for the effective international control of heavy weapons, based inter alia on consultations with Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements;

9. Encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to cooperate effectively with the Secretary-General in his efforts to assist the parties in implementing the peace plan in accordance with paragraph 8 above;

B

Determined to strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

10. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall, to the extent that they establish obligations beyond those established by its earlier relevant resolutions, come into force nine days after the date of the adoption of the present resolution unless the Secretary-General has reported to the Council that the Bosnian Serb party has joined the other parties in signing the peace plan and in implementing it and that the Bosnian Serbs have ceased their military attacks;

11. Decides further that if, at any time after the submission of the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Bosnian Serbs have renewed their military attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall come into force immediately;

12. Decides that import to, export from and transshipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper authorization from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively;

13. Decides that all States, in implementing the measures imposed by resolutions 757 (1992), 760 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present resolution, shall take steps to prevent diversion to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and products said to be destined for other places, in particular the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces;

/...

14. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR in the fulfilment of its immigration and customs control functions deriving from resolution 769 (1992);

15. Decides that transshipments of commodities and products through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the Danube shall be permitted only if specifically authorized by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) and that each vessel so authorized must be subject to effective monitoring while passing along the Danube between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;

16. Confirms that no vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (c) suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution shall be permitted to pass through installations, including river locks or canals within the territory of Member States, and calls upon the riparian States to ensure that adequate monitoring is provided to all cabotage traffic involving points that are situated between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;

17. Reaffirms the responsibility of riparian States to take necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in accordance with resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present resolution, including any measures under the authority of the Security Council to halt or otherwise control all shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations, to ensure effective monitoring and to ensure strict implementation of the relevant resolutions, and reiterates its request in resolution 787 (1992) to all States, including non-riparian States, to provide, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, such assistance as may be required by the riparian States, notwithstanding the restrictions on navigation set out in the international agreements which apply to the Danube;

18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to the Committee regarding alleged violations of the relevant resolutions, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

19. Reminds States of the importance of strict enforcement of measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, and calls upon them to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the measures imposed by resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present resolution and to impose appropriate penalties;

20. Welcomes the role of the international Sanctions Assistance Missions in support of the implementation of the measures imposed under resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present resolution and the appointment of the Sanctions Coordinator by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and invites the Sanctions Coordinator and the Sanctions Assistance Missions to work in close cooperation with the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

21. Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds derived from property, (a) of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (b) of commercial, industrial or public utility undertakings in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (c) controlled directly or indirectly by such authorities or undertakings or by entities, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by such authorities or undertakings, shall require all persons and entities within their own territories holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and calls on all States to report to the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) on actions taken pursuant to this paragraph;

22. Decides to prohibit the transport of all commodities and products across the land borders or to or from the ports of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the only exceptions being:

(a) The importation of medical supplies and foodstuffs into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as provided for in resolution 757 (1992), in which connection the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) will draw up rules for monitoring to ensure full compliance with this and other relevant resolutions;

(b) The importation of other essential humanitarian supplies into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) approved on a case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

(c) Strictly limited transshipments through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), when authorized on an exceptional basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect transshipment on the Danube in accordance with paragraph 15 above;

23. Decides that each State neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall prevent the passage of all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except at a strictly limited number of road and rail border crossing points, the location of which shall be notified by each neighbouring State to the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) and approved by the Committee;

/...

24. Decides that all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft may be forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that they have been in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution;

25. Decides that all States shall detain pending investigation all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in their territories and suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution, and that, upon a determination that they have been in violation, such vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft shall be impounded and, where appropriate, they and their cargoes may be forfeit to the detaining State;

26. Confirms that States may charge the expense of impounding vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft to their owners;

27. Decides to prohibit the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, to any person or body for purposes of any business carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the only exceptions being telecommunications, postal services, legal services consistent with resolution 757 (1992) and, as approved, on a case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991), services whose supply may be necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes;

28. Decides to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) except when authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) or in case of force majeure;

29. Reaffirms the authority of States acting under paragraph 12 of resolution 787 (1992) to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to enforce the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

30. Confirms that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 29 above, strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions, do not apply to activities related to UNPROFOR, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or the European Community Monitor Mission;

C

Desirous of achieving the full readmittance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the international community once it has fully implemented the relevant resolutions of the Council,

/...

31. Expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian parties have accepted the peace plan and on the basis of verified evidence, provided by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian Serb party is cooperating in good faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review all the measures in the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions with a view to gradually lifting them;

32. Invites all States to consider what contribution they can make to the reconstruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

33. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25619
17 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 APRIL 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With regard to the letter of Mr. M. Sacirbey (S/25529) of 5 April 1993 addressed to Your Excellency, I would like to deny in the strongest terms the malicious allegations contained in the said letter.

Such charges, as well as those that "a convoy of armoured vehicles entered Zeleni Jadar, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the territory of the Republic of Serbia" are shameless fabrications whose sole purpose is to step up the pressure on, and impose new sanctions against, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

It is widely known that the Army of Yugoslavia left the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina almost a year ago and that there is not a single soldier of the Army of Yugoslavia in its territory. Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in no way a party to the civil, inter-ethnic and religious war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25619
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(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/819 (1993)
16 April 1993

RESOLUTION 819 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3199th meeting,
on 16 April 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

Taking note that the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8 April 1993 in the case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) unanimously indicated as a provisional measure that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming its call on the parties and others concerned to observe immediately the cease-fire throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the practice of "ethnic cleansing",

Concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia and in this regard reaffirming that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is unlawful and unacceptable,

Deeply alarmed at the information provided by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 16 April 1993 on the rapid deterioration of the

Bosnia
Yugoslavia
H. Rights (former
Yugoslavia)
S

situation in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, as a result of the continued deliberate armed attacks and shelling of the innocent civilian population by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,

Strongly condemning the deliberate interdiction by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units of humanitarian assistance convoys,

Also strongly condemning the actions taken by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against UNPROFOR, in particular, their refusal to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of UNPROFOR personnel,

Aware that a tragic humanitarian emergency has already developed in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as a direct consequence of the brutal actions of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, forcing the large-scale displacement of civilians, in particular women, children and the elderly,

Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) on the mandate of UNPROFOR and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act;
2. Demands also to that effect the immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica;
3. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings; demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully and promptly with UNPROFOR towards that end; and requests the Secretary-General to report urgently thereon to the Security Council;
5. Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is unlawful and unacceptable;
6. Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of "ethnic cleansing";

7. Reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts shall be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

8. Demands the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and recalls that such impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

9. Urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to use all the resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant resolutions of the Council to reinforce the existing humanitarian operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular Srebrenica and its surroundings;

10. Further demands that all parties guarantee the safety and full freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and of all other United Nations personnel as well as members of humanitarian organizations;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with UNHCR and UNPROFOR, to arrange for the safe transfer of the wounded and ill civilians from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and to urgently report thereon to the Council;

12. Decides to send, as soon as possible, a mission of members of the Security Council to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain the situation and report thereon to the Security Council;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider further steps to achieve a solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council.

16 April 1993

19-4
Yugoslavia
Bosnia

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN FOR CYRUS VANCE AND LORD OWEN

Fred Eckhard, spokesman for Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, this afternoon told correspondents that both Mr. Vance, who is on vacation, and Lord Owen, who is in London, had put themselves at the disposal of the President of the Security Council, in the context of the Council's deliberations on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each was prepared to return to New York, should the President of the Council request it, for the debate currently scheduled for Monday.

Lord Owen had spoken to Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia, a short time ago and had discussed the situation in Srebrenica with him, said Mr. Eckhard. President Milosevic had told Lord Owen that he had spoken with Radovan Karadzic, who informed him that he did not intend to take Srebrenica. Lord Owen had said he would "hold Dr. Karadzic to that pledge".

Lord Owen had added Belgrade to his itinerary for next week, Mr. Eckhard continued. Next week's itinerary was now: Belgrade on Wednesday; Skopje on Thursday; and Athens on Friday. Both Co-Chairmen planned to be back in New York on 26 April for the expected Security Council meeting on the sanctions question. He had mentioned before that Lord Owen had planned to meet with the special envoys, Reginald Bartholomew of the United States and Vitaliy Churkin of the Russian Federation. Lord Owen had met with Ambassador Bartholomew yesterday, but Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin had decided to return to Moscow, so that meeting had not taken place.

A correspondent said the Russian Federation had suggested that the Security Council vote had been postponed until 26 April because they wanted more time to deal with the Bosnian Serbs, yet Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin had returned to Moscow. Why was that? he asked. Mr. Eckhard said the correspondent would have to ask Mr. Churkin about his itinerary and instructions.

Asked why Lord Owen did not take his ideas on "aerial interdiction" directly to the Security Council, Mr. Eckhard said Lord Owen's views had been presented in an article in Foreign Affairs, and his public comments today had put the same ideas in a contemporary context. It was Lord Owen's intention to be in New York on Monday. Perhaps then he would put some of those ideas directly to the Council, if that was agreeable to the Council and the Council President.

A correspondent said that Reuters had quoted Alija Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as saying that if Srebrenica fell, the talks were over. Had President Izetbegovic communicated that idea to the Co-Chairmen? she asked. Mr. Eckhard said not to his knowledge, although he had not yet spoken directly to either of the Co-Chairmen today.

(more)

In a follow-up question, the correspondent asked if the Co-Chairmen were prepared to return to New York if the Council sought to precipitate a vote. Mr. Eckhard said he did not know how soon they could return and, again, it was up to the President of the Council. They were, however, prepared to return as soon as they could, if asked, and at the moment they expected that would not be before Monday. Of course, that hinged on the results of today's Security Council consultations.


Asked if he could expand a bit on the idea of getting Canadian peace-keepers into Srebrenica, Mr. Eckhard said it was not for him to talk to that particular point, since it was a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) issue. The mandate of the Force, of course, was to escort UNHCR humanitarian convoys. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was on the verge of a major operation there, so it seemed to him that an UNPROFOR military presence might be justified. Again, though, it was not for him to talk on that particular point.

Asked about a column that had appeared in The New York Times, describing an incident in which Muslim forces had broken the cease-fire in Srebrenica, Mr. Eckhard said he was in a "bit of an awkward position". UNPROFOR internal cables did come to the Co-Chairmen, so they were informed on a daily basis about the situation on the ground. A report had been relayed to them from their own UNPROFOR liaison officer, that on Tuesday, although it was quiet in the morning, Muslim forces had initiated tank and mortar fire at about midday.

Mr. Eckhard said he mentioned that only because the Co-Chairmen had emphasized repeatedly that the conflict was, at this point, a civil war involving exchanges of gunfire and fighting, which formed the backdrop for what they had to deal with as negotiators. Again, however, it was not his place, but UNPROFOR's, to provide such information.

Asked to clarify the days of shelling in question -- what about Monday? a correspondent asked -- Mr. Eckhard said he did not have "chapter and verse" for Monday. He had cited Tuesday's information only as illustrative of the nature of the conflict. It was a pattern that had been seen repeatedly in the past. It was actually a "three-way civil war". Correspondents might have seen reports of renewed fighting between Muslim forces and the Bosnian-Croat forces in central Bosnia. The Co-Chairmen had spent a great deal of time trying to "patch up a spat" between those parties during the last round of talks in New York. It had to be faced. That was the nature of the conflict.

* * * * *



UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

19-4
World Conf. H. Rights
Yugoslavia
OLA

TO: Ms. Elsa Stamatopoulou, Chief
A: Centre for Human Rights, NY Office

DATE: 16 April 1993

THROUGH: Carl-August Fleischhauer
S/C DE: Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
FROM: The Legal Counsel
DE:

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Yugoslav participation in the World Conference on Human
OBJET: Rights

1. It has come to our attention that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been invited to participate in the upcoming World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (14 - 25 June 1993).
2. By General Assembly resolution 47/1 it was decided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly. This means it shall also not participate in the subsidiary organs of the Assembly, nor in conferences and meetings convened by it.
3. As you know, the World Conference on Human Rights is a conference convened by the General Assembly. Thus, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not entitled to participate in the work of that Conference.
4. It is therefore necessary for the Centre for Human Rights to inform the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia that by administrative oversight the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been invited to participate in the World Conference which, in the light of Assembly resolution 47/1 will not be possible.

cc: Mr. J.-C. Aime ✓
Mr. M. Goulding



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25572*
16 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF SLOVENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Please find enclosed a copy of the letter from H.E. Mr. Lojze Peterle, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, dated 4 March 1993, addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning the applicability of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) and of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 727 (1992) to the Republic of Slovenia. As you will recall, the letter was transmitted to the members of the Security Council on 8 March 1993. I should be grateful if the letter would be subject to consultations of the Security Council.

May I also take this opportunity to assure you that Slovenia will continue to scrupulously observe and implement all Security Council resolutions concerning sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

Letter dated 4 March 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Slovenia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On 25 September 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 713 (1991) imposing a general embargo on the delivery of arms and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

As far as the Republic of Slovenia is concerned, the developments since then justify the need not to apply paragraph 6 of the said resolution to the Republic of Slovenia. The Republic of Slovenia proclaimed independence on 25 June 1991, and was granted full membership in the United Nations on 22 May 1992, thereby becoming a distinct international entity, separate from the political unit once called the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and separate from the unit which today calls itself the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

The Republic of Slovenia has adopted the political system of parliamentary democracy, including the respect for human rights, which is at the European level and in some areas goes a step further, a fact acknowledged by the competent European institutions, among them the Council of Europe, whose full member Slovenia will become in May of this year. The Republic of Slovenia implements the policy of peace and has been successfully establishing relations with its neighbours. Our country is also engaged in, and supports, in a constructive and concerned way, the efforts of the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Communities to bring peace to the rest of the territory of former Yugoslavia. This role of the Republic of Slovenia in international relations has been recognized by all international organizations.

Notwithstanding the basic right of States to self-defence, enjoyed by all Members of the United Nations, Slovenia is being discriminated against, with respect to other Members of the United Nations, by the general embargo on the deliveries of arms and military equipment imposed by Security Council resolutions 713 (1991) and 727 (1992). The Republic of Slovenia cannot secure the most elementary needs of its national defence, which has a direct impact on its security and on the security of that part of Europe. The Republic of Slovenia, a full Member of the United Nations, suffers this inequality due to the measures which the Security Council adopted against the international political entity called Yugoslavia, a country that no longer exists, a fact entrenched by the Security Council: all further steps taken by the Security Council to relieve the situation in the Balkans were selective.

The Government of the Republic of Slovenia therefore requests the Security Council to exempt the Republic of Slovenia from the application of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) and paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 727 (1992). The Republic of Slovenia is a peaceful, sovereign and

independent Member of the United Nations which consistently meets all its international obligations as stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations and other international documents.

(Signed) Lojze PETERLE

Yugoslavia

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Security Council

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16 April 1993

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council and, in accordance with operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 816 (1993), has the honour to bring to his attention further information received by UNPROFOR regarding apparent violations of the ban on flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Between 12 and 14 April 1993, there appear to have been four flights of fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those exempted in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 816 (1993) or approved by UNPROFOR in accordance with paragraph 2 of that resolution. Details as to the itinerary of these flights are annexed to the present note verbale.

ANNEX I
**INFORMATION ON FLIGHTS IN THE AIRSPACE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA NOT AUTHORIZED BY
THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE**
(12 - 14 April 1993)

SRL	DATE	START	END	REMARKS	HEADING, SPEED, ALT.
517	12 Apr	13.48	13.54	AWACS reported a track that originated 1 nautical mile Southeast of Bileca and flew Southeast for 10 nautical miles before fading from radar coverage. The aircraft was last seen near the boundary of the No Fly Zone. This track originated in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	150 degrees 150 kts 3,500 ft
518	13 Apr	07.49	08.09	AWACS reported a track 1 nautical mile Northwest of Banja Luka that headed East for 2 nautical miles before turning onto a northerly heading which it maintained for 7 nautical miles until it faded from AWACS cover 9 nautical miles North-Northeast of the town. This track is assessed as a helicopter and originated in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	010 degrees 160 kts unknown
519	13 Apr	07.51	07.56	AWACS reported a track 3 nautical miles North of Banja Luka which flew South for 2 nautical miles before fading from AWACS coverage over the town. This track is assessed as a helicopter and originated in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	180 degrees 150 kts unknown
520	13 Apr	17.24	17.37	AWACS reported a track 6 nautical miles West of Mostar moving Southeast before fading from cover 15 nautical miles North Northeast of Bilecca. This track is assessed as a fixed wing aircraft and originated in an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.	120 degrees 250 kts 20,700 ft
				[14 April: no violations reported]	

Yugoslavia

FSM 7213 -04

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UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

1993 APR 15 P 2:26

Pale, April 15, 1993

War in Bosnia and HerzegovinaREPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR
AND SOCIAL SECURITY

NO.: 01-65/93

Pale, April 15, 1993

Attn.: BOUTROS-BOUTROS GHALI
UN GENERAL SECRETARY
NEW YORK

Your Excellency,

With the greatest concern, we regard the information we have just received on the new rules and regulations, by which UNPROFOR shall permit only certain flights over the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the information, each transport of the wounded will have to be announced six hours prior to the flight. UNPROFOR will also approve the flight plan, from which there may be no deviations.

This Ministry and the Government of the Republic of Srpska express the deepest disagreement with your unreasonable decision. Since the urgent and prompt transport to appropriate medical aid is the only way for saving the lives of the heavy wounded, it is absolutely unacceptable, from a medical point of view, to make any limitations regarding the flights of medical helicopters. The hospitals on the territory of the Republic of Srpska can not provide an appropriate medical care to all the wounded, thus their urgent and undelayed transport to greater medical centers is necessary. None of the medical helicopter flights has not so

far been misused for any other purpose. These flights are not armed, and all of them are regularly marked. They are very often forced to land under fire for the purpose of evacuating the wounded, having no possibility to announce, or change the existing flight paths. From security reasons, these helicopters can not take previously determined paths, for being good target for armed groups on the ground, who ignore all the norms and regulations of the international humanitarian right, including the ban on shooting on medical means of transport.

Concerning all these reasons, we are appealing to you and President of the Security Council to reconsider the regulations regarding the limits on the medical flights as soon as possible, and to find out some other possibilities to control the helicopters flying in humanitarian mission as well. So far established limits directly endanger the lives of tens of the heaviest wounded.

With highest respect,



Dr. Dragan Kalinic


MINISTER OF HEALTH
OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SRPSKA



PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
854 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 Tel. (212) 879-8700/4 Fax: (212) 879-8706

*Mr. Aruan
as Mr. Fleighman
Dr. Goulding
Mrs. C. Thompson
Mr. Deque
AS*

Yugoslavia



No.394/93

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to inform about the procedure for obtaining visas for persons travelling to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or in transit through its territory.

The officials of the United Nations, including members of the UNPROFOR, and of other international organizations and agencies within the UN system, bearers of the passports of the countries which maintain visa regime with the FR of Yugoslavia, are required to obtain visas.

Visa applications for the official representatives of the UN or of the organizations and agencies within the UN system has to be accompanied with a letter of the Secretariat acknowledging their official status and purpose of visit.

The members of the UNPROFOR (military and civilian) and their immediate family on a visit, are required only to submit visa applications.

Foreign nationals who provide services to UNPROFOR, not members of the UNPROFOR themselves, in addition to a visa application are required to submit a certificate issued by UNPROFOR acknowledging their status and purpose of visit.

Visa applications should be submitted to the nearest Embassy or Consulate of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the United States, further information could be obtained from the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Washington D.C.20008, 2140 California Street, N.W. (telephone number: 202-462-6566).

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General the assurances of its highest consideration.

15 April 1993

SECRETARY-GENERAL
New York



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Yugoslavia

1 April 1993

PRESS BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN FOR CYRUS VANCE AND LORD OWEN

Fred Eckhard, spokesman for Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, began his briefing by outlining their appointments for today. At 10 a.m., Lord Owen had met with the Ambassadors of European Community States. He and Mr. Vance had met, at 11:30 a.m., with Foreign Minister Gareth Evans of Australia. The Co-Chairmen would meet with the new President of the Security Council, Jamsheed K.A. Marker of Pakistan, at 2:15 p.m.

Recalling a recent request by correspondents for a background briefing by Ambassadors Herbert S. Okun and Geert Ahrens, who were conducting the talks on the situation in the Krajina, Mr. Eckhard said those talks had progressed rather well. The two mediators would be available to brief correspondents on a background basis this afternoon. An announcement would be made once the time was finalized.

Mr. Eckhard went on to say that he could not deny reports that Mr. Vance was preparing to step down as Co-Chairman of the Conference. Most people were aware of the great number of responsibilities Mr. Vance had outside of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, including those related to his law firm, the corporate boards on which he sat and the public service organizations he supported, such as the United Nations Association of the United States.

Mr. Vance, who had given up virtually all of that when he agreed to take on the task of Co-Chairman, had told the Secretary-General at the time that he could not make an open-ended commitment to work exclusively on the Conference for an indefinite period. Since December, there had been rumours that Mr. Vance would be stepping down, and correspondents had been reassured that he would certainly not be stepping down at such a crucial juncture when talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina were being conducted intensively. The Vance-Owen plan was now fully developed and had been signed by two of the three parties. "The matter is in the hands of the Security Council, so the moment has come for him to discuss with the Secretary-General a time and a replacement." It would be up to the Secretary-General to announce that information when he was ready.

Referring to speculation in one newspaper that Mr. Vance might have chosen to step down for health reasons, Mr. Eckhard reassured correspondents to the contrary. "The pace he has maintained since early September has exhausted people half his age." The most Mr. Vance had had to deal with over the course of the Conference had been a bout with the flu, and he had just about fully recovered from that. He was hale and hearty and would return to a full set of responsibilities outside of the United Nations.

Responding to a question which had been raised during the DPI briefing concerning Mr. Vance's availability for future United Nations assignments, Mr. Eckhard said that would be a matter between Mr. Vance and the

(more)

Secretary-General. He would be available to offer advice to the Secretary-General, with whom he had a close working relationship.

A correspondent asked about Lord Owen's opinion of how Mr. Vance's decision would affect the chemistry of the talks. Mr. Eckhard suggested that the correspondent speak with Lord Owen himself as he would probably like to place on record his feelings about his Co-Chairman.

Did Mr. Vance's decision have anything to do with a lack of enthusiastic backing from the United States for the peace plan? a correspondent asked. "Nothing whatsoever", Mr. Eckhard replied. If that had been a real obstacle, Mr. Vance's instinct would probably have been to stay on and fight until he felt that the talks had reached a point at which he could, in good conscience, step down. It had been Mr. Vance's long-standing position that he would give up everything for the International Conference for a limited amount of time, and take it to a logical point at which he could step down. That point had been reached. His decision had nothing to do with the substantive state of the negotiations.

Were the Co-Chairmen working with the Security Council on its formal endorsement of the plan? Mr. Eckhard was asked. He replied that they were very much involved in that process. That was the main purpose of their meeting with the Council President this afternoon. "It is a question of timing." If at all possible, they would like to see the resolution adopted tomorrow, but that would require that all Council members "be in sync". The draft resolution being circulated was a complex, omnibus text and there were still a few matters to be sorted out, so adoption could not be definitively predicted for tomorrow, but that would be the preference of the Co-Chairmen.

A correspondent, citing the horrifying images coming from Srebrenica as the Co-Chairmen were "just shuffling bits of paper", asked if their level of frustration was very high. "Hardly more than before", replied Mr. Eckhard, who recalled that the process had been going on for seven months. It had taken from September to December just to get the parties to agree to talk face to face. The January plenary had produced the outline of an agreement, which had been impossible to nail down in Geneva. As a consequence, the talks had been moved to New York. There had been a sense of frustration over the fact that precious time had been lost.

One of the daily aspects of the job of the Co-Chairmen, Mr. Eckhard said, was that they had "to wake up to a body count before beginning the day's work". Now that the peace plan had been completed and was on the table, it was hoped that the last step towards the plan's implementation -- its acceptance by the Serbs -- could have the maximum support from Governments. "Negotiators have taken this as far as they can. It is now up to Governments to ram it home."

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