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JUN-9 1945

MEDICAL SUPPLY DIVISION

U.N.R.R.A.
MIDDLE EAST OFFICE

2nd Fortnightly Report
April 1st - 15th
1945

1341 Comm. Ave.
Jlb

1. Introduction

1. The period covered by this report was a particularly significant one for the MEO, as it included the first three repatriations of refugees from the Middle East camps. Full details of these operations are included in the Report of the Repatriation Division (see App. C).
2. Though the repatriations were naturally the main focus of attention during the period, a considerable amount of time also had to be devoted to administrative and personnel problems left over by the Balkan Mission. Some progress was made towards clearing up the outstanding problems, but too many of them still remained unsolved at the end of the period. Fuller details of these points are given in paragraph 16-21 below and in the Report of the Bureau of Finance and Administration (see Appendix A).
3. Now that the repatriation programme has started and will result in a steady reduction in the number of refugees remaining in the camps, one of the most important tasks facing the MEO will be to prepare a scheme for an orderly contraction of its own operations and for planned reductions in staff. No practical steps have yet been taken along these lines, but the problem was under discussion during the period under review, and will certainly need increasing attention in the immediate future.
4. By comparison with the 1st Fortnightly report, the detailed reports from the individual Bureaux (attached as Appendices) are fuller in this report; the main report is therefore correspondingly shorter, and only covers those points not fully brought out in the individual reports.

2. Repatriation.

5. As will be seen from the report of the Repatriation Division, the first repatriation moves went off extremely smoothly, despite frequent last-minute changes in sailing dates. Full reports from the flight-teams are not yet available, but there is no reason to suppose that any serious difficulties arose during the journey. The MEO can certainly be satisfied that the repatriates returned home in good health and well-clothed.
6. Owing to difficulties already referred to in the 1st Fortnightly Report (see para. 26), it is probably that the scale of issue of clothing to the repatriates has been rather too generous. It is hoped to obviate this in the future by ensuring that all refugees in the camps are adequately provided with the proper scale of clothing. This should eliminate the necessity for any special last-minute issue to repatriates.
7. At one time during the period under review it was feared that the repatriation to the Greek islands would have to be held up as a result of the simultaneous repatriation of the Greek mutineers previously interned in the Middle East. Though both this repatriation and that of the UNRRA refugees were being arranged through the Allied military authorities in Greece, it appeared that no consideration had been given to the problems of feeding and shelter that might arise on the islands if both moves were more or less simultaneous. After some days of uncertainty the matter was finally cleared up by an agreement under which both groups were to be repatriated as originally scheduled.
8. Two important questions of principle came up in connection with the first repatriation move. Firstly the question of war risk insurance, and secondly the question of ultimate payment for the shipping. On the first point it was thought advisable to send letters to the Cairo representatives of both the Greek and Yugoslav Governments pointing out that UNRRA could not accept any financial obligation to meet claims, either from individual refugees or from the governments, for loss

or injury sustained during the repatriation moves. The second point arose following a statement from GHQ that the Army would charge LE. 11 per head per refugee - the normal commercial rate - and following a cable from London implying that Commander Jackson and Mr. Hendrickson were taking up the point of view that the military were responsible for meeting the transportation costs of displaced persons movements undertaken by them. This point was also settled by a cable from Washington agreeing that UNRRA should meet the costs.

9. One of the most satisfactory aspects of the first repatriation moves was the excellent publicity which they received throughout the press of the Middle East, as a result of the efforts of the Public Relations Division. Details are given in Appendix D. This favorable publicity was particularly welcome. The stories and photographs of the refugees going home was the first concrete evidence they had had that UNRRA was actually doing a practical job in the Middle East.

3. Camps.

10. The civilianisation programme in the Camps (see paragraphs 30-32 of the 1st Fortnightly Report) made further progress during the period under review. Details are given in Appendix C, Section 2. The process of releasing unwanted military personnel went ahead rapidly. On April 1st a list of 130 British military personnel to be turned back to the army was sent to GHQ and their actual return has been proceeding throughout the period. The parallel process of transferring selected military personnel (almost exclusively officers) to civilian UNRRA employment has not made such rapid progress, partly owing to uncertainties as to the precise camps jobs for which they were to be recruited, but more particularly owing to the continued uncertainty as to the appropriate conditions of service (i.e. scales of pay and allowances) applicable to British employees.

4. Relations with Governments.

11. During the period three separate questions arose which threatened to cause difficulties with the Yugoslav, the Greek, and the Polish Governments respectively.

12. As already mentioned in the 1st fortnightly report, the Yugoslav authorities took strong exception to the replacement by a civilian of Col. Bekker the South African military Commandant of El Shatt camp. Col. Bekker had made himself extremely popular with the partisan authorities in the camp and the latter were apparently apprehensive that his removal might mean a reversion to the regime under this predecessor during which there had been numerous differences and difficulties between the camp administration and the refugees. These apprehensions - which were, of course, quite misplaced - were finally allayed.

13. The Greek authorities raised at the beginning of April the question of the repatriation of those refugees who have been living in Palestine at the expense of the Greek government. As these groups are mostly of a different social and political outlook from the Greeks in the UNRRA camp at Nuseirat in Palestine, and as there is not likely to be shipping available to repatriate both groups simultaneously, this request may cause considerable difficulties in the future. On April 12th a cable was therefore sent to Headquarters setting out the facts and asking for guidance.

14. The local Polish authorities - owing allegiance to the London Polish group - officially requested the MEO to stop registration of the Polish refugees in the Middle East on the grounds that the Yalta Conference decisions had so upset the refugees in the camps that they would resent a registration which they might fear was a prelude to their forcible return to Russian-occupied Poland. Though not accepting the Polish authorities' interpretation of the position, the MEO decided to discontinue the registration that was being carried on in Africa and India. In both cases it had already met with strong opposition and scarcely-veiled sabotage from some of the local Polish authorities, and experience had shown that successful registration under such conditions was impossible. As there is no immediate prospect of repatriation in the case of these refugees, the suspension of registration will not create any immediate practical difficulties.
x To many Cairo residents.

15. There were some further cordial exchanges with the Egyptian Government during the period under review (see Report of the Liaison Officer, attached as Appendix E.) . In particular the decision of the Council of Ministers of February 17th (see 1st Fortnightly Report para. 21) took legal effect as a result of Proclamation No. 571 of April 3rd made by the Military Governor.

5. Administration.

16. Unfortunately it was still true that a disproportionate amount of energy had to be expended during the fortnight under review on problems of internal administration, though not to quite the same extent as during the preceding period (see 1st Fortnightly Report, paras. 10-20).

17. Most of the personnel problems concerned with the separation of the MEO from the remnants of the Balkan Mission were settled during the fortnight, though there remained a good deal of work for the Liquidators Office in connection with the termination or the assignment to the Country Missions of personnel not wanted by the MEO. It had been hoped that this work would have enabled the MEO to complete the Personnel Budget for submission to Headquarters. However the absence of a Budget Officer and the fact that so many of the staff were fully engaged on urgent questions concerning the repatriations, made it impossible to complete this during the period under review. A further cable was sent to Headquarters on April 7th urging the immediate appointment of a Budget Officer.

18. At the beginning of this month it was confidently hoped that the outstanding remuneration problems referred to in the 1st Fortnightly Report would be disposed of by the middle of the month. An Administrative Memorandum was therefore issued on April 2nd stating that all anomalies in salaries and allowances were being reviewed and that it was hoped that all necessary adjustments would be made in time to be incorporated in the April payrolls. Unfortunately this proved to be over-optimistic. A step forward was taken on April 6th; a cable was sent to Washington giving proposed rates for the new Living and Quarters Allowances to start on May 1st, and these were accepted by Washington on April 14th. This eliminated one difficulty, but it still left the thorny problem of how to determine the "Home Station" in the case of the numerous different categories of employees who constitute borderline cases between Class I and Class II. The Washington instructions appear to be mainly designed to meet either the relatively straightforward problems of HQ or the ERO or else the special cases of the Country Missions who hire personnel locally in a country which is itself receiving relief. The MEO falls between these two categories, and has the special problem of having to rely for recruitment mainly on a special class of employees who are local employees without being local nationals (e.g. Palestinians, Syrians, Greeks, etc). After many discussions among the Bureau Directors and with Mr. Siegel, all these individual cases were settled with the exception of about 50. These were left over for discussion with Mr. Harris who was expected to arrive shortly after the end of the period.

19. An even more pressing problem that was reluctantly left over till Mr. Harris' arrival was that of the appropriate salary scales for British personnel. As already pointed out in the 1st Fortnightly Report (see para. 14), the uncertainties concerning the appropriate scale had already caused many difficulties even before the establishment of the MEO. During the fortnight under review these uncertainties were multiplied and the outstanding cases remained outstanding. In an effort to get some clear cut decision a cable was sent to Washington on April 12th emphasising the difficulties that were being caused. This crossed two cables sent from Washington and London on April 12th. The first laid down a new scale which, so far from authorising salary increases to the British staff, actually involved reductions in some of the lower grades. The second requested the postponement of any decisions pending the arrival of Mr. Harris. It must therefore be said that this problem - the personnel problem which causes more resentment and disappointment than any other - was no nearer solution than when the MEO was first established.

20. While dealing with matters causing resentment and disappointment the withdrawal of American APO facilities should be mentioned. Just at the time when the

MEO was being formed, the American military authorities notified the Chief of the Office that facilities would have to be withdrawn. As a personal favour he postponed the withdrawal for a fortnight to allow the MEO to explore alternative facilities. Application for pouch facilities was therefore made to the American Legation, but unsuccessfully. It therefore became necessary on April 4th to issue an Administrative Memorandum informing all American personnel that after April 15th all letters would have to go through Egyptian mail - thereby involving extra cost, very considerable delay, and a substantial element of risk. On the next day a cable was received from Headquarters stating that the whole question was being discussed at Washington with the appropriate authorities. This cable - though most reassuring - could not, of course, have any effect in mitigating the resentment felt as a result of the issue of the Administrative Memorandum.

21. The only other question of internal administration worth mentioning is that of internal office security. The Balkan Mission had a deplorable record in this respect, and a good deal of this had been inherited by the MEO. There was no realization of the need for security on the part of the staff, nor any attempt to check the breaches that were constantly occurring. As a consequence, GHQ Security Officers had made frequent reports on breaches of security found when inspecting UNRRA offices, and there was a real danger that GHQ might issue an order forbidding the transmission of any security information to UNRRA. Shortly after the establishment of the MEO special steps were taken to remedy this serious state of affairs. A member of the Camps War Establishment was appointed as Security Officer, a careful check was made to see that all filing cabinets etc, had proper locks, and an Administrative Memorandum was issued on April 7th emphasising the gravity of security breaches and warning that exemplary disciplinary action would be taken in cases of repeated breaches. As a result of these steps there has already been a great improvement, and GHQ have admitted that far fewer breaches are now being committed.

5. Supply.

22. There were no outstanding supply developments during the fortnight under review. Following further discussions with GHQ it was agreed that the ML Balkan Stockpile should be taken over physically by UNRRA on July 1st. It was still difficult to assess the amount of work this would involve for the MEO, but indications seemed to imply that the greater part of the Stockpile might have been called forward to the Country Missions by the time the MEO took over. At the same time there was growing evidence that the MEO would have to deal with an increasing number of enquiries from the Country Missions for Middle East procurement of items independent of the Middle East stockpile.

23. An important decision was taken during the period under review concerning the procurement of medical supplies. Great difficulties had previously been encountered in obtaining regular supplies of medical stores for use in the camps, and expensive local purchases have sometimes had to be made to make up emergency deficiencies. Arrangements were set up for obtaining future supplies from ML stockpile part of which is located in Italy and part in Egypt. It is hoped that this will help to eliminate most of the medical stores difficulties in the camps. A cable was sent to Headquarters on this matter on April 14th. At the same time steps were taken to bring order into the requisitioning and storage of medical supplies by obtaining the loan of Mr. Delgado of FEA who arrived from Teheran on April 10th, and by calling forward Mr. Packwood from Caserta.

Attachments:-

1. Appendix A. Bureau of Finance and Administration - Gill
2. Appendix B. Bureau of Requirements and Supplies - Supply
3. Appendix C.I Repatriation Division. - DP and Camps
4. Appendix C.II Camps Division - Camps - R. Brown & DP
5. Appendix D. Report of Public Relations Section - Salisbury
6. Appendix E. Report of Liaison Officer - GC
7. Appendix F. Minutes of Directors' Meetings - Rontil to Gill, Hanner, Howell, Dayton, Central Files.

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JUN 23 1945

MEDICAL SUPPLY DIVISION

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U.N.R.R.A.
MIDDLE EAST OFFICE

3rd Fortnightly Report:
April 16th-30th
1945

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A. Introduction.

1. There were no outstanding developments during the fortnight under review. Repatriation continued with two further flights of Yugoslavs, and this operation is now beginning to take on a routine character. Up till now the principal repatriation problems have mostly been practical ones concerning the physical arrangements for the movement of the refugees: henceforward the main problems will probably be more political, concerning such questions as the amount of shipping available for repatriation, priority between different groups, definition of statelessness, relations with the Intergovernmental Committee, etc.
2. Supply matters tended to take up more time than in previous periods and several complicated problems arose following requests by the Balkan Missions for Middle East procurement.
3. Outstanding problems concerning personnel policy and remuneration policy continued to cause trouble, and despite the visit of Col. Joseph Harris from H.Q., several of them remain unsettled.
4. The majority of the activities of the MEO are described in detail in the Reports of the individual Bureaux which are attached as Appendices; the paragraphs below touch only on those matters which justify additional comment.

B. Bureau of Operations.

5. Ever since the establishment of the MEO it has been recognised that the organisation of the Camps Division of the Bureau of Operations did not properly reflect the work of the Bureau. In the Balkan Mission the running of the Middle East camps was merely one of a series of functions, and the Camps Division was therefore constituted as a normal functional division. When the MEO took over from the Balkan Mission this arrangement was perpetuated, despite the fact that the running of the camps now constituted almost the main *raison d'être* of the whole Office rather than merely one of many functions. The ideal structure would therefore have been one in which problems in the camp, instead of being handled by a separate Camps Division, were covered by the other functional Divisions as a principal part of their normal functions. Hitherto it has not been thought advisable to reorganise the whole Office merely in order to eliminate this structure defect but the removal from the office of the Director of Operations on April 30th will provide an opportunity for reviewing the whole question and making any necessary changes.
6. Now that the internal administration of the office is beginning to take up less time, it should be possible for the Chief of the MEO to spend more time in direct contact with the Camps and with their staffs and problems. A start was made with a visit to El Shatt camp on April 26-27, and this will be followed up by more frequent visits in the future.
7. On April 21st the Chief of the MEO gave a 9 minute broadcast on the repatriations over the Egyptian State Broadcasting system.

C. Bureau of Requirements and Supply.

8. Two complicated questions concerning supplies for the Balkan Mission arose during the period under review. The first concerned the transport by air of 50 tractors from Cairo to Belgrade. On April 26th the MEO was suddenly confronted with a request from GHQ for a signature accepting payment by UNRRA of transportation costs amount to \$140,000. GHQ stated that failure to accept the cost would hold up the planes and jeopardise the whole operations, which had apparently been arranged by ML and AFHQ at the highest level. As this was the first intimation the MEO had received about this case, and as they had received no request or authority from any UNRRA office, they were placed in a very difficult position. After some hasty consultations it was decided to accept the cost for the first 8 planes carrying 16 tractors, but to hold up acceptance of the remaining 34 till authority had been received from Caserta or Washington. Cables were sent to these two actions, with the result that a standstill order was issued, pending clarification of the financial position between Belgrade, Caserta and Washington. It seems a great pity that these questions could not have been settled prior to the actual shipment, for the sole justification for air transport was the urgency with which the tractors were needed in the Voivodina, and this advantage is now in danger of being lost as a result of the delay.

9. The second supply problem concerned the shipment of grey mullet fish fry to Greece. The MEO was just informed about this project on April 20 in a cable from Athens. Many highly technical questions arose concerning the suitability of air-transport for the fish fry, the appropriate type of containers, the quantity of fry required, etc. Fortunately the Director of the Greece Mission Fisheries Division came over to Cairo to settle these problems on the spot. At the end of the period under review the matter is still being negotiated with the Egyptian Government authorities, but it is hoped that final details will soon be settled.

10. The two cases just described - the tractors and the fish fry - drew attention to the need for a general tightening up of the procedure for Middle East procurement for the Balkan Mission and for calling forward from the Balkan Stockpile. A cable was therefore sent to Washington on April 25 setting out a proposed standard procedure.

11. The scheme for drawing medical supplies for the camps from the Military Stockpile (see 2nd Fortnightly report, para 23) went ahead during the period under review, and a cable was received from Washington on April 25 endorsing the scheme. The practical value of these arrangements had already been shown on April 19th when a cable to Caserta asking for 10,000 c.c. of alum precipitated diphtheria prophylactic for the inoculation of returning repatriates led to an immediate release from stock in Alexandria within 24 hours.

12. Following receipt of the Camp Requirements Guide prepared by Headquarters, there was much discussion of the basic on which camp supplies for the third and fourth quarters should be requested from Washington. The main difficulty was to arrive at an accurate estimate of the probable population in the camps during the third quarter. An estimate was finally prepared on the basis of the latest intelligence concerning the speed of repatriation, and a detailed cable was sent to Washington on April 21st. During the discussions concerning this matter it transpired that there were 500 Singer sewing machines in the camps surplus to requirements. A cable was therefore sent to Washington and to all the Country Missions on April 24th giving details of the machines and their availability.

D. Bureau of Finance and Administration.

13. The problems arising during this period are extensively discussed in the Report of the Director of the Bureau (See Appendix A). Unfortunately many of them are still outstanding, and the hopes expressed in the 2nd Fortnightly Report that Col. Harris' arrival from Washington would clear them up were not fulfilled. Progress has certainly been made in settling the problems of local employees; all local jobs have been graded, a local salary scale has been fixed and applied, and the final details of a form of contract for local employees is now being worked out. But similar progress has not been made with the long-outstanding question of determination of Home Station (see 2nd Fortnightly Report, para 18), while the equally vexed question of a fair British salary scale now seem even further from solution than before, for on April 21st a cable was received from Washington instructing the MEO to go ahead with one of the earlier scales, only to be followed three days later by a cable from London giving precisely contrary instructions.

14. On April 24th the Personnel Budget for the MEO for the second quarter was finally completed and sent off to Washington and London. The preparation of the "Other Expenses" Budget is unfortunately not yet finished as the work is handicapped by the absence of a Budget Officer. A cable was received from Washington on April 17th stating that a Budget Officer would be available in six weeks time.

Attachments:

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|----|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. | Appendix A. | Finance and Administration Division. |
| 2. | Appendix B. | Bureau of Requirements and Supply. |
| 3. | Appendix C. I | Repatriation Division. |
| | Appendix C. II | Meeting on Repatriation. |
| | Appendix C. III | Camps Division. |
| 4. | Appendix D. | Report of Public Relations Section. |
| 5. | Appendix E. | Liaison Officer. |
| 6. | Appendix F. | Directors Meeting. |

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UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

8, SHARIA DAR EL-SHIFA - GARDEN CITY - CAIRO

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
UNRRA-CAIROTELEPHONES:
47816-41317

To : Dr. James A. Crabtree
From : V. B. Norelli
Subject: Medical Supply information.

In reference to Dr. J. A. Crabtree's letter of August 28,
subject: "Reports by Mr. Norelli" and Colonel Brown".

At time of report definite information on Camps' need was not available, therefore a definite request could not be made. We have since received the information and a detailed tabulation made and given to Dr. Osincup to be submitted to Washington.

We have not been able to obtain a list of items available in the Middle East although it is understood that the Army has surplus stock of majority of items.

As explained in August report, a firm agreement with USAFIME should be made and we will then be in a position to inform Washington of what can be available in the Middle East.

The estimates for the camps are for one year. If material is not available in that amount, then any fraction should be sent as soon as possible

2 September 1944.

NOTES ON MEDICAL SUPPLY PROBLEMS

- Mr. V. B. Norelli.

1. The U.S. Army in the Middle East has great quantities of certain medical supplies. A firm agreement should be made in Washington between U.N.R.R.A. and S.G.O. or Army whereby stocks can be transferred to us for camp use. USAFIME should be informed immediately of plan, if an agreement can be reached. We understand that AML will use very little of this stock.

2. Army (AML) estimates, by their own admission, will not be adequate to meet all emergency during their period of responsibility. UNRRA, in order to protect itself from criticism (since we may be forced to assume responsibility sooner than expected) should start a stockpile near the field of operations at once and be ready to supplement army supplies.

Bari is a centrally located spot and should be recommended as a central warehouse point.

3. Key and experienced personnel should be recruited and sent to Headquarters at once. Suggest contact C. F. Kelly, Secretary, American Pharmaceutical Association, who may be of assistance in obtaining proper medical supply personnel.

4. Fifty or more medical supply programs needed.

5. A definite understanding should be reached between the Health Division and the Bureau of Distribution and Warehouse in matters of allocations and distributions of medical supplies. It is felt that this is strictly a Public Health problem and this should remain within the jurisdiction of the Health Division.

1st September, 1944.

To: Colonel Brown, Director, Health Division.

From: V.B. Norelli

Subject: Medical Supplies for Camps

(1) The enclosed list of items is the estimated needs of Medical Supplies for the refugee camps in the Middle East.

(2) The estimates are for a period of one year to supply a population of 75,000.

(3) The method of determining the amounts is based on UNRRA adopted policy, the actual needs of Camps, and on U.S. Army procedure.

V.B. Norelli
V.B. NORELLI
Specialist Requirements.

VEN/ok

28 August 1944

TO: W. E. Brown
FROM: J. A. Crabtree
SUBJECT: Reports by Mr. Morelli and Yourself

Mr. Morelli's report of 1 August to Colonel Brown regarding camp medical supplies does not give us adequate information. The only request specific enough for action is that for 100 rolls of 16-mesh wire screening for kitchens, hospitals, fly traps, etc.

Mr. Morelli reports shortages of hypodermic syringes, needles, clinical thermometers, empty containers, biologicals, sulfa drugs, hexoresorcinal crystals, santonin, etc. There are no specifications regarding kind and quantities of the various items needed, nor is there any information concerning amounts available in the Middle East on which we may determine what additional quantities must be supplied from here. This information is necessary before we can issue instructions to pack and ship any supplies.

It is urgently necessary, therefore, that a detailed tabulation of the supplies, item by item, be made separately for each camp to provide a three months' supply. The tabulation should, moreover, indicate the amounts of each item certainly available in the Middle East, possibly available, and definitely not available. It is so important to get this information that I believe you should send an officer to each camp at once to compile it, if your present information is inadequate for the purpose, because until we receive this information, I repeat, we cannot authorize procurement and shipment.

Our information on your health personnel available and needed is similarly meager. We have not at any time planned to supply permanent professional staff for refugee camps from here. The budget of 10 June labeled "MERRA Camps" brought to you by Doctor Weber was intended, as an accompanying memorandum stated, to supply Balkan field team personnel to make up the deficit in the Voluntary Agency recruiting in this country. It was understood they would serve in the camps until needed in the Balkans. The 23 doctors and 71 nurses are for this purpose. The budget title "MERRA Camp Budget" is simply a misnomer. It was understood they would serve in the camps until needed in the Balkans.

We agree with the suggestion made in CAWA 114 by Colonel Wright to eliminate methyl bromide and the chambers from our procurement program and are continuing to make efforts to get allocations of DDT.

We are required to present by 8 September estimates of all automotive equipment for Health Division staff use and for other specialized health and sanitation

W. E. Brown

28 August 1944

technical field operations, such as malaria control, typhus control, ambulances, etc. You are requested to cable a statement of your automotive requirements for mission staff and for camp operations, excluding automotive equipment needed for the hauling of supplies or for other general transportation purposes. This estimate should specify number and types of vehicles, purpose, and proposed location. This must be in sufficient detail for us to justify a firm request for procurement. Do not include any equipment that can be secured locally for this purpose. Your estimates should not include transportation facilities for the mobile teams for the Balkans since we understand military transportation is obligated for these mobile teams.

The only supplies we are able to authorize for shipment at present are those needed now for health and sanitation services in the camps and for the dispensary you are operating in Cairo for UNRRA personnel. UNRRA medical and sanitation supplies for Balkan relief will not be shipped from this country until we are notified by the Military that Balkan destinations are available to receive them. This is a policy of the Combined Shipping Authorities against double ocean shipping.

Furthermore we may move forward only your camp supplies after we receive your lists. We are prepared to ship immediately upon receipt of your detailed requisitions, a sufficient supply of medical and sanitation items for one year's camp supplies to the point at which an issue warehouse will be established. Before this shipment can be undertaken, it will be necessary for you to notify us of arrangements completed for the establishment of an issue warehouse in Cairo or some other convenient point in the Middle East. Such arrangements for an issue warehouse may be negotiated with existing warehousing facilities or you may find it necessary to organize an UNRRA issue warehouse if the former alternative is not possible.

CANA 115--Colonel Brown's Report

Reference is made to the supplement to the monthly report submitted by Colonel Brown under date of 24 July. This was not forwarded by the Chief of the Mission until 4 August and was not received in the Washington office until 26 August. The report to which this is a supplement has not yet been received. There is some indication that this is being held for incorporation in a comprehensive report from the Mission for June and July. This delay emphasizes the desirability of expediting duplicate copies of your reports without delay in the Mission Office.

With regard to your item 3, we agree with your position. It is impossible to furnish non-professional personnel such as cooks, interpreters, and mechanics for Balkan teams. The transportation problem from here is sufficient to justify this position. Regarding your No. 5, the comments on Mr. Morelli's report cover these items. We have no 10,000 population unit; the only emergency unit we have in our program is the CAD unit with which you are familiar. It is impossible to justify a full CAD unit for the camps, inasmuch as it does not contain the sanitation items which you are obviously needing.

Miss Johnston is to visit you as soon as her recruitment schedule is in hand. The question of commissioning nurses has been settled, and most of the American nurses being sent out are coming in uniform as commissioned officers in the Public Health Service. The uniform is the same as the nurse uniform with USPHS insignia. It will be possible to adjust the matter of uniforms if difficulties arise in the field. No nurse will be required to apply for a commission.

We have had conferences with Doctor Hyde and officials in the Washington office of the Foreign Economic Administration, and he will understand the methods of transferring surplus supplies from Military Lend-Lease to Civilian Lend-Lease and a second transfer to emergency UNRRA needs.

The attached letter, written 25 August, was prepared before the reports written by yourself and Mr. Morelli (CANA 114 and 115) were received. It serves to emphasize the needs indicated in this letter.

Attachment
DAReckie/fg