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UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO

FINANCIAL SITUATION

of

RELIEF OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO

Interim Report and Recommendations,
based on the accounts
as at 31 October 1961

Leopoldville
13 November 1961

Frederick W. Tooby
Economic Relief Coordinator
ONUC

1. As Economic Relief Coordinator^{1/}, ONUC, I have three funds at my disposal from which to finance the relief operations under my direction in the Congo. They are:

- a) The United Nations Congo Famine Relief Fund
- b) UNICEF allocations
- c) The 1960 Food Relief Counterpart Fund

2. There are two other funds, not controlled by the Economic Relief Coordinator, from which the relief operations might draw financial support. They are:

- a) Budgetary provision of \$500,000 for a Refugee Relief Project, under the Congo Fund.
- b) The Counterpart Fund established under the Agreement of 28 March 1961 between the Secretary-General and the Republic of the Congo, concerning the sale of American surpluses supplied to the UN for the UN programme of economic aid to the Congo. One of the agreed purposes for which this fund may be used is famine relief. No proposals for such use have yet been made to the Congolese Government.

3. The nature of the three funds controlled by the Economic Relief Coordinator, and their state at 31 October 1961, are shown in Appendices A, B, and C to this paper.

4. The financial situation of the relief operations at 31 October 1961 with regard to these three funds, may be summarized as follows.

Note: ^{1/} The title was changed from Chief Refugee Relief Coordinator on 1 July 1961, with the assignment of additional functions (See Civilian Operations Circular No.31 dated 15 July 1961)

a) UN Congo Famine Relief Fund

	\$	\$
Net total of fund	-	904,513
Less: Purchases of Supplies	129,725	
Operational and Administrative Expenses	<u>616,287</u>	<u>746,012</u>
Disposable balance		<u>\$158,501</u>

b) UNICEF Allocations

Total allocations		411,000
Less: Purchases of		
- Food	111,781	
- Seeds	52,231	
- Medical Supplies	<u>22,712</u>	<u>186,724</u>
Uncommitted balance		<u>\$224,276</u>

(available for use in emergencies to be selected by ONUC and UNICEF in consultation)

c) 1960 Food Relief Counterpart Fund

Total of fund	170,631
Total commitments	<u>157,853</u>
Uncommitted balance	<u>12,778</u>

(available for transfer to the UN Congo Famine Relief Fund)

5. UNICEF is being asked to agree to the retention by ONUC of the balance of allocations, amounting to \$224,276 (4(b) above), for this purpose. This sum may be considered adequate to finance the food purchases for relief operations foreseen in the remainder of 1961.

6. Whether the funds remaining in the Congo Famine Relief Fund will be sufficient to meet the as yet unrealized costs of the relief operation up to 31 December 1961 depends on a decision by

the Controller as to what proportion, if any, the Funds should bear of the operational and administrative expenses of ONUC. Expenditures by ONUC under this head debited to the Fund up to 31 October 1961 appear in summary as follows:

	\$
Inland freight and warehousing	527 446
Maintenance of Vehicles	40,242
Salaries and Wages	48,005
Other operational expenses	<u>594</u>
Total	<u>\$616,287</u>

7. With regard to inland freight and warehousing costs, it is an easy matter to identify those charges which relate specifically to relief stocks and operations. Unpaid liabilities under this head at 31 October 1961, plus expenses to be incurred up to 31 December 1961, are estimated at approx. \$300,000. It is recommended that these costs, incurred in Congolese currency, and easily identified, should be financed out of the Counterpart Fund (Agreement of 28 March 1961 - see para 2(b) above). From the date of the agreement up to 31 December 1961, expenditures incurred under this head will exceed CF 25,000,000, equivalent to \$500,000, and it is here proposed that the agreement of the Congolese Government be sought for the utilization of that sum for this purpose. Total credits to the Counterpart Fund (Agreement of 28 March 1961) up to 31 December 1961 are expected to amount in total to approx. Cf 240,000,000. A ceiling of Cf 180,000,000 has been placed on allocations for public works. A separate proposal is in preparation to allocate Cf 5,000,000 to finance ONUC participation in a project sponsored by the High Commissioner for Refugees, to resettle 20,000 Ruanda refugees in the Congo. Sufficient funds are therefore available in the Counterpart Fund (Agreement of 28 March 1961) to provide for the credit of Cf 25,000,000 here proposed.

If this recommendation were adopted, the Congo Famine Relief Fund would be relieved of charges amounting to \$500,000, and the disposable balance of the fund, increased by this sum, would be available to cover other famine-related expenditures.

8. Heavy costs were incurred by ONUC for the airlift which, in January and February 1961, was the only means by which food could be delivered immediately to South Kasai in the period before supplies could arrive by the surface route. The aircraft employed were not engaged exclusively on this airlift, however, since they were also required for the logistic support of the UN military forces. No separate costing of the food airlift was made at the time; and a later attempt to make such a costing was abandoned as impractical. My guess, based on weights lifted, aircraft capacity, and charter costs, is that the food airlift cost something of the order of \$750,000. Sir Alexander MacFarquhar has questioned whether these costs should be considered as additional expenditures by ONUC incurred solely by reason of the food airlift; he suggests that the total charter costs would not have been reduced by this amount had there been no food airlift, since the aircraft were needed in any case for military logistic support. I agree with this suggestion, having participated at the time in the debate between Leopoldville and New York on the need for additional planes to be chartered, and, later, in discussion of the relative priorities of military (including PX) supplies and of food for the starving Balubas. In his agreement to convince New York the Air Commander, ONUC, made much use of the tonnage lift and delivery schedules imposed by the tragedy in South Kasai; at the time he was also receiving increased demands to airlift military supplies, but the security situation was in such flux that his forecasts of military traffic necessarily lacked the arithmetical certainty of the demands of the relief operation. It is understandable,

therefore, if in New York the view is held that the additional charters which were signed in January and February were justified almost wholly by the food airlift to South Kasai. But once the additional aircraft had joined the ONUC fleet, I found it necessary to bid daily for the food airlift against the competing demands of the military logistical services. It is certainly my conclusion that even had there been no food airlift it would have been necessary to charter roughly the same number of additional aircraft as were in fact added to the fleet in February 1961 under the pressure of greatly increased military traffic. The validity of this conclusion may be tested by comparing the size of the fleet which has been engaged on solely military missions since March 1961 with the size of the ONUC fleet in use at the peak of the food airlift during February 1961. The facts of this comparison are best known in New York; it is believed they support the view that aircraft charter costs incurred by ONUC in January and February of this year would not have been substantially reduced had there been no food airlift.

9. This conclusion has an important bearing on a proposal put forward tentatively by New York that the Congo Famine Relief

Fund should be drawn upon to pay a proportion of the charter and operational costs of the ONUC air fleet. If it be accepted that ONUC incurred no substantial additional expenditures by reason of the food airlift, the making of a substantial charge to the Famine Relief Fund on this score may well appear as merely a financial expedient. Indeed, the view is strongly held by many people that the use of charitable funds to pay for anything more than the barest minimum of administrative and operational costs is improper; that to spend such trust funds on anything other than the purchase of foods and medicines would be an abuse of the charity of that great number of anonymous donors, throughout the world, who gave money to the UN, at personal sacrifice,

to provide food for Congolese who were starving to death. The international bodies that have collected some of these contributions, such as the League of Red Cross Societies, are unwilling to pass the considerable funds in their hands to ONUC except for the purchase of foods and medicines. In general, they are opposed to the use of contributed funds by the UN to "make ends meet" in ONUC's strained administrative and operational budget. This is, I believe, the first occasion on which the UN has been directly responsible for a relief operation involving the administration of charitable funds contributed internationally; it would be damaging to the public relations of the UN if the view became widespread among the non-governmental organizations (whose support is of great importance to the UN) that in the management of charitable trust funds the UN, on this occasion, sacrificed the principles of trusteeship to financial expediency. For these reasons I strongly recommend that a way be sought to avoid charging any proportion of ONUC's operational and administrative costs to the Congo Famine Relief Fund.

10. The preceding paragraph may be summed up as a statement of principle that, in the operational conditions of 1961, ONUC should provide logistic support to the UN relief operations in the Congo at the expense of its own budget. This applies with special reason to the costs of the food airlift, but the principle is equally applicable to charges for the use, maintenance, and operation of vehicles, salaries and wages of staff employed in the supply operation, and other operational charges. As shown in para. 7 above, ONUC has debited charges under these heads to the Famine Relief Fund to an amount of \$88,841. If the principle as just stated is applied, these charges should be reversed and borne by the ONUC general budget. There are some strong practical considerations which support this view. First, to

arrive at the true costs of the relief operation it would be necessary to analyze all expenditures by every ONUC disbursing officer and every issue voucher from all ONUC supply depots. This has not in fact been systematically done (conditions in the Congo have made it impractical) and the charges which have so far been debited to the Famine Relief Fund cover at best only fragments of the actual costs. Second, some of the major costs that were in fact incurred in the relief operation have not been recorded separately. An important example of this is the heavy consumption of petrol, fuel oil, and lubricants, by the military vehicles which were engaged for many weeks in convoying food from Luluabourg to Bakwanga. On the other hand, the charges that have been made to the Famine Relief Fund include some \$20,000 for petrol ordered in special circumstances against requisitions bearing my signature, although subsequent changes in the circumstances of the ONUC supply operations caused these particular lots of petrol to be used largely for military purposes. The argument that it is wrong in principle to portion out part of ONUC's administrative and operational costs in 1961 to be borne by the Famine Relief Fund is therefore reinforced by the consideration that, as a matter of practical bookkeeping, it could not be done with systematic completeness in the conditions of ONUC's work in the Congo during 1961.

11. The principle is also applicable to the various proposals that have been made to charge the Famine Relief Fund for the use of the considerable fleet of vehicles employed over periods of some months in the relief operation. These vehicles were in fact borrowed from the very much larger ONUC fleet and have been returned to that fleet as reduction in loads permitted. The provision of these vehicles formed part of the logistic support provided by ONUC to the relief operation, and strict application

of the principle requires that they be provided as a charge to the ONUC operational and administrative budget.

12. I suggest the following steps to avoid charging any proportion of ONUC's operational and administrative costs in 1961 to the relief operation, while at the same time, making full use of all funds available to finance the several operations of the UN in the Congo.

- a) Adopt the principle that, through 1961, the costs providing logistic support to the relief operation in the Congo should be borne on the ONUC budget. In consequence, reverse the fragmentary charges amounting to \$88,841, debited to the Famine Relief Fund up to 31 October 1961 (para. 6 and 10)
- b) Transfer the debit already made to the Congo Fund in respect of salaries of FAO experts (\$33,519) to the ONUC budget
- c) Treat the credit of \$500,000 in the Congo Fund (para. 2(a)) as a contribution to ONUC budget finances, to defray part of the costs of ONUC logistic support for the relief operation, including the costs of the food airlift.
- d) Seek the agreement of the Congolese Government to the use of Cf.25,000,000 (\$500,000) from the Counterpart Fund (Agreement of 28 March 1961) towards the costs of inland freight and warehousing (para. 7 above).

13. The effect of these moves on the Famine Relief Fund would be as follows:

Disposable balance at 31 October 1961	\$158,501
(Appendix A)	

Reversal of ONUC charges for administrative and operational expenses made to 31 October 1961 (para. 12(a))	\$ 88,841
Transfer of costs of inland freight and warehousing to Counterpart Fund (Agreement of 28 March 1961) (para. 12(d))	<u>500,000.</u> 747,342
Less: Estimated amount of unpaid liabilities for inland freight and warehousing, plus expenses to be incurred under this head up to 31 December 1961 (para. 7)	<u>300,000.</u>
Resultant disposable balance at 31 December 1961 (estimated)	<u>\$447,342</u>

Estimates for 1962

14. I turn now to the future of the relief operation. The joint UNICEF - League of Red Cross Societies - ONUC project to establish food stocks in the Congo for the prevention of famine, which was launched in October 1961, assumes the restoration of internal security and freedom of movement of supplies. At the present time the Congo is still divided, sporadic outbursts of mob violence are still frequent, and the internal transportation of supplies is hampered by many technical difficulties that are compounded by the lack of security. ONUC relief operations continue and, as far as can be foreseen now in the kaleidoscopic changes of conditions, must probably be continued, by ONUC, through at least the first half of 1962. An estimate of the additional quantities of food required for this purpose cannot be other than a rough guess. The costs of storing and transporting the supplies can be calculated on the basis of the current year's experience and will vary roughly with the quantities of supplies to be handled. The detailed assumptions and calculations of my present

estimate of food supplies and operational funds required for the first half of 1962 are set out in Appendix D to this paper. In summary, the requirements are:

Supplies	<u>Additional Imports Required</u>	
	<u>Quantity M. tons</u>	<u>Approx. Value, delivered Matadi</u>
Rice	3,000	420,000
Maize flour	1,500	112,500
Dried fish	1,200	360,000
Vegetable oil	600	120,000
Skim milk powder	<u>720</u>	<u>208,800</u>
Totals	<u>7,020</u>	Say <u>\$1,250,000</u>

Operational Funds:

Inland freight	\$	\$
- River/rail	685,000	
- Trucking	<u>100,000</u>	785,000
Warehousing and Maintenance		100,000
Direct labour		<u>15,000</u>
Total, operational funds required		<u>\$900,000</u>

15. As this paper is written, the member nations are debating the Congo question in New York. No decision has yet been reached on any changes in the tasks to be assigned to ONUC in 1962, nor has any budgetary provision yet been made to which the organizational structure is to be adjusted. In due course, a decision must be taken on whether the ONUC budget in 1962 should bear the costs of logistic support to the relief operation in 1962 estimated at \$900,000. If not, it would be useless to appeal to the nations for further supplies of food unless, at the same time, an appeal were made for funds from which to pay the operational costs entailed.

16. With regard to the 7,020 metric tons of food required, I suggest that the Secretary-General requests the Director General

of FAO to obtain the supplies required within the framework of the proposal now before the FAO Conference to establish a joint FAO/UN office to administer a multilateral programme for the utilization of surpluses. It should be borne in mind, however, that deliveries at Matadi of each of the commodities required should begin in January 1962.

17. In the matter of a fund to cover operational costs, if it is decided to raise this outside the ONUC budget, I recommend that the funds disposable in the Congo Famine Relief Fund at 31 December 1961 (para.13) should not be applied to this purpose in 1962, because of the known objections to such use (para. 9). I suggest that an appeal for, say, \$1,000,000 for this specific purpose should be addressed by the Secretary-General to the international federations of national charitable societies, and also to UNICEF. Indeed, since the international non-governmental organizations that might be interested nearly all have consultative status with the UNICEF Executive Board, the Executive Director of UNICEF might be asked to manage the appeal on behalf of the Secretary-General.

18. If my recommendation is followed not to use the balance in the Congo Famine Relief Fund for operational expenses, and if agreement is reached on the utilization of \$500,000 from the Counterpart Fund (Agreement of 28 March 1961) to defray inland freight and warehouse costs, there will remain in the Congo Famine Relief Fund at the end of December 1961 a balance now estimated at approx. \$450,000 (para. 13). Since this sum would not be required for expenditures directly ^{famine} related, ONUC could come nearest to fulfilling the intention of the donors of the fund by rising the balance to finance ONUC projects which relieve suffering among the Congolese people. I propose, therefore, that the balance in the Congo Famine Relief Fund at the end of 1961 should be used to finance public health and welfare projects for which budgetary

provision would otherwise be made from the Congo Fund, thus releasing funds for additional technical assistance in other fields.

Congo Famine Relief Fund

1. To quote Mr. B.R. Turner (his memo of 27 June 1961 to Dr. Linner): "This is a United Nations trust account established by the Controller to hold cash contributions made to the United Nations, for United Nations disbursement, in response to the appeals of the Secretary-General and of FAO. Disbursement should be limited to famine-related expenditures. The authority to disburse is with the field."
2. It should be noted that the Congo Famine Relief Fund came into being in 1961 as a result of appeals by the Secretary-General in December 1960 for help in relieving mass starvation among some 300,000 Baluba refugees in South Kasai, which had developed into a tragic crisis that shocked world sentiment. The Office of Refugee Relief Coordinator was established on 1 December 1960 to direct and coordinate the relief operations mounted by ONUC to halt this tragedy. Thus the task of the Refugee Relief Coordinator in 1961 was both different and separate from the task of the former Food Relief Coordinator in 1960. (In this connection, see also Appendix C)
3. Authorization of expenditures from the Congo Famine Relief Fund was made a function of the Refugee Relief Coordinator, and continues to be the responsibility of the Economic Relief Coordinator, (see Civilian Operations Circular No. 31 dated 15 July 1961.)
4. Cash contributions to this fund amounted to \$782,403 at 31 October 1961.
5. In addition, some of the supplies received, both as contributions in kind to the fund, and as purchases from the fund itself, proved to be surplus to practical requirements and were sold, the proceeds of sale being credited to the fund,

to a total of \$127,295.

6. In the transfer and conversion of these monies; bank charges and apparent loss on exchange were incurred in an amount of \$5,185.

7. As at 31 October 1961, the total net credit to the Congo Famine Relief Fund therefore stood at \$904,513, composed as follows:

Contributions	\$	\$
- through national societies	587,301	
- through U.N. offices	152,406	
- others	<u>42,696</u>	782,403
Sale of surplus supplies		<u>127,29</u>
		909,698
Less: Bank charges, etc		<u>5,185</u>
Net total of fund		<u>\$904,513</u>

8. Famine-related supplies were purchased out of the fund in the amounts below, as at 31 October 1961:

	\$
Food	105,543
Seeds	125
Medical Supplies	2,753
Tools and Equipment	<u>21,304</u>
	\$129,725

9. Operational and administrative expenditures amounting to \$616,287 had been charged by ONUC to the fund as at 31 October 1961, divided as follows:

	\$	
Inland Freight and Warehousing	527,446	
Maintenance of Vehicles	40,242	
Salaries and Wages	48,005	
Other Operational Expenses	<u>594</u>	
Total	\$616,287	

10. The disposable balance of the Congo Famine Relief Fund, as shown in the accounts at 31 October is therefore \$158,501, calculated as follows:

	\$	\$
Net total of fund		904,513
Less: Purchases of Supplies	129,725	
Operational and Administrative Expenditures	<u>616,287</u>	<u>746,012</u>
Disposable balance		<u>\$158,501</u>

UNICEF Allocations

1. Out of two allocations approved by its Executive Board, UNICEF transferred a total of \$411,000 to ONUC, earmarked as follows:

	\$
For Food	306,000
" Seeds	90,000
" Medical Supplies	<u>15,000</u>
Total	<u>\$411,000</u>

2. These funds were placed at the disposal of the Refugee Relief Coordinator, and authorization of expenditures against these allocations continues to be a function of the Economic Relief Coordinator.

3. Up to 31 October 1961, the UNICEF funds have been committed and disbursed for the following purchases of supplies:

	\$
Food	194,335
Seeds	52,231
Medical Supplies	<u>22,712</u>
Total	<u>\$269,278</u>

4. The League of Red Cross Societies contributed \$82,554 to pay for purchases of food included above, which were thereupon treated as having been pre-financed by UNICEF. The payment by the League thus served to increase the unspent balance of the UNICEF allocation earmarked for food. (See HQ cable from Cordier and Turner to Balinsky and Ahmed, No.988 dated 11 February 1961)

5. The situation of the UNICEF funds held by ONUC, at 31 October 1961, was therefore as follows:

<u>Earmarked for</u>	<u>Allocation</u>	<u>Net Expenditure</u>	<u>Unexpended Balance</u>
	\$	\$	\$
Food	306,000	111,781	194,219
Seed	90,000	52,231	37,769
Medical Supplies	<u>15,000</u>	<u>22,712</u>	(<u>7,712</u>)
	<u>411,000</u>	<u>186,724</u>	<u>224,276</u>

6. It has been agreed by UNICEF that this balance would remain available for alleviation of Congo needs in other emergencies to be selected in consultation with UNICEF and ONUC. (See HQ cable No.988 referred to above)

7. In November 1961 the Refugee Relief Coordinator has been called upon to supply food for refugees under UN protection in Elizabethville, involving local purchases of protein foods and vegetable oils not available from donations in kind. UNICEF is being requested to agree to the use of the balance of funds shown above in this emergency

1960 Food Relief Counterpart Fund

(Note: This is proposed change of title. In the accounts of ONUC to 31 December 1960 this fund was named "Food Relief Counterpart Fund", and in 1961 it has appeared in the accounts as "Counterpart Relief Fund".

1. This fund was established in 1960 to hold the proceeds of sale of certain governmental gifts of food to the Congo which, being surplus to the requirements for free distribution, were sold to meet shortages in the commercial markets resulting from the flight of the Belgians from the Congo in July 1960. These operations were conducted by an ONUC official with the title of Food Relief Coordinator. Funds accumulated from these sales were placed in a bank account separate from the accounts of ONUC, and disbursements were made on his sole authority. These operations were practically completed by November 1960, although the Food Relief Coordinator entered into commitments to pay certain expenses of the Congolese Red Cross which continued until July 1961. The separate bank account was closed on 28 January 1961, and the balance transferred to ONUC funds. The residual funds and stocks of supplies, and the small remaining staff of the former Food Relief Coordinator, passed into the control of the new Refugee Relief Coordinator on 1 December 1960, when that new office was created to direct the emergency relief operations mounted by ONUC to save some 300,000 refugees in South Kasai from death by mass starvation.

2. The former Food Relief Coordinator sold donated foods to a value of \$170,631, comprised as follows:

<u>Food contributed by</u>	<u>Proceeds</u>
	\$
Cameroons	12,117
Denmark	3,058
India	81,783
Tanganyika	2,800
U.K.	28,000
U.S.A.	<u>42,873</u>
	<u>\$170,631</u>

3. By 31 October 1961 the commitments entered into by the Food Relief Coordinator against this fund are believed to have been completely paid, and amounted to \$157,853. There is an uncommitted balance available on the "1960 Food Relief Counterpart Fund", therefore, of \$12,778.

4. I recommend that the balance remaining on this account at 31 December 1961 be transferred to the UN Congo Famine Relief Fund.

Estimates for 1962, Supplies and Funds Required

1. Relief operations are assumed to continue as follows:
 - a) In South Kasai: Food for 60,000 refugees to be supplied through December 1961. From 1 January 1962 assume a need to feed 60,000 during three months
 - b) Angola Refugees: Food for 140,000 refugees to be supplied through December 1961. From 1 January 1962 assume a need to feed 70,000 during three months
 - c) South Katanga: Food for 45,000 refugees under UN protection in Elizabethville is assumed to be necessary through December 1961. From 1 January 1962 assume a need to feed 30,000 for three months.
 - d) North Katanga: Assume a need to feed 45,000 refugees for six months, January through June 1962.
 - e) General: Localized famine situations requiring food distribution of short duration continue to arise at points throughout the Congo. Assume a need to feed an average of 50,000 people daily through June 1962.
2. The foregoing assumptions are no more than guesses as to the possible future needs for free distribution in the Congo. On this basis, provision should be made for 30,000,000 daily rations for distribution January through June 1962. It is proposed that the daily ration in 1962 should be kept to minimum subsistence levels, relative to Congolese rural standards, and restricted to basic items of the local dietary as follows.

Approximate food values			
	<u>Daily Ration</u>	<u>Calories</u>	<u>Protein</u>
	grammes		grammes
Rice or maize flour	200	720	14-18
Canned Meat or Dried Fish	40	104	6-16
Vegetable Oil	<u>20</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>-</u>
	<u>260</u>	1,000	<u>20-34</u>

In addition a daily ration of 40 grms of skim milk powder should be provided for all children and nursing and pregnant mothers, estimated at 40 per cent of refugee populations.

3. The total quantities of foods required to provide 30,000,000 daily rations in 1962 to the proposed scale are:

	<u>Metric Tons</u>
Rice or maize flour	6,000
Canned Meat or Dried Fish	1,200
Vegetable oil	600
Skim milk powder	<u>720</u>
Total	<u>8,520</u>

Maize flour is not an acceptable item of diet throughout the Congo, and should not amount to more than one-third of the total cereal supply.

4. Taking into account the stocks estimated to remain at the end of December 1961, the additional supplies to be imported for distribution in the first half of 1962 are:

	<u>Total Supply</u>	<u>Est. Stocks at</u>	<u>Import</u>
	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>31 December 61</u>	<u>Requirement</u>
	M. tons	M. tons	M. tons
Rice	4,000	1,000	3,000
Maize flour	2,000	500	1,500
Canned meat or dried fish	1,200	nil	1,200
Vegetable oil	600	nil	600
Skim milk powder	<u>720</u>	<u>nil</u>	<u>720</u>
	<u>8,520</u>	<u>1,500</u>	<u>7,020</u>

5. The approximate cost of the import requirements, delivered Matadi, would be as follows:

	Quantity	Value per	Total
	<u>M. Tons</u>	<u>M. Ton</u>	<u>Value</u>
		\$	\$
Rice	3,000	140	420,000
Maize flouring	1,500	75	112,500
Dried fish	1,200	300 ^{1/}	360,000
Vegetable oil	600	200 ^{2/}	120,000
Skim milk powder	<u>720</u>	<u>290</u>	<u>208,800</u>
	<u>7,020</u>	Total	<u>1,221,300</u>
		Say	\$1,250,000

1/ Dried fish from Africa

2/ Palm Oil from the Congo

Assuming that in 1962 the costs of internal distribution of relief supplies cannot be financed from the ONUC budget, special funds will be required to cover these expenditures.

These are estimated as follows:

a) <u>Inland Freight</u>	M.tons	Approx. Cost \$
- River - rail:		
Matadi to Leopoldville	7,000	154,000
Leopoldville to Songololo	1,770	24,800
Leopoldville to South Kasai	1,490	77,500
Leopoldville to Katanga	<u>5,260^{1/}</u>	<u>420,700</u>
	Total	677,000

Note: ^{1/} Includes general reserve

.../over

- Trucking

8,520 M. tons @ \$12.00

(based on average road-haul
of 50 miles @ approx. \$0.25 per
mile/ton

Say 100,000

Total Inland Freight: 777,000

b) Warehousing and Maintenance

8,520 M. tons for six months

main depot and depots in
distribution areas

Say 100,000

c) Labour

(50 men for six months

Say 15,000

892,000

Total Internal Distribution Costs: Say \$900,000

PRESENT SITUATION OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN THE MATADI
TERRITORY.

Since the launching of the struggle of the Angolan peoples for their independence and the consequent determination of Portugal to stifle these nationalistic sentiments for arms, millions of our Angolan brethren have abandoned their villages to seek refuge among us.

Although we too are still fighting against immense difficulties which have been provoked by the long and cruel crises which our country has known since her accession to Independence, nevertheless we have welcomed our brothers with enthusiasm in their distress.

However, with the excessive number of refugees and the feeble means at our disposal, the Officials of our country have been forced to make an appeal for aid to the International Red Cross to come to the help of these people.

Very quickly the Red Cross responded to the appeal of the Congolese Government and since March 1961, is devoting its energies daily to lighten the burdens and sufferings of our Angolan compatriots.

Unfortunately, our Angolan brothers do not appear to appreciate the real value of this help, offered to them free and gratis. In bad faith, certain people even endeavour to misconstrue the true reason for this aid. Intentionally, they hide from their compatriots its origin so that they will think that this help is being brought to them by the U.P.A. political party. This is the reason why many refugees who are quite naïve, allow themselves to be persuaded to become awkward. They demand woollen blankets instead of accepting cotton ones such as the Red Cross puts at their disposal.

Elsewhere, misled by certain adventurers who have no scruples and who promise them Independence in a month or two, these men refuse to be employed in agricultural work. To convince oneself of the truth of this, one only has to make a tour around the villages of the surrounding district and one sees them peacefully sitting in front of their huts, simply waiting for the Red Cross trucks to arrive, in order to receive their rations.

In view of this attitude, many chiefs of villages no longer hide their disgust and demand that their villages be demolished.

During the month of September, 1961 a European representative of the Red Cross paid us a visit. He informed us that this international organisation will cease its distribution next November. From then onwards, it will proceed to liquidate any excessive stocks in existence, at the end of which it will withdraw all aid to refugees. The Red Cross representative justified this step by the fact that since March 1961 the refugees will have had sufficient time to do gardening and thus provide their own needs. To this end, hoes and machettes are being distributed to them.

cont

We have done our utmost to bring this information to the knowledge of our Angolan brethren and encourage them to prepare for their future by devoting themselves to cultivation.

In spite of our good intentions in their interests, our brothers from Angola believe us to be deceptive and it is only their politicians who tell the truth and seek after their well-being.

In four of the surrounding villages, there are now 6.000 refugees registered by the Security Department at Matadi to whom it is a pleasure to pay special tribute for the devotion they are showing to these unfortunate people. In the township of Matadi the number is 4.000.

Anyone familiar with the district would admit that this bush land is not propitious to intensive cultivation. That is why we are asking refugees to go to the Seke-Banza territory on the instructions of the Administration, who are willing to put fertile land at their disposal. This advice is given to them over and over again by various authorities of the Republic throughout Matadi, including President Kasa-Vubu during his recent visit.

Unfortunately, our help is being opposed by a propagandist influence in the nature of Angolan politicians living at Matadi who, to make felt their power, seek to destroy our work in front of the refugees, to show them that we are incapable of giving efficient aid to their compatriots. They go as far as telling that the local Administrator of Matadi, together with the Territorial Authorities of Seke-Banza are trying to disperse their compatriots on the right bank of the river for the sole purpose of making them "slaves" of the Bayombe tribe. Libellous, anonymous and injurious letters against us have been sent to the highest authorities.

It should also be pointed out that by staying in Matadi some refugees are taking to spying on behalf of the Portuguese Authorities of Noqui. By out-of-the-way routes they return to Noqui where they furnish the Portuguese with information which is needed for their own purposes.

Fortunately, we have succeeded in discouraging some of these adventurers. We hope that the Minister of the Interior, competent in his field, will vigorously punish these wrong-doers. It was due to this propaganda that up to that time, in spite of our constant intervention and repeated advice that only 240 persons accepted to go to the Seke-Banza territory; the others persisted in staying at Matadi or in nearby villages, making game at the decisions made by the Authorities.

Another crucial problem which faces the local Administration is that of our own unemployed, who do not understand why the Authorities at Matadi are concerned for the refugees to whom is given a free ration and medical supplies when they themselves also in need, do not receive such a ration, and are in fact expected to pay for their own medical supplies. The explanations we gave them were received sceptically and it should be noted that on this side exists a problem which calls for a rapid solution, as social peace is not to be disturbed in the near future at Matadi.

cont

In particular the situation of the township with 4.000 refugees, without work and not submitted to paying the various taxes, puts a grave problem on finances. The amount of Régidese invoices (local water authorities) is increasing monthly; the dustbins as in the case of public water closets, are presenting a problem to the disposal authorities; dispensaries are full every day; the nationals are refusing to pay their taxes under the pretext that the Authorities are more interested in the lot of the refugees than their own. This state of affairs is causing anxiety and is liable to lead to a catastrophe.

As will be seen, the prospects are black. The first measure to be taken, to my mind, is to transfer the refugees to other districts where one can bring them the same aid without giving rise to petty jealousies on the part of our own people. Our efforts tend to bring about this feeling, but persuasion having not succeeded, will not our officials authorise the eventual application of force to evacuate these people?

Matadi, 30th September, 1961.
For the Administrator of the Territory,
(abs.)
the Assistant Administrator.

- LANDU Sébastien.

Received in Reg 2 Div. 175.
on 11 October 1961
CZ

Room 641

R/Soc 500/1

PRIORITY

RECEIVED

1961 SEP 20 PM 11:56

79

C

Let's try to set up
Teler con with O'Brien.

ACTION COPY

TO.....	SP RSP
File No.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Action Completed	
Initials.....	
Return to Registry Section	

UC78CUE 019

IS CUA

DE CUE 019/30

FM ONUC ELISABETHVILLE

TO ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

BT

UNCLAS ELLEO 950

LINER FOM CRUISE OBRIEN STOP THE REFUGEE CAMP AT SWEDISH LINES
ESTABLISHED WITHOUT PRIOR PLANNING AND WITH AN ESTIMATED NUMBER OF
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND REFUGEES. STOP IT IS A DISORGANISED COMMUNITY
IVING IN EXTREMELY CLOSE PERSONAL CONTAT AND UNDER VERY BAD CONDI-
TIONS. NO ADQUATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUPPLY OF FOOD. VERY INADEQUATE
WATER SUPPLY. NO ADQUATE SANITARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH MASS FOULING
OF GROUND. MEDICAL TREATMENT CARRIED OUT ONN EMERGENCY
BASIS AND IS TOTALLY INADQUATE. THE SITUATION IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS
AND UNLESS IT IS TACKLED THOROUGHLY AND AT ONCE THERE IS BOUND TO
OCCUR AN EPIDEMIC WHICH UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS WOULD BE IMPOSS-
IBLE TO TO CONTROL.

CFN ELLEO 950

8275

Bill

for discussion
prior to any
decision.

2
x

1/ Log ✓

2/ Canadian ✓

3/ file (Camp Refugees Eville)

J. H. Hellewell

PAGE TWO DE CUE 37/30

HELP URGENTLY NEEDED ACCORINGLY WE REQUEST FOLLOWING: FIRSTLY THAT A ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE BE RECONSTITUTED TO RUN THE REFUGEE CAMP AND SHOULD CONSIST OF A SENIOR LOGS OFFICER AND STAFF TO INCLUDE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF INTERPRETERS. SECONDLY A NUMBER OF HYGIENS TEMS, ~~SEEEEEEE~~ TEAMS SIX, WITH WINGFOG GUNS, KNAPSACK AND HUN SPRAYERS. THIRDLY. TEAM OF ENGINEERS TO SUPERVISE WATER. LIGHT, ETC. FOURTHLY. A PIONEER TEAM TO SUPERVISE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF REFUSE AND TO PROVIDE LATRINE FACILITIES. FIFTHLY. A NUTRITIONAL EMPZRT TO PROVIDE A MINIMUM BALANCED DIET PARTICULARLY FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN. SIXTHLY. TRANSPORT SECTION TO ENSURE FOOD DISTRIBUTION, GARBAGE AND OTHER TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS. SEVENTLY. A HOSPITAL AND DIPENSARY SERVICES. THE HOSPITAL ON SITE ALREADY SITUATED WITH NECESSARY LEVELLING FOR TENTAGE. SUFFICIENT TENTAGE TO CATER FOR AN EIGHTY BED UNIT WHICH WILL INCLUDE OBSTETRICAL AND PAEDIATRIC. A SMALL ISOLATION UNIT. A FIELD LABORATORY SERVICE, STAFFED BY A TROPICAL AND INKECTIONOUS DISEASE EXPERT. EIGHTLY. FULL HOSPITAL AND THEATRE EQUIPMENT, HOSPITAL KITCHEN AND APPLIANCES. NINTHLY. FIELD CLEANSING UNIT TO INCLUDE LAUNDRY. TENTHLY. BEDS, MATTRESSES, BLANKETS TO EQUIP EIGHTY BED HOSPITAL. ELEVENTHLY, STAFF. MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT, SURGEON, HANND AO LEAST ONE OTHER MEDICAL OFFICER, NATIVE NURSES AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO CATER FOR ORDINARY NEEDS OF SUCH A UNIT. THIRTEENTHLY. IN PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS A GRAVE DANGER OF A SERIOUS EPIDEMIC OCCURRING.

BT

CFN NIL

30/11452 SEP CUE

CR ✓ AC file
01500 500/1

C

116 RECEIVED

1961 SEP 12 PM 5:38

O.N.U.C.

CUL 028

1961 SEP 12 PM 5:05

ACTION COPY

FFF CUA

DE CUL 28/12

FM ONUC LULU

TO ONUC LEO

BT

TO Food Relief

File No. _____

☐ Action Completed

Initials _____

Return to Registry Section

4827

UNCLAS RL 314 FOR KAUFMAN FROM CAPESTRANI • STOCK REPORT FOR 12 SEP
 NO CHANGE IN FIGURES •

BT

CFN RL 314 12

2/15002 SEP CUL

REC'D CIV. OPS.

DATE : 13 SEP 1961

TIME : 09 28

INCOMING TELEGRAM delivered to:

Chief Gen. Serv.	FLC
Chief Insp. SG	UNESCO
Chief Assist. SG	Mail Operat.
Chief Civ. Ops	PA Officer
Chief Adm. Off	PAO Repr.
Chief Fid Adm	PRU Repr.
Chief Insp. Off	WFO
Chief Fin Off	Comm. Off.
Chief Proc Off	

MILITARY Section

C/SOC 500/1

✓AC

02

NNNN

VU

UE154CUL 031

FFF CUA

DE CUL 31/28

FM ONUC LULU

TO ONUC LEO

BT

RECEIVED

1961 AUG 28 PM 6:29

1961 AUG 28 PM 6:55

O.N.U.C.

ACTION COPY

Good Rel.

TO

File No.

☐

Action Completed

Initials

Return to Registry Section

2586

UNCLAS RI286 (.) FOR TOOPY FROM KAUFMAN (.) STOCK REPORT FOR TWENTYEIGHTH

MAIZE FLOUR 871750 IN NIL OUT NIL BALANCE 871750

RICE 587823 IN NIL OUT NIL BALANCE 587823

POWDERED MILK 135344 IN NIL OUT NIL BALANCE 135344

DRIED FISH 226320 IN NIL OUT NIL BALANCE 226320 (.)

BT

TN 286 871750 871750 587823 587823 135344 135344 226320 226320

28/1358Z AUG CUL

REC'D CIV. OPS.
DATE 29 AUG 1961
TIME 0915

INCOMING TELEGRAM delivered to:

Spec. Repr. SG	Chief Gen. Serv.	ILO
MB. Assist. SG	Publ. Info Off	UNESCO
Chief Civ. Ops	Civil Aviation	Met. Office
Chief Adm. Off	WHO	PM Office
Chief Adm. Off	Acco.	FAO Repr.
Chief Pers. Off	Language Serv.	ITU Repr.
Chief Fin. Off	UN. Food Repr.	WMO
Chief Rec. Off	Stat. Serv.	Ch. Conting. Off.

MILITARY ATTACHMENT

NNNN

Registry
C/Doc 500/1

13 July 1961

My Lord Mayor,

We have just been notified that our bank has received a further donation by the citizens of Leicester of three hundred pounds for the United Nations' Congo Famine Relief Fund. This brings their contribution to a total of one thousand six hundred pounds. Their splendid generosity is greatly appreciated. It has contributed greatly to the relief of famine among the poor villagers who have been forced, by inter-tribal fighting, to abandon the land and crops which are their mainstay, as has happened, and unhappily continues to happen, particularly among the Baluba people of the province of Kasai.

Please accept, My Lord Mayor, and carry to the good citizens of Leicester, the warmest thanks of the United Nations Organization in the Congo.

Sincerely yours,

F. W. Tooby
Economic Relief Coordinator
ONUC

The Lord Mayor of
Leicester, England

Encl. Receipt for £300

c/soc 500/1
c/orb 130/1

cc. Mr. Rossborough
Mr. McLean
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Chief Fin. Officer
Mr. Cahen

RR

Our Ref: RR-259
16 June 1

Mr. S. H. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer
F. W. Tooby, Chief Refugee Relief Coordinator

Third Progress Report on ONUC Operations
covering the period October 1960 - June 1961

1. I regret that I am not in a position to provide the information requested in your memorandum of 14 June.
2. As regards both financial expenditures and commodity transactions you are aware, from the Audit and Inspection Service reports, that a separate system of accounting for the operation of the Refugee Relief Operation has not yet been established. Basic commodity records have been maintained however, with such accuracy as the emergency itself and the attendant political and security factors have permitted. Financial transactions have been carried out and recorded by the Finance Division.
3. I have had several discussions with Messrs. Leckie and McLean with a view to establishing a system and designating codes to be used by the Finance Division in accounting separately for our operation. It was their intention to assign an accountant to this task, but apparently none has been available. With the reorganization of my office to include responsibility for the procedures connected with the United States Economic Aid Programme, two accounts assistants have been transferred to my staff (Mr. Saltuzzi and Mr. Mohap) with effect from 13 June. This has enabled me to assign Mr. Cahen to the exclusive task of recording the basic accounting documents covering the period 1 January 1961 to date, with a view to producing an analytical statement of both financial and commodity transactions of the Refugee Relief Operation for the six months ending 30 June 1961. I hope to reach agreement with Mr. McLean on an appropriate code during the coming week.

4. It would be of great assistance to me if you would please establish precise and detailed agreement with New York on the policy of allocation of financial expenditures as among the ONUC general budget, the Congo Fund, the Congo Famine Relief Fund and the UNICEF funds earmarked for Refugee Relief. Certain broad lines of division are already established, but uncertainty causes confusion when dealing with supplies which are in common use by the Administration, by the U.N. Force and by the Relief Operation, such as, for example, petrol, blankets, or tents.

5. Broadly speaking; it appears likely that the contributed funds in the Congo Famine Relief Fund will be no more than sufficient to pay for internal freight and storage of the contributed supplies of food and medicines. This does not include the cost of the airlift in January-February, towards which New York has agreed that \$500,000 should be contributed from the Congo Fund. It will be necessary, therefore, to reconsider at an early date, the entire question of the financing of the Refugee Relief Operation. This makes it the more urgent that the accounts should be produced. But this cannot be accomplished until I receive the policy directive on the apportionment of common expenditures referred to in the previous paragraph.

C/SOC 50% *no. 2/21*

Our ref: RR-139

25th May

1

Mr. P. Cahen

John Grin

Your article: "Un résultat positif de l'action
des Nations-Unies au Congo"

Thank you for your memorandum of the 25th May and the rewrite of those pages of your article concerned with the Refugee Relief operation. There remains only one comment: The Austrian Medical Team to which you refer as running the tented hospital in Bakwanga was not a Red-Cross Team but an Austrian Military Medical Team. Apart from that, I think this part of your article is generally acceptable.

C/Soc 500/1

Refstj

Our ref: RR-115

19th May 1

Mr. P. Cahen

Mr. J. Grün

Your article: "Un résultat positif de l'action des N.U. au Congo"

I am afraid I have quite a few comments to make. In your first paragraph you omit mention of UNICEF whose allocations, in fact, enabled the programme to get off the ground as quickly as it did. You also omit to mention the very considerable assistance we received from international charity, both organizations and individuals.

In your second paragraph you seem to imply that only 300,000 Balubas emigrated towards Lulua territory. I do not know what the actual figure is but it is sure to be considerably more. The figure of 300,000 is the number of refugees which left Lulua territory and sought refuge in what is now the South Kasai.

In your third paragraph the figure of 1,000 tons distribution per day is incorrect. The theoretical figure for feeding 300,000 people, the 15 calory diet established by FAO, is 120 tons per day. For practical purposes, however, our target has been 80 tons per day.

In the fourth paragraph you confused the time of sowing with the time of harvesting. The seeds (maize, groundnuts and beans) had to be distributed and planted by early February.

In your fifth paragraph the figure of 100 tons per day air-lift may have been the ideal but it was certainly never attained.

In your final paragraph on page 10 you quote Mr. Caballero. First of all I do not think that individuals in the Refugee Relief operation should be referred to by name, and secondly the statement made by Mr. Caballero comes from a WHO Doctor and was made at end of January.

In conclusion I should like to say that I find it extremely difficult to be more constructive because I have not seen the first nine pages of the article. Frankly, I feel you would do the Refugee Relief operation more justice by either saying very much more than you have done or very much less.

19 avril 1961

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET



LETTER



CABLE



MEMO

OTHER:

FROM :

X. Caballero

TO :

Mr. Linier

SUBJECT :

Rapport de fin de Mission

SUMMARY :

Original filed in No.:

with Relief Office

UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE
PRIORITY

S V C Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

N R

Address (es)

ONUC

BAKWANGA

1ST MARCH 1961

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE REFPAK 53 TO CABALLERO FROM GRUN
 FURTHER MY REFPAK 52 PLEASE INCLUDE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT
 NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LANDINGS AND TONNAGES EACH KIND OF
 SUPPLY CARRIED TO BEING UP TO 28 FEB THE DATA GIVEN YOUR
 PREVIOUS PROGRESS REPORTS

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

Mr. Tooby *h*

UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE
PRIORITY

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Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

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UNATIONS

1ST MARCH 1961

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

ONUC 1000

TO MACFARQUHAR FROM LINER FOR PURPOSES OF CONSOLIDATED
PROGRESS REPORT GRATEFUL YOU ARRANGE REPORTS BY ALL
UNITED NATIONS OFFICES MONIES RECEIVED FOR FAMINE RELIEF
FUND TO 28 FEB AND CABLE CONSOLIDATED FIGURES EARLIEST

Handwritten initials

Alga 5684 - 100,000 - 26/10/60

1961 MAR 1 17:19
TRANSMITTED
ONALC

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

Mr. Tooby

Mr. Liner

Priority Nations traffic
is strictly limited

2 V C Service	Priority Routing	2 2 2 2 Priority	PRIORITY NATIONS
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INDICATE
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Drafted by

Approved

Date

BY

T. R.

T. D.

c/soc 500/1
Mr Grun
HJ
S

REPORT ON WORK OF WHO STAFF

IN BAKWANGA

For the week ending 18 February 1961

by Dr E.M. Poulton

Personnel

Dr Moreno-Martinez arrived in Bakwanga on 11 February 1961. His knowledge of French is very slight, and it has not been possible as yet for him to work alone. It has been stressed in previous reports, and it is stressed once more that medical officers sent to this area must have a working knowledge of French, unless they speak Tshiluba.

Transport

Of the six UNICEF Willys station wagons which have so far been received at Bakwanga, only two have been allotted to WHO staff. This is on the direct instruction of Mr Grun, the chief co-ordinator, who states that the other four cars are not bound by the usual UNICEF rules, and are intended for the general refugee programme. In fact, two of these cars have been issued to the Austrian medical team, one has been used by FAO and the sixth has been used by Mr Caballero personally.

There are four WHO medical officers at Bakwanga with two Willys station wagons. A third car was hired by ONUC from the Forminière company and put at the disposal of Dr Hasselman. However, on its first long excursion it suffered a puncture, and it was found that the spare wheel did not fit the car. Dr Hasselman was therefore obliged to spend the night with the Catholic Sisters at Katanda. Since then she has been allowed to use Mr Caballero's station wagon pending the arrival of another Willys station wagon from Leopoldville.

When this car arrives there will still be only three cars for four doctors. A medical officer in this area is quite useless without a car. Therefore it is essential that if further doctors are to be sent to Bakwanga, transport should also be arranged for each of them. The rule must be - no car no doctor.

Work carried out

Work was continued as previously, each of the three WHO staff members that had a car being responsible for the dispensaries and hospitals of one sector - Dr Hasselman the area of Tshilenge, with occasional visits to the area of Katanda, Dr Delcos the area of Miabi-Merode, and Dr Poulton the area of Tshibombo - Kabeya Kamwanga - Mukamba. Dr Moreno accompanied Dr Delcos with whom he could speak Spanish, and occasionally Dr Poulton with whom his communication was extremely limited.

The Austrian medical team continued to do the work of three doctors, looking after the pediatric department at Disele hospital, the Red Cross Camp and its associated tented accommodation at Disele, and Miabi hospital.

Captain Melson of the Ghana forces is understood to be stationed at Mwene Ditu, and to be giving medical care to the surrounding area.

There is need for a medical officer at Gandaajika, where there is considerable refugee problem.

General situation

Refugees continue to arrive in considerable number. During this week 40,000 arrived, mostly from Usumbura, and were widely distributed through the area. Cases of Kwashiorkor with oedema are now uncommon in the area around Bakwanga, but the countryside is full of very thin children and adults slowly gaining strength. Most of the frank areas of Kwashiorkor have now been concentrated in the Disela hospital and camp at Bakwanga, having been brought in by the WHO staff on their visits. A considerable number of cases of smallpox are still occurring at certain points in the areas of greatest refugee concentration. Vaccination is hampered by lack of vaccine. The dried vaccine requested by cable three weeks ago, and requested again personally by Dr Delcos last week has still not arrived. Perhaps the personal appeal which Mr Grun promised to make this week will be more successful.

(Sgd.) E.M. POULTON

PRIORITY

NNN

UC 69

CUL 013

PPP CUA

DE CUL 013/07

FM ONUC BAK

TO ONUC LEO

BT

UNCLAS(.) ONUC BAK 094 (.) FOR GRUN FROM CABALLERO REF YOUR
BAK 31 (.) NO REPEAT. NO DISTRIBUTION OF REPORT HAS BEEN MADE HERE

END

BT

CFN ~~BAK094 31~~

07/1545Z FEB CUL

1961 FEB -7 PM 4:21

O.N.U.C.

phoned to Mr. Tooley 1625Z


C25 to file

79

C/Soc 500/1

INCOMING TELEGRAM delivered to:		
Spec. Repr. SG	Chief Gen. Serv.	ILO
Mil. Assist. SG	Publ. Info Off	UNESCO
Chief Civ. Ops	Civil Aviation	Mail Operat.
Chief Adm. Off	WHO	PX Officer
Chief Fid. Adm	Acco & Travel	FAO Repr.
Chief Pers Off	Language Serv.	ITU Repr.
Chief Fin. Off	UN Food Relief	WMO
Chief Proc Off	Welfare Office	Ch. Comm. Off.

MILITARY recipients: M:



UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES

INDICATE
PRIORITY

SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

N R

Address (es)

UNCO
BAKANGA

6 February 1961

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

FOR CABALLERO FROM GRUN REFBK 31 STOP YOUR FIRST
REPORT TO TWENTYEIGHT JANUARY GREATLY APPRECIATED AS
BEING COMPREHENSIVE AND TIMELY STOP PLEASE NOTE
THAT NO DISTRIBUTION OF THIS REPORT SHOULD BE MADE
FROM BAKANGA STOP PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY HAS ALREADY
BEEN MADE AND IF SO TO WHOM

Alga 5684 - 100,000 - 26/10/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

F. J. Rooby

J. Grün

to file.

REPORT ON REFUGEE RELIEF ACTIVITIES
IN SOUTH-KASAI

Up to 4 February 1961

I. CENSUS DATA

1. No further information was available during the week ending February 4, 1961. It is recalled that the last known census reports showed a total of 282.300 refugees for the 22 communes covering the main refugee areas.

II. FOOD INCOME AND DISTRIBUTION

A. Movement of foodstuffs

2. Total tonnage received up to and including February 3, 1961,

1,587.430

Total quantity delivered for distribution
up to February 3, 1961,

752.672

Available balance

834.848

For breakdown of above quantities, see Annex I.

3. Distribution to hospitals and dispensaires was disrupted during the week, due to the decision taken by local authorities to relieve the missionaries of the Congo Protestant Relief Agency from the responsibility that had been given to them in this field. This decision was taken without previously establishing precise ways of serving the needs that the CPRA trucks had been covering. Thus, a solution of continuity took place.

4. The Ministry of Health, while disagreeing with the above decision, took steps to fill the gap. Most unfortunately, a conflict of competence opened, between that Ministry and the Refugees Commissioner, who wants to be also responsible for supplying to hospitals and dispensaries. In the absence of Messrs. Kalonji and Ngalula (in Katanga) no one felt capable to arbitrating in this conflict. Thus, the Refugees Commissioner is nominally in charge of the task, but no appreciable activity has yet been developed by him in this field. The development of the situation will be followed closely.

III. AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMME

5. The main work of the FAO team during the week can be resumed as follows:

- (a) Redistribution of the seed stocks previously accumulated on main distribution points;
- (b) Advise on action tending to obtain an increase of the cultivated area, by using Colocoton machinery and also manpower supplied by the local authorities.

6. The annexed report prepared by the members of the team, contains detailed data on the quantities of seed distributed.

IV. MEDICAL AID AND HEALTH PROGRAMME

7. Follows the weekly report of Dr. Poulton:

" Care of the pediatric ward and isolation block at Disele Hospital was handed over to the medical team, together with the care of the 450 undernourished children and mothers at the Red Cross Camp, Disele. In the place of Dr. Poulton of WHO who previously carried out this work, there are now three medical officers of the team, who carry out the same work, with the addition of an adult tuberculosis ward that has been handed over to their care. The medical team also provides a dentist who has begun to work in Disele Hospital.

Dr. Delcos and Dr. Blankhart have given great attention to the distribution of medical supplies, received on January 30th by air, to the dispensaries and rural hospitals of the area. In this they have been assisted by two or three junior members of the Red Cross. Dr. Blankhart left Bakwanga on February 2nd; Lt. Dr. Melson of the Ghanaian forces has been posted away from Bakwanga. His daily visits to Miabi hospital have been taken over by a member of the medical team.

Fish meal has been distributed to a family living at the public dispensary, Bakwanga, and that does its own cooking. Fish meal has also been incorporated with rice in a meal given to the refugees at the Red Cross Camp, Disele. It was not popular on account of its grittiness, although the flavour was not disliked.

Co-operation between WHO staff members and the medical team is as satisfactorily as possible in the circumstances. It is however unsatisfactory in a small area like Bakwanga that the reinforcing medical personnel should receive instructions from different sources, often conflicting. There are usually a number of different ways in which a medical or organizational problem can be tackled, some of

them equally practical. It is however advisable that all the medical personnel should be working according to the same plan, and it is better that this plan be worked out as far as possible locally rather than centrally. It is necessary to appoint a teamleader in Bakwanga, who will be responsible for developing the general plan, and for co-ordinating all the international medical personnel working in the area."

7. This last paragraph calls for the following observation. The Austrian medical team has a very specific task, as per the instructions given by Col. Kapoor. This task can be developed independently from the activities of the WHO team. Cause for "conflicting instructions" should therefore not exist. Much less at present, when the control of and responsibility for the facilities available at Disele have been transferred to the medical team. It took some time, however, to obtain recognition of this separation of fields of competence, as some members of the WHO team appeared to believe, at the beginning, that the medical team had to be integrated to some extent in their own schedule of work.

A. Austrian medical team

8. The work of the team was concentrated on the development of the Disele tent camp. Forty Congolese workers were specially engaged to help in mounting the tent camp and thus good progress has been made. It is expected that this work will finish by the middle of next week. Tent mounting in Miabi will then start.

9. Medical work in Bakwanga and Miabi proceeded simultaneously.

V. ACTIVITIES OF THE ICAO TEAM

10. Work at the airport proceeded normally. The total of UN flights during the week (28 January - 3 February) was as follows:

<u>Origin</u>	<u>Landings</u>	
Léopoldville	33	
Ndola	20	
Luluabourg	18	
Kamina	12	
Nairobi	2	
Usumbura	2	
Elisabethville	1	
Luanda	1	
Salisbury	1	
Tshikapa	1	91
Take offs	91	91
Non-UN landings and take offs	23 + 22	45
Overall total of movements		227

VI. PERSONNEL (Week ending February 3, 1961)

International

Start of week	18	
Additions during week (Raba, Hasselman)	2	
Departure (Blankhart)	1	
	<hr/>	19

Local

Office and Stores	3	
Drivers	45	
	<hr/>	48

Galante

SUPPLIES REPORT

Week ending: February 3, 1961

Items	Weight per unit	R E C E I V E D						Distributed		Balance		Forecast		Notes
		A I R		O T H E R		T O T A L		(List attached)		7/1961		In	out	
		QTY	WGT	QTY	WGT	QTY	WGT	QTY	WGT	TY	WGT			
BEANS	50 kg	987	49.350			987	49.350	585	29.250	402	20.100			
Fish, can	20 kg	1.235	24.700			1.235	24.700	639	12.780	596	11.920			
FISH, dry	90 kg	2.432	218.880			2.432	218.880	2032	182.880	400	36.000			
FISH, dry	50 kg	701	35.050			701	35.050	N I L		701	35.050			
FLOUR	70 kg	11493	804.510	200	14.000	11693	818.510	4096	286.720	7.597	531.790			
MILK, drum	110 kg	211	23.210	170	18.700	381	41.910	229	25.190	152	16.720			
MILK, ctn	30 kg	3.350	100.510			3.350	100.510	165	4.950	3.185	95.550			
PAIM OIL	250 kg	285	71.250	89	22.250	374	93.500	224	56.000	150	37.500			
POTATOES	45 kg	2.686	117.230			2.686	117.230	2686	117.230	N I L				
RICE	50 kg	836	41.800			836	41.800	544	27.200	292	14.600			
SUGAR, box	66 kg	565	37.290			565	37.290	152	10.032	413	27.258			
SUGAR, bag	88 kg	100	8.800			100	8.800	5	440	95	8.360			
TOTAL		1,532.480		54.950		1,587.430		752.672		834.848				

WEEKLY PROGRESS REPORT

of

FAO Seed Distribution Team
ONUC Refugee Relief Program

from

28 January - 4 February 1961

1. During this week great efforts have been made to arrange for the re-distribution of seed stocks which had been accumulated in the previous period in local stores in the districts of Dibungi, Tshilenge, Dilunga and Tshintshianku. This was only possible by transporting small quantities of 5 bags a time by jeep into the neighbouring villages. The distribution in the region North of Bakwanga (Bena Ditutu, Bakwa Disumpu and Lupatapata) was hampered by the bad condition of the roads which are practically inaccessible in this rainy season for 5-ton trucks. The arrival of the 4-wheel drive 1-ton trucks at the end of the week facilitated the distribution in this and other areas. The general output of this week was also slowed down by the fact that the central store at Bakwanga run out of stocks of maize and groundnut seed. Mr.Grun's office at Leopoldville was therefore requested by cable to make urgent arrangements for airlifting the remaining quantities of seed to Bakwanga. The team also decided to order an additional quantity of 75 tons of KUNDE bean seed from "Sociedade Angolana de Cereais" at Luanda (Angola), if airlift to Bakwanga would be possible before mid February. According to information received from various reliable sources this type of bean can be planted in the area until the beginning of March.
2. The quantities of seed and tools actually distributed in this week are the following: 409 bags of maize seed (37,628 tons), 148 bags of KUNDE bean seed (13,616 tons), 86 bags of groundnut seed (4,730 tons), 4550 hoes and 2310 bushknives, according to the attached survey. In consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture for South Kasai at Bakwanga, the team tried to fill up as much as possible the areas which had been overlooked or insufficiently served during the previous period. The total quantity of about 56 tons of seeds was transported by 16 loads in trucks from the UN Pakistani troops. In all these activities the guidance and assistance of the local agricultural staff again appeared to be indispensable and was therefore greatly appreciated by the team.
3. Mr.J.Berlijn, the FAO Rural Engineer stationed at Leopoldville, visited Bakwanga from 29 - 31 January to advise the Minister of Agriculture on mechanized land preparation at the paysannat "KALENDE KASHILE" and in the neighbourhood of Bakwanga, in cooperation with the COLOCOTON company and the FORMINIERE mining company respectively. As far as the latter project is concerned, a first investigation by the expert

disclosed that the graders made available by FORMINIERE cannot be used for this particular purpose. As only one tractor and additional agricultural equipment is available. the acreage to be mechanically prepared in the neighbourhood of Bakwanga will not surpass 30 ha. in the period still left. The Minister was advised accordingly.

4. On 30 January Mr. Berlijn visited the paysannat "KALENDE KASHILE", together with Mr. Müller, the Belgian adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture at Bakwanga. They discussed the question again with Mr. Joseph Lukusa, the mechanisation expert of the paysannat, and with Mr. C. NPoy, the agronomist of the paysannat. They came to the conclusion that even when the COLOCOTON company could make available the 10 Fordson Mayor tractors and necessary plough and disc harrows they promised, it would be very doubtful whether the revised target of preparing a total acreage of 225 ha. could be reached before the sowing deadlines for the various crops. The main difficulty is to cut the standing vegetation in this rainy season. Normally land is prepared in May/June after burning the vegetation. The COLOCOTON company therefore agreed to do the ploughing, but could not guarantee the harrowing. It was finally agreed that the seed necessary for planting 25 ha. of maize, 100 ha. of KUNDE beans and 100 ha. of groundnuts would be reserved, but only supplied according to the acreage prepared. Mr. Berlijn has presented a report to the Minister of Agriculture on this matter, dated 31 January 1961.
- 5; The proposal of the Minister of Agriculture to make available young native workers to open new land for additional food production, has now been elaborated for 800 persons in 5 different localities for a period of 17 successive days, possibly to be extended to one month. The target per person is to open up 2 are per day, which acreage will be planted the next day with seed to be reserved for this purpose, according to the following scheme:

Region	Number of workers available	Total acreage to be opened in 17 days	Maize		Beans		Groundnuts	
			acreage in ha.	seed in kgs.	acreage in ha.	seed in kgs.	acreage in ha.	seed in kgs.
Bakwanga	100	34	6	-	17	680	17	2380
Tshibombo	100	34	17	680	17	680	-	-
Miabi	200	68	34	1360	34	1360	-	-
Kabeya								
Kamuanga	200	68	68	2720	-	-	-	-
Munkamba	200	68	-	-	68	2720	-	-
TOTALS	800	272	119	4760	136	5440	17	2380

Note: Seed rates calculated are for maize: 40 kgs./ha., for KUNDE beans: 40 kgs./ha., for groundnuts: 140 kgs./ha. (unshelled).

It has been agreed in principle with the Refugee Relief Coordinator, Mr. Caballero, that foodstuffs will be supplied to these workers on the spot for a maximum of one month, on the basis of 300 gr. of maize

flour and 60 gr. of dried fish per person per day for 6 days a week. This means for 800 persons a total supply of 80 bags of maize flour (70 kgs./bag), 12 bags of dried fish (90 kgs./bag), and 1 barrel of palm oil (200 kgs. net/barrel) for the maximum duration of one month.

6. Mr.J.Abbott, FAO Liaison Officer with Mr.Grun's office at Leopoldville, and Mr.De Traz, his successor, visited Bakwanga on 1 and 2 February to make themselves familiar with the activities of the team on the spot. Unfortunately, they did not meet the teamleader, who was on a field trip. Mr.Abbott, who made a short distribution trip with Mr.de Jong in the Dilunga area, was particularly impressed by the local seed distribution system which already existed in the area for cotton seed. This system is, of course, of great help to the present UN seed distribution project. Mr.Abbott was requested to discuss at FAO Headquarters in which sequence and by what intervals the three members of the team should leave Bakwanga to return via Leopoldville to their duty stations. It is suggested that Mr.de Jong should leave Bakwanga about 15 February, Mr.Egli one or two weeks later, and Mr. Wirtz about 5 March 1961.
7. It should be realised that to evaluate the present food position in the refugee area, it will be necessary to undertake a thorough examination in each district of the actual foodstuffs available in each household, and of the quantities of food expected to be harvested in the next few months. This investigation should be based on a systematic sampling method. Such a study would enable an estimation of the period during which the food supply should be continued, eventually of the foodstuffs which should be distributed, and may also give an insight into the desirability of further assistance in the agricultural field.
Meanwhile, the team has started a preliminary investigation on food stocks available in some of the districts. This work will be intensified as far as time permits, in collaboration with the WHO Nutrition Expert, Dr.A.Raba, who arrived at Bakwanga on 2 February. As the team will be mainly occupied, for the remaining period of their assignment, with the actual seed distribution, it is strongly recommended to recruit as soon as possible an FAO Expert, who could carry out this task in cooperation with a Nutrition Expert and the local staff of the Ministry of Agriculture at Bakwanga.
8. It has also appeared that after the seed distribution is finished, the collection and distribution of manioc sticks has to be organised. Manioc which is the staple food of the area, can be planted until mid April. The crop is normally harvested after one to three years. In the famine period the majority of the older plantations have been harvested. As a consequence there is at present very little planting material available, while the demand, especially on the part of the refugees, is very great. This problem calls for special attention.
10. Another problem which may be considered for further action, either by FAO or WHO, is how to establish new fresh water resources for the population. The team was informed that the reason why this area has not been populated before the recent migration is not in the first

instance the poor fertility of the soil, but the lack of fresh water, which in some cases has now to be carried over distances of 8-10 kms.

- II; In many districts of the refugee area vegetable seeds are requested for immediate sowing. The team will try in the next few days to find out the quantities and species needed in each district, and will cable accordingly to ONUC Headquarters in Leopoldville for possible supplies.
12. The team has cabled on 3 February to accept the 100 tons of fertilizers kindly offered by The Netherlands in a NPK mixture of 5/14/0 or similar composition, but is still awaiting further information about the most suitable composition for the area. This fertilizers will be applied in the most progressive districts and possibly for demonstration plots, at the rate of 150-200 kgs./ha., to be chosen in close consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture at Bakwanga.

Bakwanga, 5 February 1961.

Mr.H.Wirtz
Mr.J.J.de Jong
Mr.R.Egli

ds/dj;

OUTPUT

QUANTITIES OF SEED AND TOOLS DISTRIBUTED PER AREA IN THE PERIOD
28 JANUARY - 4 FEBRUARY 1961

REGION	MAIZE		KUNDE BEANS		GROUNDNUTS		HOES	MACHETES
	NUMBER OF BAGS (92 kg)	TONS	NUMBER OF BAGS (92 kg)	TONS	NUMBER OF BAGS (55 kg)	TONS	NUMBER	NUMBER
DILUNGA	88		30		-		1.000	500
B. DITUTU-B. BISAMPU	54		-		-		-	-
KANSHI	30		-		-		-	-
LUPATAPATA- BATUMBA	15		-		-		-	-
BANDIBANGA	22		13		-		900	400
MOLOWAIE	35		-		-			
TSHIJIBA	40		-		-		-	-
KAMIJI	20		-		-		-	-
KAKONA	70		-		-		600	300
KASEKAYI	35		-		-		1.200	650
DIBUNGI	*		35		-		850	460
KABEYA KAMUANGA	-		35		63		-	-
BUSHIMAIE TSHIABA	-		35		-		-	-
PAYSANNAT KALENDE KASHILE	-		-		24		-	-
TOTALS	409	37.628	148	13.616	86	4.730	4.550	2.310

annex to weekly report

REPORT ON REFUGEE RELIEF ACTIVITIES
IN SOUTH-KASAI

Up to 4 February 1961

I. CENSUS DATA

1. No further information was available during the week ending February 4, 1961. It is recalled that the last known census reports showed a total of 282,300 refugees for the 22 communes covering the main refugee areas.

II. FOOD INCOME AND DISTRIBUTION

A. Movement of foodstuffs

2. Total tonnage received up to and including February 3, 1961,

1,587.430

Total quantity delivered for distribution
up to February 3, 1961,

752.672

Available balance

834.848

For breakdown of above quantities, see Annex I.

3. Distribution to hospitals and dispensaries was disrupted during the week, due to the decision taken by local authorities to relieve the missionaries of the Congo Protestant Relief Agency from the responsibility that had been given to them in this field. This decision was taken without previously establishing precise ways of serving the needs that the CPRA trucks had been covering. Thus, a solution of continuity took place.

4. The Ministry of Health, while disagreeing with the above decision, took steps to fill the gap. Most unfortunately, a conflict of competence opened, between that Ministry and the Refugees Commissioner, who wants to be also responsible for supplying to hospitals and dispensaries. In the absence of Messrs. Kalonji and Ngalula (in Katanga) no one felt capable to arbitrating in this conflict. Thus, the Refugees Commissioner is nominally in charge of the task, but no appreciable activity has yet been developed by him in this field. The development of the situation will be followed closely.

III. AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMME

5. The main work of the FAO team during the week can be resumed as follows:

- (a) Redistribution of the seed stocks previously accumulated on main distribution points;
- (b) Advise on action tending to obtain an increase of the cultivated area, by using Colocoton machinery and also manpower supplied by the local authorities.

6. The annexed report prepared by the members of the team, contains detailed data on the quantities of seed distributed.

IV. MEDICAL AID AND HEALTH PROGRAMME

7. Follows the weekly report of Dr. Poulton:

" Care of the pediatric ward and isolation block at Disele Hospital was handed over to the medical team, together with the care of the 450 undernourished children and mothers at the Red Cross Camp, Disele. In the place of Dr. Poulton of WHO who previously carried out this work, there are now three medical officers of the team, who carry out the same work, with the addition of an adult tuberculosis ward that has been handed over to their care. The medical team also provides a dentist who has begun to work in Disele Hospital.

Dr. Delcos and Dr. Blankhart have given great attention to the distribution of medical supplies, received on January 30th by air, to the dispensaries and rural hospitals of the area. In this they have been assisted by two or three junior members of the Red Cross. Dr. Blankhart left Bakwanga on February 2nd; Lt. Dr. Melson of the Ghanaian forces has been posted away from Bakwanga. His daily visits to Miabi hospital have been taken over by a member of the medical team.

Fish meal has been distributed to a family living at the public dispensary, Bakwanga, and that does its own cooking. Fish meal has also been incorporated with rice in a meal given to the refugees at the Red Cross Camp, Disele. It was not popular on account of its grittiness, although the flavour was not disliked.

Co-operation between WHO staff members and the medical team is as satisfactorily as possible in the circumstances. It is however unsatisfactory in a small area like Bakwanga that the reinforcing medical personnel should receive instructions from different sources, often conflicting. There are usually a number of different ways in which a medical or organizational problem can be tackled, some of

them equally practical. It is however advisable that all the medical personnel should be working according to the same plan, and it is better that this plan be worked out as far as possible locally rather than centrally. It is necessary to appoint a teamleader in Bakwanga, who will be responsible for developing the general plan, and for co-ordinating all the international medical personnel working in the area."

7. This last paragraph calls for the following observation. The Austrian medical team has a very specific task, as per the instructions given by Col. Kapoor. This task can be developed independently from the activities of the WHO team. Cause for "conflicting instructions" should therefore not exist. Much less at present, when the control of and responsibility for the facilities available at Disele have been transferred to the medical team. It took some time, however, to obtain recognition of this separation of fields of competence, as some members of the WHO team appeared to believe, at the beginning, that the medical team had to be integrated to some extent in their own schedule of work.

A. Austrian medical team

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9. Medicalwork in Bakwanga and Miabi proceeded simultaneously.

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10. Work at the airport proceeded normally. The total of UN flights during the week (28 January - 3 February) was as follows:

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Take offs	91	91
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Overall total of movements		227

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Additions during week (Raba, Hasselman)	2	
Departure (Blankhart)	1	
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Local

Office and Stores	3	
Drivers	45	
	<hr/>	48

SUPPLIES REPORT

Week ending: February 3, 1961

Items	Weight per unit	R E C E I V E D						Distributed		Balance		Forecast		Initial
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SUGAR, bag	88 kg	100	8.800			100	8.800	5	440	95	8.360			
TOTAL		1,532	480	54	950	1,587	430	752	672	834	848			

UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES

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is strictly limited.

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ONUC
BAKWANGA

1 February 1961

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

FOR CABALLERO FROM GHUN STOP REFBK 28 STOP PLEASE
 CONFIRM IN WRITING YOUR DAILY CABLE OF SUPPLIES REPORT
 STOP NUMEROUS DISCREPANCIES IN FIGURES AS RECEIVED
 FROM DAY TO DAY ~~STOP~~ SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE GARBLING IN
 TRANSMISSION AND CORRECTED FIGURES NECESSARY FOR
 CONTROL PURPOSES HERE

Alga 5484 - 100,000 - 25/10/60

T. O. R.

BY:

T. O. D.

Drafted by:

Authorized:

Date:

F.W. Tooby
J. Grün

UNITED NATIONS - NATIONS UNIES

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Dr. Huner

Address (es)

ONUC
LULUABOURG

1 February 1961

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

FOR GAVARD FROM GRUN STOP PLEASE INCLUDE IN YOUR DAILY
CABLED REPORT DETAILS OF SUPPLIES IN STOCK AT LULUABOURG
IN WAREHOUSE AND AT AIRFIELD CMA QUANTITIES RECEIVED
CMA QUANTITIES DESPATCHED STOP DAILY WRITTEN CONFIRMATION
REQUIRED

A/gu 5644 - 100,000 - 26/10/60

T. O. R.

BY:

T. O. D.

Drafted by :

Authorized

Date

P.W. Tooby
J. Grün

O.N.U.C.
LEOPOLDVILLE

Office of Public Information

(For use of information media - not an official record)

Press Release LEO/P/10

30 January 1961

CONGO FAMINE RELIEF

An overwhelming response has been received to the United Nations appeal for help to combat the Congo famine.

As a result of the widespread publicity given in the Press, governments, societies, volunteer organisations and individuals have rushed immediate aid which has enabled the UN to cut down the death rate by 75 per cent in a matter of weeks.

So far the United Nations has only physically received ~~\$286,000~~ ^{436,000} from UNICEF, and \$154,000 from general contributions, but it is known that further funds are either on the way or are being held at the disposal of the United Nations by other organisations throughout the world.

In the United Kingdom, the Oxford Famine Relief ^{Committee} organisation, for instance, has already announced cash contributions totalling £100,000; the British government has given a £5,000 contribution; the British Embassy in the Congo capital, Leopoldville, has announced a contribution of £5,000 from the UK's "Save the Children Fund"; the Swedish "Save the Children" fund has announced that £60,000 is being held at the disposal of the UN; and the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva has pledged approximately \$140,000 from various countries. In addition to these "bulk" contributions, small donations are being received by letter every day from people all over the world.

These contributions are vital if the conditions of the Kasai province refugees are to be permanently improved.

Steps to combat the famine began in November when the United Nations was faced with providing help for nearly a quarter of a million refugees living under famine conditions in the Bakwanga area alone. The estimated total for the Kasai province at that time was 300,000. A coordinating committee was set up in the area, comprising representatives of local authorities as well as representatives of all the donor organizations. This committee still supervises the distribution of food by the Congolese Red Cross, Protestant and Catholic Missions, and other bodies, and a small UN team takes care of warehousing, organization of transport, and other planning and administrative details.

.....

It is in Leopoldville that the UN Chief Refugee Relief Coordinator, Mr. John Grün, his deputy, Mr. F. Tooby, and a small staff organize the flow of food supplies to the stricken areas. From 15 December to 25 January 700 tons of food were flown into the Kasai province, mainly maize, dried fish, palm oil and milk, but a lack of transport within the famine area controlled distribution. It has only been possible to distribute one third of the food necessary to keep the refugees rations at an adequate level, but it is hoped that this position will change in the next week when the UN will have at its disposal all the trucks needed for a full-scale distribution.

And airlift facilities have also improved. The United States has placed ~~five C-124~~ aircraft at the disposal of the UN to supplement its own air transport. The large quantities of supplies needed have been located in the countries neighbouring the Congo - maize flour and seeds from Rhodesia; maize flour and dried fish from Uganda; Hospital tents from Kenya; ground nut seeds from Cameroons; bean seeds from Angola; and the added possibility of 100 tons of rice from Cairo and 100 tons of dried fish from Europe.

In addition to these airlifts, the American Government has informed the UN that a large and continuing supply of American foodstuffs would be made available through maritime shipments. This includes an immediate allotment of 10,000 tons of rice, 4,000 tons of corn meal and 1,000 tons of dried milk. In addition, the American Government has promised to ~~provide~~ ^{make} 1,500 tons of foodstuffs ~~for~~ ^{to} the Congo on a monthly basis, beginning early in February.

These airlifts will continue until the first bulk food supplies can reach the famine area by surface route. It is expected that the first bulk shipment of 1,500 tons of maize flour will arrive in the Congo at the port of Matadi from the United States on 10 February, but it will take a further 20 days to reach the Bakwanga area. From Matadi the supplies have to travel by road to Leopoldville, then by river barge to Port Francqui, by rail to Luluabourg, then on to the famine area in a fleet of UN trucks. At this stage it is not anticipated that the Luluabourg railhead will be available before the second part of February.

But the question of supplying adequate food to the refugees is not the only problem; there are others, each requiring urgent attention.

To provide food for the hungry is an immediate consideration, but thoughts have to be given to the planting of crops as a long-term measure. Here, the time element is the big factor. The seeds that are being, and have been, flown into the Congo must be planted in Kasai by the end of the first week in February for a June crop. Two hundred tons of maize and bean seeds have already been distributed, and the first groundnuts to arrive from the Cameroons are also being distributed as a matter of urgency. Seeding will be limited due to the unavoidably late preparation of the land, but it is the UN intention to take every measure to achieve

a maximum crop yield in June. But not only the time element controls this factor. The Kasai soil is notoriously unfertile, and when combined with a serious water shortage in the area a firm estimate of the June harvest becomes a difficult matter.

Another grave problem - a medical one - has also to be faced.

Malnutrition and under-nourishment need specialized medical care, and the famine has caused an accumulation of severe cases. These cases are mainly concentrated in the Bakwanga and Miabi hospitals - at Miabi 1,200 patients are living in a hospital of only 200 beds - and the overcrowding raises sanitary problems and the accompanying danger of a gastro-enteritis epidemic. Any failure to prevent such an epidemic could give rise to a death rate higher than that caused by the actual famine.

The United Nations have taken steps to avert this danger. An advance party of what will eventually be a 50-man medical team is already in the Bakwanga area, and tenting facilities for 1,500 patients are being organized to relieve the overcrowding in hospitals. Famine conditions require specialized feeding, and to meet this the United Nations have provided four World Health Organization advisors - who use helicopter facilities to speed their movement - to advise the medical staffs in the area.

The United Nations has thrown all its available resources into meeting the emergency situation. Of its efforts to date, Mr. John Grün, who has been involved in the operation since its inception, says: "We virtually 'crashed' our way into the relief programme, for it was a situation of extreme emergency requiring immediate action. Now, with the situation coming under control, it is time to consolidate our position and smooth out the organizational and distribution difficulties that exist. This operation - involving the saving of human life and the curtailment of misery - can truly be said to be a United Nations task. Regardless of the political situation within the Congo at present and the frustrations that exist, every UN member knows that in this respect he or she is doing a vital job. Looking back to the famine conditions that existed last November, when it was estimated that 200 people were dying daily, we can truthfully say that steps taken to halt the famine have been beyond our greatest expectations. There is much work ahead, but now we have more to go on than mere hope".

Gahala

C/Soc 500/1

REPORT ON REFUGEE RELIEF ACTIVITIES
IN SOUTH-KASAI

Up to 28 January 1961

Note: This report, the first of a series of weekly report to come, recapitulates information concerning refugee relief operations from the beginning, in a resumed form.

I. CENSUS DATA AND OTHER EVALUATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES

A. Census data

1. In the early days of the relief operation figures for the number and location of refugees were the result of evaluations based on individual observation. The first census reports started coming in a fortnight, and are now being gradually added to.

2. Detailed figures broken down by family status and village have been received for only a small number of the thirty-six communes in the relief area. However, the census takers' totals, without detailed analysis, are available for twenty-two of these communes and are complete up to 31 December 1960 or soon after. They show a total of 282.300 refugees, all of whom, in the opinion of the Government Commissioner for Refugees, are in need of relief. The twenty-two communes cover the main refugee areas and it is believed that the number of refugees in the other communes will not be as great by far as in the areas covered by the census.

3. It may thus be roughly estimated that the total number of refugees will at least reach 300.000. New inflow is rated at about 100 a week through the Lake Mukamba-Dimbelenge border. A group of 4.000 refugees arrived at Mwena-Ditu on 26th of January from the Mueka region. Such mass-arrivals, however, are not expected to become a regular feature, provided that the political situation does not deteriorate.

4. The census figures are compiled by census takers appointed by the Commissioner for Refugees and directly supervised by him or his deputy. The criteria for the definition of refugees appear to be fairly stringently observed, and as far as possible ration cards are issued only on the certification of the Commissioner or his deputy.

5. The procedure for withdrawing ration cards as the holders become self-supporting, has hardly yet been put into effect. It will be watched with great interest. It must be borne in mind that, in the conditions which are likely to prevail in South-Kasai for some time to come, the line between refugees deemed to be in need of relief and those deemed to have become self-supporting will be most difficult to draw; individual cases will have to be considered sympathetically. For example, an estimated five to ten per cent of the refugees at present in need of relief are children and widows whose fathers or husbands were killed in the disturbances of October 1960, and these will presumably have to receive relief from some source or another for a considerable time to come. Similarly, a sympathetic view will have to be taken of the position of the "sinistrés", that is former inhabitants of the region who lost most of their property and food reserves in consequence of the depredations of October last.

B. Other evaluations of the number of refugees

6. In the early part of January 1961 two helicopters were used to make a survey of a large part of the refugee area with the object of counting houses and thereby obtaining data on the general population concentrations.

7. The total number of houses counted was 63.000; at a conservative estimate of seven persons per house this would give a total of 441.000 inhabitants, though it should be pointed out that the helicopters flew mainly along the more important roads, so that a fairly large number of houses, particularly those not attached to existing villages, may have remained uncounted.

8. It is hoped to obtain copies of aerial photographs of the region made in 1956 and to compare these with the results of the helicopter survey (Léopoldville office, please note.) The difference between the number of houses present in 1956 and the number observed in January 1961 should give a reasonably approximate indication of the number of refugees who have moved into the district. Meanwhile, it may be stated that on the assumption that some seventy-five per cent of the 441.000 persons are in need of relief, the total thus obtained ties in fairly closely with the estimate of 300.000 given in paragraph 3 above.

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been given a complete review to determine the extent of the damage to the system and the need for further action. It is recommended that the system be brought back to its normal operating condition as soon as possible.

The following information was obtained from the review of the system logs and the statements of the personnel involved. It is recommended that the system be brought back to its normal operating condition as soon as possible. The following information was obtained from the review of the system logs and the statements of the personnel involved. It is recommended that the system be brought back to its normal operating condition as soon as possible.

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II. FOOD INCOME AND DISTRIBUTION

9. The main stages of the Food Relief Operation in Bakwanga, and their progress to date, are as follows:

A. Reception and storage of food

10. Foodstuff arriving by airlift at Bakwanga airport are unloaded directly to trucks and then transported for storage in buildings obtained from the Mibeka company. These buildings are situated inside the Mibeka's fenced-in compounds; the company has agreed that their own security force should keep a permanent guard in the storage site. To the present there was no lack of storage space. With the gradual increase of the number of trucks intended for distribution, a better balance between in- and outgoing stuff is being achieved; eventual lack of storage space is therefore less likely to arise.

11. In the earlier days of the operation, unloading and storage were handled very efficiently by the UN-Ghana troops posted in Bakwanga. Through circumstances beyond our control, this highly satisfactory arrangement has had to be discontinued. Unloading is now done with local manpower supplied and paid by the local authorities. UN trucks driven by local drivers paid by the UN transport the goods to the store rooms. Supervision at the airport and at the stores is carried out by non-coms of the military transport unit, supported by local foremen and storekeepers, included in the operation's pay-roll.

B. Distribution

12. Three different distribution networks have been organized, in order to serve the main groups in need of food relief, as distinguished in the basic technical reports that have oriented the operation.

- (i) The top-priority group is constituted by those refugees (adult and children) whose advanced state of sickness imposes their internment in hospitals, dispensaries and "Kwashiorkor centres". Regular food stockage in such institutions was made the particular responsibility of the volunteer workers of the Congo Protestant Relief Agency, who deserve unlimited praise for their devoted and well organized work. After establishing weekly distribution patterns, the C.P.R.A. submit to the Refugee Relief Co-ordinator their estimates for the quantities of food that are necessary for each health institution. On approval and delivery of the quantities of food involved, the C.P.R.A. men transport and supply them to the hospitals and dispensaries. Actual distribution to the sick refugees is then made by the staff of these institutions. Most unfortunately, there are resistances arising in certain circles against the participation

of the C.P.R.A. in this type of work. The Refugee Relief Co-ordinator discussed and agreed with the Bishop, Msg. Kongolo, the possibility that a number of the hospitals and dispensaries should in the future be served by his subordinates. This has not yet materialized as the trucks on which the bishop was counting upon are not yet available.

- (ii) The second priority is given to the so-called "vulnerable group" of the refugee population at large, composed of expectant mothers and children. This group is expected to receive, over and above the minimum complementary diet referred to under (iii) below, an additional ration of milk and high-protein food. This need is being covered in part by the Red Cross centres and in part by the so-called canteines populaires, created by the Refugee Commissariat. The Red Cross centres distribute mainly milk, while the canteines populaires (groups of volunteer ladies in each village) cook additional rations of rice and fish that are distributed on the spot to the women and children at noon-time. Supply to centres and canteines is made at appropriate intervals by UN trucks, on request of the Red Cross or of the Refugee Commissariat.

- (iii) According to the conditions contained in the basic technical reports, the refugee population at large is supposed to receive an individual complementary diet, the proportion and nutritional value of which are already known. To cover these requirements, the Refugee Commissariat has organized some 540 distribution points which are located in such a way as to serve the needs of the refugees who live in the neighbourhood of each point, without forcing them to walk long distances in order to receive their food. Distribution is made by agents appointed by the Government, controlled by the Committees of Refugees, to heads of families. This last network has not yet attained the desired degree of organization and systematic functioning. The local authorities, however, are making a decided effort to push forward organization and to regularize distribution procedures. One of the main difficulties is the standardization of measures. A request has been made to Headquarters Léopoldville for the supply of 600 sets of measures. It is hoped that this request will be met in the near future. As for the Red Cross and the canteines populaires, supply of foodstuff to the refugee distribution points is made by UN trucks following requests submitted by the Refugee Commissariat.

13. As indicated above, actual hand-to-hand distribution is carried out by local agents, the Refugee Relief Operation limiting itself to stocking food at the distribution points. The reasons for such division of functions are obvious. In the early stages of the operation it was considered advisable not to intervene too much at the actual distribution stage, for psychological and political reasons. With the increase of the UN transport capacity and the consequent greater tonnage of food put at the disposal of the local authorities, the need is also increasing to regularize as much as possible the direct distribution procedures.

Therefore, a closer co-operation with the Refugee Commissariat is taking place. This co-operation will include the necessary continuous checking and controlling of hand-to-hand distribution now that a climate of mutual understanding and trust has been established.

14. To recapitulate the above description it may be indicated that:

- (i) No major problems are being faced concerning unloading and storage of incoming goods, although the lower efficiency of the local manpower imposes the need for a greater effort on the part of our foremen and supervisors.
- (ii) The initial difficulties and limitations in our distribution activities are being gradually solved with the arrival of a greater number of trucks. It is considered that a total capacity of 150 tons (for example 30 trucks at 5 tons each) will sufficiently meet our needs (including unloading and distribution).

15. The administration of our new truck fleet has proceeded with some difficulties. It is expected that once Captain Iqbal has taken charge of this task, the desirable degree of efficiency will be achieved. Possibilities have been found for appropriate maintenance work (both preventive maintenance and repair) to be performed by local contractors. The same goes for the regular supply of fuel. Headquarters will be informed in detail and consulted for final approval within the next few days.

C. Movement of foodstuffs and seeds

16. The overall total tonnage of foodstuffs and seeds received in Bakwanga, from the beginning of the airlift operation (December 14, 1960, up to January 27, 1961) is 1,519.790 kgs. This total includes small quantities brought by the two truck convoys arrived to date from Luluabourg.

17. The total quantity delivered for distribution, between the dates referred to above, amounts to 758.842 kgs.

18. The available balance is 760.948 kgs.

19. The breakdown of the above quantities by types of foodstuffs and seeds is given in Annex I.

20. Following instructions received from Headquarters ONUC a total of 892 kgs of foodstuffs was backlifted to Luluabourg, in order to enable the feeding of some 1.200 refugees for a period of one week.

1519790
22

303958
303958

3343538

D. Other supplies

21. Difficulties are being experienced for the desirable control of reception of other supplies. In some instances, the description in the manifests is such that it does not permit easy identification of the goods received. The pressure of work does not make it possible to uncrate immediately any number of boxes for inventoring purposes. In other instances, total weight is only indicated without mentioning the number of pieces (boxes, cartons, bags, etc.). Again other times, the number of pieces is indicated without giving the weight. It should be mentioned that these deficiencies are more noticeable in manifests prepared by UNOC at Léopoldville. The next weekly report will include a detailed inventory of supplies other than foodstuffs received to date.

III. AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMME

A. Activities of the FAO team

22. Mr. Wirtz, Senior FAO Expert, arrived in Bakwanga at noon on 16 January. He was immediately put into contact with the competent local authorities and agreed with them on a tentative plan of action. The next day he surveyed by helicopter the greater part of the refugee area accompanied by local officials. As a result of his observations, recommendations were cabled to UNOC Léopoldville concerning the quantities of seeds that should be furnished. In the meantime, the first shipments of maize seeds have arrived. Distribution was started on the 19th of January and has continued ever since.

23. The other members of the FAO team, Mr. de Jong and Mr. Egli, arrived on 22 January and started to participate in field distribution as from the day thereafter. The new recruits, Messrs. Koopmans and Mendes, whose presence at Lake Mukamba is not yet necessary were put at the disposal of the FAO team to help them supervise loading and distributing activities. Detailed reports of the FAO team are attached as Annexes II and III.

B. Seed income

24. The total weight of seeds received up to and inclusive 27 January amounted to 189.050 kgs. The daily rate of arrival was the following:

16 January	Maize	21.060	Beans	Peanuts
17		6.750		
18		11.250		
19		12.420		
20		22.140	26.280	
21		4.140	17.280	
22		4.320	10.350	
23		-	-	
24		-	8.550	
25		-	10.800	
26		6.300	10.800	
27		-	4.500	11.840

25. For details of the quantities of seeds distributed per area in the period 19-28 January 1961, see the table appended to Annex III.

IV. MEDICAL AID AND HEALTH PROGRAMME

26. Doctors Poulton, Blankhard and Delcos have continued their daily visits to hospitals and dispensaries throughout the refugee area for the purposes of supervising the work carried out in them as well as for giving direct medical aid. The campaign of vaccination against smallpox has been actively pushed forward. According to their appreciation of the medical situation, it would appear that the most severe part of the crisis for the children of the area has passed, at least for the moment. The numerous severe cases of Kwashiorkor reported in December have partly died and partly recovered. Few new cases of severity are now coming to light. It is estimated, however, that this favourable trend depends entirely on the continuation and increase of food supplies distribution by the United Nations. Should this fail, the position would return to the conditions of late 1960 within a month. For a more detailed appreciation of the general situation in this field, see Annex IV.

A. Austrian medical military team

26a. This team has arrived on 17 January 1961 and is composed of 14 persons (for details, see Annex V). The team was accommodated in a tent camp within the compound occupied by the UN Ghana troops. Arrangements were made with the local authorities and other interested parties:

- (i) For the team to take over responsibility for the paediatric ward at Disele hospital, the adjoining houses of the former military camp, and a tent hospital, to be erected at the side of these houses.
- (ii) To take over Miabi hospital, equally enlarged by a tent camp to be erected.

26b. Immediately on arrival of the tents obtained by the UN from Kenya, work at Disele started and is proceeding at a satisfactory rate. The impossibility to obtain help from the UN Ghana soldiers (due to a change of troops which is taking place) was an obstacle. It is envisaged to engage local manpower for a few days, in order to help in mounting the tents.

26c. The doctors of this team have already undertaken professional work, both in Miabi and Disele.

V. ACTIVITIES OF THE ICAO TEAM

27. The ICAO team arrived on 25 December 1960 and started immediately the installation of its technical equipment. The facilities now available are one non-directional beacon VHF radio frequency 118.1 Mcs and HF radio 8820 Kcs. The airport's runway, originally designed for the use of aircraft of the DC-3 type, has on the whole resisted satisfactorily the heavy traffic of the airlift. With the exception of a couple of occasions when heavy rainfall interrupted operations for a few hours, the airfield has been 100 per cent available both for landings and take offs.

28. Up to and including 21st of January, there have been 282 landings, with a corresponding number of take offs by UN aircraft. 52 Landings and as many take offs by non-UN aircraft also took place. The total number of movements therefore amounted to 668.

29. On Saturday, 21 January, the airfield was closed at 13.30 ~~h~~ ^h time, due to the extremely heavy rainfall; further use under those conditions would have permanently damaged the surface. Four diversions were necessary. Of these aircrafts, one proceeded to Elisabethville and three to Luluabourg.

30. For the period 22 - 27 January, the combined numbers of landings and take offs have been as follows:

22 January	Total	30	UN	24 ¹²	Others	6
23		40		34		6
24		30		26		4
25		30		18		12
26		36		24		12
27		32		32		-
		<hr/>		<hr/>		<hr/>
		198		158		40
				79		

564
104

668

282
79

361

52
40

92

VI. PERSONNEL (Week ending January 28, 1961)

International

Start of week	17	
Additions during week (Egli, de Jong)	2	
Departure (Mollet)	1	
	<hr/>	18

Local

Office and Stores	2*	
Drivers	19*	
	<hr/>	21

* Em. BAYA resigned January 28, 1961.

** Three drivers hired.

For details, see Annex V.