

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 16-10-62  
NO. : 7354

MOST IMMEDIATE

Some delegations and the press agencies report that cease  
fire was actually signed in Elisabethville at noon on 16 October. Please  
confirm urgently.-

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 16-10-62  
NO. : 7329

ROUTINE

Reference G-1430. Will UN troops be guarding the bridge?

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 16 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7328.



Reference G-1406.

Do you feel that any approach to Adoula on subject of  
Gbenye's arrest is called for ?

There seems to be little or no reaction here.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 16 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7325.

*216/16/60*

**SECRET**

Reference G-1428.

1. We note with satisfaction that constitution has at last been released. To whom has it been released and what now is its status ? Has any representative of Tshombe or Katanga received a copy ? Is it possible for interested parties, such as Tshombe, now to submit to Adoula comments on the draft ? Is it a public document ? When is it likely to be presented to parliament ?

2. In light of your message Secretary-General would like to make confidential distribution of the draft constitution to members of Congo advisory committee since a number of them have been pressing him for it. It is a long document, of course, and would take us a few days to have it reproduced. Please advise urgently on this and on questions in para one.

3. Will be sending later today draft amnesty text in response to request in last para of G-1421.



Incoming Code Cable

Priority

*Ref 16/10*

✓  
To : Gardiner, Kebbede, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 16 October 1962.  
No. : 7325.

Indonesian Government is now very positive about its willingness to provide a new Indonesian contingent to the force from two or three battalions. We are inclined favourably to the approach, having in mind that the Tunisian contingent will be lost at the end of the year, and possibly a Nigerian battalion. Would appreciate your views on desirability of accepting the Indonesian offer to the extent of two battalions. We appreciate, of course, that, coming by sea, it will take the battalions about two months to arrive in the Congo.

Incoming Code Cable

*not info*

Immediate

To : Gardiner, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 16 October 1962.  
No. : 7324.

SECRET

With regarding to the timing of my impending visit to the Congo, second thoughts, which I have checked with Secretary General, support deferring my departure until the weekend. Among other things, this would make it possible for me to stay with you a few more days and might also, I suspect, find you with more time to spare than during this week. Unless you have preference for the earlier departure date, that is on the 16th., I will plan to arrive Leo early next week. Indications now are that next Congo Advisory Committee meeting will be convened somewhat later than 23rd. in any case.



Ruk/10/12

Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Kebbede, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 15 October 1962.  
No. 7319.

Reference ONUC 6994. Changes in Malayan repatriation schedule suggested necessitates delay in Blatchford ETD Dar-es-Salaam by two weeks. This again seriously reduces time available for major repair and upkeep of Blatchford between this and next task. This also causes undersirable delay in repatriation of Malayan troops.

Please consider possibility of transporting by road/rail to Mombasa and use of this port by Blatchford.

Please advise.

cc : Gardiner.



Incoming Code Cable

*Ref 10/10*

Routine

To : Kebbede, Ahmed, Leo  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 15 October 1962.  
No. : 7315.

1. Ryga termination of duty report suggested that some DC-4 aircraft be replaced by DC-6 and thereby reduce DC-4 and C-46 on charter. This has been discussed before. However, reasons in favour seem more valid now and assuming that routine logistic support and 115/145 AVGAS is moved by surface, then the aircraft would be used mainly for troops rotations and maintaining operational mobility for the force.

2. Suggest that this be discussed with Seward on his forthcoming visit. Also that Air Congo be approached on purely exploratory basis to ascertain if they intend to or would operate DC-6 aircraft. Obviously it will assist the Congo to further develop their national airline.

3. Nevertheless, reduction in DC-4 and C-46 aircraft should be possible after bridge is completed regardless of DC-6 question.

cc : Gardiner.

**SECRET**

Incoming Code Cable

*Ref 116/10*

Priority

To : Gardiner, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 15 October 1962.  
No. : 7313.

On reflection, would not wish my visit to Leo to interfere with your plan to attend opening of Lubilash bridge ceremony on 17 October as per G-1420. I can shift dates of visit if this would better meet your convenience.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

*Ref. 6964*

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 15-10-62  
NO. : 7312

ROUTINE

Ref 6964. As all Swedish armoured cars are primarily anti-aircraft AFV's, please report deployment and serviceability.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 15-10-62  
NO. : 7311

*Ref no*  
ROUTINE

Please reply my 6761 para 3.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 15-10-62  
NO. : 7303

*Ref* *info* PRIORITY

You will have heard from Secgen of my impending hasty visit. Because of shortness of my sojourn in Leo I would hope to avoid invitations to social functions as I would like to have as much of your time and Kebbede's as can be spared. For same reason I would wish to avoid to extent possible official contacts other than ONUC.-

(No dist.)



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : SECRETARY GENERAL, NY  
DATE : 15-10-62  
NO. : 7300

PRIORITY

*Relx 10/16*

I am having Bunche make a short trip to Leo to consult with you and Kebbede in order to obtain a first hand picture of where we are, our likely direction and our capability if new developments occur. I consider this to be particularly important in preparation for the Congo advisory committee follow-up meeting on 23rd because of which I am asking Bunche to return to New York on the weekend. He will be departing from here on the weekly Panam jet flight tuesday 16th and will inform you of other details.-

(No dist.)



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : ~~7299~~ 15-10-62  
NO. : 7299

*11/15/62*

PRIORITY

Reference G-1420. In connection with the projected ceremony and opening of the Lubilash bridge on October 17, what is being done about the laying of the rails?

(No dist.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : AHMED, LEO  
FROM : FIELDSEV, NY  
DATE : 13-10-62  
NO. : 7288

ROUTINE

Has Tomalin departed? If not request reason.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner. ✓



## INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 13-10-62  
NO. : 7287

PRIORITY

*Ref 26/10*

Advisory Committee met afternoon 12 October, attended by several foreign ministers. Meeting began with Secgen's statement (pouched text slightly amended). Supplemental information on progress of implementation of plan was provided by reading excerpts of cables regarding work of commissions and your meeting of 11 October with Tshombe.

Members of committee generally were impressed by and welcomed Secgen's statement but wanted more time to examine it. Few questions were put, and few comments made. More important points raised are summarized below:

1. India and Indonesia considered Secgen should strengthen UN force in Congo without delay. Indonesia implied that his government would be ready to provide new contingent. Mali stated that his government would examine carefully any request made by Secgen. Secgen stated in this connexion that he considered force adequate for present duties, but would have to have to be strengthened if given new responsibilities. He indicated that he would not seek to strengthen force without advice of Advisory Committee.

2. Ghana said his government was disturbed by possible effects of federal constitution on Congo. Mali stated that part of population concerned had expressed reservations on draft constitution; he wished to have a copy of draft. Same wish was expressed by Nigeria.

3. India and Malaya pointed to the risk of having revenues from Union Minière collected through Katangese provincial authorities.

4. Ghana considered that immediate steps including use of force if necessary should be taken to disband Katangese Gendarmerie and to channel Katangese revenues to Central Government.

Next meeting scheduled for afternoon 23 October.-

(No dist.)



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 12-10-62  
NO. : 7270

ROUTINE

Ref ONUC 6993. Am attempting to obtain information as requested.  
Will keep you informed.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 12-10-62  
NO. : 7269

ROUTINE

Reference ONUC 6752 and our 7039. Norway agrees to the appointment of Lt. Col. Klevao along line you suggested.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, <sup>✓</sup>KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 12-10-62  
NO. : 7244

*REC 20/10*

ROUTINE

Have received information from a reliable source that "two or three" ANC battalions are being made available for inclusion in the Congo contingent in ONUC. Please advise.-

INCOMING ~~XXXXXXXX~~ CODE CABLE

NEW YORK

12 OCT 62

LEOPOLDVILLE

Nº 7242

GARDINER FROM BUNCHE

FOLLOWING NOTE VERBALE DATED 11 OCTOBER 1962 RECEIVED FROM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM : PARA QUOTE LE REPRESENTANT PERMANENT DE LA BELGIQUE PRESENTE SES COMPLIMENTS A MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL ET A L'HONNEUR DE SE REFERER AU DOCUMENT S/5053/ADD 12: SUBQUOTE REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FROM THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 21 FEBRUARY AND 24 NOVEMBER 1961 UNSUBQUOTE PARA DANS LE PARAGRAPHE 33 DE CE RAPPORT, A LA PAGE 10, IL EST SIGNALE QUE, SELON UN CERTAIN NOMBRE DE RAPPORTS JUSQU'A PRESENT NON CONFIRMES, DES AVIONS ONT ETE MONTES DANS LES USINES DE L'UNION MINIERE A KOLWEZI. PARA L'UNION MINIERE DU HAUT KATANGA A ADRESSE AU GOUVERNEMENT BELGE UNE NOTE DANS LAQUELLE ELLE AFFIRME QUE CES ALLEGATIONS SONT TOTALEMENT INEXACTES. LA COMPAGNIE RAPPELLE QUE DEJA LE 20 SEPTEMBRE DERNIER ELLE AVAIT, AUPRES DU REPRESENTANT DE L'ONU A LEOPOLDVILLE, M. MATHU, DEMENTI CES ALLEGATIONS. ELLE AVAIT, EN OUTRE, SUGGERE QUE DES REPRESENTANTS DE L'ONU VISITENT SES INSTALLATIONS ET SE RENDENT COMPTE PAR EUX-MEMES DE L'INANITE DE CES ACCUSATIONS. CES REPRESENTANTS AURAIENT PU SE RENDRE COMPTE DE L'IMPOSSIBILITE TECHNIQUE QU'IL Y AVAIT A PROCEDER A UN MONTAGE DANS LES ATELIERS EN QUESTION. PARA. LE REPRESENTANT PERMANENT DE LA BELGIQUE A RECU INSTRUCTIONS DE SON GOUVERNEMENT DE PORTER CE QUI PRECEDE A LA CONNAISSANCE DU SECRETARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES. PARA LE REPRESENTANT PERMANENT DE LA BELGIQUE SAISIT CETTE OCCASION DE RENOUVELER A M. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL L'ASSURANCE DE SA TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION. UNQUOTE. PARA.

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND ADVICE, ESPECIALLY AS TO IMPLICATIONS OF SUGGESTED VISIT TO KOLWEZI.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 11-10-62  
NO. : 7227

ROUTINE

Further to our cable 6364, para 2. Pakistan has agreed to the extension of tenure of major Ata Tasul as requested.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 11-10-62  
NO. : 7226

ROUTINE

Further to our cable 4028 of 5 June 1962. India now informs that three medical officers, one surgeon, one anesthetist, one gynecologist and thirty other ranks are available. Since the demand has been unavoidably delayed, request you confirm the requirement of this team so that necessary action can be taken.-

c.c. Mr Gardiner. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 11-10-62  
NO. : 7225

ROUTINE

Further to our 6079. Please confirm that you wish the service of Brigadier Guha to be extended for a further six months due to his experience and knowledge of operation and area.-

c.c. Mr Gardiner.



Incoming Code Cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Kebbede, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 11 Oct 1962.  
No. : 7214.

As indicated in our 7130 the Irish government is prepared to supply a battalion to replace 37 Irish battalion. The government wish to refer to the strain imposed on their limited resources by this commitment and to indicate to the acting Secretary General that, after the tour of duty of the replacement battalion on which will now be sent, that it is their desire to reduce the Irish contribution to the force, or, if circumstances permit to terminate it.

cc : Gardiner. ✓



Incoming Code Cable

Priority

SECRET

To : Kebbada, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 11 Oct 1962.  
No. : 7213.

Transport of Irish crew for armoured car squadron (96 all ranks) and transport of advance party 38 Irish battalion (54 all ranks) will be arranged as one move carrying a total of 150 all ranks and 20,000 lbs cargo, personal baggage included. Aircraft returning to Ireland should carry advance party 37 battalion and such other additional personnel and cargo of 37th battalion as its commander may recommend in order to fully utilize the capacity of aircraft. This move will be planned to end in Ireland 5 November at the latest. Details about this transport and rotation of main body will follow. Rotation of main body will be planned to end in Ireland 17 November at the latest.

cc: Gardiner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 11-10-62  
NO. : 7207

ROUTINE

*Ref  
20/10*

Reference G-1314. Have approached UK mission for action suggested and they are taking up matter with London. They have information already that you have discussed this with Riches in Leo.-

(No dist.)



*Copy given to  
Mr Jacobs*

**SECRET**

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 11-10-62  
NO. : 7204

*Ref  
20/6*

Further to our 7140.

1. Following results of further verification of our list of mercenaries just received from Belgian mission:

"SUITE DE L'EXAMEN DE LA LISTE DES MERCENAIRES. BOURDEAUX MICHEL EST FRANÇAIS. DEMOULIN A QUITTE KATANGA 10 SEPTEMBRE 1961, EST EN AFRIQUE DU SUD. DRAPIER EST <sup>(A)</sup> GARDE TERRITORIALE AU RWANDA. HOUTERS EST RENTRE ARMEE BELGE 16 JANVIER 1961. LEPAGE FERNAND EST A BRAZZAVILLE. LECLERCQ JEAN EST BURUNDI DEPUIS 5 JANVIER 1962. PEVENAGE EST RENTRE BELGIQUE 26 MAI 1962 SON PASSEPORT LUI A ETE RETIRE PAR SURETE ET ENVOYE AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES. FEES JEAN OCCUPE FONCTION CIVILE A EVILLE AU SERVICE DU BUDGET. VAN DER VEKEN BLESST EN SEPTEMBRE 1961 ETAIT ENCORE EN TRAITEMENT HOPITAL EVILLE MI-AOUT DERNIER. VAN RISSEGHEN A QUITTE DEFINITIVEMENT LE KATANGA."

2. As you know, all the names have been published in annex III of SECCO report, and we cannot rule out possibility of additional communications of this type from Belgians. In light of foregoing, would you agree that it would be advisable to circulate corrigendum to S/5053/ADD.12?

(No dist.)

**SECRET**

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

To: Gardiner, Leo.  
From: Bunche, New York.  
Date: 10 October, 1962.  
No. 7200.

What is status of letters Adoula plans to send out? May the Secgen count on receiving at least the one addressed to him before Friday?

.....



**SECRET**

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : GARDINER , KEBBEDE, Leopoldville.  
FROM : BUNCHE, New York.  
DATE : 10 October, 1962.  
NO. : 7199.

Ref ONUC 6792.

Grateful any available further information on Australian pilots flying Vampires, as Australian Mission is much interested. How long have pilots been in Katanga ? How reliable is source ? Our 760 P12 refers.

Incoming Code Cable

Most Immediate

To : Gardiner, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 10 October 1962.  
No. : 7172.

SECRET

A Reuters despatch of 10 October reports arrest or detention of Gbenye on his return to Congo from visit to United States. It attributes to Thomas Mukwidi, a member of parliament, statement to effect that a security agent presented Gbenye with a search warrant, went through his luggage and had him driven to Ndolo prison. Despatch also quotes Antoine Kiwewa, another opposition member of parliament, as telling a press conference that Gbenye's arrest was expected on pretext he was involved in a secessionist plot to split eastern Swahili-speaking areas from the Congo in collaboration with Tshombe. Jean Miruho, former president of Kivu province and several of his cabinet ministers are also said to have been arrested and brought to Leo on similar charges. Please advise if you have any information about Gbenye's arrest or arrest of others on political basis.



Incoming Code Cable

*Ref 1/10*

Priority

To : Gardiner, Leo.  
From : SecGen, New York.  
Date : 10 October 1962.  
No. : 7167.

**SECRET**

Your G-1385. Approve your proposed reply.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Refuse*



TO : MARX Leopoldville  
FROM : MACFARQUHAR Newyork  
DATE : 10 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7165.

Reference George Wood.

Thank you for your report of 25 September with the attached 19 July memorandum from Le Harivel. As I am sure you appreciate, Mr Wood's case is not an easy one for us. The lateness of the notice alone and consequent upset in his plans created a difficult atmosphere. Furthermore, we are concerned as to whether this is a bona fide case of redundancy, offering reasonable grounds for defence before the appeals machinery. When we received your first cable, we assumed that at the very least his departure would represent a reduction in the total staff of the fellowships unit. Is this the case or do you intend to propose the appointment of the Belgian candidate suggested by Le Harivel ( Megali ) or another professional ? Even if this is not the case, we can expect difficult questions regarding our efforts to arrange alternate placement, but would probably come out somewhat better and would also have a better basis on which to deal with Wood.

Reference your clear 6565.

I assume that you are satisfied that there is no possibility for Wood with UNESCO in the Congo. He had understood that such a possibility did exist, is anxious to return and in addition is concerned about his personal effects, apartment lease etc...

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : AHMED Leopoldville  
FROM : FIELDSERVICE Newyork  
DATE : 10 O-CTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7164.



Reur 6856.

Concur with your recommendation not to extend Ben Kaplan's contract beyond present expiry date. Please insure you give him adequate notice. Have discussed Two possible candidates with Ben Twigt for chief of general services section. He will advise you details upon arrival

cc : Gafdiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Ref w/ve*  
ROUTINE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 10 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7163.

1. Malayan mission informs that after repatriation of Malayan units in November MSF will consist of

- (I) 2 R Malay less one coy
- (II) C SQN 2 RECCE
- (III) remainder Bde HQ personnel
- (IV) signal detachment
- (V) maintenance detachment
- (VI) coordination staff in leo

2. Above mentioned (I), (II) and (III) will be replaced in February/March 1963 by ~~ex~~(I) one infantry battalion complete  
(II) one RECCE SQN.

3. After repatriation in November CO battalion MSF becomes contingent commander MSP. MSF coordination staff consisting of 2 officers and 4 OR be located in Leo replacing existing MSF LO to provide liaison of operational and admin matters between HQ ONUC and MSF. Please provide affice space, accommodation and transport for MSF coordination staff.

4. In order to bring MSF up to the strength indicated in para 1 following personnel will be sent to the Congo: 2 signal specialists (replacements), 12 for maintenance detachment, 4 OR for coordination staff.  
Will advise their ETA.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 10 October 1962  
NUMBER : 7162.



Swedish government has agreed to increase number of patrol dogs with Swedish battalion from 12 to 17. Transport of additional five dogs will be included in rotation of Swedish battalion in October.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE *Relf 10/10*

**SECRET**

TO : KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 9 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7148.

Reference ONUC 5713, para 2.

We approached observer of government of Federal Republic of Germany about this subject and have received a reply which states :

" The boelkow works have once again been requested with all possible insistence to see to it that their planes are flown out of Katanga immediately. Furthermore, the competent authorities in Germany have introduced law proceedings against the Boelkow works since there is a suspicion that this firm has tried to bypass a legal ordinance forbidding the export of airplanes of any kind without special permission. "

We are again approaching the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for additional information.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Ref code*

PRIORITE

**SECRET**

TO : AHMED Leopoldville  
FROM : FIELDSERVICE Newyork  
DATE : 9 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7147.

Your 6833. Aly repatriation approved by medical director.  
Please advise ETA in order have relative meet.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 9 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7146.

*next copy*  
PRIORITE

**SECRET**

Reference G-1331, G-1377, G-1379.

1. Belladone and Mahauden not repeat not deleted from annex I of S/5053/add.12; all other names in our 7122 and 7140 were deleted.
2. Reference Taminiau and Bauwens, we doubt utility of publishing in SECCO report names of persons who are dead or have left Katanga permanently. Similarly, Demeuse deleted because we felt it inappropriate to list belgian consulate staff as mercenaries unless evidence supports the charge as valid at present.
3. Three names in G-1331 para 1 were added to annex I; 36 names in para 2 published separately as annex II.
4. Of 21 names in G-1379 para 1, all were published in annex I except Nos 6, 7, 13, 15, 19, whom we do not find on your lists.
5. We note from your pouched memo of 28 September 1962 that an addendum to list of foreign personnel is being prepared. Suggest five persons referred to in para 4 above be included in that addendum for eventual publication as add to todays SECCO report.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

*ack 9/10*

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 9-10-62  
NO. : 7140

Further to our 7122.

Belgian mission further informs that following six persons are no longer in Katanga:

Fleerackers Joseph, Ministere des Finances, Bruxelles, depuis le 7 Mars 1961.

Geigerat Jacques, Armee Belge fin 1961, forces belges en Allemagne.  
Huykebaert Willy, idem.

Servais Auguste, armee Belge Decembre 1961.

Van Mechelen Paul, Burundi depuis le 28 Fevrier 1962.

Wolter Rene, armee Belge Decembre 1961.

After examining the two lists submitted by Belgian mission, we decided to delete 40 names from list of mercenaries annexed to SECCO report. A few consequential changes were also made in body of report. We are publishing the amended list but quite frankly with some anxiety because of uncertainty about its accuracy and even the authenticity of the sources on which it is based.

SECCO report (S/5053/ADD.12) now expected to be distributed 9 October.-

(no dist,)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

To : Gardiner, Leo  
From : Bunche, NY  
Date : 9-10-62  
No. : 7139

PRIORITY

*RL 9/10*

SECGEN has just received from Adoula following letter, dated 1 October, which was sent directly from Leo by post.

"Monsieur LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL, J'AI PRIS CONNAISSANCE DE LA COPIE QUE VOUS AVEZ BIEN VOULU M'ENVOYER DE LA LETTRE DE PROTESTATION DU 17 SEPTEMBRE 1962 QUI VOUS AVAIT ETE ADRESSEE PAR MONSIEUR TSHOMBE, A LA SUITE DU GRAVE INCIDENT DU 12 DU MEME MOIS, SURVENU ENTRE LES TROUPES INDIENNES DE L'ONU ET LA GENDARMERIE KATANGAISE. PAR LES FAITS QUI M'ONT ETE RAPPORTES INFIRMENT LA THESE SOUTENUE PAR MONSIEUR TSHOMBE ET SUR LAQUELLE IL FONDE SA PROTESTATION.

PAR SURCROIT LES GRAVES ACCUSATIONS QU'IL PORTE CONTRE L'ONU APPARAISSENT TOUTES, PRECISEMENT, COMME ETANT CELLES QUE CES FAITS AUTORISENT A DIRIGER CONTRE LUI.

J'EN CONCLUS, A UNE NETTE MAUVAISE FOI DE SA PART.

SI L'ONU ESTIME QUE LA VERITE LUI PERMET D'ETRE DE CET AVIS, JE LUI DEMANDERAI DE BIEN VOULOIR ME FAIRE CONNAITRE LA SUITE QU'ELLE ENTEND DONNER A CETTE AFFAIRE.

J'ESPERE QU'ELLE AURA ADOPTE A CET EGARD LA POSITION DE FERMETE QUI S'IMPOSE.

JE LUI EN EXPRIME A L'AVANCE MES CHALEUREUX REMERCIMENTS.

VEUILLEZ AGREER, MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL, L'ASSURANCE DE MA TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION. LE PREMIER MINISTRE C. ADOULA



## INCOMING CODE CABLE

Rut a/c

ROUTINE

To : Gardiner, Kebbade, Leo  
From : Bunche, NY  
Date : 9-10-62  
NO. : 7138

**SECRET**

Following is a rough and unofficial translation of a message which Swedish mission has received from its foreign office. Text reads:

"At an improvised press conference arranged by the Swedish general staff at the Arlanda airport on his arrival thursday night Lundquist in answer to a question if he from the airborne plane had seen any movements on the ground replied that he at that moment had not seen any firing possitions but that he later detected where they were. In reply to a question if he knew exactly from which party the fire had come he referred to the reconstruction made later and said 'yes absolutely'. Lundquist however refused to reveal which party he was referring to. Lundquist's appearance was throughout very confident and collected.

Secundo. Zwagne Hamrin, Dagens Nyheter Rome correspondent quotes Lundquist as saying that the fact that two helicopters ready to take off at dawn to assist the crashed plane got no permission to start is no less than a scandal. Not until five hours later was this permission granted and the helicopters could take off. Half an hour later the rescue expedition arrived at the scene of the crash. This delay could have cost several lives. Lundquist said he did not know who was responsible for this unexplainable delay. 'before my departure from Leopoldville I spoke to colonel Olof Carlsson, on this matter', he said. 'Colonel Carlsson is second in command of the UN Congo airforce. He could not give an explanation'.

Tertio. In an editorial friday the Dagens Nyheter writes IA: with unparalleled clumsiness and without the effect desired attempts were made to cover up the shooting down and the hunt for the guilty. It is natural that no statement on the question of the guilt were made before the inquiry board had concluded their investigations, but why were there so persistent attempts to quiet, any deny that the crew after the landing had been shot at by Congolese soldiers, an incident which not necessarily had any direct connection with the actual grounding of the plane? Why were the photos of the crash and the survivals labelled secret? Why were the surviving Swedes to completely isolated sometimes under ridiculous circumstances as they were not able to judge who was responsible for the shooting



down of the plane but could have told about the dramatic 24 hours after the crash.? Why has the explanation not been given to why a number of Swedes who did not normally belong to the crew were aboard the plane? The result of the UN policy of secrecy was a flood of rumours and misunderstandings and the result of denials of obviously correct information is a growing distrust in the UN information policy in the Congo. Already in connection with the fighting in Katanga in September and December last year serious shortcomings were revealed and UN information officials appeared a group of last amateurs compared to the cunning propagandists of the Tshombe's regime.

The assumption was that these experiences should result in a renewal of the UN information service, its resources and goals. The Swedish information service-the channel between the Swedish UN battalion and the Swedish press via the Swedish general staff has evidently become more effective, but it is telling that these efforts have indeed not been greeted with any greater satisfaction from the higher chiefs of the organisation in the Congo, but rather created frictions. A review of the whole attitude and the activities is necessary. The responsibility towards member states demands information and not censure."

Would appreciate your comments.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : AHMED, LEO  
FROM : FIELDSEV, NY  
DATE : 8-10-62  
NO. : 7131

PRIORITY

*Act after*

Your 6840. Although our 6748 permitted relaxation for leave pax to travel Yukon, it was not the intention to establish fixed policy or quotas for following reasons:

A. UN is under no obligation to provide transportation for leave pax in view of cash payments in lieu of leave centres etc.

B. Space problems could be caused at Pisa by returning leave pax when higher priorities involved.

C. Since restricted Yukon flights were introduced by Canadian government as economy measure, request for additional seats for leave pax could result in necessity of these flights being queried and decrease in their frequency.

D. It is somewhat early to assess the average space available on these flights to UN for duty pax and compassionate cases, let alone leave pax.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 8-10-62  
NO. : 7130

PRIORITY

*Net 9/10*

Irish mission informs that Irish government is willing to replace 37th battalion in November. Please advise number of personnel and weight of equipment and stores for advance party and main body respectively.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*ref a/c*  
**SECRET**

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 8-10-62  
NO. : 7129

PRIORITY

Nigerian mission approached to request Nigerian government to replace QONR in November. Please advise if rotation can be performed by ONUC air transport.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 8 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7125.

*ref a/c*

**SECRET**

Reference G-1366.

Unable to find Lauwerg Victor PH. in your list. Please  
clarify urgently.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY IMMEDIATE

To: Gardiner, Leo.  
From: Bunche, New York.  
Date: 6 October 1962.  
No: 7122.

SECRET

Reference G-1363.

1. Belgian Mission, to which we passed list for verification,  
have advised us of results of their first check as follows:

" "Resultat d'un premier pointage de la liste des mercenaires.

Bauwens Jacques, tue le 15 aout 1962 sur route Kabongo.

Balladone, agent sanitaire Kamina.

Coller Cyrille, Ruanda depuis le 7 fevrier 1962.

Colpaert Georges, attache consulat Belge Salisbury.

Crustin Charles, rentre armee belge le 21 decembre 1961.

Dedeken Noel, rentre Belgique mi-1961 et a reintegre sizieme  
de likce à Anvers le 31 decembre 1961.

Demeuse Roger, adjoint consulat à Elisabethville.

De Troyer Jacques, est aux forces belges en Allemagne depuis le  
19 decembre 1960.

Flara Maurice est au Burundi.

Gesnot Armand est decede le 31 janvier 1961.

Grandelet Claude rentre armee belge le 24 aout 1961.

Greindl Emmanuel rentre armee belge le 26 mars 1962.

Guerit Jean, est a Leopoldville.

Gysels Marcel, est à Uccle, 809 Chaussee d'Alseberg.

Heureux Paul rentre armee belge le 12 juin 1961.

Kuppens Hubert Jean, est en Belgique.

Laureys Robert, rentre armee belge le 28 fevrier 1962.



SECRET

Leclerc R. G. G., tue à Kabalo le 7 octobre 1960.

Lembroug Marcel, rentre armee belge le 11 decembre 1961.

Louviaux Joseph, rentre armee belge le 11 octobre 1961.

Maeck Raymond, est au Burundi depuis le 26 aout 1962.

Mahaudem Jacques, releve de fonctions à l'armee pour raisons  
de sante le 3 novembre 1961.

Mathy Paul, est rentre du Rwanda le 2 septembre 1962 en Belgique.

Mathys Jacques, rentre armee belge octobre 1962.

Moret Georges, rentre armee belge le 4 janvier 1962.

Peeters Louis, tue par detachement Ethiopiens à Kabalo le 8 avril 1961.

Piret Rene, rentre armee belge le 28 fevrier 1962.

Rimbaut Marcel, rentre armee belge le 1 mars 1962.

Rouchefort Rene, est à Bruxelles.

Sautois Jacques, est rentre armee belge le 23 mars 1962.

Somville Marcel rentre armee belge le 1 mars 1962.

Taminiau Fernand, administrateur territorial en Belgique depuis  
13 aout 1962.

Vandamme Rene, rentre armee belge le 16 decembre 1960.

Veron Jacques, rentre armee belge le 2 mars 1962.

Volont Victor, rentre armee belge le 1 novembre 1961.

Van Gremberghen Fernand, ecole des cadets Laeken depuis  
le 10 juin 1961."

2. This information clearly raises some serious questions about reliability of immigration card file and our other sources, and may require reappraisal of figures given in body of report to SECCO. Please advise most urgently as we are holding up publication of report on mercenaries.

.....



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*ref 7/6*  
**SECRET**

TO : GARDINER, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 6-10-62  
NO. : 7120

PRIORITY

Belgian mission has received information to effect that United Nations in Leopoldville had made offer to Adoula that services of constitutional experts might be continued and that Adoula had rejected the offer. I informed Belgian mission that we have no repeat no information about any such actions. Please advise.-

(No dist.)



INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE *Ref of 10*

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 6 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7118.

Reference (A) ONUC 6455 and (B) ONUC 6419.

Blatchford will after completion of repair 25 October proceed according to following itinerary : ETD Karachi 25 Oct., ETA Mombasa 31 Oct. for fuel and stores, ETD 1 Nov. ETA Dar-es-salaam 2 Nov. for embarkation of Malayan troops, stores and vehicles to be repatriated, ETD 6 Nov. ETA port Swettenham 16 Nov.. Debarkation of Malayan troops, stores and vehicles, ETD 19 Nov. ETA Subik for upkeep 23 Nov.

This schedule allows sufficient time for drydocking prior to rotation of Indian, Pakistani and Malayan troops from February 1963 onwards. Please inform number of Malayan troops, weight and volume of stores and vehicles to be repatriated. Transport of troops, etc . from Congo to Dar-es-salaam is assumed to take place by road ~~fraxtion~~/rail. Pakistan mission has been approached to request pakistan to make workshop unit ready for transport by Blatford from Karachi 25 Oct. Will keep you informed of their reply.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Rel. of*

TO : KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 6 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7119.



Reference your 6814, and letter dated 1 October 1962.

Notes verbale sent out before receipt of your communications of above reference requested that unit strength of canberras be kept at 6, and that Ethiopia and Sweden provide 2 additional fighter aircraft. In light of your messages we shall now ask Ethippia and Sweden for 4 additional instead of 2.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Ref of*

ROUTINE

SECRET

TO : GARDINER, KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 5 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7115.

Your ONUC 6813.

Have informed belgian mission and also making independent  
check on Schramme's activities but not through interpol.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 5 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7092.

Reference ONWC 6805.

Canada approached along lines suggested.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

SECRET

PUY 6/10

TO : KEBBEDE Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 5 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7091.

Reference ONUC 6751.  
Matter in hand.

cc : Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 5 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7090.



*Ref of 10*

Grateful your urgent advice on our 7015.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Reel 4*

SECRET

To: Gardiner, Leopoldville.  
From: Bunche, New York.  
Date: 5 October, 1962.  
No. 7086.

Information in Your G-1355 most valuable. Urge that in future such information be flagged and passed promptly to Headquarters so that missions concerned may be informed. Otherwise missions make a strong case for inability to act due to lack of information.

....



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*16. has replied  
RUF/s/c*

IMMEDIATE  
**SECRET**

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville  
FROM : BUNCHE Newyork  
DATE : 4 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7062.

Your G-1307 and ONUC 6765.

1. Have informed South African mission who request all available details, such as name of firm in South Africa providing Harvards and possibly origin of P-51 Mustangs in South Africa.

2. Have informed Garin, portuguese permanent representative, of information concerning shipments of aircraft in crates through Angola. After consulting his foreign minister, who is in New York, he declared that all such reports are utterly without foundation, that portuguese authorities exercise the strictest control over shipments to Dilolo, and asked that a mention of this denial should be inserted in the ~~SEC~~ report . Would appreciate your advice.

Please reply soonest.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GARDINER Leopoldville  
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL Newyork  
DATE : 4 OCTOBER 1962  
NUMBER : 7059.



Reference G-1346.

As usual you will, of course, reply to Mr. Tshombe's latest letter addressed to me. In giving appropriate answers to the points he tries to establish which you can readily do on the basis of facts well known to you, you might take occasion perhaps to point out delicately to Tshombe that the press is not always a source of accurate information.



Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Ahmed, Leo.  
From : Fieldserv, New York.  
Date : 3 October 1962.  
No. : 7057.

SECRET

Reur 6732. Controller is very much surprised at your reaction to Teahan who was originally slated for accounts division Headquarters but at considerable inconvenience diverted to ONUC. No experienced Headquarters candidate available. In circumstances will maintain plan for Teahan asking him to come to New York for three months training while you have services Venkataraman whose extension for three months is approved.

cc : Gardiner.



Incoming Code Cable

Routine

To : Kebbede, Leo.  
From : Bunche, New York.  
Date : 3 October 1962.  
No. : 7039.

**SECRET**

Reference ONUC 6752.

Norway approached to concur along lines you suggest.

cc: Gardiner.



Incoming Code Cable

**SECRET**

Priority

To : Gardiner, Ahmed, Leo.  
From : SecGen, New York.  
Date : 3 October 1962.  
No. : 7036.

Reference ONUC 6703.

1. We see no objection from either political or legal view point to an individual representative of ministry of national defence being stationed at Kitona base while its present limited administration by ONUC continues, so long as he has no repeat no command authorities, operation responsibility or access to restricted materials.

2. It could be understood in effect that his presence would be designed to enable Congo Government to become familiar with problems of base operation and maintenance so as to facilitate smooth Congolese assumption of these tasks at early date. This would also serve as token indication that delay in our transfer of Kitona to central government is not ascribable to any unwillingness on our part to hand over to Congolese but only to the need for legal discharge from Belgium.

3. Therefore, we would agree to proposal by Secretary of state of ministry of national defence under conditions set forth in para 1 above and provided there are no major administrative considerations against proposal at your end. Of course it should be made clear that this arrangement should be no repeat no precedent for Kamina.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER  
FROM : BUNCHE  
DATE : 2 OCT. 1962  
NO. : 7015

SECRET

Reference G 1296. Assume you intend Annex A of SECO Report to contain name-list and biographical material pouched by you 25 August 1962. If so, question arises as to inclusion of identification of confidential sources of information. In particular, would appreciate your views on advisability of omitting references to : A) Lufungula, Cornaz and other individuals who passed information to ONUC; and B) Embassies and Consulates which apparently passed information to ONUC.

Awaiting your advice before we proceed with publication.



## INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : GARDINER  
FROM : BUNCHE  
DATE : 2 OCT 1962  
NO. : 7005

**SECRET**

Reference G 1313, 1322 and our 6934.

1. Hope it will not be too disappointing to you to learn that on second thought we have decided not repeat not to publish pamphlet on mercenaries which you had submitted. It is well enough written but we feel that our first responsibility is to report to SECO on a matter of this importance. Any information that is sound enough to put out at all should be included in report to SECO. It could seem odd and might be misunderstood if, in addition to a report to SECO, we put out a pamphlet carrying material not included in report to SECO. If any material in the pamphlet is not sufficiently supportable to include in report to SECO it could not be very effective as a pamphlet released publicly. We are therefore looking carefully at the pamphlet text to determine what material from it might or should be incorporated in forthcoming report to SECO.
2. The pamphlet text is good but we do not feel that it would be helpful at this time to put it out as a sort of competing document with the SECO report. We could not put it out earlier because we had not yet reported to the Council, to which we have first responsibility.
3. I am sure that you will understand our problem.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

TO : KEBBEDE, LEO  
FROM : BUNCHE, NY  
DATE : 3-10-62  
NO. : 7033

MOST IMMEDIATE

Reference ONUC 6750. Concur.-

c.c. Mr. Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

*Ref s/w*

TO : OPERATOR, LEO  
FROM : OPERATOR NYK  
DATE : 2 OCT. 1962  
NO. : 7030

SECRET

We have been advised by addressee of G 1338, that this message should be treated as UNNUMBERED, and to advise sender of this.

c.c. Mr. Back. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Ref 5/12*

ROUTINE

TO : GARDINER  
FROM : BUNCHE  
DATE : 2 OCT. 1962  
NO. : 7015

**SECRET**

Reference G 1296. Assume you intend Annex A of SECO Report to contain name-list and biographical material pouched by you 25 August 1962. If so, question arises as to inclusion of identification of confidential sources of information. In particular, would appreciate your views on advisability of omitting references to : A) Lufungula, Cornaz and other individuals who passed information to ONUC; and B) Embassies and Consulates which apparently passed information to ONUC.

Awaiting your advice before we proceed with publication.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

*Ref 5/20*

TO : GEN. KEBBEDE  
FROM : BUNCHE  
DATE : 2 OCT. 1962  
NO. : 7009

SECRET

Sweden informs unable to provide swedish officer with the necessary qualifications to serve as Liaison Officer to Arme National Congolaise at ONUC HQ. It may be that Ethiopia or Ireland could provide. Would appreciate your views.

c.c. Mr. Gardiner ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : GARDINER  
FROM : BUNCHE  
DATE : 2 OCT 1962  
NO. : 7005

*ref 5/10*  
**SECRET**

Reference G 1313, 1322 and our 6934.

1. Hope it will not be too disappointing to you to learn that on second thought we have decided not repeat not to publish pamphlet on mercenaries which you had submitted. It is well enough written but we feel that our first responsibility is to report to SECO on a matter of this importance. Any information that is sound enough to put out at all should be included in report to SECO. It could seem odd and might be misunderstood if, in addition to a report to SECO, we put out a pamphlet carrying material not included in report to SECO. If any material in the pamphlet is not sufficiently supportable to include in report to SECO it could not be very effective as a pamphlet released publicly. We are therefore looking carefully at the pamphlet text to determine what material from it might or should be incorporated in forthcoming report to SECO.
2. The pamphlet text is good but we do not feel that it would be helpful at this time to put it out as a sort of competing document with the SECO report. We could not put it out earlier because we had not yet reported to the Council, to which we have first responsibility.
3. I am sure that you will understand our problem.



SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

*Rich*  
*spe*

To: Kebbade, Leo.  
From: Bunche, NewYork.  
Date: 2 Oct. 1962.  
No.: 7002.

Please advise if any of the ONUC Fighter Aircraft could  
be readily fitted for dropping NAPALM bombs.

cc: Gardiner. ✓



INCOMING CODE CABLE.

*7.13*  
PRIORITY *ack 5/60*

**SECRET**

To : General Kebbede.  
From : Bunche.  
Date : 2 October 1962.  
No. : 7001.

Reference ONUC 6691.

Your recommendation approved in view of shortness of time. In future insistence should be on following established procedure.

c.c. Mr. Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE.

*7/15*  
ROUTINE. *pkx/fo*

**SECRET**

To : Mr. Ahmed.  
From : Fieldservice.  
Date : 1 October 1962.  
No. : 6997.

Your 6459. Report on Wood unreceived.  
Please expedite.

c.c. Mr. R. Gardiner.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

1.7

ref sw

TO : GARDINER  
FROM : BUNCHE  
DATE : 1 OCT. 1962  
NO. : 6973

**SECRET**

Your G-1324.

Regret delay at this end. Prompt steps being  
taken to have IMF experts designated and available soonest. Endit.



INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

TO : AHMED  
FROM : VAUGHAN  
DATE : 1 OCT. 1962  
NO. : 6971

*1-5*  
*Relax to*  
**SECRET**

For Timbrell from Vaughan reur clear 6699, still deeply concerned about Elms in view of letter to his wife advising of his illness. Please cable urgently details his condition and your recommendations. Endit

c.c. Mr. Gardiner



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : BUNCHE, NY  
From : GARDINER, LEO  
Date : 31 OCTOBER 62  
N<sup>o</sup> : G- 1539

*ok / LAL*  
**SECRET**

*Ref 31/10*

1. FOLLOWING FROM KAHLE COQUILHATVILLE (GK-727) FOR INFORMATION : QUOTE  
BOCHELEY EGIDE AND TUPA EDWARD BOTH RUNNING AWAY FROM STAN JUST ARRIVED COQ BY  
ROAD THROUGH IKELA AND REQUESTED ASYLUM AT ONUC GUESTHOUSE. TUPA IS SECRETARY  
GENERAL JEUNESSE MNC AND COMMISSAIRE DISTRICT BUNIA. BOCHELEY IS NATIONAL DEPUTY  
AND VICEPRESIDENT MNC. HIS ARREST PRESUMABLY ORDERED BY ADDULA ALONG WITH OTHER  
LUMUMBIST DEPUTIES TO PREVENT ATTENDANCE SESSION OF PARLIAMENT 5 NOVEMBER. WHEN  
INFORMED NO ONUC TROOPS POSTED COQ BOTH REQUESTED AUTHORISATION TRAVEL ABOARD ONUC  
AIRCRAFT MAINTAINING THAT TRAVEL VIA AIR CONGO WOULD LEAD TO THEIR ARREST AT NOJILI  
UPON ARRIVAL. BOCHELEY NOTED WITH APPRECIATION HIS ASYLUM AT ROYAL LEO PRIOR HIS  
TRAVEL TO STAN 25 MAY 1961 ABOARD ONUC AIRCRAFT AND APPEALS TO YOU PERSONALLY TO  
AUTHORIZE TRAVEL TO LEO ABOARD SF-8 TOMORROW AND TO ACCORD HIM AGAIN ASYLUM LEO.  
PLEASE ADVISE. UNQUOTE.
2. WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY ADVICE.
3. HAVE REPLIED AS FOLLOWS : QUOTE I HAVE CABLED NEWYORK FOR GUIDANCE. ARRIVAL  
OF PERSONS CONCERNED IN LEO MAY CAUSE SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT HERE. WILL ADVISE FURTHER  
ON ACTION TO BE TAKEN. UNQUOTE.

RG/jg



OUTGOING CLEAR CABLE

1962 NOV -3 AM 10:03  
Priority  
O.N.U.C.

LEOPOLDVILLE  
3 November 1962

UNATIONS NEWYORK

G-1538

BUNCHE FROM GARDINER

FOR INFORMATION, FOLLOWING FROM MATHU E'VILLE: QUOTE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER SR/1421/MV/ DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1962 ADDRESSED TO ME BY MINISTER MUHONA. "UN COMMISSAIRE DE POLICE ET UN POLICIER DE LA POLICE KATANGAISE SONT TOMBES EN SERVICE COMMANDE, CETTE UNIT, L'UN TUE SUR LE COUP, L'AUTRE MORTELLEMENT BLESSE ET DECEDE UN PEU PLUS TARD DANS LA NUIT, TOUS DEUX VICTIMES D'UN GROUPE DE SOLDATS DE L'ONU. PARA. JE LAISSE AUX AUTORITES JUDICIAIRES LE SOIN DE PROCEDER AUX ENQUETES ET D'ETABLIR LES FAITS ET JE VOUS SAIS GRE D'AVOIR ACCEPTE CETTE UNIT MEME DE DESIGNER DEUX DELEGUES DE L'ONU POUR PROCEDER AVEC NOUS A L'ENQUETE. JE REGRETTE QUE VOUS N'AYEZ PU ACCEPTE DE NOUS RENDRE ENSEMBLE SUR LES LIEUX NI D'ALLER CONSTATER LES DECES. PARA. MAIS JE PROTESTE ENERGIQUEMENT CONTRE LES EVENEMENTS DE CETTE NUIT. UNE NOUVELLE FOIS, DEUX KATANGAIS SONT TOMBES SOUS LES BALLES DE L'ONU. ILS INTERVENAIENT DANS L'EXERCICE DE LEUR FONCTION A LA SUITE D'UNE QUARELLE SURVENUE AU CENTRE DE LA VILLE ENTRE DES CIVILS KATANGAIS ET DEUX SOLDATS DE L'ONU. LES POLICIERS QUI FAISAIENT LEUR RONDE EN JEEP N'ONT MEME PAS SORTI LEURS ARMES POUR INTERVENIR. ILS NE LES ONT PAS SORTIES NON PLUS QUAND EST SURVENUE LA JEEP DE L'ONU VERS LAQUELLE SE SONT ENFUIS LES DEUX SOLDATS. ILS SE SONT MIS A LA POURSUITE DES FUYARDS MAIS LES SOLDATS DE LA JEEP DE L'ONU LES ONT FROIDEMENT ABATTUS, SANS AUCUNE SOMMATION, PUIS SE SONT EUX-MEMES ENFUIS. PARA.

./.



CES ELEMENTS DES TROUPES QUI PRETENDENT ASSURER ICI LE CALME ET LA SECURITE ONT UNE NOUVELLE FOIS PORTE GRAVEMENT ATTEINTE AU CLIMAT DE DETENTE INDISPENSABLE A LA RECONCILIATION NATIONALE. ILS PROTENT L'ENTIERE RESPONSABILITE DE CE DOUBLE CRIME QUI ENDEUILLE, UNE FOIS ENCORE, NOTRE PAYS. UN SENS ELEMENTAIRE DE JUSTICE EXIGE QUE DES SANCTIONS EXEMPLAIRES SOIENT PRISES ET APPLIQUEES ET QUE DES MESURES ENTRENT IMMEDIATEMENT EN VIGUEUR PARMi VOS TROUPES POUR EMPECHER A JAMAIS LE RETOUR DE SEMBLABLES EVENEMENTS, NOTAMMENT EN LEUR INTERDISANT LA FREQUENTATION DE NOS ETABLISSEMENTS PUBLICS. SALUTATIONS.

-- MUHONA". UNQUOTE

RKG/ln



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

SECRET  
*ok/lay*

Routine

TO: BUNCHE, New York  
FROM: GARDINER, Léo  
DATE: 31 October 1962  
NUMBER: G-1537

*Rel x 20/10*

REFERENCE YOUR 7669.

ADOULA INFORMS ME THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO  
BOMBOKO TO FORWARD ORIGINAL LETTER THROUGH CONGO DELEGATION  
TO SECGEN. HE IS SENDING A TELEX MESSAGE TODAY TO BOMBOKO  
TO FIND OUT CAUSE OF DELAY.

RKG/ln



OUTGOING CLEAR CABLE

LEOPOLDVILLE

1962 OCT 31 PM 2:37

MOST IMMEDIATE

31 OCTOBRE 1962

O.N.U.C.

UNATIONS NEW YORK

g) 1536

BUNCHE FROM GARDINER

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT  
TSHOMBE DATED 31 OCTOBER 1962, TOGETHER WITH ANNEX QUOTE EVALUATION DES  
BESOINS DU PLAN UNQUOTE. THIS INCLUDES THE CONTROVERSIAL PASSAGE. QUOTE  
LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL



- Projet -

Le Secrétaire Général p.i. m'a demandé de vous faire part d'un certain nombre de ses observations en ce qui concerne le Plan de réconciliation nationale que je vous ai présenté en son nom en août dernier.

Le manque de tout progrès substantiel dans l'application effective du Plan constitue pour lui une source de sérieuse préoccupation.

Il conviendrait peut-être que je fasse remarquer tout d'abord que le Secrétaire Général est fermement convaincu que le Plan constitue une proposition raisonnable pour les deux parties, et vous a été présenté à vous, aussi bien qu'à Monsieur Adoula, aux fins d'acceptation ou de rejet pur et simple, et non pas pour faire l'objet d'une discussion. Dans ces conditions il ne saurait être question de négociation.

De plus, ainsi que les délais fixés dans diverses dispositions du Plan l'indiquent nettement, l'intention évidente est que le Plan doit être appliqué à bref délai, sous peine d'être considéré comme caduc. Il est certain que le Plan perdrait toute signification si la période prévue pour sa mise en oeuvre devait être prolongée indéfiniment. En fait, c'est bien parce

.../...



.../...

- 2 -

que le délai imparti arrive à expiration qu'il appert à cette date tardive du mois d'octobre qu'il est important qu'un contact soit repris avec vous à ce sujet.

En fait, le Plan appelle de la part des parties intéressées des mesures concrètes qui devraient être promptes et décisives à la fois, dans l'intérêt d'une réconciliation et d'une réintégration. Le Plan définit les mesures précises qu'il convient de prendre en ce qui concerne les dispositions constitutionnelles, les revenus et les devises, la monnaie, les dispositions militaires, les affaires étrangères, l'amnistie, la coopération avec l'ONU et la reconstitution du Gouvernement Central.

De la nature même du sujet, et du fait que la province du Katanga est invitée à se départir de son attitude ~~de~~ séparatiste, il découle que c'est aux autorités katangaises qu'incombent essentiellement les mesures à prendre, bien qu'il convienne de ne pas minimiser l'importance de celles qui sont à la charge du Gouvernement Central.

Il est permis de puiser quelque encouragement dans le fait que certaines des mesures prises, les unes se rattachant au Plan et les autres ne s'y rattachant pas, permettent, toutes, de constater que de nouveaux contacts et communications se sont établis entre Léopoldville et Elisabethville, créant ainsi un climat meilleur.

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L'une de ces mesures consiste dans la disposition à mettre fin aux mouvements de troupes, et l'autre, dans la reprise du trafic sur le Pont de la Lubilash. Toutefois, la pierre de touche est de savoir s'il y a eu commencement d'exécution du Plan en ce qui concerne les dispositions prévoyant la réintégration.

Le but précis de la présente communication est de vous indiquer ce qui, outre les mesures déjà prises, incombe au Katanga (à votre Gouvernement) afin de permettre l'entrée en vigueur du Plan. C'est pourquoi, je me permets de vous remettre en annexe à la présente lettre l'évaluation des besoins du Plan énumérant les mesures que le Gouvernement Central et le Katanga doivent prendre, ainsi que les mesures déjà prises par eux. Il est possible de constater à l'examen de cette énumération que, si certaines mesures peuvent être portées au compte du Katanga, l'on ne saurait cependant prétendre que ces mesures constituent un progrès substantiel vers la fin de la sécession du Katanga et de sa réintégration. Certaines mesures importantes apparaissent, d'autre part, dont l'exécution incombe au Gouvernement Central.

En vue de l'acceptation que vous avez bien voulu donner précédemment au Plan, il est permis de présumer que vous êtes disposé à prendre rapidement les mesures

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précises qui vous incombent encore pour remplir cet engagement. Je me permets d'espérer que, dans ces conditions, vous voudrez bien répondre rapidement à ma lettre.



DISPOSITIONS CONSTITUTIONNELLES

Un projet de constitution instituant un système de Gouvernement fédéral a été rédigé en septembre avec l'assistance d'experts en matière de droit constitutionnel mis à la disposition du Gouvernement par les Nations Unies à sa demande. Le 23 août aussi bien qu'à une date ultérieure, le Gouvernement central, conformément à son communiqué du 29 juillet, a invité les gouvernements provinciaux et tous les groupes politiques du Congo, intéressés en la matière, de lui faire parvenir leurs vues sur les dispositions qui devront être incluses dans cette Constitution. Les "premières remarques" des autorités katangaises et les propositions faites par d'autres groupes ont été communiquées aux experts qui en ont tenu compte. Le projet de constitution a été soumis par le Gouvernement central aux présidents de provinces réunis à Léopoldville le 16 octobre, mais aucun représentant du Katanga n'était présent pour en recevoir communication. Le Plan prévoit que le Gouvernement central soumettra le projet de constitution au Parlement et l'y défendra jusqu'à ce qu'il prenne effet. L'avant projet de constitution a été réuni aux Bureaux des deux Chambres le 13 octobre 1962.

REVENUS ET DEVICES

A. REVENUS

Le projet de Loi de Finances visé dans le Plan a été rédigé, comme prévu, avec la collaboration d'experts fournis par les Nations Unies. Le Plan envisageait que tous les Gouvernements provinciaux soient invités à présenter leurs vues sur les lois à proposer. Or, le Gouvernement central est d'avis que la loi financière, en tant qu'acte de législation ordinaire, ne nécessiterait pas de



renvoi spécial aux Gouvernements provinciaux, étant donné que ces derniers pourront toujours présenter leurs vues sur le projet de loi au moment où celui-ci sera examiné par le Parlement. Une Commission des revenus, composée de représentants du Gouvernement central et du Katanga assistés d'experts de l'ONU a été constituée. Au cours des réunions que cette commission a tenues à Elisabethville, l'accord s'est fait sur les questions de procédure. Le Plan prévoit que, jusqu'à ce que la commission ait complété ses travaux, et que les dispositions définitives prévues aient été mises en vigueur, le Gouvernement central et le Katanga conviennent de partager, à parts égales, les revenus découlant de toutes taxes ou droits sur les importations et exportations ainsi que de toutes redevances provenant de concessions minières. La délégation katangaise à la commission s'est déclarée disposée à verser 25 à 30 % de son revenu net. Toutefois, cette proposition n'est pas conforme au Plan qui prévoit qu'au cours de la période intérimaire précédant la mise en oeuvre des dispositions définitives, tous les revenus en question seront divisés par parts égales. Cette disposition, ainsi que le Plan lui-même, ne sauraient faire l'objet de négociations. En conséquence, les autorités katangaises n'ont pas rempli les conditions du Plan.

#### B. DEVISES

Le Plan prévoit qu'en attendant la mise en oeuvre des dispositions définitives toutes les devises devront être versées au Conseil monétaire ou à l'institution que celui-ci désignera et que les parties intéressées acceptent, et que le Conseil monétaire contrôlera l'utilisation des devises de quelque partie du Congo qu'elles proviennent, et accordera au Katanga, pour ses besoins essentiels, 50 % au moins des devises ayant leur origine dans cet état. La Délégation katangaise a refusé de verser ces devises au Conseil monétaire ou à l'institution que celui-ci désignera et a suggéré au lieu de cela, que seul le solde disponible après couverture des besoins du Katanga soit versé au Conseil monétaire. En outre,



MONNAIE

Aux termes du Plan, le Gouvernement central invitera les Nations Unies à demander au Fonds monétaire international de charger ses experts de préparer un plan portant sur l'unification progressive de la monnaie. Le Gouvernement central a déjà lancé cette invitation par l'intermédiaire de l'ONU et celle-ci a été acceptée par le Fonds, encore que les experts du FMI ne soient pas encore arrivés. Il s'en suit que la date à laquelle cette unification commencera à prendre effet (dix jours après l'approbation du Gouvernement central) n'a pas encore été déterminée.

DISPOSITIONS MILITAIRES

Conformément au Plan, les officiers de la Gendarmerie katangaise devront prêter le serment usuel d'allégeance au Président de la République. A ce jour, le Katanga a exigé, comme condition préalable, que d'accord entre le Gouvernement central et le Katanga, un texte de loi d'amnistie soit établi, promulgué et mis en vigueur, bien que le Plan ne prévoit pas cette condition. Cette disposition du Plan n'a, par conséquent, pas été respectée. La Commission militaire, composée de représentants du Gouvernement central et du Katanga, assistée par des experts de l'ONU, s'est réunie à Elisabethville mais le plan qu'elle devait mettre au point, dans un délai de trente jours pour une intégration rapide des unités de Gendarmerie dans l'Armée nationale congolaise, n'a pas été formulé. En conséquence, ce programme ne peut être mis en oeuvre dans les soixante jours suivants comme le prévoit le Plan. Il en résulte également que les parties n'ont pas eu l'occasion d'exprimer clairement leurs vues sur la question de la complète liberté de mouvement sur l'ensemble du territoire du Congo, de la Commission militaire et des experts de l'ONU,



conformément aux dispositions du Plan.

#### AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

Le Plan stipule qu'aucun Etat (c'est à dire aucune autorité provinciale) ne devra maintenir à l'étranger des fonctionnaires ou des missions diplomatiques ou consulaires, étant donné que la conduite des affaires étrangères est réservée au Gouvernement central. Cependant, le Katanga maintient toujours le poste de "Ministre des Affaires étrangères", et il n'y a aucune indication que ses représentations à l'étranger ont été supprimées.

#### AMNISTIE

Aux termes du Plan, le Gouvernement central décrètera une amnistie générale et, s'il y a lieu, présentera et défendra au Parlement une loi à cet effet. Aucune mesure n'a été prise à ce jour.

#### COOPERATION AVEC LES NATIONS UNIES

En ce qui concerne la coopération avec les Nations Unies, prévue par le Plan, les autorités katangaises n'ont pris aucune disposition importante en vue d'appliquer les résolutions de l'ONU plus particulièrement celles visant les mercenaires et elles maintiennent leur refus de la liberté de mouvement dans le sud Katanga au personnel de l'ONU.

#### RECONSTITUTION DU GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL

En ce qui concerne la reconstitution du Gouvernement central, à l'occasion de laquelle le Plan stipule que le Premier Ministre offrira des ministères à des membres du Parti Conakat, aucune mesure en ce sens n'a été prise à ce jour.



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*For Info*

FOLLOWING FROM MATHU (ELLED 1498) : QUOTE POLLING DAY FOR RHODESIAN ELECTIONS IN EVILLE RESULTED IN A MINOR RIOT BEFORE LUNCH TODAY 30 OCT WHEN BRITISH CONSUL DODSON SUFFERED NOT TOO SERIOUS NECK INJURIES. ABOUT TWENTY RHODESIAN AFRICANS TURNED UP TO CAST THEIR VOTES AT THE BRITISH CONSULATE. THEY FOUND THAT THEY COULD NOT BE PERMITTED AS THEIR NAMES DID NOT APPEAR IN THE VOTERS ROLL. THEY OUGHT TO HAVE REGISTERED ON OR BEFORE 30 JULY LAST. THE GROUP OF THESE ANGRY MEN STARTED SMASHING WINDOWS OF CARS NEAR CONSULATE. CONSUL WENT OUT TO SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING. IT WAS THEN THAT HE FELL IN HANDS OF THESE MEN WHO SUPPORT WELENSKY REGIME THROUGH NKUMBULA AND ANC. THE CONSUL IS IN HOSPITAL AND IS EXPECTED TO BE DISCHARGED IN A DAY OR TWO.UNQUOTE.

RG/jg