

[3 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 51002

BOX 118

FILE 5

ACC. 1993/0283

1 1 051050 SEP 94

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CGM 3 CYANGUGU

FHQ // HUMANITARIAN BRANCH

INFO MILOB GPHQ

SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS

1. You are informed that UNHCR has stopped transport of displaced persons to their home destinations.
2. It is suggested that if UN convey can be provided to quickly repatriate displaced persons.

EOM

HAE

Are there any reasons?

Reason

→ LACK OF ETHIOPIAN ESCORT.

SPS

Sorted out and instructed accordingly to MP-1

②

Staff A
file with S. treps
Sectors.

May

DISTRIBUTION - DATE DE DISTRIBUTION	
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5000.8/HAC

24 July, 1994

To : FC

From: HAC

Subject: EVACUATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM MURAMBI

1. The HAC has been tasked to carry out staff checks on the evacuation of displaced persons from Murambi in the French Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) to areas in the RPF Zone.

LIAISON WITH RPF

2. Preliminary discussions have been held with the RPF Senior LO and he agrees with the plan in principle.

3. The RPF will be prepared to assist in the fol areas:-

a. Provide guides/escorts from RPF Zone up to the HPZ demarcation line and back.

b. Provide clearance for the movement of UNAMIR convoy(s) through the RPF Zone.

c. Ensure that all RPF local commanders are notified of the details of the operation.

PLANNING DATA

4. The French Coalition Force (FCF) has provided information on the displaced persons in Murambi (Attached as Annex 'A'). It is clear from the information provided that the problem is more involved than we had anticipated. UNAMIR does not have the logistics capabilities to evacuate the numbers involved in one snap operation. UNAMIR also lacks the resources to handle the evacuation of the sick and handicapped among the displaced persons.

5. Under the circumstances, it is suggested that we devote our efforts to evacuating the able bodied whilst the FCF take responsibility for evacuating the sick and handicapped.

APPROACH

6. It is assumed that the operation aims at:-

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
- a. Demonstrating to the Rwandese population that UNAMIR is a viable force capable of replacing the FCF once it withdraws.
 - b. Serving as a "dress rehearsal" on how UNAMIR can operate in the HPZ with the same operational posture as the FCF when the planned relief in place operation takes place.
7. Bearing in mind the above assumptions, it is suggested that the evacuation operation be conducted in a high profile manner as is being done by the FCF. Therefore armed troops (minimum of 2 platoons) should be used instead of UNMOS.

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

8. The following concept of operation is recommended:-
- a. UNAMIR convoy moves from Kigali to HPZ line under RPF guides/escorts.
 - b. Convoy moves from HPZ line under FCF guide to Murambi (Pick up Point).
 - c. Convoy returns to HPZ line under FCF guide.
 - d. Convoy crosses HPZ line and moves to designated drop off point(s) under RPF guide.
 - e. Process is repeated until operation is completed.
 - f. Route - Kigali - Gitarama - Butare - Gikongoro - Murambi.

CONVOY COMPOSITION

9. The recommended convoy composition is as follows:-



PLANNING AND EXECUTION

10. To date, the HAC has planned and executed convoy moves to evacuate displaced persons including the employment of force reserves. Although this arrangement has worked satisfactorily, it is considered to be out of line with normal operational procedures.

11. With the current mandate of UNAMIR and related UNAMIR contingency plans for deployment in Rwanda it is envisaged that such operations will become one of our main tasks both at Force and sub-unit level. Therefore it is important that the procedures for such operations be streamlined. There should be a clear delineation of responsibilities between the HAC and UNAMIR Ops. The following "division of labour" is suggested:

- a. HAC. Should be responsible for:
 - (1) Providing planning data on displaced persons.
 - (2) Liaison with all agencies concerned with operations to move displaced persons.
 - (3) Monitor and evacuate conditions of displaced persons once they are moved to new locations.
 - (4) Co-ordinate all humanitarian activities for the management of displaced persons in new locations.
- b. UNAMIR OPS. Should be responsible for:
 - (1) The actual planning, execution and control of convoy operations.
 - (2) Assigning tasks to units as appropriate.
 - (3) Co-ordinating/Liaising with HAC on all humanitarian related issues likely to affect the operational plans.

RECOMMENDATIONS


12. The following recommendations are made:-

- a. UNAMIR should undertake a high profile operation to evacuate the displaced persons from Murambi (Approx 725 persons).
- b. The FCF should conduct a separate operation to evacuate the sick and disabled (Approx 45 persons).

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c. The operation should be planned and executed by UNAMIR Ops using the information and guidelines provided in this memo.

13. Submitted for your study further direction please.



CB YAACHE
Col
CHAO

URGENT / Protège.

1126B / 21/07/94

ANNEX A

FM : CHEF DL

GOMA LE 21 JUILLET 1994

TO : DL KIGALI

NMR 47 /PCIAT/DL

OBJET : RETOUR DES DEPLACES EN ZONE FPR.

1 - VOUS TRANSMETS LES ELEMENTS TECHNIQUES SUSCEPTIBLES DE FAVORISER LA REALISATION DE CE MOUVEMENT DANS LES MEILLEURES CONDITIONS.

A) SITE : CAMP DE NURAMBI (2 KM NORD DE GIKONGORO EN 518-288)

B) NOMBRE DE DEPLACES : 770 VOLONTAIRES A LA DATE DU 20 JUILLET

C) DATE DU MOUVEMENT : A PARTIR DU 27 JUILLET.

D) ITINERAIRE : L'ITINERAIRE PERMETTANT D'EVITER LA TRAVERSEE DE GIKONGORO EST IMPRATICABLE (POINT D'ENTREE EN ZHS : PONT EN 627 - 407 - CARREFOUR MWOKORA EN 553 -395 RUGARAMA EN 504 -353)

ITINERAIRE LE PLUS COURT EN ZHS (ENVIRON 10 KM) LE PLUS DIRECT ET ENTIEREMENT BITUME EST LE SUIVANT :

POINT D'ENTREE EN ZHS : PONT EN 602 -222
GIKONGORO -MURAMBI.

E) TRANSPORT COUCHE : 15

HANDICAPES, MALADES ,PERSONNES AGEES : 30

ENFANTS DE MOINS DE 3 ANS :100


FEMMES : 150

MOYENS DE TRANSPORT NECESSAIRES :

10 BUS , 5 CAMIONS , AMBULANCES POUR 15 PERSONNES

2 - VOUS DEMANDE NOUS FOURNIR RAPIDEMENT VOS REMARQUES OU SUGGESTIONS CONCERNANT LA PROCEDURE ENVISAGEE

LE COLONEL CANOVAS
CHEF DES DL



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5000.5/HAC

24 July, 1994

To : FC

From: HAC

Subject: CONTROL OF MISSING RWANDESE AND FOREIGN
NATIONALS IN RWANDA

1. Since the outbreak of war in Rwanda on 7 Apr 94 numerous enquires have been received by UNAMIR from many interested parties concerning the whereabouts of "missing people" in Rwanda (both Rwandese and ex-patriates).
2. This necessitated the establishment of an UNAMIR Missing Persons Cell manned by a Force EDP officer and a Rwandese civilian.
3. To date, the cell has compiled data on some 2,000 persons.
4. While a few of these "missing persons" have been located, the whereabouts of the majority is still unknown. UNAMIR's efforts to confirm their whereabouts has been hampered by the following factors:
 - a. In accessibility to most parts of Rwanda due to hostilities.
 - b. Lack of man power within the HAC to handle the numerous tasks.
 - c. Frequent movement of the population from place to place as a result of fighting.
5. Now that the situation in Rwanda is returning to normal, it is suggested that this operation be turned over to the new Rwandese government or to any UN Agency or NGOs with the required expertise in such matters. The suggestion is supported by the following reasons:
 - a. The task requires a certain level of expertise which the HAC does not possess at this time. This includes adequate knowledge of the political structure, the people and the language.
 - b. The HAC is about to lose the services of the only EDP officer who was well versed in the establishment of the data bank. (He is due for repatriation soon). It is anticipated


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that it will take a considerable length of time to obtain a replacement with the same level of knowledge in computer operations.

c. The exercise of tracing missing persons is expected to be a long term one which will require permanent and adequate staffing. The HAC in its present and future structure does not satisfy this requirement.

d. In other missions that have been face with a similar situation, the solution has been the establishment of a civilian missing persons bureau by the UN with adequate staffing and logistics resources to handle the problem.

6. If the suggestion is endorsed, the HAC would hand over the available data to the new organisation to serve as basis for the execution of its task. The UNAMIR HAC would then liaise closely with this new organisation and offer any advice and guidance as may be necessary.



CB YAACHE
Col
HACO

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