

A-5

FC/AIR/3037 - AIR Inspections and Reports

02/11/1961 - 25/02/1964

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

Clear-NK

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-0787

BOX 9

FILE 8

ACC. DA613/16.5.00

3037

GGW:jmg

cc: Force Commander ✓  
Ch Air Ops  
Ch Mil Info  
Ch Mil Ops  
Ch Air Eng Off

*File*

25 February 1964

To : Chief of Staff

From : Air Commander

*DA 25/2*

Subject: Air Commander's Visit to KIKWIT - 24 FEB 64

1. The Air Commander visited ONUC personnel at KIKWIT Airfield on the afternoon of 24 Feb 64, travelling by chartered Transair aircraft both ways.
2. On arrival at KIKWIT, Capt Von Bayer reported that the airfield was safe and the situation was unchanged from reports over the past few days. There had been very heavy thunderstorms throughout the morning in the KIKWIT area and this was the reason that the SSB communication did not operate until after 1200Z.
3. As discussed with you before my departure, and on the recommendation of Capt Von Bayer and Lt Glantz as well, a priority message was sent to Air Ops, LEO, instructing them to move one Helicopter from LULU to KIKWIT as early as possible on the morning of 25 Feb (copy of ..... message attached).
4. The aircraft fuel supply at KIKWIT is running very low and even though the ANC have ordered a re-supply of aviation fuel from Air Congo, Von Bayer was instructed to keep a close watch on the aircraft fuel situation and ask for a re-supply by air, if it appeared that the Air Congo arrangements ~~for fuel~~ were not satisfactory.
5. The ANC have two of their aircraft out of commission. One Harvard type aircraft was a complete write-off after a landing accident at IDIOFA about one week ago. Their Dove aircraft was hit by ground fire while flying over WUTU (approximately 30 kms east of KIKWIT) and received damage to the <sup>rudder</sup> ~~motor~~ controls and brake system. While attempting a landing on its return to KIKWIT this morning, the aircraft went out of control and into the grass area on the side of the runway.

.../2

6. Capt Von Bayer reported that the ANC are flying a DC-3 type aircraft into IDIOFA and the re-supply of the ANC garrison at that town is well in hand.

7. The ONUC Otter aircraft is doing four trips a day to GUNGU, weather permitting, and at that rate, the original ONUC commitment should be finished by Saturday, 29 Feb. The Otter aircraft has seven holes where it has been hit by ground fire.

8. On the morning of 24 Feb the ANC used a road convoy to evacuate one priest and 120 children from a mission at MAKUNGIKA (east of the KIKWIT-GUNGU road).

9. The Air Commander <sup>did</sup> had a flight of approximately one hour in a Helicopter over the area of this mission and over the road system between there and KIKWIT. The mission was intact and guarded by ANC troops. There were numerous road blocks but Jeunesse activities were almost non-existent—less than a dozen Jeunesse were seen in one of the small villages only.

10. The moral of the ONUC personnel appears to be extremely good but they were asking information as to the target date for their withdrawal from KIKWIT.

*G G Wright*

(G G Wright) G/C  
Air Commander

*25/2*

7032

IN LIEU OF MESSAGE FORM

ROUTINE

FROM: AIR COMMANDER

TO: AIR BASE COMMANDER, N'DJILI  
MAJ E GARNES, N'DJILI

UNCLAS A0710 20 FEB. BOARD OF INQUIRY IS HEREBY APPOINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH HQ ONUC INSTRUCTION NO. 5008/R/PERS DATED 26 APRIL 63 TO INVESTIGATE, MAKE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE REPORTED LOSS OF SURPLUS CANBERRA EQUIPMENT FROM AIR BASE NDJILI.

THE BOARD SHOULD ESTABLISH THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH THE REPORTED LOSS OCCURRED AND SHOULD CONSIDER IN PARTICULAR THE MEASURES TAKEN AND THE CONTROLS NOW IN EFFECT TO PREVENT FURTHER LOSSES.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD IS TO REPORT TO THE AIR COMMANDER, ONUC HQ, AT 1000 HOURS, MONDAY, 24 FEB 64, FOR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND TERMS OF REFERENCE. THE COURT IS TO CONVENE ON 24 FEB 64 AND IS COMPOSED AS FOLLOWS:

PRESIDENT : MAJ E GARNES, BASE TECH OFF  
MEMBER : CAPT C HAGA, BASE ADMIN OFF  
MEMBER : MR. C. V. SMITH, BASE ADMIN ASST

*P. 10*

*[Signature]*  
(G G WRIGHT) G/C  
AIR COMMANDER

Distribution:

*[Signature]* *n/a*

Force Commander	Chief Admin Off
Chief of Staff	Chief Pur + Supp Off
Air Commander	Property Survey Bd
Chief Mil Pers	
Chief Air Eng Off	
Chief Air Admin Off	

3037

*Air Commander*

13 February 1964

To : Chief of Staff

From : Air Commander

Subject : Tour Notes of Air Commander's Visit to  
LULUABOURG, KAMINA, KOLWEZI and ELISABETHVILLE - 10/11 Feb 64

INTRODUCTION

1. The Air Commander, G/C G G Wright, travelled via scheduled flight to LULUABOURG, KAMINA, KOLWEZI and ELISABETHVILLE on 10 Feb and returned on 11 Feb. The purpose of the trip was to check on the operation of the scheduled flights service which is now contracted to Transair Sweden, using C-46 type aircraft, and to have discussions with the Air Division representatives at the different points of landing.

LULUABOURG

2. The Air Division Section at LULUABOURG is moving into other offices in the same Headquarters building in the town to make space for the Swedish Battalion Headquarters. This will result in the Civilian Administration, the Swedish Battalion Headquarters, the Air Division Section, the Canadian Signals Unit and the Air Division SSB Unit all being located in the same building.

3. The Air Base Commander has asked for a larger supply of spare parts most normally needed for the daily maintenance of Otter and Helicopter aircraft and he said he had submitted a request to the Base Supply Officer at M'djili accordingly.

Recommendation: The Chief Air Engineering Officer is to take follow-up action with the Base Supply Officer at M'djili.

4. The Air Division personnel were experiencing difficulties in getting new or replacement refrigerators when needed for their villas and in getting repairs done to unserviceable refrigerators. Apparently, the local civilian administration is responsible for this service.

Recommendation: The Air Base Commander is to submit a report in writing to this Headquarters, if the situation does not improve in the near future.

5. Fresh meat and vegetables are in extremely short supply through UN sources and practically non-existent on the local market at LULUABOURG.

Recommendation: Suggest the Chief Logistics Officer takes action to rectify this situation. The larger C-46 type aircraft now being used on the weekly flight to GOMA for fresh vegetables could bring back larger quantities than had been carried by C-47's previously.

6. Some of the Air Division aircrews who were required to fly over isolated and sometimes unfriendly territory have no personal weapons for their own protection and survival, if they are forced down during such flights.

Recommendation: It was agreed that personal weapons may be carried on such flights but, since Air Division has no such items in its supply inventory, the Air Base Commander was advised to request the contingent commanders of the personnel concerned to have personal weapons issued on loan from national supply sources.

7. Four of the five Helicopters on the Air Division establishment are at LULUABOURG at present on stand-by for possible use in KWILU Province. It is suggested that two of these aircraft be moved to ELISABETHVILLE as soon as possible to support the Army commitments in the ELISABETHVILLE/JADOTVILLE Sector.

#### KAMINA

8. On arrival at KAMINA on 10 Feb, a representative from the Swedish Battalion and the Air Division, as well as the officer in charge of the Canadian Signals Detachment, advised they were very concerned about the many discrepancies that existed between the plans they had for withdrawing from KAMINA and those that ONUC HQ were following. Since my information was based on Headquarters' plans, I suggested they use all communications facilities available on a priority basis and ask Headquarters for immediate clarification because some of the plans were to be actioned the following day. On my return trip through KAMINA on 11 Feb a revised plan had been worked out with Headquarters and everything seemed to be progressing smoothly.

#### KOLWEZI

9. There are no Air Division personnel at KOLWEZI. It is an uncontrolled airfield with no let-down facilities which means the

scheduled flights will probably have to over-fly the station, if bad weather prevails at the time of intended arrival.

10. Since no proper ground handling equipment was available, considerable difficulty was experienced in unloading some large, heavy pieces of cargo for the Irish unit at KOLWEZI. It was suggested to one of the Irish officers present that their battalion workshops might construct a portable wooden ramp made out of planks about 12 feet long to be available at the airfield for use in unloading similar pieces of cargo in the future.

Recommendation: Suggest the Chief Logistics Officer takes follow-up action to have some such unloading device made available at KOLWEZI.

#### ELISABETHVILLE

11. Both the Air Base Commander and the Commander ELISABETHVILLE/JADOTVILLE Sector at ELISABETHVILLE are anxious to have some Helicopter and Otter aircraft made available to meet their requirements in South Katanga. I advised that they could expect to have one Otter and two or three Helicopters in the near future.

12. As mentioned in the report on my last field trip in early November 1963, there is still 360,000 litres (1600 barrels) of surplus 115/145 AVGAS stored on the airfield. ONUC has no further use for this fuel, which will reach the end of its storage life by 1 March 1964.

Recommendation: Chief Air Engineering Officer at Air Division Hq takes hastening action to have the Purchase and Supply Section dispose of this surplus fuel as soon as possible.

13. The Air Base Commander ELISABETHVILLE asked when he might expect to get rid of the 22 ex-Katangese aircraft which were left in his custody for safekeeping after cessation of hostilities in South Katanga. He was advised that this Headquarters had almost completed negotiations to have the Central Government appoint a representative to sign receipts and take over these aircraft. On my return to Headquarters, a Central Government representative was waiting for a meeting on this subject and, as a result, a Congolese delegation departed for ELISABETHVILLE on 13 Feb to take over and sign for these aircraft.

14. The Air Base establishment had six vacancies at the time but arrangements had already been made to send four replacements via SF 1 on 12 Feb and the remaining two positions should be filled within the following week.

15. The vehicle establishment is considered to be insufficient for the needs of the Air Division Detachment staff members and the aircraft crews who are often required to report on short notice and at odd hours for operational flights. Two additional vehicles are required.

Recommendation: It is suggested that Chief Logistics Officer takes action to have two additional vehicles (of Jeep or Land Rover type) supplied to the Air Base Commander at ELISABETHVILLE as soon as possible.

16. On arrival and departure at ELISABETHVILLE, there were many vehicles and extra people on the ramp in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft. People other than the passengers were even in the aircraft on the morning of departure. It is suggested that unnecessary cars and people other than passengers or officials who attend to details at the aircraft should not be allowed beyond the terminal building, and certainly not on the ramp in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft, when ONUC flights are arriving or departing.

Recommendation: Chief Logistics Officer or Chief Movement Control Officer should give specific instructions to the Movement Control Officer at ELISABETHVILLE in accordance with the suggestion in para 16 above.

#### N'DJILI

17. On arrival at N'DJILI there was one Movement Control representative to meet the aircraft. He appeared to be more concerned in unloading the cargo than taking care of the passengers. The aircraft had been parked at the "American" hangar and there was no suitable transport to take the passengers to the terminal building. No one seemed to know why the aircraft had been parked so far away from the passenger terminal. The passengers were left standing under the wing of the aircraft, in the rain, and had to fend for themselves as far as transportation was concerned. When the baggage finally was unloaded, it was put on the back of an uncovered vehicle--a steady rain was still falling--and transported to the terminal building.

Recommendation: Someone in authority at this Headquarters should take immediate action to improve the service of the Movement Control staff and facilities at N'DJILI so that passengers are given more suitable treatment.



Transair Scheduled Flights Operation

18. Air Division Headquarters still does not have a copy of the contract under which Transair Sweden is operating for ONUC.

Recommendation: Air Commander to bring this to the attention of the Chief Administrative Officer so that New York can be asked to hasten copies of the contract to this Headquarters.

19. When KAMINA BASE is closed and scheduled flights no longer required to stop there, and when more exact flying times are established after approximately two weeks of operation by Transair, new scheduled flights programmes should be drawn up in consultation with a Transair representative and issued to all concerned. Also, there should be some flexibility as to the number of seats available at each stop.

Recommendation: To be actioned by Chief Air Operations Officer.

20. Although my trip was only the second scheduled flight operated by Transair with their C-46 aircraft, everything went very well. The aircraft is much more comfortable than the C-47's we operated previously and, with the increased payload capability, the new aircraft should be able to meet our scheduled flights requirements easily.

*W. G. Wright*  
(G G WRIGHT) G/C  
AIR COMMANDER

Distribution:

✓ *17/2*  
Force Commander  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Admin Off  
Chief Logistics Officer  
Chief Movement Control Off  
Chief Purch + Supply  
Chief Mil Ops  
Chief Air Eng Off  
Chief Air Ops  
Chief Air Admin  
Air Inspector (FAA)  
Air Base Cmdr, N'djili  
" " " Lulu  
" " " E'ville  
CO Sup Squad, N'djili

# ROUTING SLIP

TO

*The Force Commander  
HQ ROYAL.*

APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE	X	YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

DATE

*14/2/64*

FROM

*Property Survey Board*

## PROPERTY SURVEY BOARD

Minutes of 86th Meeting  
Held on 30 January 1964

By cable No. ONUC 5045 dated 8 Aug 63 the Force Commander requested disposal instructions from Headquarters, New York for the following five F 86 E Aircraft:

Serial No.	19483
"	" 19542
"	" 19659
"	" 19709
"	" 19784

file

These aircraft on charge of UNATB are a liability and require constant maintenance to prevent undue deterioration. The Chief Purchasing and Supply Section in cable No. ONUC 6698, recommended that these aircraft be scrapped, the engineering staff having been so reduced as to make continued daily maintenance and the acceptance of caretaker responsibility an impossibility.

Authorization to scrap the aircraft was received from Headquarters, New York through cable No. 7124 dated 1 Dec 63.

The Board noted the reasons given in cable No. ONUC 5137 from the Chief, Purchasing and Supply Section, as to why the aircraft could not be dismantled, crated and shipped, and recommended that:

- 1) instruments and radio equipment which are serviceable and can be used in other ONUC aircraft be removed, taken on charge and stored in Air Supply stores
- 2) the guns be removed and destroyed in the presence of a representative from UNATB and Purchasing and Supply Section
- 3) the aircraft themselves be rendered non-repairable and unusable by being smashed with heavy hammers
- 4) serviceable instruments and radio equipment which cannot be used in other ONUC aircraft and which have no military value be sold at the best possible price by Purchasing and Supply Section, together with the remaining scrap items
- 5) a full report on the disposal and sale of these aircraft be forwarded to Headquarters, New York by the Chief, Purchasing and Supply Section, with a copy to the ONUC Property Survey Board.

Property Survey Board  
Meeting - 30/1/64

- 13 -

Old No.	Make and Type	Chassis No.	Engine No.	Year	Class	Damage due to	On Charge	Inventory value	Assessed value
RNA 490	Landrover	152903176	151920308	1958	IV	fwtd*	4 Ghana Regt	\$2500	-
RNA 495	Landrover	152301157	151000962	1958	II	"	"	2500	-
RNA 621	Landrover	152003859	15104942	1958	IV	"	"	2500	-
RNA 633	Landrover	152000929	151025777	1958	V	"	"	2500	-
RNA 634	Landrover	152003725	151024735	1958	VI	fwtd + acct	"	-	\$ 1250
RNA 640	Landrover	152003929	151025699	1958	IV	fwtd	"	2500	-
-	Bedford	RLC3-36360	RL3-47567	1958	IV	"	"	6000	-
-	Bedford	J5LC-89943	J4563-82169	1960	V	"	"	4000	-
-	Bedford	RLC3-36736	RL3-46590	1958	IV	"	"	6000	-
RNA 2332	Bedford	RLC3-34611	RL3-45548	N/A	IV	"	300NR RNA	6000	-

\*fair wear and tear

The Board noted that:

By a FAR dated 21 Dec 63, the Administrative Officer, Luluabourg, advised that the above-mentioned vehicles had been handed over on loan to the ANC

By a memo dated 6 Dec 63, the Senior Administrative Officer indicated that "the UN/ANC Liaison Officer was negotiating for their sale to the ANC on a cost-less-depreciation basis"

The FME inspection report for ONUC 3627 stated that the vehicle was involved in an accident. The fact that efforts to locate the accident report were unavailing indicated that the accident was unreported by the unit.

The Board recommended that:

The above-mentioned vehicles be disposed of as under para (a) above

The case be referred to Headquarters, New York for consideration to be given to the possible recovery of the loss (\$1250.00) of ONUC 3627 from the Government of Ghana.

3032

X

UNCLASSIFIED

AIRBASE COMMANDER ELISABETHVILLE  
" " LULUABOURG  
AIRDIV DETACHMENT KAMINA

Info: AIRBASE COMMANDER NDJILI  
GO SUPPORT SQUADRON

*Handwritten signature*

AO 664 FROM AIR COMMANDER. AAA. AIR COMMANDER WILL BE ONBOARD SFI MONDAY  
10 FEB PROCEEDING TO EVILLE AND RETURNING LEO FOLLOWING DAY. BBB. WISH TO MEET  
AND HAVE BRIEF DISCUSSIONS WITH MAJOR BERLIN AT LULU AND 1/LT TAARNING AT KAMINA  
DURING ONE HOUR STOPOVER BOTH DAYS. CCC. WILL REMAIN OVERNIGHT EVILLE AND WISH  
TO DISCUSS LOCAL SITUATION WITH MAJOR SPIEL THERE. PLEASE ARRANGE ACCOMMODATION  
EVILLE

*Handwritten signature: G G Wright*  
(G G Wright) G/C  
Air Commander

cc: Force Commander ✓  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Mil Pers  
Air Admin Off  
Chief Air Ops

*Handwritten signature: [illegible]*

*Handwritten word: File*

08 FEB 8  
364 FEB - 8 AM 11:34

RECEIVED

PRIORITY

VV LE0027TTTTTTTSH 005

SS 4UC75

201 24(1)

DE 4UC91 29/0735Z

FROM CO SUPP SQDN

TO SUPP SQDN N, DJILI

INFO AIR OPS HQ LEO

BU

UNCLAS GET OTTER 302 READY AYAP REPEAT ASAP

302 SHALL BE MOVED TO KIKWIT BY WO/2 ERIKSSON.

303 SHALL BE BROUGHT BACK TO LEO BY WO/2 ERIKSSON

HEL 265 WILL COME TO LEO PROBABLY ON

THE 29TH FOR 100 HRS INSP, PERFORM ASAP

M/SGT WALLIM AND POUITZKI RETURN LEO TO-DAY

HAVE YOU GOT NEW TANK FOR 636

WILL 302 BE READY FOR MOV ON THE 29TH

CFN ~~302 302 2 303 2 265 29 140 636 302 29~~

BT

28 January 1964

To : Secretary, Property Survey Board

From : Air Commander

Subject: H-19D Helicopter, S/N 57-1620, Case No. ONUC/SB/474

*29/1*

1. Reference is made to your memo dated 14 December 1964, subject as above.

..... 2. Attached for your information are photostatic copies of cable COS273, in which this Headquarters requested Sector E'ville to try and obtain information on the whereabouts of Helicopter S/N 57-1620, and cable sent by Sector E'ville in reply.

3. As far as the ONUC Air Division Headquarters is concerned, there is no official record as to the whereabouts of this Helicopter, since late 1961 and it is suggested that any further investigation would be of little value.

4. It is the recommendation of the undersigned, therefore, that Helicopter S/N 57-1620 be written off and ONUC records amended accordingly.

*G G Wright*

(G G Wright) G/C  
Air Commander

cc: Force Commander  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Air Eng Off



8 MAY 63  
17/5

17 May 1963

To : Chief of Civilian Operations  
From : Senior Administrative Officer  
Subject : Mr. Amachree's Agenda

1. Please refer to this Office letter dated 16 May 1963 on the above subject, addressed to the Air Commander with a copy to you.
2. We have now been informed that the DC6 is committed as follows:
  - Troop movements within the Congo - 27, 28 and 29 May 63.
  - Nigerian repatriation - 31 May, 1 June and 2 June 63.
3. We understand from the Chief of Air Operations that the DC6 can be taken away from its commitments inasmuch as the internal troop movements are concerned, but it cannot be used on the dates as given above for the Nigerian repatriation.
4. We shall, therefore, be grateful if you will inform the Air HQs of any other dates for the field visits of Mr. Amachree which would ensure that the Nigerian repatriation is not disturbed.

cc: Force Commander ✓  
Air Commander  
Chief Air Operations Officer.

FC  
Cm

25 March 1963

TO: Mr. Ben T. Twigt  
Chief Administrative Officer

FROM: R. K. A. Gardiner  
Officer-in-Charge

SUBJECT: Air Missions, former Kivu Province

I understand that you have expressed concern regarding the expenditure involved in establishing regular air missions in the former Kivu Province.

..... The plans are not new, having been proposed by the Chief of Civilian Operations to the Force Commander in November of last year (see attached memoranda of 23 Nov 62, 16 Jan 63 and 12 March 63). Besides serving the hospitals in a region where road communications are difficult, the missions are primarily designed to enable the Chief Civilian Officer to keep in close and regular touch with the interior of the region for which he is responsible. The proposal for Kivu would merely bring it into line with the arrangements already applying in Kasai.

Since the C47 stationed at KAMEMBE is used for this flight, the only direct cost is that of the fuel used. In fact, the more the plane is used, the more the overhead costs are spread.

I wish these missions to be carried out, and I trust you will find no administrative difficulties to prevent this.

In the same connection, it has just come to my attention that you have cancelled the contract with AIR BROUSSE for the use of a Beechcraft plane by the Chief Civilian Officer in Stanleyville. Since a light plane is the only means of reaching most places in the former Orientale Province, I shall appreciate it if you will renew this contract until such time as one of the new Otters is available for this work.

cc: Force Commander ✓ KG.  
Mr Ahmed  
Air Commander  
Mr Gilpin  
Mr Gaviola  
Mr Amonee  
Mr Kaufman

AG/lm

37

MIL INFO 800

13 Feb 63

Aerial Photography

*F*

Enclosed find amendment of ANNEX "B" to Mil Info  
800 dated 17 Nov 62.

*G. Samuelson*

( G. Samuelson )  
Lt.-Col.  
Chief of Military Information

Distribution:

HQ KAT Area  
→ Force Commander  
Chief of Staff  
Fighter Ops KAMINA  
CO 22 Sqdn KAMINA  
Int Platoon KAMINA

Amendment No 1

13 Feb 63

ANNEX 'B'

TO MIL INFO 800

dated 17 Nov 62

Collection Programme - Photo Reconnaissance

Following is considered photo requirements according to priority for the period 11 Feb to 16 Mar 1963:

1. PRIORITY I

- a) Check the following railway lines and take vertical and oblique (large scale) photos of destroyed bridges:

- (1) KOLWEZI-EVILLE
- (2) KOLWEZI-DILOLO
- (3) KAMINA-TENKE
- (4) KAMINA-LUBILASH
- (5) KAMINA-KABALO
- (6) KABALO-AVILLE
- (7) KABALO-KINDU

- b) Check the following roads and photograph destroyed bridges as under (a) above:

- (1) KOLWEZI-EVILLE
- (2) KOLWEZI-DILOLO
- (3) KAMINA-LUBUDI-KAMBAYA-GUBA
- (4) KAMINA-NASONDOYE
- (5) KAMINA-SANDOA-DILOLO
- (6) KAMINA-LUBILASH
- (7) KAMINA-KABONGO-KABALO-AVILLE
- (8) KABONGO DIANDA-MANONO
- (9) MANONO-MITWABA-JADOTVILLE

2. PRIORITY II

- a) Take large scale vertical and oblique photos of the following airfields:

- (1) EVILLE
- (2) KAMATANDA
- (3) KOLWEZI-KENGERE
- (4) KOLWEZI-TOWN
- (5) KISENGE

2.

- (6) DILOLO
- (7) SANDOA
- (8) KAPANGA
- (9) KAMINA-BASE
- (10) KAMINAVILLE
- (11) KANIAMA
- (12) KABONGO
- (13) KABALO
- (14) KONGOLO
- (15) NYUNZU
- (16) AVILLE (NEW)
- (17) AVILLE (OLD)
- (18) BAUDOUINVILLE
- (19) KANSIMBA
- (20) MANONO
- (21) MITWABA

b) Photograph the following hydroelectric power stations as under 2a above:

- (1) LE MARINEL
- (2) DELCOMMUNE
- (3) BIA
- (4) FRANQUI
- (5) KAWA
- (6) KILUBI

3. PRIORITY III

Map photograph (Scale about 1:20000) the following towns:

- a) EVILLE
- b) JADOTVILLE
- c) KOLWEZI
- d) KAMINAVILLE
- e) KABONGO
- f) KABALO
- g) KONGOLO
- h) NYUNZU
- i) AVILLE
- j) BAUDOUINVILLE
- k) MANONO
- l) MITWABA

3037

bm  
✓

23 November 1962

To: Lt. Gen. Kabbete Guebre, Force Commander  
From: M. Habib Ahmed, Chief of Civilian Operations  
Subject: Air missions in former Kivu Provinces.

1. In accordance with the plans established by Mr. Gardiner for regular air missions to the interior of the provinces, I shall be grateful if you will issue the necessary instructions for the DC-3 stationed at Bukavu/Boma to be made available to the Chief Civilian Officer in Bukavu, on the basis of the following schedule :

The DC-3 would be used by Mr. Gaviola for a minimum of four days and a maximum of eight days in each month. The four trips would be made on dates fixed well in advance and notified to all concerned. They would relate primarily to the needs of hospitals served by WHO doctors, but would also be used by experts from the various branches of Civilian Operations.

2. So far as possible, depending on the needs of Civilian Operations, any additional trips, up to the maximum of eight, would also be scheduled in advance, and a programme of flights would be submitted by the Chief Civilian Officer in Bukavu to Headquarters, for circulation to all interested persons.

cc: Mr. Gardiner  
Mr. Gaviola  
Mr. Amoneo

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Bu

NOTE ON SECOND AIR MISSION TO KIVU AND MANIEMA PROVINCES

1- The second air mission to Kivu and Maniema provinces will leave Leopoldville by DC 3 for Bukavu (Kamembe) on Saturday, 3 November 1962, at 0830 Z.

2- The mission is expected to consist of the following persons:

From Leopoldville: J.H. Amonoo

F. Emmenegger, ONUC Postal Adviser  
E. Seiler, Unesco  
M. Manzini, Metrological Service  
P. Blok, Telecommunication Expert  
D. Teodoru, Press Agency "Fiel"  
Capt. J.J. Morneault, ONUC Military Information.

From Bukavu:

C. Gaviola, or another ONUC officer  
ANC officer  
Postal Expert  
UNESCO Expert

3- From Bukavu, the mission will take cases of selected medical supplies, Japanese donated rice and divers articles for the following hospitals : Katana, Shabunda, Kindu, Kalima, Punia, Uvira, Fizi, Goma, Massisi, Kirotshe, and Kasongo. From Goma, the mission will also take some sacks of Milk Powder offered by the Red Cross Society for distribution to the places visited.

4- Between 3 and 14 November inclusive the mission will visit the following places :

.../...

Saturday,	3	November	Leopoldville/Bukavu
Sunday,	4	-	Bukavu
Monday,	5	-	Bukavu/Katana/Bukavu (xx)
Tuesday,	6	-	Bukavu/Shabunda/Kindu
Wednesday,	7	-	Kindu/Kalima/Punia/Bukavu
Thursday,	8	-	Bukavu/Uvira/Fizi/Bukavu
Friday,	9	-	Bukavu/Goma
Saturday	10	-	Goma/Kirotshe/Massisi/Goma (xx)
Sunday	11	-	Goma
Monday	12	-	Goma/Kindu
Tuesday	13	-	Kindu/Kasongo/Bukavu
Wednesday	14	-	Bukavu/Leopoldville

5- Mr. Gaviola will ensure

- (a) that an ANC officer and appropriate officials of the Provincial Government will participate in each trip, and,
- (b) that the authorities in the places to be visited are notified well in advance by radio and any other means available.

6- In view of the food shortage in some of the places to be visited, members of the mission are asked to carry with them some sandwiches etc...

7- Basic rules for the mission will be found overleaf.

JHA/mm

(xx) road transport.



A N N E X

BASIC RULES FOR AIR MISSIONS TO THE PROVINCES

1- Adequate notice must be given to the authorities in the places to be visited, including the airport authorities, and confirmation of the receipt of such notice should be insisted upon. In view of the inadequacy of regular telegraphic services, the ANC or missions can be approached for use of their radio networks in case of need. Once the itinerary of the mission has been announced, it should be strictly adhered to unless there are compelling reasons for modifying it.

2- The Civilian Officer for the province, or his deputy, should accompany every mission, at least until the system is well established.

3- An officer of the ANC or Gendarmerie must be included in every mission.

4- Wherever feasible, an official of the provincial and/or Central Government directly concerned with the question(s) under study by the mission should be included, but transport should not be provided for their families.

5- Ministers of the provincial government should only be included if their presence is considered necessary to the ONUC operation(s) being dealt with by the mission. Transport should not be provided for their families.

6- Every participant in the mission should be issued with a Movement Order.

7- The missions should be unarmed, and no arms should be carried on the planes.

/// 8- Each civilian member of the mission should wear an ONUC or OMS armband.

-:-:-:-:-

to send me 37.

16/4/62

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO


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AHQ/6201/1/OPS

16 April 1962

To : Military Assistant to the Force Commander  
From : Air Commander  
Subject: Authorization for Inspection Tour to East Congo

The Deputy Air Commander will automatically take over the  
Air Commander's duty when I am away.

  
(JOHN RYG) Maj Gen  
Air Commander

16 April 1962

To: Maj. Gen. J. Ryg, Air Commander

From: Military Assistant to the Force Commander

**Subj: Authorisation for Inspection Tour to East Congo**

The Acting Force Commander has directed me to inform you that he authorises your proposed tour accompanied by S/L Stuart.

Gen. Yacob wishes to know who will act in the capacity of Air Commander during your absence please.

(J. I. Cooney) Lt. Col.

**JIC/ajg**

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES  
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION  
IN THE CONGO

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AHQ/6201/1/OPS

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

*AIR*

14th April 1962

*File*

A : Force Commander  
De : Air Commander  
Objet : Authorization for Inspection Tour to East Congo

It is my intention to go in inspection trip to East Congo commencing April 17th. The route will be as follows:

17th April : N'Djili - Luluabourg - Kamina  
Night stop : Kamina  
18th April : Kamina - Albertville - Elisabethville  
19th April : Elisabethville - N'Djili

I hereby ask you to authorize that tour. S/L Stuart will be accompanying me.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J. Stuart'.

Translation of letter from Officer - in - Charge delivered  
on 22/3/62 to Mr Kimba, <sup>(to be translated)</sup> in reply to his letter of 17/3/62 No SR/257/MV

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. SR/257/MV,  
dated March 17th, 1962, concerning the aerial reconnaissances by ONUC planes.

You will <sup>no doubt be aware</sup> ~~notice~~ undoubtedly that it is not easy to determine, without a  
very careful observation, <sup>whether</sup> ~~if~~ a plane carries military personnel or equipment.  
According to the information in our possession, <sup>there are,</sup> apart the African seminarists,  
~~there are~~ hardly any civilians who have remained in Kongolo, and one can  
reasonably assume that the planes going to or coming from this locality are  
engaged in military activities. Up to now, we did not take measures accordingly,  
but the ONUC aircraft have tried, even in incurring some risks, to approach  
all planes flying over this area, in order to determine the nature of their

activities. The allegation according to which two ONUC jets have made a sham attack  
against a Katangese plane carrying women and children on March 16 1962 is entirely false.

As you know, the ONUC mandate obliges it to do everything possible to prevent  
civil <sup>war</sup> ~~strife~~, whose threat concerns now almost exclusively Katanga. This is why  
we are taking complementary <sup>precautionary</sup> ~~measures of protection~~ in this region.

The ONUC is as much <sup>concerned</sup> ~~preoccupied~~ as the Katangese authorities about the  
welfare of the inhabitants of the province - as it is, in fact, of the welfare  
of all the Congolese. To avoid incidents such as those you mention, we have made  
arrangements with commercial firms and air lines in order to send food, merchandise  
and medical supplies to most of the regions of North Katanga. The central Govern-  
ment has full knowledge of these arrangements and I believe that, if we obtain the  
support of the provincial authorities of Katanga, we could extend those arrange-  
ments to meet the needs of all parts of the province. I am convinced that it should  
not be difficult at all to obtain the cooperation of the Katangese authorities, not  
only to perform this humanitarian task but also to create conditions which will  
help in a great measure to prevent any form of civil <sup>war</sup> ~~strife~~.

I trust that you will give the utmost consideration to this request for  
cooperation. Salutations.

Sir,

I am in receipt of your communication dated 17 March 1962, for which I thank you.

We have taken note of the allegations made regarding the "framing" of the Heron on 15 March 1962 and the sham attack on the same plane on 16 March 1962.

We wish to bring to your notice that the United Nations Force in the Congo came solely with the purpose of assisting the Central Government in the maintenance of law and order. It is, therefore, incumbent on the United Nations Forces in the Congo to ensure that no unauthorised aircraft is allowed to fly in the Congo without obtaining the prior concurrence of the appropriate UN authorities. We are, therefore, continuing with tracking and identifying all aircraft which fly in the Congo without prior concurrence of the appropriate authorities.

We appreciate the humanitarian tasks undertaken by your plane under reference, but until such time as complete flight plans are not intimated by your appropriate operating company to the appropriate ONUC authorities, well in advance, we shall consider such movement as unauthorised and in violation of the terms of ONUC's mandate laid down in the pertinent Security Council Resolutions. We are, therefore, within the meaning of the Security Council Resolutions, justified, in taking such appropriate measures to identify aircraft flying without our information.

Coming now to the definite ~~accusations~~ made, we would like to inform you that the Heron which was framed on 15 March 1962 was so done with the sole intention of observing the identification marks of the aircraft, to enable us to lodge a protest with you. Unless an unidentified aircraft is framed, it can always deviate from its course, thereby making it impossible to be identified, definitely.

As regards the accusation made regarding the interference of the same Heron on 16 March 1962, I wish to intimate that no United Nations fighter aircraft came in contact with the Heron on that day. The United Nations Headquarters have issued strict instructions to all their jet fighters that no attack will be made on any aircraft unless it is in self-defence, and that necessary action for the identification of the aircraft will only then be taken. That the United Nations are strictly adhering to these instructions was amply brought out in the incident which took place on 5 Mar 1962, when one of our aircraft was fired at by your ground forces from Kaminaville, and damaged, whereas the UN fighters showed admirable restraint and did not retaliate.

We, however, wish to bring to your notice that unless previous intimation of the details of a flight are communicated to the nearest ONUC authorities, well in advance, all your aircraft will continue to be framed to ascertain their identity, and any damage that may be caused to your aircraft would be your sole responsibility.

In conclusion, we must forcefully bring to your attention that the United Nations must retain complete freedom of movement in the Congo, and hence will base its troops and aircraft in any part of the Congo considered necessary for its proper function. Similarly, whatever air supply is necessary to maintain its troops in any of the locations in the Congo, it will do so by using any aircraft available, and any interference in the process by the Katangese authorities will be met with force.

The markings on the Heron observed by our pilots is TN-AAA. It was painted white with one blue and one yellow stripe along the middle of the body and the under carriage. It will be appreciated if we could be informed of the Country where this aircraft was registered with the markings TN.

Elisabethville, March 17, 1962

To the United Nations representative  
Elisabethville

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to you the following facts:

On March 15, at about 4:45 p.m., between Bukama and Kolwezi, the Heron plane affected to the supplying of North Katanga has been framed and followed by two U.N. jets.

On March 16, at about 3:45 p.m., in the same area, the same<sup>plane,</sup> which was bringing back women and children from Kongolo, ~~has~~ received the same treatment from two U.N. jets, but this time the jets launched a sham attack against our plane, causing utter panic among its passengers.

I wish to draw your attention to the following:

1. The Government of Katanga has the strictest duty to supply the population of North Katanga and does not intend to evade this humanitarian task.
2. Since ONUC prevents railway traffic in the North, it is normal that the Katangese Government supply the population by plane.
3. Since we have informed you, by our letter of January 25, that an air-lift was to be established in order to supply the population of the North and particularly that of Kongolo, the conduct of your planes violates all humanitarian principles.

On the other hand, I wish to observe that you supply by plane the ONUC personnel in Elisabethville, especially by means of Globemasters. The Katangese Government has never protested, because it is normal that you supply your troops and personnel.



Furthermore, it is a fact that the Kamina base and the U.N. planes stationed there are a constant source of incidents.

I trust that you will give the strictest orders to insure that these facts, against which I protest in the strongest way, will not be repeated.

You can be sure that the Government of Katanga knows its obligations towards its populations, and that it will not evade them.

I seize this opportunity to assure you, Sir, of my highest consideration.

for the President of Katanga:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs:

(signed) E. Kimba

FLIGHT SAFETY REPORT No. 2  
on  
AIR DETACHMENTS AND UNATB N'DJILI

1. Inspecting Party

Norström, S. G. H. (Brig)	Air Commander
Holm-Johnsen, A. S. (Lt-Col)	Chief Air Engineering Officer
Lemieux, R. J. (S/L)	Air Hq Flight Safety Officer
Bystrom, C. (Maj)	UNATB Telecom Officer
Lefebvre, D. (F/L)	Air Hq Telecom Officer
Gulbrandsen, T. (Capt)	Air Supply Officer, N'djili

2. Itinerary

Lulua bourg	22 - '23 Jan
Albertville	23 - 24 Jan
Elisabethville	24 - 25 Jan
Kamina	25 - 26 Jan
N'djili	27 Jan

3. Introduction

The observations raised in this report are arrived at from an inspection of bases shown in paragraph (3) and discussions held with area ICAO and UN representatives. Findings and recommendations summarize the report on this visit and indicate the actions needed and by whom.

4. General Observations

(a) The uncertainty of commercial power and the bad state of auxiliary or stand-by power plants at all airports, except N'djili, makes IFR flying ~~in~~ in Congo a precarious operation. Dependable power supply is needed to provide reliable navigation aids, communications, aerodrome lighting, etc. In view of the well established accident pattern to date, viz four aircraft lost which force landed away from destination or in the jungle because pilots became lost mainly through the lack of navigation aids. In the neighbourhood of 97 fatalities to military and civilian personnel could well have resulted from these incidents and accidents. Unless quick and positive action is taken by UN and ICAO, more incidents of this nature are bound to happen.

(b) Flight planning, flight information, meteorological and flight following services inadequate throughout.

(c) Procurement of spares for "Operationally Required" materiel is hampered by the procurement system. To maintain facilities in a continuous operational status, the procurement system both for ICAO and UN will have to be re-assessed and changed to ensure demands for materiel are handled more expeditiously, since it does not measure up to the operational demands by being subject to unreasonable delays or complete lack of results, viz navigation aids, fire trucks, re-fuelling equipment, electronic equipment, auxiliary power plants and spares for all of the above.

(d) There is a lack of adequate and proper aircraft jungle survival equipment.

(e) Contaminated fuel still exists at Albertville in spite of previous correspondence on this matter. One emergency landing of a UN aircraft was the direct result of this fuel contamination.

5. LULUABOURG

(a) Rotating beacon bulb burnt out. No replacements, although on order for some time.

(b) Fire truck - unserviceable. No qualified personnel to operate.

(c) Single-side band radio cannabilized to render Kamina SSB equipment operational. Nil spares available.

(d) NDB beacon stand-by power plant broken down. Nil qualified operating personnel. Nil spare parts to repair plant. Essential navigation aids unreliable because they are subject to whims of commercial source of power. Due to beacon location it is exposed to sabotage.

(e) Diesel fuel supply for ICAO communications stand-by power plant down to 1½ days supply. Order through local UN civil administration has failed to provide results.

(f) Although Air Congo has refuelling contract, Air Operations and Movement Control personnel take over to by-pass interference and lack of interest in providing fuel for UN charter aircraft.

(g) Jungle survival equipment for light aircraft needed. Verrey pistols and cartridges requested in lieu of hand-held distress signal. This is felt to be essential, should crew come down in jungle. A distress signal with trajectory capability is needed.

- (h) Because of location of present NLB beacon at Lulua bourg, guarding of location by troops needed. Unreliability of commercial power and breakdown of stand-by power, a portable low frequency beacon is required which can be situated on the airport with an independent power supply.

6. ALBERTVILLE

- (a) Nil fire fighting equipment at old airport where light aircraft and helicopters are based.
- (b) Fuel contamination still a problem. Lack of suitable refuelling equipment to filter fuel.
- (c) Insufficient refuelling equipment capacity for the volume of traffic handled. One of the few aerodromes in the eastern Congo where fuel in large quantities can be obtained.
- (d) Lack of battery carts and other ground handling equipment. This is considered necessary in view of the lengthy periods light aircraft and helicopters are based at this detachment without the benefit of the facilities of UNATB base facilities for periodic inspections.
- (e) Five aircraft engines stored outdoors for some months awaiting airlift to N'djili. It is doubtful if these engines have been properly inhibited to prevent deterioration. One engine and propeller still at Nyunzu.
- (f) Guarding of aircraft for security non-existent. Detachment Commander reports many instances of theft and illegal entry into aircraft during silent hours.
- (g) Chaulks and tie-down kits required for light aircraft and helicopters.
- (h) Incomplete survival equipment for aircraft.
- (i) Aircraft maintenance and condition form 781 all parts and sections urgently needed for five aircraft.
- (j) Moveable LF beacon complete with independent power source and spares required to complement existing facility. Present beacon location isolated and unguarded.

7. ELISABETHVILLE

- (a) Fire fighting equipment non-existent.
- (b) Refuelling equipment and fuel supply inadequate.
- (c) Guarding of navigation and landing aids inadequate. Theft from and damage to beacon and ILS facilities by UN troops base at airport during week of visit. Stolen horses for army officers housed in ILS glide slope shack. Paradoxical situation when UN troops are needed to guard vital equipment for air operations against theft and damage by other UN troops.
- (d) Survival equipment for aircraft - nil.
- (e) Moveable low frequency beacon as a navigation and approach aid with independent power supply and spares not yet received. Requisitioned in 15 Dec 1961 on a priority basis.
- (f) ICAO personnel report that Indian troops interfering with power supply. Pulling master switches in power distribution room to listen to noises and for purpose of hanging laundry on handles.

8. KARINA

- (a) Commercial power cut off since September. Power for airport facilities dependent on stand-by and auxiliary power plants. No reserve generators.
- (b) Shortage of fuel for piston aircraft. Emergency fuel stop only.
- (c) Two fire trucks. Shortage of trained personnel. Little training done due to shortage of chemical refills.
- (d) Ethiopian squadron carry no survival equipment. It was suggested that a safety equipment section was required to maintain parachutes, personal safety equipment, ejector seats, etc. The Swedish Squadron Commander will look into possibility of adopting Swedish type seat pack survival kits to F-86.
- (e) Difficulty still being experienced in putting into operation UHF/DF unit due to shortage of vital parts. Equipment damaged when shipped from Elisabethville. Extent of damage unknown to date.

9. Recommendations

Action by

It is recommended that:

- (a) A meeting be held forthwith with representatives of ICAO, UN Procurement and Air Hq staff to discuss navigation and airport facilities in Congo. The aim of the meeting being to:
- (i) To allocate clearly the areas of responsibility as it concerns equipment and back-up of all airport facilities and aids, i.e. auxiliary power, portable beacons, flight information communications, aerodrome lighting, etc.
- (ii) To review the present procurement procedures with a view to obtaining needed equipment promptly and establishing a priority for "operational requirements" to ensure demands are actioned expeditiously.
- (iii) Requisitioning the operational equipment and spares needed to ensure continuous and reliable operation of air navigation and terminal facilities within Congo.
- Preference paras 4 (a), (b), (c)  
5 (a), (c), (d)  
6 (j)  
7 (e)
- (b) A single-side band circuit be established and operated by ICAO for flight and weather information at Stanleyville, Kamina, Elisabethville, Luluabourg, Albertville, and all other airfields used by UN aircraft.
- (c) Fuel tender or pumps equipped with filters be procured for Albertville, Elisabethville, and Luluabourg.
- Preference paras 4 (3), 5 (f), 6 (b), (c), 7 (b)
- (d) Jungle survival kits for light aircraft be shipped to Albertville, Elisabethville, and Luluabourg.

AIR COMMANDER  
AIR STAFF CHIEF  
ICAO MISSION

CHIEF PROCUREMENT  
OFFICER

CHIEF AIR  
ENGINEERING  
OFFICER

BASE COMMANDER  
UNATB NDJILI

Preference paras 4 (d), 5 (h)

- (e) Four additional low frequency radio beacons type AN/URN 5 Model FA-4-08 25 to 400 watts complete with back-up kit and two PE95 or PU 58G power units, technical order publications and 50 cycle conversion kits be demanded on an "operational requirement" basis for Luluabourg, Albertville, Kamina. The fourth to be held in stored reserve. These required to back-up existing facilities or replace inoperational facilities which are unreliable and subject to sabotage because of their location relative to the airports.

CHIEF AIR  
ENGINEERING  
OFFICER

Preference paras 5 (d), 6 (j), 7 (c)  
8 (a) and (e)

AIR COMMANDER

- (f) Area military commanders through the Force Commander's office be ordered to provide guards for aircraft, navigation and landing aids at Luluabourg, Albertville and Elisabethville.

Preference paras 5 (d), 6 (f) and (j)  
7 (c)

- (g) Aircraft engines, propellers and other salvageable items located at Nyunzu, Albertville and Kamina be brought to N'djili as soon as possible so as to prevent further deterioration due to exposure to elements in present location.


BASE COMMANDER  
NDJILI



(R. J. LEMIEUX) S/L

Distribution:

Air Commander  
Chief Air Engineering Officer  
Chief Procurement Officer  
Chief ICAO Mission  
Base Commander N'djili  
Base Supply N'djili  
Air HQ Flight Safety Officer



APPROVED/NOT APPROVED

(S. G. H. NOSTROM) BRIG  
Air Commander

2 November 1961

To : Air Commander  
From : AIR/HQ Prof. Stds and Flight Safety Officer  
Subject : MONTHLY REPORT NO. 1.

1. The observations and recommendations contained in this report concerns N'DJILI UNATB.

2. PROFICIENCY AND STANDARDIZATION

Nil progress to date. Evident reluctance on C-47 squadron members to undergo proficiency checks. The only observations which can be made in this respect are as a result of casual mutual flying with some of the squadron aircrew whilst awaiting official introduction of a flight check program and two flights as an observer on UN aircraft flown by C.47 squadron aircrew. Further observations were made while in attendance in the control, and incident reports received from ICAO personnel at the N'Djili tower and the Chief of the ICAO mission.

3. STANDARDIZATION - GENERALLY

- (a) Standard Operating techniques and operating procedures vary with nationalities, however it was noted that by not using pilots check lists important vital action checks were missed or omitted during all stages of operation from start-up to shut down. Unfamiliarity with use of check list was evident.
- (b) Lack of crew coordination and teamwork. Co-pilot not being briefed and utilized properly.
- (c) Lack of knowledge of air regulations very evident viz: violations submitted by control tower.
- (d) Non-standard radio procedures and phraseology evident in many instances with due consideration given to the language problem.
- (e) Evidence that no pre-flight pilot navigation planning was being made in one instance. Fuel consumption and cruise control charts not being used.



- (f) No formal authorization of flights except by Indian Air Force crews.
- (g) No unit continuation training program in force as per ONUC ASI'S.
- (h) No standard briefing and orientation program carried out for newly arrived crews. This appears to be left to the individual's initiative rather than a forceful well supervised program.
- (i) No evidence of periodic checks for pilots, Radio operators and navigators as per ONUC Air staff instructions.

4. FLIGHT SAFETY SURVEY

- (a) Flying Times - Much disparity between nationalities. Royal Norwegian Air Force crews appear to obtain 3 to 4 times the number of hours of any other nation.
- (b) Emergency Drills - No evidence that these are being carried out.
- (c) Survival Equipment - Insufficient to equip all aircraft. Thirteen partially complete kits available for C-47 aircraft. Nil available for light aircraft. ONUC AIR/HQ actioning this deficiency.
- (d) Flight Planning - Meteorological briefings sketchy due to lack of weather information. Up to date Notams on aerodrome and radio facilities inobtainable.
- (e) Shortage of aerodrome let down charts and current radio facilities charts.
- (f) In-flight Feeding - Sea rations provided if requested.
- (g) Dash-one tech. orders and check lists outdated.
- (h) Form 1 aircraft condition forms kept on aircraft. Evidence in one instance that page containing four major unserviceabilities was torn from book. Rectification in one instance definitely not carried out.
- (i) Fireguards - Nil fire-fighting equipment used. No auxiliary power units used for starts or on daily inspections.

- (j) Aircraft Loading - No weight and balance forms compiled.  
Insufficient cargo tie-down equipment.
- 5. GROUND SAFETY - The accident potential in this area is extremely high.
  - (a) Aircraft Parking - Serious congestion of hangar apron and taxi lanes due to lack of sufficient parking space. One vehicle/ aircraft accident in last fortnight. Aircraft in dirty condition due to sand and grit.
  - (b) Hangar -
    - (i) Nil fire fighting equipment although it has been ordered for some six months.
    - (ii) Complete disregard for smoking in hangar floor area.
    - (iii) Draining of fuel from hangared aircraft and washing down of aircraft with aviation fuel a common practise.
    - (iv) Private cars parked in hangar under, and around hangared aircraft, and in front of hangar doorway.
    - (v) No fire lanes - obstructed by stocked parts, shipping crates, roped-off light aircraft etc..
    - (vi) Nil or very limited washroom facilities in UN portion of hangar.
- 6. Unit Flight Safety Program - No unit flight safety officer. Flight and ground safety items discussed at Base Commander's staff meetings. Action to be taken in minutes of meeting are for the most part disregarded.
- 7. RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommendations made in this report are those which require N'Djili ATB action. Those requiring action by ONUC AIR HQ's are contained under separate cover.

It is recommended that:

- (a) A vigorous continuation training program be instituted at once to standardize operating procedures and operating techniques i.e. Use of check lists, instrument flying practise, emergency procedures, night flying and that in the future, all newly arrived

7. (a) contingents undergo a scheduled training and orientation program prior to commencing operational flying.
- (b) The RCAF ATC check list and SOP's for the C-47 be adopted and that their use be made mandatory.
- (c) UN flight authorization form which is being printed be utilized by all nations at N'Djili and its detachments.
- (d) A lecture program be instituted immediately to review ICAO air regulations and R/T procedure. The chief controller at ICAO tower N'Djili has offered his services at any time by pre-arrangement.
- (e) Senior contingent officers attend Base commander's and C-47 squadron meetings in order that they be kept fully aware of the base commander's instructions and problems.
- (f) A training program for second pilots be instituted so that may become more competent and useful crew members.
- (g) Navigation logs be introduced for crews not utilizing navigators
- (h) A senior pilot be delegated from each contingent to supervise and coordinate his contingent's continuation and proficiency flying program.
- (i) Current tech orders dash one be ordered for each squadron pilot.
- (j) Fire fighting equipment for aircraft starting and hangar be obtained through priority procurement action.
- (k) The air movement unit at N'Djili be instructed to weigh cargo, prepare weight and balance forms. The responsibility for the proper tie down cargo in all UN aircraft rests with the Air Movement Unit.
- (l) N'Djili base commander's instructions regarding parking, smoking and the use of aviation fuels in hangar be strictly enforced immediately.
- (m) Sanitary facilities be repaired and once repaired be maintained properly on the highest priority basis. The lack of these facilities is having an adverse effect on the productivity and welfare of ground crew personnel.

( R.J. LEMIEUX ) S/L  
AIR/HQ PROF/STDS and FLIGHT SAFETY.

APPROVED (H.A. MORRISON) A/C  
AIR COMMANDER

26 February 1962

Report on Standardization and Proficiency C-47 Squadron N'Djili

1. Introduction: This is the first report on the standardization and proficiency to be submitted by the undersigned. A comprehensive appraisal of this squadron is possible at this time due to the excellent cooperation of Lt. Col. Bacha, the incumbent Commanding Officer of the C-47 Squadron. His assessment of the squadron was made by means of an "open book" type of written examination, followed by proficiency check rides with eight squadron captains; Brazilian Air Force (5), Indian Air Force (2), Ethiopian Air Force (1). Eleven squadron pilots wrote and turned in written examinations. Three examinations presented to the three Indian Air Force captains have not returned after three weeks - reason unknown. All squadron captains could not be tested due to being detached or away from Leopoldville.
2. General Comments: It is felt that sufficient information has been gathered to observe on the areas of weakness which need attention in order to obtain standardizations and proficiency on the unit. General comments on the ground examinations are made in this report. Observations on the check rides for each individual are appended to this report.
3. Ground Examinations - Written by Brazilian Air Force Contingent only. A very good technical knowledge of the C-47 aircraft is evident. Power settings, emergency procedures, fuel, electrical and hydraulic systems indicate a thorough knowledge and standard with USAF dash one. Knowledge of ICAO air regulations which were examined on, was less well done - some questions left unanswered by some of the candidates, or answered vaguely. These are: the definitions and limits of transition levels, altitudes and layers, clearance limits from cloud and visibility distances for UFR, UMC, definition of IFR and IMC. Sample clearances and IFR procedures were well answered. However, this knowledge was not borne out by the observations made on the check rides.
4. Check Rides: See appended reports on individual rides.

Observations

1. Overall, the squadron requires an intensive training program to bring them up to transport command requirements. This to be followed by a well coordinated continuation training program. Specific observations follow.
2. Non use of check list has led to many major vital actions omissions, and to improper checking of equipment in all stages of aircraft operations.

3. Air traffic and control instructions not clearly understood by majority of candidates due in part to language but mainly to unfamiliarity.
  4. Non standard radio phraseology and patter leading to confusion for tower personnel.
  5. Clear hood flying generally adequate. Requires more polish in many cases.
  6. Emergency procedures - knowledge and execution excellent.
  7. IFR procedures poor throughout except on one check ride.
  8. Two instances of dangerous errors regarding altimeter setting and fuel selection.
  9. Flight engineers from some contingents assist in aircraft operation. Generally this is well done but the setting up of power for take-off and climbs is varied and not in accord with dash one.
  10. Numerous instances of bad engine handling, overboosting, misuse of engine controls; should be increasing power MRT decreasing TRM.
- 
5. Squadron Morale - Very high both of air and ground crew. Indications of teamwork and coordinated effort.
  6. Organisation - For short period under new commander, this area is excellent, will improve still more when requested facilities and material are provided.
  7. Squadron Orders and Notices - Orders in process of being re-written and amended as needed. One area which may be observed on is the many notices written in the Brazilian language. It is felt that if these are to apply to all national groups, they should also be posted in English. To elaborate somewhat on this point, I feel that crews should when at all possible be composed of mixed nationalities. This might bring about better relations between squadron personnel, improve the understanding amongst the ethnical groups, help overcome the language problems, and standardize procedures and techniques. It is noticeable that the squadron members seem to band together by national groups. At a later date some of the squadron executive administrative responsibilities, once well established by the Brazilians, could be rotated to officers of the other nationalities.
  8. Technical - Aircraft serviceability has constantly improved from 20 to 25% at the middle of January to a reported 82% on 23 February 1962. The squadron commanding officer and his technical staff can be highly commended in this respect. Motor transport appears to be very well controlled and maintained under the supervision of a squadron aircrew officer and technical personnel. Once the vehicles are repaired and overhauled it is felt that many of the squadron motor transport problems will have

9. Flight Safety - This bears improvement in the following areas.
- (a) Fire guards and starting crews could be more alert.
  - (b) Parking of aircraft dangerously close to taxiway connecting cut off with the apron has real accident potential.
  - (c) Post inspection flight checks - of vital importance on all post inspection air tests, and especially the acceptance air tests from contractor is that they be done thoroughly. To accomplish this a flight test report form must be used. Two instances of many major unserviceabilities on acceptance from contractor were revealed during the period of the squadron assessment.
  - (d) A noticeable improvement on aircraft cleanliness. However, some aircraft appear to have various sorts of boxes containing redundant equipment and plain garbage. In this respect, suitable containers should be placed on all aircraft to hold aircraft spares, tie down equipment, control locks etc.
  - (e) Survival equipment for C-47 aircraft should be reviewed and repacked with a view to reducing its contents especially the number of one man dinghies. The present number is excessive and results in a large bundle and extra weight. Further, now that a full supply of jungle survival pack components are reported to have been received, proper containers of standard size and shape should be provided for all unit C-47 aircraft. Drawings should be provided to Sabena for construction.
  - (f) Survival equipment be placed on all aircraft and should be inspected and signed for daily as for other aircraft equipment.
  - (g) Dirty aircraft windows, others badly cracked and distorted through age or fatigue impeding visual look out.
  - (h) Lack of proper simulated instrument flying equipment.
  - (i) In flight feeding is atrocious.
10. Manuals, maps and briefcases and forms.

- (b) Shortage of maps and briefcases
- (c) Shortage of protractors and dividers.
- (d) Nil flight planning navigation log forms being used.
- (e) Nil flight authorization form being used.

11. Radio Equipment

- (a) Ground radio station are operational requirement for proper squadron control.
- (b) ILS glide slope on all aircraft flown are unserviceable due to lack of test equipment.
- (c) Earphones in all aircraft worn out, lashed up or have missing earpads. Generally in a very bad condition.
- (d) When interphone is selected on some aircraft, ground control transmissions are blocked out. This results in much hand waving and across the cockpit shouting when commands are given if a listening watch on tower frequency is to be maintained.

Check Ride - Lt. Col. Bacha - Brazil

- (a) Equipment Familiarization - Fire extinguisher system not tested. Gyrosynerection system not energized.
- (b) Starting Procedure - Did not turn on fuel when read out from check list on pre-start check. Turned on while energizing.
- (c) Taxying - No comments.
- (d) Pre take-off procedures -
  - (i) Missed curb heat check on run-up.
  - (ii) Gyrosyn compass gyro erecting switch not used.
  - (iii) Fire warning test not carried out.
  - (iv) Wind shield wiper test not carried out.
- (e) Take-off - Normal. Did not understand departure clearance.
- (f) Slow flying - good stall recovery good.
- (g) Holding Pattern - Incorrectly executed. Homed to facility rather than a rack track pattern. Did not set up for economical operation.
- (h) ADF Homing - Unable to tune for station. Volume in jack box low, side window open creating noise. Could not hear transmissions.
- (i) Radio Phraseology - Rather weak and non-standard. Confusing to tower.
- (j) Engine Out Operation - Very good procedure. Single engine turning very shallow bank unnecessary. Holding of altitude good. Heading varied 20 to 30°.
- (k) ILS Approach - Not well done. Needs review and practise. Did not use check list on pre-landing check. Many items missed.
- (l) Flapless Landing - Well done.
- (m) Short Field - Take-off insufficient power before releasing brakes. Landing - approach too fast 90 kts. Touchdown long by 300'. Altitude on touchdown, tail too high.
- (n) Shutdown - As per check list.

Comments - General flying cleark hood and instruments very good.



Appendix "B"

Check Ride - Capt. Yohannes - Ethiopia

- (a) Equipment Familiarization - no comment.
- (b) Starting Procedure - Good. No radio checks requested of co-pilot as made by Captain.
- (c) Taxiing - No check list used. Following items omitted. Auxillary tank function not check. Radios, flaps, ILS not checked. Fire warning system and gyrosyn erecting system not energized.
- (d) Pre-Take off Procedures - No check list. Many items omitted - Rotating beacon, compasses, instruments, no TO briefing.
- (e) Take-off - Good. No post take-off for co-pilot check. Improper engine handling when reducing power RPM before manifold pressure causing overboost.
- (f) Landings - All good. Flapless, short field. No check list in pre-landing check. Many items missed.
- (g) Single Engine Operation - Very good in the air and on circuit and landing. Restart - mixture AL before unfeathering engine.
- (h) Overshoot - Throttle before pitch, mixture auto lean.
- (i) ADF Letdown - Good. Holding pattern confused.

Comments - Captain Yohannes has a good command of English and his R/T work is satisfactory. Engine handling very poor. Continuously overboosting, never used checked list therefore many vital actions items on take-off, post take-off, pre-landing and shutdown were omitted. Co-pilot not briefed or used as a part of crew. Needs training on engine handling, co-pilot crew duties, use of check list. A competent pilot otherwise.

Check Ride - F/O Mathur - Indian Air Force

- (a) Equipment Familiarization - No fire extinguisher system check. Gyrosyn compass erection system not checked.
- (b) Starting Procedure - Radios, ILS not check nor was co-pilot requested to assist. Gyrosyn compass not synchronized with standby compass. No pre-start check list used. Many items omitted i.e., carb heat, fuel gauges for contents, etc.
- (c) Taxying - Started to run up engines on ramp in front of hangar. Generators, inverters, pitot heat, windshield wipers not functionally tested.
- (d) Take-off - No co-pilot briefing. Co-pilot has no function during most phases of operation. Radio compass and ILS not turned as tuned in prior to take-off. Told tower what he was going to do rather than requesting a clearance to working area. Power setting on climb 2250 RPM and 34 "hg. then reduced to 2150 RPM and 33 "hg. 49½ "boost on take-off engine handling generally weak and not in accordance with dash one.
- (e) ADF Procedures - Complete confusion on holding pattern. IAF technique has navigator spell out headings, heights and times. While on intercom no listening watch on tower frequency very dangerous in holding patterns and letdowns. Economic cruise not set up in holding pattern. Unable to interpret clearance correctly. No check list for pre-landing check, many vital action items omitted. No post landing check.
- (f) Single engine procedures - Well done throughout.
- (g) Short Field - Take-off as before no check list. Many items omitted otherwise good. Booster pumps, no briefing, rotating beacon omitted. Landing - good - no check list used.
- (h) Comments - General flying good. Crew cooperation poor, co-pilot totally ignored. By not using check list many vital actions omitted in all phases of operation. I/F clearance and tower clearance interpretation only vaguely understood. Competent but needs standardization on techniques, use of check list, crew participation, ICAO regulations and power setting in accordance with dash one.

Appendix "D"

Check Ride - F/O MacDonald - Indian Air Force

- (a) Equipment Familiarization - No comments.
- (b) Starting Procedures - Adequate. No check list. No co-pilot function. Radios not checked except for tower frequency, ADF, ILS, VOR, fire warning system not checked prior to take-off.
- (c) Taxiing - No pre taxi check list. Items omitted - hydraulic test, radios, instruments, auxilliary tanks test, erection system gyrosyn compass.
- (d) Pre-take-off procedures - Check list not used for pre-run up. Full power check. Dead mag check after run up completed. Pre take-off check while holding on runway. No control surface check. No post take-off check. Many vital action items omitted all stages of operation.
- (e) ADF and Holding - Attempted to hold left hand instead of right hand pattern. No economic cruise. Attempted to feather wrong engine on simulated engine failure. Bird-dogging on ADF approach, allowed large errors to build up before making corrections to pre-determined track.
- (f) Take-off - No complete pre or post take-off checks done. No check list. Many items omitted.
- (g) Single Engine Landing - Circuit too close in. Approach speed high 110 kts. Unable to land in short field. Hydraulic selector to dead engine. Drove aircraft onto runway.
- (h) Short field landing - Hot on approach missed mark by 400' to 500'. Heavy braking with tail well up.
- (i) Fire in the Air - Shut down ok live engine power set at 2400 and 38" hg. Unfeathered - feathered - unfeathered on re-start.

Comments - Needs practise in general flying. Most procedures non-standard. ADF fair only. No constant use of check list during all stages of operation. Many vital actions omitted. Co-pilot has no function on crew. Flies safely enough but needs complete review of IFR and Aerodrome control procedures. Engine handling as per dash one badly needed. Marginally competent. Requires a recheck after training.

Appendix "E"

Check Ride - Capt. Xavier - Brazilian

- (a) Equipment Familiarization - Very well done.
- (b) Starting Procedure - Used direct cranking with energizer type starter. Nil use of co-pilot. Fine warning system not checked.
- (c) Taxiing - No check list. Auxilliary tanks not tested. Instrument check poor. Set altimeter to 14' ASL 28-98 inches rather than 1014' ASL.
- (d) Before take-off - Altimeter as above. Main tanks selected - fuel guage selector on auxilliaries throughout exercise. Dead mag check after run-up completed. Missed many vital action items through non-use of check list. At field barometric pressure, right engine 2350 RPM only - not noticed. All landings and take-offs good.
- (e) Instrument flying and procedures - General I/F very good. After limited panel I/F gyros and horizon remained caged for ADF homing. Gyrosyn compass erection system not energized. Holding pattern - complete confusion. Doing procedure turns on stand by compass. Heights - 150' to 250'.
- (f) Single engine operation - Attempted to feather wrong engine. Lost 300'. Engine handling poor, not in accordance with SOP's.
- (g) Comments - The candidate, with his experience obviously suffered from testitis. However the ride generally is a complete failure except for circuits and landings. Many serious errors, i.e., altimeter, fuel selection and guages. Needs a complete review on ground and a recheck.

Check Ride - Lt. Naguchi - Brazilian

- (a) Equipment check and starting procedures. This ride taken on DC-2 type of aircraft. First flight for candidate and testing officer in this type. Aircraft equipment carefully studied prior to start-up - no comments - indications of a careful pilot by manner of approach. Check list used throughout.
- (b) ADF procedures and overshoot - No problems R/T or clearance interpretation. Letdown 100 below minimum on final to 1700' versus 1800'. Did not request tower instructions on overshoot as published in handbook. Position reported in fact when maintaining a flight level. Economic cruise not set up for holding. Excessive bank in turns for instrument procedures.
- (c) Engine out operation - well done.
- (d) Take-offs and Landings - Too fast, too much power on short field and flapless landings. Missed touchdown spot by wide margins.
- (e) Comments - Generally the best ride of squadron. Used check list consistently. Made use of co-pilot. Good understanding of clearances and instructions. Good candidate for a unit training officer.

Check Ride - Lt. Maguoi - Brazilian

- (a) Check ride done in two flights due to unserviceabilities and recall on first flight.
- (b) Equipment check - Well done. Some mix-up with obtaining starting crew. Finally started without. Nil instructions to co-pilot. No check list used. Many vital actions omitted.
- (c) Taxiing - Vital actions omitted because no use made of check list. Carb heat, radios, gyrosyn erecting, fire warning system etc.
- (d) Pre Take-off Check - No check list. Items missed - rotating beacon harness, auto pilot, windows, carb heat hatches, no take off briefing.
- (e) Take-off - Rather vague about climb clearance. Needed assistance. Did not maintain VFR in climb. Very good take-offs and landings.
- (f) Instrument flying and procedures - General I/F good. Many errors in ADF procedures. Letdown below minimum, no pre-landing check as per check list. Vital actions omitted. Confused on holding pattern, did not follow clearance requirements.
- (g) Comments - A good competent clear hood pilot. Difficulty with instrument clearances and procedures. Needs to use check list. R/T procedures adequate.

Recommendations

1. Flying

- (a) A training program needed to practise use of check lists, crew cooperation and instrument procedures. To achieve this, a squadron training officer is required for lecturing, programming and flying instruction. All power settings should be in accord with USAF dash-one, and should be placarded in cockpit.
- (b) Instrument flying hood needed for each aircraft so that I/F can be practised on operational missions or when on detachment.

2. Flight Safety

- (a) A squadron test pilot or pilots to be appointed. Each post inspection or acceptance test flight to be recorded in test flight form.
- (b) Survival equipment to be standardized and properly packaged in each C-47 aircraft.
- (c) Dirty windows to be cleaned and kept so. Discoloured or cracked windows to be replaced.
- (d) In flight feeding - Sabena have been asked to put up a proposal to Air Headquarters.

3. Publications

- (a) Redundant manuals to be destroyed. Current publications to be obtained.
- (b) Navigation logs to be introduced.
- (c) Navigation items demanded should be expedited by supply section and Base Ops.

4. Radio

- (a) Ground station be obtained for squadron operations.
  - (b) Test equipment be obtained for ILS.
  - (c) Earphones be replaced as required and checked daily.
  - (d) Jack boxes be rewired so that tower can be monitored while selected on interphone.
- [Handwritten signature]*