

Cable File
New York Code Cables
Incoming and Outgoing

01/12/1960 - 31/12/1960

1/2

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

sc
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UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 50736

BOX 6

FILE 3

ACC. DAG 13/1.6.1.2.0

DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
No. : 4569
Date : 31 December 1960.

Re Sly's programme in Leo

Reur B-1777. OK repeat OK.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Mr. Cordier and Protitch,
No : 4566
Date : 31 December 1960

Ch. Amst
21
file
2/1

Last moment change by Ghana Government designating ambassador Quiason-Sackey to replace origin-ally designated Nana Kabi Na Nkatsia as member of conciliation commission.

He will be arriving with main group on tuesday, 3 January 1255 , Flight AF 407

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 31 December 1960
Number : 4558

Following note verbale was handed today to Belgian Delegation :

Le Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies presente ses compliments au Représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies et désire attirer son attention sur le fait qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui , de source digne de foi , des informations selon lesquelles des autorités Congolaises se sont adressées à l'Ambassadeur de Belgique à Brazzaville pour demander que l'aéroport d'Usumbura , situé dans le territoire sous tutelle du Ruanda-Urundi , soit utilisé pour les besoins des troupes de l'armée Nationale Congolaise qui doivent se rendre dans la région de Bukavu .

Le Secrétaire Général est convaincu que , compte tenu du statut du territoire sous tutelle et des dispositions de l'accord de tutelle , aucune autorisation de ce genre ne sera accordée aux autorités Congolaises . Toutefois , en raison de la gravité du problème en question , il estime de son devoir d'attirer l'attention du Représentant Permanent de la Belgique sur les dispositions du paragraphe 6 de la résolution 1474 (E S IV) adoptée par l'Assemblée Générale le 20 Septembre 1960

Le 30 Décembre 1960

INCOMING CODE CABLE

C3
line 61. answers speak
No
31/12

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 30 December 1960
No. : 4550

I would wish to have a person familiar with machine code operation to accompany me from Leopoldville to Pretoria. Will you kindly make travel arrangements for this person for my onward flight to Pretoria. This person would return directly to Leo immediately upon termination of the South African visit.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Mr. Kell
for drop mt.
30/12*

TO; DAYAL
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 30 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4534

Your B-1594 and B-1656. Indian Mission now enquiring as to subsequent events relating to detention and trial of 50 Luena Baluba leaders in Elizabethville and in particular if guarantees given by Procureur general of Katanga were observed in practice. Please advise.

50 Luena Baluba reference to in OPS 978 ??

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*file. Action taken
20/12*

TO: NWOKEDI
FROM: BUNGE, NEW YORK
DATE: 30 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4531, 4532

Reur B-1759.

Immediate cause of present unrest in Belgium is connected ~~ix~~ with bill 649 "Bill on economic development, social progress and financial recovery", popularly known as "loi unique", consideration of which has been suspended before Christmas and is supposed to be resumed on 3 January by Belgian Parliament. At congress of the ~~three~~ main parties held on 18-19 December, Socialists unanimously opposed the bill, while the Social Christians unanimously approved it and Liberals approved it by 440 votes to 272. Various socialist organizations decided on common action asking immediate reconvening of Parliament. To that effect, they ordered work stoppages supposed to last only a few days. Strikes have now become widespread in Wallonia, where they have reached extent not foreseen by socialist and labour leaders. The strike movement has extended into the Flemish part of Belgium and to Brussels where it is gradually reaching serious proportions. Although acts of ~~destruction~~ and sabotage have been committed by strikers, no fatalities have occurred so far. Collard, president of the Socialist Party, has declared that socialists are ready

...../...

to seek a solution of the strike problem with the Government, but not on the basis of the "loi unique" which must be withdrawn before the strike is ended. He stated that the IFTU had promised financial help to Belgian strikers.

The recess of Parliament for the year-end arranged by government is regarded by socialists as a manoeuvre to wear the strikers out, but labour leaders have announced that strikes will continue even after 3 January, the date ^{when} ~~wha~~ Parliament reconvenes. They have stated that workers might, if necessary, abandon their tools, namely they might abandon the machinery which requires continuous care. The strikers are not striking for higher wages, nor because of any conflicts with their employers. The unrest is social and political. It is the culminating point of long opposition to the economic policies followed by the coalition cabinet of Liberals and Social Christians, such as a too slow rate of economic development, persistence of a high rate of unemployment, insufficient social progress and the bad state of public finances.

The reason publicly advanced by the government to justify the "loi unique", namely the need to recoup the losses suffered in the Congo, is regarded by many as a pretence to adopt a policy directed especially at the working-class. Socialists say that the "loi unique" contains a number of provisions tightening controls in fields such as unemployment, social security, workers pensions and housing, and increasing taxes in such a way as to affect workers more than other classes. There is also some apprehension as to certain features of the bill in other political or economic

sectors, for example businessmen dislike increased power of the executive in the dismissal of personnel. Many Liberal leaders have stressed the anti-liberal features of a number of provisions. So far, only the Socialist Union has issued strike orders. The Christian Union has officially decided not to participate in strikes, although it has requested changes in the bill. However, there are signs that workers belonging to the Christian Union have joined the strike movement spontaneously. The Socialists would not settle ~~now~~ now for changes in the bill, they demand its total and final withdrawal. A government spokesman, Mr. Van Audenhove, has stated in a radio broadcast that the government did not envisage such withdrawal which would only mean the end of the parliamentary system. It appears that the socialists have seized upon the "loi unique" to launch a strong attack against the government; for some time already they have tried to obtain its resignation, the dissolution of the chambers and a new general election. This is still their objective. Thus the Congo situation may be in the background but is not in the foreground of the present Belgian unrest, whose causes are of long-standing. Of course the socialists do not approve of the Congo policy and actions of the present government, but such criticisms are expressed in political debates in the chambers, not in the streets.

Within recent congresses, Social Christians have denounced "international political manoeuvres in the Congo", while Socialists, besides deciding to act on the "loi unique" have concentrated on military questions, such as whether Belgium should or should not

leave NATO, their final attitude being one of critical and conditional acceptance. In a debate before the chambers on 20 December, two Socialist speakers attacked the government actions in the Congo, such as the appointment of Aspremont-Lynden as Minister for African Affairs, the fact that 30 million francs had been appropriated to him for uses which were not to be accounted for, and questions connected with the publication of General Janssen's memo and the rebuttal published by Mr. Van den Bosch. Socialist former Foreign Minister Larock stressed need for efficient cooperation between UN and Belgium, although he rejected extreme, biased and sometimes deeply unjust criticism levelled against Belgium at UN. Wigny concurred in the need for co-operation between UN and Belgium but stated that there could be no question that Congo, as a sovereign state, should go through UN to select its own officials. He added that he had stretched out his hand to the Secretary General, but that there had been no response.

Present composition of chambers follows: Senate: Social Christians - 91, Socialists - 65, Liberals - 18, Communist - 1; Chamber of Representatives: Social Christians - 104, Socialists - 84, Communists - 2, Flemish Peoples Union - 1. In the present government, 7 posts are occupied by Liberals, main posts being held by Rene Lefebvre, Vice-Premier and Minister of Interior; Van Offelen, Foreign trade. Social Christians hold 13 posts, main ones being held by Gaston Eyskens, Prime Minister; Pierre Wigny, Foreign Minister; Gilson, Defence; Jean Van Houtte, Finance; Harold d'Aspremont-Lynden, ^{African} ~~Foreign~~ Affairs

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL, KETTANI
FROM: BUNGE, new york
DATE: 29 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4513

1. Ghana Mission on twenty-eighth presented note reporting new difficulties being experienced by Ghana in landing aircraft with supplies for Ghana Contingent. Specific reference is made to "another incident" which occurred last week "in which an aircraft carrying supplies for the use of the Ghana Contingents was, at the last minute, refused landing at Leopoldville by Mr. Pongo." Note adds that "Government of Ghana is much concerned at these incidents and will be obliged to consider reducing the size of its contingents in the Congo if such interferences with the service continue."

2. Please provide all information available about alleged landing difficulty and, if confirmed, measures being taken to avoid any repetitions.

Distribution: Gen. Kettani

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4512

The plans for my visit to Leo and South Africa are now taking shape. I shall be leaving New York on 2 January 1961 at 1000 hours, by Air France 010 and, after a stop over in Paris, shall arrive in Brazzaville at 1845 hours on 3 January by Air France 401. I hope that helicopter service may still be available at that hour.

I shall leave for South Africa at 0900 hours on 5 January by KLM 593. Since my stay will be short, the mazimum use must be made of it. I hope that you will arrange a meeting with Kasavubu for the morning of 4 January, but I do not intend to have any contacts with other Congolese authorities. Some short time should be set aside for a meeting with Wachuku and his colleagues.

Wieschhoff, Wachtmeister and Ranallo will be accompanying me.

Reur B 1761. I am strongly of opinion that no social function be arranged by either side. But believe it wise to have Berendsen, Duran, Miller and Umbricht available for discussions.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*M. Barthoud
may H. attempt draft
reply AD
29/12*

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECGEN, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4501

[The Greek Mission to the United Nations has expressed its concern about the safety of its estimated 500 nationals in Stanleyville. Although they feel re-assured concerning the steps which have been taken regarding the protection of the foreign residents in that city, they expressed their great anxiety about the difficulties of securing exit permits and they have expressed the strong hope that the United Nations would use its good offices in assisting in the expediting of the granting of such permits, particularly for those who should leave Stanleyville temporarily for reasons of health or business. They have been informed that the granting of permits has been purposely delayed so as to hold people "as hostages" in Stanleyville. The Greek Mission would be grateful for any information which we could provide in regard to the question raised. I would appreciate an early reply for transmission to Greek Mission here.]

INCOMING CODE CABLE

24

TO: OLVER
FROM: FIELDSEV, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4500

Reur 3463 will pouch in ten packages as requested. Pouching respectively each package with Admin Reports 110, 1961 series 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 and 9. Admin Report reference will be by cable number. Request you acknowledge receipt each package by cable reference.

Distribution: Mr. Olver

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SEC GEN, NEW YORK
DATE: 29 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4499

The remainder of the Kanza delegation has approached us again in matter raised in 4433. They state that Kanza has a bank account with the Chase National Bank and that they need money to pay a four week hotel bill urgently. Can any contact be made with Kanza regarding this matter?

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 28 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4486

Your B-1758 please advise me regarding possibility and advisability of UN Forces working out protection plan for Bukavu similar to the one worked out for Stanleyville by Ethiopian Brigade.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. J. Olver
From : Mr. Devlin
Date : 27 December 1960
No. : 4470

Your ONUC 3129. I have been directed to
advise you that Johan Mollers is cleared to operate
and repair the Hagelin equipment.

Dist. 2 copies - Mr. Olver
1 copy - Mr. Dayal

27 December 1960

To : Mr. R. Dayal,
for Wachuku and Colleagues

From : Secretary General

Number : 4468

Reference your 1751.

Most disappointed with Kasavubus reaction your point 2. Composition of group is sole responsibility of U.N. and can not be changed at request of Kasavubu nor can such request be considered valid reason for proposal to any country to withdraw voluntarily. Were conditions re composition to be maintained, this is for us tantamount to refusal to receive commission as set up and would have to go on record as such refusal. Matter will be taken up in advisory committee thursday afternoon, and if there is no change in Kasavubus attitude, these are the comments with which it would have to be reported. Were, as I take for granted, my interpretation of the situation to be confirmed by advisory committee, matter would have to be reported to G.A.

In these circumstances, before taking matter to advisory committee, I would hope that Kasavubu would reconsider situation and drop condition. Any other stand could not but lead to most strained relations with U.N. and leading members of organisation and would tend seriously to harm presidents own position with

friendly members. This is particularly unfortunate at time when Congo's own interest would speak for efforts from the president to work in exactly the opposite direction, as indicated in my letter, in order to render possible continued U.N. contribution and in order to give weight and value to what he may have achieved during his visit to New York.

Naturally, it is essential to have reaction of president to my letter before meeting of advisory committee.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. J. Olver
From : Field Service
Date : 27 December 1960
No. : 4467

Your 3504. Coleno not recommended for renewal
of contract. Re Massebeuf refer Headquarters 4449
to Linner indicating he also not acceptable.

Dist. 2 copies - Mr. Olver
1 copy - Mr. Dayal

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: CORDIER, NEW YORK
DATE: 24 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4452

Irish Mission informs us that Commander McKeown will arrive
Leo 6 January.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Show Dr. L
24/12

SL

To : Mr. R. Dayal (personal)
From : Secretary General
Date : 23 December 1960
No. : Unnumbered

Regret very much not to be with you for Christmas holidays of shared hopes and shared worries. Looking forward to see you in a week's time. At luncheon today trying to compete with Nimba experience one year ago, Heunz, Bill and I joined in nostalgic memories transmitted to Sture. I am sure that he will manage to infuse the whole Leo team with the right spirit of Swedish irresponsibility for Ziks which gets reflections even in U.S. press as, for example, today when Hearst press hailed Mckeown for being a General who "shoots first and thinks afterwards." We know that you think first but we also know that with the right cause you do shoot afterwards.

All the best to you all from all.

INCOMING CODE

Dr. Linale
24/12

To : Mr. Dayal.
From : SECGEN.
Date : 23-12-60.
No. : 4442.

Reur B-1744 para 10. I am a little puzzled by your comments on staff. While I see no objection to the changes you indicate, there are internal reasons why replacement of Berendsen by Miller at this time may be inadvisable. I believe that those who in your opinion lack good judgement etc might be considered for re-patriation.-

cc: Mr. Dayal only

INCOMING CODE

To : Mr. Dayal.
From : Mr. Bunche.
Date : 23 Dec. 1960.
No. : 4439

Cham
Rs
23/12

Reference B-1730. We have carefully considered suggestion for custodial maintenance contract with commercial engineering firm and regretfully find it not feasible for a number of reasons. Will therefore undertake prompt recruitment of consulting engineer for short period as per your alternative.-

cc: Mr. Dayal only.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, KETTANI, LEOPOLVILLE
From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK
Date : 23 December 1960
No : 4438

Para 1 our 4309.

Approach to Italy to accept responsibility for providing all personnel to operate - repeat operate the C-119 squadron, requires information about additional Italian personnel that would be needed. Please itemize requirements. Indian and Norwegian crews now participating in C-119 operation are to be replaced now or at the time of the expiry of their tours of duty? Please advise.

New subject. ONUC 3385.

According to your recommendation, Italy will be requested to provide aircraft spare parts depot personnel to replace Indian team. Based on previous experience, long delay occurs between our request and the provision of personnel. Indian Government inquiring again when Indian team will be repatriated. Hope at least that the eight personnel who wish to be repatriated immediately could be released before availability of Italian replacements. Please advise.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Ch Asst
Ask Duran for
report Pds
24/12*

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 23 December 1960
No. : 4437

The British have repeatedly approached me regarding problem of evacuation of non-Africans from Orientale province. Have told them the little we know. Their interest is provoked by questions on their home front and concentrated around possibility of preparations for evacuation in case of crisis. I have said that I fear no prior arrangements would stick in real crisis while on other hand there are strong objections against evacuation prior to crisis with consequences of such move for economy of province. However, I have added that this is thinking aloud and that I would like to revert to matter after having your views perhaps as now based on Duran's on the spot findings regarding attitude of authorities.

INCOMING CODE

To: : Mr. Dayal.
From : SECGEN.
Date : 23-12-60.
No. : 4435-4436.

Ch Asmt Jw
Show Dr. Linum M Sz
23/12

Reur 143.

Letter to Kasavubu read by Fawzi and Jha and, more important, given to US and UK ambassador. To the latter with the explicit statement that I hope this would sober down those who look with favour at military undertakings by Mobutu-Kasa-Vubu; the obvious implication was that I expect London and Washington to exercise influence in direction of the letter.

I also gave two western ambassadors the following note on my reaction to sixty million dollar proposal:

✓ "I have learned that the European Economic Commission intend to consider the extension of a dollars 60 million grant to the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) , the counterpart funds for commodities delivered to be under the control of EEC. The contracting party on the Congo side is supposedly to be the Commissioners Regime, originally set up by Colonel Mobutu and functioning after a suspension of Parliament.

This plan gives rise to serious concern. Financial support given to authorities the constitutional position of which is, at best, controversial, represents an element in the political picture tending to influence strongly the relative strength of factions and persons active in country. Its timing is such that it coincides with efforts to build up the Mobutu Regime which it is difficult to explain sort of counting on some kind of outside support and outside advice. Even for a neutral body like the United Nations the Operation would in these circumstances have heavy political overtones, naturally, these overtones are strongly increased when the agent is an International Organization in fact representing six colonial or ex-colonial powers (with the exception, of course, of Luxem-

bourg) one of which is Belgium.

It is unavoidable that at the present juncture the financial arrangement under consideration would be interpreted as a case of solid Belgian financial backing of the Mobutu Regime in co-operation with France and West Germany. How this would influence the evaluation of the work of the United Nations is obvious, and it may easily give rise to a situation in which the United Nations civilian operation in the fields of finance and trade should be discontinued.

I have in this context to note that the delegate of the United States, speaking in the General Assembly, 17 December 1960, restated a stand taken earlier by the United States in favour of aid through the United Nations, in the following terms: "We have channeled all our aid - military transport, technical, administrative and financial - through the United Nations, and have repeatedly urged others to follow our example. Today we believe that more than ever". The delegate of the United Kingdom, on 20 December 1960, indicated a similar attitude by the implications of the following statement: "While my Delegation would agree that in the present circumstances it is desirable that, to the greatest extent possible, economic and technical assistance to the Republic of the Congo should be channeled through the United Nations, we cannot agree that any resolution of the General Assembly can properly inhibit the Republic of the Congo ^{from} ~~for~~ arranging for non-military assistance from other sources".

I agree with the attitude reflected in the two statements quoted, that there is no legal basis for a demand that all economic assistance be channeled through the United Nations; However, the United States explicitly and the United Kingdom implicitly has recognized the strong political reasons why such aid, in present circumstances, should be channeled through the Organization. I could myself ^{use} the words of the United States Delegate and repeat: "today we believe that more than ever".

In the circumstances I have, in this informal way, to voice my serious concern for the plan under way. I do not see why a form could not be found under which this assistance would be rendered politically neutral under the United Nations flag. And I must take the greatest exception to the idea that counterpart funds should be under the control of

(Continuation of 4435-36, third page)

the E.E.C. , while the role of the United Nations in the financial field remains central and essential, although backed only by very modest resources."

They were both shocked by the idea and even more so by the timing.

Will cable you later concerning our analysis of situation on basis of talks with some knowledable people who have been here for G.A. discussion. On the whole my conclusions are that we have a period of diplomatic juggling in front of us which may be fairly long unless the Mobutus start moving.

cc: Mr. Dayal only.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 23 December 1960
No. : 4434

Reference our 4379. My plans are now shaping up so that I would leave here first of January for South Africa with stop-over couple of days in Leo. I would consider it essential that conciliation commission by that time was in Leo and had started some kind of work. Also in view of effect presence of such U.N. body might have on certain well known tendencies from Kasavubu-Mobutu group which I tried to undercut by my message yesterday, I feel that their presence in Leo is highly desirable at earliest possible date. However, I find it difficult to push them off short of having green light from Wachuku and his colleagues. Therefore, I would ask you to try to get them to give me first reaction soonest and preferably with demand for immediate departure of conciliation commission.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLVILLE

From : SEGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 23 December 1960

No : 4433

This afternoon, 22 December, Messrs. Alfonse Lema, François Misano, Daniel Vibudulu and Marcellin Tshitenzi, who came to New York as members of Mr. Kanza's delegation, approached Mr. Wiesschoff. They said that they had great financial difficulties and asked whether it would be possible for us to contact Mr. Kanza (from whom they have not heard for three weeks) to inform him that they are stranded here without money and with their hotel bills unpaid for two weeks.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : CORDIER, NEWYORK
Date : 22 December 1960
No : 4401

Following press release issued here 1500 hours 21 December:

"General Von Horn completes temporary Congo assignment and will return to UNTSO in Jerusalem. Major-General McKeown of Ireland to command UN Force in Congo.

At the time of the urgent organization of the United Nations Force in the Congo in mid-July, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold transferred Major-General Carl Von Horn from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem, of which he was in charge, to the command of the Force in the Congo. As the transfer was intended to be temporary, the post was not filled and functions of the incumbent have been met on an acting basis. The Secretary-General has now found it necessary to ask General Von Horn, after his present vacation, to return to his post in Jerusalem as it can no longer be left vacant. General Von Horn will resume his duties in Jerusalem on 1 February. Effective from 1 January the Secretary-General has appointed Major-General Sean McKeown of Ireland as Commander of the Force. Generals ben Hammou Kettani of Morocco and Iyassu Mangasha of Ethiopia will remain in their functions as Deputy Commander and as Chief of Staff of the Force. In view of General McKeown's important duties in his own national service, his services also can be available to the United Nations only for a limited period."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : PRESS ONUC
From : OMNIPRESS NEWYORK
Date : 22 December 1960
No : 4400

Press release 21 December and Biographical Note on Major-General Sean McKeown.

Major-General Sean McKeown, who has been appointed Commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo effective 1 January 1961, was born in County Louth, Ireland on 3 June 1910. He entered the Army in 1930 as a cadet in the Cadet School of the Irish Military College and was commissioned the following year. He served in the Infantry Corps until just before World War II, he returned to the Military College to serve on the staff as an instructional officer. During the war years he commanded an infantry battalion. He rejoined the Military College as Commandant of the Cadet School at the end of the war.

In 1953, he joined Western Command Headquarters, where he served for four years. In May 1957, he returned again to the Military College and in December of that year was appointed Commandant of the College. He remained in that post until 1 January 1960, when he was appointed Army Chief of Staff, with Headquarters in Dublin.

General McKeown is married and has four children.

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 21 December 1960
Number : 4379

Your 1709, 1715, 1716, 1733, 1734.

Parallel with these valuable and searching observations of yours we have been engaging in a kind of dialogue with you through speeches here in the council and the assembly. These speeches having exhausted my imagination and our discussion time we have so far not got beyond points they indicate. However, the immediate follow-up of my statements will be letter to Kasavubu laying down the law as it can be derived from what has happened here; . I would try to support that letter by solid talks with Washington and London requesting effective support for our stand in this situation of crisis where they have themselves got committed through their own^{draft} resolution. Hope to cable draft of such letter tomorrow which, if you approve, should go straight on to Kasavubu. Thus I now follow up your 1709 but with our hand strengthened.

When tonight this part of the assembly session has ended we will fortunately have time to concentrate again on essentials, but also an opportunity to talk things out with some top men like fawzi. I am worried by certain undercurrents which may take us to a crisis so early as not to give proper time for us to use to the full our means of persuasion. However, there are strong elements of bluff and even blackmail in the picture and we shall have to try to call the bluff and resist the blackmail.

It is as yet impossible to say with certainty to what extent we should take withdrawal decisions seriously apart from the spearhead one by yugoslavia where we should implement our part as quickly as possible by as smooth arrangements as possible for the return of there people whatever it costs us. I have told Popovic that he will regret it, but their line is firm, determined probably by factors very far from the Congo, and then it is better to liquidate that part of the story without any further notice.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 20 December 1960

No : 4355

Congo Delegate in General Assembly this morning read following "precisions" from Leopoldville Foreign Office.

"Des incidents s'étaient produits entre l'Armée nationale congolaise et les forces de l'ONU à Bukavu, le vendredi 16 décembre. Une mission médicale autrichienne, composée de 52 personnes, est arrivée à Bukavu en vue d'y installer un hôpital dans le cadre de l'assistance de l'ONU au Congo. Bien que le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères fut au courant des négociations entre l'Autriche et l'ONUC pour l'installation de l'hôpital en question, il ignorait tout concernant la mise en place et notamment la date d'arrivée du personnel médical. Du fait, les autorités locales de Bukavu n'ont pas été prévenues et donc la mission médicale non plus n'a pu exhiber aucune autorisation ou justification du Gouvernement central et n'a possédé que des documents émanant de l'ONUC; C'était la raison des autorités locales pour l'arrestation des 53 membres du personnel médical et pour leur maintien en résidence surveillée en attendant les instructions nécessaires du Gouvernement central.

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères constate que l'ONUC a de nouveau manqué à la collaboration indispensable avec le Gouvernement de la République du Congo. Son manquement est d'autant plus grave et regrettable qu'il a provoqué des incidents sanglants."

I replied at once that in view of his observations we would immediately publish a full report which would give "a somewhat different picture". In the light of this preposterous attempt of Leo authorities to turn fire against us for their irresponsible handling of matter and lack of control, I ask you to cable in clear most urgently text of your earlier communications re the matter, reedited for publication in accordance with your best judgment of what is finally confirmed and proper for publicity.

INCOMING CODE

To : Mr. Dayal
From : SECGEN.
Date : 20 Dec. 1960.
No. : 4351.

Your 1728. I find your conclusions and my intervention in Assembly today well harmonized. Your line of action as stated in para 8 anyway corresponds to my concept of what you can do. Note however that in my intervention I claim certain freedom in interpretation of mandate in situation of duress where preventive action can be justified as taken for protection of life and property.-

cc: Mr. Dayal only

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE - for WACHUKU and colleagues
From : SECGEN, NEWYORK
Date : 19 December 1960
No : 4322

I receive with the greatest satisfaction the news of the safe arrival of the advance party of the Conciliation Commission. I see in their presence in Leo a most important new element and wish them most sincerely all success in their work. Again I promise them our strongest support and trust that the co-operation between them and the representatives of the United Nations Secretariat will be as close as fruitful. The sooner they feel that they can give me a first indication of their views after personal contact with parties the more helpful it will be. They may wish to note the summing up of my views on the future in the Congo to be found in the latter part of my statement in the General Assembly on Saturday. However, I will abide by the conclusions of the experienced representatives who are now added to the UN team in this important operation.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 18 December 1960
No. : 4311

Your B-1709 and related cables. Policy line will be given immediately after Assembly has finished current debate. As I said in 3973 we must have single consistent policy and improvisations on any one point unwise. I recognize almost intolerable conditions in which most of our work is being conducted, but, but -.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 18 December 1960
No. : 4309

h
Ch ant
N 18/12
Jm
19/12

1. Our 4226 accepted recommendations in your (III) A and B of B-1634 on C119s and reported that Italy has already been approached.

2. In existing circumstances and in view of considerations set forth in B-1634, agree with your conclusion that Kamina be put on aye custodial maintenance basis as soon as possible. Implementation of this conclusion will, of course, involve discharge of most of Congolese workers on base. In view of their numbers this will be a serious dislocation, which could be cushioned to some extent by liberal application of measures indicated in your numbered paragraph one of B-1635.

3. Concurrence on cancellation of current construction contracts as indicated your numbered paragraph two of B-1635 naturally follows, and ^asome is true of numbered paragraphs three and four. A sharp check should be kept by us on the number of Belgians who, under the revised approach to Kamina, might be considered necessary to retain beyond 31 December.

To : Dayal , Kettani
From : Bunche
Date : 18 December 1960
Number : 4307

Big R
Pl check. We should
agree immediately
AD
18/12

1. Mission of Federation of Malaya informs on 17th that Government intends to send to Congo Brigadier Osman and Lieutenant Horsfield for about a fortnight for purpose of visiting the Malayan special force . The two officers are ready to depart . Please advise .

2. Mission also informs of their government's readiness to send to Congo immediately , by air , an additional Malayan company with personnel , equipment , weapons and that , if United Nations command has need , later on , Malaya will be prepared to send additional troops . Your views requested . We look at this as encouraging development .

3. Mission further conveyed concern of Malayan government about general situation in Congo and its request that no detachments of Malayan special force be widely dispersed without dependable support .

cc : Gal. Kettani

To : Dayal
From : Secretary-General
Date : 17 December 1960
Number : 4297

Reference B-1680 .

*Big R.
Draft reply to
this para pt.
PD
18/12*

1. A prime concern for us all is to ensure consistency in policy, although the policies themselves may occasionally require change in the face of different conditions. I note indication your paragraph 5 that Mobutu " continues to clear troop movements " with you under September principle reported by you in your B-941 imposing restrictions on use of airfields in transportation of troops or war stores for purposes of civil strike. How frequently are such clearances sought? What information is required as basis for clearance? Is it always requested? Has it ever been denied ? Is clearance required for war materiel ?

2. I note that paragraph 6 you differentiate between situation in September when radio and airports were closed down and prevailing situation resulting from internal constitutional struggle . This interpretation has validity although September episodes also reflected internal constitutional differences . But in both September and current situations , United Nations basic objective has been and continues to be maintenance of law and order . As indicated in B-828 and B_837 , action closing airports was made necessary by deepening of domestic crisis threatening complete civil breakdown . In my statement to Security Council on 9 September I pointed out that the closings were an emergency measure taken under the mandate of the force to maintain law and order . Outbreak of conflict between Leopoldville and Stanleyville would , as you indicate in paragraph 6 of B-1562 , create grave problem of law and order which would inevitably call for emergency measures to extent of capacity of force .

3. Principle of operation and consistency dictate continued application of policy of restrictions on troop movements with aggressive intent . But there are important differences in some aspects of situation as between September and now , as regards nature of conflict threatened , political conditions , the strength and new aggressiveness of ANC , and fact that in a Leo-Stanleyville conflict major ANC movement would likely be river . These factors and frank appraisal of capacity of force in employment of force , must of course be taken into account in prolongation of September policy or its modification to cope with changed conditions .

Conclusion is that established policy should be maintained but that length to which force would go to maintain it must be subject to on the spot judgement of situation , force capacity and reasonable interpretation of use of arms for self-defense only .

Would appreciate your comments on these observations which would be helpful to us in clarifying our position .

INCOMING CODE

To : Mr. Dayal.
From : SECGEN.
Date : 17-12-60.
No. : 4276.

Reference B-1684.

Review, in B-1683-4, of background leading to Kitona episode of thirteenth and fourteenth is very helpful and particularly as indicating lines your own thinking.

Basic principles applying to the two bases, their installations and supplies, are as set forth in my third report to Security Council (S/4475). Thus U.N., as a provisional measure in sense of article 40 of Charter, has assumed temporary responsibility for administration of Kitona, acting as "caretaker" for all legitimate interests involved in accordance with recognized principles of law." This has relevance to question of arms and ammunition raised in para onezero of B-1684. It is noted from B-~~1686~~ that while Kitona has large supplies of ammunition, gasoline and vehicles, the supply of arms fortunately seems not to be substantial.

Safeguarding of arms and ammunition stores at Kitona by adequate U.N. security measures is an action consistent with our caretaker role. ANC claim to ownership of such material, supported by belgians, would at least have raised some delicate questions about removal and/or requisitioning by U.N. Our requisitioning claim seems to have received little recognition at Kamina. On basis all circumstances, I concur

(2)

therefore, in advisability of proceeding along suggested
safeguarding line.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Ro

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Mr. R. Bunche
Date : 15 December 1960
No. : 4233

Reference B-1675. Italian government has
been advised accordingly.

INCOMING CODE

To : DAYAL
From : SECGEN
Date : 15-12-60
No. : 4226.

Re 1690. Addressed yesterday message to Chiefs of State of countries wishing to withdraw. Text follows:

"I am sure that you have been fully informed by your permanent representative in New York concerning the statements which I made before the Security Council on 7 and 13 December and particularly the General appeal which I felt it my duty to address to those Governments who had announced their intention to withdraw from U.N. force.

As Secretary General, I feel obliged to underline these public appeals by a personal approach to you. While it is superfluous to reiterate what has already been said publicly in the Security Council, permit me to express to you my deep anxiety about the consequences of a liquidation of the United Nations Operation such as may be forced upon the Organization by the threatened withdrawals. Whatever opinion may be held with regard to the extent of the functions of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the elimination or the weakening of the United Nations Force from the Congo would inevitably lead to the situation which in the course of the last five months we have with all our means attempted to forestall, namely a disintegration within the country provoking open and active involvement of major powers. The threat of such an involvement is likely quickly to become a reality if present intentions to withdraw from the United Nations Force should materialize.

In the light of these very serious prospects, I regard it as the clear obligation of the Secretary General to appeal to you and to your Government to reconsider the intended withdrawal of your troops from the United Nations Force in the Congo in the light of such further steps as the General Assembly may take for a strengthening of the possibilities of the United Nations to further a peaceful development in democratic forms. I am personally firmly convinced that the threat to peace and security in a substantial part of the world is vitally involved in this question."

Agree with your para two. We shall have a word with diplomatic representatives here.

Your para three. believe threats to withdraw have a strong element of wish to exert pressure on SECCO and Assembly for reaching decision on Lumumba. To that extent there may be an element of bluff.

However further elements enter picture, varying from country to country, such as basic discontent, pressure from certain big power. In a couple of cases I believe in possibility of revision of decision provided G.A. resolution gives some face-saving.

Naturally we must look for replacements but problem is exceedingly difficult if withdrawals are made effective, as this probably would close our possibilities also for increase of contingents from non-withdrawing african states. Note also possible impact of developments in Ethiopia. Risks for breaking down of Force from within therefore exist as wmality and I do not believe even strong arguments my SECCO speech tuesday have much influence but if people are bent on suicide who can stop them from finally succeeding. In this case certainly two of permanent members SECCOR, forming strange couple of bed_ fellows, wish to see a liquidation of U.N. Operation.-

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 15 December 1960
No : 4220

1685, paragraph 4. You are right. We have lately with some success preached line now taken by Timberlake. Receptivity increased by sad experiences after seating and probably also thanks to London pressures. Have told Washington spokesmen that this line still has to be tried but chances would have been very different 6 to 8 weeks ago. Washington and London now urge me, and this is of special interest to you, to visit Leopoldville. It cannot be at Christmas to my great regret but may well come about on way to Pretoria early January. One aim seems to be that I supposedly could complete conversion of Timberlake.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*Seen
RD
14/12*

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General
Date : 14 December 1960
No : 4186

Reference Kitona affair. After receiving your further communications have decided to cover the ground publicly as follows:

We do not repeat not follow through on idea of publishing your first cables but instead will publish your letter of protest which gives good summary and also a letter of protest from me which will further elaborate legal aspects and requests to Kasavubu dervied from these legal considerations. Thus, the two letters of protest, together, would constitute full report as of now. Will cable you text of my letter to Kasavubu as soon as possible.

INCOMING CODE

To : Mr. Dayal.
From : Mr. Cordier
Date : 13 Dec. 1960.
No : 4156

*Speak to Ribby
Amb Stewart on phone
13/12
PS
Hoken
b*

Ambassador Barnes of Liberia once more approached me today saying that Colonel Stewart and Major Kun who had come to Leopoldville to observe the hearing on the Liberian incident "continue to be ignored". He was unable to tell me where they were staying in Leopoldville. I would appreciate a reply regarding this mystery.

c.c. Mr. Dayal only.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SECGEN, NEWYORK
Date : 12 December 1960
No : 4133

Reference ONUC 3192.

1. Fully share your concern about famine conditions in Kasai and need for emergency relief effort on part of UN.
2. Wish you to have material on this matter cast in form of a report for use here emphasizing facts, and which should fill in gaps, including reasons for present crisis.
3. My intention is to bring this situation effectively to attention of General Assembly and Security Council.
4. Recognize need for exceptional steps to obtain funds but do not favor idea of the broad appeal you suggest.
5. Matter of additional aerial transport being reported on separately.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 11 December 1960

No : 3178

Following is text of my statement before Security Council last night:

"The Representative of the USSR to the Security Council addressed a request to me this afternoon to submit urgently to this evening's session of the Security Council complete information in regard to a subject which is described in document S/4590. No report has been made by me in regard to this matter, as it is still under consideration in Leopoldville. In this respect, I follow a rule consistently maintained in this as other similar United Nations organizations. Practically daily difficulties and conflicts arise. We do not trouble the General Assembly and Security Council with them, short of having first tried to find a satisfactory solution without recourse to the authority of those organs. Another approach would submit them to a meaningless burden without adding to the efficiency of the Organization. However, the facts of this matter are as follows: The Special Representative of the Secretary-General received confirmation that, as rumored, on 5 December an order had been issued to Otraco, a parastatal transport organization, by the Administrateur en Chef de la Sûreté restricting the transport of military material and vehicles of the United Nations Force in the Congo. As soon as the Special Representative learned about this matter, he began discussions with the local authorities concerned and finally, not having received satisfaction, addressed in the course of to-day the following letter to the President of the Republic:

'I have the honor to invite your attention to the enclosed copy of an order issued to Otraco by the Administrateur en Chef de la Sûreté restricting the transport of the strategic or military material and vehicles of the United Nations Force in the Congo. This order represents an interference in the

fulfilment by the Force of its essential functions in the Congo, and the immediate effect has been to prevent the shipment of essential material as to which arrangements must be made with Otraco by to-day, Friday, 9 December 1960. I need not point out that the order also represents a flagrant violation of the Agreement of 27 July 1960, signed by Dr. Bunche and Mr. Bomboko, guaranteeing la liberté de mouvement à l'intérieur du pays pour la Force, and that it is likewise in contradiction of Articles 25 and 49 of the United Nations Charter. As representations made to Mr. Bomboko and Mr. Nendeka have not brought about a rescission of the order, I must urgently bring the matter to your notice for immediate action. You will appreciate the urgency of the cancellation of the order so as to obviate the necessity of my referring it to the Secretary-General for the attention of the Security Council now in session.'

I have subsequently been informed that discussions concerning this matter are still going on and that the possibility of rescinding the order does not seem too distant. Irrespective of the order, the United Nations Command is as usual bringing its supplies to the docks and is preparing for shipment which it is presumed will be undertaken as scheduled. Of course, I shall inform the Security Council if direct interference with the movement of United Nations supplies should occur."

d

To : Dayal - Linner
From : Secretary-General
Date : 10 December 1960
Number : 4128

I talked to yugoslav ambassador about Boscovic .
He would take matter up immediately with Belgrade .
Pending government reaction Boscovic should stay on
unless for other reasons than governments decision he
would wish to leave .

To : Von Horn
From : Secretary-General
Date : 10 December 1960
Number : 4127

U.A.R. Representative on ninth gave oral notification
of decision of his government to withdraw contingent .

No time limit indicated .

cc : Dayal

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Mr. Dulles
By wire today
10/12
10/12
10/12

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4126

Fawzi (UAR) will say in his intervention in Security Council discussion inter alia "UN forces arrested 50 nationalists in Katanga and handed them over to Belgian-dominated Katanga police".

This obviously refers to last paragraph B 1594 of 4 December. I would ask you to give us urgently such further details as would be throwing light on this situation, specifically reasons, as you would formulate them, for military action against Balubakats, basis for their arrest, and justification for handing them over to E'ville.

Matter is important as anti Tshombe stand of Balubakat will easily turn them into "good guys" in some circles here and, correspondingly, us into "bad guys".

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: DAYAL
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4104

Further to my cable 4089 regarding OTRACO, I wish to advise you that I have received from Soviet side a request to circularize a report concerning control established by Congolese authorities over transport serving UN. It is therefore urgent that your letter contained in B 1644 be despatched immediately because I shall be including it in short statement which I am making to Secco tonight.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDOVILLE
From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
Date : 9 December 1960
No : 4101

Following is text of letter received to-day from USSR
Representative:

"According to press dispatches irresponsible armed groups in Leopoldville have established a control over the transportation serving the armed forces sent into the Congo in accordance with the decision of the Security Council. From press dispatches it would also appear that Brigadier Rikhye had made a protest in this connexion. Unfortunately the members of the Security Council which is considering at the present time the question of taking urgent measure in connexion with the latest events in the Congo have no official information regarding the above events in Leo which could have far reaching consequences. Therefore as the Representative of the USSR to the Security Council I consider it necessary to request you to submit urgently to the session of the Security Council which will be held at 7.30 p.m. 9 December as complete information as possible regarding the question of the obstacles which have arisen to the implementation of the action of the UN in the Congo and regarding measures undertaken by you and your representatives in the Congo in this connexion. I would also be grateful to you for distributing this letter as an official document of the Security Council."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: VON HORN
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4100

Reference ONUC 3160. Thanks for information. Request made to USA for airlift. Do not understand, however, since these men were included in original Moroccan Contingent, why they are not returning to their units rather than to Morocco.

Distribution/ Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: VON HORN
FROM: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 DECEMBER 1960
NUMBER: 4097

Reference ONUC 3153. Delighted at your appreciation but I cannot accept unmerited credit, since, as explained in my 4038, USA notified us of willingness to provide airlift before we received your "growlings" via ONUC 3103.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn