

MIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS- MISCELLANEOUS

[1 JAN 1993 - 31 DEC 1994]

[1 CONFIDENTIAL]

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 152

FILE 6

ACC. 1998/0283

PAMPHLETS OVER GOMA REFUGE CAMPS

13 Aug 94

REFERRED TO
TRANSMISE A

REMARKS - REMARQUES

(To be signed in full showing appointment, telephone number and date)
(Attaché de signature, fonction, numéro de téléphone et date)

Dr Kabia

1. I am confident that the production of pamphlets for distribution over Goma can be completed by 19 Aug 94.

2. To maximise the impact that these pamphlets will have on the refugees, they will be designed in a way that lets the refugees understand that the piece of paper that the UN has dropped from the sky is a ticket to return home.

3. In order to increase the chances of success of this campaign I recommend that the Force Commander be requested to provide the following support:


- a. that one day prior to drop, several UN vehicles patrol areas surrounding the camps to alert refugees;
- b. that an armed UN presence be established as of the 20 Aug 94, 08h00 on the Rwanda side of border as a confidence builder;
- c. that MLVW-HLVW be at the border to help transport the sick or injured;
- d. that one Cdn Hercules be re-directed (Fm Nairobi to Goma) for distribution of pamphlets on 20 Aug 94 - Time over target to be 08h00; and
- e. that air drop be carried out in as many phases as possible to increase UN visibility and presence;

4. Although I am not convinced that a single air drop will be enough to convince everyone, it will certainly give UNAMIR a good foundation on which to build the next campaign.


S. Grenier
Capt
CC UNAMIR


② Mr. meyer may we discuss? 14/8
③ Capt Grenier
General Dallaire
promised to take
to the air group.
He says we should
go ahead 14/8
ED says

RWANDA




FORCE HQ 24 MULTINATIONAL

2130/21 APR 94




- (1) ALL APC DRIVERS STAY AND TROOPS ARE DRIVER QUALIFIED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
- (2) TAKEOVER BTR 80
- (3) TOTAL FORCE - 416 ALL RANKS

UNAMIR OPERATIONAL SECTORS



ORGANISATION OF UNAMIR



(*) SRSG: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SECRETARY GENERAL


UNAMIR MANDATE

- TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF KIGALI WITHIN A WEAPON SECURE AREA
- **TO MONITOR THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT MANDATE, LEADING UP TO ELECTIONS**
- **TO ASSIST WITH MINE CLEARANCE, PRIMARILY THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMS**
- **TO INVESTIGATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT**
- **TO MONITOR THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS**
- **TO ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES**
- TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON INCIDENTS REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE

The UN DECISIONS

Security Council Resolution 872 - 05 October 1993

DECIDED

 **TO ESTABLISH A PEACE
KEEPING FORCE NAMED
UNAMIR (UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR
RWANDA).**

The ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

04 AUGUST 1993

- **INSTALLATION OF A BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (BBTG) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES**
- **SETTING UP OF TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS**
- **DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (UN Military Observer Group)**
- **WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN RWANDA**
- **DEPLOYMENT OF A RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) BATTALION FOR THE PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF RPF POLITICAL LEADERS FOR MOVING IN AND AROUND KIGALI**
- **INTEGRATION OF GENDARMERIE INTO A NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE**
- **DISENGAGEMENT, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZING AND RETAINING OF MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE PARTIES TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE NATIONAL ARMY**
- **PROTECTION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY AND SECURITY OF THE CONTRIBUTED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**
- **INTEGRATION ON NMOG (Neutral Military Observer Group - Part of OAU) INTO UNMO**
- **REPATRIATION OF THE REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS**
- **ASSISTANCE IN ENSURING THE SECURE ATMOSPHERE REQUIRED FOR THE ELECTIONS**

THE CRISIS

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

- . TUTSI MONARCHY TILL 1959**
- . PARMEHUTU 1962 - 1973**
- . SECOND REPUBLIC**

THE CRISIS

THE CONFLICT

***A THREE YEARS
ARMED CONFLICT WITH
RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT
INVADING THE COUNTRY FROM
NEIGHBORING UGANDA
IN OCTOBER 1990***

Feb 93 : Second assault

Aug 93 : Arusha Peace Agreement

ETHNICITY

HUTU : 85 %

TUTSI : 14 %

TWA : 1 %

GEOGRAPHY

LOCATION

TERRAIN


RIVERS / LAKES

CLIMATE

LANGUAGE

OFFICIAL: FRENCH

OTHER : KINYARWANDA



Rwanda



Africa



**WELCOME
TO
UNAMIR HQ**

GEOGRAPHIE

ORIENTATION

TERRAIN

RIVIERES / LACS

CLIMAT

LANGUES

OFFICIELE

FRANCAIS

AUTRE

KINYARWANDA

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

4 PHASE CONCEPT



PHASE 1

05 Oct 93 - 04 Jan 94

***Installation of a Broad Based
Transitional Government***



PHASE 2

05 Jan 94 - 04 Apr 94

***Preparation of the Disengagement,
Demobilization and Integration of
Forces***



PHASE 3

05 Apr 94 - 04 Jan 95

***Disengagement, Demobilization and
Integration of Forces***



PHASE 4

05 Jan 95 - 04 Nov 95

***Providing security in the period
leading up to elections***

4. IDÉE DE MANOEUVRE



MANOEUVRE EN QUATRE PHASES

PHASE 1

05 Oct 1993	→	D - Day (31 Dec 93 ?)
Résolution 872 du Conseil de Sécurité		Gouvernement de Transition à Base Elargie installé à KIGALI

- ETABLISSEMENT DE LA MISSION 1428
Pers (211 Obs incl.)
- ETABLISSEMENT "D'UNE ZONE DE
CONSIGNATION D'ARMES A KIGALI" (KWSA)
- OBSERVATEURS DANS LA ZONE TAMPON
(DMZ) ET EN OUGANDA

PHASE 2

D



D + 90 (Mar 94 ?)

- **ETABLISSEMENT DE LA MISSION 2548**
Pers (331 Obs incl.)
- **MAINTIEN DE LA ZONE DE**
CONSIGNATION D'ARMES A KIGALI
- **SUPERVISION DE LA DMZ ET DE LA**
FRONTIERE OUGANDA / RWANDA
- **DEMARCATIION DE ZONES DE**
RASSEMBLEMENT
- **SUPERVISION DE LA DMZ MODIFIEE**
- **ASSURER LA PREPARATION DU**
"DESENGAGEMENT, DEMOBILISATION
et INTEGRATION DES FORCES
& GENDARMERIE" (DDI)
- **RESERVE de la FORCE (jour et nuit)**
Compagnie de RUTBAT avec +/- 14 BTR 60
2 à 5 BELL 25
Contrôle de Manifestations
à être engagée partout dans le pays endéans 1Hr30

PHASE 3


D + 90




D + 360 (Dec 94 ?)

- **DDI**
- **REDUCTION DE LA FORCE a 1240**
- **ETABLISSEMENT, SUPERVISION ET CONTROLE DE LA ZONE TAMPON**
- **SUPERVISION DE LA FRONTIERE OUGANDA / RWANDA**
- **POINTS DE RASSEMBLEMENT ET DE CANTONNEMENT - CENTRES D'ENTRAINEMENT INTEGRES**
- **SUPERVISER LES MOUVEMENTS DES UNITES MILITAIRES**
- **SECURITE GENERALE A KIGALI ET DANS TOUT LE PAYS.**

DETAILED ORGANIZATION OF
FORCE HEADQUARTERS





CONCLUSION



**UNAMIR = PEACE-KEEPING
MISSION**



THIS MEANS:

- MONITORING THE CEASE-FIRE
- PATROLLING
- ESCORTING
- PROVIDING SECURITY
- "SHOWING THE FLAG"
- INVESTIGATING (CIVPOL IN CO-ORDINATION WITH GENDARMERIE)

CURRENT OPERATIONS



Essentially PEACE-KEEPING

- MONITORING
- PATROLLING
- ESCORTING
- INVESTIGATING (CIVPOL IN CO-ORDINATION WITH GENDARMERIE)
- SECURING
- "SHOWING THE FLAG"



ON WEEKLY BASIS THIS MEANS:

- FOOT PATROLS 90
- MOBILE PATROLS 220
- AERIAL PATROLS 20
- ESCORTS 25
- SECURING
- LEGAL BASIS FOR OFFENSIVE / DETERRENT OPS ARE BEING ANALYZED



UNOMUR

- PATROLLING
- OBSERVATION OF BORDER CROSSINGS

PHASE 4

Jan 95

Nov 95

➡ ***Completion of the Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration of Forces and Gendarmerie***

- ➡ ***Reduction of the mission strength to 930***
- ➡ ***Monitor security in the period leading up to elections***
- ➡ ***End of monitoring DMZ and Ugandan/Rwandan border***

PHASE 3

05 Apr 94

04 Jan 95

D + 90

D + 360

☞ Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration of Forces and Gendarmerie

- ☞ Reduction of the mission strength to 1,240***
- ☞ Establish, supervise and monitor DMZ***
- ☞ Monitor Ugandan/Rwandan border***
- ☞ Monitor Assembly Points***
- ☞ Monitor Cantonment Points***
- ☞ Monitor Integrated Training Centers***
- ☞ Monitor movement of military bodies***
- ☞ General security in KIGALI and the Country***

PHASE 2

05 Jan 94

04 Apr 94

D

D + 90

☞ Preparation of the Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration of Forces and Gendarmerie

- ☞ Build up of the mission up to 2,548 personnel including 331 observers**
- ☞ Ensure "KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA (KWSA)"**
- ☞ Monitor DMZ and Ugandan/Rwandan border**
- ☞ Demarcation of assembly zones**
- ☞ Monitor modified DMZ**

PHASE 1

05 Oct 93

**M - Day
Resolution
Security Council
872**

04 Jan 94

**D - Day
Broad Based Transitional
Government installed
KIGALI**

**☞ Assist the Nation to install a
Broad Based Transitional
Government and Transitional
Institutions**

- ☞ Build up of the mission up to 1,428
personnel including 211 observers**
- ☞ Establishing a "KIGALI WEAPON SECURE
AREA (KWSA)"**
- ☞ Observers in DMZ and UGANDA**
- ☞ Moving and securing ONE RPF Battalion +
VIPs into KIGALI**

U N A M I R

DATE :21 MAR 94

WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

ANNEX 'A'
TIME: 0800 HRS

SL NO	COUNTRY	TROOPS										MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL
		INF BN	LOG COY	ENG COY	MED COY	MOVCON PL	MP SEC	DMZ COY(-)	SUB TOTAL	STAFF	TOTAL		
1	AUSTRIA											15	15
2	BANGLADESH	370	200	203	50	19	11		853	30	883	59	942
3	BELGIUM	423							423	17	440		440
4	BOSTWANA											9	9
5	BRAZIL	3							3		3	10	13
6	CANADA									1	1	1	2
7	CONGO											26	26
8	EGYPT											10	10
9	FIJI											1	1
10	GHANA	800							800	19	819	24	843
11	HUNGARY											4	4
12	MALAWI											5	5
13	MALI											10	10
14	NETHERLAND											9	9
15	NIGERIA											15	15
16	POLAND											5	5
17	RUSSIA											15	15
18	SENEGAL											39	39
19	SLOVAKIA											5	5
20	TOGO											15	15
21	TUNISIA							60	60	1	61		61
22	URUGUAY											25	25
23	ZIMBABWE											29	29
	GRAND TOTAL	1596	200	203	50	19	11	60	2139	68	2207	331	2538

ARRIVALS OF CONTINGENTS

COUNTRY	SEP 93	OCT 93	NOV 93	DEC 93	JAN 94	FEB 95	REMARK
BANGLADESH				485	369		
GHANA						800	
BELGIUM			403				
TUNISIA	60						

**DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOBILIZATION
INTEGRATION OF FORCES**

Total troops

55,600



36,600


Civil

19,000

National Rwandese Army

UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH

Phases 1 and 2



(1) Personnel strength: AUTHORIZED / PRESENT

(2) Total UNMOs: 331/313


(*) KIBAT: Belgian Battalion,

RUTBAT: Bangladesh Battalion,

BYUBAT: Ghanaian Battalion

FORCE HQ
24
MULTINATIONAL

2130/21 APR 94



- (1) ALL APC DRIVERS STAY AND TROOPS ARE DRIVER QUALIFIED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
- (2) TAKEOVER BTR 80
- (3) TOTAL FORCE - 415 ALL RANKS

PLAN

GENERAL

THE CONFLICT

THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

THE UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS

THE ORGANIZATION OF UNAMIR


CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

CONCLUSION

3. ARRIERE PLAN


- **GEOGRAPHIE**
- **LANGUE**
- **RELIGION**
- **ECONOMY**
- **ETHNIES**
- **ARRIERE PLAN HISTORIQUE**
- **LA CRISE**
- **L'ACCORD DE PAIX D'ARUSHA**
- **GOMN**
- **LA MISSION DE RECONNAISSANCE NU**
- **LE RAPPORT TECHNIQUE AU
SECRETAIRE GENERAL**
- **LES DECISIONS DES NATIONS UNIES**

DISENGAGEMENT DEMOBILIZATION INTEGRATION OF FORCES



UNAMIR

DIVISION OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION



RELIGION

IMANA	:	45 %
CATHOLIC	:	45 %
PROTESTANT	:	9 %
MUSLIM	:	1 %

ECONOMY

AGRICULTURE

MAJOR CROPS: COFFEE
TEA

ETHNIES

HUTU 85%

TUTSI 14%

TWA 1%

ARRIERE PLAN HISTORIQUE

- . ORIGINE**
- . CONFLITS TRIBAUX**
- . AUTONOMIE INTERNE ET
INDEPENDANCE**
- . MILITAIRES au POUVOIR**

RELIGION

IMANA	45 %
CATHOLIQUE	45 %
PROTESTANTE	9 %
ISLAMIQUE	1 %

ECONOMIE


AGRICULTURE


RECOLTES MAJEURES

CAFE	50%
THE	24 %

Cartes des camps
au 12 janvier 1994

Secrétariat Permanent du Comité de Crise





CONTINGENT OWNED VEHICLES

BANGLADESH		BELGIUM		GHANA		TUNISIA		UN	
RUTBAT Log Coy Engr Coy		KIBAT		BYUBAT		TUNCOY			
APC (BTR-80)	8	APC (CVR-T)	6	TRUCK	4	/	0	TRUCK	4
TRUCK	26	TRUCK 4 T	29	JEEP, PICK-UP	16			JEEP, PICK-UP	320
PICK-UP	30	TRUCK 3,5 T	46	RECOVERY	1			<i>Heli BEL 212 2 + 3</i>	
JEEP	40	JEEP	60						
BULLDOZER	4	VAN	6						
GRADER	4	MOTO	5						
RECOVERY	1	RECOVERY	1						
		HELICOPTER (Alouette II)	2						
113		155		21		0		324	

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

32. Also the mission is responsible for ensuring an orderly safe return of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons, and to assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction with relief operations. We patrol refugee and displaced persons camps by road and helicopter. No escorts have been provided so far to relief operations as the situation has not yet required it. Present map of Rwanda shows the refugee/displaced persons situation:

Rwandan refugees outside the country	: 1,000,000
Displaced persons	: 350,000
Spontaneous returnees from Uganda	: 6,000
Burundi refugees (south Rwanda)	: 272,000

This task is accomplished by the Humanitarian Affairs Officer from the Plans Section at Force HQ. He co-ordinates with UNDP, UNHCR, CICR,.. etc.

MINE CLEARANCE

33. The war has left about 30,000 mines in the North of the country. The clearance is monitored by a UNAMIR Mine Clearance Cell. The duties of this cell are:

- a. To establish a mine intelligence database.
- b. To co-ordinate and prioritize mine clearance demand.
- c. To task mine clearance effort.
- d. To record and co-ordinate mine clearance information.

A three phased operation has been set up:

- a. UNAMIR engineers are clearing for military/demobilization needs.
- b. Training RPF/RGF soldiers to commence clearing of critical areas in the country.
- c. Civilian contract to hire locals to clear the rest of the country.


UNAMIR
United Nations
Assistance Mission
for Rwanda

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

4 PHASE CONCEPT

	PHASE 1	05 Oct 93 - 04 Jan 94
<i>Installation of a Broad Based Transitional Government</i>		
	PHASE 2	05 Jan 94 - 04 Apr 94
<i>Preparation of the Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration of Forces</i>		
	PHASE 3	05 Apr 94 - 04 Jan 95
<i>Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration of Forces</i>		
	PHASE 4	05 Jan 95 - 04 Nov 95
<i>Providing security in the period leading up to elections</i>		

**ORGANIZATION OF
UNAMIR**



(*) SRSG: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SECRETARY GENERAL



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/872 (1993)
5 October 1993

RESOLUTION 872 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3288th meeting,
on 5 October 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993,

Reaffirming also its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 24 September 1993 (S/26488 and Add.1),

Welcoming the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement (including its Protocols) on 4 August 1993 and urging the parties to continue to comply fully with it,

Noting the conclusion of the Secretary-General that in order to enable the United Nations to carry out its mandate successfully and effectively, the full cooperation of the parties with one another and with the Organization is required,

Stressing the urgency of the deployment of an international neutral force in Rwanda, as underlined both by the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and by the Rwandese Patriotic Front and as reaffirmed by their joint delegation in New York,

Paying tribute to the role played by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in the conclusion of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Resolved that the United Nations should, at the request of the parties and under peaceful conditions with the full cooperation of all the parties, make its full contribution to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/26488);
2. Decides to establish a peace-keeping operation under the name "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" (UNAMIR) for a period of six months subject to the proviso that it will be extended beyond the initial ninety days only upon a review by the Council based on a report from the Secretary-General as to whether or not substantive progress has been made towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
3. Decides that, drawing from the Secretary-General's recommendations, UNAMIR shall have the following mandate:
 - (a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city;
 - (b) To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedures;
 - (c) To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections;
 - (d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;
 - (e) To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;
 - (f) To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;
 - (g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations;
 - (h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police;
4. Approves the Secretary-General's proposal that the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) established by resolution 846 (1993) should be integrated within UNAMIR;
5. Welcomes the efforts and the cooperation of the OAU in helping to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement, in particular the integration of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) within UNAMIR;
6. Further approves the Secretary-General's proposal that the deployment and withdrawal of UNAMIR should be carried out in stages and notes in this connection that UNAMIR's mandate, if extended, is expected to terminate following national elections and the installation of a new government in Rwanda;

events which are scheduled to occur by October 1995, but no later than December 1995;

7. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in this context, to deploy the first contingent, at the level specified by the Secretary-General's report, to Kigali for an initial period of six months, in the shortest possible time, which, when fully in place, will permit the establishment of the transitional institutions and implementation of the other relevant provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

8. Invites the Secretary-General, in the context of the report referred to in paragraph 2 above, also to report on the progress of UNAMIR following its initial deployment, and resolves to review as appropriate, on the basis of that report and as part of the review referred to in paragraph 2 above, the requirement for further deployments in the scale and composition recommended by the Secretary-General in his report (S/26488);

9. Invites the Secretary-General to consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR, in particular through phased deployment without thereby affecting the capacity of UNAMIR to carry out its mandate, and requests the Secretary-General in planning and executing the phased deployment of UNAMIR to seek economies and to report regularly on what is achieved in this regard;

10. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements;

11. Urges the parties to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement in good faith;

12. Also requests the Secretary-General to conclude expeditiously an agreement on the status of the operation, and all personnel engaged in the operation in Rwanda, to come into force as near as possible to the outset of the operation and no later than thirty days after the adoption of this resolution;

13. Demands that the parties take all appropriate steps to ensure the security and safety of the operation and personnel engaged in the operation;

14. Urges Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to provide and intensify their economic, financial and humanitarian assistance in favour of the Rwandese population and of the democratization process in Rwanda;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

BRIEFING FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS, MS PATRICIA IRVIN, PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE OFFICER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST/ AFRICAN AFFAIRS, LT COL. BRUCE BARTOLAIN AND THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MS Yael ARONOFF.

1. Aim. The aim of the brief is to provide a synopsis of all immediate, and indirect demining activities on the background of mine problem in Rwanda.

2. Introduction. The mine and the booby traps problem is confined to a small area of the northern part of the country. Mines were probably laid by both the parties in the dispute, but the majority were supposedly laid by RGF to defend their static locations. RPF put harassment mines, to dislocate RGF vehicle movement. The worst mine problem is in the areas where the RGF have withdrawn, leaving mines and booby traps behind them. These were laid in tea and banana plantations, on open grassland and on tracks, being serious threat to the local population and to coming displaced persons and refugees. It is estimated that approximately 30,000 mines were laid during the conflict. These include anti-tank mines, and anti-personnel mines of the blast, fragmentation and jumping varieties. Some of the mines and grenades may be fitted with simple booby-traps.

3. Scope. The scope of the brief is as follows:

- a. Mine Clearance.
- b. Mine location.
- c. Mine Clearance Capability.
- d. Mine Intelligence Database.
- e. Mine Clearance Problems.
- f. Mine Awareness Training.
- g. MCCC Needs.

4. Mine Clearance. Both the RGF and RPF claim to have the skills and equipment to remove the known mines in their areas, but this is probably not the case. The RPF have no electronic mine detectors and RGF have none of them operational. The first problem is to mark the main area of mine contamination. Mine clearance in Rwanda falls into the following broad categories:

a. Clearance of routes and areas needed for Assembly Points, Cantonment Points and Integrated Training Centers , and their logistic support.

b. Clearance of routes necessary for the humanitarian movement of food to feeding centers in areas of starvation.

c. Clearance of routes necessary for the return of refugees from across the Ugandan border, and displaced persons from southern Rwanda, to their farms, plantation and homes in the north.

d. Clearance of villages, access roads and rural areas necessary to the re-settlement of refugees and the displaced persons.

5. Mine Location. The first problem is to locate the main areas of mine contamination. This can either be done using a commercial company, or by setting up a mine intelligence database in UNAMIR Headquarters.

6. Mine Clearance Capability. No indigenous organization capable of mine clearance currently exists in Rwanda, so one will have to be established. The options available are:

a. UNAMIR Engineer Troops. The Bangladesh contingent in UNAMIR contains a number of engineer troops, who may be allocated for mine clearance, and mine clearance training and supervision. They are trained in conventional military mine warfare, but not in mine clearance, and they require re-equipment and a period of refresher training before they can operate as mine clearers. With experience, they will be able to act as the nuclei for demining and repair teams, and certain contingents may be able to provide instructors for mine clearance training.

b. RGF and RPF Engineers. The RGF and RPF both contain engineer elements who have laid mines, and some individual soldiers may have cleared a few of them, but they have little or no mine clearance equipment, and will need a period of retraining before they can be used on mine clearance duties. Once trained , they could be deployed, initially under Bangladesh or Contractors supervisors and management.

c. Rwandese Mine Clearers. A key element in the Rwanda Mine clearance plan is the training and deployment of Rwandese mine clearers. For operational as well as political reasons, it is essential that these come from both the RGF and RPF. Initial discussions with General Nsabimana and General Kagame have indicated that both parties are willing to cooperate in this. The number of Rwandese mine clearers to be trained should not initially exceed 40, or three teams of 12 plus a small number in case some

trainees are found unsuitable, The number of trained mine clearers to be deployed parties to be deployed will depend on the equipment levels, and the number of supervisors.

Training of the Rwandese mine clearers should be done by the NGO or commercial company mentioned above, assisted by Bangladesh instructors. Training course should last six to eight weeks, and include live clearance exercises.

d. Transfer Of Mine Clearance Programme to Rwandese Control.

It is likely that the Rwanda Mine Clearance Plan will have to extend beyond the UNAMIR mandate. Experience from Cambodia shows that a smooth transition from UN to National Government Control is difficult to accomplish, but is more likely to be achieved if such transition has been built into the programme from the start. Preparatory works are required in the fields of management, equipment, legal and founding. Although the Rwanda mine clearance Plan will be managed by UNAMIR, at the termination of the UNAMIR mandate, any UN aspects of management responsibility will have to be passed to UNDP. In the same way, while initially the plan will be managed by OIC MCCC and the Mine Clearance Experts, a UN - employed programme Manager will have to be established, possibly recruited by UNDP. He should have his office in an organ of the Rwandese Government; should mine clearance be the responsibility of the RGA, then it should be in RGA Headquarters, with staff provided by the RGA. This programme Manager needs to be recruited as soon as possible, and discussions held with the Rwandese Government about the location of his department. It will be necessary to start a trust fund, to continue the mine clearance beyond the UNAMIR mandate, when founding from the UNAMIR budget will cease. This trust fund will need to be set up by UNDP.

9. Mine Intelligence Database. The Mine Intelligence Database is compiled in the form of a master map, backed up by data sheets. The database shows which roads and areas are known to be mined, which are thought to be mined and which are known to be clear of mines. The inputs of this database will come from :

- a. Any mine clearance map obtained from the RGF and RPF.
- b. Any mine data provided by RGF, RPF, UN departments, Aid agencies, ICRC or Medicine sans Frontiers.
- c. Cleared route data from RGF, RPF, Un departments, Aid agencies, ICRC or MSF.

The meeting with the RGF, RPF and NGOs, all expressed willingness to cooperate with the data collection process. This database will be the master information record, to which all UN units , agencies and aid NGOs will have access. The existence of the mine intelligence database will allow decisions to be made to which sites can immediately be used for Assembly Points, Cantonment

Points and integrated Training Centers, and which roads and trucks in DMZ cannot yet be used.

10. MINE CLEARANCE PROBLEMS. For achieving maximum levels of clearance, most mine clearance will probably be done conventionally, by hand. This consists of mine detection, using electronic mine detectors, prodders or perhaps the use of dogs, followed by mine destruction or removal. If it is found that mines have been extensively laid in densely cultivated areas such as tea plantations, some form mechanical clearance assistance will be necessary. Mine clearance of roads and tracks is difficult, because mines are usually laid at random, and many meters or even hundreds of meters apart. Some roads previously thought as mined may now have been used by vehicles, and assumed to be clear. This is a dangerous assumption, because mines sometimes require repeated pressure function. Eventually most roads in the known mined area may have to be check-swept for mines over their entire length.

11. MINE AWARENESS TRAINING. Civilian casualties will be reduced if mine awareness training is carried out amongst the returning refugees and displaced persons, who have no local knowledge of mines in their home areas, and therefore in special danger. The UNHCR have made a study of mine awareness programmes, and they will be asked if they can carry out such a programme in Rwanda.

12. MCCC Needs. Eight high sensitive mine detectors are going to be purchased for mine clearers from Force Engr Coy, because there are some non detectable mines like A/Pers :

- M-409, M-35, TS-50

when using mine detectors METEX 4.125.04.

Perhaps specially trained dogs with handlers or even aardvark flail machines would be available (3 PCT) for tea plantation demining.

Mine clearance NGO, such as HALO Trust, Norwegian People's Aid, Mines Advisory Group or Handicap International to conduct 6 - 8 weeks refresher training with Bangladesh (and RGF & RPF) mine clearers who are only trained in conventional military mine warfare (not in mine clearance) and must be trained before they can operate as mine clearers.

Mine awareness programmes for Rwandese society, with close co-operation with UNHCR Mr Gerhard Borman from Geneva, would be advantageous.


Trust Fund establishment in UNDP, to cover all expenses regarding mine clearance in Rwanda.


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
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





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
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
Cartes des camps
au 12 janvier 1994


Secrétariat Permanent du Comité de Crise




Cartes des camps
au 12 janvier 1994

Secrétariat Permanent du Comité de Crise







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The ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

04 AUGUST 1993

- ***INSTALLATION OF A BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (BBTG) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES***
- ***SETTING UP OF TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS***

The ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

04 AUGUST 1993

- ***DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE
(UN Military Observer Group)***
- ***WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
TROOPS STATIONED IN RWANDA***

The ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

04 AUGUST 1993

- ***DEPLOYMENT OF A RWANDAN
PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF)
BATTALION AT KIGALI FOR
THE PROTECTION AND
SECURITY OF RPF POLITICAL
LEADERS FOR MOVING IN AND
AROUND KIGALI***

The ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

04 AUGUST 1993

- ***DISENGAGEMENT,
DISARMAMENT AND
DEMOBILIZATION OF THE
FORCES***
- ***INTEGRATION OF THE FORCES
INTO A NEW RWANDESE ARMY***
- ***INTEGRATION OF GENDARMERIE
INTO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
FORCE***

The ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

04 AUGUST 1993

- ***PROTECTION OF THE
EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY AND
SECURITY OF THE
CONTRIBUTED HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE***
- ***REPATRIATION OF THE
REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT
OF DISPLACED PERSONS***

The ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

04 AUGUST 1993

- ***ASSISTANCE IN ENSURING THE
SECURE ATMOSPHERE
REQUIRED FOR THE ELECTIONS***

The UN DECISIONS

Security Council Resolution 872 - 05 October 1993

MANDATE

- ➡ **TO ESTABLISH A PEACE KEEPING FORCE NAMED UNAMIR**
- **TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF KIGALI WITHIN A WEAPON SECURE AREA**
- **TO MONITOR THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT MANDATE, LEADING UP TO ELECTIONS**
- **TO ASSIST WITH MINE CLEARENCE, PRIMARILY THROUGH TRAINING PROGRAMS**
- **TO INVESTIGATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE INSTANCES OF ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT**
- **TO MONITOR THE PROCESS OF REPATRIATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS**
- **TO ASSIST IN THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES**
- **TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ON INCIDENTS REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF THE GENDARMERIE AND POLICE**