

[7 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120

BOX 52

FILE 10

ACC. 1998/0278

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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SPAShahman
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JUN -9 PD 10:26

UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS

TO: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 9 JUNE 1995

NUMBER: 1937

SUBJECT: Security Council consultations

Further to my cable 1925 of earlier today, please find attached final text of Security Council resolution on UNAMIR, will send to you the official document as soon as available.
Best regards.

UNAMIR
195 JUN 10 11 04 551

Draft resolutionThe Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, and 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 4 June 1995 (S/1995/457),

Recalling also its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of certain offenses in Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation among all members of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Noting with great concern reports of military preparations and increasing incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime and underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Calling again upon all States to act in accordance with recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura in February 1995,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

-2-

Reaffirming the need for a long-term solution to the refugee and related problems in the Great Lakes States, and welcoming, therefore, the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to carry out consultations on the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months of the adoption of this resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months;

2. Decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel;

3. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;

(c) Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining;

(d) Assist in the training of a national police force;

(e) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need;

4. Affirms that the restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of arms and matériel specified therein to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda;

5. Calls upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps, with the aim of putting an end to factors contributing to the destabilization of Rwanda, to ensure that such arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel referred to above; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution;

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-3-

7. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the agreements made between them, in particular the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement concluded to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;

8. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

9. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system;

10. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 August 1995 and 9 October 1995 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

35-06 09 01:26 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

001 P01

CNR 158 P1/2

UNAMIR
195 JUN -9 03 52'

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 8 JUNE 1995
NUMBER: 1917

H. Annan

SUBJECT: Security Council consultations

1995 JUN -8 P 9:30
UNEP NATIONS
LE OPERATIONS

Please find attached text of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of draft resolution on Rwanda which reflects the understanding that we finally reached today, with Rwandese delegation, on UNAMIR's future force strength. This understanding was presented to the Security Council and approved, in principle, during informal consultations held late this afternoon. The final text of draft resolution is expected to be available morning of 9 June and will immediately be forwarded to you. It is expected that the Security Council will approve the draft resolution on same day. Will keep you informed. Regards.

YCY **
01:27

5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

001 P02

CNR 158 P2/2

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months and to 1,800 troops within four months,

2. Decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1995/465
8 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council.

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, and 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 4 June 1995 (S/1995/457),

Recalling also its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of certain offenses in Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation among all members of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Noting with great concern reports of military preparations and increasing incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime and underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda,

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

8/1995/465

English

Page 2

Calling again upon all States to act in accordance with recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura in February 1995,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

Reaffirming the need for a long-term solution to the refugee and related problems in the Great Lakes States, and welcoming, therefore, the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to carry out consultations on the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months of the adoption of this resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months;

2. Decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel;

3. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;

(c) Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining;

(d) Assist in the training of a national police force until such time as the Government of Rwanda has entered into bilateral arrangements for the establishment of other training programmes;

(e) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need;

4. Affirms that the restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of

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S/1995/465
English
Page 3

arms and matériel specified therein to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda;

5. Calls upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps, with the aim of putting an end to factors contributing to the destabilization of Rwanda, to ensure that arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaïre on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaïre, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to Rwanda; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution;

7. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the agreements made between them, in particular the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 or any subsequent agreement;

8. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

9. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system;

10. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 August 1995 and 9 October 1995 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

** CYCY **

1995-06-09 14:20 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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CNR-160 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

195 JUN -9, 16 1401

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 9 JUNE 1995
 NUMBER: 1925



UNITED NATIONS
 CIVIL OPERATIONS
 1995 JUN -9 A 10:21

SUBJECT: Draft resolution

Re our 1917 of 8 June, please find attached the text of the draft resolution as it now stands. The Security Council will resume its consideration of the draft this morning and it is expected that minor adjustments will be made to it, in particular paragraph 6. These adjustments, however, are not expected to affect operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 which define the future mandate and troop level of UNAMIR. It is anticipated that the Security Council will hold a formal meeting late this morning or early afternoon to adopt the draft resolution. We will advise you as soon as the Council has acted. Regards.

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1995/465
8 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, and 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

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Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasising the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

3/1995/465

English

Page 2

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Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

Reaffirming the need for a long-term solution to the refugee and related problems in the Great Lakes States, and welcoming, therefore, the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to carry out consultations on the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months of the adoption of this resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months;

2. Decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel;

3. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities, and, to that end, to support the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks throughout the country with military and police observers;

(c) Support the provision of humanitarian aid, and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining;

(d) Assist in the training of a national police force until such time as the Government of Rwanda has entered into bilateral arrangements for the establishment of other training programmes;

(e) Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel and premises of United Nations agencies, of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need;

4. Affirms that the restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of

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arms and matériel specified therein to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda;

5. Calls upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps, with the aim of putting an end to factors contributing to the destabilization of Rwanda, to ensure that arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaïre on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaïre, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to Rwanda; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution;

7. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the agreements made between them, in particular the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 or any subsequent agreement;

8. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

9. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system;

10. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 August 1995 and 9 October 1995 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

To: Ismael Diallo FRANCAIS
attention personnelle
De: Jocelyne

Texte du projet de résolution (S/1995/465)

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Rappelant toutes ses résolutions précédentes sur la situation au Rwanda, en particulier sa résolution 872 (1993) du 5 octobre 1993, par laquelle il a créé la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), et ses résolutions 912 (1994) du 21 avril 1994, 918 (1994) du 17 mai 1994, 925 (1994) du 8 juin 1994 et 965 (1994) du 30 novembre 1994, qui énoncent le mandat de la MINUAR,

Avant examiné le rapport du Secrétaire général sur la MINUAR en date du 4 juin 1995 (S/1995/457),

Rappelant aussi sa résolution 955 (1994) du 8 novembre 1994, portant création du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda, et sa résolution 978 (1995) du 27 février 1995, concernant la nécessité d'arrêter les personnes soupçonnées de certains crimes au Rwanda,

Soulignant qu'il importe de parvenir à une réconciliation authentique de tous les membres de la société rwandaise dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha,

Prenant note avec une vive préoccupation d'informations selon lesquelles des éléments de l'ancien régime mèneraient des préparatifs militaires et feraient des incursions de plus en plus fréquentes au Rwanda et soulignant la nécessité de prendre des mesures efficaces pour que les Rwandais se trouvant actuellement dans des pays voisins, y compris ceux qui sont dans des camps, n'entreprennent pas d'activités militaires destinées à déstabiliser le Rwanda et ne reçoivent pas d'armements, étant donné qu'il est fort probable que ces armements seraient destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda,

Soulignant que des efforts accrus sont indispensables pour aider le Gouvernement rwandais à instaurer un climat de stabilité et de confiance propre à faciliter le retour des réfugiés rwandais se trouvant dans des pays voisins,

Soulignant aussi qu'il est nécessaire d'accélérer le versement de l'aide internationale pour le relèvement et la reconstruction du Rwanda,

Demandant de nouveau à tous les États d'appliquer les recommandations adoptées par la Conférence régionale sur l'assistance aux réfugiés, rapatriés et personnes déplacées dans la région des Grands Lacs, tenue à Bujumbura en février 1995,

Mesurant l'utilité du concours que les spécialistes des droits de l'homme déployés au Rwanda par le Haut Commissaire aux droits de l'homme ont apporté en vue de l'amélioration de la situation générale,

Considérant qu'il incombe au Gouvernement rwandais d'assurer la protection et la sécurité de l'ensemble du personnel de la MINUAR et des autres membres du personnel international servant au Rwanda,

Réaffirmant qu'il est nécessaire de régler à long terme les problèmes de réfugiés et problèmes connexes dans les États des Grands Lacs et notant avec satisfaction, par conséquent, que le Secrétaire général a l'intention de nommer un Envoyé spécial chargé de procéder à des consultations concernant la préparation et la convocation, dans les plus brefs délais, de la Conférence régionale sur la sécurité, la stabilité et le développement,

1. Décide de proroger le mandat de la MINUAR jusqu'au 8 décembre 1995 et autorise une réduction des effectifs, qui seront ramenés à 2 330 soldats trois mois après l'adoption de la présente résolution et à 1 800 soldats un mois plus tard;

2. Décide de maintenir à son niveau actuel l'effectif des observateurs militaires et du personnel de la police civile;

3. Décide, compte tenu de la situation actuelle au Rwanda, de modifier le mandat de la MINUAR en lui assignant les fonctions suivantes :

a) User de ses bons offices pour faciliter la réconciliation nationale dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;

b) Aider le Gouvernement rwandais à faciliter le retour librement consenti des réfugiés, en toute sécurité, ainsi que leur réinsertion dans leur milieu d'origine, et, à cette fin, appuyer les efforts faits par le Gouvernement rwandais pour instaurer un climat de stabilité et de confiance, grâce à des activités de surveillance menées dans l'ensemble du pays par des observateurs militaires et des observateurs de police;

c) Faciliter l'aide humanitaire, ainsi que la fourniture d'une assistance et de services spécialisés en matière de génie civil, de logistique, de santé publique et de déminage;

d) Aider à l'instruction d'une force de police nationale jusqu'à ce que le Gouvernement rwandais conclue des arrangements bilatéraux en vue de la mise en place d'autres programmes d'instruction;

e) Contribuer à assurer la sécurité, au Rwanda, du personnel et des locaux des organismes des Nations Unies, du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda, notamment en assurant en permanence la protection du Bureau du Procureur, ainsi que des spécialistes des droits de l'homme, et contribuer également, si besoin est, à assurer la sécurité des organismes humanitaires;

4. Souligne que les restrictions imposées par la résolution 918 (1994) en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies s'appliquent à la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels qui y sont spécifiés à des personnes se trouvant dans des États voisins, si ces armements ou ces matériels sont destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda;

5. Demande aux États voisins du Rwanda, de façon à éliminer des facteurs contribuant à la déstabilisation de ce pays, de prendre des mesures pour veiller à ce que des armements et des matériels ne soient pas fournis aux camps de réfugiés rwandais se trouvant sur leur territoire;

✓ 6. Prie le Secrétaire général de tenir des consultations avec les gouvernements de pays voisins concernant la possibilité de déployer des observateurs militaires des Nations Unies, et de consulter en priorité le Gouvernement zairois concernant le déploiement d'observateurs, y compris dans les aéroports situés dans l'est du Zaïre, afin de contrôler la vente ou la livraison d'armements et de matériels connexes au Rwanda; prie aussi le Secrétaire général de lui faire rapport sur cette question un mois au plus tard après l'adoption de la présente résolution;

7. Prend note de la coopération existant entre le Gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR aux fins de l'accomplissement de son mandat, et prie instamment le Gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR de continuer à mettre en oeuvre les accords conclus entre eux, en particulier l'accord sur le statut de la Mission, en date du 5 novembre 1993, et de mettre en oeuvre tout accord qu'ils pourraient conclure ultérieurement;

8. Rend hommage aux États, aux organismes des Nations Unies et aux organisations non gouvernementales qui ont fourni une aide humanitaire aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées qui étaient dans le besoin, les encourage à persévérer et demande au Gouvernement rwandais de continuer à faciliter l'acheminement et la distribution des secours;

9. Demande aux États et aux organismes donateurs d'honorer l'engagement qu'ils ont pris d'apporter une aide au relèvement du Rwanda, d'accroître l'aide qu'ils apportent déjà à cette fin et, en particulier, de favoriser la mise en place à bref délai et le fonctionnement efficace du Tribunal international ainsi que le rétablissement de l'appareil judiciaire rwandais;

10. Encourage le Secrétaire général et son Représentant spécial à continuer de coordonner les activités des Nations Unies au Rwanda, dont celles des organisations et organismes qui s'occupent de questions humanitaires et de développement, ainsi que celles des spécialistes des droits de l'homme;

11. Prie le Secrétaire général de lui présenter d'ici au 9 août 1995, puis le 9 octobre 1995 au plus tard, un rapport sur la manière dont la MINUAR s'acquitte de son mandat, sur la situation humanitaire au Rwanda et sur les progrès réalisés en ce qui concerne le rapatriement des réfugiés;

12. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.

5-06-09 01:27 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

001 P03

CNR 159 P1/5

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 8 JUNE 1995
NUMBER: 1918

SUBJECT: Security Council consultations

Please find attached for your information minutes of the
Security Council consultations of 7 June. Best regards.

UNAMIR
15 JUN - 9 17 03 521
UNATIONS
CODE OPERATIONS
15 JUN - 8 P 9 30

CNR 159 P2/5

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Wednesday, 7 June 1995

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

Rwanda

Commenting on the report of the Secretary-General (S/1995/457), delegations acknowledged recent improvements in the situation on the ground and recognized the Rwandan Government's ability to control its territory; however, they highlighted a number of concerns raised in the report, such as little progress in national reconciliation, overcrowded prisons, lack of an effective judicial system, militarization of the border refugee camps and cross-border infiltration. Delegations agreed with the need to increase assistance to the Rwandan justice system and the International Tribunal, to promote the safe return of refugees and to encourage the international community to disburse funds for the rehabilitation of Rwanda's institutions.

In terms of specific issues, Nigeria, Czech Republic, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States expressed concern with the state of cooperation between UNAMIR and the Government. Indonesia and Botswana raised the prospect of reconsidering the UN arms embargo to enable the Rwandan Government to provide for the country's security. The United States underlined that the draft resolution should make clear that the arms embargo also applied to those Rwandese in neighbouring countries who were engaged in military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda.

Nigeria, Botswana, Honduras, Oman, Indonesia, Italy, Russian Federation and Argentina stressed the importance of regional efforts to promote security, particularly through the OAU; several of these delegations cited the importance of convening the Regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development. Argentina supported the need to reactivate the Bujumbura Declaration of February 1995.

On the restructured mandate, members supported the Secretary-General's recommendations regarding (1) tasks specifically required to sustain UNAMIR, including the protection of UN premises, the International Tribunal personnel and those of UN agencies, and (2) tasks aimed at assisting the Rwandan Government in confidence-building and in the promotion of a climate conducive to stability and to the return of refugees and IDPs. Supporting the report's recommendation to extend the mandate for six months, delegations noted the differences between the Government and the Secretary-General on the number of UNAMIR troops required to implement the mandate. They agreed to await the outcome of the Secretary-General's discussions with a delegation sent by the Government since UNAMIR's Chapter VI mandate necessitated the consent of the Government. In this

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context, China and Germany underlined that the decision on the mandate would have to take into consideration the views of the Kigali authorities.

Responding to the SRSG's recommendations on the border camps, made during informal consultations of 5 June, the United States indicated that her Government had approached the Zairian authorities to propose that small teams of 3-4 observers be positioned at airfields in eastern Zaire; it would be useful to authorize UNAMIR to place observers in eastern Zaire to monitor possible arms shipments and military activities. She hoped that language could be found, in the draft resolution, to allow monitors into such airfields and other locations in eastern Zaire where military activities were alleged to occur "at the discretion of the force commander and with the consent" of the Government of Zaire. France suggested that "special measures" could be taken in this regard, such as the ad hoc deployment of civilian observers in sensitive border areas and airports in all countries bordering Rwanda. Nigeria supported the view of the SRSG that the refugee camps should be moved away from Rwanda's borders; this would still not separate the "killers" from the true refugees and would not change the situation on weapons in the camps. Indonesia considered it essential for the Council, in close cooperation with Rwanda's neighbours, to intensify its efforts in establishing a monitoring mechanism to avoid further violations of arms deliveries to elements of the former Government. The Czech Republic noted that it would be useful, in the draft resolution, to appeal to neighbouring countries to take steps to prevent incursions and the arming of the camps.

Rwanda, commenting on specific paragraphs in the report, noted that on political aspects, it did not indicate the Government's efforts to facilitate the return of refugees at a time when other countries were trying to arm those refugees. On the overcrowded jails, he maintained that one could not call for better conditions in prisons when the justice system needed to be developed. On security, he stated that undisciplined UNAMIR soldiers were involved in acts unacceptable to the Government; the Government had asked the Secretariat to work on ways to improve this situation, but there appeared to be a tendency to defend UNAMIR and its troops.

On para. 10 of the report regarding the Kibeho incident, Rwanda stated that if the last sentence could be relocated, the meaning of the entire paragraph would change. He reiterated that the Kibeho massacres had begun within the camp, leading the population to break through the line of RPA guards. On the Independent Commission of Inquiry, he pointed out that the Government had already set up its national commission and had "shouldered its responsibility". On para. 49 regarding financial aspects, he invited DPKO to analyze what would be the "impact on UNAMIR" if half of its budget were given to the Government. He

also maintained that several points were unanswered in the report. Despite Ms. Ogata's explanations, he wished to have more information on the militarization of the refugee camps. The Government must shoulder its responsibilities throughout Rwandan territory, since confidence in the country would not exist as long as there was an "intermediary" or a "mentality of tutors". Concerning the situation within and outside Rwanda, he stated that NGOs and journalists should not take "initiatives" beyond the mandate of the Council.

After delegations had made their interventions, the President announced his intention to fax a draft resolution on the renewal of the UNAMIR mandate this afternoon to members. He hoped that on 8 June the draft could be discussed with a view to reaching agreement on 9 June, the expiration of the UNAMIR mandate. Responding to several points voiced by members, Special Representative Khan, referring to the militarization of the refugee camps, clarified that he did not feel that there was encouragement or acquiescence from the Zairian nor Tanzanian governments. On the contrary, both governments had indicated a need for assistance to ameliorate this problem. Turning to the camps themselves, Mr. Khan stated that arms sales and military training were occurring in primarily military camps not covered by UNHCR.

On the idea of deploying UN monitors to the camps as well as the airports of Zaire, Mr. Khan felt the Council should take such a step, although UNAMIR could probably not incorporate this endeavour into its activities. Perhaps the monitoring of the camps could occur within another UN operation, such as the UNAMUR operation on the Rwandan/Ugandan border, due to the sensitivities of the Zairian authorities. On the consultations to reach an agreement on the number of UNAMIR troops, Mr. Khan said that while he supported the Rwandan Government's proposal on the total number, he felt that the four support units -- medical, engineering, logistics and communications -- should be brought in because these were "part and parcel" of UN efforts to promote confidence-building in the country.

Rwanda, commenting on the border camps, maintained that UNHCR was not monitoring former Government soldiers in the UN camps; there were also close relations between former RGF soldiers in the UN camps and those in the other camps. He noted that despite its denials, the Zairian Government was hosting camps that were not allowed to be monitored by UNHCR; that was why his delegation had asked the Secretariat to provide information on these separate camps. He continued to hope that the Secretariat would take his request seriously, as to date only NGOs were providing information. The President, referring to his conversation with Ms. Ogata yesterday, recalled that the High Commissioner had stated that the rearming of refugees was not related to the UNHCR camps; the problem was with smaller camps

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outside of UNHCR's responsibility. The President recalled that Ms. Ogata had underlined the need for the reactivation of the Bujumbura Declaration in this context.

1995-06-09

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN/AIME, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 24 APRIL 1995
NO.: MIR
SUBJECT: THE KIBEHO DISASTER
NO OF PAGES: 6

1. In response to the request in your code cable no. 1292, of 23 April, I am forwarding below a report and assessment of the recent Kibeho disaster.

2. The background

Last December 28, UNAMIR and the agencies, in cooperation with the Rwandese Government, launched Opération Retour to encourage and expedite the voluntary return home of displaced persons estimated then at about 300,000 in several IDP camps in southwestern Rwanda. By the time Opération Retour ground to a halt in early February following the RPA attack at the Busanze IDP camp during which about twelve displaced persons were killed, about 40,000 IDPs had voluntarily returned to their home communes. Since then, UNAMIR, the Agencies and the Rwandese Government, operating jointly in the Integrated Operation Centre (IOC), had attempted to formulate an agreed action plan to persuade the estimated 250,000 IDPs remaining in the camps to return home voluntarily. Kibeho, with over 100,000 IDPs, was the largest camp, followed by Ndaga (40,000), Kamana (25,000) and Munini (15,000).

3. It has long been evident that the RPA was anxious to close down these IDP camps as it regarded them as hot-beds of armed opposition and de-stabilization. The Government was also anxious to have the camps vacated to assume full sovereignty over its national territory.

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4. In order to reign in attempts by RPA to close down the camps forcibly, the IOC prepared a joint paper in favour of a voluntary process in which the following broad elements were discussed:

- (a) An intensive information campaign would be mounted to assure IDPs that their rights would be protected and they would be treated fairly upon their voluntary return. These assurances were to be given at a high level.
- (b) Conditions would be prepared in the communes to receive the returning IDPs. This would require humanitarian assistance, housing and administrative arrangements. The United Nations had earmarked part of its Trust Fund resources for this purpose.
- (c) An operation would be launched to arrest the alleged criminals who were expected to be found in fairly large numbers in the camps.

5. While items (a) & (b) had been discussed in detail and agreed in principle, modalities of (c) were not finalized. Nor was the date for the launching of the operation agreed. Moreover, the Rwandese Government's formal approval for the IOC's plan of action had not been given. I had, in my meeting with Rwandese leaders strongly urged the Government to accord its approval to the proposal so that a joint, well co-ordinated operation could be launched in a proper manner. No such approval was forthcoming. Instead, on Tuesday 18 April, the RPA launched an operation, without prior consultation with us and it appears not even with its own civilian agencies, to close the IDP camps.

The developments

6. On 16 April before dawn, the RPA surrounded the 4 larger camps, namely Kibeho (100,000), Ndaga (45,000), Kamana (25,000) and Munini (15,000). They fired shots in the air and called on the IDPs to gather in a central area. By far the most critical site was Kibeho with the largest population of IDPs who were huddled into a small area. The RPA then sought UN assistance to transport these people to their communes. These developments were reported in my code cable no. 1379 dated 20 April and for the sake of brevity I shall not repeat them in this report.

7. By Friday 21 April, there were danger signals appearing that the situation could degenerate into a wider crisis. These were discussed with the Vice-President (my code cable no. 1415 refers) and could be summarized as follows:

- (a) There was danger of cholera in Kibeho. The Government therefore needed to permit more people to walk-home (rather than wait for vehicles which were hampered by rains and muddy roads to reach the camp) in order to relieve pressure.

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- (b) The Government should allow cooked food in the camps and the distribution of water.
- (c) Security should be provided in the communes for returning IDPs.
- (d) Permission should be granted for agency representatives to enter the camps.

8. Despite our reservations to the manner in which the camps were being closed and due to the fact that we were faced with a massive humanitarian problem, UNAMIR and the UN Agencies decided to help alleviate the problem by providing humanitarian aid to the IDPs and placing over 80 vehicles at the disposal of the Government to transport IDPs back to their communes.

9. On Saturday 22 April, I telephoned Gen. Kagame at 9 am to inform him that the situation in Kibeho was desperate and that action to ease the pressure needed to be taken. He agreed with my recommendations and sent his Chief of Staff to my office at 12 noon. Gen. Tousignant and I jointly met the Chief of Staff and we agreed to take steps to ease tension (based on para. 7 (a)-(d) above). Regrettably, while we were discussing the issue, the first attempt by IDPs to break-out of the RPA cordon was taking place in Kibeho. In a sense, remedial measures were already too late. Thereafter, as the crisis escalated, no member of the Government leadership was available.

10. The crisis took the following form:

- (a) At 11.30 am on Saturday, 22 April, there was an attempted break-out by a crowd of IDPs from the RPA cordon. While RPA fired to control it, similar break-outs were attempted in other sectors resulting in several breaches of the cordon through which a stampede began. This led to chaos in which thousands attempted to escape. RPA fired guns, machine guns and grenades to contain the mêlée. Lives were lost through the firing, some by the stampede. There was tension and pandemonium for about 3 hours after which relative calm was restored by 2 pm. The dead and wounded were attended by UNAMIR forces deployed in the Kibeho camp, i.e. Zambatt (2 companies) and Ausmed (1 company).
- (b) At 5 pm later on the same day, another surge took place in order to break-out of the cordon. This effort was more successful than the morning attempt with the result that thousands again began to flee. This time RPA's response was more ferocious and a large number were killed by firing. Some IDPs were bayoneted to death. Some soldiers lost their discipline and engaged in indiscriminate killing and looting.
- (c) As regards the Government's claim that its forces had been provoked, there have long been strong indications that the IDP camps in Kibeho, Ndaga, etc., had interahamwe desperadoes in them. The RPA subsequently claimed that their soldiers had been fired upon. This is possible as the hard-core

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interahamwe suspected of being in the camps were expected to have some arms. On two nights running before Saturday's crisis, these armed elements who are believed to be supporters of the former government forces, had intimidated the civilian IDP population by killing or wounding with machetes those who had shown a desire to leave. Some of these intimidators had been arrested by Zambatt.

- (d) By nightfall, Kibeho camp emptied on its own with the flight of the IDPs either towards Butare (20,000) or to their communes (where they have been given a hostile reception by the inhabitants) or towards the borders which have been closed. The majority would attempt to scatter and live off the land as best they can, including through banditry. Those that reach Butare and our overnight relief centres are being given humanitarian aid and transport to their communes. Initially (on Saturday 21 April) the estimated deaths were reckoned at over 4,000. The following day after FC Gen. Tousignant's visit to Kibeho and a carefully organized count on scientific lines, the estimate was reduced to 1,800-2,000.
- (e) About 2,000 IDPs, probably hard-core, militant elements, have remained in Kibeho, holed-up in the medical centre. They are likely to be armed. They refuse to leave despite threats by RPA to blow up the building. We are advising restraint and normal procedure of arrest.
- (f) Of the remaining camps, there has been an incident at Kamana in which 5 people were killed but otherwise developments there have been peaceful. Ndaga and Kamana remain cordoned off while Munini has seen a voluntary closure with the "walk-home" of the IDPs. We are pressing the Government for these two camps to be closed gradually in an orderly fashion.
- (g) A major humanitarian operation is being launched from Butare by UNAMIR in co-ordination with the UN agencies and NGOs.

Assessment

11. The following is my assessment:

- (a) The killing at Kibeho camp was due to insensitivity by the RPA towards the IDPs who had been huddled together in impossible conditions for 4 days. There was mismanagement and a lack of compassion which led to the crisis. However, I believe it was the RPA's intention to close the camps in an orderly way, but the operation went horribly wrong.
- (b) The fact that, at the outset, RPA were careful not to cause casualties and not to destroy tents and other IDP belongings showed that the intention was to close down camps as peacefully as possible. Of course, knowing that hard-core militia elements were in the camps, the RPA may have anticipated some

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violence and killing. Gen. Kagame's willingness to relieve pressure by accepting my suggestions as also his immediate decision to send his Chief of Staff to work out details also indicated a desire for the operation to be completed smoothly. Nevertheless, having anticipated the possibility of violence, the RPA should have been better prepared to contain it and prevent the killing of unarmed civilians, including women and children.

- (c) The killing of about 2,000 IDPs occurred when tension in Kibeho became unbearable due to: (i) the lack of food, shelter, sanitation and water for 3 days; (ii) the lack of space and the slow thinning out from the Kibeho camp; and (iii) the intimidation, especially at nights, when the hard-core intimidators murdered and wounded, with machetes, those who had decided to leave. Proof that it was the inhuman conditions at Kibeho which led to the bread-out and subsequent killings is available in the fact that in the other three camps, where conditions were not so desperate, there has been a relatively peaceful closure.
- (d) The IDP closure was the first important initiative that the Rwandese Government and its Army (RPA) took without consulting UNAMIR since the Government was installed last July. All other major initiatives (e.g. take over of Sector 4, Opération Retour, Opération Hope, new currency notes, etc.) were taken in consultation and in cooperation with UNAMIR. They were all carried out successfully. I am sure that if consultations had taken place for this operation, the disaster could have been avoided. Nevertheless, I regard the operation to have been derailed through lack of sensitivity to conditions in Kibeho and to mismanagement.
- (e) The reason for the non-consultation by RPA with UNAMIR is the recent smear campaign that has been pursued, with the Government's acquiescence, against UNAMIR. Clearly, the predominating hard-line attitude of extremists elements within the Government and RPA have precluded consultation and cooperation with UNAMIR.
- (f) Despite absence of consultation and our reservation at the abrupt decision to close the camps, we have committed all our available resources at alleviating the humanitarian problem facing us in the camps and now in Butare stadium. This includes:
 - (i) vehicles
 - (ii) humanitarian relief, including food, water, medicare
 - (iii) repair of roads to the camps
 - (iv) retention of Zambatt and Ausmed in Kibeho to look after the IDPs, especially the wounded, as well as children, many of whom are now unaccompanied.

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- (g) Even after the crisis on Saturday, we have worked round the clock to provide medicare, humanitarian assistance and vehicle/helicopter help for the injured and wounded. MILOBs have been sent to the communes to which IDPs are returning, so as to help create a climate of confidence and conditions of security for the returnees. We are in regular contact with the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda with a view to finding effective ways and means of enhancing respect for the rights of all citizens, including IDPs and promoting security and confidence in the various communes and villages.
- (h) As regards the UN operation in Rwanda, we stand at the cross-roads. The Government can take this opportunity to reverse the tide of sponsored antagonism against us. Responsible Rwandese leaders, especially the President and the Vice-President, have expressed a desire to do so. Gen. Kagame specifically appreciated UNAMIR's role after RPA had moved into the camps. He agreed with the relief measures I had proposed. So, at the responsible level, there is recognition of our positive and constructive role. This crisis could therefore help bring us back to the path of cooperation. To do so would however require a clear lead from the top and throughout the State machinery. The leadership should not be saying positive things while the managers with whom we have to work on a daily basis are acting otherwise.
- (i) On the other hand, the crisis could send the Government in the other direction, pushing it to use UNAMIR as a scapegoat by criticizing it publicly for exacerbating the crisis. It could claim that UNAMIR forces did not cooperate, give negative advice to IDPs or exaggerated death-figures. I fear that this is the more likely trend.
- (j) In any event, UN would have to review its role in Rwanda in the coming weeks and would take into account the current context of the sovereign Government being incapable or unwilling to accept our advice and role as prescribed in our mandate. Are the resources (personnel and equipment) as well as the powers (Chapter VI of the Charter) given to UNAMIR adequate to cope with the challenges that remain, as illustrated by the Kibeho disaster? The mandate discussions should provide a particularly timely and appropriate opportunity for a full and detailed consideration of the Rwandese situation and of the role of the United Nations and the international community as a whole.

CNR 054 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE UNAMIR

95 MAR -7 04 26

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 6 MARCH 1995
NUMBER: UNAMIR 727
SUBJECT: Security Council Informal Consultations

Please find attached a note on the Security Council Informal Consultations on Burundi and Rwanda held today 6 March. The reports in English and French (S/1995/157, S/1995/163, S/1995/164) as well as the letter from the Burundi Permanent Representative have been faxed to you.

Best regards.

BRSG

CNR 054 P2/2

SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION CONSULTATIONS
ON BURUNDI AND RWANDA
6 March 1995

The Security Council held informal consultations today, 6 March to discuss the reports of the Security Council Mission to Rwanda and Burundi.

Burundi

Security Council Members had also before them a letter from the Burundi Permanent Mission in which he requested for time to enable his Government to study the report before the Council commented on the conclusions and recommendations in the report.

The Czech Republic, Botswana, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Honduras made statements in which they all emphasized the urgency of the situation in Burundi and the need for the Council to discuss as soon as possible the report of its Mission to Burundi and decide which recommendations to implement. Indonesia said that as the Chairman of the caucus of the Non-Aligned Members in the Council it would convene a meeting of the caucus tomorrow 7 March at which the Permanent Representative of Burundi would be invited to exchange views with the Members of the caucus. At the suggestion of China, as the President of the Council for the month of March, it was decided to postpone the discussion of the report on Burundi to Wednesday, 8 March.

Rwanda

The Czech Republic, Botswana, Rwanda, Oman, Argentina, France, and Italy made statements on the report of the Council Mission to Rwanda. There was general agreement that the Mission visited Rwanda since it was within the region and therefore no action was required on its report apart from the Council taking note of it. Members highlighted a number of issues raised in the report. Rwanda said that the gendarmerie which had been trained by UNAMIR was desperately in need of equipment and other material in order to perform their work; appealed for economic assistance to enable it to create conditions conducive for the return of refugees; complained that many Human Rights Monitors being sent to Rwanda were without any experience and needed training; reiterated its wish to have had the seat of the International Tribunal in Rwanda but however pledged its cooperation with the Tribunal; and stated, without amplifying, that rules of conduct agreed between the Rwandese Government and UNAMIR should be respected. France said that more French speaking judges should be sent to Rwanda to assist it in rehabilitating its local courts. Oman requested that UNAMIR radio should also use Swahili since many refugees in the camps speak the language.

Leonard T. Kapungu
6 March 1995

Pl. look at
the comments
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DPKO SITUATION CENTRE REPORT

UNAMIR - RWANDA


Time: 0800 Hours NYT 25 May 1995

HIGHLIGHTS

- The General Assembly elected jurists from five countries to serve as judges on the international tribunal.
- Rwanda's Vice-President Kagame said he would not mind if UNAMIR left next month.
- Burundi's prime minister offered to meet Tutsi youths to seek a peaceful solution to recent violence.
- Violence in BUJUMBURA subsided during the night of 24 - 25 May.

POLITICAL

On 24 May, the General Assembly elected jurists from five countries to serve as judges on the international tribunal set up last November to try people accused of genocide and other human rights violations in Rwanda. The Assembly failed to elect a sixth judge to complete the panel and was to resume voting on 25 May. The five chosen so far are: Ms. Pillay, an acting judge of the South African supreme court; Mr. Kama, senior advocate-general in the court of cassation of DAKAR, Senegal; Mr. Khan, a Bangladeshi former judge and law minister; Mr. Ostrovsky, first deputy director of the Russian foreign ministry's legal department; and Mr. Sekule, a Tanzanian high court judge. (REUTER)



On 24 May, Rwanda's Vice-President Kagame said he would not mind if the UN abandoned its peace-keeping and diplomatic mission when its mandate expired next month. "On our part, even if UNAMIR was to wind up and leave that wouldn't be a problem," Kagame told reporters at ENTEBBE airport at the end of a visit to Uganda. (REUTER)

Burundi: On 24 May, Burundi's prime minister, seeking to end three days of paralysis of BUJUMBURA by a Tutsi youth militia, offered to meet those involved to seek a peaceful solution. "They are using the arrest of a youth leader to try and provoke confrontation," said SRSG Abdallah. (REUTER)

Violence in BUJUMBURA subsided during the night of 24 - 25 May after a conciliatory speech on the radio by the Prime Minister. The city was also quiet on 25 May. (AFP)

MILITARY

On 24 May, in Sector 4A, the RPA commander at RWAMIKO requested that all matters of security be handled by RPA forces along with UNAMIR. The request followed a recent deterioration in relations between Zambian battalion troops and RPA forces. The deterioration was due to RPA allegations that Zambian troops had misinformed the international commission of inquiry with regard to RPA activities in

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