

~~[S CONFIDENTIAL]~~

6 Confidential

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S1002

BOX 5

FILE 1

ACC. 1998/0292

NOTED

WILCOY
JL 11a
BY JMB COW 1 LTOA 1
BY DB.

WILCOY/7435.9/0

cc Distribution.

①


81 Oct 94

WILCOY/7435.9/0

1. The Joint Continental Commander, Lt Col L. Wilcoy will
be working with it to arrive on Tue 1 Nov 94 at 1100hrs.
The purpose is to meet with the J. Comd in forward for
initial discussion.

2. You are therefore requested to arrange reception.

3. Please acknowledge receipt.



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1. 1111 1111
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4. 1111 1111
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② Not
JL/FC
3 Nov 94

NOTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OG/11/B/A

PERMANENT MISSION OF MALAWI (212-599-5021)
FORCE COMMANDER
UNAMIR
KIGALI (212-963-3090)


05 December, 1994

FOD, DPKO NEW YORK -1-212-963-4879

RE-WITHDRAW FROM UNAMIR
MAJOR B. CHIKOKO (0399)

1. Please refer to our previous correspondences on the above subject. This officer who has been since withdrawn from Rwanda left his belonging in Rwanda when he had to be admitted in Nairobi Hospital. Could arrangements therefore be done to prepare for him a return airticket to Rwanda to allow him collect the belongings.
2. Your quick action on the matter will be highly appreciated.

for


O. N. D. NAMANGALE
Captain
Commander
MALAWI ARMY

Copy to :-

Defence Advisor
Malawi High Commission
NAIROBI
KENYA.

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TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS
UNAMIR
BUTARE

OPS 076/2

27 NOVEMBER, 1994

See Distribution:

MANPOWER REQUIREMENT
AT TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS BUTARE


1. When the Tactical Headquarters was established in Aug 94, its main objective has been collection, collation and rapid dissemination of information to UNAMIR HQ for effective planning.
2. In order to achieve the set objectives, the office was equipped with good and reliable communication sets and correspondingly good radio operators, although some of the equipments had been dismantled. Subsequently officers were drafted to the headquarters for effective operation.
3. The equipment in use are:
 - a. 2 x VHF radio sets, one on the FC's net, while the other is on Sector Comd's net.
 - b. 1 x radio on channels linked with Military Observers, UNCHR and Non Governmental Organisations.
 - c. 1 x INMARSAT.
4. The effective operation of above mentioned equipment were facilitated by about 21 Canadian operators. The strength is now reduced to 4 operators. For effective coverage, the equipment were manned for 24 hours daily. The same equipment are now manned by 4 operators. Obviously the result may not be the same.
5. Most of the officer pioneers of the Headquarters have been reassigned. The expectation is that the corresponding number of officers reassigned would replace them. Pertinent to say that 2 of the officers sent to Tac HQ now cannot communicate effectively in English language whereas the business of the office is conducted in English language. This makes their deployment to Tac HQ irrelevant since they cannot perform the functions they were here for.
6. Furthermore, it is now a fact that the Canadian signallers would be leaving the operational area early next year. In order not to create a vacuum, it is suggested that qualified signallers from other units should be seconded to this HQ to understudy the

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procedure so that the transitional period would be smooth, not only at Tac HQ but also in other sectors.

7. It is also suggested that officers who cannot be effectively employed here as a result of language difficulties should be recalled to Kigali for re-assignment.

8. Please, accept for consideration.


H. OSAE-ADDAE
Col
Chief Operations Officer

Distribution:

External:

Action:

DCOS (OPS)

Information:

FC ✓

DFC

DCOS (PLANS)



File No 5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

To: HAC (less enclosure)
MILOB GP HQ (less enclosure)

From: HQ UNAMIR

Info: TAC HQ (less enclosure)
DFC/COS/CMO
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G3 PLANS (less enclosure)

Date: 3 Nov 94


Subject: MONITORING OF LIVING CONDITIONS OF RETURNEES.

Reference: MILOB Team (Butare) report dated 21 Oct 94

1. The information provided in the Reference is particularly useful to the humanitarian effort. Additional data, such as that contained in the referenced report, is required for future operations. Accordingly, MILOB GP HQ, in consultation with HAC, is to develop a plan to extend this monitoring exercise throughout all Sectors.

2. Consolidated bi-weekly reports, commencing on 24 Nov 94, are to be submitted to HQ UNAMIR and HAC.

3. MILOB Team (Butare) is commended for its initiative.



G.C. Tousignant
MGen
FC

Enclosure: 1

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INTERIM REPORT ON MILOB MONITORING EXERCISE OF CONDITION OF
RETURNEES - MUYIRA COMMUNE

Introduction

1. In fulfillment of part of MILOB tasks, to assist displaced persons in returning to and settling down in their homes, the team in Butare embarked on an exercise to monitor conditions of returnees in their homes. The exercise started on 12 October 1994 in cooperation with the UNHCR who however withdrew after the first day. The exercise started with the Muyira Commune in Butare Prefecture and is intended to cover all the communes. The MILOB Team is also using the exercise to confirm ^{whether} ~~whether~~ returnees are actually going back to the DPC, and if so, at what rate.

2. The monitoring exercise in Muyira Commune lasted four days during which the MILOBs interviewed the locals. The interview took the form of asking the people how the security situation in their homes was, what their most serious problems were i.e. health, food, clothing, housing, farming etc. At the end of the first phase of the exercise, many things were brought to the fore.

Aim

3. The aim of this report is to give a brief account of the MILOB monitoring exercise of returnees in Muyira Commune and make recommendations.

Conduct of Exercise

4. The exercise started 12 October 1994 with MILOB using the list of returnees as registered by UNHCR in the DPC during Op Homeward. The team visited the homes of returnees, checking their living conditions and also cross-checking the returnees families against the lists. At the end of the first day out of 17 families registered for Muyira Secteur, 14 families were located. Three families that could not be located were said to be generally around. The exercise thereafter continued in Mukoma, Nyamiyaga and Munyinya Secteurs. Due to the large area to be covered and limitation in time, the exercise had to be reviewed after the first day. Random sampling is now done, rather than check family by family. The last Secteur, Munyinya was checked 20 October 1994, after which the exercise will continue in other communes.

5. Many problems were reported by the locals, the most acute which is common in all the Secteurs, being that of lack of hoes. As many as 4000 families require hoes to enable them to cultivate the land. Those that have hoes now are people who did not leave their

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homes and those who returned early enough to loot from other homes. The fear now is that if these hoes are not distributed in time people would be forced to eat the seeds given them. During the exercise, it was also discovered that the local staff of the NGOs responsible for distribution of cooking oil sold them to the locals rather than give them freely. A few people confessed to buying the cartons at 2000 FRW per carton of six gallons. A computation carried out by the MILOB Team and the Bourgemestre, showed that about 109 cartons of cooking oil, out of the stock brought for distribution could not be accounted for. Other problems identified include lack of medicines, food and building materials since many homes were destroyed.

6. It was also observed during the course of the exercise that contrary to general reports and impressions held, not very many people have returned to the DPC's or the refugee camps. Most of those who returned to the DPC are the early returnees, ie those who returned to their homes in late July and early August. In Munyina Secteur, the people reported that many of the early returnees were harassed by the Tutsis while some were killed. These prompted some to run back to the DPC and refugee camps thereby spreading the story of reprisals. This has generally stopped as many neighbours now live in peace.

Findings

7. The following findings were made:

- a. Local NGOs staff sell cooking oil instead of distributing it free;
- b. The people are hardly cultivating the land due to lack of hoes;
- c. About 4000 hoes will be required for the commune;
- d. Many people have no shelter and are therefore living in overcrowded homes where they are sheltered by friends and relatives;
- e. MSI and ICRC, during their food distribution refused to give to the new returnees who were not registered during the registration exercise conducted in September;
- f. Medical centres located at Nyamiyaga (SQ8490) and Busoro (SQ) are not adequate;

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- g. Some families still have relatives in the DPCs and refugees camps and would therefore want them brought back. Many families have been displaced and do not therefore know the whereabouts of their kin;
- h. Contrary to general belief, not very many returnees have fled back to the DPCs. Those that have fled are people who were caught up in the reprisals of July and August by the Tutsis. This has generally stopped; and
- i. The condition of most earth roads are bad. Many will be rendered impassable in the near future. Many wooden bridges also require repairs.

Conclusion

8. The monitoring exercise has enabled the team to identify many problems of the locals which were hitherto unknown. Cooking oil meant to be given out to the locals free is now being sold by the local staff of the NGOs. Many locals can not cultivate the land due to lack of hoes, thereby negating the objective of bringing people home to cultivate the land. Rural roads and bridges if not repaired will soon cut off many rural areas from the urban centres, thereby encouraging rural - urban migration.

Recommendation

9. It is recommended that:
- a. Monitoring exercise be encouraged in other areas with large numbers of returnees;
 - b. The allegation of sale of cooking oil be investigated by the NGOs concerned and those found responsible dismissed;
 - c. The present system of distribution of relief materials be reviewed. That is, hoes and seeds be issued out together so that people with seeds but without hoes are not tempted to eat the seeds;
 - d. Appropriate NGOs and UN agencies be encouraged to assist locals with building materials to enable them to rebuild their destroyed homes; and

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- e. Government be advised to encourage locals to repair their roads/bridges in view of lack of resources by the Government, otherwise, many rural areas will be cut-off from urban centres.



E. Essten
Major
Senior Team Leader
Butare

21 October 1994

4/4

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CRN-383

MIR-2258

UNAMIR[®] FORCE HQ
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
94 NOV -1 23 41

1 NOVEMBER 1994

TO: BARIL UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX: (212) 963-9070	FAX: 1-212-963-3090
SUBJECT: RPA RESTRICTIONS - USE OF APC	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THE COVER: TWO	

REFERENCES: A. TELECON TOUSIGNANT/BARIL 01 2100B NOV 94

1. AS A RESULT OF A RWANDAN FAMILY'S APPEAL TO AN OFF-DUTY MILOB FOR PROTECTION DUE TO RPA HARASSMENT, INTIMIDATION, VIOLENCE AND ALLEGED SHOOTING OF SMALL ARMS, D COS OPS UNAMIR DEPLOYED UNAMIR (KIGALI) RAPID REACTION FORCE (RRF). RRF SECTION (10 PERS) DEPLOYED TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION AND TO RESPOND TO THE CALL FOR HELP FROM THE UNMO. SINCE UNAMIR IS STILL AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF INDIA, AUSMED IS CURRENTLY TASKED TO PROVIDE RRF CAPABILITY IN THE CITY OF KIGALI. RRF DEPLOYMENT IS PLANNED AND ACHIEVED BY M113 APC. IN ACCORDANCE WITH RRF OP ORDER, AND INSTRUCTIONS FROM CO AUSMED, ONCE THE RRF ENCOUNTERED A ROAD BLOCK (AS ANTICIPATED) NEAR THE VICINITY OF THE INCIDENT, THE PLATOON COMD IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AND HIS CREW AS UN TROOPS AND GAVE THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF HIS PRESENCE. THE RPA DENIED ACCESS AND REFUSED TO LET HIM PROCEED. AFTER ABOUT ONE TO TWO MINUTES, THE RRF COMD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERED HIS APC TO ADVANCE IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH HIS MISSION AND LINK UP WITH THE MILOB WHO ORIGINATED THE CALL.

2. PRIOR TO MAKING CONTACT WITH THE MILOB AT THE SCENE, THE RRF WAS CONFRONTED BY ABOUT A PLATOON OF 35 RPA SOLDIERS WHO POINTED SMALL ARMS WEAPONS AND 3 RPG-7 ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AT THEM AND REFUSED THEM FURTHER MOVEMENT. ONLY AFTER 45 MINUTES OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE AUSMED AND RPA PLATOON COMMANDERS AND THE RPA AND UNAMIR LIAISON OFFICERS WAS THE SITUATION DEFUSED. FINALLY, THE AUSMED RRF WAS ALLOWED TO RETURN TO BARRACKS. EVEN THOUGH THE SITUATION WITH THE RWANDAN FAMILY WAS NEUTRALIZED THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF THE MILOB, AS A RESULT OF THE ACTIONS AT THE ROAD BLOCK AND THE RPA PLATOON, THE RRF NEVER ARRIVED AT THE INTENDED DESTINATION.

3. AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT, THE RPA LO CONTACTED D COS OPS

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SRSQ

FC

UNAMIR RIGHT AWAY TO LODGE A PROTEST WITH REGARD TO THE RRF MOVING THROUGH THE ROAD BLOCK. THIS SITUATION WAS DEFUSED TEMPORARILY BY STATING THAT THE RRF HAD INITIALLY STOPPED AT THE ROAD BLOCK AND ONLY HAD SUBSEQUENTLY PROCEEDED THROUGH ONCE THE DELAY BECAME UNACCEPTABLE. SINCE UNAMIR TECHNICALLY HAS ACCESS TO ALL AREAS OF RWANDA, THERE WAS NO VALID REASON FOR THE DENIAL OF ACCESS. EVEN THOUGH THE WIDER ACCESS IS ALWAYS ACKNOWLEDGED, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IS FREQUENTLY DIFFERENT

4. TODAY THE RPA LO INFORMED ME THAT RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE HAD PROHIBITED FURTHER MOVEMENT OF ALL UNAMIR APCS SINCE THEIR USE WAS CAUSING TOO MUCH DAMAGE TO THE ROADS. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT ALL AUSMED TRACKS AND PADS ARE IN EXCELLENT SHAPE AND THAT NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE ROADS CAN BE OBSERVED. THESE RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN IMPOSED BEFORE TO GHANBATT AND TUNBATT. IT IS BELIEVED HOWEVER THAT THE RPA IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR INABILITY TO STOP THE APCS WITHOUT DIRECT CONFRONTATION AND VIOLENCE/DESTRUCTION. AS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN MANY OF OUR SITREPS, UNAMIR HAS AND IS BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO CERTAIN AREAS OF THE COUNTRY AND HAS BEEN OCCASIONALLY DENIED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITH APCS. THUS FAR, MOST OF THESE INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED WHEN UNAMIR TROOPS HAVE BEEN IN SOFT SKIN VEHICLES. NOW THAT ONE OF THESE INCIDENTS HAS OCCURRED WITH AN ARMoured VEHICLE AT A TIME WHEN THE RPA HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DENY OUR PROGRESS; I BELIEVE THAT THEY REALIZE THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO RESTRICT US TO CERTAIN AREAS WHEN THEY FEEL IT IS CONVENIENT OR NECESSARY TO DO SO.

5. I AM SCHEDULED TO VISIT THE VICE-PRESIDENT/MINISTER OF DEFENCE WITH THE SRSG TOMORROW TO DISCUSS A RANGE OF ISSUES INCLUDING THOSE RELATED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS, ACCESS TO AREAS, UNRESTRICTED DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT, ETC. I WILL CONFIRM THE ISSUE OF USE OF UN APCS IN THE THEATRE IN GENERAL AND SPECIFICALLY IN KIGALI. HOWEVER, IF MY TROOPS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR MANDATE, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THEY ARE GIVEN UNRESTRICTED DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT IN RWANDA WITH RESPECT TO LOCATION, TIME OF DAY AND TYPE OF VEHICLE. OUR MOVEMENT CAN NOT BE CURTAILED IN ANY FORM OR MANNER. OUR VEHICLE FLEET IS INADEQUATE IN NUMBERS AS IT IS; LIMITING THE USE OF APC WOULD EVEN FURTHER HAMPER OUR ABILITY TO PATROL.

6. IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS FUTURE IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO UNAMIR'S FREEDOM OF ACCESS, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU ASSIST ME IN RESOLVING THIS ISSUE WITH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND ALSO PROVIDE ME WITH GUIDANCE AS TO HOW TO PROCEED WITH FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

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TAC HQ
BUTARE

/ NOVEMBER, 1994

Ops 006

(1)

See Distribution:

CONVENING ORDER-
BOARD OF OFFICERS
TO ASSESS AND ALLOCATE ACCOMMODATION
AT TAC HQ, BUTARE

GENERAL

1. A Board of Officers as composed below will assemble at a place and time convenient to the President to review the accommodation state at TAC HQ, Butare:

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------|---|------------------|
| a. | Maj Lidstone RH | - | President |
| b. | Maj Cooper-Glawu | - | Member |
| c. | Mr Rudolf Reimann | - | Member |
| d. | Capt Kweifio-Okae | - | Member/Secretary |

(2)
Noted
JLP/EC
3 Nov 94

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The Board will investigate the living accommodation state at TAC HQ, express opinions, present findings and make recommendations.

3. The Board shall establish the following facts:

- a. Number of living accommodations at TAC HQ.
- b. Number of present occupants.
- c. The daily military function of TAC HQ.
- d. The physical defence of the TAC HQ.
- e. Those whose immediate function must take place within TAC HQ compound should take priority over those whose function can be done outside the compound.
- f. Any other points that the Board may consider relevant.

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WITNESSES

4. The following personnel will appear before the Board to give evidence:


- a. Lt Singh K - Canadian Signal Rep, Butare
- b. Rep from MILOB Sector 3, Butare
- c. Rep from CIVPOL, Butare

OPINIONS/RECOMMENDATION

5. The Board will express opinions and recommendations as to who should be accommodated at TAC HQ immediately. Any future recommendations for office/living accommodation.

SUBMISSION OF REPORT

6. The Board will submit five (5) copies of Record of Proceedings to the COO by 4 Nov 94.


H OSAE-ADDAE
Col
COO

Distribution:

Internal:

Action:

Maj Lidstone RH
Maj Cooper-Glawu
Capt Kweifio-Okae
Lt Singh K
Mr Rudolf Reimann
Sector 3 MILOBS
CIVPOL

External:

Information:

FC, UNAMIR HQ
DFC, UNAMIR HQ
DCOS OPS, UNAMIR HQ,
OIC, DIV OF ADMIN, UNAMIR HQ