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ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

15 November 1961

A : Maj-Gen Iyassu Mengasha
De : Commander, UN Forces in the Congo
Objet : Attached

With reference to the attached cable from New York, would you please provide material for a reply to the part on the training and reorganization of the Congolese Armed Forces.

K. O'Brien
for. (Sean Mac Eoin) Lt-Gen

INCOMING CODE

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

To: LINNER, MACBOIN, LEO
From: BUNCHE, NEW YORK
Date: 14 November 1961
No. 8017.

Please prepare for inclusion in addendum 13 separate section covering available information on the Kindu incident and on developments to date in the training and reorganization of the Congolese armed forces.

Dist Dr. Linner.
Gen. MacBoin.

Rec

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File

Re handling in NY.

1073

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

10 October 1961

TO : Lt. General S. Mac Eoin
Force Commander


FROM : Maj. General Iyassu Mengesha

SUBJECT : ANC Training Policy

1. Referring to my memorandum of 30 September concerning the ANC Training Programme, I am compelled to raise the same subject again, because :
 - (a) As you know, I am back in the Congo since 20 September 1961 on a new assignment but have not yet started dealing with it.
 - (b) Maj. General Jacob G.L. is also here since 30 September and has taken over from me the duties of Deputy Force Commander.
 - (c) No directive has yet been given to me as to what UN policy the ANC Training Programme should be based, nor have I been officially introduced to the Congolese Government as Military Adviser.
 - (d) It appears to me unwise to start functioning in my new capacity without knowing the policy which should govern the ANC Training Assistance Programme of the UN.
2. One of the most important points to be seriously considered is the recruiting of staff officers and instructors. In this respect I would like to know whether the establishment suggested by Colonel Kjellgren has been approved or not.

.../...

3. As far as office space is concerned, I have already approached Mr. H. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer.
4. Although I perfectly understand that there are more immediate and pressing problems with which this Headquarters has to deal, I would like the above-mentioned points to be considered and a broad directive given, which would enable me at least to make a preliminary study of the problem.


Maj. General IYASSU MENGESHA

20 Oct 1961

ANC ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING MISSION1. Overall Coordination

| | | |
|---------------|--------------------|------|
| Maj Gen YASSU | Chief Director and | Eth |
| | Advisor ANC | |
| Col KJELLGREN | Deputy Director | Swed |
| Maj NORMANDIN | LO ANC GHQ | Can |
| Maj HASON | Assistant | Pak |
| Lt HELLEBERG | Assistant | Swed |
| WO PERSSON | Interpreter and | Swed |
| | Clerk | |
| | Secretary | |

2. Advisors Ministry of Defense and ANC GHQ(a) General Staff Duties and Organization

| | |
|----------------|--------|
| Maj BOUFFARD | 2) Can |
| Maj MUMTAZ ALI | 3) PAK |

(b) Operation and Training

| | |
|--------------|--------|
| Maj WOODCOCK | Can |
| Maj KUN | 3) Lib |
| Capt KOFFE | 3) Lib |

(c) Signals

| | |
|---------------|--------|
| Capt GAUTHIER | 2) Can |
| Lt MOTHERWAY | 3) Ir |

(d) Logistics and Personnel

| | |
|--------------|--------|
| Lt Col MADAN | 3) Ind |
|--------------|--------|

(e) EME

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Maj BEERING JENSEN | Dan |
|--------------------|-----|

(f) Medical

| | |
|-----------------|--------|
| Col NANDKEOLYAR | 3) Ind |
|-----------------|--------|

(g) Legal Matters

| | |
|------------------------------------|------|
| Lt Col Maj LINDEBLAD | Swed |
|------------------------------------|------|

3. Advisors Provincial HQs

(Stenleyville, Thysville, Luluabourg, Elisebethville)

4 Lt Cols, 4 Majs, 4 Cpts
requested from New_York4. Advisors ANC Units10 Majs, 10 Cpts
requested from New-York

5. Instructional and Administrative Staff
at Interim Officers Course KAMINA BASE

Requested from New-York: 1 Lt Col, 4 Maj, 9 Cpts or Lts, 15 Sgts.
 8 Offrs or Civs to teach academic
 Subjects.

- (a) School Commandant (b) Advisor
 Col 1) Congo Lt Col

(c) Course Administration Officer and Staff

Maj KEOGH 3) 4) Adm Offr Ir
 Capt MOSTELLO 4) Asst Adm Offr Ir
 1 Sgt Clerk 3) 4)
 1 Clerk 3) 4)
 1 Typist 1)

Personnel for messing and accommodation.

(d) Officer incharge of instructional administration and Staff

Capt 1)
 One Junior Congolese Officer 1)
 One Sgt Clerk 1)
 One Clerk 1)
 One Typist 1)
 Interpreter 1)

(e) Officer Instructors
and Class Leaders

Maj 1)
 Maj 1)
 Capt 1)
 Capt 1)

Officer Instructors in
Staff and Adm work

Capt TORNERHJELM ? Swed
 Capt ?
 2 Junior Congo Offrs 1) Congo

(g) Academic Teachers

1 Headmaster 1)
 3 Teachers French 1)
 1 Teacher Math 1)
 1 Teacher Geo 1)
 1 Teacher Hist 1)
 1 Teacher Citizenship 1)

(h) Drill and Weapon Instructors

8 Junior Congolese Officers
 1) Congo
 4 UN WOs or NCO 1)

(i) Physical Training
Instructors

WO 1)
 1 NCO 1)
 1 NCO 1)

- I) NOT yet arrived
- 2) Leaving Shortly
- 3) NOT French Speaking
- 4) From Ir Unit at KAMINA BASE.

NOTE :

- (a) Personnel serving within UN contingents has to be ordered to serve as advisors or instructors.
- (b) Some more interpreters might be required.

COL.

(A . KJELLGREN)

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Bunche
From : Linner, Mac Eoin
Date : 21 Oct 61
No : A-2454

Further to your 7280 and our A 2425, Mac Eoin has given IYASSU a brief on ANC reorganisation and training. It is intended that this brief should form the basis of initial discussions with Adoula and Mobutu. We shall be grateful for your comments on this brief which we regard as being provisional only and providing a general outline of initial UN policy with regard to ANC training. The following are the terms of the brief.

QUOTE:

A number of problems at high level will need to be solved before UN can embark on any detailed and progressive plan of military assistance to the Congolese Army. All of these problems must be directly related to the role of the Congolese Army as stated by the Central Government.

1. The overall integration of the Mobutu and Lundulla ANC and the Katangese Gendarmerie is something which needs to be examined at an early stage. This problem is closely related to the Congolese General HQ structure. I feel that their GHQ is in need of some overhaul, particularly with a view to the ultimate integration referred to above.
2. The territorial military sub-division of the Congo also requires study. This again is related to the problem outlined in para 1, but it is a matter on which an early decision should be made.
3. The actual size of the army which the Central Government needs and can afford to maintain should be determined at least in an approximate fashion as early as possible.
4. The constitution of this force will need careful examination, for example how many infantry Bns, artillery batteries, armoured units, engineer units etc., should go to make up this force.

There will also be the matter of the other supporting and supply echelons such as signals, medical, supply and transport, ordnance etc. In addition, some instructional establishments will be necessary and these will have to be kept in mind when an effort is being made to determine the overall strength of the army. It would appear to be premature at this stage to concern ourselves unduly with the problems of the formation of a small airforce, and perhaps a small naval group for use at Mbandaka for example.

5. It is likely that the ultimate strength of the Congolese Army will be much below what it is now. The disbandment of very big numbers of soldiers would be likely to have many serious effects in the Congo. It is suggested therefore that consideration be given to the formation of construction corps units which could absorb those it may be found necessary to demobilise from the army proper.

6. The normal practice is to have the chief of State, i.e., the President in this case, act as Commander in Chief of the army of the Country. The military head of the General Staff is normally referred to as the Chief of Staff. It is likely in the situation obtaining here that some clarification of present titles will be necessary.

7. (a) On the matter of immediate military assistance to the Congolese army, certain steps can be taken simultaneously with any discussions which will be necessary on the foregoing issues. For example, we should proceed at once with the establishment of an ~~officer's~~ School at Kamina as already planned. I have in my possession a number of documents which will brief you in detail on this problem.

(b) The setting up of a school for NCOs at Kamina should also receive early attention.

NOTE. It is understood of course that the Commanders or Heads of these Schools would be Congolese officers advised and assisted by officers provided by UN.

(c) We should immediately assign a number of officers to the present ANC GHQ who would advise and help in the matter of the reorganisation of that HQ. It must be understood that an assignment such as this would be essentially for the purpose of giving advice.

(d) Similarly, a number of officers can be assigned to the other major HQ, for example Thysville, Stanleyville, Eville. Their function would be the same as envisaged for those assigned to GHQ.

- (e) We should assign two or three officers to some units of Bn and equivalent strength. This would include the assignment of some officers to recruit training installations and any other instructional establishments already functioning.

Note: The vast bulk of the officers required for the foregoing attachments will of course have to be specially recruited because of the language problem. Further details on this idea can be obtained by reference to Sec-Gen's 5651 and our A-1689.

- (f) In addition to the foregoing assistance, we should be able to give considerable help in the technical field, such as for example maintenance of transport, maintenance of radio and signal equipment, assistance in the organisation of the ANC medical units, engineer units etc. In this group we should be in a position to find a number of technical officers and other ranks who could be assigned to this work at short notice.

8. Officers assigned to work with the ANC, as stated earlier, should be assigned by their home countries to the Congolese Army for a period of approx two years. They should live and work with the echelons or units to which they are assigned as distinct from operating from a UN HQ.

All of the foregoing planning should be on a short-term experimental basis, say for a 3 year period, when the whole situation should be examined anew and necessary adjustments made. UNQUOTE

During earlier discussions with Mobutu on ANC training, Luluabourg was considered as an alternative to Kamina. The facilities at Luluabourg are quite good and Mobutu would be satisfied with this location. We have also considered Kitona which has excellent training facilities.

In order to commence implementation of the ideas contained in this brief, it is necessary that officers be recruited as early as possible for this specific work. Generally speaking, officers of different nationalities suitable as advisers and instructors and at present serving ONUC are disinclined to accept assignments as such. The reason, which appears to be common, is that they do not consider the present financial terms adequate to enable them to participate in work of this kind without serious financial losses to themselves. In order to attract suitable officers this matter will have to be given some consideration. Apart from the officers requested in our A-1689 for the purpose of staffing an ANC Officers' School, we request that ~~four~~ four Lt-Colonels, four Majors and four Captains be recruited for employment with the main ANC HQ other than the HQ at Leo, i.e. Thysville, Stanleyville, Eville and Luluabourg. This estimate is based on assigning one Lt-Col, one major and one captain to each of the HQ referred to. It is estimated that there is at present a total of thirty Bns or equivalent units in the Congo, including the Katangese gendarmerie. There are also two field artillery batteries, two anti-aircraft batteries and some small armoured units. It is

not proposed that we should assign officers initially to all of these units, but a group of say ten majors and ten captains should be provided initially for assignment to selected units on an experimental basis. Further assignments could be effected when the problem has been more fully examined. This brings the total request in this cable to four Lt-Colonels, fourteen majors and fourteen captains. Of these one Major and one captain should be artillery officers, one major and one captain armoured officers, one major and one captain signal officers, one major and one captain maintenance (EME) officers.

It will be necessary to assign some NCOs to ANC units at a later stage. This problem is being examined and we shall cable you separately concerning it. There will be some language difficulties in this case as so many of the other ranks of the ANC and Gendarmerie speak only swaheli or lingala for example.

OUTGOING CODE ~~B~~ABLE

To : Sec Gen
From : ~~KHIART~~^{Miner}, MacEOin
Date :
No :

Your 565~~1~~ and our A-1689 refer.

1. We appreciate the urgent need to provide immediate assistance for reorganising and training of the Congolese Army. We are not in a position to provide many officers from our immediate resources in Congo. However, a small planning team of approximately 5 officers for overall coordination purposes is organised. This team is also the staff of the Chief Military Advisor to the Congolese Government, General IYASSU. Some officers of the various Branches of the ONUC Military Headquarters will be able to work with the ANC Headquarters in Leopoldville in an effort to examine the many problems and to help by discussing the problems with the officers of the corresponding Branches of the ANC.
2. We are in a position to provide some advice in the technical fields such as maintenance of transport, radio and signal equipment and medical aid.
2. With regards to the problem^s at a higher level, these will have to be the result of discussions with the Minister of Defence and ANC Headquarters. These problems are firstly the size of the military force which is possible for the Congo to maintain. This first matter will have to be related to :-

...2/-

- (a) the present strength of the ANC.
- (b) the ^{role}~~purpose~~ envisaged for the ANC.
- (c) the amount of money which can be made available for the maintenance of a military force in the Congo.

This first estimate should be on the basis of a short term experiment, say ~~three~~ ^{one} to ~~five~~ ^{two} years. Secondly, the constitution of the force will have to be established; for example, the number of infantry brigades or battalions, the number and types of artillery units and the setting up of all the other ancillary corps such as engineers, signals, medical, and the necessary instructional establishments. The territorial organisation or military sub-divisions of the Congo will have to be determined. It is not clear yet what this is likely to be, but it may resolve itself into four command areas :

Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Elisabethville and Luluabourg.

3. We should provide assistance in the following ways :__

- (a) to assign as outline above, a team of officers to examine the structure and problems at ANC HQ ;
- (b) to have officers specially trained to investigate the problems and to provide assistance at the various lower levels of HQ and in the different corps, e.g signals, transport , medical etc.
- (c) the assignment of a number of officers to each of the major military HQ, other than army HQ; for example, Lt-Col, a Maj and a Captain might be assigned to each brigade or groupment HQ.
- (d) the assignment of one or two officers , say a Major and a Captain, to some battalions and units of equivalent size such as training depots ;
- (e) the provision of schools such as that already referred to in our A-1689 at KAMINA for officers and NCOs;
- (f) a detachment of a company of ANC for example to a UN contingent battalion for a training period of eight

to ten weeks. In this case the ANC company would live in the same quarters, partake of the same meals and participate in the normal daily routine of the UN Unit. As well, training appropriate to the standard of the ANC company could be given insofar as it is feasible by the officers of the UN unit.

It is envisaged that some measure such as set out in (f) above is necessary immediately because of the fact that it will take a considerable time to put the majority of ANC officers and NCOs through courses conducted by the UN and, in that way, to improve the overall standards of the various ANC units.

4. (a) Apart from the officers requested in our A_1689 for the school at KAMINA and the overall coordination team assigned on an interim basis to ONUC HQ in Leo, we now request four Lt Cols, four Majors and four Captains for employment with HQ at THYSVILLE, STANLEYVILLE, Eville and LULU i.e on the basis of the proposal in para 3 (c) above.
- (b) It is estimated that there are at present a total of 30 battalions (or equivalent units) in the Congo, including the Katangese Gendarmerie. There are also two field artillery batteries, two anti aircraft batteries and some small armoured units. It is not proposed that we should assign a Major and a Captain to each of these ~~30~~ units, but say a group of 10 Majors and 10 Captains to apportion to initially selected units on an experimental basis. Further assignments could be effected if and when it is considered necessary.

This brings the total request in this cable to four Lt Cols, fourteen Majors and fourteen Captains. Of these one Major and one Captain ~~armoured officers~~ should be artillery officers, one Major and one Captain armoured officers, one Major and One Captain Signal officers, One Major and One Captain maintenance (EME)

Officers. Further requests will be made when the problem has been examined with the ANC in more detail.

5. It would be desirable to assign a few NCOs to each battalion or unit equivalent strength, but there will be some difficulty with language in this connection as so many of the other ranks of the ANC speak only Swahili or Lingala, for example. This problem is still under examination and we shall make our recommendations at an early date.
6. It is envisaged that officers especially recruited for work with the ANC should be seconded by their home countries to the ANC for a period of one to two years. These officers would live and work with the ANC unit to which they might be assigned rather than operate from a UN HQ. Some views on terms for officers working with ANC are forwarded in a special cable.
7. A comprehensive review of the ANC training situation will be sent by mail.

Amici
cc: Mr ~~KHARAI~~
Force Comdr

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

To : BUNCHE
From : LINNER, Mac EOIN
Date : 21 Oct 61
No : A-2454

PRIORITY

Further to your 7280 and our A 2425, Mac Eoin has given IYASSU a brief on ANC reorganization and training. It is intended that this brief should form the basis of initial discussions with ADOULA and MOBUTU. We shall be grateful for your comments on this brief which we regard as being provisional only and providing a general outline of initial UN policy with regard to ANC training. The following are the ~~key~~ terms of the brief.
QUOTE:

A number of problems at high level will need to be solved before UN can embark on any detailed and progressive plan of military assistance to the Congolese Army. All of these problems must be directly related to the role of the Congolese Army as stated by the Central Government.

1. The overall integration of the MOBUTU and LUNDULLA ANC and the KATANGESE Gendarmerie is something which needs to be examined at any early stage. This problem is closely related to the Congoless General HQ structure. I feel that their GHQ is in need of some overhaul, particularly with a view to the ultimate integration referred to above.
2. The territorial military sub-division of the Congo also requires study. This again is related to the problem outlined in para 1, but it is a matter on which an early decision should be made.
3. The actual size of the army which the Central Government needs and can afford to maintain should be determined at least in an approximate fashion as early as possible.
4. The constitution of this force will need careful examination, for example how many infantry Bn, artillery batteries, armoured units, engineers units etc., should go to make up this force. There will also be the matter of the other supporting and supply echelons such as signals, medicals, supply and transport, Ordnance etc. In addition, some instructional establishments will be necessary and these will have to be kept in mind when an effort is being made to determine the overall strength of the army. It would appear to be premature at this stage to concern ourselves unduly with the problems of the formation of a small airforce, and perhaps a small naval group for use at MATADI for example.

It is likely that the ultimate strength of the Congolese Army will be much below what is now. The disbandment of very big members of soldiers would be likely to have many serious effects in the Congo. It is suggested therefore that consideration be given to the formation of construction corps units which could absorb those it may be found necessary to demobilize from the army proper.

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(b) The setting up of a school for NCOs at KAMINA should also receive early attention.

NOTE. It is understood of course that the Commanders or Heads of these schools would be Congolese Officers advised and assisted by Officers provided by UN.

(c) We should immediately assign a number of officers to the present ANC GHQ who would advise and help in the matter of the reorganization of that HQ. It must be understood that an assignment such as this would be essentially for the purpose of giving advice.

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NOTE The vast bulk of the officers required for the foregoing attachments will of course have to be specially recruited because of the language problem. Further details on this idea can be obtained by reference to Sec-Gen's 5651 and our A-1689.

(f) In addition to the foregoing assistance, we should be able to give considerable help in the technical field, such as

for example maintenance of transport, maintenance of radio and signal equipment , assistance in the organization of the ANC medical units, engineer units etc. In this group we should be in a position to find a number of technical officer and other ranks who could be assigned to this work at short notice.

8. Officers assigned to work with the ANC, as stated earlier , should be assigned by their home countries to the Congolese Army for a period of approx two years. They should live and work with the echelons or units to which they are assigned as distinct from operating from a UN HQ.

All of the foregoing planning should be on a short term experimental basis, say for a 3 year period, when the whole situation should be examined a new and necessary adjustments made. UNQUOTE

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In order to commence implementation of the ideas contained in this brief, it is necessary that officers be recruited as early as possible for this specified work. Generally speaking, officers of different nationalities suitable as advisors and instructors and at present serving ONUC are disinclined to accept assignments as shch. The reason, which appears to be common, is that they do not consider the present financial terms adequate to enable them to participate in work of this kind without serious financial losses to themselves. In order to attract suitable officers this matter will have to be given some consideration. Apart from the officers requested in our A1689 for the purpose of staffing an ANC Officers School, we request that 4 Lt Colonels, four Majors and four Cpts be recruited for employment with the main ANC HQ other than the HQ at Leo, i.e. THYSVILLE, STANLEYVILLE, EVILLE and LULUABOURG. This estimate is based on assigning one Lt Col, One Major and one captain to each of the HQ referred to. It is estimated that there is at present a total of thirty Bns or equivalent units in the Congo, including the KATANGESE Gendarmerie. There are also two field artillery batteries, two anti-aircraft batteries and some small armoured units. It is not proposed that we should assign officers initially to all of these units, but a group of say ten majors and ten captains should be provided initially for assignment to selected unit on a experimental basis. Further assignments could be effected when the problem has been more fully examined. This brings the total request in this cable to four Lt cols, fourteen majors and fourteen captains. Of these one Major and One captain should be artillery officers, one major and one captain armoured officers, one major and one captain signal officer, one major and one captain maintenance (EME) officer.

It will be necessary to assign some NCOs to ANC units at a later stage. This problem is being examined and we shall cable you separately concerning it. There will be some language difficulties in this case as so many of the other ranks of the ANC and Gendarmerie speak only swaheli or lingala for example.

Draft

LEOPOLDVILLE
21 Oct 1961

To : Sec Gen
From : LINNER MacEoin
Date :
No : ONUC

Your 5651 and our A 1689 and refer

1. It appears less practical to base the ANC training programme mainly on officers at present serving with the UNOC. The reasons are several ; the question of sufficient knowledge of French; too short periods of duty; economic consideration; replacement at their present units.
2. Officers of different nationalities, suitable as advisors and instructors and at present serving with the UNOC are disinclined to accept assignments as advisors and instructors. Their reason appears to be common; they do not think that present economic conditions are satisfactory.
3. In order to attract suitable instructors it is necessary to offer economic conditions acceptable to qualified personnel. These conditions must be attractive and laid down firmly so as to exclude future changes. This is a principle applied in various other military missions. As a basis for consideration some suggestions are made in the following paras.
4. Various types of employment for advisors and instructors have been considered specially with a view to the necessity of securing high quality. The conclusion has been arrived at that instructors and advisors should be employed and paid by the UN according to the same principles as for example technical experts. Advisors and instructors should be recruited by New York after recommendation and authorization of governments concerned. The conditions of employment should coincide with the conditions of technical experts. The pay should depend on

rank and appointment. The period of duty should be at least 12 months.

5. The implementation of the suggestion of para 4 will, however, probably require some time. Officers are urgently needed as advisors attached to ANC HQs and units. An interim officers Course is going to commence at earliest possible date. If this course shall be able to do so, it is necessary to use temporarily as instructors and advisors officers at present serving with the UNOC. The following paras 6-10 are intended as suggestions on this matter.
6. The advisors and instructors should retain their present remunerations from their respective government.
7. Advisors and instructors should have the same economic conditions - as already decided by New_York - as staff officers at HQ ONUC. The UN should be responsible for good accommodation and provide housing for boys as well. If the UN provides messing facilities, the instructors or advisors should, however, not be compelled to use these facilities, this must be done completely voluntarily, specially as due consideration must be given to different national preferences in food. Those who avail themselves of the messing facilities must, for obvious reasons, pay a reasonable amount for them out of their allowance to the same extent as they use the messing facilities.
8. If officers, serving at present within UN contingents and used temporarily as advisors or instructors, are employed for a longer period of duty, they should have the same conditions as in para 4.
9. Extension of period of service has to be asked for most of the temporary instructors and advisors as many of them are due to leave shortly: length of extension depends on arrival of advisors and instructors requested by New-York.

FOURTH.

To: Mr. Khary Gen. MacEoin.

From: Sec Gen.

Date: 15 August 1961.

No. 5651.

1. The need to provide immediate assistance for reorganizing and training the Congolese army is clearly urgent. We understand that now, particularly with the departure of Tunisians, you are not in a position to provide this assistance on an interim basis. At the same time, it is highly important that some FM assistance in a practical form be immediately placed at the disposal of the Congolese authorities. While the planning team at your Headquarters may be adequate for the time being, it is essential that officers considered for assignment with the AHC must be fluent in French. Provision of such officers should be of high priority. Therefore, even at the cost of loss of some efficiency in the force, we would urge you to assign temporarily some French speaking officers, with suitable qualifications, to immediate service with the AHC. We will support such action through the missions concerned. Please dispatch earliest particulars of the officers so assigned and the nature of their assignments. We would hope you could start this assistance within a week.

2. Brig Gen Yakub has been appointed to replace Maj Gen Lyasse in the force. In view of Lyasse's experience, we suggest that a request for his services as military adviser to the Congolese Government and to be in charge of the training programme be made to Ethiopia and we shall do so given your concurrence. It will be intended to maintain training assistance to the Congolese army outside of the functions of the force and as a part of a technical assistance programme.

3. We are proceeding with the recruitment of suitably qualified military personnel as indicated in your paper on AHC training. While we realize that at this stage it is not possible for you to submit precise requirements, we would appreciate having from you a consolidated list of personnel likely to be required, with their qualifications.

4. It is suggested that consultations on this subject be undertaken by Khary with the Defence Minister with a view toward agreement along lines described above.

Dist. Mr. Khary

Gen. MacEoin.

*a full meeting
by H. Khary*

X

COPY
(ANC TRAINING)

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : Sec Gen New York
From : Linner Mac Eoin Leopoldville
Date : 7 Sept 61
No : A-2099

Your 5844-45 has had our attention during course of several meetings and studies. However, in view developments in Katanga at present, it would be premature to forecast with any degree of accuracy our estimated requirements as they will be dictated to largest extent, by the results we can achieve in E'ville and rest of Province. The resorbtion of Katangese secession and its integration into the rest of Congo is likely to have greatest bearings on all our future planning including a nation wide programme for re-organisation and training of ANC.

We are however confident that this particular situation, in view of the positive action which we are proposing to take, will be such as to enable us to give you in the near future more positive and exact informations.

cc: Force Commander.

JP.-

COPY
(ANC TRAINING)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. Khiari, General Mac Eoin, Mr. Ahmed
From : Sec Gen
Date : 23 August 61
No : 5844-5845

Reference A-1971 and A-1973.

1. In light of recent favourable developments in the Congo and on assumption this trend continues, a progressive reduction in size of ONUC should be envisaged. This would, of course, be implemented on basis of consultations with Congolese Government and in relation to their intention and ability to give to Congolese security forces increasing responsibility in the field of law and order, with resultant decrease in United Nations direct participation. UN planning, therefore, must necessarily be geared to plans and actions of Congolese Government in this respect and their indications of degree of assistance in security field likely to be required from ONUC. Scope of UN assistance should be so planned as to give reasonable assurance to Congolese Government of forces ability to cope with foreseeable situations. On the other hand they should be aware of our wish to achieve speediest possible phasing out and should thus not be permitted to tie ONUC to the Congo in order to avoid responsibilities which they themselves should be able to shoulder.

2. As we see it, our future military operations in the Congo relate to the following major tasks facing the Congolese Government, in connection with which and in varying degree they may continue to require our assistance:

- a. Integration of Mobutu-Lundulla ANC;
- b. Settlement of Katanga problem, including the withdrawal of Gendarmerie ~~wi~~ from North Katanga and integration of Gendarmerie with ANC;
- c. Establishing law and order in Kivu, including exclusion of ANC from provincial politics;
- d. Achieving quiet in Kasai.

3. Assuming steady congolese progress henceforth along lines indicated, and subject to review on basis of Congolese reactions in course of consultations, our thinking about phasing out the force is that, in the first instance, the additional Ethiopians, Irish Liberian, Malayan and Swedish troops provided as result of my emergency request of February 1961 may constitute the first reductions which would occur at about times when tours of these particular detachments are up. Subsequently, it would appear to be possible, through only parital replacement of rotating troops, to reduce force to approximately 8000 by one January 1962. Situation would be thoroughly reviewed at that time to determine the rate of future reductions. Present aim would be to maintain existing contributing countries, but with contingents reduced to a battalion or so.

4. We understand desirability that UN military presence be maintained for a month or two in cities and inhabited areas. Please keep us informed of any pertinent reactions of Congolese authorities. It would seem that planning and preparation for a move to outskirts of cities would need to start immediately, in appropriate consultations with Congolese authorities, if such a step is to be implemented within any reasonable time.

5. The proposed reduction of the force should be reflected in a reduction in civilian staff serving ONUC and should be lead to reduction of the future logistical requirements for the force. This would require an early review and revision of budget estimates and we would therefore like to have soonest your considered and more detailed views on these matters, including answers to following specific questions, taking into account thinking, desires and capacity of Congolese:

A. What areas of responsibility for law and order can be fully handed over to a Congolese ANC, Gendarmerie and civilian police now and in near future, indicating approximate dates;

B. What would be likely deployment of ONUC reduced as proposed on 1 January 1962;

C. What logistic support would be required and what should be the reduction in logistical units in keeping with the above proposals;

D. What would be your air transport requirement in months immediately ahead;

E. What will be the housing prospects for meeting force needs under your proposals for its deployment;

F. What reduction can be effected in UN civilian staff now supporting force and how should it be phased.

6. Lihner concurs with foregoing and will discuss this with you on his return to Leo.

cc; General Mac Eoin
Mr. Ahmed

SECRET

COPY
ANC TRAINING

To: Linner, Mac Eoin
From: Nwokedi
Date: 4 Sep 61
No: 6121

Reur ONUC 5113, following cable sent by Sec-Gen
to UNESCO:

"At request Congolese Government United Nations
is proceeding with preparations for the setting up of a
school for army officers at Kamina and would appreciate
your help in recruiting following teachers for academic
subjects: Headmaster, one; mathematics, one; French, three;
geography, one; history, one; and civics, one.

Possibility of transferring some of the teachers
already in the Congo examined not found ~~feasible~~ feasible.

United Nations would prefer to avoid recruiting
within a field that is of UNESCO competence but is prepared
to offer to teachers selected by UNESCO on its behalf for
the purpose terms of employment exactly the same as those
of UNESCO teachers already in the Congo.

I shall be grateful if you could let us know if
you could suggest from among the candidates available to
UNESCO the teachers for the army school. There is a great
urgency as we would like to have team assembled in Leo by
15 Sep.

I am quoting this cable to Leopoldville."

COPY

ANC TRAINING

To: Nwokedi
From:à Mac Eoin
Date: 4 Sep 61
No: ONUC 5113

Reur 5950. We are informed by Civilian Ops that UNESCO has at present only 52 teachers in the Congo and this number is far from being sufficient for the actual needs of the country. We do not see how it would be possible to release any for teaching duties at Kamina, even if this were otherwise acceptable.

However, the Consultative Group discussed the question of training for Army officers. It was felt that the Specialized Agencies of the UN would be precluded by their constitutions and/or traditions from assisting in this training as such and that it should be undertaken by the UN itself, even in subjects normally recognized as being within the competence of a Specialized Agency.

The UNESCO representative thinks however that UNESCO HQ in Paris would be ready to provide the UN with addresses of recruitment sources for the training to be given in academic subjects.

COPY
ANC TRAINING

To: Mac Eoin, Rossborough
From: Nwokedi
Date: 26 Aug 61
No: 5950

Your ONUC 4952. Please advise if teachers for academic subjects could be made available from secondary school teachers sent by UNESCO. If so, please advise giving full particulars in order to negotiate their reassignment.

COPY
ANC TRAINING

To: Sec-Gen
From: Linner, Mac Eoin
Date: 25 Aug 61
No: ONUC 4952

Reur 5093 of 23 July.

We are proceeding with preparations for the setting up of a school for ANC officers at Kamina. The necessary administrative arrangements are well in hand but we are still without a team of instructors. While we can conduct certain preliminary training with the officers available to us at the moment, it is necessary that the instructors who will eventually conduct the course proper should arrive at the earliest possible date.

On a reconsideration of the requirements of teachers for academic subjects, we now suggest that teachers qualified as follows should be sought:
Headmaster - one; Mathematics - one; French - three:
Geography - one; History - one; Civics - one.

We should be grateful therefore for your comments on this problem.

COPY
(ANC TRAINING)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Dr. Linner, Gen. Mac Eoin
From : Sec Gen
Date : 23 July 61
No : 5093

Reference A-1689.

Since your cable was received at a time when parliament was due to meet at Lovanium, we thought it would be advisable to await results of meeting which would determine the timing of our final preparatory efforts towards the start of ANC training. We have yet to reach the stage when we can make definite demands on governments for instructional staff. We are, however, undertaking informal consultation with various missions in this respect.

a few French-speaking NCOs but not French-speaking officers.

The administration of the school can be undertaken by the unit providing the garrison at Kamina. In addition this unit should also be in a position to give the necessary training demonstrations required on a course of this type. It is desirable that we should have these instructors assembled as early as possible in order to proceed with the necessary preparatory work for this course. The problem of providing courses for ANC NCOs is still under examination but it is possible that this might have to be deferred until we have completed the first training course with officers in order to be in a position to use Swahili and Lingala-speaking Congolese officers.

The Commandant of the school would of course be a Congolese officer of say the rank of Colonel.

We would like to have your comments on this problem.

COPY
ANC TRAINING

To: Bunche
From: Linner, Mac Eoin
Date: 13 Jul 61
No: A-1689

Subject: ANC Training.

We have been examining the problem of ANC training for some time, with particular reference to the training of officers and NCOs. We have taken initial steps to establish a school at Kamina which would cater in the first instance for sixty to eighty officers. It is possible, if Parliament meets with any success, that we shall be able to proceed immediately with the training of ANC at least from STAN and LEO.

We considered at one stage that it might be possible to find sufficient officer and NCO instructors from the contingents at present in the Congo. A detailed examination of this problem however, has indicated that this is not possible. We have therefore to request that the necessary representations be made at your end in an effort to find suitable instructors.

The course envisaged would be a standard infantry course with more emphasis on elementary subjects than is the case normally in a course of this type. The duration of the course would be approx six months. The instructors therefore should be drawn mainly from the infantry corps. We would require one Lt-Col, two majors, nine captains or lieutenants, twelve drill sergeants, three physical training sergeants, eight officers or civilians to teach academic subjects; all of these would of course have to be French-speaking.

A discussion held at this HQ with the Contingent Commanders now serving in the Congo has revealed that Tunisia and Canada are likely to be in a position to provide both officers and NCOs who are French-speaking. Sweden might be in a position to provide a couple of French-speaking officers. India, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ireland are not likely to be in a position to provide either French-speaking officers or NCOs. Ghana may be able to provide