

UNAMIR

CODE CABLES - OUTGOING

24 FEB - 23 JUNE 1994

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cc : Gen. Dallaire

P41

UNAMIR  
1 FEB 24 17  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-59

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 24 FEBRUARY 1994


SUBJECT: Official Visit



MIR- 408

UNAMIR  
1 FEB 24 17  
421

1. Reference your UNAMIR 541 of 23 February 1994 regarding the above subject, please be advised that we welcome the visit of the Deputy Commander of the Botswana Defence Forces to UNOMUR from 2-8 March 1994.
2. The Force Commander, UNAMIR was informed earlier by UNOMUR of the proposed visit and appropriate arrangements will be finalised now that you have approved the visit.
3. Regards.

②  
D/C  
MA  
Please note. If possible,  
say hello. ~~person~~  
  
D/C  
26/2

⑤ MO  
11/3/94

CRN 2170

PAGE 1

U N A M I R

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 94 JUN 24 04 23

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

INFO: UNOMUR

DATE: 23 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: MIR 1219

SUBJECT: VISIT TO UNAMIR

I am afraid that I do not concur with the position you have adopted regarding the visit to UNAMIR of Miss Glynne Evans. Miss Evans has been very supportive of this mission and I am inclined to do whatever I can to enable her to visit us if she so wishes. I hope that the security situation will have improved considerably by the time the visit is to occur. I will, of course, monitor the situation carefully to ensure that Miss Evans is not invited into danger. Best regards.

*NYK DE Kib. G'day mate.*

*Can you please pass this to Unomur on Request*

*of DALLAIRE FORCE Commander*

*Thanks*

*B.*

*PC only*

*Passed to*

*Unomur*

*OK*

UNAMIR

*B.*

94 JUN 24 06 58



1/2

CRW 216

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 94 JUN 23 12 37

To: ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

From: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Date: 23 June 1994

Subject: SUBMISSION OF PERSONNEL STATE

Reference: Your code cable Number 2012 of 20 June 1994

HIR 1215

1. Concerning your code cable in reference, please be advised that there is no Peruvian CIVPOL in UNAMIR.
2. Mr Alfredo Ulloa La Rosa is a Peruvian UN Security Officer. He was however assigned within UNAMIR to perform the duties of Security Assistant in cooperation with the CIVPOL for issuing ID cards and to supervise the general security situation at the Force Headquarters, as the attached note indicates.
3. The mention of a Peruvian CIVPOL in our Personnel State was therefore a mistake for which we apologize.
4. Regards.

UNAMIR  
94 JUN 23 13 16

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - KINSHASA

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

8 March 1994

TO: Ms. C. De Liso, OIC, DMA

FROM: Mr. A. R. Diallo, CCPO *DAD*

SUBJECT: Assignment - Mr. Alfredo Ulloa La Rosa

With reference to my discussion with Mr. Kane, SRSG's Political Adviser, regarding the above mentioned subject, please be informed on the following.

Mr. Ulloa La Rosa newly appointed Security Assistant would be assigned as a back up to Mr. Mbolli, SRSG's personnel Security Assistant. In addition, Mr. Ulloa La Rosa would perform duties of Security Assistant in cooperation with the CIVPOL for issuing IDs and he would also supervise the general security situation at Force Headquarters Premises.

You may wish to confirm the above mentioned information, with Dr. Kabia, the Executive Director of the SRSG's office so that Mr. Ulloa La Rosa could be informed accordingly.

RECEIVED	
OFFICE OF CAO	
Date	08/03/94
NO.	By <i>[Signature]</i>

*confirmed with E.O. [Signature] 8.3.94*

*cc. HM for ltr info 2 fls  
ccp 2AL 12-5-94*

CRN 215

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR 1/2  
94 JUN 22 07 39

TO: BAREIL UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 21 JUN 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 1208

SUBJECT: SIT MAP\RWANDA\21 JUN


1. ATTACHED IS SITUATION MAP SHOWING DISPOSITIONS OF PROTAGONISTS IN RWANDA AS REQUESTED.

2. REGARDS.

2/2

AREAS OCCUPIED BY WARRING FACTIONS AS AT 211800 B JUN 94.

REF P.03



UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 213

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 JUN 21 12 09

1/4

To: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
From: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
Date: 21 June 1994  
Subject: RWANDAN MEDIA CAMPAIGN

MIR/203

1. Please note the attached radio monitoring transcripts.  
The campaign on the Government radio against Canada versus the  
FC, is of note (paragraph 3).
2. Best regards.

FC only



C ②  
D.F.C.  
Transmitted  
speech. (U) 20/6/94

2/4

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20.06.1994 12:15 News from Radio Muhabura: the Voice of RPF.

Resolved

1. France hid itself behind the lack of interest and passivity of the International Community and of the UNATIONS and decide invading Rwanda. It has started to play the "superman." Seeing that the intervention is going to be condemned by everybody, it is now running here and there, looking for alibis in order to implement its sinister aim at Rwanda. Italy which had initially accepted to participate in the bloody mission, has come to reason and decided to avoid the trap France is setting by refusing to commit criminality in Rwanda. So far Congo, Senegal and Ghana have already expressed their wish to participate in the criminal mission but they should balance their actions and think twice on the real aim that France has in invading Rwanda. The RPF authorities affirmed that the French intervention would spoil all the things. The RPA chairman, Major General Kagame said to be concerned with the unilateral decision and fears that such intervention was done by force could render the Rwandese conflict a regional crisis. After the RPF authorities, the Designated Prime Minister condemned the French pitiful initiative to protect the killers; on the VOA and RFI, he declared to be consternated with French interference in the Rwandese crisis from its beginning up to now. For him, France would do better if it asked its partners to provide logistic means in addition of what it was going to use in this intervention and let UNAMIR II do the duty which was assigned to it. Moreover, the International organizations displayed their concern on the French intervention in Rwanda. As for the French Newspaper, La Liberation, the French action in Rwanda constitutes a wicked way to protect the killers or to force the RPF to negotiate with the Government it has never accepted. The RPF High Commander has put that a French soldier on its held territory would be considered as an enemy and the RPF would fight him with the means at its disposal.
2. The Pope envoy visited the RPF held zones yesterday. After a mass he celebrated at Byumba parish, The envoy visited Byumba Hospital where the injured are treated and an orphanage in Byumba where children who lost their parents during this war are taken care of.

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20.06.1994 19:00 hrs News from Radio Rwanda.

1. Today the acting President has come back from Tunis where he attended the OAU session. At his arrival, he addressed the population. In his speech, he explained that the

[REDACTED]

Rwandese conflict had drawn the attention of the Heads of State. He said that he had explained at length the Rwandese crisis and that his explanations had met the approvals of most of the Presidents save the supporters of the RPF. He indicated that he had defended the resolution of the Rwandese crisis through negotiations which would permit the fighters to stop war, to come to reconciliation, to favour power-sharing and to repair the destroyed things. A conclusion was reached after the meeting of the neighbouring countries' representatives as what hostilities must stop whether RPF wants it or not. He called and warned the wrongdoers to stop their aggressive acts and looting, for such acts disgrace the countries. He urged the population to consider those persons as enemies and asked court to apply justice. He indicated that they need assistance and not worries. He asked the population to praise and help the RGF for their bravery and requested the RGF high commanding authorities to submit as quick as possible the list of the braves for decoration. He stressed on the only motto: to win at all cost.

2. Fights have gone on on all the war fronts. Yesterday, the inyenzi kept on shelling in Nyamirambo, Gikondo. At Kinamba (valley down Sainte Famille) heavy fights took place and the RGF helped with the population pushed back the attack. It was said that the inyenzi lost a lot of theirs and equipment. Last night, inyenzi fired "les fusées éclairantes" and all the population got frightened. They urged them to hide themselves when such devices are fired and be vigilant, for the enemy fire to identify the position where he would attack. In Gitarama, Butare and Ruhengeri not serious fights are reported.
3. France continue to explain its initiative for a humanitarian action in Rwanda. Senegal is the only country which has accepted to participate with troops (around 300 to 800 men) in the action. Italy which had expressed its readiness to participate in the mission displayed its reticence and promised to help in logistics. Anyway, President Mitterrand had declared that French troops would perform the mission willy nilly even if the UNATIONS refused their accord. The French ambassador in the UNATIONS has already submitted the project of resolution and the resolution would be voted tomorrow or a day after. The RPF categorically refused the intervention though the former French ambassador was sent to explain them the lay-out of the intervention. The journalist called on the international community to condemn the RPF and its supporters who had started going around and asking the countries to reject the French intention. They pointed their fingers at Belgium and at the Designated Prime Minister, Twagiramungu Faustin who is "plotting with Canada" to convince the International community to refute the French intention. He concluded with saying that the Government sustained the project at 100 %.

*He is apparently  
in Montreal  
now?*

4. The Prime Minister has enthroned the mayors of Nyabikenke and Nyakabanda in Gitarama today. During the ceremonies, he initiated the action of providing weapons to self-defending forces with distributing guns to the youth trained at Ndiza Mount. Among those young people, there were around 150 persons who fled from Bugesera and who swore to go back to liberate their region. The Prime Minister gave a rendez-vous to the population at Amahoro stadium on 01 july 1994 to celebrate both the independence day and the victory over the RPF. He also promised them to continue to find weapons to them.

UNAMIR  
HQ  
loc.

UNITED NATIONS  
MISSION FOR RWANDA



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94 JUN 21 17 01

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

94 JUN 21 16 38

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
Info: BARIL  
From: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
Date: 21 June 1994

Subject: EVACUATION OF SENEGALESE, CONGOLESE AND  
TOGOLESE CONTINGENTS

MR 1205

1. Due to the strong and already difficult reaction of the RPF to the impending French-led coalition (they have just restricted all movement of our MILOBs who are deployed in Northern RPF-Mulindi zone), we have found it necessary to implement the evacuation tomorrow of 42 x UNMOs to Nairobi of the Senegalese, Congolese and Togolese contingents for both their own security and the UNAMIR transparency, until further notice.

2. RPA check points are already making passage of UNAMIR French-speaking military personnel very difficult. Please inform the appropriate Permanent Representatives of this and of the fact that we have a guarantee for their safe conduct from the RPA. Their subsequent employment or return to their respective countries will be assessed by 26 Jun 94.


2/2

3. FC is planning to bring 48 x UNMOs from Nairobi to replace the above-mentioned <sup>②</sup>officers. FC cannot understate the very negative impact of this emergency redeployment of many of the most effective and also bilingual officers of the Force. The efficiency of the Force will be significantly effected by their departure, just at a time when they would be needed the most to assist in the build-up and continuity required for our liaison and humanitarian efforts. All HQs and operational sectors, including FC's Cabinet, have had to readjust to this major shift in personnel.

3. Should the negative coverage by the government press continue against Canada, FC will be forced to move that contingent out also. At this time, FC is about to restrict their movement to RPF territory only.

4. This Mission will not be able to sustain its rhythm of activities, let alone see any increase of work with any major changes or personnel cuts to its limited forces in theatre. FC cannot make this point more emphatically.


5. Best regards.

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To: ANNAN ONLY (NO DISTRIB  
UNATIONS NEW YORK  
KIGALI

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Rwandan  
media

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23 pages excluding cover page TOTAL 24.



UNAMIR

94 JUN 20 13 30

CRN 212

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: ANNAN *(signature)* ONLY (NO DISTRIBUTION)  
UNATIONS NEW YORK

From: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR KIGALI

Date: 20 June 1994

Subject: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED FRENCH-LED INITIATIVE  
IN THE RWANDESE CRISIS

MIR 1199

1. Attached you will find the document on the above subject.
2. Regards.

23 pages excluding cover page total 24.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED  
FRENCH-LED INITIATIVE IN THE  
RWANDESE CRISIS

INTRODUCTION

1. Since the death of President Habyarimana through a mysterious plane crash on 6 Apr 94, Rwanda has been thrown into a state of war and anarchy which has resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of non-combatants (women and children) mostly of the Tutsi ethnic group. At the moment, the indicators are that the RPF has gained the upper hand and is poised to pursue their military objectives. These may include either the overrunning of the whole country or the attrition/destruction of the Rwandese Government forces and their political leadership.

2. Efforts have been made to broker a cease-fire to bring the war and the atrocities to an end by the international community and UNAMIR. These efforts have so far not yielded any significant positive results on the battle field except the transfer of the displaced persons between each zone. Thus the atrocities and hostilities continue relatively unabated.

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3. Efforts are being made to assemble more UN troops for UNAMIR in order to help stop these atrocities, provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Rwanda and be in a position to monitor the future cease-fire. The international community has been slow to move as molasses in the dead of winter in responding to the UN requests for troops and equipment. This situation seems to have led to the French Government's initiative in announcing that it would intervene militarily in Rwanda on humanitarian grounds to put a stop to the bloodshed.

#### POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

4. External. The initiative of the French has raised eyebrows in certain quarters while some have welcomed it as a step in the right direction. Politically, neighbouring Zaire with its strong French links was one of the first to welcome the idea. Zaire has in the past been a sympathizer of the Habyarimana Government and this did not come as a surprise. Uganda, on the other hand, has not made any comments on the issue, certainly because the Museveni Government has been labelled as a sympathizer of the RPF, an issue the Uganda Government constantly denies. The stands of Burundi and Tanzania are not too clear as of now. Burundi has similar problems as Rwanda which it is grappling with at the moment.

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The recent radio announcement that the Bukova Refugee Camp in Tanzania has been turned into a militia training camp, leads one to believe that there may be an armed move from that location by sympathizers of the present interim Government.

5. Internal. The interim Government of Rwanda and the government forces (RGF) welcome the French initiative because it will certainly put a stop to the offensive action they have been subjected to from the RPA so far. On the other hand, the political and military leadership of the RPF have bluntly rejected the French move and called it an insult to the Rwandese. They have promised to fight the force wherever they see it.

#### MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

6. RPF. With the political/military leadership not accepting the French lead initiative, the likely implications to be drawn from this attitude is that the RPF will militarily confront the French when they arrive on the battlefield should such circumstances present themselves. This eventuality is highly anticipated as, even if the French lead force deploy in RGF territory (i.e. west of Ruhengeri-Gitarama-Cyangugu lines), the RPF forces are still advancing at a steady pace,

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both west and south. Furthermore, any deployment in and around Kigali, where so many people are at risk and which has caught the French public opinion, will immediately put the French lead forces in contact with the RPF who continue to close the noose around the city. With the cease-fire talks still on-going, as is the fighting, it is not expected that the RPF will halt its offensive operations because of the presence of the French lead forces. It does however seem very probable that the RPF leadership will want to "bloody" the nose of this French lead force in order to, as a minimum gesture to its followers, show that they stood up to the French, and then it would be time to go for a cease-fire. This is perceived so far as the most optimistic situation that could be seen on the battlefield between the French lead forces and the RPF.

7. As current as this morning, the RPF senior liaison officer has confirmed the following points raised through him by the Force Commander yesterday to RPA Commander, MGen Paul Kagame:

a. In response to the question concerning his reaction to the French lead forces coming to Rwanda, it was made very clear that this is once again another mistake by the

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international community in its attempt to solving problems in far away lands. He stated that the conflict is going to evolve into a REGIONAL problem involving some neighbouring countries. The humanitarian problems now facing Rwanda will worsen and spill over the borders and thus create a considerably more complex and difficult situation. The liaison officer was emphatic in saying that "the French cannot impose themselves anywhere in this region, as it will escalate the tensions and the conflict".

b. To the question of their perception and position in regards to UNAMIR, the liaison officer specifically stated that Resolution 918 has been adversely affected by this French lead initiative, both in its tasks and its force composition. The humanitarian support and security tasks, particularly in RGF territory or near the confrontation lines, including Kigali, will be plagued by the fighting that they intend to conduct against the French lead forces. They cannot see how we will be able to accomplish our security tasks without getting involved in the conflict. They are concerned that UNAMIR will end up in the middle, and/or inadvertently targeted, in this very difficult situation. They furthermore have already

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stated that the transparency of UNAMIR is being seriously affected by the fact that some of the countries participating in the French lead coalition have elements in UNAMIR (Senegal, Congo and Togo, in particular). They clearly indicated that they will not be able to guarantee the security of these officers any more. Lastly, they even expressed concern that these officers have possibly already problems of dual and conflicting loyalties and obviously being deployed behind their lines is troublesome to them.

c. To the Force Commander's request to meet MGen Kagame, the liaison officer was emphatic in saying that he will not be available for the next two weeks and regrets not being able to meet face to face.

8. The apparent reasons for the RPF hostility to the French in particular are:

a. The French will prevent them from achieving their goal of possibly taking over the whole country, destroying the RGF on the battlefield and of bringing the interim Government before justice.

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b. The efforts they have put in so far to make their case heard as a group, which has been forced to live in destitute as refugees for the past 30 years, will possibly come to something less than anticipated.

c. They view the French lead initiative as a covert attempt to restore the other side. They will be protecting, so the RPF say, the criminal elements they in fact created and which they, the French, have all along been supporting.

d. The French have engaged the RPF on the battlefield during the previous wars and there are scores to settle.

9. UNAMIR/RPF Position. There are two possible scenarios that will present themselves in the UNAMIR/RPF relations due to this French lead initiative. The first is that UNAMIR troops may become targets of the RPF, as the French lead initiative is being endorsed by the UN Security Council and the RPF have, at least so far stated that the Secretary-General is obviously leading both mandates and as such must have linked the missions/tasks. This could draw UNAMIR into a Chapter VII-type operation with its attendant consequences which UNAMIR has not been mandated to do. The RPF resistance

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to the French lead initiative is likely to protract the war, particularly if they have any successes and, as they state, expand the conflict into a regional affair, with the RPA possibly changing their tactics into a purely guerilla mode. The Force Commander, at this juncture, wishes to remind you that the RPF are in a position to prevent the re-supply and even exit of UNAMIR from Rwanda as we are now wholly behind their lines, including our main supply route. The RPF have informally stated that such a situation will never occur, but...

10. The second possibility is the French lead initiative would be accepted/tolerated by the RPF, and thus the situation described above would not occur. We then would see an atmosphere conducive to and supportive of the implementation of UNAMIR's mandate. UNAMIR would in fact be more free to pursue the monitoring of the cease-fire to a great extent as a number of security tasks would be handled by the French lead force which will be deployed principally in the RGF territory, and that until the UNAMIR forces are at the strength level needed to do all its tasks.

11. The former Minister of France, Bernard Kouchner and the Director of the Centre de Crise français, met yesterday with

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the RPF Chairman and he apparently stated that if the coalition force did not have French troops, it may be acceptable and thus the situation could still evolve in the area. However, the RPA liaison officer this morning stated that if there were no French troops, who would be leading this force? Also, why have this separate force instead of simply reinforcing UNAMIR? Lastly, some of the coalition countries (like Senegal) have already shown their hand and as such are nothing more than French lackeys. Already the RPA liaison staff here have openly expressed to my officers from the said countries their negative views of this coalition force. Both the Senegalese and the Congolese contingent commanders have communicated with their national HQs to express their concerns for their safety and effectiveness in this situation. Should the Force Commander have to redeploy these contingents, then the bulk of the French language, bilingual capability will be lost. Our eyes and ears will be gone.

12. RGF. Having lost so much ground so far (6 Prefectures out of 10), with questionable logistics resupply and morale dropping daily, the RGF have suddenly, over the last few days, demonstrated a more determined position. They are quite pleased to have the French come to what does seem to them to be to their aid. There is also a seemingly sense of relief

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among some of them that an outside force is coming in to do what they could not achieve, i.e. stopping the militia/Interhamwe from further killing the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. They have repeatedly stated that they could not handle this problem because their forces are committed to fighting the RPA and so could not spare men to confront the militia/Interhamwe. This position would mean that there is no link between the RGF and the militia/Interhamwe, a position that is not readily accepted due to past experience. There are links but they are not at all clear, neither in method nor in chain of command.

13. UNAMIR/RGF Position. The RGF have accused UNAMIR in the past of helping the RPA in the war against them. One of the cases that comes to mind is the Kigali International Airport (KIA). The RGF accused UNAMIR of handing over the airport to the RPA after we had struck a deal with RGF to make the airport a UN Neutral Territory. They essentially state openly, as part of their propaganda, that wherever UNAMIR elements go, the RPA follows soon thereafter. We have been accused of being RPA reconnaissance elements. They also relate the cases of the Byumba Garrison, the Amahoro complex, the CND complex and other infrastructure/locations in the general Kigali area that were overrun by the RPA in the early

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stages of the war through our presence, and yet we were simply there before the hostilities started. There are also tensions between the Interim Government and in particular the FC as you well know. This has spilled over to their troop level as the Rwandese media have again, yesterday, targeted the UNAMIR FC as being a flagrant RPF sympathiser. Relations with the RGF leadership are still open but being handled, quite effectively, principally since last week, by the Deputy Force Commander, BGen Anyidoho of Ghana.

14. MILITIA/INTERHAMWE. If the French initiative is to be taken on the surface, the militia/Interhamwe and whoever is subversively leading them or giving them orders (maybe some RGF leaders, but certainly some political back-room leaders) may not be fully supportive with this move because they will be the primary targets. They may therefore go all out to fight the French and resist their presence because they will be prevented from pursuing their aim of eliminating their long-time enemies - the Tutsis. Alternatively they may also simply move into the shadows and feel a certain level of protection and relief behind French lines as the RPA will not be able to get at them. Such a position would be to their advantage until at least the French leave and then they would come out during UNAMIR's mandate and start their terrible actions again having had a good rest and a rebuilding period.

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15. UNAMIR/INTERHAMWE/MILITIA Position. The Interhamwe/militia will most likely target UNAMIR for collaborating with the French but more importantly with the RPA in order to stop their barbaric acts. Even though the Interhamwe has in the past not targeted UNAMIR, a sudden change for the worst in the attitude of these young men who operate under the influence of drugs, alcohol, money and ethnic emotions cannot be entirely ruled out. They are bold in certain quarters of Kigali and have become bolder in the northern prefectures where the interim Government is now established and which is the Hutu extremist homeland.

16. UNAMIR. Since the passing of Resolution 918 of 17 May 94, UNAMIR has patiently waited for its expansion in order to fan out and help stop these massacres, offer humanitarian security assistance to the hundreds of thousands of displaced Rwandese and be in a viable/effective position to influence and implement a cease-fire. The ineffective reaction to meeting the critical needs of the Mission in order to implement its mandate has been nothing less than scandalous from the word go, and even bordering on the irresponsible to dangerous towards the personnel of the Mission here in theatre. This has directly led to the loss of many more Rwandese lives, to the casualties amongst our troops and of course to the French initiative.

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17. UNAMIR hopes to see an immediate end to the war, the movement of humanitarian supplies and the cessation of the wanton killings of civilians in particular. The French lead initiative is not seen by UNAMIR as the most effective solution to the situation. We see this French lead force as a misguidance of resources that could have come into the UNAMIR family. Furthermore, the proposal to have French troops deployed on Rwandese soil totally ignores both the recent conflicts (Oct 90 and Feb 93) and the agreements made with both parties for the instituting of the original UNAMIR mandate and troop composition, i.e. Resolution 872 of 5 Oct 93.

18. All of the above will most likely put the Force in an unacceptable and complex position with potentially any one or more of the three factions (RGF, Interhamwe/militia, RPF) due to the Secretary-General's position of having condoned the French lead initiative without clarifying nor directing any change to UNAMIR's mandate or modus operandi in Rwanda, with the Rwandans to start with, and with UNAMIR in particular, before decisions were seemingly taken. The very real possibility exists that UNAMIR will be drawn into an armed conflict or at least suffer from very strained relations (at best) to sustaining more unnecessary casualties (at worst)

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than what we have already incurred due to the lack of support to UNAMIR. UNAMIR may be forced to conduct active self-defence actions caused by the friction between us and the factions in this increasingly tense and growingly negative attitude towards the Mission's mandate, its work, its contingents, even its sustainment and some of its personnel. It is our assessment that this French lead initiative, both by the way it has been launched politically, and in its naïve future operations on the ground, has already, over the last few days, significantly undermined the months of determined and courageous work accomplished by this Mission's personnel.

19. At the moment, UNAMIR cannot pursue a Chapter VII mandate and is just holding on militarily (all 8 x BTR 80s are unserviceable now) and basically surviving logistically (we have had no fuel for 3 days). Resolution 925 does not approve the use of force, except in self-defence and in the protection of humanitarian activities which may be threatened. Getting dragged into an armed conflict will only be suicidal for this force under these circumstances. Regrettably, the mission is physically dependant on the cooperation of the RPA. This is because all our units/assets are behind RPA lines and our logistics support must also come through RPA lines. Should we be cut off, with limited ammunition stocks, next to no fuel

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and only thirteen days of supplement rations left, we are operationally vulnerable to RPA intentions and whims.

OPTIONS

20. In the light of the above, the options open to UNAMIR at the moment are the following:

a. Option 1. To close down operations of the mission by terminating its mandate .

(1) Advantages. The only advantage here is that there would be no casualties to UNAMIR troops since confrontation with any group would be avoided.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) The good work so far done would come to nothing.

(b) UNAMIR would be seen to have abandoned Rwandan displaced persons and the country as a whole and as such would make it very difficult to recreate a similar mission later.

b. Option II. UNAMIR to operate either side by side or in cooperation, even limitedly, with the French lead forces but still under different mandates.

(1) Advantages.

(a) UNAMIR would continue to try (if RPA agree) to build up its forces and resources and maintain the current humanitarian and cease-fire tasks.

(b) The French would fill in certain humanitarian security tasks and UNAMIR could thus pursue its other tasks with less hindrance.

(c) The killings of civilians should abate in RGF territory with the coalition troops presence.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) The two different structures of command operating in the theatre, would not see eye to

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eye since each is operating with a different mandate, different Rules of Engagement and different capabilities that may not be wholly complementary. This situation would lead to conflicts between the two forces that could further lead to operational incidents/accidents and these divergences certainly could be exploited by either belligerent.

(b) UNAMIR troops could be deliberately targeted by any of the three different parties in the Rwanda conflict that are wishing to sabotage or create confusion to their advantage.

(c) Division of tasks may not be possible due to the close proximity of the belligerents, particularly in Kigali, and the varying attitudes towards the French and UNAMIR.

(d) The French lead initiative speaks of a coalition of contributing countries and as such, should any of those countries already have contingents in UNAMIR, we would be forced

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to withdraw them as they would be targeted specifically by RPA. They would in fact be in conflict of interest/loyalty in possible compromising operations due to the hostile confrontation that the RPA intend to take against this French lead force. This will create serious turbulence to UNAMIR's structure. The francophone African countries have particularly effective contingents in UNAMIR at this time and their departure could be devastating. As an example, the Senegalese contingent holds down such critical jobs as all the G-2, MA and ADC to FC, UNMO team leaders and sector commander. They have been dynamic, courageous and determined UNMOs who are also fully bilingual. This loss to the force, at a time when we are supposedly building up, borders on ridicule and danger.

c. Option III. To temporarily withdraw UNAMIR to allow the French lead force to conduct their Chapter VII operations. This would permit UNAMIR to build up its forces in a secure area before returning to Rwanda as a sort of relief force to the French lead force. UNAMIR

UN RESTRICTED

would of course return if and when all sides have stabilized the situation, have worked out a modus vivendi that would not create increased insecurity for UNAMIR, and when UNAMIR has the capabilities to do its mandate job.

(1) Advantages.

(a) UNAMIR would take over from where the French lead initiative would end, after having built its capabilities in a secure environment, reducing the chances of casualties in the process.

(b) UNAMIR would avoid any increased confrontations in any form, with any of the parties.

(c) Security actions for humanitarian goals could continue and in fact may be effective sooner.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) The Rwandese may not accept UNAMIR when the French lead forces hand over operations to UNAMIR at the end of the coalition mandate.

(b) The withdrawal will have a negative effect on the morale of our troops that have survived so far to maintain the Mission alive.

(c) The building up of the force may be difficult to accomplish in a neighbouring country in view of both the terribly weak FOD administration/logistics capabilities to respond to the needs of the force, and due to the problems inherent to obtaining consent from such a host country, particularly if the conflict becomes regional in nature.

CONCLUSION

21. The political and military implications of the French lead initiative to intervene in the Rwanda conflict has its pros and cons. Taken on the surface, it could be perceived as

a very positive action of the UN and the contributing countries to come to the aid of Rwanda and by extension to UNAMIR. But it certainly has all the signs of further complicating the already difficult situation in the country which UNAMIR is doing its best to help resolve. This is mainly due to the reactions of the RPF against any French forces on Rwandese soil. Should however the RPF agree to a French lead intervention, the early deployment of this force could help UNAMIR in getting its capabilities together and see the humanitarian effort continue more effectively.

22. Should the French initiative bring forces into Rwanda not linked to UNAMIR command, there is the likelihood of a conflict between the two command structures that will be on the ground, since each force will be operating with a different mandates, ROE, etc. This situation could also be negatively exploited by either of the belligerents and be the cause of increased risks to the force. One wonders why and how the UN and the international community has permitted itself to get into such a situation in the first place, as an early and determined effort to get troops and resources on the ground under UNAMIR's mandate could have avoided all this and already saved so many lives.

23. The RPF has so far vehemently rejected the French lead initiative that would involve French troops. The interim Government welcomes the move for a shopping list of reasons. The militias may respond in either way but they can afford waiting behind the scenes for a while.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

24. It is strongly recommended that the French lead initiative be encouraged only if the RPF agree to French troops on the ground, or if this force comes with personnel and equipment but no with any French troops. Should this option not be possible, then in order to avoid an escalation of the conflict, both inside Rwanda and in the region, as well as escalating the risks of putting the whole UNAMIR mission in doubt, the French lead initiative should be let to run its course alone and permit UNAMIR to build itself up in a secure environment in a non-involved/aligned neighbouring country, after which the Mission could redeploy with the effective forces planned for in its mandate. This is essentially Option III.

25. If option III cannot be followed, for a variety of reasons, then the risk assessment must be weighed as to the

UN ~~R~~RESTRICTED

dangers to the current UNAMIR forces and those new troops being considered for deployment in Rwanda, against the option of a total cancellation of the UNAMIR mandate and go with a strong and even expanded mandate for the French lead initiative. This may subsequently lead to a cease-fire and peace agreement in which a "peace-keeping" force would then be mandated for monitoring and security tasks.

26. In light of RPA liaison officer responses today that reflect the RPA Commanders' position, the Force Commander is initiating the withdrawal of Senegalese, Congolese and Togolese contingents to Nairobi, over the next few days, with its inherent damaging effects on the Force capabilities and its obviously negative impact on all concerned.

27. Contingency plans for the absorption of increased forces to UNAMIR are still being finalised for immediate implementation, but so is the mission withdrawal plan to a neighbouring country.

28. At this point, FC finds regards very difficult to express.

\* \* \*

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS  
MISSION FOR RWANDA  
UNAMIR  
94 JUN 18 06 22



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN-211

P1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEWYORK  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: JUNE 1994  
SUBJECT: RADIO RWANDA BROADCAST

*[Handwritten signature]*

UNAMIR  
94 JUN 18 06 45

MIR-1187

1. Attached is a transcript of a radio broadcast from Radio Rwanda transmitted 12 June. Please note para. 4.
2. Best regards.

P1/3

MIR 1187

③  
A/HM  
Prepare para 4  
Annex attached  
this used  
note para 4.  
17/6

12.06.1994 19:00 hrs News from Radio Rwanda.

P2/3



1. Yesterday, negotiations for a cease-fire between both warring factions in Rwanda resumed but did not reach any agreement. Comments in details are still awaited.
2. The 60th OUA ministerial session has finished its work in Tunis yesterday. The Rwandese conflict took a lot of time and is expected to be brought to the Presidents' session attention tomorrow. The UN Secretary General said to the Press on 5500 soldiers needed for the whole UNAMIR-A, 3000 men are available and 100 APCs among which 50 were provided by the RSA. In Tunis, the Rwandese President met the RFI journalists and answered their questions. He declared that he would ask the International Community to condemn Museveni's interference in the Rwandese crisis. He also added that he had reliable proofs as what Museveni directly helped the RPF both in Logistics and in men. He reminded that even Museveni himself had acknowledged the existence of the Ugandan youth fighting on the sides of the Inyenzi.
3. The RGF continue to prove their bravery. Yesterday in Rulindo the RGF killed a lot of Inyenzi among whom a captain and got a lot of ammunition. In Kigali, the Inyenzi continue to shell onto civilians in Gikondo, Nyamirambo, Kimihurura and Gisozi. 2 inyenzi were caught in Kimihurura where they had come to spy the RGF positions and were killed. In Nyanza, the fleeing population stated that the RPF killed all the people without making any differentiation.
4. The Government issued a communique in which it provided proofs for their wish on the replacement of the Force Commander. In this communique signed by the Minister of Information who is said to be the Government spokesman, the government accused the Force Commander to be either partial or incapable. It was reminded that the Arusha Peace Agreement stipulated a neutral force which would be assigned for:
  - a. security throughout the country.
  - b. security of civilians in general.
  - c. monitoring and watching of the implementation of the Arusha Accord.


The Government declared that all these assignments have been a "veritable fiasco." and for them all the mistakes had to be shouldered by the Force Commander. They affirmed that the President's airplane was highjacked while UNAMIR was guarding the airport, UNAMIR Force had very sophisticated equipments and it was understandable how their equipment did not detect the existence of ambushes around the airport. They added that if Dallaire had done his work as it should have been done, they would not have been such a bloodshed in Rwanda. They maintained that it





was due to UNAMIR that the Inkotanyi were brought into Kigali, that the Inkotanyi's truck used to go to Mulindi everyday supposedly to fetch water and firewood but actually to bring the inkotanyi so that at the end the strength had gone from 600 men up to 3000 people, and meanwhile others were infiltrating through the hills of Jari and Kinyinya. They also accused the UNAMIR of having helped the Inyenzi to sabotage communication with the World while participating in the destruction of the Radio communication equipment in Jari and Kinyinya. They indicated that all the RPF heavy armament was installed near the premises of UNAMIR at Remera, King Faycal Hospital and at Rebero which was rent by the Belgians. They affirmed to detain some information as what some UNAMIR soldiers participated to the fights in Kigali town. They proved the Force Commander's incapacity by advancing that he had declared to the press that the RPF soldiers did not shoot at demonstrating population at Gishushu whereas one of his Sector commanding chiefs had afterward affirmed that it was true that the RPF soldiers had shot. They said that General Dallaire has been convincing the World that the President's airplane fell by accident. They finally put forth that General Dallaire continues to bring about the death of hutu while stating that the inyenzi never killed civilians. To conclude they declared that General Dallaire must be replaced by someone else who is supposed not to be partial.

5. Some of the clergymen condemned the massacres of their colleagues at Kabgayi. His Lordship Jean Baptiste Gahamanyi of Butare declared that he has been consternated with the killings of the Bishops at Kabgayi. He condemned massacres of innocent people in general. He criticised bad tongues which advanced that the Rwandese Church had distinguished itself with a partial silence to stop the killings in the country. He said that all the butchered bishops had remained at Kabgayi to prove their commitment to their parishioners while helping them in their forsakenness. In the same view, Priests who sought refuge into Mushishiro parish addressed the parishioners of Kabgayi a condolence message. They asked the Front to hand the dead bodies of the clergy VIPs for a honourable burial. They promised to pray for all the dead so that they be awarded by the Almighty in his Heaven. They called on all the Rwandese to stop butchery for a nation reconciliation.



UNAMIR  
94 JUN 15 13 02



CRN-209 P1/1

U N A M I R  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: EKHART, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: ANYIDHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 15 JUN 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-1169  
SUBJECT: DAILY PRESS BRIEFING 14 JUN

①

FROM THIS END OF THINGS, THE USE OF THE TERM "GRUMBLING" IN CONNECTION WITH STATEMENTS BY GHANAIA TROOPS IN KIGALI IS UNFORTUNATE. IT IS A GREAT PITY THAT A LESS PEJORATIVE TERM COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN. ONE WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT SENIOR SPOKESPERSONS OF THE UN WOULD HAVE MORE LOYALTY TO THE TROOPS ON THE GROUND AND MORE SYMPATHY FOR THEIR PLIGHT. PLEASE NOTE FOR FUTURE BRIEFINGS THAT THE CONDITIONS ARE VERY DIFFICULT AND THE LOGISTICS AND WELFARE SYSTEMS DO NOT SEEM ADEQUATE AT THIS POINT IN TIME. THE BEST WAY TO STOP THE "GRUMBLING" IS TO FIX THESE SYSTEMS.

BEST REGARDS.

②  
D/C  
Will send  
Right on  
ll  
D/C  
14/6

UNAMIR  
94 JUN 15 13 07

Received Message

00:06 15/06/94

ZCZC KGMS0340 DPIC1126  
SP KGM  
.NEWYORK (PKFOD) 15 0202Z  
BT

FROM DPIIDS

OMNIPRESS / UNDEVPRO  
ADD/AGOLI-AGBO, DAM/HLA/BAUTISTA, NIC/ROKOSZEWSKI,

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING, 14 June 1994

Joe Sills, Spokesman for Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, said at the noon briefing that the Secretary-General was in Geneva taking part in ceremonies associated with the 1994 United Nations Population Award. (See Press Releases SG/SM/5332-POP/542 and 543.) The Secretary-General had lunch with Vehbi Koc, President of the Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation. The Award was presented by the Secretary-General to Mr. Koc and to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The Secretary-General would leave Geneva tomorrow to return to New York.

Mr. Sills then said that Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Envoy and Head of the Fact-finding Mission to Yemen, had delivered an interim report to the Secretary-General. A statement had been issued this morning in which the Secretary-General regretted that the cease-fire had not been effective despite assurances that both sides would adhere to it. The situation in Aden was very worrying, with water shortages, hospitals filled to capacity and shortages of equipment and health supplies. The Secretary-General urged that the parties observe the cease-fire so that urgently needed humanitarian aid could reach Aden and other areas.

The Secretary-General also asked his Special Envoy to complete his contacts with the parties in the area as soon as possible in order to submit his report to the Secretary-General under the terms of Security Council resolution 924 (1994). (See Press Release SG/SM/5331.)

Mr. Brahimi had left today from Abu Dhabi to Doha; tonight, he would travel to Jordan. The United Nations humanitarian mission today left Sana'a for Djibouti on a plane chartered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and would sail from Djibouti to Aden to assess damages to that southern city. The mission is headed by Serge Telle of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and includes representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Responding to an earlier question regarding the appointment of James Victor Gbeho of Ghana to succeed Lansana Kouyate as Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, and the appointment of Shaharyar Mohammed Khan, former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of

①  
MA to FC  
I want a message drafted  
for me to sent to UN Spokesman  
on the comment made on  
Rahmanism troops. I hate  
the comment grumbling  
See my notes at page  
last page.  
JG  
15/6  
DFC

Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, as the Special Representative for Rwanda. Mr. Sills said a formal announcement could not yet be made. The Security Council had been advised of the intention of the Secretary-General to make these two appointments, but the Council had not yet responded. Following endorsement by the Security Council, the appointments would become effective on 1 July.

Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Rwanda, had submitted his resignation a few days ago, Mr. Sills said. 11

Mr. Kouyate, who has been the Acting Special Representative in Somalia, would return to Headquarters to assume his new function as Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Political Affairs.

Mr. Sills then drew correspondents' attention to a Note to Correspondents, Note No. 5181, on the 16 June visit to Headquarters of the Emperor and Empress of Japan.

Regarding the situation between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Sills said membership in the IAEA and adherence to provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were two different things. There were 121 member States of the IAEA and 164 parties to the NPT. State parties to the NPT were subject to inspection by the IAEA whether or not they were members of that Agency. That did not mean that inspectors would not face difficulties, he added. That had happened in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the IAEA Board of Governors had then decided to suspend its technical assistance because of non-compliance by that country.

Concerning reports that there was a first draft of a Security Council resolution proposing the commencement of phased sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Sills referred correspondents to the Permanent Mission of the United States. The Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had stated that his Government had sent a notice to the United States, in its capacity as the depositary State for the IAEA agreement, with notification of its intention to withdraw from the Agency. Any confirmation of that receipt would have to come from the United States. Such information would presumably be passed along to the IAEA. Mr. Sills said he had not received any information from the United States either way.

Mr. Sills said he had no indication from the United States, the United Kingdom or the Russian Federation (the three NPT depositary States), or from the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that a withdrawal from the NPT would be undertaken. Regarding IAEA technical assistance projects in that country, Mr. Sills said there were 11 such projects, and that all had been suspended.

Correcting an announcement made at yesterday's noon briefing, Mr. Sills said that two Member States, Honduras and Nicaragua, (not Nigeria, as previously announced), had in the past withdrawn from the IAEA. Nicaragua had since returned to IAEA membership.

A correspondent then pointed out that the IAEA charter

bound member States to their budgetary obligations to the Agency through the end of the year. Did that mean a fiscal year or calendar year? Mr. Sills referred the question on the time-frame of the year to the IAEA, but added that under the IAEA scale of assessments, the annual assessment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was around \$65,000.

Another correspondent said that IAEA inspectors were still in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and asked whether the cancellation of IAEA membership would create problems for future inspectors. Also, did the cancellation of IAEA membership render NPT membership moot?

Mr. Sills repeated that being a party to the NPT obliged members to accept IAEA inspection, irrespective of IAEA membership. Most NPT parties that had nuclear-weapons programmes were members of the IAEA. Withdrawal from IAEA membership should not create problems for IAEA inspectors because inspection and cooperation with inspectors was provided for by adherence to the NPT, not by IAEA membership. The idea that a member country of the NPT could remain a party and unilaterally decide to suspend certain obligations provided for by that Treaty was erroneous. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not withdrawn from the NPT, he added.

If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not recognize the IAEA, did it have to allow inspectors in? Mr. Sills said that if it were a party to the NPT, it did. Failure to do so would constitute non-compliance with the NPT and would be a matter for action by the Security Council. There was now a situation of non-compliance.

Asked if he knew why Honduras had withdrawn from the IAEA, Mr. Sills said he did not.

Mr. Sills then said that the Security Council would hold consultations today on Georgia, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Rwanda and other matters.

He said the Spokesman's office would make available an announcement from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that Christian Chartier had been appointed as a Press and Information Officer. Mr. Chartier had worked for 15 years as a journalist with Le Monde and with French-speaking radio. A press communique from the International Tribunal contained biographical information and a direct phone number. Mr. Chartier hoped to visit Headquarters in the next few weeks.

A correspondent then asked whether or not the work of the International Tribunal was languishing, as no prosecutor had been named. Mr. Sills rejected that characterization, he said. Graham Blewitt, the Deputy Prosecutor and the staff were working hard; operations had not been suspended pending the appointment of a prosecutor.

Another correspondent asked for information on reports that Ghanaian troops serving with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had complained that they had inadequate supplies and no proper medical unit, whereas peace-keeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina had such support. Mr. Sills said it was the policy of the Organization to make every effort to provide logistical, medical and other supplies to all peace-keeping operations. The correspondent

said the implication was that the Ghanaian troops had been provided with inadequate support because they were African. This rejected that view.

Fred Eckhard of the Spokesman's office, responding to the same question, said that supplies had been a problem for UNAMIR due to the closure of the airport. Supplies now moved to the operation overland, so peace-keepers were eating rations instead of fresh food. They were working under very difficult conditions. The Organization paid tribute to those units despite any grumbling.

Continuing his briefing on peace-keeping operations, Mr. Eckhard reported that UNAMIR plans to evacuate more civilians trapped behind confrontation lines in Kigali fell through when militias at a government-controlled site, the Sainte Famille church complex, blocked the operation. Also, the normal escort of gendarmes failed to show up. Some 3,000 civilians, mostly Tsi, were in the compound. Yesterday, 400 refugees had been evacuated by UNAMIR from the site, as had 225 mostly Hutu refugees from the King Faisal Hospital in an Rwandese Patriotic Front-controlled area.

A few minutes ago he had been informed that a senior official of the Rwandese Patriotic Front had said that he had information that this afternoon 30 to 40 children at the Sainte Famille site had been massacred. The UNAMIR had no way of confirming that report, he said.

Yesterday, questions had been raised as to whether UNAMIR peace-keeper Captain Mbaye Diagna Babacar of Senegal, who was killed in Rwanda on 31 May, would be recognized for heroism. There was no special United Nations commendation or citation, but the force commander had recommended that the home Government recognize his performance and that Senegal would honor him, he continued.

In other UNAMIR developments, Mr. Eckhard said that Zambia had offered a battalion of 800 infantry. That brought the number of troops pledged to more than UNAMIR required but lack of equipment remained a problem. There were conflicting reports as to the status of 50 armoured personnel carriers that South Africa was considering making available to the Mission; he had no official information from South Africa as to its decision. A United States contract for the leasing of 50 armoured personnel carriers would be considered by the United Nations committee on contracts today. The Organization was also looking into moving armoured personnel carriers from Somalia.

END OF PART 1 OF 2  
SIDOROVA

=0615940011GMT

NNNN

if the situation  
is understood.

15/6  
DFC

If a senior  
not official  
describes suffering  
of troops in the  
field as grum-  
bling when he  
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safety and  
comfort (I  
feel sad  
and sorry  
for what  
the whole  
UN is about,

CRN-210

P1/1

UNAMIR  
94 JUN 15 20 24

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: ANYIDHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA  
DATE: 15 JUNE 1994  
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH PARTIES  
REFERENCE: YOUR CODE CABLE 1952 OF 14 JUNE 1994

*Handwritten signature*

MIR-1171

Both parties have been consulted concerning troop contributions and  
neither have any objections. Consultations were verbal. Regards.

UNAMIR  
94 JUN 15 20 46

UNAMIR  
1994 JUN 12 06 55

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U N A M I R  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-206

P1/1

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: ANYIDHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Handwritten signature*  
DATE: 12 JUN 1994  
NUMBER: MIR-1153  
SUBJECT: PRIORITY TROOP REQUIREMENTS

1. IN VIEW OF THE EXPECTED VOLUME OF TROOP MOVEMENT AND THE NEED FOR INITIAL TRAFFIC CONTROL DURING DEPLOYMENT FOR NEXT PHASE, THE MILITARY POLICE COMPANY AND A MOVCON ELEMENT ARE CONSIDERED THE FIRST PRIORITY REQUIREMENT. REQUEST STEPS BE TAKEN TO GET THEM INTO KIGALI FIRST FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE VARIOUS STAGING POINTS.

2. THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE IMMINENT DEPLOYMENT OF MANY CONTINGENTS, WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY TROOPS YET. IF DEPLOYMENT IS TO PROCEED AS PLANNED, RECCE PARTIES FROM EACH CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY NEED TO ARRIVE ASP. WE HAVE NOTICE OF THE CANADIAN RECCE PARTY BUT OF NO OTHERS.

MIR 1169

UNAMIR  
1994 JUN 12 06 59





1/2

IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE



CRN 205

UNAMIR  
194 JUN 11 09 56

To: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
From: ANYIDHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI *[Signature]*  
Date: 11 June 1994  
Number: MUR 1148  
Subject: EVACUATION OF CHILDREN  
Reference: Your code cable UNAMIR 1924 of 10 June 1994.

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1. Your code cable referred to a request that had already been received from M. Bernard Kouchner earlier. Attached is our reply. Since sending it, we have received word of an incident in the area involving an as yet unidentified orphanage. We have despatched a team to investigate. The situation in Kigali today is as you have described in para 3 of your code cable.

2. Best regards.

*[Signature]* EDIR



2/2

Kigali, le 10 juin 1994

Monsieur le Président,

Je vous remercie de votre lettre du 9 juin dernier et de votre préoccupation concernant la sécurité des orphelins à Kigali. Nous sommes également très concernés par leur sécurité et nous faisons tout ce qui est dans notre pouvoir pour les protéger, malgré nos ressources limitées. Bien que je partage votre désir de trouver une solution pour mettre ces enfants en sécurité, la situation à Kigali s'est détériorée à un tel point que je ne crois pas possible de les évacuer sans les exposer à un risque encore plus grand.

Nous avons obtenu du succès auprès des Forces Gouvernementales en leur faisant accepter la responsabilité de protéger certains des orphelinats dans la région de Kigali et avons déjà attiré leur attention sur les orphelinats qui vous intéressent. Bien que cela ne semble pas être d'une grande assurance dans une ville dominée par des milices indisciplinées, je crois que cette option leur offre une meilleure chance que de les déplacer à travers les nombreux barrages qui les séparent des lieux sûrs auxquels ils ont droit. Basé sur nos expériences, ces barrages peuvent s'avérer très dangereux.

Veuillez accepter, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de mes plus profonds regrets de devoir vous donner ce conseil et soyez assuré de mon désir le plus fervent de voir ces enfants demeurer sains et saufs jusqu'à l'arrivée des troupes dont j'ai besoin pour la conduite de telles opérations. Je me permets donc de vous demander de reporter votre visite et cette évacuation jusqu'à ce que plus de troupes soient mises à ma disposition.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. Anyidoho'.

H.K. Anyidoho  
Brigadier-Général  
Commandant Adjoint de la Force

Monsieur Bernard KOUCHNER  
Président  
Association pour l'Action Humanitaire  
56-60, rue de la Glacière  
75640 PARIS CEDEX 13  
France



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 204  
MIR 1138

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR (2 pages)  
194 JUN -9 19 33 1/2

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: ANYIDOHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA  
DATE: 09<sup>th</sup> JUNE 1994  
SUBJECT: ATTACKS ON THE UN

1. At approximately 1035 hrs on 9 Jun, the UNAMIR headquarters building in Kigali was hit by what appeared to be an aimed round of anti-tank or artillery fire. At 1230 hrs a UNAMIR convoy to escort the RGF contingent to cease fire talks was shelled. Over the past few days, we have discovered prepared demolitions in one of the UNICEF building in Kigali near our headquarters, were fired on by artillery at KIA when our resupply flight was on the ground and were fired on by HMG at UNAMIR HQ just prior to a daily meeting. These incidents together constitute a disturbing pattern that will require investigation. One could speculate that there are elements of one or both of the parties to the Rwandan conflict that want to intimidate UNAMIR.

2. Our patrols in the Kigali area over the past two days have had an increasingly difficult time navigating around the fighting and yesterday were involved in a very tense incident in which a French journalist was shot and the rest of the team had a narrow escape.

- 1 -

FEERIR



The danger level near or behind the RGF lines is already enough to induce a fairly high level of tension among UN personnel. Paranoia aside, renegade elements within the RGF lines are making movement difficult. UNAMIR will continue exercise a level of caution commensurate with mission accomplishment. Would appreciate the arrival of the cavalry soon.

3. Best regards.

2/2

- 2 -



CRN203

PAGE 1 UNAMIR

94 JUN -8 21 33

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

(8 PAGES)

TO: *Dallaire* RZA (ONLY), UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
(NO DISTRIBUTION)

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 8 JUN 1994

NUMBER: MIR 1138

SUBJECT: DRAFT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA RWANDA  
(UNOMUR)

1. THE ENCLOSED IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION.
2. REGARDS.

MIR 1138

EDIR  
L<sup>©</sup>

DRAFT

DRAFT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS  
OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA RWANDA (UNOMUR)

1. Under paragraph 2 of Resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR), to be deployed on the Ugandan side of the border for an initial period of six months, subject to review every six months. By paragraph 3 of the same Resolution, the Council decided that UNOMUR would monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda, focusing primarily in that regard on transit or tour tracks that could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material that could be of military use.

2. By paragraph 2 of its Resolution 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNOMUR for a period of six months, as envisaged in the Council's resolution 846. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolutions 846 and 891 (1993) and covers the period since my last Report on the subject to the Council, dated 15 December 1993 (document S/26878).

I. DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES

3. As of 3 June 1994, UNOMUR was composed of 81 military observers, from the following countries: Bangladesh (20), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Hungary (4), Netherlands (10), Senegal (10), Slovakia (5) and Zimbabwe (10). In addition, the Mission included 11 international civilian and 7 locally-recruited staff performing a variety of substantive and



administrative support tasks.

4. Prior to the resumption of hostilities in Rwanda in April 1994, and as pointed out in my report of 15 December, UNOMUR's deployment and operational activities covered mainly two major and three secondary crossing sites stretching from Sabinio volcano in the west to Lubirizi in the East, on the Ugandan side of the border. Since the resumption of the Rwandese civil war, UNOMUR has extended its observation activities to the whole border, up to Mirama Hill on the eastern part of the Ugandan side of the border, a distance of some 170 km from Sabinio Volcano to the West.

5. During the period under review, UNOMUR has, especially since the renewed outbreak of war, carried out its tasks essentially through the increasingly vigorous patrolling, monitoring and surveillance of the whole stretch of the operational area, involving both mobile and fixed observation as well as on-site investigations of suspected cross-border traffic. Their success has been useful in helping to establish credibility in the face of RGF contentions concerning Ugandan support and has thus eliminated to some extent one of the uncertainties that hampered negotiations. More importantly, as the RGF continue to argue that the embargo is more harmful to them, as conventional forces, than to the RPF who operate unconventionally. UNOMUR operations permit us to reply that our surveillance activities take this into account.

6. To help meet the increased operational requirements that have emerged since the resumption of hostilities, UNOMUR currently maintains 7 observation posts and checkpoints manned on a 24 hour basis as opposed to 2 previously. The arrival in the Mission area, in early April, of three helicopters has also strengthened UNOMUR's overall operational capacity, although the helicopters lack of night-vision capability has proved to be a serious limitation, especially with regard to their use for night aerial surveillance or reconnaissance. The helicopters are currently used primarily for emergency medical evacuation purposes, the transportation of military observers to observation post, especially in remote or difficult-to-



reach locations, daytime aerial surveillance, patrolling and reconnaissance and the transportation, from Kampala to Kabale and back of senior visitors to the Mission area.

7. The recent extension of the Mission's monitoring activities to the whole border has also necessitated the readjustment of tasks and the reassignment of military observers in the operational area. Consequently, the headquarters staff at Kabale has been reduced from 14 prior to the recommencement of the war to 9 currently to permit the creation of additional monitoring teams, with the remaining headquarters personnel also participating, as appropriate, in patrolling and other monitoring assignments.

8. In carrying out its monitoring mandate, UNOMUR is currently performing a number of specific tasks, including, inter alia:

- (a) fixed 24 hour manned observation through the two main crossing sites at Katuna and Cyanika and the secondary crossing points at Bigaga, Lubirizi, Kafunzo, Kashekye and Mirama Hill;
- (b) random day and night mobile patrols to cover routes or tracks which require surveillance;
- (c) random day and night foot patrols covering areas which also require surveillance but are inaccessible by mobile/vehicle patrols;
- (d) random aerial day patrols involving the airlifting by helicopter of military observers into areas of high elevation for a clearer view and observation of routes leading to the border.
- (e) random aerial day surveillance by helicopter of the border areas and routes. Such surveillance is often conducted by Mission commanders and staff to monitor movements along the border and routes leading to the border.

9. UNOMUR's activities in pursuance of its mandate have generally been effective during the reporting period especially as the Mission's surveillance capacity was recently enhanced with the arrival of three helicopters. As a result, despite intensified activities,





since the resumption of hostilities, it appears that the decrease in clandestine cross-border traffic mentioned in my previous report to the Council (S/26878), has generally persisted.

10. With the overall situation in Rwanda having changed drastically since the incidents that began with the plane crash in Kigali, on 6 April, that killed the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, and as the renewed civil war has intensified, tensions have risen and relations with the civilian and military authorities in the Mission area, though generally cordial and cooperative, have come under increased pressure. Attempts to restrict, curtail or prevent UNOMUR patrols have increasingly been reported, including isolated reports of the harassment of patrol teams. Though allegations that troops and support equipment for the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) have been crossing the Ugandan border into Rwanda have continued to grow, especially since the resumption of hostilities, it has not been possible, through UNOMUR's observations and investigations, to substantiate these claims. As the war continues, it is not inconceivable that such allegations could increase even further, thus heightening even more tensions and pressures that could impact on relations with the authorities in the mission area as such reports are investigated. UNAMIR's capacity to conduct such investigations would be enhanced if all of the borders could be monitored in the same way. While it is possible to assure the RGF that the alleged RPF supply lines are being monitored thanks to the presence of UNOMUR, the same assurance cannot be given to the RPF with respect outside assistance to the RGF.

## II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS

11. By its resolution 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993, the Security Council noted that the integration of UNOMUR within UNAMIR, called for by the Council in its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, was purely administrative in nature and in no way affected the mandate of UNOMUR as set out in resolution 846 (1993). Consequently, UNOMUR's status of mission agreement (SOMA) has remained valid and has continued to govern relations between Uganda and the United Nations in this matter. Furthermore, UNOMUR's



operations in pursuance of its mandate have continued to be carried out smoothly and without limitations as a result of the administrative integration into UNAMIR.

12. The personnel and material resources available provide adequate administrative and logistical support for UNOMUR's operations, in accordance with its mandate. There was however continuing concern during the period under review over the long delays it took to construct observation posts and check-points as well as to receive spare parts and batteries for transportation and communication equipment.

13. The total operating costs for UNOMUR for the period 22 December 1993 to 22 June 1994 have been estimated at \$..... gross (\$.....net). These estimates take into account the actual dates of arrival of military and civilian personnel in the Mission areas and savings made as a result of the redeployment to UNOMUR of equipment from other peace-keeping operations.

### III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14. It is now nearly a year since the Security Council decided to establish UNOMUR and almost ten months since the Mission was fully deployed in its operational area. It is to be recalled that the establishment of UNOMUR was intended to create an atmosphere conducive to a negotiated settlement of the Rwandese conflict and to underscore the importance that the international community attaches to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. I wish to reaffirm my strong belief that UNOMUR has been a factor of stability in the area and has from its inception played a useful confidence-building role. This aspect of its work has been particularly critical in recent months as UNOMUR has striven to defuse tensions associated with developments since hostilities resumed in April.

15. However, as a result of the dramatically changed situation in the Rwandese conflict, both the priorities and requirements of the international community for dealing with that conflict have also evolved and may appear to have invalidated the raison d'être of

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UNOMUR. In this connection, it is to be recalled in particular that the Security Council, by its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May, decided to expand the United Nations' role in Rwanda by emphasizing additional humanitarian tasks and by deciding to impose an embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunition and related material to Rwanda. As the embargo is intended to apply to all of Rwandan borders, it will be increasingly difficult to monitor only one border without taking on the appearance of bias. To achieve credibility, it will be essential to monitor all borders. This can be done most effectively from within Rwandan territory.

16. Putting forces in place within Rwanda to monitor the embargo will be extremely difficult until such a time as a cease-fire has been achieved. But, as the issue of Ugandan assistance is one of the major hurdles in the negotiations, it is vital that UNOMUR remain in action until a cease-fire has been achieved. Their presence allows us to address the issue of outside interference to some degree and thus to deal with one of the critical issues. I therefore recommend that the verification of this border continue until such a time as we are able to get a cease-fire in place. Once this has been achieved, surveillance of all of Rwanda's borders can be effected by UNAMIR, operating entirely inside of Rwanda.

17. In view of the difficulty of cease-fire negotiations so far and in consideration of the delicacy of the talks, it is difficult to predict precisely the most suitable date for the termination of UNOMUR's mandate. Consequently, I would like to recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of UNOMUR be renewed for a period of up to 4 months and that the disposition of their assets be reviewed in the context of the progress of cease-fire talks at that time. In the meantime, the UNOMUR HQ in Kabale should be given the task of coordinating the logistics, humanitarian activities of UNAMIR through the Kabale transit base.

18. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to the Government of Uganda for the cooperation and assistance extended to the United Nations throughout the existence



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of UNOMUR. Without their help, it would have been impossible to discharge effectively the important mandate assigned to the Mission. I also wish to pay tribute to both the military and civilian personnel of UNOMUR for the professionalism and dedication with which they have carried out their tasks under very difficult conditions.

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(4 pages)

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FOR: RIZA, DPKO  
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA  
DATE: 8 JUNE 1994  
SUBJECT: DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR UNAMIR  
REFERENCE: YOUR CODE CABLE 1839 OF 7 JUNE 1994

CRN 202  
HR 1130

1. The document attached at reference is first class. The tone and content reflect very positively the orientation of this Mission.

2. There are however three comments that we wish to offer:

a. Para 1. The Phases 1 and 2 deployment in "close synchronisation" is very good. We hope that this means we can deploy Phase 2 at the same time as Phase 1, for that is an absolute must due to the far over delays that we are already have to deal with. Secondly, there is no mention of Phase 3. Whether this is deliberate or not, we feel that a statement must be added that specifies the time frame or process that must be used by UNAMIR to be able to come back to the Security Council with its Phase 3 implementation plan. We would prefer

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that Phase 3 implementation simply be ready to execute at the end of the Phases 1 and 2 operational deployment but we can accept a procedure that tells us to report back during Phases 1 and 2 (in a timely fashion) in order to get Phase 3 mobile with a minimum delay.

b. Para 9. Again we feel that the cease-fire subject has been relegated much too much to a secondary position. The cease-fire will permit us to get into the far west and north-west heartland (Cyngago, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi) much sooner than if we had no cease-fire. The planned Phase 1 and Phase 2 assets do not provide us with the force levels needed to permit us to go so far into RGF territory without a cease-fire. Some UNMOs and a few formed troops could conduct very limited monitoring and humanitarian security tasks in these outer reaches with a cease-fire because it would at least provide a reasonable feeling of confidence that the shooting and aggression were being controlled through the agreement between the three of us (RGF/RPF/UNAMIR). This would be an important start and even encourage the rapid deployment of Phase 3. We thus recommend that:

(1) Para. 9 be moved up to at least para. 6 in order that it would support para 5. The paragraph should indicate clearly that it is expected that UNAMIR forces will be so deployed as to be able to monitor effectively

a cease-fire agreement and that forces, both UNMOs and formed troops, be even accelerated in their deployment in order to be able to respond to both the tasks in para. 4 and the cease-fire monitoring.

(2) Possibly a rider can be added to either para. 1 or para. 9, specifically stating that should a cease-fire agreement be signed, then Phase 3 assets will be accelerated into the theatre in order to provide the levels of troops and UNMOs that will be essential for both major tasks: the humanitarian security and support contribution and the cease-fire monitoring.

c. There is no mention of UNOMUR. It is our recommendation that UNOMUR be maintained for another 2 months as an element of political stability and then be reduced by more than half (mobile patrols and HQ staff), and then be eliminated. The delay of 2 months to keep UNOMUR at current strength is necessary due to the fact that the RGF continue to argue that the embargo is against them but does not disrupt the unorthodox rebel forces arms acquisition methods. We are now able to respond that if that is so, the only border now under surveillance is the Uganda/Rwanda border that they accuse the RPF of using for supplies. This has been a very effective argument and we wish to maximise it for as long as we can during the cease-fire negotiations over the next while.

3. We can work with this modified resolution and look forward to the Security Council's continued support in getting men and material into Rwanda ASAP.

4. Best regards.

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