

WDR

MISCELLANEOUS

1 MAR 1944 - 12 JAN 1945

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[5 CONFIDENTIAL]
RHWG JULY 2009

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES 5-1002
BOX 167
FILE 4
ACC. 1998/083

12 Jan 95

From : Force Engineer Company

To : DFC (UNAMIR HQ) ✓

Subject : ROUTE RECCE : MPANDA - RUSENGE - BUNGE AND JALI

1. Refer sitrep dated 03 Jan 95 and remarks of DFC for carrying out a recce of the route Mpanda (5607), Rusenge (5904), Bunge (5501) and Jali (5900) (copy attached for reference).

2. Recce for the route was carried out on 11 Jan 95. Details are as under :-

(a) Mpanda is located approximately 20 KM from Butare. Track between Butare - Mpanda is jeepable one way track. Track between Mpanda to Rusenge is jeepable but has ruts in between and due to the absence of drain, rain water travels along the track.

(b) Between Rusenge and Bunge (distance approximately 15.5 KM) the track is narrow and at places is covered with grass.

(c) The houses along the track Mpanda - Jali are deserted and only houses around Mpanda are occupied.

3. The work involed for improving the track are as follows :-

(a) Clearing of under growth along the road.

(b) Digging of a drain to channelise the rain water so as to avoid damage to the road.

(c) Filling of ruts by putting stone aggregate and mud.

4. Due to inaccessibility of the area engineer plant can not be utilised and the work can be done by employing mannual labour only.

FED
So who exactly
will employ this
labour? Carry out
Liaison with C/Gs
and find out whether
Brown + Route has
that responsibility
13/1
DFC

Encls : (two only)




(B D Pandey)
 Major
 OC Force Engr Coy

c.c. : Force Engineer Officer - For information.

Q6 recce
18/1/95
SB

ROAD RECCE MPANDA TO BUNGE



NOT TO SCALE

send in
Force Engr Off:

1/3 Gorona Rifles	
CC	✓
2 IC	82
ADJT	Q
QM	
MTO	

(38)

PRATEYEN UCCVDE0006 0032200-DUEU--UCCVDA UCCVDD.
243 00000
P 002200 JAN 95
FM UCCVDEB/UNAMIR HQ BUTARE7
TO UCCVDA/UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS/DFC/HAC//
INFO UCCVDD/SECTOR 3 HQ GITARAYA
BT
LOCALS OPS 181
SUBJ: SITREP COVERING PERIOD 002200 TO 002200 JAN 95
IN GEN SIT: CALM

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES: NTR.

FACED ACTIVITIES:

1. DEAF: CONTINUE CONDUCTING PATROLS AND SNAF ROAD BLIND
2. THE WHOLE AREA.

3. OPS: NTR.

4. MILITIA: NTR.

5. VILLAGER ACTIVITIES:

A. VALAN. COY: PATROL WAS SENT LONG ROUTE MPANDAY 5907
KUSINGE 5902 (SPRINGE 5507) AND ALPH 5900 AND REPORTED THAT THE
MAIN PROBLEM IN THE AREA IS THAT LOCALS FAIL TO RECD VE
ASSISTANCE IN TIME BECAUSE MOST OF THE ROADS ARE IMPASSABLE
THE SO HEAVY RAINS. ANOTHER PARTOL WAS SENT TO RUTINYA MCO.
ADVISED THAT THE LOCALS ARE BEING HAPPY WITH UNAMIR PRESENCE
THE AREA.

6. TRANSITARIAN ACTIVITIES:

A. ST. RETOUR. 874 DPG MOVED FROM CYANIRA TO BITHA. 1. 1. 1. 1.
821 DPG MOVED FROM NYAGO TO BITHA. 1. 1. 1. 1.
KIBUNGO AREA.

7. CIVIL AFFAIRS: NTR.

8. ECONOMICS: NTR.

9. OTHER: NTR.

CO-ALDBBTIP
Could your Engrs pse
carry-out a recce in
that area.

②
COS

30/11/94

Engr Det

10
06.01.95

05/1
DFC

Recd on 11 Jan 95

3 GORONA RIFLES
Register No. 995/02/14
Date 6/1/95
Recd Ref.
Ref Ref.



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Force PM
INFO: D COS Ops & DCOS SP
FROM: Maj J-G Plante
CO Force MP Coy
DATE: 12 Dec 94
SUBJECT: OP OVERTURE -ROUTE RECCE REPORTS

② DFC
your info, Sir
Jury
CO

1. As I told you, on 11 Dec, I dispatched a team of MPs to conduct recce on both RED and GREEN routes. Their reports are attached to this Memo.
2. Without being alarmist, at least one large portion of RED route is very rough to say the least.
3. Time permitting, I am planning to produce NATO type Road Cards (example attached) to be distributed, in the Assembly Area, to Packet Commanders.
4. A conclusion made by my team is that it is almost impossible to pound Traffic Control Signs into the ground as the soil seems to be as hard as rock. Moreover, there are very few trees or other posts that we can use to fix our TC signs. We will however do our best with what we have.
5. Consequently, I will adjust my Traffic Control MP Deployment Plan accordingly to include several MP Jeep Teams deployed at Critical Points. Again, I reemphasize the requirement for 8 vehicles.

Q6
13/12/94
SB

PAM
Let us do the best out
of a difficult sit-
JG
12/12
DFC/COS



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Maj J-G Plante
CO Force MP Coy

FROM: Sgt Vezina/Cpl Picard

DATE 12 Dec 94

SUBJECT: ROUTE RECCE REPORT - 11 DEC 94

RED ROUTE from grid 052 132 to grid 839 094

SERIAL	GRID	KMS FROM START	REMARKS
1	052 132	0	SP - paved road for 38 kms. Good road, a lot of hills, average speed of 10 ton approx 50 km/h
2	792 231	38	End of paved road. TC 2 x JT required. Left turn onto dirt road. Sharp curve from both directions of paved road.
3	792 231	38	Extremely rough road for 23 kms. Very narrow road, steep ridges on either sides at different times. One way route only. Average speed 20 km/h. Suggest positioning wreckers at different intervals in case of break down. Minimum vehicle is 4x4 pickup, anything else such as mini Buses would have difficult times using that portion of the road.

4		45	Small wooden culvert - supported by sandbags should not cause a problem unless heavy rains washout
5		47.5	T junction at village - very populated area - TC required, 1 x TC 2 x security
6		48.6	UN Check point - s curve set up - should be dismantled for easier convoy access
7		50.8	Roads to left and right - continue straight - ideal spot to place wrecker/MRT on standby
8		52.6	Driveway on left - continue straight - ideal place for wrecker/MRT on standby
9		54.6	RWAMIKO - UN road block around a curve - should be dismantled for easy access by convoy.
10		59.1	Culvert bad shape - deep hole repair/fill if possible prior to move
11		59.3	Bridge - T junction to the left continue straight. No class on bridge - concrete ends wooden construction about 12 inches thick, 6 inches at point of contact with cement. Appears to be sufficient - suggest engineers check.
12		61	Village - RP - steep hill into village - stop first vehicle before the bridge and marshall all other vehicles behind. if poor weather, vehicles will be stuck if they stop on the hill.

General Notes RED Route - At the assembly area vehicles must be marshalled into the RED route in order that they must proceed at the SP. There is no room to pass vehicles on the last 23 kms of the route. If MRT/wreckers are placed along the route, they can extract vehicles that have broken down, once again no room for vehicles to pass. The last 23 kms of this road is very dangerous. Several steep ridges along a narrow route. Drivers must be alert. From Grid 792 231 to grid 830 130 there are several small villages/refugee camps that are very populated. Villages to note at grid 801 196 and 801 207, very populated.

GREEN ROUTE from grid 049 123 to grid 869 074

SERIAL	GRID	KMS FROM START	REMARKS
1	049 123	0	SP - intersection at Bank Commercial de RWANDA and Hotel Falcon - right turn - TC 1 x JT required - dirt road for entire route of 22.8 kms. Wide road through NGOMA narrows to single lane one way traffic after NGOMA roads are rough and full of pot holes
2		.1	T junction to the right continue straight
3		.4	Intersection - Stop Sign - left turn onto divided road
4		1.3	RPA compound road to the left - continue straight
5		1.6	T junction to the left - continue straight roads become narrow and rough through the village
6		2.4	Fork in road to the right - continue straight
7		3.8	End of village of NGOMA - roads are rough and narrow - Fork to the right - continue straight
8		6.5	Small village roads to the left and to the right - continue straight - wrecker can be placed at this point on standby
9		10.2	Small bridge - wooden construction cement ends - 12 inches thick on travel portion - 6 inches thick at joint to cement - Class unknown
10		11.7	Small bridge - same as above - Class unknown
11		11.9	Fork in the road stay left - sign RUNYNIA STADT - TC if possible 1 x JT - wrecker/MRT can be placed at this point on standby
12		13.1	Small bridge - as above Class unknown

13		13.5	Deep culvert - washed out - repair/fill prior to move if possible
14		13.8	Small bridge as above - Class unknown
15		15.2	Small bridge as above - Class unknown
16		20.7	Deep culvert - washed out - fill prior to move if possible
17		21.6	Deep culvert - washed out - fill prior to move if possible
18		22.8	RP - small wooden bridge - as above - Class unknown- marshall vehicles before the bridge. 4.7 kms to the camp at KIBEHO

General Notes GREEN Route - At the assembly area vehicles must be marshalled into the GREEN route in order that they must proceed at the SP. TherAlthough the roads are narrow and rough, this route is much better to travel than the RED route. Very few people encountered on this route during the recce. If MRT/wreckers are placed along the route, they can extract vehicles that have broken down, once again no room for vehicles to pass.



UNAMIR II

ROUTE CARD

RED ROUTE

	DISTANCE	DETAILS	SKETCH
1	0	SP	
2	.1	RIGHT TURN - PAVED ROAD FOR 38 KMS	

TCP = TRAFFIC CONTROL POST

3	38 KMS	LEFT TURN ONTO DIRT ROAD AT TC POINT. EXTREMELY ROUGH ROAD.	
---	--------	---	--

4	45	SMALL WOODEN CULVERT	
---	----	----------------------	--

5	47.5	T-JUNCTION TURN RIGHT AT TCP IN SMALL VILLAGE	
---	------	---	--

6	48.6	UN CHECK POINT	
---	------	----------------	--



7	50.8	CONTINUE STRAIGHT. ROADS TO THE LEFT AND RIGHT.	
---	------	---	--

8	52.6	CONTINUE STRAIGHT. DRIVEWAY ON LEFT	
---	------	-------------------------------------	--

9	54.6	VILLAGE OF rwamiko - UN CHECK POINT AROUND CURVE.	
---	------	--	--

10	59.1	CULVERT IN BAD SHAPE	
----	------	----------------------	--

11	59.3	BRIDGE - CLASS UNKNOWN CONTINUE STRAIGHT T-JUNCTION TO THE LEFT. STOP PRIOR TO BRIDGE.	
----	------	---	--

12	61	RP - VILLAGE ON HILL. STEEP HILL STOP BEFRE THE BRIDGE TO MARSHALL VEHICLES	<i>Jillay</i>		
----	----	---	---------------	---	---

S

MEMORANDUM

3000.5(FEO)/OPS/-1


23 Nov 94

Distribution List

ENGINEERING RECCE OF THE ROADS

1. FRAFBATT is requested to carry out the engineering recce of the road RUTSIRO and KAYOVE, specially between (A 3184) and (A 3284) or (2893).

2. Recce report is expected NLT 30 Nov 94.


J. Anp
COL
D COS OPS

DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>Action</u>	<u>Info</u>
FRAFBATT	DFC/COS

*Sam
J. Anp
25/11
D. J. Anp*

*G6
28/11/94
SB*

UNAMIR

RECEIVED
WELF/2000.MISC
16 March 1994


See Distr

RECONNAISSANCE ALONG LAKE KIVU OF PREMISES SUITABLE FOR "REST X RECREATION" PURPOSES

Reference:

A. CAO's Inter office memo dated 6 Feb 94.

Attached please find feasibility report submitted by Force Welfare Officer on the above mentioned subject for further action.


A.S. Jamil
Lt Col
CMPO

Distr:

Action:

DFC/COS

Info:

CGSO (Attn: Ms MT MEIMARI)

RECONNAISSANCE ALONG LAKE KIVU OF PREMISES SUITABLE FOR "REST & RECREATION" PURPOSES

Reference:

A. CAO's Inter-Office Memorandum dated 6 Feb 94.

1. The Welfare Officer teamed up with MS MT MEIMARI - Adm Officer in charge of accommodation to make a day's feasibility check on the Rest and Recreational facilities along Lake Kivu on the 8 March 1994.

2. The route for the team is as stated below:

Sl No	From	Speedometer at Departure	To	Speedometer on arrival	Travelling distance Kilometres	Road	Travelling Times	Remarks
1	Kigali	25680	Gitar- rama	25733	53	Aspha- lited	40 mins	Good
2	Gita- rama	25733	Butare	25809	76	"	1 hr	"
3	Butare	25809	Kira- mbo	25953	144	Asphalt ed to Rwesero	4 hrs	No-Aspha- lited from Rwesero- Kirambo (Fair)
4	Kirambo	25953	Kibuye	26027	74	Non- Asphalt- ed	3 hrs	Narrow- Fair
5	Kibuye	26027	Kibuye (E.P. Hostel)	26030	3	"		Fair
6	Kibuye (E.P. Hostel)	26030	Gita- rama	26110	80	(Under Constr) Pot- hole	4 hrs	Fair Bad Very slippery when rained.
7	Gita- mara	26110	Kigali	26163	53	Asphalt- ed	50 mins	Good

3. The team then arrived in Butare at 0745 hrs and made a few inquiries about the National Museum of Rwanda which will be of interest to visitors to the area. Details of the Museum are as :

a. Opening Hours (Daily incl Sundays).

(1) 0900 - 1200 hrs

(2) 1400 - 1700 hrs

b. Entrance Fee : 100 RWF with 50% discount for a group of 20 people or more people.

4. Butare is a beautiful town with a maximum drive of two (2) hours from Kigali, has other places of interest in addition to the National Museum. Such places are the Souvenir Shop, Vocational School for girls where handy crafts are sold, the University Campus. It is recommended for recreational trips alongside with the Akagera National Park.

5. At 1145 hrs, we arrived in Kirambo a small industrial Complex. A guide by name Hitimano Deo Gratiias led us to the accommodation premises. Tabulated below please find details about the category of accommodation available:

a. Accommodation Premises.

Single	Double	Likely to be converted to Double	Sitting/Dinning	Kitchen	Store	Bathroom Complete	Remarks
1	4	2	1	2	1	2	

b. Prefabricated building - Non-rented.

Double	Sitting/Dinning	Bathroom complete	Remarks
2	1	1	Electricity available

c. Admin Building within the Factory likely to be converted to leaving rooms.

Size	Rooms Available	No of Pers Room can accommodate	Maximum occupant	Toilets/ Showers	Remarks
10'x17'	2	2+3= 5	29 or 30	5 each	1. No water
17'x20'	4	6			2. Water tanker available with 1,500 liters of water

Observations

6. The rooms have not been furnished with beds mattresses and curtains.
7. An underground water reservoir available at Accn premises area but not functioning/operating.
8. Electricity is provided from the factory generator, when not delivered from the mains.
9. No public holiday resort.
10. At 1515 hrs we arrived in Kibuye and had our lunch at Hotel Golfe Eden.

11. We then drove to EPR CENTRE BETHANIE. Where the Manager conducted us round and briefed us as follows.

a. There are two (2) categories of rooms.

(1) A double room with Bath Room and Toilet attached =1,700 RWF per day.

(2) Room detached with Bath room and toilet = 1300 RWF per day.

b. Meals are charged as follows:

(1) Breakfast = 250 RWF per day

(2) Lunch = 550 RWF " "

(3) Dinner = 55 RWF " "

c. Electricity is provided three (3) times in a week from the National resource. There is an unserviceable generator. We were told it will be put to use as soon as it is serviced to supply electricity daily.


d. Reservation has been carried out up till the 2nd week of April 94. This will be followed by a seminar and thereafter there will be more vacancies for lodging.

Recommendations

13. The following are recommended:

a. In view of its proximity to Kigali, the excellent facilities available and its ideal locations, Butare may be included on the list of areas earmarked for recreational visits alongside the Akagera National Park.

b. Kibuye be included on the list of sites for "REST & RECREATION" visits. However such visits should be planned to begin in the early month of May by which time hopefully the constructional work on the main road leading to the town would be completed.



VKM Cooper-Glawu
Major
for CMPO

To : FC
From : COS

②
COS
Please make sure
you have the
complete file on
all correspondance
of this dossier. *PC 20/12*

RECCE OF VILLAGE URUGWIRO

1. Sector Commander Kigali, OPs Officer Kigali and COS carried out recce of Village URUGWIRO on 17 Dec 93 to find out suitability of the location for RPF battalion and their Political Wing. Following are the major points of the recce :-

a. It is a hotel complex owned by the Govt of Rwanda (Department of Tourism).

b. It has 22 one storied buildings (villas) and one reception center with a dining hall (restaurant). The whole complex covers an area of approximately 800 x 600 meters.

c. Each villa has 2 x double bedded rooms and 1x apartment having 1x living room and 1x bed room with a kitchen. It means the hotel has 44 double bedded rooms and 22 apartments.

d. The double bedded rooms can accommodate 5 to 6 persons if beds are removed. Each of these rooms has a toilet. If we consider that all the rooms less the apartments will be used as single men's barracks then a maximum of 220 persons (44x5) can be accommodated. But some rooms are to be kept reserved for their stores, armory, ammunition stores etc.

e. There are three open spaces, two in the front and one at the back. These areas can be used for fixing tents. At the most 100 to 150 soldiers can be accommodated there.

f. Security

(1) The area has wire fencing of about a man's height in all sides. There are 2 gates. One remains closed all the time. The other is used as the main gate.

(2) Immediately behind the hotel complex (just outside the fence) extremist Hutu tribe's people lives. They are reportedly politically linked with the MRND.

(3) One of the villas is reserved for the President of Rwanda and one for the Prime Minister. Rest of the villas/rooms are rented out. The Govt have to be told to vacate it by tuesday (21 Dec 93).

g. UN Troops Requirement. The complex needs

at least 4 permanent observation posts (two on the back side and two on the front side), one check point at the main entrance and a mobile patrol to look/observe the rear side. Total requirement is 1x platoon.

2. Recommendations.


a. The Urugwiro complex may be officially accepted as one of the sites for political wing and a portion of RPF battalion. ✓

b. The site is suitable for a maximum of 300 soldiers and their political wing. Approx 175 soldiers ($5 \times 35 = 175$) may be accommodated in 35 double bedded rooms and 9 rooms kept reserved as their stores etc. 100 to 150 soldiers will have to stay in the tents. VIPs to be kept in 22 apartments. }

c. For rest of the battalion i.e 300 people we need another accommodation. ✓

d. We may request Red Cross/UNDP/WFP to provide the RPF with some tents. We may also ask the RPF to bring in tents. }

G/17 1/3
TRAINING

TO : AHQ GS BR (SIG DTE) DHAKA CANTT	FROM: BGEN ANYIDHOHO, ACTING FC UNAMIR / KIGALI 
INFO: AHQ GS BR (MT DTE) DHAKA CANTT	
FAX NO: 88 - 02 - 883144 / 883233	FAX NO: 250 84266
SUBJ: APPLICATION FOR STAFF COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAM	
TO : GSO-1 (SIG DTE) DHAKA CANTT	ORIGINATOR - LT COL JAHANGIR ALAM CHOWDHURY CMPO
INFO: GSO-1 (MT DTE) DHAKA CANTT	
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : THREE (3)	

SUBJ APPLICATION OF BA-2333 MAJ SAYED GOLAM ZAHID, SIGS ALONG WITH THE FWD LTR ARE SENT HEREWITH FOR YOUR NEC ACTION PL.

2. 6 COPIES OF THE APPLICATION FORM MAY PLEASE BE PREP AND SUBMITTED TO AHQ, MT DTE BEFORE 24 MAR 94 AFTER NEC ACTION AT YOUR END.
3. ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE APPLICATION WILL FOLLOW.
4. REGARDS.

FC -

283233

Pl send it to AHQ.

UNAMIR
08 42

64 MAR 22
194 MAR 22
08 42

Ny - PSE RELAY TO DHAKA - TKJ.

(unable to get train)
(PT: "NO line TO DHAKA")

UN RESTRICTED

2/3
244

Bangladesh Contingent
UNAMIR
Kigali, Rwanda
Post Box No. 749
Tel : 86870

19 March 1994


C/008/1

See Distr :

APPLICATION FOR STAFF COURSE-ENTRANCE EXAMINATION (20) : 1994

1. Subject application form in respect of BA-2333 Maj Sayed Golam Zahid, Sigs of UNAMIR Force HQ (Ops Br) is sent herewith duly recommended for your necessary completion of para 17 and onward submission to AHQ GS Br (MT Dte) before 24 Mar 94 please.

2. Regards.


MASHIHUR RAHMAN BABUL
Maj
For Contingent Commander
Bangladesh Contingent

Encls : One (1)

Distr :

External :

Action :

✓ AHQ GS Branch (Sigs Dte)
Dhaka Cantonment
Bangladesh

Info :

AHQ MS Branch

AHQ GS Branch (MO Dte)


UN RESTRICTED

3/3
2440


FORM OF RECOMMENDATION FOR STAFF COURSE

1. Personal Number, Rank and Name : BA-2333 Maj Sayed Golam Zahid
2. Regiment/Corps : Signals
3. Personal Appointment : Trg Offr, Force HQ, UNAMIR, Rwanda
(DAMS, AHQ MS Br)
4. Centre at which the Offr will take the entrance exam : Dhaka
5. Medical Category : 'A' (AYE)
6. Date and Nature of Commission : 05 Nov 82 (Regular Commission)
7. Date of Birth : 01 July 1961
8. Total period of Commissioned service on 01 January of the Year of examination : 11 years 01 month 27 days
9. Age on date of commission : 21 years 04 months and 04 days.
10. Age on 01 January of the in which appear for entrance examination : 32 years 06 month 00 days.
11. (a) If an engineer graduate state qualifications (Graduate Engineer, M Sc in Electronic) : NA
(b) Any special qualification such as qualified interpreter and foreign languages as specified in Annexure 'R' to para 164 of Manual of Army Education 1976 : NA
12. If recommended previously, state for which course and give details : Yes. Staff College Entrance Examination-19 (Jul 93).
Not Selected
13. Authority for passing Captain to Major promotion exam : CORO ORDER NO. 112/Sigs/88 dated : 27 Aug 88.
14. Authority for attending Junior Tactics Course or Exemption from attending Junior Tactics course : CORO ORDER NO. 125/Sigs/88 Dated : 18 Sep 88.

15. Candidate's signature certifying above information to be correct

 18/3/94
(Signature)

16. Recommendation by Unit Commander
/(or equivalent)

Recommended.

Col
Contingent Comd
Bangladesh Contingent UNAMIR
(Signature)

17. Recommendation by Brigade Commander
/Director

(Signature)

18. Recommendation by Division Commander
/Head of Branch (or equivalent) :

(Signature)

KIBAT

Tf: 83522

Copy made
Original docs to
KS Comd
98/10/3

1000.7(DFC)/G/17

TRAINING

Date: 01 Mar 94

N° 002610

Ann: 3

Plse note. Have
try officer review
comment ASAM. They want to jump this week.
let's help them if Col Marchal
agrees. *[Signature]*
To Force Comdr
Through Sector Comdr
Info COps
(3) Kigali Sec Comd Bde Para Cdo
Let us discuss pse
+ 98/10/3
DFC/62.

[Signature]
MARCHEL. L
COLONEL
KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER

SUBJECT : Training plan for troops of the battalion

Ref : 1. Force HQ letter N° 1000.1(FC) dated 21 Jan 94
2. KIGALI Sector HQ letter N° 7128.9/X/Ops dated 24 Jan 94
3. UN Training guidelines exercises - General guide

1. Please find here attached our training plan as requested by document in Ref 2.

2. Introduction

- This plan is made in accordance with FCO's directives (Ref 1).
- Although NOT covered by documents in Ref 1 and Ref 2, we insist on the importance of physical training as a basic requirement, and as an excellent anti-stress therapy-in PK operations.
- This plan is made for airborne troops belonging to KIBAT. It can be adapted to other members of KIBAT (NOT airborne). It could also be used by other units or HQ's as a guide to some training facilities in RWANDA.

3. Aspects of training

a. General

- The general aspects of training like security, map reading, communication and voice procedures, observation and patrolling, sentry and guards duties, surveillance and use of night vision equipments, checkpoints, road-blocks,

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: DFC Brig. Gen. Anyidoho
A:FROM: Ladan M. Rafii
DE:

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

7/12/94

FOR ACTION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

FOR APPROVAL

POUR APPROBATION

FOR SIGNATURE

POUR SIGNATURE

FOR COMMENTS

POUR OBSERVATIONS

MAY WE DISCUSS?

POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?

YOUR ATTENTION

VOTRE ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

COMME CONVENU

AS REQUESTED

SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTE AND RETURN

NOTER ET RETOURNER

FOR INFORMATION

POUR INFORMATION

Susan
Open a miscellaneous type of folder
put notes like this on. Thank you
Jhi
09/12
DFC/103

NOTE FOR THE FILE

On 7 December 1994, the SRSG held a meeting with the Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on internally-displaced persons, Dr. Francis Deng, who was accompanied by his Associate Expert, Mr. Daniel Helle, and two interpreters. Also present were the Deputy Force Commander for UNAMIR, Mr. William Clarence and Mr. Alain Sique from the Centre for Human Rights, and a UNAMIR Political/Legal Officer.

In his introduction, the SRSG gave a general overview of the findings of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission of Experts appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda. He stated that according to their recently-published reports, both the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) are guilty of human rights violations, but that only the RGF can be accused of having committed genocide on a massive scale in Rwanda.

He added that, based upon the foregoing, it was not surprising that approximately 40-50% of the Rwandese population have left their homes resulting in an estimated 2 million refugees abroad and 350,000-400,000 internally-displaced persons (IDPs). He cited three reasons for the reluctance of these people to return to their homes:

- fear of acts of vengeance, summary justice and retribution upon their return, despite the Government's assurances to the contrary
- intimidation in the camps of a serious nature by members of the former Government seeking restrictions on the return of refugees
- lack of resources and facilities for recent returnees (such as a properly functioning system of law and order) due to insufficient public funds

The SRSG stated that UNAMIR was currently engaged in joint efforts with the Rwandese Government and other U.N. agencies to find ways and means of dismantling these camps without having to resort to the use of force. He emphasised the need for a voluntary return whereby the safety and security of the returnees could be ensured, despite the fact that the Government was intent on closing down the IDP camps, since they were beginning to resemble the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania with a nucleus of anti-Government activity developing within them. These armed elements engaged in political activity sought to destabilise the country by committing acts of banditry and violence in order to counteract any Government efforts aimed at restoring stability within Rwanda.

The Deputy Force Commander joined the SRSG in expressing the view that any deterioration in the general security situation in the country was of concern to UNAMIR, because it had been mandated by the U.N. Security Council to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. He claimed that only recently the prefect in Butare had sought UNAMIR's assistance in restoring law and order to his administrative area following the occurrence of incidents of killings along the border of Sectors 3 and 4. An investigation traced the murders to a concentration of IDPs from where armed elements were instigating acts of terror by mounting nightly attacks and then returning to the security of their IDP camps.


He added that following a series of meetings held with UNAMIR, the Government has agreed to undertake certain measures aimed at facilitating the return of IDPs. These include the removal of a number of roadblocks impeding the return of people to their homes, and the designation of an RPA officer in the lead vehicle of convoys leaving the camps to ensure safe passage for returnees. Further evidence of this spirit of cooperation could be noted in the fewer restrictions imposed upon the movement of UNAMIR personnel seeking to provide security to IDPs.

After expressing his gratitude to the SRSG for his kind reception, Dr. Deng then proceeded to state that although the problem of IDPs lies within the sovereignty of nations, there are certain responsibilities attached to the notion of sovereignty. That is, a country should be responsive to the international community's capacity to cooperate, if it is not able to maintain its sovereign responsibilities properly. He urged the importance of reconciling human rights with humanitarian aspects of the IDP problem.

He was particularly interested in the methodology to be used for encouraging the return of IDPs, as well as in the conditions awaiting them upon their return to their home areas, especially with regard to their security. He also enquired about the means to be used for obtaining governmental cooperation in dismantling the camps.

In response, the SRSG stated that Dr. Deng's assistance was needed to convince the Rwandese Government to adopt UNAMIR's approach to solving the problems posed by the IDP camps. He believed that it was imperative for the Government to demonstrate its cooperation with the world community in addressing the problem of displaced persons, particularly if it wished to gain access to the large amounts of foreign aid needed desperately for its economic and social rehabilitation. In return, there was an urgent need for international action to provide immediate financial assistance, as the Government did not now have the means of ensuring the safety and security of returnees by maintaining proper law and order throughout the country.

Dr. Deng also made enquiries regarding the methods adopted by UNAMIR in assuring the Government that armed elements would not take over the IDP camps; the issue of a broader power-sharing arrangement to ensure the political legitimacy of the current Government; the possibility of a major offensive being launched by rebel forces situated in the refugee camps abroad; and the interplay between the situation in Burundi and that of Rwanda.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ladan M. Rafii', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Ladan M. Rafii
Political/Legal Officer
7 December 1994

S25G
DFC
ED
wfo.
9/12
102

Susan
on the MRC file
JG
9/12
DFC/US

Winnie Mandela. The two may or may not be genuine Africanists. But they both recognise that Africanism has a powerful appeal. How powerful, though? No more so, argues Tom Lodge, professor of political studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, than in the 1950s, when Africanists broke from the ANC to found the Pan Africanist Congress. They said then that whites and Indians in the ANC were diluting its African-nationalist tradition. Today, says Mr Lodge, the whites and Indians in Mr Mandela's cabinet—men such as Joe Slovo and Jay Naidoo—are popular with poor blacks. Yet the ANC over the decades has had to incorporate successive waves of Africanist ideas into its own, to meet the challenge of more radical rivals. Its salute is still the clenched fist of black power. As Mr Mandela recounts in his autobiography, published in America and Britain this week, he and others such as Mr Lekota, who now preach—and practise—non-racialism, were once fierce proponents of black nationalism; indeed Mr Lekota joined the ANC only after he had been jailed for his black-consciousness activities and met Mr Mandela on Robben Island. It is no surprise that younger figures follow the black path. The poorest people and the mass support of the ANC are, after all, almost entirely black.

Refugees that he was "terrified". Relief workers who had faced death threats from the militia, which has been stealing thousands of tonnes of food, were staggered. The UN Security Council is considering proposals to send blue berets into the refugee camps in Zaire, to restore order and separate the Hutu soldiers, politicians and militiamen from the 650,000 or so ordinary Rwandans whom the extremists are preventing from returning to their homes and farms. The Zairean army's methods are brutal, but they may prove more effective. They may, of course, prove other things too. The Zaireans have frightened the armed Hutus out of putting up road blocks on Zaire's roads and mugging locals. But when President Mobutu Sese Seko's troops are let loose, public security is seldom the result. His paracommandos and the "elite" Special Presidential Division, in their red and black berets, have a hard-earned reputation for violence and looting. In driving the refugees out of Zairean villages, they also relieved them of the burden of carrying away anything of value. Driving back to Goma, the army trucks were piled high with sofas, mattresses, hi-fi sets and other goodies. Any Rwandans outside the camps lost their vehicles. Not all deserved better. Among these unfortunates were members of the notorious "social commission", a 12-man group of ultra-extremist Hutus who planned the genocide of Tutsis. Francois Karera, the ex-mayor of Kigali, who has boasted of burying 60,000 corpses from the slaughter in the Rwandan capital last April, lost his smart Toyota saloon, his clothes and his son, now said to be in detention. The soldiers also looted houses nearby where expatriates working for UNHCR and non-governmental relief agencies had been living until they were evacuated. Still, these foreigners saw consolations. "This may be the time for the UN to send in a force. The Hutu extremists have had a bloody nose," said a UNHCR man. The Zairean authorities have told the UNHCR that not only will they allow no new camps, but that those that exist must take up less land. Plainly, say aid workers, the Zaireans have had enough of refugees and want to make their lives uncomfortable enough to drive them home. The risk remains that, after they have got over this week's bloody nose, the Hutu militiamen and the 30,000 men of the former Rwandan army, now based near Mugunga camp, may hit back. Mr Karera insisted that the Zairean paracommandos were in the pay of Rwanda's new rulers, and vowed to "defend my people". For that noble work, the ex-mayor needed to get to the Mugunga camp, about 80 kilometres from his new home. He asked the UNHCR last week to give him a lift. "The request was politely refused," says an official.

Rwandans in Zaire The killers meet their match

BULGING out of his snow-white safari suit, North Kivu's governor looked on proudly as his paracommandos applied their own solution to Zaire's Rwandan refugee problem, catapulting 37 alleged Hutu criminals by their arms across the frontier into the hands of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army. "We are no longer prepared to put up with the criminal activities of these people," declared the governor, as his men glowered at the prisoners from behind their wraparound sunglasses. At about the same time, 20,000 Rwandans living alongside Zaireans in their villages were being burnt out of their huts and forced into official refugee camps. A few days earlier 24 refugees (and three Zaireans) had been killed and 78 wounded when soldiers fired on a crowd at Katale camp, 50 kilometres (30 miles) north of Goma. The effect on the camp, where Hutu militiamen responsible for last spring's genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda were training for a rematch, was dramatic. Even the leader of the militia, who was behind the murder of 30 Zairean boy scouts in September, told the United Nations High Commissioner for