



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

7 October 2015

Dear Mr. President,

I refer to Security Council resolution 2232 (2015), by which the Council requested me “in consultation with all stakeholders, to carry out a strategic review of UNSOA, including a thorough review of support provided to AMISOM by all partners, and set out a wide range of options on how to improve overall support to AMISOM, in the context of the efficiency surge outlined in paragraph 6, including through making improvements to the performance, management, and structures of UNSOA, bearing in mind the imperative of responsible cost control and taking into account the availability of resources.”

In line with this request, a strategic review of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was undertaken under the leadership of the Department of Field Support (DFS) between July and September 2015. A team comprising representatives of the United Nations Secretariat (DFS, the Department Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), the United Nations Office for the African Union (UNOAU)), the African Union (AU) and Member States, travelled to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Mogadishu and Baidoa where it held extensive consultations with several interlocutors. These included the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the African Union, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCCs), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, the European Union, Member States, Secretariat entities including DFS, DPKO, DPA, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNOAU, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), DSS, as well as United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programs and UNSOA. The review was undertaken applying the principle of comprehensive and wide-ranging consultations, underpinned by an evidence- and metrics-based approach to assessing performance.

His Excellency
Mr. Román Oyarzun Marchesi
President of the Security Council
New York

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Resolution 2232 (2015) also took note of my recommendation “to establish a non-lethal support package for the Somali police force” and stressed “that an appropriate UN trust fund or voluntary funding arrangement should be used to fund such support if authorised by the Security Council”. The resolution requested me to provide further details for implementation and delivery of such support by 30 September 2015. Additionally, it also took note of my recommendation “to extend the SNA non-lethal support package authorized in paragraph 14 of resolution 2124 (2013) to 3,000 Puntland forces on an exceptional basis”, and requested me “to explore the feasibility of implementing this recommendation, and to report to the Council by no later than 30 September 2015”.

In line with these requests, the United Nations further developed, in consultation with the FGS, the concept for the start-up support to the Somali police and the non-lethal support to the Somali National Army (SNA) troops in Puntland. The options and recommendations summarized in this letter are also informed by the overall findings of the UNSOA strategic review.

UNSOA Strategic review

As mentioned in my letter of 2 July 2015, all efforts of the international community should be aligned to support the political process in Somalia with a view to bring peace and stability to the country in the long term. In particular, efforts on the security front should aim to create and preserve an enabling environment for the political, peace and reconciliation process to unfold. This approach was endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2232 (2013).

The strategic review assessed the performance of UNSOA in support of this approach and against the core objectives I have established for the delivery of field support – effectiveness, responsiveness, efficiency and responsible stewardship.

The Operating Context

The Somalia context today is vastly complex, comprising a Federal Government simultaneously instituting a federal political system and its complementary institutions across an extensive territory, while dealing with insecurity and violent extremism on a large scale. This translates into unique security, operational and program delivery challenges for the United Nations’ effort to “stay and deliver” in partnership with the African Union.

In this environment, the role and impact of field support as a strategic enabler of peace operations has significantly grown, while the logistical enabling environment has remained weak and fragile, challenged by insecurity and a lack of access to major supply routes.

Evolution of mandated tasks

UNSOA was established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009) with an initial mandate to provide a logistical support package aimed at providing mission support services to AMISOM with a view to raising operational standards in order for AMISOM's forces to be incorporated into a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

As initially authorized, the logistical package covered accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured vehicles, vehicle maintenance, communications, enhancement to key logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services. It did not allow for the direct transfer of funds to the African Union or AMISOM, and was to be one element of a hybrid model of support through assessed and voluntary contributions. The logistical package was provided at the time to a military-focused operation with an authorized strength of 8,000 troops, and with an area of operation limited to Mogadishu.

Since its authorization, the scale and scope of the United Nations support package has been in a constant and dramatic state of expansion. In terms of scale, the logistical package has expanded three times as the authorized strength of AMISOM grew from 8,000 to 12,000 in 2010, to 17,731 in 2012 and to 22,126 in 2013, currently constituting the largest United Nations-mandated force in peace operations.

In terms of scope, the initial package as authorized has been expanded on four separate occasions to include:

i) the direct provision of catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services provided in-kind to AMISOM in line with the restriction of direct transfers that were initially in place;

ii) the provision of strategic communication and explosive hazard management capacities (including mitigating the threat of explosive devices);

iii) the reimbursement of AMISOM major contingent owned equipment in line with United Nations practices and rates (lifting the restriction on the direct transfer of funds to the AU and AMISOM); and

iv) the provision of support to up to 70 personnel within the AMISOM civilian component.

In addition, through resolution 2102 (2013), the Security Council established UNSOM and also mandated UNSOA to provide mission support services to it.

Resolution 2102 (2013) further mandated UNSOA to provide a non-lethal support package, funded from voluntary sources, to 10,900 personnel of the SNA, when operating alongside AMISOM, consisting of food, water, fuel, transport, tents and in-theatre medical evacuation.

Separate from these mandates, through its Nairobi-based presence, the Secretariat decided that UNSOA would take on the provision of support to the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes and the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group.

The delivery of support to these mandates has taken place in an extremely non permissive environment, framed by the significantly higher operational intensity of AMISOM and the SNA's operations compared to standard United Nations peacekeeping operations.

In sum, the demands placed on UNSOA have dramatically increased since its establishment. It is now mandated to support both very high intensity military operations and highly mobile political engagement across different areas of operation, and in an operating environment that has become much more complex logistically, and much more difficult in terms of security. The number of personnel supported by UNSOA has more than quadrupled to over 33,000, the number of entities supported increased from one to five, and the area of operations increased 4,000 times over.

In responding to this expansion, the Secretariat has underestimated the scale and scope of demands that support to these entities would entail, with the overall support component expanding from 249 to 450 personnel, and the budget from \$215 million to \$600 million, growth factors of 1.8 and 2.8 times respectively.

As a result, UNSOA has become an under-resourced support mission which, despite pioneering innovative approaches which have positively contributed to the gains made by AMISOM and UNSOM, is significantly constrained in delivering on the demands being placed on it.

Assessment of Support to Mandate Delivery

The strategic review assessed support to mandate delivery as a combination of effectiveness, responsiveness and efficiency. While the review found that performance was mixed across each of these individual criteria, there was, overall, a real and widening gap between mandated tasks and support capacity to deliver it. In particular, the review noted that the historical emphasis on efficiency has had a direct impact on effectiveness and responsiveness.

The review noted that UNSOA was effective and responsive in the delivery of certain elements of the logistical support package to AMISOM, including rations, fuel, communication and medical support. UNSOA has also been able to respond effectively in support of UNSOM during major political events as well as in optimising the use of its existing assets, infrastructure and capacities in support of the wider United Nations and international effort. In this regard, approximately 20 percent of all UNSOA passengers were a combination of United Nations Country Team personnel, Somali officials or members of the diplomatic community. In addition, and in response to recent attacks, members of the United Nations Country Team and diplomatic community have been temporarily accommodated within the UNSOA/UNSOM compound in Mogadishu.

In other critical areas however, the review found that UNSOA was unable to fully meet the demands placed on it. Gaps have appeared, in particular, with regard to the ability to provide water in remote locations, field defence supplies, maintenance services, tentage for tactical deployments, recruitment and administrative support, access to mobility for programmatic activities and significant delays in the completion of construction in the UNSOM regional offices and AMISOM sector hubs outside Mogadishu.

The review also noted commonly held concerns by its clients as to the challenges UNSOA faced in providing support across competing demands, visibility by clients over key operational and resourcing activities being undertaken, and access to more predictable support.

Beyond UNSOA's operational delivery priorities, the review noted that the Office was headed by a Director based in Mogadishu with a limited senior leadership team. As such there were real gaps in the strategic engagement capacity of UNSOA to liaise at senior levels with key stakeholders, including the African Union, AMISOM troop and police contributing countries, Member States and AMISOM regional partners.

In terms of efficiency, the review confirmed that UNSOA was very efficient with indicative comparators across a range of peacekeeping missions, showing UNSOA utilising a lower resource base to deliver mission support services. This was particularly stark in the case of the number of support personnel, where UNSOA had a supported to support personnel ratio between three and ten times lower than comparable missions.

UNSOA has been able to deliver this by pioneering the "light footprint" concept and outsourcing model. This approach has brought real gains and flexibility in operating in high risk environments, including by maximising the programmatic footprint on the ground.

This efficiency, however, is also partially driven by the under resourcing referred to above, with a direct impact on the ability of UNSOA to be responsive and more effective in meeting the needs of all its clients. Furthermore, there is a largely unavoidable risk associated with very high reliance on one mode of delivery through outsourcing, as opposed to a more resilient service delivery model where outsourcing and organic capacity are more balanced.

The “light footprint” approach has brought a number of tangible gains. However, UNSOA’s staffing capacities and processes need to be significantly strengthened. In this regard, UNSOA is undergoing an internal restructuring to bring it in line with United Nations supply chain and service delivery policies for peace operations. A civilian staffing review has also been conducted with the aim to adapt the UNSOA staffing complement and structure to its mandate and the resultant expectations.

The review also identified a number of wider critical issues that need to be addressed. Firstly, different understandings exist between the AU, TCCs and the UN as to the extent of the logistical support package UNSOA is mandated to deliver. In particular, there was a gap between the support package mandated by the Security Council and the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) currently in place between the African Union and AMISOM troop and police contributing countries.

Secondly, mechanisms for joint planning and coordination, both within and between UNSOA, AMISOM and UNSOM to enable the establishment of joint strategic resourcing priorities, need to be strengthened taking into account the operational realities on the ground and the real capacity constraints of UNSOA. This would allow for focused attention and clear delineation of responsibility and accountability.

Thirdly, and as I have also noted in my report S/2015/682, the current administrative framework for peace operations is often slow, cumbersome and averse to risk.

This is particularly important in the Somalia context, where there is a need to respond consistently and rapidly to high intensity and fast changing operations in both AMISOM and UNSOM. The current administrative framework, which on average takes 180 days to recruit someone off a roster, 288 days for purchases off a systems contract to be delivered, and 114 days to amend an existing contract limits process risk but places the preponderance of risk on mandate implementation.

Assessment of Responsible Stewardship

In addition to delivering its mandated tasks, it is essential for UNSOA to meet the requirements of responsible stewardship that apply for all United Nations entities. Compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is a cornerstone of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia and a precondition for the provision of support to AMISOM, the SNA and, eventually, to the Somali police forces.

The strategic review noted that in the case of Somalia, a United Nations system-wide HRDDP framework is in place under the overall authority and responsibility of my Special Representative, and that a review of existing structures and practices was underway. In the context of United Nations support to AMISOM and the SNA as provided through UNSOA, the review noted the following measures were in the process of being implemented:

First, the overall monitoring framework in Somalia will be strengthened with dedicated operational support from UNSOA. This will be done through four mechanisms: (i) The strengthening of UNSOA procedures to better track support and the way it has been used; (ii) The provision of HRDDP training for all UNSOA and UNSOM personnel to facilitate monitoring; (iii) The strengthening of the existing human rights monitoring function within UNSOM to all entities receiving support from the United Nations system, and supplemented by the sharing of information with the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis & Response Cell (CCTARC) of AMISOM; and (iv) The sharing of information between UNSOA and UNSOM, with regular reporting by UNSOA and other United Nations entities delivering support to non-United Nations security forces.

Second, UNSOM through its Human Rights Section will support UNSOA with the necessary monitoring, risk assessment and responsibilities under the HRDDP with UNSOA directly supplying resources to UNSOM for that purpose and playing a proactive role in HRDDP related mechanisms.

Third, given the continuing nature of UNSOA's mandate to support AMISOM and the SNA, regular risk assessments will be undertaken on a quarterly basis to provide both UNSOA and my Special Representative with updated and accurate information about the overall level of risk of human rights violations by support beneficiaries. This would be in addition to specific and ad-hoc requests for support, which already require risk assessments. The review noted the importance of AMISOM taking action in cases where violations are reported and implementing any mitigating measures necessary for UN support to be delivered in compliance with HRDDP.

The review also noted that United Nations entities providing support to non-UN security forces have the responsibility to ensure that their support is in compliance with the HRDDP, while my Special Representative has overall responsibility for the implementation of the policy in Somalia. This includes my Special Representative informing AMISOM and the SNA of any measures they need to take to comply with HRDDP as well as making any decisions regarding the suspension of support, which would be done in consultation with United Nations Headquarters.

While there is no record of allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse for UNSOA or UNSOM staff members, and only a handful of other allegations each year for other types of misconduct, past allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by AMISOM personnel, and more recent allegations of indiscriminate use of force by AMISOM against civilians, are indicative of some of the risks to the United Nations when providing operational support to a military force in combat operations. The HRDDP will continue to guide our activities in Somalia, and the United Nations will need to ensure that human rights risks are assessed and addressed properly.

The impact on the environment of the United Nations-supported activities in Somalia also remains a concern. The review noted the absence of an environmental baseline study, dedicated environmental management capacities, and an AU environmental policy to guide AMISOM's operations, particularly with regard to wastewater management.

AMISOM Logistics Support Package and Enabling Capabilities

While assessing the AMISOM support package, the review noted that the initial restrictions within the logistical support package with regard to the direct transfer of funds were lifted in 2012. However, legacy restrictions remain with regard to elements of the package related to catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services approved before 2012 and still provided in kind. These services are normally provided by the Troop Contributing Country and reimbursed under the self-sustainment framework in line with UN practices.

Further challenges raised during the review related to the issue of logistical mobility along the main supply routes and down to tactical locations. The challenges were twofold; firstly ensuring clarity on roles and responsibilities between UNSOA and AMISOM, and secondly addressing capacity gaps.

Recognizing the strain that would be placed on logistical supply lines when AMISOM deployed outside Mogadishu, and the need to have an organic logistical capability, 1,845 uniformed personnel were authorized as part of the AMISOM strength in resolution 2124 (2013) to serve as enabling units. Of these enablers, only a small number have since been deployed and they have largely remained contingent rather than becoming force assets.

The review also identified that there was a significant gap in the overall logistical capabilities of individual contingents with AMISOM having approximately 30% of the support mobility capabilities of a United Nations mission of a similar size.

Coupled with security risks along the Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and the inability of civilian contractors to operate in these conditions without force protection, UNSOA is unable to use the MSRs on a sustainable basis for the delivery of logistical support. As such, UNSOA currently flies rations to approximately half of all troops deployed outside Mogadishu, a situation that is both operationally and financially unsustainable.

In this context, the review reaffirmed that logistical mobility was a joint responsibility between UNSOA and AMISOM. UNSOA, with force protection, would be responsible for delivery along the main supply routes to the sector hubs and battalion headquarters locations, and AMISOM responsible for carrying it forward from that point using its own organic capacity.

The United Nations remains committed to working together with partners to assist the African Union in generating the authorised capacities called for in Resolution 2124 and as part of the efficiency surge supported in Resolution 2232. This will allow AMISOM to significantly enhance its logistical capabilities. It is, however, likely to be a longer term solution.

In the interim and in addressing the challenges of mobility and reliance on air support, UNSOA will support the establishment of Mission Enabling Units within AMISOM comprising organic heavy transport, combat engineering, explosive hazard management capability (including mitigating the threat of improvised explosive devices) and security elements.

The Mission Enabling Units would build on initial arrangements in two of AMISOM's six operational sectors where they would be under the command and control of AMISOM, but with training and mentoring provided by the United Nations, and equipment provided through a combination of donor support and the United Nations logistical package. This, of course, will incur significant additional costs and can be operationalised only in the medium-term perspective.

In the short term, AMISOM will have to continue to rely on air deliveries to these locations with the associated costs that they entail. In parallel, individual contingents would need to raise their equipment levels in order to move their supplies from their battalion headquarters forward, in line with the agreed roles and responsibilities between AMISOM and UNSOA. Bilateral support, both equipment and training, to these contingents will be critical in this regard.

Finally, the predictable and sustainable provision of ammunition was raised as a gap in support to AMISOM. Recognizing that this would be a task that would come with significant challenges for delivery by the United Nations, I propose that the Council consider urging Member States to overcome this gap through bilateral assistance.

Support to UNSOM and the political process

Support to UNSOM in the framework of Somalia's emerging federal map requires going beyond the area of operations of AMISOM. As I outlined in my letter of 2 July 2015, the implementation of the overall political and security strategy "will require progressively aligning security efforts with the federalism process, especially in terms of the development of the Somali security sector, alignment of AMISOM sector boundaries to the newly formed interim regional administrations, and engagement with the regional authorities."

Pending this progressive realignment, and in support of the mandate to strengthen the presence of UNSOM in all interim regional administrative capitals, focused support is required for UNSOM to facilitate this deployment. The review also recognised the need to be responsive to the dynamic, and sometimes unplanned, surge requirements of support to the political process including access to aviation and mobility assets.

In the coming months, these needs will likely increase as engagement with the Somali people for the implementation of vision 2016 will grow. I therefore support the strategic review's call for strengthened joint planning and coordination mechanisms between UNSOM and AMISOM, to allow for a dynamic management of limited resources.

UNSOA restructuring

UNSOA has a senior leadership structure comprising a Director, a Deputy Director and a Chief of Operations in Somalia. As per resolution 2093, (2013) the Office reports to the Department of Field Support on the delivery of the support package to AMISOM and the SNA, and to my Special Representative on logistical support to UNSOM, as well as on policy or political questions arising from the work of UNSOA that are relevant to the mandate of UNSOM. The review also identified a number of deficits in the way in which the Office was structured.

These included a senior leadership structure that did not provide sufficiently for the separate and distinct roles of strategic engagement and operational delivery. This practically has meant that UNSOA does not have the capacity to service the mutually dependant relationship between the UN, the AU, AMISOM TCCs and bilateral partners at the strategic level while simultaneously undertaking a robust operational leadership role in Mogadishu.

The review also noted that the current mandate of UNSOA was scattered across several resolutions with differences of view on how they should be interpreted. There has also been no regular practice of reporting to the Security Council, except through my periodic reports on Somalia. Furthermore, UNSOA's name continues to reflect only its responsibilities to AMISOM, whereas its mandate is in fact bound to the mandates of both AMISOM and UNSOM.

Start-up support package to the Somali police

In my letter of 2 July 2015, I fully supported the recommendation of the Joint Mission to deliver a non-lethal support package to jump-start policing in the regions and bridge the gap between needs today and the longer-term mechanisms under the New Deal framework. Security Council resolution 2232 (2015) takes note of the recommendation, and "requests further details from the Secretary-General for implementation and delivery of such support by 30 September 2015, and underlines that such support should be provided in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-United Nations forces (HRDDP)."

I recommended that the package would include the provision of elementary infrastructure, basic equipment, sustainment items and medical evacuation support. AMISOM, in collaboration with UNSOM and other partners, has the capacity to provide training for the Somali police forces. However, without the requisite logistical support, including water, food, interpreters, stationery and other course material, such training cannot take place. It is, therefore, recommended to include logistical training support as a fifth element.

I proposed in my letter of 2 July 2015 to the Council that UNSOA provide support for the delivery of fuel and in-theatre medical evacuation. However, given the gaps between UNSOA capacities today and the demands of its current mandate, new tasks for UNSOA will come at the opportunity cost of a continued inability to meet all existing demands. As such, I recommend that fuel support to the Somali police be provided by another United Nations entity. I also recommend that the funding mechanism for the police package be directly administered by the entity which will implement it, rather than using the SNA trust fund. In the specific case of in-theatre evacuation, however, I believe that it is important that UNSOA provide this support on a basis similar to that provided to the SNA. This support will be provided by leveraging its existing capacities and in areas where AMISOM is deployed.

The United Nations has looked at a number of options to provide the remaining four items of the package. At this stage, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) seems best positioned, as it is experienced in working throughout Somalia supporting the national and regional authorities and AMISOM. UNOPS implements the disbursement of stipends and the Biometric Registration System, which could be utilized for asset accountability tracking through bar coding of equipment and linking to the payment of stipends. UNOPS is implementing projects to strengthen police capacity in Somalia, in particular with regard to providing equipment and developing explosive ordnance disposal and IED defeat capacities.

Coordination of the support package with other support initiatives and prioritization as agreed by the federal and regional authorities will take place in the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG) 2 Police Working Group within the national police development plan (Heegan Plan) currently under development. A project management structure of the implementing entity would be established within UNSOM to support effective coordination within wider security sector reform efforts and to make available the required expertise to the implementer.

To ensure compliance with the HRDDP, AMISOM and UNSOM would play a key role in assisting in the vetting of candidates and provide training in human rights and international humanitarian law. It is envisaged that UNSOM will begin to assist the FGS in establishing vetting criteria and provide technical support to the vetting process in line with international human rights standards. UNSOM will also provide advice and technical assistance to strengthen the legal and policy framework on oversight, investigations and accountability. It is expected that AMISOM police working alongside the Somali police forces and providing operational support will have a deterrent effect and support United Nations reporting on human rights violations.

Non-lethal support to the Somali National Army (SNA) forces in Puntland

In my letter of 2 July 2015, I recommended the provision of the Somali National Army (SNA) non-lethal support package to be expanded to 3,000 Puntland forces, on an exceptional basis until the end of 2016, upon completion of the integration process and inclusion into the Gulwaade (Victory) Plan. This is intended to facilitate Puntland forces' efforts against Al-Shabaab and help prevent a negative spill-over from the conflict in Yemen. Security Council resolution 2232 (2015) takes note of the recommendation and "requests the Secretary General to explore the feasibility of implementing this recommendation." Resolution 2232 (2015) also highlights the criteria for providing support to the SNA specified in 2124 (2013), specifically that "this exceptional support shall be provided only for joint SNA operations with AMISOM and which are part of AMISOM's overall strategic concept."

Since my letter of 2 July 2015, the work of the National Integration Commission (NIC) has continued. Discussions are ongoing between the FGS and Puntland, as well as with the international community in the framework of the New Deal Compact, with the aim of conducting the integration process in Puntland in the first half of 2016.

All Puntland forces integrated into the SNA will need to be provided with training in full compliance with the HRDDP as a condition of eligibility for United Nations support. While potential trainers have been identified, further assistance will be needed to financially and logistically support this training. Furthermore, while non-United Nations military trainers will also likely be needed to ensure other training requirements under the integration process, no entity that is both willing to carry out such training and is acceptable to the Puntland government has yet been identified. Moreover, lessons learned from the provision of the current non-lethal support package to the SNA have shown the importance of ensuring that those who receive the support package are paid regularly to allow the provision of support to have its intended effect. This lesson should be taken into account in the roll-out of the proposed support to the Puntland forces, as well as in the ongoing provision of support authorized under resolution 2124 (2013).

I would like to emphasise that non-lethal support to Puntland must be provided in line with the following principles: (i) *Supporting the political vision of building a federal state*: Integration of the Puntland forces into the SNA must be completed in a manner that furthers the objective of developing a federal security architecture; (ii) *Coherence and oversight*: Support to the 3,000 Puntland forces must be carried out in a manner that supports overall civilian oversight, and command and control of the SNA, including common salary scales and training curriculum; (iii) *Conflict sensitivity*: The integration process and the provision of support will be informed by the context, the conflict and risk assessments; (iv) *Risk Mitigation*: Integration and the process for providing support will be designed and implemented to reduce risks; and (v) *Sustainability*: The support provided should include a capacity-building element that allows a gradual transition of logistical support tasks to Somali counterparts.

I have examined the concept and feasibility of the options available for entities to provide the non-lethal support package to the Puntland forces to be integrated into the SNA. While UNSOA is currently providing the non-lethal support package to the SNA troops operating alongside AMISOM in South Central Somalia, the review also identified gaps in the provision of this support. In this regard and as I have outlined above, the gaps between UNSOA's capacity today and the demands of its current mandate require a focus on strengthening support to its core clients in their areas of operation.

Moreover, as support to the Somali security forces is a long-term endeavour, greater efficiency may be realized by working with another United Nations provider that is better placed to perform this task. Such an entity would also likely be better positioned to work with the SNA to build its capacity in the medium term.

Coordination of the Puntland support package with the non-lethal package already provided by UNSOA to troops operating alongside AMISOM, as well as other support initiatives as required, will take place in the PSG 2 Defence Working Group.

Observations and Recommendations

UNSOA has contributed positively to supporting the gains made by AMISOM and UNSOM, often pioneering innovative approaches to the provision of field support in a unique and non-permissive environment. It has also provided tangible evidence of success in the partnership between the United Nations, the African Union and Member States in sustaining African Union peace support operations. Investment in, and support to, this partnership should continue.

It is clear that despite its innovation and best efforts, the resources provided to UNSOA and its resultant capabilities have not been able to keep pace with the dramatic expansion of its mandated tasks. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine offensive operations in any other theatre today that would involve 32,000 uniformed personnel but with a support element of less than 500 personnel. This support element is, in parallel, also required to support a highly mobile political effort.

In sum, UNSOA has been operating at the very edge of its capabilities with a progressively widening gap between mandated tasks and its capacity to deliver. Going forward, AMISOM will require surge support to address gaps. UNSOM will also require specific and focussed support to respond to demands to support the political process in Mogadishu and the regions, especially the interim regional capitals. Neither will be possible without a significant strengthening of UNSOA.

I therefore intend to strengthen UNSOA along the following lines and in this seek the support of the Council.

Firstly, it is critical to consolidate and prioritise UNSOA's efforts around the strategic objectives established by the Council for Somalia. This would entail focusing primarily on facilitating the political process in Somalia through support to UNSOM and AMISOM. I therefore intend to transfer the responsibility for the provision of mission support services to the Special Envoy of the Great Lakes and the Somalia Eritrea Monitoring Group to another United Nations entity more suitably placed to provide this support.

Secondly, I intend to address administrative, coordination and structural gaps.

Administratively, current processes struggle to respond to the operational demands in Somalia. As I have noted in my report S/2015/682, I am putting in place, by the end of 2015, standing administrative measures for start-up and crisis situations to go into effect for six months on a renewable basis upon the establishment of a peace operation or my certification of a crisis or emergency. Given that, UNSOA has been in almost constant state of expansion since its establishment, I will closely look at how these measures could potentially be applied in this context.

There is a need for strengthening decision making frameworks between UNSOM and AMISOM, including at the senior leadership level with the SRSG and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia for AMISOM, so as to ensure that operational efforts are aligned to a common set of strategic priorities, linked to capabilities and taking into account the threat environment. I have asked my Special Representative to establish this framework with support from UNSOA and in consultation with DFS.

Structural gaps also need to be addressed. In this regard, I propose that the Council rename UNSOA to clearly reflect its expanded mandate and endorse a strengthening of its leadership including by appointing a Head at the Assistant Secretary-General level. This re-named entity would have a single and clear mandate focused on the provision of support to, but operationally separate from, its core clients, namely UNSOM, AMISOM and the SNA.

It would have clear accountability mechanisms, through a Compact, for the provision of support to each client and a reporting relationship with the Council through my Special Representative. This formal reporting would be complemented by informal and technical level briefings that would be conducted by the Under-Secretary General for Field Support, as requested by the Council.

I also expect that the ongoing internal restructuring of UNSOA in line with United Nations supply chain and service delivery models for peace operations will contribute to improving the effectiveness of mission support services.

Thirdly, the overall capacity of UNSOA is simply inadequate. I therefore intend to present proposals to the General Assembly for a significant strengthening of UNSOAs staffing complement, based on the findings of the civilian staffing review of UNSOA that is underway. In this context, it is important to note that the light footprint approach has been broadly successful and UNSOA has been used as the support model for the establishment of MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

In both of these subsequent missions, lessons were learned in the application of the light footprint approach including the overall capacity required which, compared to UNSOA, is significantly higher. These lessons have informed the civilian staffing review. Any strengthening of UNSOA should be viewed through the lens of the application of lessons learned in other missions and the gaps identified in the Somalia specific context.

The partnership with the African Union will be critical to our joint success in Somalia. I intend to strengthen the partnership and our support to the African Union, especially in the context of the generation of its enabling capacity and the AMISOM efficiency surge.

I intend to urgently finalise discussions on a new trilateral MOU framework between the United Nations, the African Union and AMISOM troop and police contributing countries. This will serve as a basis for jointly improving performance, including raising visibility of and regularising equipment levels within the maintenance and contingent-owned equipment reimbursement frameworks.

I also propose that the Council consider lifting legacy restrictions around the provision of catering, communications, cleaning and sanitary, and furniture and stationery services. I recommend that services be provided in line with United Nations practices, and that TCCs that are willing and able to provide these services themselves be reimbursed directly in line with the existing United Nations self-sustainment reimbursement framework.

I further propose that this framework be extended to include the reimbursement of tentage for tactical deployments, in lieu of their provision by UNSOA, and in line with normal United Nations practices and self-sustainment rates.

Clear roles and responsibilities for the delivery of sustainable logistical support within the framework of the joint responsibilities of AMISOM and UNSOA has been a critical and positive step. However, the inability to maintain the MSRs open as the primary basis for the delivery of logistical support remains a concern. A situation where half of the forces outside Mogadishu are supported by air is not a sustainable option.

In parallel with the generation of enabling units by the African Union, I will proceed urgently with supporting the establishment of mission enabling units and progressively expanding that capacity to all sectors. Equipment for existing capacities on the ground has been funded by bilateral contributions supplemented from the United Nations logistical package. Additional equipment required to support this establishment could be funded either through direct bilateral sources or through an expansion of the logistical package.

In addition, individual contingents will need to raise their equipment levels in order to undertake their own responsibilities to take supplies forward from AMISOM sector hubs and battalion headquarters locations. I call on Member States to urgently support AMISOM TCCs in this regard.

In support of these efforts, I also recommend that the Council consider assigning a specific mandate for UNSOA to support the efforts of AMISOM in the coordination of support between bilateral partners, AMISOM and the United Nations.

On support to the Somali security forces, I remain of the view that the expansion of the SNA support package to Puntland forces is critical to their efforts against Al-Shabaab and to help prevent further conflict as a result of the conflict in Yemen.

Sustainability of the delivery of this support in the long run, and infrastructure support to facilitate handover, are key factors to determine the providers. Therefore, I recommend that support to the SNA in Puntland be provided by a United Nations entity other than UNSOA, and will keep working towards identifying the best mechanism.

I also strongly support the establishment of a police support package as a fundamental means to deliver basic security services in newly recovered areas and to create an enabling environment for stabilisation and the political process to succeed.

I will use existing UNSOA modalities on a cost-recovery basis for the Somali police forces for casualties sustained in the line of duty and in areas of operation where similar support is provided to AMISOM and SNA. This includes extending the in-theatre medical evacuation to the Somali National Police.

The provision of logistical support by the United Nations to the Somali security forces should, however, not be open-ended. It should be seen as an exceptional measure. It is essential that this assistance be coupled with a concerted effort to build the capacity of the Somali security forces to assume responsibility for their own logistics.

I, therefore, intend to work with international partners to support the Somali federal and regional institutions in this regard. I look forward to the support of Member States in providing the necessary technical and material expertise to these institutions.

I will pay particular attention to the implementation of the HRDDP in the delivery of all support to AMISOM and the Somali security forces. In this regard, the steps outlined in the review will help strengthen United Nations mechanisms and engagement with AMISOM and the SNA. These include, in particular, strengthening the monitoring systems of the United Nations with additional capacity, and which will be reflected in the civilian staffing review.

The impact on the environment, in particular waste water management, remains a core concern. I will establish a robust capacity to support UNSOA and propose that the Council give UNSOA a mandate to assist the African Union and AMISOM in the development of their own environmental policies and standards and to ensure subsequent compliance with them.


While recognizing that there have been no reports of allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse in UNSOA or UNSOM, I nonetheless strongly support the establishment of a dedicated capacity for conduct and discipline in UNSOA to support UNSOA and UNSOM and to advise the AU/AMISOM on the development and implementation of its zero tolerance policy. This is especially important as the United Nations own policy and implementation mechanisms continue to evolve with the approval by the General Assembly of special measures to strengthen the Organization's response to SEA.

Many of the recommendations outlined above will take time to materialize on the ground. Although implementation must start now, we must also be cognizant that, in the short term, the capacity of UNSOA will continue to be overstretched. Joint prioritization and comprehensive approaches that bring together programmatic, security and logistical imperatives and constraints will therefore be required.

Mission support services provided by UNSOA are strategic enablers that provide the platform for supporting political progress in the country, through specific support to AMISOM, UNSOM and the SNA. As Somalia continues making progress towards peace and stability, it is critical that the United Nations keeps reviewing and adapting its posture and resources to a fast evolving environment.

Strengthening and refocusing UNSOA is essential in this context. I look forward to the support by the Council of my recommendations and efforts as a means to strengthen the ability of the United Nations and the international community to secure the important gains achieved and enable continued progress in the political and stabilization processes in Somalia.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



BAN/Ki-moon

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL

To: Mr. Feltman (through o/DSG),

URGENT

Please find attached the draft SG letter transmitting the main recommendations of the UNSOA review report, requested by SCR 2232 (2015). This is the first comprehensive review of UNSOA since its establishment in 2009, and highlights how the capacity of the Office has been significantly overstretched to effectively carry out its mandate given the expansion of support overtime.

The review therefore recommends that the SC renames the Office, and gives it a mandate which focuses on its core support functions to Somalia (AMISOM, UNSOM and SNA), while discontinuing support functions to the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and the Special Envoy for the GL (to be covered by another UN entity). The new UNSOA would be separate from UNSOM but report to the SC through the SRSG. It also recommends the appointment of a Head at the ASG level and a strengthening of its staffing level (proposal to be submitted to GA).

Several steps to strengthen the partnership with the AU/AMISOM are proposed. The letter confirms the importance of extending SNA support package to Puntland, but concludes that UNSOA is not the appropriate entity to carry out this task. In terms of support to Somali police, the review does not recommend UNSOA to take on this task either given its limited capacity, and identifies UNOPS as the best suited. The review also looked into HRDDP implementation and outlines steps for its strengthening. As per the above, the review did not reach any final conclusions in terms of implementing entity of support to the SNA in Puntland or Somali police, nor as regards

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whether the new UNSOA will be a mission or office. While the SC is expected to decide on the latter, internal consultations are ongoing on determining the most appropriate support providers on the former (influenced also by the ongoing SNA integration process). The SC is expected to endorse the recommendations in a Res.

The reason for the lengthy SG letter is due to the fact that the actual UNSOA review report is not considered to be of the quality required for submission to the SC. The letter therefore summarizes the main findings of the review report on which DPA and DFS agree. DPKO is said to be in disagreement with the recommendation that UNSOA should not be the support provider to the Somali police and SNA in Puntland. The letter is due to the Council tomorrow, 7 October.

Political Unit
6 October 2015

Received in ODSG

6 October 2015

Seen by: PV@ 4.30 p.m.

6 October FZ

15-08611

RECEIVED

OCT - 1 2015

15-08611

EOSG/CENTRAL

ACTION AG

COPY DSG, Cdc

Immediate

(attachment in Corlog)

Note to the Deputy Secretary-General

Letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council
on the requests of Security Council resolution 2232 (2015) on the UNSOA strategic
review and non-lethal support to Puntland forces and Somali police

1. Please find attached, for the Secretary-General's approval, a draft letter to the President of the Security Council on the request made by the Security Council in resolution 2232 (2015):

- (i) to conduct a strategic review of UNSOA; and
- (ii) to assess the feasibility of the delivery of non-lethal support to (a) the Somali National Army (SNA) troops in Puntland and (b) to the Somali police.

Resolution 2232 (2015) requested that the findings on these issues be submitted no later than 30 September 2015. However, due to delays in the finalization of the UNSOA review report, including ensuring appropriate final engagement and consultation with the African Union, the Council agreed to postpone the submission of the letter to 7 October. The Security Council is expected to discuss the letter of the Secretary-General on 14 October 2015.

2. The strategic review found that UNSOA has contributed positively to the gains made by AMISOM and UNSOM, often pioneering innovative approaches. However, its resource base and resultant capabilities have not been able to keep pace with the dramatic expansion of its mandated tasks. The review also found that UNSOA is operating at the very edge of its capabilities and concluded that without significant strengthening, UNSOA will not be able to provide the necessary surge capacity to enable both the military and political effort in 2016.

3. The review recommends a strengthening of UNSOA in the following ways:

- (i) strategically refocusing its mandate on its Somalia clients (AMISOM, UNSOM and the SNA operating alongside AMISOM), with a clear link to the overall strategic objective of supporting peace consolidation;
- (ii) applying special administrative measures for start-up and crisis to UNSOA;
- (iii) strengthening joint priority setting mechanisms between AMISOM and UNSOM;
- (iv) strengthening the Office led by an Assistant Secretary-General, renaming it and giving it a single focused mandate reflecting its three core clients (UNSOM, AMISOM and the SNA).

The new entity would have a clear accountability mechanism, through a Compact, for the provision of support to each client and a reporting relationship with the Council through my Special Representative. This formal reporting would be complemented by informal and technical level briefings that would be conducted by the Under-Secretary General for Field Support, as requested by the Council.

Finally, proposals will be presented to the General Assembly for a significant strengthening of the staffing component of UNSOA to match the demands placed on it.

4. The review also found that UNSOA provides tangible evidence of the success of the

partnership between the United Nations, the African Union and Member States in sustaining African Union peace support operations. The review recommends that the United Nations should continue to support and invest in this partnership. It recommends enhanced support to AMISOM in two key areas: a modified logistical support package and an enhanced mobility capacity. On the support package, the review recommends that the Security Council lift previous restrictions requiring that self-sustainment be provided in kind and recommends allowing for direct reimbursement in line with normal United Nations practices and rates. On mobility, the review found significant gaps in the logistical capabilities of AMISOM, compounded by its inability to secure the main supply routes. The result is an unsustainable dependence on air support as a means of rations supply to troops on the front line. The review therefore recommends establishing mission enabling units as integrated capacities capable of securing the main supply routes. It also calls on Member States to support the strengthening of the organic logistical capabilities of individual AMISOM units.


5. On the issue of support to UNSOM, the review recommends focusing on supporting the political process, whose logistical requirements, especially in Somalia's regions, are increasingly de-linked from those of AMISOM.

6. In line with the strategic refocusing, the review recommends that UNSOA not be the entity tasked with the delivery of non-lethal support packages to the Somali police or the SNA forces in Puntland. This is for two main reasons. First, putting in place this support would place a significant additional burden on UNSOA at a time when its focus should be on improving mission support to its existing client base. Second, support to the Puntland forces should be provided by an entity that can remain present in the region in the medium to long term, and which will, over time, build the capacity of the Puntland forces to assume responsibility for their own logistical support. The draft letter to the Council indicates that other options (e.g. UNOPS) are being explored. However, in the specific case of in-theatre medical evacuation, the draft letter proposes that UNSOA provide limited services to the Somali police, based on its existing infrastructure.

7. The draft letter of the Secretary-General supports the recommendations of the review, which should improve the delivery of support to the military and political effort in Somalia over the next 18 months. It needs to be appreciated, however, that while some of the recommendations on strengthening coordination, refocusing the mandate and surge capacities will have immediate effects, others will take effect over a period of time. As this occurs, joint prioritization of effort within existing capacities will be critical.

8. We expect that the Council will welcome these recommendations. Moving forward, we need to keep advocating for the involvement of all partners in providing support to AMISOM, and keep engaging the African Union Commission and AMISOM TCCs on the provision of enablers. We will also need to conduct comprehensive and coordinated fundraising for the Trust Funds for AMISOM and the SNA, as well as for the implementation of resolution 2232 (2015) and of the UNSOA strategic review.

9. The text of the draft letter was consulted with the members of the Somalia Integrated Task Force. We would be grateful if you could obtain the Secretary-General's approval for the letter.



Jeffrey Feltman
29 September 2015



Atul Khare
29 September 2015

cc: Ms. Malcorra
Ms. Clark
Mr. Drennan
Mr. Kay
Mr. Ladsous
Mr. O'Brien
Mr. Ra'ad Al-Hussein