

[1 CONFIDENTIAL]

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120

BOX 50

FILE 8

ACC. 1998/0278

2

SURVIE57 avenue du Maine 75014 PARIS
Tél. 43 27 03 25 Fax 43 20 55 58

« Donner valeur de loi au devoir de sauver les vivants » (116 Prix Nobel)

UNAMIR

1996 JAN -4 P 2/11

TELEFAX PAGE DE GARDE/TELEFAX COVER PAGE

Date: 04.01.96

Total pages: 2 y compris cette page
Total number of pages: including this pageA l'intention de M. le Représentant Spécial, l'Ambassadeur Shmayer PHAN
Aux bons soins de M. le Porte-Parole ISMAEL DIALLA

For the attention of:

Fax: 15.1.212.963.30.90

(Si vous ne recevez pas toutes les pages, prière de nous contacter dès que possible)
(If you do not receive all pages, please contact soon as possible)

Téléphone : (1) 43 27 03 25 Fax : 43 20 55 58


Réf:

De la part :

Shmayer COURToux

From :

Vous prie de bien vouloir transmettre
le courrier ci-après à Monsieur
le Représentant Spécial, en vous en
remerciant bien vivement avec ses
meilleures salutations.



SURVIE

« Donner valeur de loi au devoir de sauver les vivants » (116 Prix Nobel)

57, avenue du Maine - 75014 PARIS
Tél. : 43 27 03 25 - Fax : 43 20 55 58

La Déléguée du Président : S. COURTOUX

Paris, le 4 janvier 1996

M. Shaharyar Khan
Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des
Nations-Unies pour les droits de l'Homme au Rwanda

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

La presse fait actuellement écho à de très alarmantes déclarations émanant de personnalités rwandaises - dont l'ancien Premier ministre M. Faustin Twagiramungu - au sujet de massacres qui auraient été perpétrés au Rwanda par l'Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR). Ces massacres traduiraient une volonté de vengeance du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) à l'oeuvre depuis l'installation du gouvernement d'union nationale mis en place à Kigali en juillet 1994.

Monsieur Twagiramungu affirme (communiqué du 27 novembre dernier) détenir les *preuves irréfutables* du massacre de 250 000 personnes.


Plus récemment (communiqué du 8 décembre dernier), M. Sixbert Musangamfura, ancien Chef du Service Civil des renseignements auprès de M. Twagiramungu, a accusé le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) d'être responsable du massacre de 312 726 personnes entre avril 1994 et juillet 1995. M. Musangamfura affirme par ailleurs que certaines zones du pays, utilisées pour dissimuler des charniers, seraient interdites d'accès et de survol aux observateurs étrangers. Il accuse par ailleurs ces derniers de s'abstenir volontairement d'élever des protestations.

Nous nous étonnons, bien entendu, que la légitime publicité donnée à de telles allégations ne s'accompagne pas d'une vérification de leur exactitude. Mais nous nous étonnons surtout que des accusations d'une si extrême gravité ne déclenchent pas une mobilisation pour en confirmer ou infirmer la teneur. Pour d'aucuns, ce silence signifierait que les observateurs présents au Rwanda les considéreraient sans fondement au point d'estimer qu'elles ne méritent pas de commentaire. D'autres se demandent s'il ne s'agit pas d'un aveu. Pour notre part, nous ne pouvons pas nous contenter de supposer. La situation nous conduit à vous prier de bien vouloir nous faire savoir si vous tenez ou non ces accusations pour crédibles. Si elles reflètent la vérité, une action immédiate s'impose. Si elles sont fausses, il est également urgent de le faire savoir.

Le génocide en 1994 a laissé le Rwanda confronté à d'innombrables problèmes auxquels ses autorités doivent faire face. Alertés dès 1993 des menaces de génocide qui pesaient sur le pays, nous nous sommes efforcés de renforcer les avertissements de ceux qui ont révélé ces dangers. Aujourd'hui, nous ne sommes prêts ni à accepter qu'une campagne mensongère sape les efforts d'un gouvernement dont la tâche est déjà bien rude, ni à fermer les yeux sur des crimes s'il s'avère qu'ils ont été commis. Nous espérons bien vivement en vos éclaircissements.

Dans cette attente, je vous prie de recevoir, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'expression de ma haute considération.

Sharon COURTOUX



NATIONS UNIES



UNITED NATIONS

BUREAU DU COORDONNATEUR RESIDENT POUR LES ACTIVITES
OPERATIONNELLES DU SYSTEME DES NATIONS UNIES AU RWANDA

B.P 445, Kigali Rwanda.


Phone : (250) 75381, 76906, 72796, 75773 or 73360

Fax: 76283 or 73360

FACSIMILE

No. _____

Ref:



To: All Heads of UN Agencies, IOM and ICRC

From: Sukehiro Hasegawa
Resident Coordinator

Date: 8 January 1996

Subject: 8 January meeting of Heads of Agencies

Please find attached a summary record of the Heads of Agencies meeting held on Monday 8 January 1996.

If you have any comments or amendments I should be grateful to receive them by 12:00 noon Tuesday, 9 January 1996.

Best regards.

DRAFT (8/1/1996 19:45)

HEAD OF AGENCIES MEETING

Special Meeting

Kigali, 8 January 1995

1. In response to an urgent request from UN Headquarters, this meeting was convened by the UN Resident Coordinator, Mr Sukehiro Hasegawa, to solicit the views of Heads of Agencies on the UN structure in post-UNAMIR Rwanda in preparation with the meeting of the Rwanda Task Force at UN Headquarters on 9 January and for the meeting of the Rwanda Operational Support Group in Washington on 12 January 1996.
2. Mr Ian Martin, the HRFOR representative said that his agency attached great importance to the role played by UNAMIR in providing field security and communications, particularly given the large number of personnel (second only to UNHCR) that they had in the field. Other Agency representatives pointed out that this role had diminished due to the reduced field presence of UNAMIR under the current mandate. Mr Collins Asare, Deputy Representative of UNHCR, said that in the case of communications and logistics, UN Agencies could coordinate among themselves to provide facilities (e.g. HRFOR could use UNHCR field communication facilities where available.)
3. Mr Tom Bergmann, OIC UNICEF, raised the question of security of international personnel, particularly in the light of several robberies the past weekend in Kigali. There was some discussion as to whether UNAMIR had a role to play in this type of incident or whether it should be dealt with by the local police. It was agreed that UNAMIR was not in a position to provide comprehensive security to all UN personnel and property, nor was there an expectation that it should do so. Mr Baba-Moussa, WHO Representative a.i., pointed out that in the majority of duty stations, there was normally a UN Security Plan to cover UN international staff and that such a Plan could be introduced in Rwanda.
4. The UNHCR Representative, Mr Roman Urusa, said that it was necessary to address the wish of the Government to have a continuation of some of the non-military technical assistance provided by UNAMIR in the area of rehabilitation of infrastructure. Two options were discussed: (i) bilaterally provided "service packages" (e.g. civilian corps of engineers, a group of doctors and health workers) such as utilised in the refugee camps in Zaire for; or (ii) assistance provided through the "White Helmets" modality.
5. Responding to some Agency representatives who maintained that this type of assistance could be provided through the normal UN Agency channels, Mr Urusa said that it would be difficult for UN agencies to provide such assistance in an expedient manner and funding would not be readily forthcoming to UN Agency appeals. There was however, he said, a perception on the part of the international community that there should be some form of replacement of UNAMIR and it could therefore be easier to obtain voluntary contributions for modalities such as "service packages" or White Helmets.
6. Mr Tacheste Zergaber, Country Director WFP, noted that the current coordination system was working adequately, and that there was no need for any new coordination structure to be put in place. The World Bank Representative a.i. added that national capacity building should be an important element of any UN assistance provided.

7. In summarising the discussion, Mr Hasegawa referred to the need for continuation of some form of political office after the departure of UNAMIR to deal with issues such as justice, human rights prisons, repatriation, security etc. All Agencies representatives agreed that such an office could serve a useful function.

8. Reviewing the current coordination structures in place in Rwanda, Mr Hasegawa asked the meeting participants if they thought there was a need for additional or higher-level coordination structures other than those that already existed. The participants agreed that the current structures functioned well and enabled UN Agencies to share information and views on emergency issues and policy matters. They believed that, with the addition of a political liaison office, these existing coordination structures could more than adequately serve the coordination needs of the UN agencies in Rwanda, without creating any unnecessary additional layers of authority.

9. Mr Hasegawa also pointed out the need to review those specific functions currently being carried out by UNAMIR, which need to be continued with external assistance after UNAMIR's departure. In this respect a technical committee had been set up to examine the questions of security, communications, medical facilities, and air transport.

10. It was agreed that the views expressed by the Heads of UN Agencies would be sent to UN Headquarters.

* * * * *

Kigali, 8 January 1996 / DB

List of Participants

UNDP Mr. Sukehiro Hasegawa, UN Resident Coordinator

DHA Mr. Bob Turner, Field Officer

UNAMIR Mr A.B. Sidique Dao, Humanitarian Affairs Officer

UNHCR Mr. Roman Urasa, Representative
Mr Collins Asare, Deputy Representative

UNICEF Mr. Tom Bergmann, OIC

WFP Mr. Tacheste Zergaber, Country Director

FAO Mr. Jean François Gascon, Representative a.i.

WHO Dr. Amidou Baba-Moussa, Country Representative a.i.

HRFOR Mr. Ian Martin, Chief

IBRD " Ms. Chantal Uwanyiligira, Representative a.i.

IOM Mr. Joost Van der Aalst, Operations Director

ICRC Ms. Silvia Schallerm Deputy Head of Delegation

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

1995 DEC 27 P b: 21

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1995 DEC 27 P b: 41

CHN-447 1/5

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 27 DECEMBER 1995

NO.: MIR - 4335

NO. OF PAGES: 5

SUBJECT: The UN presence in Rwanda after March 8

1. The question of a UN presence in Rwanda after UNAMIR phases out on March 8 needs to be examined, negotiated with the Government of Rwanda and decided well in advance of the final date. In fact, paragraph 10 UN General Assembly resolution on the situation in Rwanda states as follows:

"Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the Government of Rwanda and with the relevant United Nations agencies on the nature of a continued United Nations presence in Rwanda after 8 March 1996 6/ and on the role such a United Nations presence might play in furthering the search for peace and stability through justice, reconciliation and refugee return and in assisting the Government of Rwanda in its pressing task of rehabilitation and reconstruction, and to report to the General Assembly by 1 February 1996 on the results of those consultations in addition to submitting to the Assembly at its fifty-first session a report on the implementation of the present resolution".

CRN 447
(1)

2. In evaluating options, the following three broad formulations may be examined:

- a) UNAMIR need not be replaced at all. After UNAMIR's draw-down on March 8, existing UN Agencies [UNDP, Human Rights, Tribunal, UNHCR, etc.] may carry out the UN agenda;
- b) A limited UN civilian presence with an SRSG coordinating efforts to address outstanding agenda items of refugee return, justice, reconciliation, prisoner rights, etc.;
- c) A regional role in the Great Lakes countries.

3. Before analysing each of the above three formulations, the Rwandan government's own preference may be noted. This preference is viewed in an ideal context rather than as a practical formulation, feasible within the UN framework. Ideally, Rwanda would prefer to see a civilian, rapid reaction UN presence that would be able to respond to its immediate needs of infrastructure repair, distribution of agricultural goods, transport of fuel, food, prisoners and refugees, demining, demobilisation, etc. In short, the conversion into a civilian force [White Helmets?] of UNAMIR's military engineers, logistics cell, communication unit. It is argued, with some justification, that a twilight, peace-building zone exists between peace-keeping and the traditional role of UNDP, World Bank, etc. in the rebuilding of the socio-economic sector and that this twilight zone needs to be bridged through the appointment of a "white-helmet" or a civilian, UN peace corps. Unfortunately, in practical terms, the UN has no precedent for this formula because funding for such an operation is not available from assessed contributions. Voluntary contributions which would presumably sustain such an operation would take time and much lobbying to give it shape. Therefore, this "ideal option" that the Rwandese frequently propose does not appear to be a realistic proposition.

A. A complete phase-out after March 8

4. A good case can be made out for a complete phase out after March 8. UNAMIR II may be seen to have successfully completed its stabilising role in Rwanda. The course for the remaining agenda - refugee return, justice, reconciliation etc. - has been charted and accepted all round. There is, therefore, no longer a meaningful political role for a civilian presence to play in Rwanda. Less so even than Burundi where two main parties continue to vie for political power and ascendancy. In Rwanda, the power struggle is not so much within the country but with elements outside. The political role is, therefore, not Rwanda-centred but regional.

5. Secondly, a civilian presence would raise expectations of UN being able to "deliver" in the event of an internal crisis. In my view, the chances of another political crisis occurring in Rwanda within the short to mid-term are high. This crisis may not reach the genocidal proportions of 1994 but the stability, harmony and peace that comes from within a nation or a people is still far removed and will take several generations to achieve. Outside forces can, at best, play a marginal role in such a syndrome. UNAMIR II has achieved its short-term role of providing stability and recovery. It no longer has a definitive political role. There is a strong case for it to move out at the same time as the military and leave the socio-economic rebuilding programmes to the UN Agencies.

B. A small residual civilian presence

6. The arguments in favour of a small residual civilian presence after UNAMIR's military phase-out are the antithesis of the rationalization in paragraphs 4 and 5 above. A civilian presence would be justified in the context that an agenda of outstanding political issues remains to be completed. Specifically, issues such as refugee return, justice, reconciliation, human rights and socio-economic recovery from the civil war of 1994 need to be addressed. While relevant agencies are engaged in addressing these issues, a guiding, coordinating political presence is needed for a further period of 6 months to a year to provide direction and an adhesive glue to the stability and recovery that UNAMIR II's efforts have achieved in Rwanda. In fact, the Secretary-General's latest report to the Security Council suggests such a civilian presence in the following extract:

"The United Nations still has a useful role to play in political efforts to this end. I recommend therefore that it should maintain a political presence in Rwanda after the withdrawal of UNAMIR. A United Nations office, headed by my Special Representative, could be established with a view to furthering, in consultation with the Government of Rwanda, the search for peace and stability through justice and reconciliation. My Special Representative would also continue to have overall authority for the coordination and expansion, as appropriate, of the assistance that the United Nations and the international community are providing in support of Rwanda's rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. It is understood that, in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Rwanda would allow this Office the necessary freedom of access and movement throughout the country and ensure its safety and security."

7. Moreover, the continuation of a civilian political presence in Rwanda would also reflect the desire by the international community not to walk away from Rwanda and to provide guidance and continuity to its commitment to assist Rwanda resolve its problems.

8. This is a laudable objective but if a UN civilian presence without the support of a military contingent is to be effective and not simply a hollow presence, it must be given a clearly defined role and the necessary means to achieve its objectives. In the overall organizational set-up, the UNDP's Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator should assume the role of Deputy to SRSG so that he assumes an overall co-ordinating role while the UNDP Resident Representative continues in his role as Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. This would organically link the UN Agencies' role to achieving the political objectives set forth by the Security Council. Secondly, SRSG must have some controlling influence on the flow of funds to Rwanda. Without these clearly defined functions, the UN's civilian presence is likely to become relatively meaningless as it would have neither stick nor carrot to influence the government in political directions outlined by the Security Council.

C. The Regional Role

9. The basic argument in favour of a UN presence in the region is that the political issues that beset the country are not Rwanda-centred but spill over to its neighbours. Their redress lies in a regional approach, encompassing refugee return, reconciliation, an Arusha-based Tribunal, justice and an overall approach to humanitarian and economic planning for the resolution of problems that have erupted in Rwanda in 1994 but fester in Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and even in Kenya and Uganda. The regional approach, addressing issues which have a common thread, therefore, would seem logical. In addition, the UN would appear to remain committed to problem-solving in the region while, at the same time, appearing to conclude its Rwanda-specific agenda on a positive note.

10. In this option, also, the political office of the UN would need to have sufficient financial and organizational clout for countries concerned to pay heed to its advice. It would need to have facilities such as a small aircraft and some influence over the direction and tempo of funds committed to the region by UN Agencies.

11. In evaluating the three broad options stated above, certain extraneous factors may become influential. For instance, the current financial crisis would weigh in favour of a close down (Option A). In Option C, all Member States' agreement would have to be obtained and a decision taken on location of the Regional Office. Logically, Kigali appears the most suitable location as Rwanda appears the fountainhead of regional problems but countries like Zaire and Kenya may object to a regional UN presence being located in Kigali. The obvious alternative of Nairobi may evoke a similar reaction from Rwanda. As Burundi is too insecure, the only viable alternative may be Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam or Arusha).

12. In my opinion, Option "B" is the most logical and practical of the three but only if the UN's political presence is backed up by a clear-cut hierarchical organigram relating to other UN Agencies as also some control over the flow of funds. For Option B, the UN's presence would need to have another nomenclature. Ideally, the best mandate that could be provided to the UN civilian presence would be a White Helmet type of scheme with adequate voluntary funding. However, it would be difficult, though not impossible, to have such a scheme take-off within the next 2 months.

13. Option A does not require further definition but has the merit of seeing a UN Mission conclude, hopefully, on a positive note. Frankly, if the UN's political arm cannot be given the organizational and financial back-up that I consider essential in Options B and C, it would be advisable to opt for Option A.

14. Option C - the regional role - is the most challenging and dynamic of the three options. There are important political objectives to be achieved in the Great Lakes Region. It is in fact a challenge for preventive action that needs to be picked up by the United Nations. The Regional Option also has the advantage of UNAMIR II successfully completing its role in Rwanda but at the same time not appearing to walk away from Rwanda or from the problems of the region.

CRW-447

()

15. In conclusion, I find all three options viable and the difference between them marginal. Options B & C need to be supported by effective back-up for UN's political presence. Given this back-up, Option C is the more relevant and challenging operating on a broad canvas. Option "B", is the narrower, safe alternative to "C" as it would be a continuation of a logical fade-out of UNAMIR. I suggest that all three options be presented to the Security Council in the Secretary-General's next report. However before the Security Council takes a decision, interested member States should be briefed on each of the options so that they examine, assimilate and eventually come forward with their own ideas. A good starting point for such an exercise would be the ROSG Meeting in Washington on January 12, 1996.

Best regards.

NOTE AU REPRESENTANT SPECIAL

Objet : Réunion des Ambassadeurs du "Groupe des 10"

1. Comme convenu, j'ai participé à la réunion des Ambassadeurs du "Groupe des 10" qui s'est tenue le jeudi 30 novembre 1995, à 15 heures, à la Représentation de l'Union Européenne à Kigali.
2. La réunion a porté essentiellement sur la suite à donner aux discussions de la semaine dernière sur la question du remplacement des casques bleus par une nouvelle mission de "casques blancs". Le Groupe s'est également penché sur l'annonce -non confirmée- que le Président Bizimungu et ses pairs auraient décidé à la conférence du Caire de solliciter une extension de trois mois du mandat de la MINUAR, afin que celle-ci aide au rapatriement des réfugiés.
3. S'agissant du premier point, Monsieur Hasegawa, Représentant Résident du PNUD, a présenté le document ci-joint, préparé par ses services. A cette occasion, il a déclaré que l'étude de ce document ne revêtait plus un caractère d'urgence, étant donné l'apparente possibilité d'un renouvellement du mandat de la MINUAR. Certaines délégations ont estimé cependant qu'en tout état de cause, le document en question mériterait d'être étudié soigneusement car il pourrait servir à préciser le mandat de la MINUAR si celui-ci est prorogé, ou à constituer la base du mandat d'une nouvelle mission.
4. Quant à la question du renouvellement possible du mandat de la MINUAR, certains Représentants, comme celui des Etats-Unis, ont déclaré que la position de principe de leur Gouvernement était que le status quo actuel de la MINUAR devrait être maintenu pour une durée supplémentaire de 6 mois. D'autres, comme celui de l'Allemagne, estiment qu'il serait irréaliste de penser que la MINUAR pourrait être maintenue sous sa forme actuelle. Madame la Représentante du Royaume-Uni a, pour sa part, rendu compte d'un entretien qu'elle avait eu la veille avec le Major Général Paul Kagame, au cours duquel celui-ci lui aurait précisé que l'annonce faite au Caire n'était qu'une déclaration du Président Carter. Le Gouvernement du Rwanda serait toutefois disposé à l'examiner, ainsi que toute autre proposition que les Nations Unies voudraient bien lui faire qui tiendrait compte des priorités du Gouvernement Rwandais.

.../...

La balle, selon lui, serait donc dans le camp des Nations Unies. Il aurait ajouté qu'il ne croyait point à l'argument selon lequel la MINUAR devrait rester sous sa forme actuelle. Toujours selon la Représentante du Royaume-Uni, le Vice-Président serait prêt à examiner tout nouveau concept que les Nations Unies voudraient avancer, y compris celui d'un nouveau nom et d'un nouveau mandat. Le Général Kagame aurait même précisé à cet égard qu'il restait conscient que son pays avait besoin de la présence et de l'assistance des Nations Unies pour au moins les 10 ans à venir. Mais insister pour que la MINUAR reste coûte que coûte donnerait, selon lui, l'impression que rien ne pourrait être réalisé sans la MINUAR.

5. L'Ambassadeur de France, pour ce qui le concerne, a tenu à donner quelques précisions sur le contexte dans lequel a été faite la déclaration que l'on prête au Président Bizimungu. Selon l'Ambassadeur, le Président Carter rendant compte aux journalistes, en présence de ses pairs, des résultats de la Conférence, aurait mentionné le fait que les participants se sont mis d'accord pour une extension de 3 mois du mandat de la MINUAR. A cette occasion, un journaliste Français aurait posé au Président Bizimungu la question de savoir s'il pouvait confirmer la déclaration du Président Carter, ce à quoi le Président Bizimungu aurait répondu : "Je confirme". Le Président Bizimungu, contrairement aux déductions qui ont été faites par les Agences de Presse, n'aurait pas dit plus.

6. Tirant les conclusions des discussions, l'Ambassadeur de Belgique qui présidait la séance, a fait remarquer qu'une certaine confusion continuait de régner en ce qui concerne la position du Gouvernement Rwandais sur l'extension éventuelle du mandat de la MINUAR. Le "Groupe des 10" estime donc que les discussions doivent se poursuivre à cet égard avec le Gouvernement Rwandais. Enfin, l'Ambassadeur de Belgique a résumé le sentiment de ses collègues en déclarant que le document présenté par le PNUD méritait d'être étudié et analysé soigneusement afin d'être discuté à une réunion ultérieure du Groupe.

WS

Wilfrid de Souza
1er décembre 1995

cc. Général Tousignant

**OFFICE OF THE RESIDENT COORDINATOR
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM'S OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES**

WHITE HELMETS INITIATIVE PROPOSAL

Title:	White Helmets Support for Post-Conflict Peace Building in Rwanda
Country and Project Location:	Rwanda
Group(s) Receiving Support:	The Government of Rwanda
Implementing Institution:	United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
Associated Agencies:	UNAMIR, UNDP, DHA, UNHCR, WFP and otehr UN Agencies
WHI Specialists:	250 Internationals and 1000 Rwandan Civilian White Helmet Volunteer Technicians
Starting Date:	9 December 1995
Duration:	6 months
Cost:	US\$ 14.800.000
Source of Funding:	Assessed Contributions of Member States

SUMMARY

Current mandate of UNAMIR expires on 8 December 1995 and maybe extended for three more months. However, international community needs to effect a transition arrangement for assisting the Government of Rwanda to contine the essential work of rebuilding the country and promoting national reconciliation, as well as enabling the victims of the genocide achieve recovery, and all Rwandese refugees who wish to return home to be repatriated, resettled and reintegrated in safety and dignity.

Consistent with the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace, the Security Council has recognized that genuine reconciliation and long-lasting stability cannot be attained without the reconstruction of the country, support to the victims of the genocide and the safe return and reintegration of Rwandese refugees. However, the national reconciliation and the return of those refugees depend not only upon an orderly implementation of the Accelerated Plan of Action for Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration, they also require the re-establishment of human security, demobilization of child soldiers and demining.

This programme will provide White Helmets assistance to the Government of Rwanda through the Office of the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations System's Operational Activities for the implementation of the Plan of Action for Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration, the re-establishment of human security (through, inter alia, re-establishment of the justice, police, gendarmerie, prison, civic education and health services systems), demobilization of combatants (particularly child soldiers) and demining activities. The White Helmets will make use of the equipment and assets transferred from UNAMIR as it prepares for departure during the next few months.

1. Project Background

As a result of the events that tragically affected Rwanda in 1994, some 1.7 million new refugees live in camps in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. The agreement reached in Cairo on 29 November 1995 by the Heads of States and Governments of Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire indicate that repatriation could accelerate significantly. Current estimates show that between 500,000 and 600,000 refugees may return during the ensuing months. To address potential problems resulting from the accelerated return of such numbers among a population of 5,500,000 -- already weakened socially and economically -- while assuring return in dignity and safety, the Government of Rwanda has proposed an Accelerated Plan of Action for the Repatriation, Reinstallation and Reintegration of Refugees and Formerly Displaced Persons (Plan of Action).

The Government of Rwanda has made significant progress in its efforts to promote human security. While fear and distrust among the Rwandese is manifested by the occurrence of clashes, including armed incursions from refugee camps in neighboring countries, the Government of Rwanda has pursued clear objectives of good governance, re-establishment of law and order, confidence building and reconciliation. Most notably, those endeavors include current initiatives aimed at restoration of an effective and credible national justice system to ensure justice and fair treatment, training of a viable police and gendarmerie, improvement and enlargement of prison and detention facilities, increased human rights awareness and expansion of civic and other education programmes, and rehabilitation of adequate shelter, water, sanitation and health services.

During this same period, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has played an important role in the country. Aside from contributing to the physical security of the country, UNAMIR has assisted the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary return and resettlement of refugees and has made available to the Rwandan authorities its various capabilities. Engineer companies have repaired bridges and roadways, prepared transit sites and other building and rehabilitation activities and undertaken (or trained Rwandese to undertake) demining and the disposal of unexploded ordinance. UNAMIR's logistics and transport companies have transported food, shelter material, blankets, clothing and firewood, as well as provided medical evacuations capacity. Over 1000 patients per week are attended by UNAMIR's doctors and dentists while communications units support the Rwandan telephone company. UNAMIR has likewise supported the programmes of UN agencies promoting repatriation, resettlement and reintegration through humanitarian relief, human rights, rehabilitation and peace-building activities.

The Government of Rwanda has carefully reviewed the mandate of UNAMIR and concluded that while the Government assumes the full responsibility for the security of the country, international assistance should be provided for rehabilitation of the damaged socio-economic infrastructure and the reinstallation and reintegration of refugees.

2. Project Justification

As security has returned to Rwanda, UNAMIR began its preparation for departure. The Government of Rwanda has requested the continuation, and expansion, of certain activities previously undertaken by UNAMIR relating to post-conflict peace building.

The goal of such activities is to support, within the context of civilian assistance, national reconciliation and increased stability, while preventing a possible relapse into the violence that overran Rwanda in early 1994. Genuine reconciliation and long-lasting stability can be attained only with the safe, voluntary and organized return of all Rwandan refugees. However, with an expected 6,000 returning refugees per day for the next six months, orderly and secure reinstallation of those refugees depends not only upon successful implementation of the Plan of Action for repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, it also depends upon the re-establishment of human security, demobilization of soldiers of the former government and demining.

Serving as a bridge between the primary peace-keeping operation of UNAMIR and medium/longer term rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes encompassed in the Round Table, the support provided by this project would be expected to promote and assist the safe return to their country of all Rwandan refugees through implementation of the Plan of Action. Within this overall context, the project seeks to better assure reconciliation and stability through assistance in re-establishing human security (through, inter alia, re-establishment of the justice system, police and gendarmerie forces, prison centers, human rights, civic education and health services), demobilization of combatants among the refugees and internally displaced (particularly child soldiers) and support to the Government of Rwanda's demining task force. Essential for the success of these undertakings is the availability of equipment currently utilized by UNAMIR.

The Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace recognizes the vital importance of post-conflict peace building. Noting that, to be truly successful, UN operations must include activities designed to "identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people." Included in the list of possible efforts appropriate for participation by the UN in post-conflict peace building are many of those identified by the Government of Rwanda and incorporated in this project -- repatriating refugees, restoration of order and reformation or strengthening of governmental institutions, advisory and training support for security personnel, advancing human rights, disarmament and demining. The Agenda for Peace likewise contemplates regional cooperative activities, the likes of which are currently underway among Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda to address the sub-regional issues associated with continuing ethnic tensions and resulting refugees.

The White Helmets Initiative was introduced in mid-1993 and has since gained international attention and acceptance as a potentially new and innovative means of addressing the UN System's needs in humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and technical cooperation for development. The recognition and support culminated in Resolution A/50/**** of the United Nations General Assembly, which calls on the UN System, through the UN Resident Coordinator system, the United Nations Volunteers programme and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, to contemplate and encourage the

use of White Helmets expertise to support activities in humanitarian emergency assistance as well as the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. Within this broad scope of possible activities, the Secretary-General and the General Assembly have included many applicable to the current needs in Rwanda, particularly conflict prevention and resolution, repatriation, logistics, food aid, engineering and construction, water and sanitation, communications, fleet maintenance, human rights and civics education, local capacity building, demobilization and reintegration and demining.

Within this context, the White Helmets Initiative provides a unique opportunity to de-militarize and de-politicize the UN System's response mechanisms for post-conflict peace building. Simultaneously, the White Helmets approach of utilizing civilian volunteers working directly with the intended beneficiaries, both as facilitators and as partners with national personnel, will, upon completion of the project, provide the Government of Rwanda a source of continued expertise.

3. Objectives

At the request and with the consent of the Government of Rwanda, the project seeks to enable the international community to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of post-conflict peace building and national reconciliation. Specific objectives include

- the safe, voluntary and organized return of all Rwandan refugees, including their repatriation, resettlement and reintegration according to the Accelerated Plan of Action.
- the re-establishment of human security and strengthening of civil society institutions through
 - restoration of an effective and credible national justice system to ensure justice and equal treatment;
 - training of a viable police and gendarmerie;
 - improvement and enlargement of prison and detention facilities;
 - increased human rights awareness and expansion of civic and other education programmes; and
 - development and expansion of adequate shelter, water, sanitation and health services.
- the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants among the refugees and internally displaced persons, especially child soldiers.
- demining and rehabilitation of land contaminated with mines and unexploded ordinance through strengthening the capacity of the [Government of Rwanda's Task Force for Demining].

4. Objectives and Activities

The WHI Specialists will address short term critical needs relative to national reconciliation and stability associated with the voluntary and orderly return of Rwandan refugees in safety and dignity, the re-establishment of human security, demobilization and demining.

4.1. First Stage Support to the Plan of Action for Repatriation, Reinstallation and Reintegration

The foreseen rapid and massive repatriation of at least one million rwandan's refugees from neighboring countries will create major logistic and security problems in the country. Although UNHCR has lately build up capacities to receive and transport to their home communes up to 6,000 refugees a day, it is recognized that a continuous flow of such a magnitude of returnees would rapidly create bottlenecks. Furthermore, if Zaire and/or Tanzania decide to proceed to force repatriation, the daily number of people returning could even be larger. Additional support would thus be needed for the transportation of refugees (specially vulnerable groups) from transit centers to their home communes, for increasing transit centers capacities, for improving service delivery in way stations and for improving emergency quick impact reinstallation activities.

The return of refugees also call for rapid development of reinstallation sites for the old caseload refugees who came back to Rwanda since the end of the war and are currently occupying land and houses belonging to refugees currently outside of the country.

Although the Accelerated Plan of Action for the repatriation, reinstallation and reintegration of refugees envisages measures to cover for these needs, its implementation will not start immediately unless resources and materials are made available. In the meantime, and following UNAMIR's withdrawal, the White Helmets will conduct operations that will facilitate the repatriation process as well as "first stage" reinstallation of refugees in their home communes.

Objective 1 - Refugee Repatriation

To facilitate a rapid and orderly repatriation of refugees from neighboring countries into their home communes:

Activities

- provision of technical and logistical support (transport and communication equipment) for UNHCR and Government institutions responsible for the repatriation of refugees;
- provision of technical and logistical support to facilitate the organization of support services for the returnees (food distribution, water scheme, health services, way stations, transit centers, etc.).

Objective 2 - Refugee Reinstallation

To facilitate the rapid reinstallation of refugees and the first stage rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure

Activities

- support the preparation of permanent resettlement sites and, if necessary, support the creation of temporary resettlement sites in communes receiving large number of refugees;
- formation of "rehabilitation brigade" capable of responding to most urgent needs in term of rehabilitating socio-economic infrastructure (health centers, schools, public administration buildings, roads and bridges, etc.);
- complement health services in communes where national capacities are insufficient.

Objective 3 - Rehabilitation

To support the coordination of resettlement and rehabilitation activities at the national and prefectoral level

Activities

- strengthen the capacity of HACU to identify, programme and monitor urgent rehabilitation and resettlement activities at the national and prefectoral level;
- strengthen the local NGOs and CBOs capacity to identify and implement rehabilitation and resettlement activities at the communal level.

4.2. Human Security

In view of a possible massive and rapid return of refugees the Rwandan authorities, along with the expression of their full support to a massive return, point out that the National Gendarmerie screening and return monitoring capacities should be improved in order to assure that no infiltration takes place during the repatriation process and that returnees can safely return to their home communes. Security of returning population is also threatened by the presence of a large number of mines in different regions of the country.

It is recognized that the return of refugees who fled the country at the end of 1994 war will create tensions and conflicts in the population in all areas of the country. The social fabric of the Rwandan population is still very affected by the genocide and massacres that took place in 1994. The return of a large number of Rwandans who committed the genocide and massacres and at the same time of people who took refuge with them but were not involved in the massacres will intensify the feeling of revenge among those who were left behind. This probability for acts of revenge is increased by the fact that the justice system is still not functioning properly and nobody charged of committing genocide have been condemned so far either by the Rwandan justice system or the International Tribunal for Rwanda. In this situation, rapid measures will have to be taken in order to assure that the security of returnees not involved in either the genocide or the massacres, as well as the security of the population actually in Rwanda, will be guaranteed. To this end, and in order to create a new sense of security in the country, the National Gendarmerie and the Communal Police should

be trained and properly equipped. They will then be able to perform their respective duties using a proper code of conduct that are now performed by the militaries.

Objective 1 - Safe Repatriation

To facilitate the safe repatriation of refugees from neighboring countries:

Activities

- provision of logistical support to the National Gendarmerie (transport and communication equipment);
- rehabilitation of Gendarmerie and training centers facilities;
- rapid training of Gendarmes and training of trainers in proper code of conduct and responsibilities towards the population;
- provision of technical support for the monitoring of refugees up to the commune level (in support of UNHCR activities);
- provision of necessary additional technical support to the Rwanda's demining task force (human resources, equipment, etc).

note: these activities will complement on-going UNDP activities in support of the Gendarmerie and Communal Police and on-going American support for demining.

It is also foreseen that a certain number of returnees will be charged with genocide crimes which will put increased pressure on already overcrowded detention centers. In that situation, the White Helmets will provide assistance to safeguard the minimum conditions of detention facilities.

Objective 2 - Detention Conditions

To increase detention capacity and ameliorate condition of living in detention centres

Activities

- provision of technical support to build new detention center(s), assist in converting warehouses in temporary detention centers and ameliorate conditions of living in existing centers.

Objective 3 - Law and order

To maintain law and order in the prefectures and communes

- provision of logistical support to the communal police (uniforms, radios, motos, office equipment, etc.);
- rehabilitation of Communal Police training centers facilities;
- rapid training of Communal Policemen and training of trainers in proper code of conduct and responsibilities towards the population.

4.3. Confidence building and national reconciliation

It is admitted that the reconciliatory and confidence building processes Rwandans have to go through in order to live peacefully together have to be developed. This is specially true in the context of the return of the refugees who flew out of the country in the same time as the perpetrator of the 1994 genocide and massacres.

As mentioned earlier, as long as the justice system is not properly functioning, probability for acts of revenge will be very high and national reconciliation will not be possible. In that situation, the judicial system have to perform efficiently in order to show to the population that people presumed guilty of genocide and massacres are traileed and that impunity is not tolerate in Rwanda anymore. Conversely, the justice system needs the capacity to determine if detainees were arrested unjustly or not so that innocents can be released. A functioning judiciary will directly support confidence building and national reconciliation.

Objective 1 - National Reconciliation

To develop confidence building and national reconciliatory sentiment throughout the population in the country

Activities:

- development of national sensitization campaign and national campaign strategy;
- establishment and training of national teams who will develop civic education campaign and promote national reconciliation throughout the country;
- development of national sensitization campaign on the return of the refugees to increase the psychological absorptive capacity of the population.

Objective 2 - Rehabilitation of the Judiciary

To contribute to the rehabilitation of the judiciary and the resumption of national judicial processes

Activities:

- provision of the appropriate equipment for the personnel of the judiciary;
- provision of technical assistance to reinforce the capacities of the judiciary to address the processes;
- rehabilitation of judiciary buildings.

5. Project Strategy and Implementation Arrangements

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the desirability of a continued United Nations civilian presence to support its objectives of the rehabillitation of the victims of the genocide, the return, in an environment of national reconciliation and stability, of all Rwandan refugees who wish to return, as well as the need to increase its capacity and ability to better assure human security, effectively demobilize and reintegrate former combatants among the refugees and rid their country of mines and unexploded ordinance.

5.1 Identification of Needs

The Offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations system's operational activities for development have developed the strategy for this project in accordance with the needs identified and objectives outlined above. In programming White Helmets activities, they have likewise been guided by the language of GA Resolutions 49/139B and 50/****, particularly as they relate to the use of teams in the areas of emergency assistance and the promotion of a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, as well as the integration and involvement, to the extent possible, of participatory approaches and linkages to national entities and individuals, including mobilization of existing local expertise.

5.2 Determining Appropriate Personnel Response

As the number and size of UN operations have expanded in recent years, so have their functions and degrees of complexity. Activities now undertaken extend beyond traditional roles into peace- and nation-building areas such as humanitarian relief assistance in complex emergencies, repatriation and resettlement, restoration of infrastructures and social services, community-level post-conflict confidence-building and conflict prevention/resolution, human rights monitoring, electoral processes, administration and management.

Current approaches to satisfying the personnel needs in operations such as those contemplated in Rwanda generally rely on the identification and recruitment of individuals, the deployment of military contingents within a peace-keeping operation or, particularly in the earliest stages of an emergency, the ad hoc fielding of small, single-purpose civilian teams. The General Assembly has recognized that the White Helmets initiative represents an innovative opportunity for the effective, efficient and economical provision of assistance to the intended beneficiaries of the UN system's operations, tapping existing but as yet unstructured and therefore unrealized sources of volunteer expertise.

But more than merely providing a new human resources base, the White Helmets initiative presents new opportunities for creative and resourceful programme design, formulation and implementation such as those incorporated within this project. Through the use of teams applied across the "continuum" in distinct sectors of activities, and linked, to the extent possible, to local NGOs, CBOs and other civil society organizations, the White Helmets initiative will encourage the introduction of greater opportunities for the integration and involvement of participatory approaches and local capacity-building.

5.3 Identification of International WHI Specialists

The project will involve the identification, selection and fielding of about 250 international WHI Specialists. The WHI Specialists will, in accordance with the needs of the project, be identified, screened and selected by the United Nations Volunteers programme through its network of participating national partners in the White Helmets initiative.

International WHI Specialists will possess the necessary experience relevant to the tasks described in Annex I, together with the capacity to plan, recommend policies and strategies and to design practical approaches to improve the utilization of current capacities as well as increase functional capabilities. Following selection, no further approval of the volunteer specialists will be required except pre-departure medical clearance and local security authorization.

5.4 Role of Rwandan WHI Specialists

The applicable General Assembly resolutions relating to the White Helmets initiative likewise seek incorporation of longer-term approaches across the "continuum" from relief to development. Those roles, particularly as they relate to the use of teams in emergency assistance and the promotion of a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, permit inclusion of key elements relating to participatory/capacity building approaches. Through linkages to Rwandan entities and individuals, the project will, to the extent possible, utilize existing local expertise, seek to animate local NGOs, CBOs, and other civil society organizations as well as promote local capacities that may likewise be used for strengthened national and regional response.

In addition to international WHI Specialists, Rwandan WHI Specialists are expected to be recruited to serve both as counterparts to the international WHI Specialists as well as a local source of skills required within the project in lieu of the recruitment of international personnel. The Rwandan WHI Specialists will benefit from training provided by the international WHI Specialists, will represent a pool of increased national capacity and will better assure the sustainability of the activities undertaken. Selection of the Rwandan WHI Specialists will be effected through a panel comprised of a representative of each of the Government of Rwanda, the Office of the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations Volunteers programme.

5.5 Project Equipment

An essential element for the success of the project is the availability of equipment of the type currently being utilized by UNAMIR in the performance of similar activities. The best (and primary) source of the equipment would be UNAMIR itself, following termination of its mandate and transfer (on a priority basis) of surplus equipment to UNDP in accordance with established procedures of the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations. However, the surplus equipment of UNAMIR may prove insufficient for the needs of the project. The equipment items are:

- generators;
- heavy duty vehicles;
- sedan vehicles;
- water purification unit;
- pumps;
- tanks and containers;
- tents;
- office equipment;
- photocopiers;
- radio and VHF equipment;

- freezers and refrigerators;
- photograph and microfilm equipment;
- TV and VCR sets.

Accordingly, additional institutional arrangements should be considered, including bi-lateral agreements as well as linkage to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs' Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) project. MCDA was developed as a response mechanism for bridging the gap between equipment needs of the relief community and resources available. Guidelines for the use of MCDA in international response have been finalized, and use of MCDA in the context of the White Helmets initiative has been embraced.

5.6 Administration of WHI Specialists

The WHI Specialists will be retained for 6 months. WHI Specialists selected to participate in White Helmets activities will be contracted by, and will serve under Conditions of Service applicable to service in Rwanda (as international or national UNV Specialists, as appropriate) as well as other rules and regulations (including the Code of Conduct and relevant security guidelines and procedures) of, the United Nations Volunteers programme.

Under the overall supervision of the Resident Coordinator, the United Nations Volunteers programme will undertake the field administration of all WHI Specialists through a Programme Administration and Management Unit (PAMU) consisting of:

- 1 Programme Manager
- 1 Logistics/Inventory Control Officer
- 1 Administrative Officer
- 5 UNV Programme Specialists
- 5 Rwandan Support Staff

All in-country entitlement and benefits will be paid or otherwise provided for by the Programme Administration and Management Unit.

5.7 Project Management

In the performance of their duties, national and international WHI Specialists will be subject to the direction and supervision of the United Nations Volunteers programme.

Under the auspices of the Office of the Resident Coordinator, the Programme Administration and Management Unit will provide overall management and guidance of the project. In liaison with relevant UN Agencies and the Government of Rwanda, the Unit will screen requests for assistance and identify priority needs for project activities.

Technical backstopping of the WHI Specialists, including work planning and implementation, will be provided, in the first instance, by the UN Agency or recipient Government Ministry or institution to which the WHI Specialist is assigned.

5.8 Linkages to the Government of Rwanda

Consistent with the Agenda for Peace and as embodied within the strategy of the Working Group on Post-Conflict Peace Building, the project seeks to create a framework that respects the principles of sovereign equality and political independence, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of Rwanda. Simultaneously, the project seeks to consolidate those principles with the objectives of the international community for genuine reconciliation and long-lasting stability through the safe, voluntary and organized return of all Rwandan refugees, the re-establishment of human security, demobilization and demining.

Throughout the process, from needs assessment and identification to project design, formulation and planned implementation, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Resident Coordinator have sought the advice and input of the Government of Rwanda. As also suggested by the Agenda for Peace and the Working Group on Post-Conflict Peace Building, the UN has likewise sought the guidance of regional cooperative organizations or undertakings in which the Government participates, as well as donors and other relevant parties.

5.9 Evaluation

The Office of the Resident Coordinator, the United Nations Volunteers programme and the Government of Rwanda will undertake to evaluate systematically the operations undertaken within this project, with specific reference to the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of the activities.

Upon completion of the project, the Secretariat of the United Nations, UNDP and the Office of the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations Volunteers programme will evaluate the project as the first large-scale operation within the White Helmets initiative with a view toward the appropriateness of similar undertakings in post-conflict peace building in the future.

6. Inputs

The project requires an integrated approach to a variety of inputs, including

6.1 International WHI Specialists

The Specialists anticipated to be fielded under the project will represent those WHI Specialists required to continue the operations of UNAMIR supporting humanitarian and repatriation operations as well as those required to implement the Plan of Action and the described activities associated with the re-establishment of human security, demobilization and demining. They will include:

- 30 logisticians;
- 40 machinery operators (trucks, bulldozers, etc.);
- 40 civil engineers;
- 15 doctors and other medical staff;

- 15 communication specialists;
- 20 surveyors, draftsman and architects;
- 10 electricians;
- 10 agronomists;
- 10 trainers for the communal police and gendarmerie;
- 10 administrators.

6.2 Rwandan WHI Specialists

In addition to international WHI Specialists, Rwandan WHI Specialists are expected to be recruited both as counterparts to the international WHI Specialists as well as a source of local skilled labor required within the project.

7. Budget

The following is an estimated budget, and reallocation of resources, based on pro forma costs of the WHI Specialists and equipment required for the project:

Personnel component:

200 International White Helmets Technicians (6 months, \$ 24,000 x 200)	\$ 4,800,000
1000 National White Helmets (6 months, \$ 2,000 x 1000)	\$ 2,000,000

Equipment:

Equipment to be transferred from UNAMIR	
Additional equipment and materials	\$ 5,000,000
Operation and maintenance of equipment	\$ 3,000,000

TOTAL	\$ 14,800,000
--------------	----------------------
