

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNCLASSIFIED
EL/WG JUNE 2009

UNARCHIVES
SERIES S-1062
BOX 61
FILE 5
ACC. 1998/0283



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

FROM : CMO

FILE : MILOB/CMO/OPS/5

TO : COS

DATE : 12 Feb 96

INFO : MA to A F C

FINAL PROGRESS REPORT OF S G ON UNAMIR : MILOB REPORT

1. Kindly refer to your letter of 09 Feb 96 on above subject.
2. **Security situation in Rwanda.** Insurgent activities by FRGF in Rwanda which had steadily increased from Aug 95 peaking in Nov 95 saw a sharp decline after the Iswawa Island episode in Nov 95. This incident possibly demoralised the FRGF rank and file operating in Rwanda. RPA is now better organised. Situation remained very peaceful for almost a month. However since second week of Dec, the insurgent activities again picked up in the prefectures bordering Zaire. As per our assessment, this trend is likely to continue in future with renewed vigour.
3. **Humanitarian Situation** The humanitarian situation has greatly improved. The local officials have been seen to encourage reconciliation. Most of the returnees have been well treated and authorities have helped them to get their houses and land returned back to them. This is indeed very encouraging. The effect of expulsion of 38 NGOs is being felt all over the country. The most badly affected are the medical services. There is a shortage of medicines and medical equipment.
4. **Repatriation of Refugees.** Despite concerted efforts by all concerned, the repatriation of refugees has remained at a rather low key. A total of 15442, 27231 and 6261 refugees returned during the months of Oct, Nov and Dec 95 respectively. Massive repatriation was expected during the month of Jan 96 by UNHCR. However only 13264 returned during the month of Jan 96. Although this was more than double of Dec 95 figure, but it is still too meagre considering that over a million refugees are still outside Rwanda. This is despite improved security situation in Rwanda. The possible reason seems to be either they are too apprehensive of security situation in Rwanda or they are quite comfortable in the camps and have no desire to leave those comforts and face hardships and intimidation in their communes. There has been an increase in returnees from Burundi because of the prevailing situation in that country. There are reports that Zaire is deploying additional troops in some camps (Kibumba in Goma and Kasusa in Bukavu)

to accelerate repatriation. Their method and its impact is yet to be seen. Repatriation is not likely to increase in the coming months (barring the possibility of forced repatriation).

5. **MILOB Operations in Current Mandate.** MILOBs were subjected to massive reduction in their strength (from 320 to 146) in the current mandate. MILOBs monitoring and patrolling the communes are very few due to their reduced numbers as well as the low intensity of returnees , which is their main task in the current mandate. Operating without formed troops has had no adverse impact on their capabilities, though theft cases are increasing within their office compounds. However remedial measures like hiring of civilian night guards has been undertaken.

6. **Future Role of UN in Rwanda.** The UNAMIR mandate ends on 08 Mar 96 with the liquidation to be completed by 19 Apr 96. However, the task of the UN still remains unfinished , with over a million refugees still outside Rwanda. The pullout of UNAMIR will create apprehensions in the minds of refugees outside Rwanda as well as the returnees in Rwanda. This is likely to hamper the return of refugees. Hence, it is felt that there is a need for continued presence of UN. It could be in one of the following form (in order of priority) :-

(a) **Continuation of UNAMIR in the Present Status.** There can be NO further reduction in strength particularly of MILOBs. Further reductions will make UNAMIR unviable and hence is strongly not recommended.

(b) **MILOB Mission** UNAMIR can be converted to a MILOB mission (UNOMIR -United Nations Observer Mission in Rwanda). However for MILOB mission to be viable , the strength of MILOBs MUST be increased to 250 to 320. Present strength of 146 is grossly inadequate particularly for an independent MILOB mission.

(c) **UN Goodwill Mission.** Last option is to convert this mission into a goodwill mission which could be more of a political nucleus which could be expanded as and when situation warrants.

(Charles Nelson)
Col
CMO

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO : COS

FROM : HAC

DATE : 04 Mar 1996

FILE : 5000.1/HAC/A/1

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELL FINAL REPORT

GENERAL

1. The Humanitarian Assistance Cell (HAC) was formed as a part of the UNAMIR HQ to receive and screen the humanitarian requests and also coordinate the provision of such assistance by UNAMIR. The HAC has been structured in different forms at different times. It was originally headed by a Colonel as the Chief Humanitarian Officer, a Lt Col as Deputy CHAO. There were also two teams of four officers each for humanitarian patrols and liaison, in addition to an Operations Officer, an OIC Database and a clerk. Subsequently the strength of HAC went down and in the later stages it consisted of a CHAO, an Operations cum Database Officer and two liaison officers.

2. UNAMIR Humanitarian Assistance Advisory Group (UHAAG) was formed to coordinate the activities of various branches of UNAMIR in the field of humanitarian assistance. It was headed by the CHAO, with HAC database officer as the Secretary. The members were representatives from the offices of the SRSG, CAO, UNAMIR Operations and UNAMIR Logistics, and also the Force Engineer Officer and the Force Medical Officer. The Group met regularly to decide on of all humanitarian assistance requests received by UNAMIR, and subsequently monitor their implementation.

TASKS OF HAC

3. The important tasks of HAC were as follows :

- (a) To brief the Force Commander and advise UNAMIR Operations Branch on matters concerning humanitarian assistance.
- (b) To assist UNDP in coordinating the humanitarian assistance activities of UN agencies and NGOs operating in Rwanda.
- (c) To conduct humanitarian recce in all sectors.
- (d) To collate humanitarian assistance data from sectors and produce humanitarian reports.
- (e) To maintain current data on refugees, returnees and displaced persons.
- (f) To effect liaison with other UN agencies, NGOs and the humanitarian representatives of the Rwandan Government.
- (g) To disseminate information concerning human rights abuses to UN human rights reporters.

POLICY OF HAC

4. HAC had the responsibility of dealing with requests coming from different sources. Due to the limited availability of resources with UNAMIR a large number of requests had to be dealt with using resources of other UN agencies or NGOs. Also, a large number of reasonable requests also had to be turned down. The policy followed by HAC was based on the following premises :

- (a) UNAMIR had only limited resources available for humanitarian assistance, and hence these had to be coordinated through regular UHAAG meetings.
- (b) Liaison with UN agencies, HACU, NGOs and embassies and coordinating with their efforts for better utilisation of the limited resources.
- (c) Priority to vulnerable groups viz orphans, widows and handicapped, and then hospitals and other critical humanitarian projects.

ACHIEVEMENTS

5. Engineering Support . UNAMIR provided engineering support all over Rwanda with the resources of the Force Engineer Company as well as the integral Engineer detachments of the formed troops battalions. The main support provided was in the following fields :

- (a) Construction and repair of bridges.
- (b) Repair of roads and tracks.
- (c) Rehabilitation of water supply systems.
- (d) Rehabilitation of electricity systems.
- (e) Construction of sanitary facilities.
- (f) Land levelling for transit camps, resettlement housing projects etc.
- (g) Demining assistance.
- (h) Deactivation of unexploded explosive devices.

6. Transportation Support. UNAMIR provided large scale transportation assistance in Rwanda. Second and Third Line transport with UNAMIR Logistics as well as First Line transport with the formed troops were used for provision of humanitarian assistance. Transport support was mainly provided in the following fields :

- (a) Transportation of essential food items.
- (b) Transportation of seeds.
- (c) Transportation of humanitarian aid items.
- (d) Transportation of essential items for other UN agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance.

7. Medical Support . UNAMIR provided medical support the resources of the Force Medical organisation (AUSMED / NORMED) as well as the integral medical and dental aid posts of the formed troops battalions. The main support provided was in terms of :

- (a) Medical and dental treatment to local patients.
- (b) Limited provision of essential medicines and Oral Rehydration Salts.
- (c) Training of local staff in the hospitals / health centres.
- (d) Provision of specialist medical advice.
- (e) Assistance in immunisation programmes.
- (f) Emergency medical evacuation including air evacuation.

8. Donations . UNAMIR and its troops donated large number of items to various organisations in Rwanda, mainly the orphanages and the hospitals. The donations mainly consisted of the following :

- (a) Blankets and mosquito nets.
- (b) Books and toys.
- (c) Sports items.
- (d) Clothing items.
- (e) Buckets, plates and cups etc.

9. Miscellaneous Support . In addition to that enumerated in the preceding paragraphs, UNAMIR also provided the following important assistance :

- (a) Rehabilitation of communication support infrastructure including Rwandatel telephone lines, telexes and radio equipment.
- (b) Provision of generators for essential power supply requirements.
- (c) Water supply to various organisations as orphanages, hospitals, transit camps etc on emergency basis.
- (d) Septic tank clearance, in situations of impending health hazard.

PROBLEM AREAS

10. The main problem area in provision of humanitarian assistance was clearly the lack of resources. As the demand for such assistance in the war ravaged country of Rwanda was very high the resources available in the country in general, and with UNAMIR in particular was meagre.

LESSONS LEARNT

11. The main lessons learnt in the provision of humanitarian assistance by UNAMIR have been the following :

- (a) A suitable centralised structure should be put in place, right at the outset, to consider with all humanitarian assistance requests and allocate resources for assistance tasks.
- (b) The mission should have at least some resources allocated to it specifically for the purpose of humanitarian assistance.
- (c) Detailed coordination with other UN agencies and NGOs is essential for a focussed assistance effort.

(d) Coordination with the country's government is required for identifying their main priorities and for smooth progress of assistance tasks.

(e) Detailed recce by MILOB patrols from the sectors and special humanitarian patrols are necessary to identify the groups / organisations in the maximum need of the limited assistance resources.

(f) A centralised database is essential for handling and disseminating the humanitarian assistance data including information on communes, organisations, refugees, returnees and requests for and provision of assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. UN needs to consider the pending agenda of humanitarian assistance in the country, and set up a structure to fulfil the role. The main humanitarian concerns still remaining in Rwanda are the following :

(a) Reception and transportation of returnees to their home communes.

(b) Resettlement of the returnees.

(c) Monitoring absorption capacity of the communes.

(d) Vulnerable groups viz orphans, widows and handicapped.

(e) Health care and sanitation.

(f) Improvement in the country's support infrastructure as roads and bridges.

(g) Justice System

(h) Education.

CONCLUSION

13. HAC has tried to fulfill its mandate to the best of its capability. It is recommended that further use be made of the HAC Database, as found appropriate, for helping in the continued provision of UN assistance to Rwandan people. The provision of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda by UNAMIR was an important task, but one which had to be undertaken without any resources allocated by UN HQ. In view of the serious lack of resources and the deluge of requests received by UNAMIR, the role performed by HAC could be considered to have been reasonably performed.

Nestor Sainz
Lt Col
CHAO



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

TO : C O S

FILE : MILOB/OPS/62

FROM : S O O

DATE : 19 Mar 96

INFO : MA to AFC

UNAMIR SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA

1. Kindly refer to the letter of SRSG dated 13 Mar 96 on above subject.
2. UNAMIR has played a very important role in the reconstruction of Rwanda. It has provided numerous humanitarian assistance. Since the resources available with UNAMIR were limited , there was need to have a coordinating agency. The Humanitarian Assistance Cell (HAC) was formed as a part of the UNAMIR HQ to receive and screen the humanitarian requests and also coordinate the provision of such assistance by UNAMIR. UNAMIR Humanitarian Assistance Advisory Group (UHAAG) was formed to coordinate the activities of various branches of UNAMIR in the field of humanitarian assistance. It was headed by the CHAO and had representatives from the offices of the SRSG, CAO, UNAMIR Operations and UNAMIR Logistics, and also the Force Engineer Officer and the Force Medical Officer. The Group met regularly to decide on of all humanitarian assistance requests received by UNAMIR, and subsequently monitor their implementation. The important tasks of HAC were as follows :
 - (a) To brief the Force Commander and advice UNAMIR Operations Branch on matters concerning humanitarian assistance.
 - (b) To assist UNDP in coordinating the humanitarian assistance activities of UN agencies and NGOs operating in Rwanda.
 - (c) To conduct humanitarian recce in all sectors.
 - (d) To collate humanitarian assistance data from sectors and produce humanitarian reports.

- (e) To maintain current data on refugees, returnees and displaced persons.
- (f) To effect liaison with other UN agencies, NGOs and the humanitarian representatives of the Rwandan Government.
- (g) To disseminate information concerning human rights abuses to UN human rights reporters.

Important Support Provided By UNAMIR

3. Engineering Support . UNAMIR provided engineering support all over Rwanda with the resources of the Force Engineer Company as well as the integral Engineer detachments of the formed troops battalions. The main support provided was in the following fields :

(a) Construction and repair of bridges. A very large number of bridges were repaired by UNAMIR using its integral resources. A few were even constructed. Just to name a few important ones :-

- (1) 220 feet Bailey Bridge at Busoro (Gisenyi).
- (2) 60 feet steel girder bridge at Nyamata (Kibungo).
- (3) Bailey Bridge at Gashora.
- (4) Log Bridge at Masango (Kigali).

(b) Repair of roads and tracks. Extensive repair of roads and tracks were undertaken by Force Engineers in almost all parts of Rwanda.

(c) Rehabilitation of water supply systems. Due to the Rwandan crisis most of the water supply system was damaged extensively. UNAMIR provided invaluable support in rehabilitation of water supply system in various parts of Rwanda to various organisations as orphanages, hospitals, transit camps etc on emergency basis. A notable one was its works in Unaccompanied Children Orphanage in Kigali.

(d) Rehabilitation of electricity supply system.

(e) Construction of sanitary facilities.

- (f) Land leveling for transit camps, resettlement housing projects etc.
- (g) Demining assistance.
- (h) Deactivation of unexploded bombs and grenades.
- (j) Rehabilitation School in Butare. The Force Engineer Company carried out rehabilitation work at the Demobilised Children Rehabilitation School in Butare. It included sanitary works, electrification , cook houses and restoration of water supply.
- (k) Mine Awareness. A team from Force Engineer Company delivered mine awareness lectures in almost all prefectures for UNAMIR, UN agencies , NGOs and the local population. This was very useful for all the people. They continued to receive request for such lectures from time to time.
- (l) Provision of generators for essential power supply requirements.
- (m) Septic tank clearance in schools , orphanages , prisons etc.

4. Communication Support Force Signals played a very important role in reactivating the telecommunications of Rwanda. This was one field which was most extensively destroyed during the crisis. Some of the important works done in this regard are listed below :-

- (a) Rehabilitation of RwandaTel Telephone Lines. The UNAMIR Force Signal Company rehabilitated a large number of important telephone lines, after extensive repairs at Kigali and Gisenyi.
- (b) Repair and Programming of RwandaTel Radio Equipment. The UNAMIR Force Signal Company has provided manpower and technical knowhow assistance in repairs and programming of RwandaTel radio equipment. A Very High Frequency Radio Repeater was also provided to RwandaTel to meet mobile communication requirements.
- (c) Repair of Satellite Equipment. The nonfunctional satellite equipment at Nyanza was repaired by UNAMIR communication personnel .
- (d) Provision of Generators on Loan to Rwanda Government. UNAMIR provided generators on loan to a number of important Rwandan government locations as Kigali Airport, Satellite Earth Station at Nyanza, Water Substation at Kimihura, Rwanda TV Station in Kigali and FM Radio Station at Kanombe.

(e) Telephone Connection to Prefect at Cyangugu. A telephone connection was provided to the Prefect of Cyangugu using UNAMIR communication resources.

5. Transportation Support. UNAMIR provided large scale transportation assistance in Rwanda. Second and Third Line transport with UNAMIR Logistics as well as First Line transport with the formed troops were used for provision of humanitarian assistance. Transport support was mainly provided in the following fields :

(a) Transportation of essential food items. It assisted WFP , local government as well as other UN agencies and NGOs in transporting food from Kigali to various communes. It even assisted RPA in transporting its supplies to its troops in various prefectures.

(b) Transportation of seeds.

(c) Transportation of humanitarian aid items.

(d) Transportation of essential items for other UN agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance.

(e) Transportation of Construction Material.

6. Medical Support . UNAMIR provided medical support the resources of the Force Medical organisation (AUSMED / NORMED) as well as the integral medical and dental aid posts of the formed troops battalions. The main support provided was in terms of :

(a) Medical and dental treatment to local patients.

(b) Limited provision of essential medicines and Oral Rehydration Salts.

(c) Training of local staff in the hospitals / health centres.

(d) Provision of specialist medical advice.

(e) Assistance in immunisation programmes.

(f) Emergency medical evacuation including air evacuation.

7. Donations . UNAMIR and its troops donated large number of items to various organisations

in Rwanda, mainly the orphanages and the hospitals. The donations mainly consisted of the following :-

- (a) Blankets and mosquito nets.
- (b) Books and toys.
- (c) Sports items.
- (d) Clothing items.
- (e) Buckets, plates and cups etc.

(W M Chomba)
Lt Col
S O O



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

FROM : S O O

FILE : MILOB/CMO/OPS/46

TO : Office of SRSG

DATE : 24 Feb 96

INFO : MA to A F C
ADCOS (OPS)

REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES DURING 95 / 96

1. Please refer to your memo of 23 Feb 96 on above subject.
2. **Details of Returnees**. Almost two million refugees left Rwanda during the Rwandan crisis in 1994 and settled down in refugee camps in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire. However only limited number of them have returned back to Rwanda. Their details are given below :-

(A) **For the Year 1995**. A total of 240,388 refugees returned back to Rwanda during 1995. Monthly figures are :

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>
Jan	34477
Feb	26421
Mar	30347
Apr	23051
May	23245
Jun	11199
Jul	10829
Aug	27044


Sep	20468
Oct	13022
Nov	6702
Dec	13583
Total	240,388

(B) For the Year 1996. During 1996 the following returnees came back to Rwanda :-

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>
Jan	13264
Feb	25498 (up to 22 Feb)

3. Assistance Provided By MILOBs / UNAMIR. The MILOBs monitor the movement of returnees from the border up to their home communes. MILOB patrols visit the border posts regularly (almost everyday for the active border posts and at reasonable frequency for other border posts). Thereafter they visit the transit camps to check the figures as well as to assess the requirements of returnees. UNHCR requests for transport whenever the number of returnees are large. UNAMIR has been frequently providing transport for the movement of returnees from border posts to transit camps. UNAMIR uses both first line and second line transport for this purpose. The MILOB patrols visiting communes check about the resettlement of returnees. They also assess their needs and try to coordinate this with necessary NGOs who could support those needs. UNAMIR has also undertaken other important tasks like dozer works in transit camps , improvement of roads and bridges to assist refugee repatriation. MILOBs have also tried to reunite the orphans with their parents. MILOB visit to communes also acts as a great source of confidence to the returnees who are otherwise very apprehensive.

(WM Chomba)
Lt Col
S O O



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

FROM : CMO

FILE : MILOB/CMO/OPS/45

TO : COS

DATE : 24 Feb 96

INFO : MA to A F C
ADCOS (OPS)

END OF MISSION REPORT (09 DEC 95 TO 08 MAR 96)

1. Please refer to your letter of 23 Feb 96 on above subject.

2. **Security situation in Rwanda.** The overall situation in Rwanda (particularly central and eastern parts) remained calm and peaceful during this period . The situation in Kigali seemed to be quite normal and well under control of RPA. However insurgent activities continued in western parts of Rwanda. There was a lull in the insurgent activities by FRGF in Rwanda from end Nov to mid Dec 95. This was in contrast to the situation prevailing in Oct / Nov 95. The Iswawa Island episode in Nov 95 possibly demoralised the FRGF rank and file operating in Rwanda. However since second week of Dec, the insurgent activities again picked up in the prefectures of Ruhengeri , Gisenyi and Cyangugu bordering Zaire. There has been a steady increase in the insurgent activities through Jan and Feb 96. A number of sabotages have been carried out by suspected FRGF elements by blowing up bridges , pylons as well as water supply lines. A number of encounters have been reported between RPA and FRGF during this period. RPA has suffered many casualties in these encounters particularly in Cyangugu. There are regular reports regarding infiltrations from Zaire in these prefectures . A number of mine incidents have been reported in these prefectures. Banditry activities have increased in other prefectures like Gitarama , Kibuye , Gikongoro as well as Butare. Arrests by RPA continue unabated. As per our assessment, the insurgent activities are likely to continue in future with renewed vigour and are likely to spread towards central and eastern Rwanda.

3. **Humanitarian Situation** There has been improvement in the humanitarian situation during this period. Most of the local officials have been seen to assist the local people particularly the returnees. Most of the returnees have been generally well treated and authorities have helped them to get their houses and land returned back to them. This is indeed quite encouraging. The effect of expulsion of 38 NGOs is being felt all over the

country. The most badly affected are the medical services. There is a shortage of medicines and medical equipment.

4. **Repatriation of Refugees.** Despite concerted efforts by all concerned, the repatriation of refugees has remained at a rather low key. A total of 13583 and 13264 refugees returned during the months of Dec 95 and Jan 96 respectively. This was despite the fact that a massive repatriation was expected during the month of Dec 95 / Jan 96 by UNHCR. However during the month of Feb there has been a considerable increase. Up to 22 Feb a total of 25498 returnees have come back to Rwanda. But this increase is primarily due to the problems in Burundi. Even now there are over 1.6 million refugees living outside Rwanda. This is despite apparently improved security situation in Rwanda. The possible reason seems to be either they are too apprehensive of security situation in Rwanda or they are quite comfortable in the camps and have no desire to leave those comforts and face hardships and intimidation in their communes. Zaire is reported to have deployed additional troops in some camps (Kibumba in Goma and Kasusa in Bukavu) to expedite repatriation. However so far repatriation has not been forced. There has been hardly any increase in repatriation from these camps. As such this exercise seems to be quite futile. Repatriation is not likely to increase dramatically in near future barring in the eventuality of forced repatriation.

5. **Reconciliation Process.** Although at the surface it appears that there has been some improvement in the reconciliation process, but the hatred for the other ethnic group seems to be too deep rooted. The memory of genocide is still too fresh and almost all families have suffered losses of their near and dear ones. But political leaders and high officials have been seen to encourage reconciliation. Much more needs to be done at grassroot level to achieve any tangible results.

6. **MILOB Operations in Current Mandate.** MILOBs were subjected to massive reduction in their strength (from 320 to 146) in the current mandate. MILOBs monitoring and patrolling the communes were much lesser due to their reduced numbers. Operating without formed troops had no adverse impact on their capabilities, though theft cases increased from their office compounds. However remedial measures like hiring of civilian night guards were undertaken. But MILOB patrols were source of confidence to the local populace. The locals and large number of officials in communes and prefectures have been requesting for continued presence of UNAMIR. However politicians and RPA have their reservations.

7. **Future Role of UN in Rwanda.** The UNAMIR mandate ends on 08 Mar 96 with the liquidation to be completed by 19 Apr 96. However, the task of the UN still remains unfinished, with over a million refugees still outside Rwanda. The pullout of UNAMIR will create apprehensions in the minds of refugees outside Rwanda as well as

the returnees in Rwanda. This is likely to hamper the return of refugees. Hence, it is felt that there is a need for continued presence of UN. It could be in one of the following form (in order of priority) :-

(a) Continuation of UNAMIR in the Present Status. However there can be NO further reduction in strength particularly of MILOBs. Further reductions will make UNAMIR unviable and hence is strongly not recommended.

(b) MILOB Mission UNAMIR can be converted to a MILOB mission (UNOMIR -United Nations Observer Mission in Rwanda). However for MILOB mission to be viable , the strength of MILOBs MUST be increased to 250 -320. Present strength of 146 is grossly inadequate particularly for an independent MILOB mission.

(c) UN Civil Assistance Mission. Last option is to convert this mission into a civil assistance mission.

8. Best regards.

(Charles Nelson)
Col
CMO



UNAMIR (RWANDA) MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ

(13 MAR 96)

Lessons Learnt

1. The following are the major lessons learnt :

(a) Mandate. The mandate must be well defined , absolutely unambiguous and it must be very clear to, both the host nation and the peacekeepers. Nothing should be left to interpretation at field level. The host nation must disseminate the mandate appropriately to its officials at lowest levels.

(b) Resources. A UN mission must have adequate resources. Lack of resources curtails the activities and usefulness of MILOBs .

(c) Restricted Areas. Restricted areas deny access to some important areas. There should be no restricted areas for the movement and activities of MILOBs in the country.

(d) Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs. Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs proved to be very useful. Both the parties could assist each other. A Military Observer Advisor to Heads of UN agencies concerned should be foreseen and would be highly useful.

(e) Joint Patrolling and Investigations. A number of joint patrols were carried out with HR , UNHCR and other agencies as well as NGOs. These were found to be very useful to both parties. Joint investigations by MILOBs and HR also proved to be very effective and useful. A common radio channel is a must for quick sharing of useful information and for seeking assistance in distress.

(f) Reduction in Strength of MILOBs. In the last mandate the strength of MILOBs was reduced from 320 to 146 without much change in their charter of duties and area of responsibility. This affected their output adversely. Cuts must not be applied equally across the board but should be based on needs of the organisation.

(g) Command and Control. MILOBs can not be equated with formed

troops and hence they must operate directly under SRSG. They should be granted adequate infrastructure to support their tasks.

(h) Liquidation Plan. Liquidation Plan should be drafted after a meeting of all components including MILOBs, to avoid unnecessary rushing of liquidation and changes in the plan at a subsequent stage. A minimum of ten days is required prior to departure of any MILOB from mission area at the end of last mandate. Liquidation is very different from rotation plan and is far more demanding.

(j) MILOB Profile. MILOBs have to operate independently. They have to be proficient in English, know driving and must have adequate service experience. There were some MILOBs who could not converse in English or French. Some were not proficient in driving. A sizeable number of them were having less than 10 years of service. These shortcomings had serious impact on their performance.

Recommendations

2. The following are recommended :-

(a) Mandate. The mandate of UN mission must be absolutely clear and unambiguous.

(b) Host Country. UN must not let a country dictate terms once the modalities for the mission have been worked out. The members of the mission should not be given a feeling that they are at the mercy of the host country.

(c) Information Campaign. UN must endeavour to implore the government concerned to educate its officials and the population at large through their national media on the reasons for the UN presence in their country in order to curtail ridicule from officials as well as locals. A proper information campaign including issue of leaflets would be essential for better and mutual understanding of the mission.

(d) Restricted Areas. There should be no restricted area in the host country and all UN personnel particularly MILOBs must have access to all places. No restrictions should be imposed on their movement or mandated activities.

(e) Access to Refugee / IDP Camps. MILOBs must have access to all the refugee /IDP camps inside the country as well as in the neighbouring countries in order to effectively monitor them and to correctly apprise the

refugees regarding security situation in their home country so as to encourage them to return. Otherwise they fall prey to false propaganda.

(f) Timely Action. Future UN intervention in any country must be timely and decisive to avoid the type of genocide that took place in Rwanda.

(g) Public Relations and Radio. UN must have an effective public relations and radio broadcasting system.

(h) Command and Control. MILOBs should operate independently under the SRSG through the CMO for better utilisation of their potential and avoidance of duplication. They should form another operating agency available to the SRSG.

(j) Resources. Adequate resources must be provided to support the mission. MILOBs must be provided with adequate number of serviceable vehicles, communication system and office equipment like computers.

(k) MILOB Profile. The MILOBs must be properly selected and must have the following profile :-

(i) Language Proficiency. MILOBs must be proficient in English. Additional knowledge of French and or local language would be very helpful.

(ii) Driving Proficiency. They should be proficient in driving and must possess proper international driving license.

(iii) Service Experience. They must have atleast 10 years of service experience.



UNAMIR (RWANDA) MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ

(13 MAR 96)

Lessons Learnt

1. The following are the major lessons learnt :
 - (a) Mandate. The mandate must be well defined , absolutely unambiguous and it must be very clear to, both the host nation and the peacekeepers. Nothing should be left to interpretation at field level. The host nation must disseminate the mandate appropriately to its officials at lowest levels.
 - (b) Resources. A UN mission must have adequate resources. Lack of resources curtails the activities and usefulness of MILOBs .
 - (c) Restricted Areas. Restricted areas deny access to some important areas. There should be no restricted areas for the movement and activities of MILOBs in the country.
 - (d) Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs. Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs proved to be very useful. Both the parties could assist each other. A Military Observer Advisor to Heads of UN agencies concerned should be foreseen and would be highly useful.
 - (e) Joint Patrolling and Investigations. A number of joint patrols were carried out with HR , UNHCR and other agencies as well as NGOs. These were found to be very useful to both parties. Joint investigations by MILOBs and HR also proved to be very effective and useful. A common radio channel is a must for quick sharing of useful information and for seeking assistance in distress.
 - (f) Reduction in Strength of MILOBs. In the last mandate the strength of MILOBs was reduced from 320 to 146 without much change in their charter of duties and area of responsibility. This affected their output adversely. Cuts must not be applied equally across the board but should be based on needs of the organisation.
 - (g) Command and Control. MILOBs can not be equated with formed

troops and hence they must operate directly under SRSG. They should be granted adequate infrastructure to support their tasks.

(h) Liquidation Plan. Liquidation Plan should be drafted after a meeting of all components including MILOBs, to avoid unnecessary rushing of liquidation and changes in the plan at a subsequent stage. A minimum of ten days is required prior to departure of any MILOB from mission area at the end of last mandate. Liquidation is very different from rotation plan and is far more demanding.

(j) MILOB Profile. MILOBs have to operate independently. They have to be proficient in English, know driving and must have adequate service experience. There were some MILOBs who could not converse in English or French. Some were not proficient in driving. A sizeable number of them were having less than 10 years of service. These shortcomings had serious impact on their performance.

Recommendations

2. The following are recommended :-

(a) Mandate. The mandate of UN mission must be absolutely clear and unambiguous.

(b) Host Country. UN must not let a country dictate terms once the modalities for the mission have been worked out. The members of the mission should not be given a feeling that they are at the mercy of the host country.

(c) Information Campaign. UN must endeavour to implore the government concerned to educate its officials and the population at large through their national media on the reasons for the UN presence in their country in order to curtail ridicule from officials as well as locals. A proper information campaign including issue of leaflets would be essential for better and mutual understanding of the mission.

(d) Restricted Areas. There should be no restricted area in the host country and all UN personnel particularly MILOBs must have access to all places. No restrictions should be imposed on their movement or mandated activities.

(e) Access to Refugee / IDP Camps. MILOBs must have access to all the refugee /IDP camps inside the country as well as in the neighbouring countries in order to effectively monitor them and to correctly apprise the

refugees regarding security situation in their home country so as to encourage them to return. Otherwise they fall prey to false propaganda.

(f) Timely Action. Future UN intervention in any country must be timely and decisive to avoid the type of genocide that took place in Rwanda.

(g) Public Relations and Radio. UN must have an effective public relations and radio broadcasting system.

(h) Command and Control. MILOBs should operate independently under the SRSG through the CMO for better utilisation of their potential and avoidance of duplication. They should form another operating agency available to the SRSG.

(j) Resources. Adequate resources must be provided to support the mission. MILOBs must be provided with adequate number of serviceable vehicles, communication system and office equipment like computers.

(k) MILOB Profile. The MILOBs must be properly selected and must have the following profile :-

(i) Language Proficiency. MILOBs must be proficient in English. Additional knowledge of French and or local language would be very helpful.

(ii) Driving Proficiency. They should be proficient in driving and must possess proper international driving license.

(iii) Service Experience. They must have atleast 10 years of service experience.



UNAMIR (RWANDA) MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ

(13 MAR 96)

Lessons Learnt

1. The following are the major lessons learnt :

(a) Mandate. The mandate must be well defined , absolutely unambiguous and it must be very clear to, both the host nation and the peacekeepers. Nothing should be left to interpretation at field level. The host nation must disseminate the mandate appropriately to its officials at lowest levels.

(b) Resources. A UN mission must have adequate resources. Lack of resources curtails the activities and usefulness of MILOBs .

(c) Restricted Areas. Restricted areas deny access to some important areas. There should be no restricted areas for the movement and activities of MILOBs in the country.

(d) Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs. Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs proved to be very useful. Both the parties could assist each other. A Military Observer Advisor to Heads of UN agencies concerned should be foreseen and would be highly useful.

(e) Joint Patrolling and Investigations. A number of joint patrols were carried out with HR , UNHCR and other agencies as well as NGOs. These were found to be very useful to both parties. Joint investigations by MILOBs and HR also proved to be very effective and useful. A common radio channel is a must for quick sharing of useful information and for seeking assistance in distress.

(f) Reduction in Strength of MILOBs. In the last mandate the strength of MILOBs was reduced from 320 to 146 without much change in their charter of duties and area of responsibility. This affected their output adversely. Cuts must not be applied equally across the board but should be based on needs of the organisation.

(g) Command and Control. MILOBs can not be equated with formed

troops and hence they must operate directly under SRSG. They should be granted adequate infrastructure to support their tasks.

(h) Liquidation Plan. Liquidation Plan should be drafted after a meeting of all components including MILOBs, to avoid unnecessary rushing of liquidation and changes in the plan at a subsequent stage. A minimum of ten days is required prior to departure of any MILOB from mission area at the end of last mandate. Liquidation is very different from rotation plan and is far more demanding.

(j) MILOB Profile. MILOBs have to operate independently. They have to be proficient in English, know driving and must have adequate service experience. There were some MILOBs who could not converse in English or French. Some were not proficient in driving. A sizeable number of them were having less than 10 years of service. These shortcomings had serious impact on their performance.

Recommendations

2. The following are recommended :-

(a) Mandate. The mandate of UN mission must be absolutely clear and unambiguous.

(b) Host Country. UN must not let a country dictate terms once the modalities for the mission have been worked out. The members of the mission should not be given a feeling that they are at the mercy of the host country.

(c) Information Campaign. UN must endeavour to implore the government concerned to educate its officials and the population at large through their national media on the reasons for the UN presence in their country in order to curtail ridicule from officials as well as locals. A proper information campaign including issue of leaflets would be essential for better and mutual understanding of the mission.

(d) Restricted Areas. There should be no restricted area in the host country and all UN personnel particularly MILOBs must have access to all places. No restrictions should be imposed on their movement or mandated activities.

(e) Access to Refugee / IDP Camps. MILOBs must have access to all the refugee /IDP camps inside the country as well as in the neighbouring countries in order to effectively monitor them and to correctly apprise the

refugees regarding security situation in their home country so as to encourage them to return. Otherwise they fall prey to false propaganda.

(f) Timely Action. Future UN intervention in any country must be timely and decisive to avoid the type of genocide that took place in Rwanda.

(g) Public Relations and Radio. UN must have an effective public relations and radio broadcasting system.

(h) Command and Control. MILOBs should operate independently under the SRSG through the CMO for better utilisation of their potential and avoidance of duplication. They should form another operating agency available to the SRSG.

(j) Resources. Adequate resources must be provided to support the mission. MILOBs must be provided with adequate number of serviceable vehicles, communication system and office equipment like computers.

(k) MILOB Profile. The MILOBs must be properly selected and must have the following profile :-

(i) Language Proficiency. MILOBs must be proficient in English. Additional knowledge of French and or local language would be very helpful.

(ii) Driving Proficiency. They should be proficient in driving and must possess proper international driving license.

(iii) Service Experience. They must have atleast 10 years of service experience.

MILOB GROUP HQ

Lessons Learnt

1. The following are the major lessons learnt :

- (a) Mandate. The mandate must be well defined , absolutely unambiguous and it must be very clear to, both the host nation and the peacekeepers. Nothing should be left to interpretation at field level. The host nation must disseminate the mandate appropriately to its officials at lowest levels.
- (b) Resources. A UN mission must have adequate resources. Lack of resources curtails the activities and usefulness of MILOBs .
- (c) Restricted Areas. Restricted areas deny access to some important areas. There should be no restricted areas for the movement and activities of MILOBs in the country.
- (d) Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs. Cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs proved to be very useful. Both the parties could assist each other.
- (e) Joint Patrolling and Investigations. A number of joint patrols were carried out with HR , UNHCR and other agencies as well as NGOs. These were found to be very useful to both parties. Joint investigations by MILOBs and HR also proved to be very effective and useful.
- (f) Reduction in Strength of MILOBs. In the last mandate the strength of MILOBs was reduced from 320 to 146 without much change in their charter of duties and area of responsibility. This affected their output adversely. Cuts must not be applied equally across the board but should be based on needs of the organisation.
- (g) Command and Control. MILOBs can not be equated with formed troops and hence they must operate directly under SRSG. They should be granted adequate infrastructure to support their tasks.

Recommendations

2. The following are recommended :-

- (a) **Mandate.** The mandate of UN mission must be absolutely clear and unambiguous.
- (b) UN must not let a country dictate terms once the modalities for the mission have been worked out. The members of the mission should not be given a feeling that they are at the mercy of the host country.
- (c) UN must endeavour to implore the government concerned to educate its officials and the population at large through their national media on the reasons for the UN presence in their country in order to curtail ridicule from officials as well as locals.
- (d) **Restricted Areas.** There should be no restricted area in the host country and all UN personnel particularly MILOBs must have access to all places. No restrictions should be imposed on their movement or mandated activities.
- (e) Future UN intervention in any country must be timely and decisive to avoid the type of genocide that took place in Rwanda.
- (f) MILOBs must have access to refugee camps in neighbouring countries as well to encourage the safe return of refugees.
- (g) UN must have an effective public relations and radio broadcasting system.
- (h) MILOBs should operate independently under the SRSG through the CMO.
- (e) Adequate resources must be provided to support the mission (specially vehicles ,communications and computers).



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

TO : All Sector Commanders

FILE : MILOB/OPS/43

FROM : S O O

DATE : 22 Feb 96

INFO : SMPO
SLOGO
SO to CMO

FINAL REPORT

1. Kindly refer to :

- (a) Our letter No MILOB/OPS/02 dated 02 Jan 96.
- (b) Ops officers conference held in this office on 25 Jan 96.

2. All sectors will prepare a Final Report in respect of their sectors as on last date of our mandate i e 08 Mar 96. It will be personally handed over to S O O by the Sector Commanders by 10 Mar 96 without fail. The report must include the following :-

- (a) Historical Background of MILOB sector . This should include , in brief (NOT to exceed half page), important historical details (post 1959 particularly the genocide period) having overbearing relevance to Rwanda / UNAMIR.
- (b) Importance of Prefectures . Include only special points if any (eg specific domination by a particular group , centre of education , power , leadership, natural resources etc).
- (c) Deployment during various Mandates. It should include deployment of MILOBs as well as formed troops during various mandates since Inception of UNAMIR. It will include the location of HQ , strengths and deployments in sub sectors if any.

(d) Important Events. It should include (NOT to exceed one page) only very important events (eg events like Kanama , Kibeho , Iwawa incidents) and major operations undertaken in which MILOBs were actively involved (eg during movement of IDPs).

(e) Returnees. Month wise details of returnees from inception of UNAMIR (if available otherwise since 01 Jan 95) should be included. Details of their resettlement commune wise should also be included. (Details will be given as per forms attached).

(f) Prison and Commune Cachot Data. Latest data available.

(g) Achievements and Failures of MILOBs and UNAMIR. Only major achievements and failures (if any) for entire period. Likely causes of failure should also be included.

(h) Future prospects of Rwanda.

(j) Recommendations. It should be included :

(i) Future role of UN , if any , in Rwanda .

(ii) Alternate strategies , if any , that could have made the role of UNAMIR even more successful including return of all refugees from neighbouring countries.

(iii) Suggested strategies / thoughts , if any , for more effective conduct of UN operations (peacekeeping or MILOB) in future in any part of the world.

(k) Any Other Points. Any other point (s) if felt to be important can be included at a suitable place in the report. But it must be very brief.

3. Needless to say , it is a very important report based on which the MILOB final report will be prepared . As such Sector Commanders are requested to make sure that the report is accurate, brief (not to exceed 5-6 pages) and submitted in time.

4. Best regards.

(S N Yadav)
Lt Col
A S O O

FINAL REPORT SECTOR 3 BUTARE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Milob Sector Butare was established on 04 Aug 1994, with the main tasks of monitoring humanitarian aid activities in the communes of Butare Prefecture. The Sector operated as a subsector of Sector 3 and was called Sector 3A until 24 Mar 95 when it became a full fledged sector and changed nomenclature with Kibuye becoming Sector 4B. At about the same time Gikongoro was established as Sector 4A to cover all the communes of Gikongoro prefecture.
2. The problem of resettlement of IDPs which was mainly of Sector 4A spilled over to Sector 4B making both the Sectors to work in close cooperation in that thousands of IDPs, then in camps in Gikongoro came from Butare as evidenced by the 70,000 IDPs resettled in home communes after the closure of all camps by the Rwandese Govt on 18 Apr 95, which operation is popularly known as the Kibeho crisis in which both the sectors actively participated. Butare infact became the transit center from where IDPs were despatched to various home communes.
3. Consequent to the new mandate in Jun 1995, Gikongoro and Butare were reorganised as Sectors 3A and 3B respectively. The two Sectors were amalgamated into one as Sector 3 on extension of the mission and revision of the mandate in Dec 1995. Milob Sector 3 therefore, now comprisis of both Butare and Gikongoro prefectures.

IMPORTANCE OF PREFECTURES

4. Butare prefecture lies 136 Kms South of Kigali and is the second largest city of Rwanda. It is hilly and can be said to be heavily populated for its size. Butare is also the educational seat of Rwanda as the only national university is situated here. Prefecture shares borders with Burundi in the South and East.
5. Gikongoro prefecture derives its importance from the fact that it was the buffer zone between the withdrawing FRGF troops and the RPA, buffer being provided by the French troops. This resulted in a large number of people fleeing their homes either into the neighbouring countries or the Nyungwe forest. Due to this a large number of IDP camps came up in the sector. The closure of these camps resulted in a large number of people returning to their home communes. As a result ther is a large

displaced population in the communes of this prefecture. The other issue is the proximity of Nyungwe forests to the prefecture. The movement of infiltrators into the prefectures of Cyangugu and Kibuye and thereafter into the forest has made the prefecture susceptible to insurgent activities.

IMPORTANT EVENTS

6. Op Homeward. The Milob Sector took part in the initial planning stages of this operation. During the operation the task was to monitor the departure point in various IDP camps. Border monitoring was one of the activity which involved confirming the reports of refugee movement towards Burundi. The Milob teams were also involved in the assessment of situation in the IDP camps in order to provide an update on the humanitarian assistance required in the camps and also to investigate human rights violations.

7. Op Hope. The Milob Sector participated in Op Hope. The tasks assigned to the Milobs during this operation under the command of contingents included the following :

- a. Perform Milob tasks assigned by the respective contingent commanders.
- b. To monitor all the activities and security situation within own area of operation.
- c. To inform Milob Tac HQ of the situation on the assigned objectives.
- d. Continuous reporting on the progress of the operation.
- e. Report any violation of human rights.
- f. Provide liaison between UNAMIR troops and NGOs and civil authorities.
- g. Maintain post operation presence in Kibeho and Ndago camps and report situation.

8. Op Retour. The Milob Sector participated in this operation which was information campaign to create conditions in the IDP camps to sufficiently motivate IDPs to return to their home communes while simultaneously gearing up the communes to receive them. Important tasks performed during this operation were :

- a. Monitor the security situation in the targeted camps with in AOR.
- b. Monitor and provide security in conjunction with armed troops in the home communes and the camps.
- c. Monitor and provide security in conjunction with armed troops within the marshalling areas.
- d. Provide Milob escorts for convoys leading to camps , home communes and to those in transit.
- e. Provide continuous liaison with the government authorities , UN agencies, NGOs and RPA .

RETURNEES

9. Month wise details of returnees in respect of both Butare and Gikongoro prefectures are attached as Appx A and B respectively.

10. The returnees are settling down well in their home communes but some with difficulties due to the fact that they left their homes a long time ago and have to start their lives all over again. Problems faced by returnees especially who left their homes decades ago are :

- a. Housing / accomodation.
- b. Food .
- c. Farming land .
- d. Farming tools .
- e. Seeds.

PRISON AND COMMUNE CACHOT DATA

11. Latest data on the main prisons and commune cachots in respect of both Butare and Gikongoro prefectures is attached as Appx C and D respectively .

ACHIEVEMENTS OF MILOBS

12. While it may be difficult to asses the success of Milob operation in our AOR in quantitative terms, it can be stated that the presence of Milobs in the area and their formal and informal interaction with the locals and the Rwandese authorities has gone a long way in bringing the situation to what it is today .

13. The Milobs were instrumental in creating a climate of confidence among the NGOs and other UN agencies operating in the sector thereby allowing them to effectively carry out their tasks . Timely and effective coordination provided by the Milobs between these various groups operating in Rwanda saw tasks being completed in more satisfactory and efficient manner.

14. Participation of Milob sectors in the crisis management committees set up in the prefectures to provide assistance and coordination in the movement of returnees into the prefectures and to their home communes was very helpfull. Milobs were instrumental in providing valuable information to the govt authorities and the NGOs about the situation as prevailing so that efforts could be coordinated. The assistance provided and verification of the sitaution was continuously done and assesments and

probable outcomes in the future were evaluated and passed on to the HQs at Kigali.

15. The Milobs have constantly monitored the situation in the communes as regarding the repatriation and resettlement of returnees and advised the Govt authorities , NGOs and UN HQ at Kigali on the same. Assistance was also provided to RPA in movement of troops , officials and rations. Schools , hospitals, clinics, and orphanages in the prefectures were regularly visited and assistance required assessed and coordinated with NGOs and HAC.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

16. The prefectures of Butare and Gikongoro are expected to remain relatively calm. This can be assessed from the fact that the RPA and the local administration are firmly in control of the situation in these two prefectures.

17. However , it can be easily said that significant amount of apprehension exists in the minds of locals , NGOs and other UN agencies regarding the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda at this crucial juncture. The withdrawal of UNAMIR may cause some increase in incidents of arrests and harassment but is not likely to have alarming proportions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. Although, the situation in the country is much improved from what was experienced last year, withdrawal of UNAMIR is likely to cause if not a drastic deterioration but definitely a feeling of insecurity in the minds of local populace and various international agencies thus hindering the normalisation process . Also, the hesitation on part of the returnees to return to Rwanda is likely to increase tremendously.

19. In view of above , the following recommendations are offered :
- a. UNAMIR should continue to maintain its presence in some form.
 - b. Deployment of Milob teams in the neighbouring countries of Zaire , Tanzania and Burundi.

CONCLUSION

20. To conclude, it can be said with confidence and certainty that the Sector was able to perform its tasks and achieve desired objectives most creditably. Appreciation recieved from the local authorities , NGOs , other UN agencies and the RPA are a pointer in this direction.

File Ref -CCS/10007

DCK KATTAN
Col
Chief of Staff

FINAL REPORT SECTOR 5

Historical Background.

1. General. Sector 5 comprised the two prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. As is well known these two prefectures were the stronghold of Hutu extremism. The former President of the country was a resident of Gisenyi. As the demography consists of 90 % Hutus the Sector was not as deeply effected during the genocide as the other prefectures. During the genocide less than three percent of the population in both prefectures were killed. These two prefectures also did not suffer large material damage during the retreat of FRGF to Zaire.

2. Importance of Prefectures. The Sector gains importance as Gisenyi is the main entry point being used by UNHCR to carry out organized repatriation. The refugees in the camps at Goma number approx 650,000. Almost every family in the sector has a member or a relative in the camps. The notorious trg camp which was used to train the Interhamwe at Bigogwe is a part of this Sector. Gishwati Forest in Gisenyi was used by the retreating FRGF as a sanctuary and leave behind a number of arms caches. These caches were used during the later part of 94 and in 95 by infiltrators to terrorize the locals and undermine the security situation in the country. Both the Prefectures have moderate Hutu prefects who have been successful in building a bridge between the local populace and the RPA.

3. The prefectures share borders with Zaire and Uganda and had developed good trade relations before the war. Gisenyi, a well frequented tourist spot, and Ruhengeri were established towns before the war. A large number of expats were living and working in Gisenyi. Tea gardens and Coffee plantations to the south of the prefectures were well developed industries. In addition the rich volcanic soil made the area ideal for a variety of vegetables, corn and banana plantations.

4. UNAMIR. Sector 5 was established with the arrival of two Milob teams to Gisenyi in Jul 94. At this time the Sector included both Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures. The Sector HQ was established in Gisenyi in the Meridian Hotel. Gisenyi Sector 5 has remained in that location to date.

5. Initially and upto Jun 95, Sector 5B Ruhengeri was considered a sub sector of Sector 5A Gisenyi and was subordinate to the Comd of Sector 5A. In Jul 95 Ruhengeri became a stand alone sector and the sectors were redesignated as 5A Ruhengeri, 5B Gisenyi and 5C Kibuye. Each sector was responsible for their operational and logistic needs reporting directly to Milob HQ at Kigali.

6. With the revision of the Mandate on 12 Dec 95 the sectors were

2

again reorganized. Ruhengeri and Kibuye sectors were closed down around mid Jan 96. Gisenyi again took on the responsibility of Ruhengeri Prefecture. The milob strength for the sector was increased to 28. The milobs left the sector finally on 08 Mar 96 for repat to their home countries.

7. TUNBATT HQ was located in Nkamira with its companies based at Gisenyi, Nyundo, Nemba and Nkamira. The Coy at Gisenyi was moved to Nyundo on the behest of RPA in May 95. TUNBATT was repat in Jul 95 during the downsizing of Form Tps. NICOY moved to Nyundo Camp from Byumba and continued to stay till the end of the Mandate providing lgs bases at Gisenyi and Cyanguu for repat of refugees.

8. The table below gives the details of strengths and deployment.

Date		Milobs		Form Tps	Remarks
From	To	Auth	Present		
Mid Jul 94		2 x Teams			First dply at Gisenyi.
Mid Aug 94					Canadian Fd Hosp est at Nkamira. British Fd Hosp reopens Ruhengeri Hosp later taken over by MSF (Holland).
Sep 94					End of UNOMUR.
Oct 94					TUNBATT HQ moves to Nkamira.
Nov 94	Jun 95		07		Est of Sect 5B at Ruhengeri part of Sect 5A.
Jul 95	Dec 96	28	24		Est of Sect 5B at Gisenyi.
			07		Est of Sect 5A at Ruhengeri.
Jul 95					TUNBATT replaced by NICOY.
Jan 96	Mar 96	30	28		Est of Sect 5 incl Ruhengeri.

Important Events

9. The Prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri were considered as the stronghold of Hutu extremism. A fair majority of the refugees across the border belonged to these two prefectures. Due to its proximity and long land/lake border with Zaire infiltrations were a usual occurrence. A variety of sabotage, mine and killing incidents were noted over the period with Gishwati being used as a sanctuary. The RPA with its meager force of five bns to look after

both prefectures were unable initially to stem the infiltrations. They attempted to sanitize the Forest area and were partly successful in reducing the number of incidents. Thus over a period of time with changed tactics, strict and sometimes harsh control measures the Sect noted a reduction of security related incidents. The capture of Ile Iwawa was a great morale boost for the RPA and Govt and put back the designs of FRGF leaders for a considerable period.

10. Due to the proximity of the refugee camps on the Zairian side, this Sector has had a decidedly operational slant to its activities. The relations with the RPA have definitely reflected the personality of the commanders either at Bde or unit level. At this time our relations are good and there is a free exchange of information regarding the activities of both organizations. The RPA LO attends our morning briefings as do representatives of all of the UN and NGO agencies operating within the Sector.

11. Certain significant events that have occurred during the UNAMIR Mandate are listed below :-

(a) Looting of WFP Trucks Feb 95. On the 18/ 19 Feb 95 several WFP and ICRC trucks carrying food items to refugees in Goma were attacked and looted. Milobs with armed assistance from TUNBATT in the form of APC's were able to remedy the sit. The looting began with active participation from the OCL from College reception centre with a hostile attitude that the trucks were carrying food for the 'Killers'.

(b) Anti UNAMIR Demonstration. In Apr 95 the locals mainly involving OCL from College reception centre were engaged in an anti UNAMIR demonstration. In the incident the angry locals forced entry into the Hotel complex. The milobs attempted to pacify the mob but were manhandled and two hand held motorolas were snatched from them.

(c) Forced Repat Aug 95. The Zairian Govt implemented their threat of carrying out forced repat of refugees as the figs for voluntary repat were small. Most of these refugees came from Mugunga Camp close to the border. From 20 Aug till the 23 Aug 5794 returnees arrived at the Gisenyi Border Post. The Sector Milobs had worked out a contingency plan with the UNHCR and other NGOS which was put into effect. The Milobs effectively monitored the border posts and transit camps during the period and were thus able to provide valuable real time info to the Milob Gp HQ and the NGOS.

(d) Kanama Massacre Sep 95. On ni 11/12 Sep a group of infiltrators were successful in ambushing a veh of the RPA near Kanama. A offr of the RPA was killed. The RPA in retribution conducted a mass killing in Kanama Commune 2712. Three sites were visited by the milob teams where a total of 101 persons of varying ages and sex were found killed. One grave was viewed and locals reported that an additional seven

4

bodies had been removed for burial. Milobs, Human Rights and CivPol were involved in the initial investigation. The locals reported the imposition of curfew. They also reported that many were afraid to sleep in their houses and take to the bush during the hours of darkness. The level of fear and mistrust remained high for weeks after the incident.

(e) Iwawa Island Nov 95. One Milob Team visited Iwawa Island on 07 Nov to view the results of the RPA mil action which took the Island from the FRGF. Seven bodies were seen and the RPA had 15 prisoners in custody. The island is mined therefore movement is restricted to the known cleared paths. A significant amount of equipment was captured including mines, HMG's, assorted small arms, explosives and det cord. It was reported that the action commenced the evening of 04 Nov and concluded on 07 Nov at approximately 0800 h. This island was considered a major training and staging base for infiltration to Rwanda. It was reported that the numbers of insurgents on the island was 400-500 broken down as 100 staff and remainder trainees. It was reported that an unspecified number died while attempting to escape from the island.

Returnees.

12. The refugees across the border have been returning in numbers not larger than 2000-2500 NCL per month. It is well known that there exists a fair influence on the refugees by leaders in various camps and intimidators. A constant effort has been made by these leaders with resort to subversive activities in the country thus creating an unfavorable security sit with rumours of harsh treatment by the RPA and local auth. There has been a large influx of OCL particularly from Masisi where reports of intimidation by the Zairian Mil and locals forced even third generation Zairians to flee. The details of returnees and their subsequent resettlement is at Appces A and B.

Prison and Commune Cachot Data.

13. The details are given at Appx C.

Achievements of Milobs.

13. The success of the Milob operation within the Sector cannot be measured by any quantitative means. The presence and regular patrolling by the Sector Milobs did have a calming effect on the situation.

14. The Sector milobs were instrumental in creating a climate of confidence among the UN and NGO agencies operating in the sector. The Milobs briefings every morning provided an ideal forum for

exchange of info and coord of tasks for each day. The Milobs were able to build a cordial working relationship with the local auth and the RPA thus facilitating the working of the NGOs. It is a credit to the Sector that throughout the mission no attempt was made to hijack any UN veh or indulge in armed robbery of UN property.

15. The Milobs were employed in the Mission in atypical fashion where they had no access to monitor the other party (FRGF and ex FAR) in the conflict. It can be also stated here that the effectiveness of the Milobs was curtailed by the Zairian Govt's decision to restrict movement across the border to the refugee camps. They were thus not able to gauge the pulse of the refugees and get details about the happenings in the camps.

Future Prospects.

16. At this time there is a significant amount of apprehension regarding the closure of UNAMIR. This also extends to the non UNAMIR agencies and the local population. The agencies see us as an element of protection and the local population see us as a restraining influence on the RPA. However with the RPA in fair control of the sit at present it appears no alarming incident is likely in the near future.

17. The FRGF will attempt to use all their means to create a sit unfavorable for the return of innocent refugees. In this regard the operation undertaken by the Zairian Govt and UNHCR will be seriously put to test. As of now the guided repat scheme of UNHCR has not been a success. With the change in Zairian Minister of Interior a hardliner stance can be expected. If the leaders at the camps manage to refrain large numbers of FRGF and the militia from leaving Zaire there is strong likelihood of an unpleasant civil war in the future. This assessment presumes that the FRGF will be able to rearm and train themselves adequately in the interim period.

Lessons Learnt.

18. Coord of Hum Tasks. The Milobs were very effective in the coord of hum tasks providing necessary assistance to the NGOs.

19. Joint Investigations. This was another aspect which provided quick and efficient reporting of an incident. The Milobs and the HRFOs were able to work together and follow an incident to its logical conclusion.

20. Withdrawal of UNAMIR. The hasty withdrawal during the genocide period due to the lack of a strong Mandate and the failure later on to build up armed tps in UNAMIR rapidly led to a tremendous loss of face and credibility. It took a lot of effort on the part of the UN community to regain the lost prestige and regain credibility.

6

21. Milobs for Hum Assistance. There is a need to create a pool of resources available with Milobs HQ for use by the milobs to undertake petty requests from the local auth.

Recommendations.

19. Though the security sit in the country has shown considerable improvement since Jul 94 the local populace and at times even the local auth have shown considerable apprehension regarding the closure of the Mission. The Rwanda Govt is reluctant to have any kind of armed tps presence in the country considering it an affront to their sovereignty. The Govt however does need support of the NGOS who alone are providing for medical care, resettlement and rehab of refugees. The NGOS are likely to severely restrict their activities with closure of UNAMIR. It is therefore strongly recommended that UNAMIR continues in some form. The presence of Milobs in the country, even though unarmed, will provide a semblance of security in the country and a suitable climate for the UN agencies and NGOS to operate. In addition the presence of UN community in the form of Milobs will be reassuring for the refugees across the border.


20. A comprehensive recce needs to be made to identify the immediate needs of the country noting vital sectors. This will help in determining the composition of the force required in terms of engrs, comn, med care and milobs for monitoring tasks.

21. Media can play an effective role in influencing public opinion. Radio UNAMIR came into existence only in Feb 95. Noting the strength of rumours and strong influence by intimidators in the camps radio broadcasts can play a crucial part in confidence building and reassuring the refugees to return.



V Belski
Lt Col
Sect Cdr
Sect 5

FROM : SO TO COS

TO : 
ADCOS (SP)
ADCOS (OPS)
HAC

INFO : COS


DATE : 23 Feb 1996

SUBJECT : END OF MISSION REPORT(9 DEC 95 TO 8 MARCH 1996)

1. The end of mission report covering the 3rd mandate 9 June 1995 to 8 December 1995 was submitted at the end of the previous mandate.

2. You are requested to prepare and submit end of mission report covering the period from 9 December 1995 to 8 March 1996 by 1st March 1996 to the COS.

3. Regards.



H M MUZYAMBA
Capt
SO TO COS
Ext 11111

Lt Col YADAV

1. CMO wants the report
up to 08 Dec 95, whether BRSG's
or whatever you have made.

2. The final report is within
our UNAMIR. So do it
before you go for your CTO.

3. The rear Party will remain to
do a Comprehensive report.



23/02



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION D'UN ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - SITAUAR

HQ SECTOR 2

HANDING/TAKING OVER CERTIFICATE
FOR COMMAND OF SECTOR 2

IT IS CERTIFIED THAT THE UNDERSIGNED HAVE JOINTLY HANDED/TAKEN OVER THE COMMAND OF SECTOR 2. ALL OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTIC MATTERS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED AND UNDERSTOOD AND ALL UN MATERIAL ON CHARGE OF THE SECTOR IS VERIFIED CORRECT.

HANDED OVER

R V BLANCHETTE
LT COL
25 JAN 96

TAKEN OVER

CHRIS NUTAKOR
MAJ
25 JAN 96

MILOBS : OPS BRANCH MAIL (DATE..31/1/98..)


	REMARKS	SIGN	DATE
C M O			
S O O			
A S O O	Seen	<i>[Signature]</i>	31/1
OPsOFFR			
SIG OFFR			
S D O			
S M P O			
SLOGO			


From: Lt Col Nestor Sainz (M - 8893)

To : Lt Col Keita M' Bemba (M - 12120)

HANDING / TAKING OVER : COMMAND OF SECTOR 3A GIKONGORO

1. A proper handing / taking over has been carried out between the Sector Comds of Butare and Gikongoro on 05 Jan 96.
2. The following was carried out :
 - A. Sector Comd Butare accompanied by all available Milobs in the Sector on that date visited Gikongoro.
 - B. Sector Comd Gikongoro gave out a detailed briefing of the Sector covering the following:
 - (1) Brief history of the Sector.
 - (2) Operational Matters.
 - (3) Humanitarian Aspects.
 - (4) Logistic/ Personnel Matters.
 - C. Briefing was followed by a visit to some of the important institutions/organisations given below:
 - (1) Visit to Prefect's office but he was not available.
 - (2) Meeting with local RPA Bn Comd.
 - (3) Offices of UNHCR , Human Rights and ICRC.
 - D. All important files and documents were handed over to the Staff of Butare Sector.


NESTOR SAINZ
Lt Col
Officer Handing Over


KEITA M'BEMBA
Lt Col
Officer Taking Over

ops 2.
On file with
others for our
final report.
see
15/1

MILOBS SECTOR 2A (BYUMBA)

FINAL REPORT

BACKGROUND

1. Byumba Sector was established in 1994 as Sector 1 to monitor the peace process when the present government had just come to power. At the time there were 36 Milobs collocated with a battalion from Bangladesh and later with a battalion from Nigeria to monitor the Prefecture with 19 communes in AOR. The NIBATT troops were re-deployed to Gisenyi at the renewal of the UN mandate in June, 1995 and Milobs were subsequently reduced in conformity to the new mandate to 25 to monitor the Sector with emphasis on humanitarian assistance to the needy in the Sector. The Milobs at this stage were concerned about their security as the formed troops had been withdrawn. There were however no incidents of security threat and the local authorities were cooperating very well with the Milobs. This era also saw the re-definition of Sector AOR with Mugambazi and Rutongo falling under Sector 6(Kigali), thus leaving the Sector with 17 communes.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PREFECTURE

2. There are two major international road links with Uganda through Gatuna and Kagitumba through which a lot of returnees from Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire are coming. There is also another small border post at Buziba which is facilitating the flow of returnees on foot from Uganda with their livestock. The Prefecture has two tea factories at Mulindi (Rushaki Commune) and Kinihira (Cyungo Commune). Tea, as one of Rwanda's foreign currency earners has attracted government attention and the two factories are being rehabilitated by a European Union Company and it is projected that by the end of March, 1996 both factories would be fully operational. There is in Cyungo Commune some small scale gold panning that is sanctioned by government. This project is authorized to interested individuals who would pan the gold and sell it at government controlled prices. These individuals are then required to pay tax to the government.

3. The Prefecture has within its AOR two reception centres at Nyagatare and Byumba which have each a capacity of 1400 returnees at any one given time. The Nyagatare one is directly manned by UNHCR whilst the Byumba one is manned by Goal Ireland on behalf of UNHCR. There are also four orphanages /children homes at Murambi, Byumba, Muhura and Ngarama. These orphanages cater for fluctuating numbers of children as some come in whilst others are being re-united with their parents by ICRC.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF MILOBS


4. During the period of the just expired mandate the Milobs of through UNAMIR(HAC) have been able to:
- a. Monitor on daily basis the flow of returnees through the three border posts within Sector AOR.
 - b. Provide transport assistance for the delivery of food items to various communes of the Sector.
 - c. Provide earth moving equipment for the leveling of Byumba transit camp site prior to the construction by GOAL IRELAND.
 - d. Acquire and distribute oral rehydration salts to all health centres and dispensaries in the Prefecture.
 - e. Provide escorts to UN Agencies and NGOs on request.
 - f. Provide transport and escorts for the delivery of scholastic and building materials to various schools in the Sector.
 - g. Maintain rapport with the local authorities through social interaction.
 - h. Provide library books to various schools in the Sector.
 - j. Repair/restore electricity and broken bridges in some of the communes.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

5. Shortly before the Sector closed down there were several humanitarian assistance request that UNAMIR accepted but these were not fulfilled when the Sector closed down. In view of the provision of the new mandate which has emphasis on the return of refugees as opposed to humanitarian assistance, it may not be possible for these projects to be fulfilled. It is deemed important that some or all of these projects be fulfilled to save the face of UNAMIR. Details of these request are covered in humanitarian final report.

6. It is recommended that stronger cooperation between the local authorities, NGOs and other UN Agencies be maintained to facilitate close monitoring of the refugees return.


Date: 15-01-96


E B Mazambani
Maj
Ops Offr


HANDING/ TAKING OVER CERTIFICATE

I, the under signed, Maj E B Mazambani (M 8834) have this 5th day of January, 1996 handed over operational responsibility and all related documents for Byumba Sector to Maj G A Biah (M 11919) at the closure of the Sector.

Handing over:

 05/01/96
E B Mazambani (M 8834)
Maj
Ops Offr (Byumba)

Taking over:

 05/01/96
G A Biah (11919)
Maj
Ops Offr (Kibungo)

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB SECTOR 2A

FINAL REPORT

INTRODUCTION

1. **General.** MILOB Sector 2A, earlier designated as Sector 1 before the current redeployment, is located at Byumba, the Northernmost Prefecture of Rwanda along the Uganda border. This Sector covers the North Eastern part of Rwanda and is bounded as follows :

- (a) Northwest and North - Uganda.
- (b) East - Along Akagera River which is along the Tanzanian border.
- (c) South - Along the Prefecture boundary dividing the National Park, moving Westwards along the South bank of Lake Muhazi till the Road Junction three kms North of Kigali.
- (d) West - Along the Commune and Prefecture boundaries moving Northwards to Kivuye on the Uganda border.
- (e) Operationally - This Sector has boundaries with MILOB Sector 2B (Kibungo) and Sector 1 (Kigali) in the South and Sector 5A (Ruhengiri) in the West.

2. **Important Towns and Villages.**

- (a) **Byumba.** This is the capital of the Prefecture of Byumba and the administrative centre. The Prefecture comprising 17 Communes is the largest in Rwanda in terms of land area. This imbalance is due to the fact that it also includes a part of the National Park which is supposed to be largely inhabited. This is also the Headquarters of the Sub-prefecture of Byumba.
- (b) **Ngarama.** This is the Headquarters of the Sub-prefecture of Ngarama and

is the administrative centre of six communes, namely Ngarama, Gituza, Murambi, Giti, Muvumba and Bwisige.

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

3. **Tasks.** As MILOBS, being the eyes and ears of UNAMIR, we observe, monitor, investigate, verify and report to MILOB Group Headquarters. IN this Sector our tasks gain even more importance as we are the only representatives of UNAMIR, no formed troops being deployed in this Sector. Some of the specific tasks we are assigned include :-

- (a) Vehicle mounted patrols on a daily basis to Communes for monitoring the situation within the area and for gathering relevant information.
- (b) Communes are assigned to teams who gather up to date data on them which is then forwarded to UNAMIR HQ through the MILOB Gp HQ.
- (c) Monitoring the inflow of returnees from border posts within the Sector AOR and sending a feedback to the Hqs.
- (d) Escort of Human Rights Teams and Returnee convoys.
- (e) Heli patrols along the borders.
- (f) Location of mines and subsequent liaison with the UNAMIR HQ EOD Teams for subsequent marking and deactivation.
- (g) Constant liaison with NGOs and other UN Agencies for data and information on condition of the returnees at the various camps and new places of settlement.

4. **Organisation.** To carry out our tasks we are organised into the HQ comprising the Operations Officer, Humanitarian Officer, Logistics/Personnel Officer and a Duty team and four teams of four MILOBS each. Teams have been allotted specific Areas of Responsibility and are assigned to the Communes from where they get their data and monitor the overall situation in the region. This also ensures familiarity, continuity and better rapport and official dealings with the civil administration and the RPA.

5. **Deployment.**

(a) **UNAMIR Forces.**

(i) **Formed Troops.** Since the redeployment of forces as a result of the new mandate in Jun 95, there are no formed troops deployed in this Sector. However earlier a Battalion from the Nigerian Army was deployed with their HQ and a Coy at Byumba and a Mech Coy each at Ngarama and Nyagatare respectively.

(ii) **MILOBS.** The MILOBS are now deployed at Byumba. During the

earlier Mandate before Jun 95, two outposts had been co-located with the NIBATT Coys at Ngarama and Nyagatare respectively where one team each used to be deployed on a fortnightly basis in rotation.

(b) RPA. The RPA is deployed as follows :-

- (i) Bn HQ with a Coy at Byumba.
- (ii) Coy each at Ngarama, Giti, Kisaro and Muhura.
- (iii) Trg Camp at Gabiro.
- (iv) Pl and Sec sized road blocks and check points at random sites.

6. Operational Achievements.

(a) Daily Patrols. Our Patrol Teams are tasked to undertake daily patrols in their areas of responsibility. An average of three patrols go daily and each of the 17 Communes in this Sector is visited at least once a week. This enables our teams to gauge the pulse of the populace and the local authorities by their regular contacts and close rapport. As a result their reporting is objective. In April two Milobs teams were deployed to Kibeho to assist in the monitoring of the situation together with Milobs from other Sectors. The Milobs were also involved in the monitoring of the resettlement of the IDPs from Kibeho into various communes of the Sector.

17 communes (b) Mine Menace. As the DMZ established before the War ran through the Northern half of the Sector, there are a lot of minefields (approx 80,000 mines) left around the old RGF defences. The records of these cannot be traced as the RGF fled the Country. Cases of mine incidents have been reported with recurring frequency. A team from the USA had done survey of most of these localities and were responsible for training the RPA in demining tasks. However, due to regular visits to these affected areas, our teams have succeeded in earmarking these areas and reporting accordingly. Moreover, we encounter a number of unexploded bombs and mortars which are reported and once the EOD Team is tasked by the HQs , our teams are responsible to guide them to the requisite spots. This has led to prevention of a lot of accidents.

(c) Joint MILOB-RPA Patrols. In order to get the confidence of the authorities, this Sector has been undergoing Joint Patrols with the RPA Officers. This has resulted in improving the working relations with the RPA and also in increasing our credibility with the local authorities of the communes.

(d) Heli Patrols. This Sector has been going on heli patrols once a week to cover the border areas and also the border posts. On numerous occasions the task table has included visits to various communes. During such visits we have incorporated the RPA Commanding Offr, the Prefect and the Sub Prefects as part of these patrols. This has resulted in giving us more credibility and in the authorities becoming more receptive to our queries. This has facilitated our performance of tasks.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS

7. **General.** The MILOBS of this Sector have had an excellent relationship with the NGOs and other UN agencies as well as the Prefect and Govt authorities. Notable among the NGOs are the AMREF, ICRC, GOAL, World Vision who are located at Byumba. In addition UNHCR, ADRA, WFP, MSF, American Refugee Trust and Norwegian Trust are located at Nyagatare.

Achievements

8. **Monitoring Condition of Returnees.**

(a) The biggest Humanitarian problem in the Sector is that of Returnees from Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. They enter through the border posts of Gatuna, Buziba and Kagitumba within the Sector. The inflow of these returnees is monitored on a daily basis by our MILOB teams specially tasked to do so. We also receive returnees through the various camps in the other Sectors, specially from Kibungo and Kigali.

(b) There are two reception centres in this Sector - one at Nyagatare and the other at Byumba. The reception centre at Byumba has been recently constructed with the assistance of UNAMIR wherein the Force Engr Coy provided the Dozer for levelling tasks. This aid was provided through endeavours made from this Sector HQ.

(c) This Sector in order to monitor the condition of the returnees who have been resettled, has been undergoing Joint Patrols with the UNHCR. This has been a great success.

(d) Moreover, after interaction with the returnees our patrols have gathered certain valuable information on the state of the various refugee camps across the borders. This information has been passed on to UNAMIR Hqs from time to time. In addition our teams have also liaised with UNHCR and ICRC to enable to try and locate certain families who have some members still in these camps.

(e) Our teams have also been instrumental in transportation of food items to be distributed to these families.

9. **Education.** As a result of the devastation caused by the War, the education system in our area of concern was practically destroyed and became non-functional. Through concerted efforts by our MILOBS and the various NGO agencies, today majority (approx 90 %) of the Primary Schools are functioning. Two-thirds, however, require extensive repairs on their buildings. Our MILOBS have been responsible in providing various stationery and teaching materials and in some cases donating books (Byumba Secondary School is a case in point) to enable the School authorities to start their own libraries. In certain cases due to our interaction with the local authorities we have succeeded in facilitating the payment of

outstanding salaries to the teachers and also in requesting the NGOs to issue food handouts to supplement their meagre salaries. The education system is fast moving towards normalisation.

10. Health Services.

(a) As a result of concerted efforts by various NGOs and other UN agencies and due to information being provided by our teams to assist them, the Sector health services are very satisfactory and almost all the health centres, dispensaries and hospitals are functioning. All work of medical NGOs within the Sector is coordinated in monthly conferences held at the Prefecture which Milobs also attend.

(b) This sector faced a major problem of an outbreak of Meningitis and Dysentery. Due to timely information provided by our teams and actions taken by NGOs, a vaccination drive was conducted throughout the Prefecture. The situation is well under control now.

(c) On numerous occasions, our teams have transported serious patients from the Communes to the Hospitals. In addition various medicines and vaccines have also been transported.

11. Orphanages. This Sector has a total of three Orphanages and the condition in all of them is satisfactory. This is largely due to the regular monitoring and interaction of the MILOBS with the authorities and as a result of our endeavour to forward their problems to the HQs and the NGOs. Provision of clothing, food and regular vaccination programmes against dreaded diseases are some of the achievements. A particular case deserving mention is the Gakoni Orphanage in Murambi Commune where about five children died of meningitis. Early reports to this effect were sent by MILOBS and vaccination by Caritas was conducted to save the situation.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

12. As this Sector has been traditionally free from cross border tension and the populace is generally law abiding and docile, there has been no major incidents in the Prefecture. This is also due to the excellent working relation we have been able to maintain with the Prefect and all other Govt officials.

13. Judiciary System. The First Tribunal has all the judges appointed as well as the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor is already dealing with some cases.

14. Canton Courts. Out of the 17 Communes of the Prefecture, only Giti Commune has its full complement of three sitting judges. All the others have either two or one. The problem is a legal hurdle which cannot be overcome without the High Court being functional as any appointment of judges by the lower courts debars them from the appeal procedure at that court, hence the First Tribunal cannot appoint judges to the Canton Courts. All cases

which cannot be settled at the commune level by the Bourgmestre and two other members on the panel in the communes are referred to Byumba.

15. Condition of Prisons. The condition of prison inmates of Byumba prison was comparatively bad. The inmates were overcrowded and there was a shortage of food; the inmates being provided only one meal per day. However with the transfer of all the inmates (252) to the Insinda Prison in Sector 2B (Kibungo) on 22 and 23 Nov 95, the situation has since improved. The entire operation of transfer of these prisoners over two days was undertaken by UNAMIR. The vehicles and the escorts were provided by GHANBATT and the entire process was monitored by MILOB Teams specially tasked to do so.


ADMINISTRATION

16. As mentioned earlier, this Sector has no formed troops and UNAMIR is represented by the MILOBS alone. This Sector HQ is located at a Missionary at Kageyo and all the MILOBS are staying in this complex. The entire responsibility of Security, Communications and all administrative requirements thus falls entirely on the MILOBS. The fact that there has not been a single case of breach of security or of any incident involving the MILOBS and the RPA/Gendarmerie/Local Authorities bears testimony to the fact that we have an excellent relationship with all of them. This has been as a result of efforts of all our Teams members and Staff Officers who have left no stone unturned to maintain a good rapport and feel the pulse of the populace.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

17. The overall situation in this sector has been relatively calm. The population in this Sector is predominantly Hutus (approx 80 %) who are very submissive and keep to their farming activities. Bulk of the Sector was under the RPF control before the War and as such the destruction and massacres in this area have been comparatively low during the War. Retaliatory killings of Hutus, however, did take place on a small scale and numerous mass graves exist around the countryside. The RPA continues to keep a firm grip on the population here. Certain cases of high-handedness of RPA were reported from time to time and were investigated by both the Gendarmarie our teams. The last such incident was involving a member of NIBATT who shot and killed a civilian on 19 April' 95. Notwithstanding this development, our relations with the local authorities are still very cordial.

18 Although the situation is calm, the locals are apprehensive over the reduction and subsequent withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda. They fear that as the majority of them are Hutus, they would, upon the withdrawal of UNAMIR fall victim to the Govt law enforcing agents. With the cooperation between MILOBS and the local authorities, confidence has now been restored. Notwithstanding that, MILOBS continue to closely monitor the returnees situation throughout the Prefecture. Although there have not been any incidents so far, however the RFA members continue to be unpredictable.



B Coulibaly
Lt Col
Sect Cdr

Nov 95

From: MILOB HQ Sector 4

To: MILOB GP HQ/SOO//

Date: 27 November 95

Subject: MILOB FINAL REPORT - SECTOR 4

Ref: MILOB GP 1270/OPS dated 25 November 1995

1. Based on the tasking done in accordance with the mandate, following duties were performed by MILOBS in Sector 4:

a. Patrolling

- (1) Daily road patrols were conducted in each of the three Sub Sectors ranging from 3-4 patrols a day. Maximum ground coverage was attempted over the period to show the UN flag in as many parts of each Sub Sector, weather permitting.
- (2) One to two air recce/patrols were conducted on a weekly basis to access the most remote areas of each Sub Sector and to cover the hinterland during the rainy season.

b. Collection Tasks

- (1) Collection tasks were assigned to Sector 4 to gather more information on specific issues of interest to UNAMIR HQ/G2. Four such tasks were assigned to Sector 4: 010, 020, 031 and 032.

c. Visits to Communes

- (1) Daily visits to communes and the bourgmestres office were made by MILOBS enquiring essentially about the security situation in the 11 communes of the Cyangugu Préfecture. Constant liaison was also made with the "Conseiller" of sectors and the "Responsables" of cells. During such visits efforts were directed to gather information with regards to the returnees including related problems, security, developmental and economic situation, humanitarian issues and incidents which were reported from time to time.

d. Investigations

- (1) AS the "eyes" and "ears" of the Force commander, MILOBS obtained information on movements and actions of FRGF/Interahamwe as well as RPA. Sources of information came from local communal authorities, local population, NGOs, UN agencies and on occasion, RPA. In many instances such as acts of sabotage, killings and ambush, the UNCIVPOL detachment in Cyangugu conducted joint investigations with MILOBS to benefit from their investigative expertise. This arrangement proved very beneficial.

e. NGOs and UN Agencies

- (1) Close association was maintained with all NGOs and UN agencies. Liaison was made with the Malawi Company to provide NGOs with logistic support, mainly in the field of transport. Also weekly security meetings, one formal and one informal (without RPA LO) were held to brief them and coordinate certain operational activities.

f. Monitoring

- (1) Monitoring of refugees was done on a daily basis by MILOBS in close cooperation with UNHCR. There are four official entry points in Cyangugu Préfecture: Rusizi I (GR , Rusizi II (GR 7422), Burundi border post (GR 9398) and Uvira border post (GR 6900). Monitoring of the two transit camps in Bugarama Cité (GR 896001) and Nyagatare transit camp (GR 805250) was done on a daily basis. The Nyarushishi transit camp (GR 845253) has been ready since 25 August but not used due to the low number of returnees. It is planned to operate Nyarushishi until 31 December 95. Monitoring was also made from the Nyagatare transit camp to the 11 communes of Sector 4 to estimate the housing and land problems the returnees might encounter as well as the attitudes and behavior of the local population to the returnees.

g. Humanitarian


- (1) Weekly visits were made to selected schools, hospitals, health centers, the four orphanages (Rusayo, Noviciat, Kibogora, Nyamashake) in the communes by MILOBS as well as the Humanitarian Officer. Some medicine, which was collected from

27/11/1995 12:10 11211

various sources at Kigali, was also provided by MILOBS. Close liaison was maintained with UNAMIR/HAC to coordinate humanitarian activities.

2. Recommendations. The following recommendations are made:

- a. Computer Course. All MILOBS must at least have a basic computer course before arriving in theater.
- b. Communications. Secure communications must be provided by tested military radios.
- c. UPS Stabilizer. It must be provided to protect all equipment from power surges. This equipment must be standard with UN deployments in all locations and headquarters.


Julien Bibeau
Maj
Ops O
For Sec Cdr



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 1273/Ops

Date: 25 November 1995


To: All Sectors

From: MILOB Gp HQ/SOO


Subject: MILOB FINAL REPORTS

1. In view of the planned closure of UNAMIR at the end of the present mandate, there is a requirement to prepare final reports that outline the duties and achievements of MILOBS in the respective Sectors. The reports should highlight the successes of the MILOBS during this mission. Some areas that should be considered are those specific operations that were conducted and included MILOB Participation, ie OPERATION HOPE, OPERATION RETOUR, KEBEHO, etcetra.

2. You are required to prepare subject reports and forward them to this HQ not later than 1400 hours, Monday, 27 November 1995.


Md Assanullah
Lt Col
SOO

Fx to all Sectors



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

TO : All Sector Commanders

FILE : MILOB/OPS/43

FROM : A S O O

DATE : 22 Feb 96

INFO : SMPO
SLOGO
SO to CMO

FINAL REPORT

1. Kindly refer to :

- (a) Our letter No MILOB/OPS/02 dated 02 Jan 96.
- (b) Ops officers conference held in this office on 25 Jan 96.

2. All sectors will prepare a Final Report in respect of their sectors as on last date of our mandate i e 08 Mar 96. It will be personally handed over to S O O by the Sector Commanders by 10 Mar 96 without fail. The report must include the following :-

- (a) Historical Background of MILOB sector . This should include , in brief (NOT to exceed half page), important historical details (post 1959 particularly the Genocide period) having overbearing relevance to Rwanda / UNAMIR.
- (b) Importance of Prefectures . Include only special points if any (eg specific domination by a particular group , centre of education , power , leadership , natural resources etc).
- (c) Deployment during various Mandates. It should include deployment of MILOBs as well as formed troops during various mandates since Inception of UNAMIR. It will include the location of HQ , strengths and deployments in sub sectors if any.
- (d) Important Events. It should include (NOT to exceed one page) only very important events (eg events like Kanama , Kibeho , Iwawa incidents) and major operations undertaken in which MILOBs were actively involved (eg during movement of IDPs).

(e) Returnees. Month wise details of returnees since 01 Jan 95 to be included. Previous details if available should also be included . Details of their resettlement, commune wise should also be included. (Details will be given strictly as per forms attached).

(f) Prison and Commune Cachot Data. Latest data available.

(g) Achievements and Failures of MILOBs and UNAMIR. Only major achievements and failures (if any) for entire period. Likely causes of failure should also be included.

(h) Future prospects of Rwanda.

(j) Lessons Learnt . (If any)

(k) Recommendations. It should be included :

(i) Future role of UN , if any , in Rwanda .


(ii) Alternate strategies , if any , that could have made the role of UNAMIR even more successful including return of all refugees from neighbouring countries.

(iii) Suggested strategies / thoughts , if any , for more effective conduct of UN operations (peacekeeping or MILOB) in future in any part of the world.

(k) Any Other Points. Any other point (s) if felt to be important can be included at a suitable place in the report. But it must be very brief.

3. Needless to say , it is a very important report based on which the Final Report of MILOB GROUP HQ and UNAMIR HQ will be prepared . As such Sector Commanders are requested to make sure that the report is accurate, brief (not to exceed 5-6 pages) and submitted in time. Along with hard paper copy , the report should be submitted on a diskette as well.

4. Best regards.


(S N Yadav)
Lt Col
A S O O

RETURN OF REFUGEES IN SECTOR.....
(PREFERCTURES OF)

1995

1996

COUNTRY		JAN	FEB **	DEC	TOTAL FOR 95	JAN	FEB	MAR UPTO 08 MAR	TOTAL FOR 96	GRAND TOTAL
	OCL										
BURUNDI	NCL										
	TOTAL										
	OCL										
TANZANIA	NCL										
	TOTAL										
	OCL										
UGANDA	NCL										
	TOTAL										
	OCL										
ZAIRE	NCL										
	TOTAL										
NET	OCL										
TOTAL	NCL										
	GRAND TOTAL										

NOTES :

- 1. OCL - OLD CASE LOAD(1959 RETURNEES)
- 2. NCL - NEW CASE LOAD
- 3. ** - ALL THE MONTHS TO BE INCLUDED .

RESETTLEMENT OF RETURNEES IN COMMUNES

PREFECTURE

RETURNEES 95							96					
COM MUNE	POPU LATION PREWAR	POPUL ATION DEC94	JAN ***	DEC	TOTAL FOR 95	JAN	FEB	MAR UPTO 08 MAR	TOTAL FOR 96	GRAND TOTAL	POPU LATION 08 MAR 96
NET TOT AL												

NOTES :


1. SEPARATE SHEET SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR EACH PREFECTURE.
2. ** - ALL THE MONTHS TO BE INCLUDED.

MILOB GP HQ
SCHEDULE OF REPORTS AND RETURNS

SER	REPORT	FROM	TO	SCHEDULE
1	SITREP	SECTORS	MILOB HQ OPS	DAILY BY 1900 HRS
2	INCIDENT REPORT	SECTORS	MILOB HQ OPS UNAMIR /DCOS OPS/	AS REQUIRED
3	SRSG REPORT	SECTORS	MILOB HQ OPS	MONTHLY BY 07 OF NEXT MONTH
4	SECT COMD ASSESMENT OF SIT	SECTORS	MILOB HQ OPS	AS REQUIRED
5	HUMANITARIAN REPORT	SECTORS	UNAMIR HQ HAC	WEEKLY
6	DAILY CONSOLIDATED SITREP	MILOB HQ	DCMO SOO UNAMIR OPS IOC HAC	
7	UNAMIR INFOSUM	MILOB HQ	SECTORS	DAILY
8	RADIO RWANDA TRANSLATION	MILOB HQ	SECTORS	DAILY
9	CONSOLIDATED SRSG REPORT	MILOB HQ	SRSG HAC	MONTHLY BY 10 OF NEXT MONTH
10	SPECIAL SITREPS	MILOB HQ	SECTORS	AS REQUIRED

Effective 21 April 95

SECTOR DEPLOYMENT MAP





UNAMIR - MINUAR

FROM : Lt Col S N Yadav
Officiating S O O, MILOB GP HQ

FILE : MILOB/OPS/67

TO : The Office of SRSG

DATE :25 Sep 95

INFO : FC
DFC/CMO
COS
DCMO
HAC
G3 PLANS

SUBJECT : REPORT ON IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR SRSG's OFFICE

1. Kindly refer to MILOB Sect commanders visit held in GITARAMA on 25 Aug 95.
2. During the Sect Commanders conference a number of issues were discussed related to the security situation in Rwanda and problems connected with the repatriation of Rwandan refugees from across the border, particularly from Zaire. SRSG had asked MILOBs to obtain certain data related to these issues. These are enumerated in succeeding paras.

TRANSIT CAMPS

3. Present Capacity. At present there are 11 transit camps in Rwanda with a capacity of 16,100. The returnees would be brought by UNHCR/IOM/UNAMIR transport to the transit camps from the border post. They would be housed in the transit camp for 24-48 hours basically for completing immigration formalities, registration, sorting as per prefecture/ commune, issue of some food and basic amenities etc. There after they would be transported to their home communes by UNHCR/ IOM depending upon the availability of transport. Most of these transit camps are planned to be expanded in case a need arises. The capacities are :-

SER NO	PREFECTURE/SECT	TRANSIT CAMP	CAPACITY	EXPANDED CAPACITY	REMARK
1.	KIGALI	NDERA	1200	1200*	* No
2.	KIGALI	GASHORA/ DIHIRO	1000	1000*	further
3.	BYUMBA	NYAGATARE	2000	2000*	expansion
4.	KIBUNGO	BIRENGA	300	2000	planned
5.	KIBUNGO	NYAKARAMBI	400	1500	
6.	BUTARE	WAY STATION	1000	1000*	

Radio UNAMIR

KIGALI
GITA X
BYUMBA
KIBUNGO ✓
BUTARE ✓
GIKO X
CYN X
KIB X
GIS X Amakora ✓ Impankol.
RUH X Butaro until Jul

1. Suitable loc Gis, Cyn, B
2. Availability of Radio
3. Publicity
4. Photocopy of broadcast
5. Both languages
6. Radio Amakora
7. Spurious radio
- 8.

7.	CYANGUGU	NYAGATARE	6000	10000	
8.	CYANGUGU	BUGARAMA CITE	500	500*	
9.	KIBUYE	NYAMISHABA	2500	2500*	
10	GISENYI	NKAMIRA	700	3000	
11.	RUHENGERI	MUKUNGWA	500	500	
	TOTAL	CAPACITY	16100	24100	

4. **New Transit Camps.** Locations for new transit camps have been identified which will be opened progressively as the number of returnees rises beyond the capacity of present ones (including the expanded capacity). These are :-

SER NO	PREFECTURE/SECT	TRANSIT CAMP	CAPACITY	REMARKS
1.	BYUMBA	BYUMBA TOWN	1,000	
2.	CYANGUGU	NYARU SHISHI	15,000	
3.	GISENYI	COLLEGE	10,000	
	TOTAL	CAPACITY	26,000	

5. **Net Capacity.** As such the net capacity is as under :-

- (a) At present : 16,100
- (b) With immediate expansion of existing camps: 24,100
- (c) With opening of new transit camps: 50,100

6. **Handling Capability.** A returnee is likely to spend 24 to 48 hours in the transit camp before he can be despatched to his home prefecture/commune. On arrival in his prefecture, he may either proceed directly to his commune or may be delayed in the prefecture transit camp for a period of 24- 48 hours. Thus on an average a returnee is likely to spend up to three days before he reaches his home commune. Therefore the handling capacity of the transit camps works out to be one third of its capacity. Thus the handling capability is :-

- (a) At present : Approx 5,500 per day.
- (b) With immediate expansion of existing camps : Approx 8,000 per day.
- (c) With opening of new camps : Approx 17,000 per day.

7. **Facilities Available in Transit Camps.** Each of these transit camps have adequate facilities for food, water, shelter, medical care and hygiene & sanitation.

AFFECTED COMMUNES

7. Almost all communes are affected by the return of refugees. However there are some communes which are critically affected. These communes will have to be given priority in building up necessary infrastructure. UNREO is working out the priority.

8. **Infrastructure Required.** The infrastructure required are:-

- (a) Food , water and cooking utensils.
- (b) Shelter(house/ house building material).
- (c) Agricultural implements and seeds.
- (d) Medical facilities.

9. **Number of Returnees.** During the month of Aug 95 over 27,000 returnees have come back to Rwanda. Most of them have come from Zaire.. Majority of them have been settled in their home communes. During the middle of Aug, there was some forced repatriation from Zaire. This has since stopped. Now most of the returnees are coming under UNHCR arrangements. Although there have been some arrests, but their number is not large.

10. **Existence of Crisis Management Cells.** Crisis Management Cells exist at Prefecture level in all the prefectures. These generally comprise of Prefect, local RPA commander, UN agency members and reps of UNAMIR (MILOBs). This is a very positive development and useful in gearing up the prefecture/ commune in handling large influx of returnees.

PRISONS

10. There are over 45,000 prisoners in Rwanda kept in various prisons. Besides the large number of central prisons, each commune has a commune cachot for the prisoners. In addition, there are military detention centres. All the prisons and commune cachots are excessively overcrowded and need to be expanded. The facilities available are extremely pathetic and deplorable. They have problems of food, water and basic amenities. In most cases they are provided only one meal by ICRC / other agencies. In most prisons the authorities permit the relatives to bring food. Prison rehabilitation work is presently on at brisk pace . Rehabilitation is required for Gitarama, Kibuye, Gisenyi, Nyanza and Nsinda to ease out congestion.

JUDICIARY


11. The large prison population Rwanda includes the perpetrators of genocide as well as innocent people. The innocent people remain in jail because their trials have not taken place. This because of lack of judicial system in Rwanda. During the war , Rwanda lost more than three fourth of the judicial personnel. Most of the prefectures have only a handful of judges and lack basic infrastructure such as building, office staff, office material and even stationary. Shortage of trained judicial staff is most acute. At present some people are being trained for judicial jobs in Gitarama. Foreign judicial experts are being recruited to provide technical assistance. Commission De Triage and Court De Premiere Instance are to meet regularly. However they have rarely been able to meet at most places. With the ongoing arrests and very few prisoners being tried and released, the situation is becoming even more critical.


RADIO UNAMIR

12. Radio UNAMIR is not heard in most prefecture. It is only heard in Kigali, parts of Byumba, Kibungo, Gitarama and Butare. It is particularly disturbing to note that it is not heard in important prefectures like Gisenyi, Kibuye and Cyangugu which are most affected by the present crisis. There is just no question of its being heard in camps across the borders in the refugee camps.

HOUSING

13. At present there is hardly any housing policy. Although the Ministry of Rehabilitation is trying to identify certain amount of land in each prefecture for the returnees, it has not made much progress except in Kibungo and Ruhengeri. At prefecture level, Prefects have laid down certain norms. Like in Gisenyi, when a returnee arrives, he is given his old house if vacant. However if that house is occupied, he is made to share with the current occupants for a period of two months. Thereafter the 59/60 caseload person has to return it to the owner. In Ruhengeri, a small plot of land for house and one acre of land is planned to be given 59/60 case load returnees. Thus there seems to be no fully orchestrated plans for housing. Lot of houses got destroyed during the war. The problem of housing for the returnees is acute in all prefectures. However, a large number of NGOs are assisting in construction of houses.


(SN Yadav)
Lt Col
Offg S O O



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

TO : ALL MILOB SECTS

FILE : MILOB/OPS/02

FROM : OFFG S O O

DATE : 03 Jan 96

INFO : SMPO

SLOGO

DCOS (OPS)

MILOB OPERATIONS IN NEW MANDATE

1. Reference to this HQ letter No MILOB/OPS/02 dated 02 Dec 96.

MILOB Sub Sectors

2. As a concept of deployment, all MILOBs in sectors will be deployed concentrated at one place. There will be no sub sectors except in Kigali. This is primarily due to security considerations and policies of higher HQs.

Security

3. Security needs of MILOBs will be closely monitored by sector commanders keeping in with the directions of UN HQ, New York. Sector commanders are responsible to keep this HQ well informed in this regards. At any time if their security is threatened or doubtful, this HQ must be immediately informed so that appropriate action can be taken .

Tasks

4. All previous security related tasks of UNAMIR are no more part of its mandate. The main tasks for MILOBs are :-

- (a) Assist the Govt of Rwanda in facilitating voluntary and safe return of refugees.
- (b) Assist the Govt of Rwanda in its effort to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks. Monitor progress of refugee repatriation , their movement through border crossings, transit camps and their settlement in communes.
- (c) Assist UNHCR and other international agencies in repatriation of refugees.

Repatriation of Refugees

5. The main emphasis in the current mandate is on refugees repatriation. Hence the single most important task for MILOBs in the current mandate is to monitor refugee repatriation and their settlement. Towards this end, following tasks must be given utmost priority :-

(a) **Border Crossings.** Endeavour should be made to obtain accurate figures of returnee every day. However after reorganisation of sectors it may not be possible to visit all border crossings everyday. Minimum acceptable frequency of visit to border crossing for obtaining returnee figures (expect in case of mass influx where it will be daily) will be as follows :

(i)	Gatuna	Twice a week.
(ii)	Buziba	Once a week.
(iii)	Kagitumba	Once a week.
(iv)	Rusumo	Every day.
(v)	Rutete	Twice a week.
(vi)	Kanyaru Haute/Bas	Thrice a week.
(vii)	Uvira	Thrice a week.
(viii)	Rusizi I & II	Every day.
(ix)	All BPs in Gisenyi	Every day.
(x)	Cyanika	Twice a week.

(b) **Transit Camps.** Nyakarambi, Birenga, Way Station (Butare), Nyagatare and Nyakamira and any other active (as and when) transit camps will be visited every day. Other transit camps must be frequently visited at a frequency to be decided by the respective sector commander. Accurate figures of returnees and any other related information must be obtained and forwarded to this HQ.

(c) **Communes.** One of the main aims of visit to communes should be to ascertain the resettlement of returnees. Frequency of visit to communes must be decided by respective sector commanders depending upon availability of MILOBs and importance of communes. Progress and problems regarding resettlement of returnees must be reported regularly.

6. **Returnee Figures.** The figures of returnees have to be forwarded to UN HQ New York every day in the SITREP. The number of returnees in various transit camps are required by this HQ to keep track of movement of returnees, identify bottlenecks and assist to the extent possible. Hence these figures have to be obtained and included in the daily SITREP without fail. The figures must be accurate without any omissions or duplications.

Monitoring Tasks

7. Due to reduction in strength of MILOBs in the present mandate , the patrolling will get restricted. Thus monitoring tasks will be fairly curtailed. However MILOBs during their visits to various places must continue to obtain all information that is feasible from all their contacts. They must further improve their relations with RPA and seek all information and assistance from them. Information must be sought from UN agencies and NGOs operating in the area.

Mediator Role

8. Since the mandate of UNAMIR is finally to end on 08 Mar 96 , MILOBs have to start playing the role of mediator between the RPA or local authorities and the local populations as well as NGOs and UN agencies. The inhibitions between both the parties needs to be removed so that they can operate smoothly after 08 Mar 96. Since MILOBs are invariably close to both the parties, they can play a very important role in this regards. The message of reconciliation also must continue to be spread to the extent possible.

Investigations of Incidents

9. MILOBs will not carry out any investigations in the normal course of their duty . Specific instructions will be passed by this HQ if some task of this nature is to be carried out. Invariably Human Rights teams should carry out these tasks.

Conclusion

10. Notwithstanding foregoing and all the limitations under which the MILOBs have to operate, MILOBs continue to be the eyes and ears of SRSG/AFC/CMO. Hence every endeavour must be made to keep in touch with the situation prevailing in your area of responsibility. Any modification / recommendations / suggestions to these instructions are welcome by sector commanders by 07 Jan 96 for considerations by this HQ.

11. Best regards.

(S N Yadav)
Lt Col
O ffg S O O



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GROUP HQ : OPS BRANCH

TO : ALL MILOB SECTS

FILE : MILOB/OPS/02

FROM : OFFG S O O

DATE : 02 Jan 96

INFO : SMPO
SLOGO

CLOSURE OF MILOB SECTORS

1. Reference to this HQ letters on new mandate and FHQ letter No 5000.26(Plans) dated 28 Dec 95 regarding drawdown plans.

2. The following MILOB sectors are to close down as per following dates :-

- (a) Byumba 05 Jan 96.
- (b) Gikongoro 08 Jan 96.
- (c) Kibuye 11 Jan 96.
- (d) Ruhengeri 13 Jan 96.

3. All MILOBs who are due for interposting to other sectors will move forthwith except for following essential personnel who will form part of rear party :-

- (a) Sect Commander.
- (b) Log and or Pers Offr.
- (c) Ops or Hum Offr.
- (d) Any other essential person (1-2) as required by Sect Commander. However prior permission must be taken from this HQ.

4. **Patrolling and SITREP.** Closing down sectors will cease their patrolling activities 5 days prior to their closure date and all operational responsibilities will shift to the new sectors. Closing down sectors will concentrate their effort in smooth closing down of the sector. However they will continue to send their SITREP (all OK report and progress on closure of sect) atleast verbally every day at 1900 hrs to Duty offr at this HQ till the last day. However they need not have any duty offr at night but during working hours an officer must be available on tele and radio.

5. **Handing Over.** The closing down sector commanders are responsible for following :-

Fixed less to all sectors
2nd
[Signature]
Duty offr.
02/01

(a) **UN Assets.** All UN assets must be handed over to authorities concerned as per instructions issued by FHQ letter mentioned above and other relevant instructions and a clearance must be obtained. The clearance should be handed over to SLOGO, this HQ.


(b) **Operational Responsibility.** The closing down sector commander is responsible to hand over operational responsibility to new sector commander. Acting sector commander of Kibungo sector will take over from Byumba sector. The new sector commander must visit the new area of responsibility with the closing down sector commander. He must introduce all his old contacts, RPA officers and other officials. The closing down sector commander must visit the new sector HQ and brief new sector commander and all other MILOBs. Handing/taking over certificate will be forwarded to this HQ at least two days prior to the closure of sector.

(c) **Documents.** All documents including SITREPs, data and other useful info material must be handed over to new sector. A report to this effect will be forwarded to this HQ at least two days prior to the closure of the sector.

(d) **Final Report.** All closing down sectors will send a Final Report (not to exceed 3-4 pages) to include the following :-

- (i) Brief Historical details of MILOB sector (date of opening, reorganisations, formed troops etc).
- (ii) Importance of prefecture concerned.
- (iii) Achievements of MILOBs and UNAMIR in the sector.
- (iv) Future prospects .
- (v) Any other points.

6. Best regards.


(S N Yadav)
Lt Col
Offg S O O

- * Humanitarian Officer

If there are six sects a total of 24 MILOBs would be required.

(e) MILOB Group HQ. It need 13 MILOBs :

- * CMO
- * SO to CMO
- * Ops Branch 6
- * Adm/Pers Branch 3
- * Log Branch 2

(f) HAC. 5 MILOBs are needed in HAC.

NOTE. Teams are comprising of four MILOBs to cater for min availability of three MILOBs due to leave / CTO.

9. Net Requirement. Thus a total of 290 MILOBs are required to carry out the task effectively.

IMPORTANCE OF MILOBs NEW MANDATE

1. Where total number is playing important role (as relevant now with UNAMIR), retention of max MILOBs is most beneficial to UNAMIR as MILOBs are all officers with military background, a great deal of experience and are capable of operating in all kinds of difficult situation.
2. Being officers they can effectively observe analyse and report accurately after making appropriate assessment.
3. It is easier for MILOBs to interact with locals and the RPA.
4. In the current mandate, max input is received from MILOBs. MILOBs are playing very useful role in making the task of UNAMIR meaningful.
5. MILOBs have operated equally well in sects where there are no formed troops. Thus there will be no problem for MILOBs to operate even if the troop level goes down further.
6. If the strength of MILOBs is reduced further, it will make them ineffective thereby reducing the effectiveness of UNAMIR.

MINIMUM STRENGTH OF MILOBs

7. Auth Strength 320

Present strength 284

8. **Minimum Strength Required**

(a) Monitoring communes. There are 143 communes. One team to visit four communes a day, thus requiring 36 teams of four MILOBs (144 MILOBs).

(b) Monitoring Borders. There are 15 border crossings. Each to be visited by a MILOB team of four (60 MILOBs).

(c) Monitoring Transit Camps. There are 11 transit camps. Each to be visited by a MILOB team of four (44).

(d) Sect HQ staff. Each Sect HQ would have for MILOBs:

- * Sect Commander
 - * Ops Officer
 - * Log/Pers Officer
-

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

FROM : G 3 PLANS *PK Malile* 5000.26 (Plans)
TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST
DATE : 15 Jan 96
SUBJECT : DRAW DOWN AND LIQUIDATION

1. Reference letter No 5000.26(Plans) dated 12Jan 96 on the above subject.
2. Please find attached the updated Annex G (Phases 2 &3) and element of Annex H (Site Specific Schedule for 95 CMSG in Phase 2).

Distribution :

INDBATT
GHANCOY 1
GHANCOY 2
NICOY
FORCE ENGR COY
FORCE SIG COY
95 CMSG
NORMED
SECTOR 1
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 3
SECTOR 4
SECTOR 5
~~HQ MH-OB-GP~~
DFC
ED
CAO
COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
CISS
CMPO
CCPO
G 2
G 3 OPS
G 3 PLANS

24	ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN UP	FROM	07-Jan	08-Jan	09-Jan	11-Jan	13-Jan	16-Jan	12-Jan	02-Feb	27-Jan	N/A	
		TO	08-Jan					17-Jan		03-Feb			
25	RETURN UN VEHs TO HVY (IVECO) WKSP		07-Jan					16-Jan		01-Feb	27-Jan	N/A	
26	HAND OVER CONTINGENT VEHs		07-Jan					16-Jan		01-Feb	27-Jan	N/A	
27	CUSTOM SEC CHECK PAX		07-Jan					16-Jan		01-Feb	27-Jan	20-Jan	
28	REAR PARTY/SECUR TM RETURNS		08-Jan	08-Jan	05-Jan	11-Jan	13-Jan	17-Jan	12-Jan	N/A	28-Jan	N/A	
29	CUSTOM SEC CHECK COE	FROM	07-Jan					16-Jan		30-Jan	28-Jan	N/A	
		TO	12-Jan					21-Jan		03-Feb	02-Feb		
30	CUSTOM SEC CHECK UNOE	FROM								N/A			
		TO											
31	MOV MAIN PAX TO HOME LOCS FROM KIA		08-Jan					17-Jan		02-Feb	28-Jan	30-Jan	
32	DESPATCH REAR PARTIES		14-Jan					22-Jan		09-Feb	03-Feb	N/A	
33	MOV OF COE TO POE	FROM								NA			
		TO											
34	MOV OF UNOE TO POE	FROM								NA			
		TO											
35	RES DAY		09-Jan					18-Jan		05-Feb	10-Jan	31-Jan	
36	SECUR TM MOV TO LOC		04-Jan					12-Jan		N/A	14-Jan	N/A	
37	DISPOSAL OF SCRAP	FROM											
38		TO											
39	CEASE OPS FROM									23-Jan	N/A	N/A	
40	MOV HQ TO TRAFIPRO												
41	CORE GP & REAR PTY MOV TO MERIDIEN												

MASTER LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE - PHASE THREE

APPENDIX 1
ANNEX 2
4800.11-00-000 (SRSG/FC)
21/12/12 JANUARY 1995

SER	ACTIVITY	SECTOR 3 (NEW)		SECTOR 2 (NEW)		SECTOR 5 (NEW)		SECTOR 4 (NEW)		SECTOR 1 (KIGALI)												REMARKS	
		MIL08 BUTARE	TPT WKBP BUTARE	MIL08 GITARAMA	NIC05 NYAMIRO	MIL08 QIBENYI	NIC05 SHAGASHA	MIL08 CYANGURU	MIL08 KIBURUGO	ENCR COV	GHANCOY2	CHU	TPT WKBP LICH1	U08 ZOY	COMMS COMPOUND	NORMED	TRANSIT CAMP	B & R	TPT WKBP KUV	NDBATT SAMP COV	CORE GP TMS MOV CON		
1	COORD OF LIQUIDATION PROCESS	01-Mar	01-Mar	01-Mar	04-Mar	04-Mar	10-Mar	10-Mar	13-Mar	13-Mar	05-Mar	14-Mar	08-Mar	03-Feb	17-Mar	17-Mar	24-Mar	24-Mar	24-Mar	09-Apr	N/A		
2	MOV SEA CNTRS TO SITES				06-Mar		08-Mar				02-Mar	13-Mar	07-Mar	31-Jan	15-Mar	23-Mar	N/A	23-Mar	14-Mar	06-Apr	N/A		
3	CEASE WATER SUPPLY	26-Feb	26-Feb	26-Feb	23-Feb	27-Feb	23-Feb	06-Mar		07-Mar	08-Mar	N/A	10-Mar	N/A	14-Mar	26-Mar	26-Mar	21-Mar	22-Mar	04-Apr	N/A	1. NDBATT SAMP COV AFTER 2. END OF LIQUIDATION	
4	CEASE POL SUPPLY	25-Feb	25-Feb	25-Feb	23-Feb	27-Feb	23-Feb	08-Mar		07-Mar	N/A	N/A	13-Feb	N/A	N/A	N/A	25-Mar	14-Jan	14-Jan	N/A	N/A	4. L TMS MOV CON. 5. LVS/AV. 6. NDBATT SAMP COV. 7. END OF LIQUIDATION	
5	CEASE FRESH RATS DEL		1		20-Feb		20-Feb				01-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	1-Mar	N/A	28-Mar	N/A	17-Mar	18-Mar	14-Apr	N/A	
6	OUT SURVEY OF COE	FROM			06-Mar		11-Mar			06-Mar	15-Mar	N/A	N/A	10-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	12-Apr	N/A		
		TO			08-Mar					12-Mar	17-Mar			13-Mar						17-Apr	N/A		
7	OUT SURVEY DOCS	FROM			10-Mar		13-Mar			13-Mar	18-Mar	N/A	N/A	14-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	18-Apr	23-Apr		
		TO			11-Mar		14-Mar			14-Mar	19-Mar			15-Mar						19-Apr			
8	PACKING AND DOCUMENTATION COMPLETED				09-Mar		11-Mar			13-Mar	18-Mar	15-Mar	25-Feb	14-Mar	03-Apr	27-Mar	27-Mar	09-Apr	09-Apr	18-Apr	23-Apr		
9	BOARDS OF INQUIRY / WRITE OFFS	FROM	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	10-Mar	06-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	20-Mar	12-Mar	26-Feb	18-Mar	04-Apr	27-Mar	27-Mar	09-Apr	09-Apr	18-Apr	23-Apr
		TO	05-Mar	05-Mar	08-Mar	11-Mar	07-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	16-Mar	16-Mar	18-Mar	21-Mar	13-Mar	01-Mar	27-Mar	08-Apr	28-Mar	28-Mar	11-Apr	13-Apr	19-Apr	
10	UNOE CLEARANCE	FROM	03-Mar	02-Mar	04-Mar	08-Mar	05-Mar	11-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar	14-Mar	13-Mar	18-Mar	10-Mar	04-Feb	14-Mar	21-Mar	25-Mar	N/A	28-Mar	18-Mar	10-Apr	22-Apr
		TO		03-Mar		09-Mar		12-Mar							28-Feb		03-Apr	26-Mar		08-Apr	08-Apr	11-Apr	
11	PICK UP WATER CONTAINERS	FROM	03-Mar	03-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	05-Mar	08-Mar	12-Mar		14-Mar	11-Mar	N/A	16-Mar	27-Feb	19-Mar	16-Mar	27-Mar	27-Mar	03-Apr	03-Apr	06-Apr	N/A
		TO																					
12	PICK UP POL CONTAINERS	FROM	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	11-Mar	06-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	16-Mar	N/A	17-Mar	28-Feb	N/A	N/A	N/A	27-Mar	18-Apr	12-Apr	11-Apr	N/A
		TO																					
13	PICK UP COMMS EQPT	FROM	03-Mar	03-Mar	04-Mar	10-Mar	05-Mar	10-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar	14-Mar	14-Mar	16-Mar	17-Mar	24-Feb	15-Mar	15-Mar	25-Mar	20-Mar	25-Mar	25-Mar	17-Apr	22-Apr
		TO						12-Mar								10-Mar	20-Mar						
14	PICK UP GENERATORS	FROM	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	11-Mar	06-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	16-Mar	N/A	17-Mar	28-Feb	25-Mar	08-Apr	25-Mar	27-Mar	10-Apr	12-Apr	19-Apr	22-Apr
		TO																					
15	PICK UP DEF STORES	FROM	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	11-Mar	06-Mar	12-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	N/A	17-Mar	25-Feb	25-Mar	05-Apr	N/A	28-Mar	10-Apr	12-Apr	10-Apr	N/A	
		TO														08-Apr							
16	MOVE COE				09-Mar		12-Mar			13-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
17	MOVE UNOE	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	10-Mar	06-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	13-Mar	N/A	11-Mar	25-Feb	15-Mar	04-Apr	27-Mar	N/A	09-Apr	09-Apr	N/A	N/A	
18	MOV WPNS AND AMMO CNTRS TO KIGALI				09-Mar		12-Mar			N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
19	ADVANCE PARTY MOV TO TRANSIT CAMP				08-Mar		N/A			15-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
20	MOVE PAX TO KIGALI (LESS REAR PARTIES)				08-Mar		12-Mar			15-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
21	REPAIR & HAND OVER ACCOM	FROM	03-Mar	03-Mar	04-Mar	09-Mar	05-Mar	12-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	N/A	17-Mar	25-Feb	18-Mar	04-Apr	27-Mar	01-Apr	09-Apr	09-Apr	18-Apr	N/A
		TO	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	11-Mar	06-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar		15-Mar	16-Mar		18-Mar	28-Feb	25-Mar	08-Apr	28-Mar		10-Apr	12-Apr	20-Apr	
22	DISMANTLING WEATHER HAVENS/RUSHALLS	FROM																					
		TO						11-Mar			16-Mar	20-Mar	N/A	N/A	24-Mar	N/A	N/A	27-Mar	N/A	N/A	16-Apr	N/A	
23	DESTRUCTION/TRANSFER OF MATERIEL	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	10-Mar	06-Mar	12-Mar	14-Mar		15-Mar	15-Mar	16-Mar	17-Mar	26-Feb	24-Mar	04-Apr	27-Mar	31-Mar	10-Apr	10-Apr	19-Apr	23-Apr	1. TMS GP VEH TRANSFER & WONT OCCUR INTO INV WKBP CLOSURE
24	ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN UP	FROM	04-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	10-Mar	06-Mar	12-Mar	14-Mar		15-Mar	16-Mar	N/A	17-Mar	26-Feb	17-Mar	04-Apr	27-Mar	28-Mar	09-Apr	09-Apr	19-Apr	N/A
		TO									15-Mar				27-Feb		05-Apr		29-Mar	10-Apr	11-Apr		

		E	Cita	G	Cya	HQ	K	En	Sig	Ind	Coe												
26	RETURN UN VEHs TO HWY (VECO) WKSP	05-Mar	05-Mar	06-Mar	12-Mar	07-Mar	13-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	16-Mar	15-Mar	19-Mar	19-Mar	05-Feb	25-Mar	04-Apr	27-Mar	N/A	08-Apr	09-Apr	11-Apr	22-Apr	LY W/REP VEHs UNDER REPAIR TRANSFERRED TO HWY WKSP. CORE OF RETAIN VEHs UNITS DEP.
28	HAND OVER CONTINGENT VEHs				12-Mar		13-Mar				13-Mar	19-Mar	N/A	N/A	23-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	11-Apr	N/A	
27	CUSTOM SEC CHECK PAX	05-Mar	05-Mar	06-Mar	13-Mar	07-Mar	13-Mar	15-Mar	16-Mar	16-Mar	15-Mar	19-Mar	16-Mar	N/A	25-Mar	05-Apr	28-Mar	N/A	09-Apr	10-Apr	19-Apr	23-Apr	
29	REAR PARTY/SECUR TM RETURNs	06-Mar	04-Mar	05-Mar	11-Mar	06-Mar	13-Mar	14-Mar		15-Mar	16-Mar	N/A	18-Mar	28-Feb	N/A	06-Apr	28-Mar	N/A	10-Apr	12-Apr	N/A	N/A	INDSATT AND SECUR TM REAR PARTIES MOVE WITH CORE OF UNITS
28	CUSTOM SEC CHECK COE	FROM			11-Mar		N/A				13-Mar	18-Mar	N/A	N/A	24-Mar	N/A	25-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	11-Apr	N/A	
		TO			18-Mar						18-Mar	23-Mar			28-Mar		28-Mar				18-Apr		
30	CUSTOM SEC CHECK UNOE	FROM												08-Feb		21-Mar		N/A	26-Mar	19-Mar	10-Apr	23-Apr	
		TO												25-Feb		03-Apr			13-Apr	13-Apr	18-Apr		
31	MOV MAIN PAX TO HOME LOCS FROM KIA	05-Mar	05-Mar	05-Mar	14-Mar	07-Mar	14-Mar	15-Mar	16-Mar	16-Mar	16-Mar	20-Mar	17-Mar	26-Feb	26-Mar	05-Apr	29-Mar	N/A	09-Apr	10-Apr	20-Apr	24-Apr	
32	DEBATCH REAR PARTIES				16-Mar		N/A				26-Mar	24-Mar	23-Mar	N/A	22-Apr	N/A	03-Apr	N/A	14-Apr	14-Apr	22-Apr	N/A	
33	MOV OF COE TO POE	FROM																					
		TO																					
34	MOV OF UNOE TO POE	FROM																					
		TO																					
36	REG DAY				15-Mar		15-Mar				17-Mar	22-Mar	18-Mar	27-Feb	27-Mar	06-Apr	30-Mar	01-Apr	10-Apr	11-Apr	21-Apr	25-Apr	
38	SECUR TM MOV TO LOC				05-Mar		10-Mar				14-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	24-Mar	21-Mar	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
37	DISPOSAL OF SCRAP	FROM												14-Jan					14-Jan	14-Jan			
39		TO												28-Feb					08-Apr	08-Apr			
39	CEASE OPS FROM							14-Mar		05-Mar	15-Mar	15-Mar	04-Feb	20-Mar	15-Mar	25-Mar	27-Mar	25-Mar	25-Mar			N/A	
40	MOV HQ TO TRAFIPRO													18-Mar									
41	CORE GP & REAR PTY MOV TO MERIDIEN																			17-Apr	17-Apr		
42																							

Appendix 7
 To Annex H
 To 4000.1/LOG-28/1 (SRSG/FC)
 Dated 12 January 1996

LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE - PHASE TWO													
	20 JAN	21 JAN	22 JAN	23 JAN	23 JAN	29 JAN	30 JAN	01 FEB	02 FEB	03 FEB	04 FEB	05 FEB	09 FEB
95 CMSS	CEASE FRESH RATIONS	MOV CONTRIS TO SITE	COORD MTG	CEASE OPS	OUT SURVEY	>>	OUT SURVEY DOCS	>>	PAX MAIN FLT		PICK UP POL CONTRIS	RES DAY	REAR PTY FLT
	CEASE POL SUP								REPAIR/ HAND OVER ACCN	>>	>>		
									DISMANTLING	>>	>>		
											DESTR / TRANS OF MAT		
							PACKING COMPLETE	CUSTOMS PAX	BOI / WRITE OFF	>>			
								COMM EQPT	ENV CLEAN UP	>>			
							UNOE CLEARANCE	>>					
								RTN/ HAND OVER VEHS					
							COE CUSTOMS MAT	>>	>>	>>			

C:\DATA\SOLOGICLOSURE\SLI-ANX.H7

CSO
CFSA
CPO
CFO
CCU
CPSU
FSO
CCO
CITMM
CMS
OCISS
SO LOG
C MOV CON
CMCC
SO MAINT
SO SUP
SUMMO
CPCIU
FEO
CBMES
SO ACCN
CMCO
SO FOOD
C GEN
CHAO
FMO
FPM

Information :

OFFICE OF SRSG
MA TO FC
B & R
CANADIAN HELICOPTER UNIT
UNAMIR AIR OPS

IMPORTANT TASKS PERFORMED BY MILOBS

General

1. MILOBS are the eyes and ears of SRSG/FORCE CDR/CMO/DCMO. MILOBS are reasonably senior, highly mature and experienced military officers who are carefully selected for an objective and unbiased reporting in war torn countries. They are performing very important tasks in UNAMIR(RWANDA). Hence it is felt that even in the revised mandate, the strength of MILOBS should not be reduced/ be only marginally reduced. Some of the important tasks performed by the MILOBS are given in succeeding paras.

Patrolling.

2. Patrolling is an essential activity for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility. The main aims of patrolling are:-

- (a) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or any violation.
- (b) To obtain information about terrain and topography.
- (c) To assess the general situation in a given area.
- (d) To show the presence of UN.
- (e) To interact with local people and other agencies to obtain any information which could be useful to UNAMIR operations/tasks.

Visits to Communes.

3. Visit various Communes in the area of responsibility to enquire about the following and take necessary actions/ info concerned agencies for necessary actions:-

- (a) Meet Commune Bourgemestre and enquire about Commune problems.
- (b) Population. Population details, ethnic groups and their inter-relationship.
- (c) Assess living conditions of local population.
- (d) Food. Check availability of food and water in the Commune. Distribution of food if any and what agency?
- (e) Orphans. Their number, condition and problems.
- (f) Education. State of education, number of children attending, availability of teachers and problems if any.
- (g) Prisons. Check conditions of prisons and detention centres. Check condition of prisoners, human right violations and the judicial system available.
- (h) Agriculture. Check availability of agricultural implements, seeds and water for cultivation.
- (i) Health. Check prevalent diseases hospitals/health centres, availability of doctors/nurses and supply position of medicines.
- (j) Security. Assess the security situation, cases of banditry arrests, killings by RPA and others.
- (k) RPA. Deployment, strength, Commanders and their attitude towards local population.

(l) Administrative Setup. The setup, their attitude, efforts towards reconciliations and inclinations.

(m) Returnees. Their numbers, integration in mainstream, problems, assistance provided by local administration, security/harassment if any, housing, food and attitude of locals and RPA.

Escort Duties.

4. MILOBs provide unarmed escorts to :-

- (a) VIPs and other visiting persons.
- (b) NGOs.
- (c) For the IDPs, while moving back to their home communes, the MILOBs are tasked for following:-
 - (i) Monitoring of target Communes.
 - (ii) Liaise and coordinate between Open Relief Centres (ORC), local authorities and IDPs.
 - (iii) Escort IDP convoys from Displaced Persons Camps (DPC) to ORC/ home communes in conjunction with RPA and UN troops.
 - (iv) Provide liaison between RPA and UN troops.

Humanitarian Situation.

5. MILOBs are monitoring the humanitarian situation in their respective sectors. Each sector has a Hum Offr who works in close coordination with local Humanitarian, Human Rights and other NGOs. Some of the important tasks are:-

- (a) Close contact with the Prefect and representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
- (b) To work in close cooperation with UNHCR and render necessary assistance to them in execution of their tasks in rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees.
- (c) Assist World Food Programme (WFP) in coordination of food and aid delivery to medical centres and orphanages.
- (d) Works in close coordination with HR and ICRC to assess the situation in Commune cachots and prisons.

Advantages of MILOBs

6. MILOBs have tremendous advantage over other agencies in carrying out accurate observation, evaluation and assessment since they are all offrs with good experience, sound military background and possess analytical mind. Some of the striking advantages of Military Observers (officers) are:-

- (a) Even in absence of comprehensive guidelines, they can carry out their tasks effectively. They do not need supervision.
- (b) Because of their military background, they can carry out an accurate assessment of the prevailing security situation.

(c) It is much easier for an officer to interact with the local population (keeping in mind the language problem in Rwanda).

(d) Correct assessment is very essential for optimum utilisation of meager UN resources. MILOBs can make an accurate assessment of existing situation as also to what is likely to happen in the near future due to their constant interaction with local population and NGOs.

(e) It has been experienced that often representatives of HR and other NGOs insists on MILOBs accompanying them.

(f) Where numbers are playing predominant role (as the Rwandese Govt is insisting on certain numbers of total strength of UNAMIR all inclusive), retention of maximum number of MILOBs may be more useful to UNAMIR.


Recommendations.

7. In view of foregoing , it is strongly felt that one of the following options could be adopted:-


(a) Option One. The strength of MILOBs to remain at the existing level. This option would be most beneficial to the organisation due to reasons given above.(Existing Organisation is given at Appx A attached).

(b) Option Two. The strength of MILOBs be marginally reduced from present 320 to 288 (a reduction of 10 %).Suggested Organisation of MILOB group with such strength is given at Appx B attached.

ORGANISATION OF MILOBS GROUP



SUGGESTED ORGANISATION OF MILOBS GROUP



LEGEND: * NOT COUNTED

ORGANISATION OF MILOBS GROUP


23

288

HAC

HAC

HAC



LEGEND: * NOT COUNTED

X

IMPORTANT TASKS PERFORMED BY MILOBS

General

1. MILOBS are the eyes and ears of SRSG/FORCE CDR/CMO/DCMO. MILOBS are reasonably senior, highly mature and experienced military officers who are carefully selected for an objective and unbiased reporting in war torn countries. They are performing very important tasks in UNAMIR(RWANDA). Hence it is felt that even in the revised mandate, the strength of MILOBS should not be reduced/ be only marginally reduced. Some of the important tasks performed by the MILOBS are given in succeeding paras.

Patrolling.

2. Patrolling is an essential activity for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility. The main aims of patrolling are:-

- (a) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or any violation.
- (b) To obtain information about terrain and topography.
- (c) To assess the general situation in a given area.
- (d) To show the presence of UN.
- (e) To interact with local people and other agencies to obtain any information which could be useful to UNAMIR operations/tasks.

Visits to Communes.

3. Visit various Communes in the area of responsibility to enquire about the following and take necessary actions/ info concerned agencies for necessary actions:-

- (a) Meet Commune Bourgemestre and enquire about Commune problems.
- (b) Population. Population details , ethnic groups and their intersay relationship.
- (c) Assess living conditions of local population.
- (d) Food. Check availability of food and water in the Commune. Distribution of food if any and what agency?
- (e) Orphans. Their number, condition and problems.
- (f) Education. State of education, number of children attending, availability of teachers and problems if any.
- (g) Prisons. Check conditions of prisos and detention centres . Check condition of prisoners, human right violations and the judicial system available.
- (h) Agriculture. Check availability of agricultural implements, seeds and water for cultivation.
- (i) Health. Check prevalent diseases hospitals/health centres, availability of doctors/nurses and supply position of medicines.
- (j) Security. Assess the security situation, cases of banditary arrests, killings by RPA and others.
- (k) RPA. Deployment , strength, Commanders and their attitude towards local population.

(1) Administrative Setup. The setup, their attitude, efforts towards reconciliations and inclinations.

(m) Returnees. Their numbers, integration in mainstream, problems, assistance provided by local administration, security/harrasment if any, housing, food and attitude of locals and RPA.

Escort Duties.

4. MILOBs provide unarmed escorts to :-

- (a) VIPs and other visiting persons.
- (b) NGOs.
- (c) For the IDPs, while moving back to their home communes, the MILOBs are tasked for following:-
 - (i) Monitoring of target Communes.
 - (ii) Liaise and coordinate between Open Relief Centres (ORC), local authorities and IDPs.
 - (iii) Escort IDP convoys from Displaced Persons Camps (DPC) to ORC/ home communes in conjunction with RPA and UN troops.
 - (iv) Provide liaison between RPA and Un troops.

Humanitarian Situation.

5. MILOBs are monitoring the humanitarian situation in their respective sectors. Each sector has a Hum Offr who works in close coordination with local Humanitarian, Human Rights and other NGOs. Some of the important tasks are:-

- (a) Close contact with the Prefect and representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
- (b) To work in close cooperation with UNHCR and render necessary assistance to them in execution of their tasks in rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees.
- (c) Assist World Food Programme (WFP) in coordination of food and aid delivery to medical centres and orphanages.
- (d) Works in close coordination with HR and ICRC to assess the situation in Commune cachots and prisons.

Advantages of MILOBs

6. MILOBs have tremendous advantage over other agencies in carrying out accurate observation, evaluation and assessment since they are all offr with good experience, sound military background and possess analytical mind. Some of the striking advantages of Military Observers (officers) are:-

- (a) Even in absence of comprehensive guidelines, they can carry out their tasks effectively. They do not need supervision.
- (b) Because of their military background, they can carry out an accurate assessment of the prevailing security situation.

(c) It is much easier for an officer to interact with the local population (keeping in mind the language problem in Rwanda).

(d) Correct assessment is very essential for optimum utilisation of meagre UN resources. MILOBs can make an accurate assessment of existing situation as also to what is likely to happen in the near future due to their constant interaction with local population and NGOs.

(e) It has been experienced that often representatives of HR and other NGOs insists on MILOBs accompanying them.


(f) Where numbers are playing predominant role (as the Rwandese Govt is insisting on certain numbers of total strength of UNAMIR all inclusive), retention of maximum number of MILOBs may be more useful to UNAMIR.

Recommendations.

7. In view of foregoing , it is strongly felt that one of the following options could be adopted:-

(a) Option One. The strength of MILOBs to remain at the existing level. This option would be most beneficial to the organisation due to reasons given above.

(b) Option Two. The strength of MILOBs be marginally reduced from present 320 to 288 (a reduction of 10 %) as per following details (detailed Revised Organisation chart is given at Appx attached).



LEGEND	
D O	DUTY OFFICER
C	COMMUNES

OPS BRANCH POINTS BY S O O
INDEX : SATYEN FILES

SER	FILE	CONTENTS	PGME	DATE	RMKS
1.	MILOBTAS	MILOB TASKS-ORIGINAL	WP	07 JUN	
2.	MLBTASKS	-DO- WITH REC	WP	08 JUN	
3.	MLBTASK1	-DO- REV & NO REC	WP	12 JUN	
4.	BB	BRIEF PTS FOR FC	WP	08 JUN	
5.	BRFNOTES	NOTES FOR SPEC ENVOY	WP	20 JUN	
6.	NEWORG	NEW MANDATE & ORG	WP	16 JUN	
7.	SLIDE	SLIDES FOR ZBTR	WP	18 JUN	
8.	ZBTR	ZAIRE & CO (66)	WP	16 JUN	
9.	ZBTR1	-DO- WITH 66	WP	17 JUN	
10.	ZBZB	-DO- WITH 117	WP	19 JUN	
11.	ZMTRL	-DO- MTRL REQ	WP	18 JUN	
12.	ZBMTRL	-DO- MTRL REQ BASIS	WP	20 JUN	
13.	NEWORG	NEW ORG	WP	19 JUN	
14.	MANDATE	NEW MANDATE	WP	18 JUN	
15.	MORNBRIE	MORNING BRIEFING	WP		
16.	LETTERHE	LETTER HEAD	WP		
17.	DBX	HARISH	WP		
18.	CONFDREP	CONF REPORT	WP		
19.	BBB	BRIEF-NEW MILOB	WP	13 JUN	
20.	MILOB	MILOB ORG 10 SECTS	QP	15 JUN	
21.	MILNEW	NEW ORG-320	QP	18 JUN	
22.	MILNEW1	-DO- WITH OLD STR	QP	21 JUN	
23.	ZBTRZ	ZAIRE & CO -ORG-117	QP	19 JUN	
24.	SCC	SECT CDRS CONF	WP	26 JUN	
	ZBZB1	Briefing 2720		29	
1.		Timely forwarding of SITREP.			
2.		Timely sending of Reports and returns.			
3.		All are not following the laid down format for the SITREP.			
4.		On occurrence of imp activity or event ,automatic assessment/ report of event should take place.			

NEW ORG1 - SOO Mandate

NEW ORG CHAN channels 00

LAW x73739

IAN x73739

Help on the IOC database

07/8/95

For easy reading Maximise this window and select Word Wrap from the edit Menu

Installation

Insert the first floppy diskette, enter Windows Program Manager and from the file menu (top left of screen) choose the Run option. Enter the line:

a:\setup

and follow the instructions as they may appear. Failure may be caused by lack of hard disk space (about 10MB required), an old version of Windows (v3.0 does not work) or changing the installation directory from c:\ioc. After installation a new Windows group containing the database should be formed, you may need to restart Windows before use.

If a message at the end of installation instructs you to run the workgroups administrator do the following:

- 1 Click on the MS Access Workgroup Administrator icon in the IOC Rwanda Database window
- 2 Click CREATE and then enter your name & organisation, following the given instructions. If you omit the work group id a warning will be issued.
- 3 The computer will form a system.mda file; accept its chosen directory by clicking OK.

If a message appears warning that it was unable to create an icon in the IOC Rwanda Database do not worry. Click OK and ignore it!

To install the database utilities (repair database and export to floppy) the following instructions need to be followed after running the setup above:

- 1 From Windows Program Manager choose option New from the File Menu
- 2 Choose New Program Group (NOT Program Item) and click OK
- 3 Leave the Description blank and enter: ioc_db_2 in the group file box
- 4 Click OK, a window entitled IOC Database Utilities should appear

Operation

To start the database double click on the icon, a Rwanda map is displayed as the database opens. It is wise to Maximise the database window (top right button on window bar) before use to allow all the screens to be seen clearly.

To exit the database use the STOP button on the entrance form, the STOP button on the other forms returns you to the entrance form. Forms or views without STOP buttons may be left using <CTRL> F4 or choosing the Close option from the file menu or the window control menu (square button with a hyphen in the top lefthand corner of the window).

If an error message relating to a corruption of the database is seen, the database needs to be shut. Then use the 'Repair' icon in the Utilites window group to automatically fix the database.

Some reports are opened up in Print Preview mode, when the mouse is over the window a Magnifying glass is displayed. Clicking once will change the display to view the full page, clicking again magnifies the image to allow the text to be read for a portion of the page. Use the scroll bars to move around the page, use the navigation buttons at the bottom left of the window to move between pages (options are first, previous, next or last page). If a report is to be printed a print option on the file menu is available from print preview mode. The printer to be used may be changed to any installed on your PC via the Print Setup option on the file menu.

Before viewing reports from the Organisations or Projects forms you may use choose the name of the organisation, organisation type or activity type.

This is done by highlighting the required name from the lists on the window.

If none are chosen the reports default to display all the records (*option), it is quicker to specify the required name before opening the report.

39

The View Commune Descriptions button on the Commune Form displays one record for each commune. To search for a particular commune highlight the commune name field (Gishamvu) and use the find option on the edit menu. Type the required name, a '*' may be used as a wildcard (eg HU* for HUYE).

To update data on your organisation, its projects or commune information use the 'update' buttons on the Organisation or Commune Forms. Enter the name of the Commune or Organisation from the lists available, a new Organisation name is allowed. Enter general data on communes in the most appropriate box, they will extend to take pages of data. Data may be pasted in to these blocks from other applications (Word, WP or Notepad for example) using standard Windows 'cut, copy and paste' procedures. Changes to general information relating to an organisation should be entered in the Details block. Project details of the organisation should be entered below, for each project enter a new record in the form with the organisation's name at the top. To form a new record use the navigation button -> at the bottom of the window. For location the available list allows communes, prefectures or 'Rwanda' for projects without specific locations.

Any data entered in the two forms mentioned above has to be returned to the IOC to allow the central version to be updated. Return to the entrance form after finishing all updates to both communes and organisation details. Use the 'Export Updates' button to transfer the data to a file called 'transfer.mdb' in the c:\ioc directory. This may be copied to a floppy diskette after leaving the database, an icon 'Export to Floppy' will do the task automatically. The diskette should be sent to the IOC in MINIREISO, Kigali (tel 73744). If the 'Export to Floppy' icon in the Utilities windows does not work copy the file manually, go to DOS and enter:

```
copy c:\ioc\transfer.mdb a:\
```


Technical enquiries should be addressed to Ian Attfield at the IOC.

MSF FAX
Oct 14, 1995

TO: Inez, MSF-I/Brussels
From: Kiko, MSF-H/Kigali

Subject: MSF Employees

Dear Inez,

Thanks for your patience in waiting several days for these statistics. I really appreciate it.

	<u>Expats</u>	<u>Local staff*</u>	<u>Staff paid through msf \$ to MOH</u>
msf/b	35	182	308
msf/f	25	60 (non medical staff) 184 (MOH/msf salary)	72
msf/h	13	50	250
msf/ch	3	75	3
msf/s	12	200	102
totals	88	751	735

* Local staff includes everyone from driver to medical personnel

Col. Yabav -
As promised, here are the figures for MSF employees.
The organizations who are working with health care in Byumba are:
- Norwegian People's Aid
- IRC
- Belgian Red Cross
- ADRA
of these most
No, new news from Byumba though.
Best regards,
K1160


MILOB GP HQ

WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

DATE:16-OCT-95


COUNTRY		TROOPS									MILOBS									REMARKS
SRL		CONT	STAFF	MILPOL	LEAVE	SIGCOY	MOVCON	ENGR	SICK	TOTAL	RWANDA	UGANDA	KENYA	UNHQ	LEAVE	SICK	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL		
1	ARGENTINA										1						1	1		
2	AUSTRIA										11				4		15	15		
3	BANGLADESH										33		1		2		36	36		
4	CANADA	78	8		16					100	9				1		10	110		
5	CHAD		2							2								2		
6	CONGO										6				1		7	7		
7	FIJI										1						1	1		
8	GHANA	294	7	12						313	33						33	346		
9	GUINEA										16				1		17	17		
10	GUINEA-BISSAU										1						1	1		
11	INDIA	494	9		145	124	15	160	2	949	18		1		3		22	971		
12	JORDAN										2				3		5	5		
13	MALAWI	133								133	10				4		14	147		
14	MALI	132								132	10				2		12	144		
15	NIGERIA	133	6	11						150	15				2		17	167		
16	PAKISTAN										3				2		5	5		
17	RUSSIA										11				6		17	17		
18	SENEGAL		1							1	2						2	3		
19	TUNISIA	3	5	11						19								19		
20	URUGUAY										21				5		26	26		
21	ZAMBIA		7	23						30	19				1		20	50		
22	ZIMBAMBWE										25						25	25		
23	TOTAL	1265	45	57	161	124	15	160	2	1829	247		2		37		286	2115		

UNAMIR CIVILIAN COMPONENT



FORCE HQ ORG

ANNEX B TO
UNAMIR SOPs
PART 2



MILOBS : KEY APPOINTMENTS

SER	NAME	APPOINTMENT	TELE NO	CALL SIGN	CHANNEL
1.	Col Charles A Nelson	DCMO	OFF- 82341 RESI- 74379	C 8	14

OPS

2.	Lt Col M Ahsanullah	S O O	11060	C3	14
3.	Maj S N Yadav	Ops Offr1	11060	C3A	14
4.	Maj C Kaefer	Ops Offr2	11060	C3B	14
5.	Maj Munir	Sig offr	11060	C3D	14
6.	MILOBS	Duty offr	11060	C0	

PERS/LOG

7.	LtCol KK Opong	SMPO	83911	C1	14
8.	Sqn Ldr FA Ayamgha	SLOGO	83911	C4	14
9.	Maj KS Zaman	Pers Offr	83911	C1A	14
10.	Maj HP Zimba	Log Offr	83911	C4A	14
11.	Capt GK Addo	SO(Fin)	83911	C1B	14

SECTOR COMMANDERS

12.	LtCol EA Mahachi	Sect 1A	11197	CK9	14
13.	LtCol RV Blanchette	Sect 1B	11235	CB9	13
14.	LtCol GK Adjei	Sect 2A	-	CA9	14
15.	LtCol A Sibanda	Sect 2B	11277	CU9	15
16.	LtCol EF Castro	Sect 3A	11030	CR9	12
17.	LtCol I Abubakar	Sect 3B	11251	CE9	12
18.	LtCol VS Dadhwal	Sect 4	11211	CG9	12
19.	LtCol ST Nestor	Sect 5A	-	CH9	10
20.	LtCol V Belski	Sect 5B	-	CY9	10
21.	LtCol Bakary Coulibaly	Sect 5C	11232	CS9	13