

Greece - Varvaressos Report

1944

Greece Varvaressos
Report



9203R Third Cut

*asked for
Greek file*

27 July 1944

~~① Arnold~~
~~② Hansen~~
~~③ Cairnes~~
~~④ Bonnell~~

To: George Xanthaky

From: H. E. Caustin

The Governor believes that you are investigating the position described by Mr. Varvaressos and hopes that you will be reporting to him shortly on the accuracy of his statement.

The Governor has mentioned the subject to Mr. Weintraub and I am seeing that copies of these papers go to him as well as to Mr. Menshikov, Mr. Feller and Mr. Jackson.

becausin

Attachment

cc: Dave Weintraub

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Y

Kyriakos Varvaressos
Governor of the Bank of Greece
Member of the Council of U. N. R. R. A. for Greece

Washington, D. C.
July 25, 1944

Mr. Herbert Lehman,
Director General, U.N.R.R.A.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Director General:

Following our conversation of yesterday I beg to transmit to you herewith ten copies of a number of documents which have been presented recently by our Department in London to different sub-committees of the Council for Europe and to the competent departments of U.N.R.R.A. in London.

These documents are the following:

- (1) Cable received on June 2nd, 1944, from the Greek Prime Minister
- (2) Revised estimates for Greece ✓
- (3) Note on Relief and other Official Distributions to the population of the capital in 1943.
- (4) Extract from a recent Report of the Swedish Relief Commission (31 April 1944)
- (5) Extract from a Report of the same Commission (January 1944)
- (6) Statement on Greece given by Miss Zafirion (June 2nd)
- (7) Greek Agricultural Production (May 1944)
- (8) Statement by the Greek Delegation to the Ad Hoc Food Subcommittee (May 1944)
- (9) Statement by the Greek Delegation to the Ad Hoc Textile Subcommittee.

Mr. Herbert Lehman
Director General, U.N.R.R.A.

- 2 -

These documents are the result of a close collaboration with the competent services and departments in London representing U.N.R.R.A., other authorities concerned with the situation in occupied countries, and the committees established by the Council for Europe.

In preparing our reports concerning the conditions prevailing in our country, we have always exercised a most scrupulous control of all information which we received with the intention of basing our statements solely on information and data received from expert objective sources, Greek or neutral, and of avoiding the use of any information which we could not control.

It was therefore with great surprise and concern that I have received a cable from London informing me that a Mr. Allen arrived in London with his assistant and asked for reconsideration of the whole work which had been accomplished up to that time.

It seems that Mr. Allen and his assistant have been occupied, I do not know on whose behalf, with the problem of ascertaining agricultural production in Greece at the present time and also with the question of the economic and food situation now prevailing in our country.

Mr. Allen has simply declared that the information and data presented by the Greek Administration under my responsibility in London were highly "exaggerated" both with regard to the conditions of agricultural production and with regard to the food situation in Greece. They declared moreover that the combined Boards would never agree to make allocations on such unfounded data.

The same gentleman claimed that his opinion was based solely on information which he had obtained from Mr. Mohn and he declared that he ignored any other information available either from Greek sources or from recent reports of the Swedish Committee of the International Red Cross in Greece.

I am obliged to raise a protest against such statements. No one is entitled to allege that a Government presents "exaggerated" information and data to an International Organization, unless he is prepared to base his allegations on more serious arguments and facts.

Mr. Herbert Lehman,
Director General, U.N.R.R.A.

- 3 -

It is well known that Mr. Mohn has been the President of the Swedish Committee of the International Red Cross in Greece, which has done and is still doing an excellent work in connection with the administration and distribution of food supplies in Greece. But it is also known that Mr. Mohn left our country in the summer of 1943. I am therefore convinced that any information which Mr. Mohn might have given could refer only to that period. Mr. Mohn could not claim authority to give information regarding the present state of affairs in Greece. I should further suggest that the only possible source from which Mr. Mohn could have obtained information regarding present conditions in my country would have been the Swedish Committee of the International Red Cross in Greece. But it is exactly on recent reports of that independent and highly reliable Body as well as on expert information from Greek sources that we base the new data which we have presented and which prove the well known fact that conditions in Greece have greatly and dangerously deteriorated since the last year. To ignore this fact would mean that we base our work on assumptions which have no relation to realities.

In the light of what has been said above, I should be much obliged to you if you would kindly arrange to have the documents enclosed herewith brought to the attention of the competent services of the Administration.

I remain, dear Mr. Director General,

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ K. Varvaressos

Kyriakos Varvaressos

Enclosures

G R E E C E

REVISED ESTIMATES

The following revised estimates are based upon cabled information given by the Director of the Greek Economic Council and the Director of the Agricultural Bank of Greece, both of whom escaped from Greece on May 5th. They are subject to revision when fuller information arrives from these sources.

GRAINS

		(000 metric tons)	
		<u>1943/4</u>	<u>1944/5</u>
Production	Wheat	375	Wheat, Barley)
	Other cereals	<u>330</u>	Rye, Oats) 200
		705(1)	and Meslin)
Imports			Maize <u>50</u>
		230(2)	250 (3)
Seed and waste		80 (Wheat 50	
		Other 30)	

- Notes (1) The estimate for 1943/4 production is given with the reservation that a large part of the crop was seized burnt or otherwise destroyed by the enemy.
- (2) It is pointed out that the larger part of these imports represented a pure gift from the Allies and the remainder an import from Axis sources in exchange for goods taken from Greece under a compensation scheme.
- (3) The Greek experts state that the 1944/5 crop of winter cereals will not exceed 200,000 tons. It has been assumed a similar reduction will take place in the spring maize crop.

POTATOES

	<u>1943/4</u>	<u>1944/5</u>
Production	44 (1)	Nil (3)
Import	9 (2)	

- Notes (1) Owing to the shortage and deterioration in the quality of potato seed the Greek representatives have reduced their estimate for 1943/4 from 44,000 tons to 25,000.
- (2) The Germans had agreed to send 20,000 tons of potatoes but in fact the equivalent of only 9,000 tons arrived in dehydrated form.
- (3) It is stated that all potatoes are consumed for human consumption and that owing to lack of seed potato cultivation has been completely abandoned. The Greek Foreign Office has been asked to request the immediate despatch from Cyprus of 2,500 tons of seed potatoes for planting until the end of July. If these arrive a crop of 30,000 tons could be produced.

EDIBLE PULSES

Up to date information not yet available. Original Greek estimate of 1943/4 production was 37,000 tons.

REFINED SUGAR

Imports in 1943/4 were reported at 12,000 tons.

LIVESTOCK NUMBERS ('000 HEAD)

	<u>30th June 1943 (1)</u>	<u>5th May 1944 (2)</u>
Horses	145	180 (50% decline from pre-war)
Cattle:	400	350 (65% do)
of which cows	(290)	(175) (" do.)
Pigs	130	55 (90% do.)
Sheep and goats	5,000	4,800 (65% do.)
Poultry	1,200	1,000 (90% do.)

Notes: (1) The original Greek estimates which are given here for the sake of showing figures relating to the position at June 1943, are not estimates in the strict sense but merely guesses based upon scanty information. In particular in the light of the latest information from the Greek experts the figures for horses was understated.

(2) Cows: The Greek cable refers to a decline of 65% in the number of cows, but pending fuller information this decline has been taken as applicable to total cattle as well as cows.

Pigs: The Greek cable states that the pig population has been entirely slaughtered, but it has been thought advisable to retain a nominal figure of 10%.

Poultry: It is thought there can be little poultry left but a nominal figure of 10% of pre-war has been retained.

MEAT PRODUCTION ('000 metric tons)

	<u>1943 (1)</u>	<u>1944 (2)</u>
Beef and veal	6)	
Mutton and Lamb)	
(including goat meat)	22)	32
Pork and bacon	7)	
Poultry meat	7)	

Notes: (1) The original Greek meat production figures for 1943 are shown here for purposes of comparison only. They are not estimates in the strict sense, but merely intelligent guesses based on the scanty information available.

(2) The cable from the Greek experts states that meat production has fallen by more than 75%. The figure taken here is 25% of total pre-war production of 128,000 tons of meat (including poultry meat) and it is assumed that it applies to the year 1944.

MILK, BUTTER AND CHEESE PRODUCTION ('000 metric tons)

	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>
Milk for human consumption	80	70 (1)
Cheese, soft)		14)
" hard)	23	4) (2)
Butter)		2)

Notes: (1) Milk - The cable from the Greek experts states that production of dairy products has fallen by over 70%. It is pointed out that a large proportion of milk is normally obtained from dairy cows whose numbers in Attica have fallen by 90%. A decline of 75% in milk production has therefore been taken.

(2) Decline in cheese and butter taken at 70%. Liquid milk equivalent of cheese and butter is as follows:-

3.5 x actual weight of soft cheese
 7 x actual weight of hard cheese
 16 x actual weight of butter

OLIVE OIL

According to the cable from the Greek experts the olive oil production did not exceed 65,000 tons. This is a reduction from the original Greek estimate of 80,000 tons. This is stated to be due to attacks by olive tree pest, lack of means of transport, primitive methods of crushing and fear of requisitioning by the German and Greek authorities.

PULSES ('000 metric tons)

(1935/7 average)

Pre-war production	75
See and waste	<u>9</u>
	66
Net import	<u>21</u>
Total supply	87
Feed	<u>25</u>
Human consumption	62

No information available about 1943/4 or 1944/5.

VEGETABLES, CITRUS FRUITS, CURRANTS AND GRAPES. ('000 metric tons)

	Pre-war Production 1935/7	Estimated decline according to Greek cable	Production 1944
Vegetables	400	70%	120
Citrous Fruits	50	60%	20
Currants and Grapes	170	70%	51

CABLE RECEIVED TODAY JUNE 2nd 1944
FROM THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER Mr. PAPANDREOU

In reply to your telegram No. 50 we transmit the following information given by Professor A. Angelopoulos, Director of the Greek Economic Council and Mr. Vasmatides, Director of the Agricultural Bank of Greece, both of whom left Greece on May 5th.

As is well-known, agricultural production has fallen considerably. As a result of the lack of draught animals, and of fodder for the animals which have survived, the lack of tractors and fuel, the total lack of fertilizers, the destruction of whole agricultural districts and consequent loss of means of cultivation, the great shortage of agricultural implements and the chaotic conditions prevailing in the countryside, the area under cultivation has been reduced by 60 per cent as compared with pre-war. Yet owing to lack of implements, machinery, spare parts, binder twine and to the appearance of locusts in Thessaly against which no pesticides are available the crop is expected to be much lower than the favourable weather conditions up to May 5th could have made possible. Under favourable conditions the crop would not have exceeded 280,000 tons, in view however of the adverse factors mentioned above it will not exceed 200,000 tons.

Owing to prevailing abnormal conditions, spring sowing will be on a very limited scale, if it takes place at all.

Livestock has declined as follows:

Horses and mules 50% in general and in Crete and the Peloponnesus 80%.

Asses 65%. (the greater decline being due to the fact that they have in many cases been slaughtered for human consumption.).

Cows 65%. Dairy Cows in Attica reduced from 25,000 to only 2,500.

Sheep and goats 65%.

Pig population has been entirely decimated.

In the regions destroyed by reprisals the decline in livestock numbers continues at an alarming rate owing to lack of fodder and the consumption of whatever fodder is available by the peasants who are no longer supplied by the International Red Cross because of transport difficulties and prohibitions on the part of the Germans.

Apart from this decline in livestock numbers yields in labour, dairy products and meat have fallen by even greater percentages owing to complete lack of fodder and drugs. As regards dairy products in particular an additional adverse factor is the lack of means of processing and of cold storage. It is expected that after this autumn there will be a very great shortage of dairy products.

We estimate that meat production has fallen by more than 75%, and production of dairy products by more than 70%.

The decline in livestock products is greater than that in livestock numbers.

If immediately after liberation feedingstuffs are not dispatched to Greece the decline in yields will continue. We estimate that it will be necessary to import at least 90,000 tons of feedingstuffs during the first six months.

There is a very great shortage of animal protein foods in Greece.

It is not possible to make forecasts about this year's olive oil crop. Last year's crop did not exceed 65,000 tons owing to attacks by the olive tree pest (*dacus oleae*), lack of means of transport and the use of primitive methods of crushing on the part of the peasants for fear of requisitioning by the German and Greek authorities. The Greek mainland suffers as never before from a total lack of olive oil. The price of olive oil in Athens on May 5th was 7,000,000 drachmas and even at this price could be obtained with difficulty. It is impossible to transport olive oil from the islands.

Owing to total lack of seed, potato cultivation has been almost completely abandoned. Production of other vegetables has declined by at least 70 per cent owing to lack of fuel for irrigation, fertilizers and drugs.

The production of fruits has fallen by 60 per cent owing to lack of insecticides and pesticides and to drought. The fruits which are produced are of poor quality and are subject to rapid decay.

Vineyards are in danger of total destruction owing to lack of sulphur and copper sulphate. Production of currants and grapes has fallen by more than 70 per cent.

Cairo 31 May 1944.

KINGDOM OF GREECE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE

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EXTRACT FROM A REPORT OF THE SWEDISH
RELIEF COMMISSION (JANUARY 1944) ON THE PRODUCTION
OF VINE PRODUCTS IN THE PELOPONNESSUS (THE MAIN VINE
GROWING REGION IN GREECE).

"In Triphyllia, the northwestern part of the province
[Messenia], vines and olives are the principal local products.
Owing to the shortage of spray substances the vine harvest was
entirely destroyed by insects and last year's olive crop was
also a failure in this district....

[In Ellis, another province of the Peloponesus] the country-
side with its vast vineyards gives an impression of prosperity,
but since the vine crop failed there is great poverty. In
small plots, grain is being cultivated instead of vines, but in
the long run this is uneconomical since it is many years before
the vines yield a rich crop and the conditions of climate and
soil are most suitable for vine cultivation. The position in
the towns of Pyrgos and Amalias, invaded by numerous unemployed
farm hands, is practically desperate.

The vine growers, who cannot expect any crop owing to
shortage of spray chemicals, have abandoned their vineyards.
The situation is the same in many villages which used to be
prosperous."

G R E E C E

The following is a summary of a statement on Greece given by Miss Zafiriou at a meeting of the Balkan Sub-Group of Group I of the Combined Working Party on June 2nd.

It would be a great mistake to take the decline in the agricultural and economic position that has occurred in some of the Eastern and Central European countries which have been worst affected by the war and the enemy occupation and expect to obtain a valid result by assuming a similar or even a rather greater decline in Greece.

The conditions prevailing in Greece are quite unique in German-occupied Europe. In order to understand the reasons for the complete disintegration of economic life in Greece and for the desperate plight in which the population finds itself it is necessary to have an idea of the background against which the war and the enemy occupation have operated in Greece.

56% of the total area in Greece is mountainous and arid and practically the whole of the 7½ million population depended on the plains, which really comprised the only land suitable for cultivation. It should also be borne in mind that the population was abnormally high in relation to the total area following the influx of over 1,000,000 refugees from Asia Minor after the last war.

The difficult position of Greek agriculture is fully shown by the fact that the peasant population, whose average holding was only 3 hectares, was able to obtain a minimum income only with comprehensive State assistance. Extensive agricultural services were provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Agricultural Bank of Greece and other Government agencies. This assistance took the form not only of finance, but also of provision of fertilizers, seeds, technical knowledge and almost every other agricultural service. Despite this, crop yields in Greece were the lowest in Europe and not more than 50 per cent of the grain needs could be met by local production, the rest having to be imported. The position as regards livestock products was rather better but this was due to the low consumption of such products. Even so, 15% of the meat requirements had to be imported pre-war. In addition import requirements of sugar were 100% of total needs; of fish 60% and of pulses 30-40%. The only crops in respect of which favourable results were obtained were tobacco, currants, raisins, fruits, vegetables, olives and to some extent cotton. The difficulty with most of these crops, however, was that foreign markets were not ready to absorb the quantities which the country could produce.

It is clear that since these difficult conditions could only be faced by a comprehensive agricultural policy on the part of the State it was only to be expected that when the administrative machinery of the country was broken up and the peasant left to his own resources, the results would be catastrophic.

The Italian-Greek war broke out just at the time when preparations were being made for planting. Consequently there was no proper sowing owing to mobilization. Horses, mules and all tractors (over a 1,000) were requisitioned. Of these tractors only 150 were finally returned but they cannot be used owing to complete lack of fuel. Livestock was slaughtered on a large scale for the needs of the fighting forces. Coastal shipping upon which Greece relied very largely for inland transportation was all practically sunk. Thus, even before the occupation the Greek economy had undergone a very substantial decline as a result of six months' fighting with little material outside assistance.

The first effects of the occupation were the splitting-up of Greece into three isolated zones under Bulgarian, Italian and German domination, with the Germans in the central part of Greece and some of the Aegean islands, the Italians in the south and the Bulgarians in the fertile plains of the north. Moreover, each zone of occupation was itself split into independent regions

and the administrative and economic machinery of the country was thus completely dislocated. Interchange of goods and communication between these areas had virtually ceased, so that olive oil, currants, etc. produced in the south could not be exchanged for cereals, pulses and livestock products produced in Central and Northern Greece.

There is every reason to believe that the Germans, contrary to their practice in other European countries they have occupied, had no intention of exploiting Greece in a rational way. One of the reasons for this was that Greece was the last country that Germany had occupied and by this time they were clearly short of supervisory staff. Another reason is that the strategic advantages to be derived from the occupation of the country were far more important than the economic advantages and the Germans concentrated on turning Greece into a base of military operations and an impregnable fortress rather than a source of supplies for their war effort. Despite their urgent need of cotton they allowed cotton to remain unginned during the first year of occupation by not providing the few tons of fuel needed for ginning. At present cotton as well as tobacco and other industrial crops have gone almost completely out of cultivation. It would not have been difficult for the Germans to maintain and even extend the production of these crops by importing cereals from the surplus countries of south-eastern Europe and exchanging them for these crops. It is, however, a fact that they have not attempted to carry out such a policy.

When the Germans entered the country, they requisitioned all available stocks at pre-war prices although the price level had gone up enormously as a result of the large-scale inflation created by them. This meant that the peasants had no incentive to produce above their needs. Furthermore the fodder position became acute since everything grown was used for human consumption.

Large tracts of Greek land have been used for aerodromes and coastal plains are believed to be bristling with mines so that much land has been put out of cultivation. In addition the lack of seed and of draught animals have also reduced the area under cultivation.

As a further evidence of the unbelievable deterioration of the Greek economy, the latest report from the Swedish Commission (31st April 1944) shows that the monetary circulation in April 1944 was 1,400 times higher than before the war, the cost-of-living 7290 times higher in March 1944 and the cost of foodstuffs 14,677 times higher (March 1944).*

In no other occupied country has the monetary circulation risen more than 5 times while the cost-of-living has risen even less.

To these appalling effects of the war and the enemy occupation has been added since last year the devastation of the country-side as a result of guerilla warfare and the savage reprisals resorted to by the Italians, Germans and Bulgarians. It was only natural that the guerillas should operate in areas where food supplies were likely to be available, i.e. near the plains. Consequently reprisals taking the form of military punitive expeditions have resulted in the wholesale burning of crops, particularly in the fertile plain of Thessaly, and the rendering of two million people, mostly peasants, homeless and destitute. Of these two million, 760,000 have actually been checked and the number is growing daily. The drifting of this homeless population towards the towns has not only inflated the large number of destitute people already there but has meant that an increasingly large part of the former agricultural population is no longer producing any food at all.

* The index of the cost of foodstuffs includes also the relief foodstuffs distributed by the Commission at nominal prices and therefore underestimates the actual increase in prices.

Finally, a report from the late Mr. Nilsson, Swedish Delegate to the Aegean Islands, shows that even where guerilla warfare has not taken place there has been a very sharp decline in agricultural production. Thus Mr. Nilsson's report shows that in Chios, though the area under cereals and pulses was reduced by only 15% in respect of the 1942-43 crop, yields were 44% lower and ascertained production had declined by 64%. This report also states that livestock has been to a great extent ("en grande partie") slaughtered or has died owing to lack of fodder.

The Greek government does not believe that any substantial quantities of foodstuffs will be dispatched to the country after the liberation before conditions have been ascertained on the spot and is not therefore interested in exaggerating these conditions.

If it insists on the prevailing appalling conditions being recognized by the responsible authorities it is in order to warn them not to rely on the existence of supplies which will not be there.

In a recent B.B.C. broadcast an American correspondent who accompanied British Commandos raiding the Greek islands stated that the British soldiers were unable to resist giving away their food rations to the starving Greek children. Unless adequate preparations are made beforehand the same phenomenon will occur all over Greece at the time of liberation.

In view of the considerations outlined above it is impossible to present any adequate statistical picture by taking the pre-war position and making assumptions about the extent of the decline from theoretical standpoints. The only safe guidance can be obtained from experts who have been on the spot and therefore the attached cable, received on June 2nd from the Greek Prime Minister, based upon information supplied by the most informed Greek experts who have recently escaped from Greece, must be taken as the best and most up-to-date indication of the position.

Note on Relief and other Official Distributions to the population of the capital (1,200,000 persons) in 1943.

(Based on a Report of the Swedish Relief Commission dated 3rd March 1944 which we have just received).

General relief distributions through the grocers in 1943, including supplementary rations to children, amounted to 22.4 kgs. per head per annum, i.e. 61 grams per day. (These consisted roughly of 50 per cent pulses and 50 per cent cereal products).

Distributions of foodstuffs provided by the Greek Authorities amounted to 11.7 kgs. per head per annum corresponding to 32 grams per day. (These consisted mainly of currants from local production and sugar, pulses and dehydrated potatoes from foodstuffs supplied by the occupying authorities as compensation for local products obtained by them). In terms of calories relief distributions corresponded to about 200 calories per head per day and other official distributions to about 100 calories per head per day.

Thus, in stating up to now that relief distributions of foodstuffs other than bread corresponded to 300 calories per head per day we have overestimated these distributions by 50 per cent.

The explanation for this over-estimation is that the Relief Commission has not been able to effect to the full the distributions originally planned mostly owing to delays in arrivals for foodstuffs and to rival claims on relief supplies. The above-mentioned Report states that whereas the population of the capital had been "promised" 31.2 kgs. per head per annum (excluding supplementary rations to children) it only received 21.2 kgs., the deficit being 10 kgs., i.e. 50 per cent of the quantities originally planned. Summing up, we may estimate that the quantities made available to the population of the capital through relief and other official distributions (including supplementary rations to children) corresponded to less than 300 calories per head per day.

In addition bread distributions have provided 450-500 calories per head per day.

Finally, certain quantities of foodstuffs have been supplied by the Commission to hospitals and other institutions as well as to several canteens but these represent only a small proportion of the quantities distributed through the grocers and bakers to the general public. We may estimate that these additional quantities correspond to some 50 calories per head per day of the total population of the capital.

Thus the total quantities of foodstuffs available to the Relief Commission from all sources have enabled it to effect distributions corresponding to some 800-850 calories per head per day.

The above refer exclusively to the distributions effected in the capital which, according to the Relief Commission, have been incomparably more regular and adequate than those in the provinces. (The latter have been considerably hampered by difficulties of transportation and prohibitions by the partisans and the occupying authorities).

It is therefore obvious that for the 800,000 people in the provinces who in principle receive foodstuffs and bread on the same scale as those in the capital the caloric intake provided by these distributions must have been considerably lower.

Finally, the 1,000,000 who are receiving only a bread ration (lower than that of the capital) have received this ration with considerable irregularity and delay.

Extract from a recent Report of the
Swedish Relief Commission
(31st April, 1944)

"Between December 1942 and March 1943 a considerable fall in prices on the free market took place. This phenomenon, rather surprising in the midst of a monetary inflation, was due in the first place to the military events in North Africa which led people to believe that the war would end soon and which induced the traders to sell their stocks, and in the second place to the favourable impression created by the system of regular distributions of foodstuffs through the grocers inaugurated at that time by the Relief Commission. During the winter 1942-1943, there was a substantial supply of foodstuffs on the free market and the food problem seemed to have been nearly solved.

In the spring of 1943, however, the position became again acute and since then it has been deteriorating every month. This is due to the fact that, with the good weather, guerilla activities spread over the whole of the Greek mainland, including the Peloponnesus, which up to then had been relatively quiet. At the time of the harvest Thessaly was the scene of large-scale fighting - the fields were devastated, the peasants driven from their homes and the villages burnt. Thus the most fertile cereal-producing region has made this year only a negligible contribution to the provisioning of the population. Very often the partisans have prohibited the dispatch of fruits and vegetables to the urban centres where an Italian or German garrison was stationed. By attacking the trucks, destroying the roads and blowing up the railway bridges they have succeeded in isolating whole regions and preventing not only the despatch of relief foodstuffs to the destitute population of these regions, but also in cutting off the despatch of local supplies to the towns. The countryside itself has been denuded by the requisitioning of the partisans and by the ravages inflicted by the occupying troops as reprisals."

GREEK AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION.

Greek agriculture has suffered a very sharp and continuous decline during the war and the enemy occupation. The reasons for this decline have been explained by us in our Report on Agriculture Production in Greece (April 1943).

On the other hand, in a Memorandum submitted to the first Council of UNRRA last November we have described the main features of Greek agriculture which account for the sensitivity and vulnerability of the Greek economic structure and for the exceptional plight in which our country now finds itself.

We may divide the years of war and enemy occupation into two periods: 1940-1942 and 1942-1943.

The Period 1940-1942

For the period 1940-1942 information about the level of agricultural production is available and is contained in a Report prepared in September 1942 by the competent Director of the Agricultural Bank of Greece. The Bank was established by the State in 1929 on a non-profit basis. Its range of operations was much wider than the granting of credit to the peasants. It had been entrusted with the supervision of and assistance to cooperatives, the marketing of agricultural products, bulk purchases on behalf of the peasants, the spreading of technical knowledge and so on. It possessed 114 Branches all over the country and was in fact a comprehensive agricultural service rather than a mere Bank. It worked moreover in close contact and cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture and other Government Departments.

The Report referred to above is based on all the official information available in the country and on information supplied by the various branches of the Agricultural

Bank. It therefore constitutes a very valuable document whose evidence should be accepted until proved inaccurate from other weightier sources of information.

The estimates for 1940-1941 and 1941-1942 contained in our Report on Agricultural Production mentioned above are based on the figures given by the Agricultural Bank. It should be noted, however, that in January 1943 it was officially announced in Greece that wheat production in the German-Italian occupied regions which had been estimated by the Director of the Agricultural Bank at 350,000 tons for 1941-1942 had not in fact exceeded 288,000 tons.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare while agreeing with most of these figures has not accepted those referring to livestock products. Its main argument is that these figures are inconsistent with the decline in livestock numbers estimated by the Agricultural Bank of Greece.

The estimates given by the M.E.W. for livestock products are on the whole twice as high as those contained in the Agricultural Bank's report.

We have explained (see our Reply to the Ministry of Economic Warfare attached to this note) why in our view there is no necessary inconsistency between the two sets of figures and why the figures of the Agricultural Bank should be accepted as representing the production of livestock products in 1941-1942.

We agreed, however, that in the case of cheese other factors, besides the decline in livestock numbers, must have operated in reducing the quantities produced since these quantities were below what the decline in numbers would have justified. In other words, the productive capacity with regard to cheese must have been higher than actual production as estimated in the report.

The agricultural year 1942-1943

In addition to estimates of current production the Report referred to above contained forecasts for the year 1942-1943.

After enumerating the factors which would affect adverse-

ly agricultural production in that year the report concluded that a further serious decline was inevitable.

On the basis of this information we assumed in our Report on Agricultural Production that a new decline of 15-20% would take place in 1942-1943.

No comprehensive and authoritative information such as that contained in the Report of the Agricultural Bank has been available for the year 1942-1943. All reports from Greece stress the fact that in view of the disorganization existing in the country it is physically impossible to obtain such information.

In a note submitted to UNRRA (ARB/AL/206) we have summarized as follows the main factors which are reported to have affected the 1942-1943 crop:

"In the summer of 1943 it was believed that favourable weather conditions had not only prevented the new decline which we had considered inevitable but had actually ensured a better crop for 1943, which was expected to ease the food situation in the country. These expectations, however, have not materialized. A few months or weeks after the gathering of the crop the food situation showed a sudden and sharp deterioration.

As already stated, the authorities have been unable to obtain sufficient data in order to make a more or less accurate estimate for the level of production in 1942-1943. It is therefore impossible to know exactly what this level has been.

All reports, however, agree that a further decline has in fact taken place.

In the first place weather conditions have not been as favourable as was believed.

The beneficial rainfalls of May-June 1943, which created this impression of good weather conditions, were coming after a period of unusual dryness which had prevented the satisfactory progress of the crops.

Furthermore, in the summer of 1943 and up to November of that year the country experienced one of its worst and most protracted

droughts, which has adversely affected all spring crops (maize, pulses, cotton etc.) as well as the olive trees and vines.

The maize crop is reported to have completely failed in a number of districts and yields in other districts have been extremely low. Similarly spring-sown pulses, such as beans, have suffered severely.

A new deterioration is reported in the yield and quality of potatoes.

There are gloomy reports on the new olive crop. Normally 1942-1943 should have been a good crop year if diseases and drought had not affected the yield. It is reported that attacks by the olive tree pest known as "dacus oleae" varied between 5-60% according to region and that the result of the protracted drought had been the shrinking of the olives which has caused a considerable fall of the fruit. It is also reported that a very considerable deterioration in the quality of olive oil has taken place.

In no case was this year's crop expected to exceed that of last year which had already been more than 20 per cent below average.

Diseases and drought have similarly had a catastrophic effect on vines. The production of currants is reported to have fallen below the very low level reached last year when it was only 25 per cent of pre-war.

Finally, grazing has been adversely affected by the drought as a result of which a new fall in milk production is reported to have taken place.

It is also stated that the production of fodder and feeding stuffs has been abandoned altogether since 1942.

Drought had also held up sowing operations in the autumn of last year. It is reported that in most cases sowing had not yet begun in October 1943."

On the basis of this information we believed that the estimates for 1942-1943 contained in our Report on Agricultural Production could not be considered as unduly pessimistic. On the other hand the M.E.W., as for the previous agricultural year, while agreeing with us with regard to most crops, suggested much higher figures for livestock products, which we found ourselves unable to accept.

We do not deny and sincerely hope that under certain more optimistic assumptions than we dare make it is not impossible that the position may have been slightly better than we estimate.

The Allied Bureau, working independently, has suggested figures which although higher than our own represent a reasonable estimate of what may have been the position under more favourable conditions than we have assumed.

We have therefore accepted these figures as a provisional estimate of agricultural production in 1942-1943.

New factors, however, have so radically altered the conditions of agriculture since last summer that the figures of the Allied Bureau which have not, and could not have taken these factors into account, necessarily constitute an overestimate of what has actually been available in the country.

These new factors are the fighting against the Germans which is taking place in Greece and the severe reprisals resorted to by the enemy as a result of this fighting.

The main scenes of the fighting are Central Greece, Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia and the Peloponnesus. Thessaly and Macedonia have always been the main food-producing regions of Greece and although as a result of the fall in agricultural production only negligible quantities of foodstuffs from these provinces were reaching the urban centres and other non-food producing regions, the producers themselves were self-supporting in foodstuffs and had been spared the privations endured by the remaining sections of the population. Even Epirus, Central

Greece and the Peloponnesus included a considerable number of self-supporting peasants.

The following table contained in our Memorandum to the first Council of UNRRA (p.33) shows what a large proportion of the self-supporting section of the Greek population was found in these regions:

Self-Supporting Population: 3,000,000

	Total Population (1940)	Self- supporting Population	Percentage of total self- supporting population in each region	Self- supporting Population Expressed as a Per- centage of Total Popu- lation in each Region.
Central Greece	2,035,000	450,000	15%	22.5%
Peloponnese	1,160,000	500,000	16.6%	43.1%
Cyclades Islands	129,000	30,000	1.0%	23.0%
Ionian Islands	219,000	100,000	3.3%	45.4%
Thessaly	573,000	450,000	16.0%	78.9%
German-occupied Macedonia	1,200,000	850,000	28.3%	70.8%
Epirus	560,000	250,000	8.3%	44.6%
Crete	438,000	180,000	6.0%	41.0%
Aegean Islands	303,000	92,200	2.0%	30.7%
German-occupied Zone of Evros Department	98,000	98,000	3.2%	100.0%

It is hardly necessary to point out that guerilla activities and the fighting have seriously hampered agricultural operations in these regions.

What is probably less well realized is the scale of the reprisals carried out by the enemy and the extent to which these reprisals have affected local supplies.

Organized reprisals against rural communities have assumed increasingly large proportions since last summer.

They consist in burning whole villages, destroying and seizing the crops and all other possessions of the inhabitants and shooting the peasants or driving them to the mountains.

According to the Swedish Relief Commission, reprisals resorted to by the Italians alone before their surrender represented a loss in foodstuffs corresponding to 30,000 million calories. If we assume an average caloric intake of 2,000 per day the supplies thus seized or destroyed would have ensured the maintenance of 83,000 persons for six months. They may therefore have affected a population of 100,000 persons.

Since the Italian surrender the reprisals carried out by the Germans in the regions where guerillas are operating have assumed such proportions that they are generally referred to in Greece as "military punitive expeditions".

In December 1943 two special Commissions have visited districts subjected to German reprisals and investigated conditions on the spot.

The following figures are a summary of their findings:

A. E P I R U S

No. of villages burnt	147
No. of families affected	17,004
No. of persons affected	85,000
No. of persons who have been dispossessed by the Germans	30,000
Total number of persons affected	<u>115,020</u>

The Report states that since the rural population of Epirus numbered 285,000 persons the above figures show that 40% of this population (which consists mostly of the population of the mountainous region) is in immediate danger of extinction.

B. A E T O L O A K A R N A N I A
(in Central Greece)

No. of villages burnt	39
No. of families affected	6,506
No. of persons affected	32,530
No. of persons dispossessed by the Germans	8,000
Total number of persons affected	<u>40,530</u>

C. M A C E D O N I A

Information in Macedonia is available only up to October 1943

No. of towns and villages destroyed	83
No. of houses burnt	7,000
No. of houses plundered	5,000
No. of persons affected	<u>60,000</u>

D. PHTIOTIS AND PHOCIS
(in Central Greece)

1. No. of villages burnt	17
No. of families affected	2,000
No. of persons affected	9,000
2. No. of villages plundered	47
No. of families affected	7,800
No. of persons affected	31,000
Total number of persons affected	<u>40,000</u>

E. T H E S S A L Y

No. of villages burnt	126
No. of families affected	18,275
No. of persons affected	<u>89,800</u>

GENERAL TOTAL	<u><u>345,350</u></u>
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The districts to which the preceding figures refer form only part of the total region affected, while for Macedonia, one of the largest provinces, the figure of 60,000 does not include persons made victims of reprisals after October 1943 whose number is known to be very large indeed. No investigations have been made in the Peloponnesus, one of the provinces which have suffered most.

The total number of persons affected in all regions has been estimated at approximately 2,000,000.

An appeal addressed by leading Greek statesmen to the Swiss Federal Council states that nearly a quarter of the Greek population have been reduced to destitution as a result of the reprisals.

According to the "TIMES" of January 26th and February 26th 1944 "1,600 villages have been completely destroyed and nearly

2,000,000 peasants who have been made homeless are wandering in the mountains and starving."

No words can describe, let alone exaggerate, the plight of this hitherto self-supporting population. The two Commissions have given a heartrending account of the calamity which has overtaken these unfortunate people. They speak of "exhausted men, women and children half-naked, livid, who look at you with dazed eyes like condemned persons asking for mercy."

The Swedish Relief Commission has urgently asked for additional quantities of foodstuffs in order to be able to bring assistance to this population.

Under these conditions it has become meaningless to speak of agricultural production in Greece as an organized economic activity.

We quote from the Report of one of the special Commissions:

"Since last April crops have either been burnt or seized or have not come in at all... A considerable part of the plains of Aetoloakarnania (Central Greece) has remained uncultivated. As regards Epirus, cultivation was out of the question. In our journey from Amphilochia to Jannina (approximately 100 Kilometres) we found land almost completely under weeds and water... Even where cultivation was possible it often did not take place owing to compulsory work for the maintenance of roads. Malaria is virulent owing to undernourishment and deprives its victims of all capacity for work. Scabies are universal. A new scourge is dysentery which attacks the weakened organisms."

According to the above-mentioned appeal of the Greek statesmen, Thessaly, the main granary of Greece, and many other regions "have remained virtually uncultivated and are in a state of devastation."

The annual Report of the Ella-Turk Company published in July 1943, that is before the devastation of the countryside,

stated that the conditions of agriculture had deteriorated to such an extent that any effort to bring about an improvement or prevent a decline was bound to fail under the prevailing conditions. It concluded that "recovery will be possible only with the return of peace and with unlimited material and technical outside assistance."

Even if the figure of 2,000,000 destitute peasants be considered as an overestimate, the total number of such persons cannot be below 1,500,000. The extent of the tragedy may also be inferred from reports that, since the influx of refugees from the provinces, the population of the Athens Piraeus region has reached 2,000,000, that is nearly doubled, and that an outbreak of epidemics may be imminent as a result of overcrowding and congestion in the city.

When, after the 1941-1942 famine, it was decided to allow the dispatch of relief to Greece, the International Red Cross Delegation in Greece estimated that the quantities of foodstuffs thus dispatched would enable it to make distributions to 3,000,000 persons, constituting the section of the population which could in no case be maintained from local production. It estimated that another 3,000,000 could be considered as self-supporting. These consisted mainly of the food-producers shown in our table of page 6.

As regards the remaining 600,000-700,000^X these, although in

X The above calculations exclude the population of the territories occupied by Bulgaria (about 700,000). The persecutions to which this population has been subjected are such that it is probable that a large section will have become destitute. The ferocity of the treatment to which it has been subjected may be realized from the fact that repeated appeals have been made to the Germans to protect the population and take over from the Bulgarians.

urgent need of assistance were less so than the 3,000,000 mentioned above. The International Red Cross Delegation stated that although it was desirable to extend relief to them as well, the quantities available were insufficient for that purpose.

From the preceding exposition it is obvious that of the 3,000,000 hitherto self-supporting population at least 1,500,000 have become destitute and that agricultural production in the main food producing centres must also be expected to have been reduced by half as compared with 1941-1942.

The conclusion is that at the time of the liberation of the country from the German and Bulgarian yoke local production of the main foodstuffs will not be sufficient to maintain more than 1,500,000 persons in the German-occupied territories and some 200,000 - 300,000 persons in the Bulgarian-occupied territories.

The remaining 5,300,000 - 5,500,000 will depend entirely on imports for their requirements in cereals, meat, fish, eggs and dairy products.

Sugar and beverages, which are not produced in the country, will have to be imported for the whole population.

As regards fats, the production of olive oil, although reduced in quantity and quality, has not been affected to anything like that of other foodstuffs. It may therefore be expected that a large proportion of the country's needs in fats will be met from local production. Import requirements are unlikely to exceed 30% of total consumption requirements.

The production of fruits and fresh vegetables, although considerably reduced, may be expected to meet the needs of the population and, in the case of vegetables, to expand rapidly with the restoration of inland transport and the importation of seeds, fertilizers and fuel for irrigation.

Note on Meat and Dairy Products

In view of the differences of opinion on the level of production of livestock products in Greece we should like to bring to the attention of those concerned the following facts which, to our mind, clearly suggest that a very sharp fall has undoubtedly taken place.

While Greece was dependent on imports for 50% of her requirements of cereals, 100% of her requirements of sugar and 57% of her requirements of fish she was practically self-supporting in meat (imports were only 15% of total consumption) and dairy products.

It was to be expected that with the cessation of imports home-produced cereals would not represent more than half the country's requirements while the fall in local production has in fact meant that the quantities produced have been barely sufficient to meet the needs of the producers themselves. The result has been that no home-grown cereals have been available for other sections of the population.

In the case of meat and dairy products, however, the cessation of imports in itself should not have made very much difference to the quantities available in the country. Moreover, unlike cereals, meat and dairy products were produced by a relatively small number of livestock breeders. Only small quantities were consumed by the producers themselves and the remaining were marketed through commercial channels.

The 1928 census shows that there were only 167,062 persons engaged in the production of livestock products as compared with 605,000 producers of cereals and 500,000 producers of other food-stuffs.

It is therefore obvious that if 56,000 tons of meat and 32,000 tons of cheese were currently available in the country as suggested by the M.E.W., these articles would not have

disappeared from the diet of the majority of the Greek population.

It is generally recognized that these products have been unobtainable for the vast majority of the urban population.

Some superficial observers have reported that meat is plentiful in Athens but is sold at prohibitive prices. The reply is of course that if meat had been plentiful prices would not have been prohibitive. If one compared the level of salaries with the price of meat and cheese in Athens in October 1943 one would have found that a day's earnings did not represent more than 1/2 kg. of meat and of 1/3 kg. of cheese. The discrepancy between earnings and prices has become much wider since.

The shortage is by no means limited to the capital. Volos, Salonika and other towns which are in the proximity of the centres of production are suffering from the same shortage. The Swedish Relief Commission has recently reported that the Germans in Salonika were importing meat from Serbia and Rumania for their own needs and were even distributing small quantities to the civilian population. It is hardly necessary to point out that they would not have done so if they had been able to requisition livestock in the country, a measure widely resorted to until now.

As regards the islands, it is well-known that practically no livestock has been left. The late Mr. Nilsson, Swedish Delegate to the Aegean Islands, reported that in Chios "cattle has been to a great extent slaughtered or has died owing to lack of fodder". (There were 6,700 cattle in the island during the pre-war period).

A copy of an article published by an Italian doctor who has spent 20 months in Greece is attached to this note.

It shows that even in the provinces and rural districts live-stock products have been practically unobtainable since the occupation.

The fact is therefore established that meat and dairy products are not available to the vast majority of the Greek population. @

What is the explanation of this phenomenon?

a) Consumption in the farm by the producers themselves is no explanation in the case of Greece where, as we have seen, the number of persons involved is relatively small.

b) It has been suggested by the M.E.W. that the peasants are withholding supplies owing to the large-scale inflation which has taken place and to the consequent distrust for the local currency.

A glance at the prices of foodstuffs obtaining in the capital will convince anyone that however great and rapid the depreciation of the currency these prices are so fantastically high that they should have brought forward any available supplies.

The following indices, compiled by the Greek Economic Council, show the rise in the cost of foodstuffs compared with the rise in the general cost of living and with the increase in the monetary circulation. The index of the cost of foodstuffs underestimates the rise which has taken place since it includes also the relief foodstuffs which, as is well known, are sold at nominal prices covering only the local expenses of handling, processing and distribution:

@ This is also categorically stated in the Appeal of the Greek statesmen mentioned above. They would hardly have made such a statement to Switzerland, which has several representatives in Greece, unless it were true.

	1939 = 100		
	<u>Index of monetary circulation</u>	<u>Cost-of-living index</u>	<u>Index of food prices</u>
15-9-1943	13,500	26,900	58,200
15-11-1943	24,000	75,600	165,100

Nor do reports on the financial difficulties experienced by the peasants support the view that the existing shortage of livestock products is due mainly to the withholding of supplies on the part of the peasants. The Report of the Ella-Turk Company quoted above stresses the financial difficulties of the agricultural population and mentions the lack of credit facilities as one of the main causes for the fall in production. A Conference of cooperatives held in Salonika in December 1943 made the question of credit facilities one of the main topics of its deliberations.

It is, however, obvious that with the fantastic prices obtaining for foodstuffs the agricultural population would not have found itself in such straits if it had had sufficient quantities of products to sell (This in fact happened during the first year of the enemy occupation when agricultural production had not yet declined to the present extent and when a great liquidity was reported among the peasants).

c) Difficulties of transportation which have accounted to some extent for the shortage of foodstuffs, particularly olive oil, affect livestock products less than any other foodstuffs. When supplies of foodstuffs are available they are still obtainable in the urban centres. Thus fruits and vegetables which present much greater problems of transportation than livestock products find their way to the market.

The only explanation for the acute shortage of livestock products is therefore that a virtual decimation of the livestock population has taken place.

Thus, the existing evidence does not support the view of the M.E.W. that 56,000 tons of meat (i.e. 40 per cent of pre-war consumption) and 32,000 tons of cheese (50 per cent of pre-war consumption) are being currently produced in Greece. Moreover, the contention of the M.E.W. that no decline in the production of livestock products has taken place since mid-1942 cannot, in our view, be easily reconciled with the picture of chaos and devastation emerging from all recent reports from Greece.

We believe that it would be unrealistic to expect that, with the need for reconstituting the Greek herds foremost in the minds of the authorities, meat production will exceed 20,000 tons during the first post-war year. Nor do we expect that more than 15,000 tons of cheese and 60,000 tons of milk will be available in the country from local production.

London May 1944.

Statement by the Greek Delegation to the
Ad Hoc Food Sub - Committee.

The Ad Hoc Food Sub-Committee is at present considering the American proposals for bases of requirements and the Statement of the Chairman at the second meeting of the Sub-Committee.

The Greek Delegation should like to make the following comments on these two documents.

A.- The American Proposals

1.- The need for flexibility

We agree with Dr. Penrose on the need of expressing requirements in terms of nutrients rather than quantities of particular commodities. In this respect the Minimum Imports Programme prepared by the Inter-Allied Committee was too rigid and would not have given to the Director General the freedom needed in order to plan in advance under constantly changing conditions.

2.- The interrelationship of needs and supplies

According to the American statement requirements and supplies are closely interrelated and should not therefore be treated as independent predetermined quantities. Since under present conditions needs cannot influence supplies the inference is that supplies must determine needs.

It has, however, been made quite clear to the Sub-Committee that no information is available on the present state of supplies. On the other hand, even if such information were available, it is doubtful whether it would in itself have enabled us to estimate the position at the time of liberation.

The position of supplies at the time of liberation will depend not only on the levels of consumption in the non-occupied Allied countries which are constantly changing but also on the volume of production all over the world which cannot be easily foreseen in all cases as well as on conditions in Europe itself which will be determined to a very considerable extent by the course of the war.

It is therefore obvious that supplies being an unknown quantity they cannot form the basis for estimating the import requirements of the occupied countries. Nor does the general statement that all supplies are likely to be short provide us with an alternative basis for estimating these requirements although it does point to the necessity of taking into account only minimum essential needs.

Moreover, we should not disregard the fact that in carrying out its task Unrra may find itself limited not only by a shortage of supplies, which may in the end prove less acute than is feared at present, but also by a shortage of financial means.

If, in the face of so many unknown and diverse factors, it is still our objective to lay down bases for estimating requirements, the only solid foundation for such a work are the needs of the populations to be liberated. In determining these needs it would of course be utterly unrealistic to aim at optimal nutritional levels or at an equalization of standards in the various countries concerned. This, however, does not mean that no objective criteria exist for determining these needs. The present appalling conditions in certain occupied countries should convince even the non-expert that the shortage of food and the lack of certain indispensable substances must

be made good immediately after liberation if the populations concerned are to recover from the state of complete physical exhaustion to which they have been reduced. For certain countries the provision of adequate food is not merely a question of political or psychological import, it is the prerequisite for the very survival of the nation.

It is obvious that under certain circumstances this task may prove beyond the power or means at the disposal of UNRRA. It is, however, our duty at the present stage to state clearly our aims, even though some of us may have doubts as to whether these aims will be realized in practice.

A further advantage of estimating requirements on the basis of physical needs is that by so doing we shall possess an objective norm by which to judge the degree of success or otherwise of UNRRA.

3.- The Levels of Consumption proposed in the American Statement.

From the general point of view we should only like to point out that, when a special sub-committee was set up last year in order to determine minimum food requirements during a short emergency period, it recommended a consumption level providing for the non-vulnerable groups of the population an average protein intake of 73.5 grams of which 21 grams were of animal origin^③.

In the American proposals the highest protein intake suggested does not exceed 60 grams, and no guarantee is given that a proportion at least of this would be of animal origin.

It seems therefore that the protein intake envisaged in

③ These figures have been worked out on the basis of the age distribution of the Greek population.

the American plan is considerably lower than what eminent nutritionists have considered a minimum for a very short emergency period.

As regards Greece, the adequacy of the proposed levels must be examined in the light of the conditions created in the country by the war and by the enemy occupation. Since statements have been made at the Sub-Committee's meetings on present levels of consumption in Europe which do not apply to Greece, we find it necessary to give a short summary of the present food situation in our country.

Greece has never been self-supporting in food. This is due to the natural conditions of the country which are unfavourable to the growth of food crops. The country depended on imports for the satisfaction of 50 per cent of its requirements in cereals, 60 per cent of its requirements in fish, 100 per cent of its requirements in sugar and 15 per cent of its requirements in meat. The provisioning of the urban population and of other non-food producing sections always depended to a considerable extent on imported foodstuffs. Greece was able to obtain these imports by exporting its special products, namely tobacco, wine, currents, fruits, olive oil and so on.

A reduction in consumption took place in Greece as early as 1939 when the outbreak of the war affected adversely the country's foreign trade.

Six months of total mobilization and of hard fighting against the might of one and then two Great Powers with little outside assistance drained the limited resources of the country and reduced considerably its wealth and productive capacity. When the enemy entered Greece in April 1941 he was occupying an economically exhausted country.

Under the rule of three unscrupulous enemies, Germans, Italians and Bulgarians, who split the country into six or seven

independent regions and thus broke up its economic and administrative unity, monopolized all the means of transport, left, wrecked its monetary and financial system by creating inflation on an unprecedented scale[©] and entirely disregarded the needs of the civilian population, the economic life of the country completely disintegrated. With the cessation of imports, the sharp fall in agricultural production, the virtual decimation of the livestock and the large-scale enemy requisitioning a large section of the Greek population soon found itself threatened with imminent extinction. The dispatch of relief was the only alternative to the death from starvation of millions of Greeks.

When the Relief Commission took over in September 1942 they estimated that the quantities of relief foodstuffs dispatched to Greece would enable them to effect distributions to 3,000,000 persons who could in no case be maintained from local production. They estimated that another 3,000,000 consisting mostly of food-producers could be considered as self-supporting. Distribution, to the remaining 600,000 - 700,000 who, although in urgent need of assistance, were less so than the 3,000,000 mentioned above, could not be contemplated with the quantities of relief foodstuffs available to the Commission. Finally the population of the Bulgarian-occupied territories (about 700,000) was not included in the scheme

© Compare the volume of the monetary circulation in the various occupied countries.

	<u>December</u> <u>1939</u>		<u>September</u> <u>1943</u>	<u>Increase</u>
Belgium	27,994	mill. francs	80,688	3-fold
Denmark	600	" krone	1,193	2-fold
France	151,322	" francs	468,015	3-fold
Greece	9,453	" drachmas	1,276,000	134-fold
Netherlands	1,152	" Gulden	3,041	2.6 "
Czechoslovakia	6,345	"	20,086	3- "

(League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Febr. 1944).

of relief. This section of the Greek population, which under normal conditions was largely self-supporting, has been subjected by the Bulgarians to such cruel persecutions that it has either fled or been reduced to complete destitution.(@)

Relief supplies, consisting of cereals and pulses, provide approximately 400 calories per head per day to 1,000,000 persons and some 750 calories to another 2,000,000. Small quantities of milk are also distributed to infants and children.

Under an agreement reached with the Relief Commission the Germans supply small quantities of foodstuffs (mostly sugar and grain) in compensation for the local products consumed by them or exported. These, together with local products, have not on the whole provided more than 300 - 400 calories per head per day to the non-producing section of the population.

Since last autumn, however, conditions have deteriorated to such an extent that the majority of the population depends almost exclusively on the relief foodstuffs and other small official distributions. Meat, milk, cheese, eggs, fish, butter etc. have completely disappeared from the diet of the vast majority of the Greek population for the last three years. Even the self-supporting population which, up to last summer, had been spared the sufferings endured by the remaining sections of the population, had seen its level of consumption drastically reduced as a result of the fall in production, enemy requisitioning and the conditions of insecurity prevailing in the country. The picture of an increased consumption by agricultural producers so often drawn is without foundation as far as Greece is concerned. Even

@ The ferocity of the Bulgarian treatment is attested by the fact that repeated appeals have been made to the Germans to protect the population and take over from the Bulgarians.

for this section of the population the average caloric intake has been low and is unlikely to have exceeded 2,000 per head per day in most cases.

Since last summer, however, new factors have affected the food situation in the country and have reduced a large proportion of the hitherto self-supporting population to destitution. These factors are the fighting which is taking place in the country and the savage reprisals resorted to by the enemy as a result of this fighting. These reprisals, generally referred to in Greece as "military punitive expeditions" consist in burning whole villages, destroying or seizing the crops and other possessions of the inhabitants and shooting the peasants or driving them to the mountains. At least 1,500,000 persons have been rendered homeless or destitute as a result of reprisals and are at present finding themselves in a desperate plight.

The distinction between a rural self-supporting population and other sections depending on outside assistance has now lost much of its meaning. The suffering and privations have spread to the remotest villages and have effected the majority of the agricultural population of the country. (©)

(©) The following extract from the Report of the Swedish Delegates to the Peloponnesus (January 1944) gives an idea of the conditions prevailing in the countryside: "During the winter of 1941-42 when famine reigned in the capital, conditions in the provinces were still tolerable. During the following winter, however, when relief from Canada for the larger towns had been organized and the stocks in the countryside had been exhausted by the free market, the situation was very different. The towns were comparatively well-supplied (Note: 750 calories per head per day) while veritable starvation reigned in certain parts of the countryside During our first tours of inspection (March 1943) we made the acquaintance of a population literally screaming for bread. Many villages had only a substitute baked of flour, wild pears and acorns - ordinary pig's food - and in many districts the population had received no other bread since

This is why it was recently found necessary to increase considerably the quantities of relief foodstuffs sent to Greece.

The results of such acute and protracted malnutrition have not failed to make themselves felt on the health of the population.

Deprivation diseases such as osteomalacia, hunger oedema, pellagra etc. are widespread. A large proportion of the children is affected by trachoma. According to the Relief Commission it was found last year that one-third of the children of Piraeus were affected with this disease.

It is estimated that there are at least 500,000 cases of tuberculosis. Practically all children suffer from adenopathy, loss of weight and general debility. Malaria, which was very prevalent even before the war, has spread to every corner of the country and is reducing the population to a state of complete exhaustion. @@)

@ (Continued from Page 7):

December. We were taken inside the houses and shown empty shelves and larders and we saw people cooking weeds without oil and salt in order to fill their stomachs. This diet caused chronic diarrhoea. The inhabitants of the poorer villages were all extremely thin and the children in particular were often in a pitiful condition with skinny extremities and swollen stomachs and without any natural vitality and cheerfulness. It was quite usual for half the children to be unable to go to school".

@@ See Report (January 1944) of the Swedish Delegates to the Peloponnesus, one of the regions less affected by malaria during the pre-war period:

"Malaria has spread during the war not only to the low districts where it has always been prevalent, but also in the mountain regions, where it has hitherto been unknown. In some districts 90 per cent of the inhabitants are affected, although the disease was less general in 1943 than in previous years owing to the drought ... Towards the end of the summer large supplies (of medicine) arrived from Canada but the disease had then become so general that only a fraction of the cases could be treated. The inhabitants of the worst malaria districts are a sorry sight, weak and pale. Among the children in

Dysentery and other intestinal troubles are universal. A great number of people are suffering from stomach ulcers owing to the continued consumption of pulses.

This grim picture is no exaggeration of prevailing conditions. It is based on reports of neutral delegates and reliable observers who have ascertained conditions on the spot.

It is obvious that a population which has lived under such appalling conditions for well over three years will never recover by merely being enabled to satisfy its energy requirements. Milk for the children and adolescents and adequate quantities of meat, eggs, cheese and other animal protein foods will be needed if the population is to regain its health. It may be hoped that the requirements in fats will be met to a large extent from home production.

The pre-war level of consumption of animal protein foods was low and did not always meet physiological requirements. It is therefore obvious that this level should be somewhat raised if the needs of a population which will have lost all its reserves of health and will have been exhausted by disease and starvation are to be met. In the Minimum Imports Program increases not exceeding 25 per cent of pre-war were budgeted for certain categories of animal protein foods. On the other hand milk requirements were calculated on the basis of the estimates worked out for the emergency period by the special sub-committee mentioned above.

This is not a question of raising the standard of living:

@@ (Continued from Page 8):
particular serious anaemia is usual, and during the height of the epidemic there are at least three or four cases in every house.
When the fever has finally subsided, the slightest effort causes a relapse".

it is the only means of doing a proper job of rehabilitation.

We have not looked upon the British wartime level of civilian consumption as a standard to which the Greek population is entitled ipso jure. Thus in estimating meat requirements we increased pre-war consumption only by 25 per cent (24 kgs. per head per annum) although under the principles adopted by the Inter-Allied Committee we could have based our requirements on the British wartime level which is considerably higher (30 kgs.) One may be entitled to doubt whether the quantities required or the means for obtaining them will be forthcoming but not that the needs as such exist and are extremely urgent. We therefore believe that the bases of requirements which will be recommended should take these needs into account. It will then be for the Director General to decide how far and to what extent these requirements can be met.

In our view considerable latitude should be left to the Director General in planning and carrying out relief provided there is agreement on the principles according to which available supplies should be distributed among the countries concerned.

In this connection we should like to make the following comments on the principles suggested in the American Proposals:

4.- Distribution of supplies among the liberated countries.

According to the American statement "available relief supplies should be distributed among the receiving countries (as far as transportation conditions permit) in such a way as to bring all to the minimum nutritional level specified before any are raised to higher levels; preferred commodities, such as meat,

dairy products and sugar to be so distributed as to bring each country to the same percentage of its pre-war level".

We have already explained that in the case of Greece the question of animal protein foods is not a question of "preferred" commodities but of foods needed in order to restore the dangerously impaired health of the population.

Within a country an equitable system of rationing ensures that scarce supplies are distributed not in accordance with previous levels of consumption or with the purchasing power at the disposal of the various sections of the population but in accordance with human needs.

Similarly an equitable distribution of scarce supplies between countries must be based on the urgency of their needs and not on pre-war levels of consumption or the purchasing power at their disposal. This principle has been explicitly adopted in Resolution 17 of the first Council of UNRRA which states that "the Director General shall pay due regard to the degree of urgency of particular relief and rehabilitation requirements and to the extent of damage suffered by member governments in a part or the whole of their respective areas as a result of hostilities or of occupation by the enemy".

We believe that in accordance with this Resolution the claims of those countries which have suffered most should be given a very high priority in all UNRRA plans.

B.- The Statement of the Chairman at the second meeting of the Sub-Committee.

We should like to make the following comments on certain points made in this statement:

1.- The position of "paying" and "non-paying" countries.

It has been suggested by the Chairman that "the authorities of a paying country would not be interested in obtaining anything beyond what they absolutely needed" whereas "the non-paying countries would not be hampered or hindered in their planning by such considerations".

In our view it is hardly realistic to imagine the "non-paying" countries as planning alone their own needs, unhindered by any considerations of payment. The status of "paying" country is likely to give much greater freedom of action to those countries which will be in the fortunate position to be able to meet their needs from their own resources.

2.- The Food supplies in occupied countries.

We have already mentioned that the statements made by the Chairman on the levels of consumption in occupied Europe do not apply to our country. Nor do his statements on hoarding food stocks and food imports. The people do not hoard food in Greece for the simple reason that there is nothing to hoard. When the country is liberated the Allied authorities will find empty larders all over the country. Similarly there is not the slightest evidence that the Germans are accumulating stocks of food for their own needs and no reliance should be placed on the existence of such stocks. Finally they are not concerned with the provisioning of the Greek population

and neither import nor accumulate food for civilian needs with the exception of the small quantities supplied as compensation under the International Red Cross agreement mentioned above.

3.- The principle of improvement

There is great force in the argument that an immediate improvement in diets will be required for political and psychological reasons even in cases when the level of consumption ensured by the Germans is relatively tolerable.

In our view, whenever such an improvement can be effected without drawing on limited supplies required by needy populations it is highly desirable that it should be achieved.

It is, however, doubtful whether this principle can be reconciled with the attempt to establish uniform bases of requirements for all countries concerned. In practice, its adoption may lead to different standards being applied in different countries and may have the result that the countries which have suffered less will be provided best.

4.- The importance of wheat.

According to the Chairman "the wheat supply situation would be the key to the whole relief situation". This may be true as far as Norway is concerned but it is not true for Greece. Wheat has always been the staple food of the Greek population and the importation of large quantities will be necessary and greatly appreciated. We wish however to repeat once more that cereals and pulses alone will not solve the food problem in Greece.

Conclusion

The discussions at the Ad Hoc Food Sub-Committee have

revealed the great variety of conditions obtaining in the European countries under enemy occupation.

At the one extreme there are the countries whose populations have been spared the evils of starvation and disease.

At the other extreme there are the countries for whom extermination would have been certain without Allied assistance.

It is necessary to understand the reasons for such differences in treatment on the part of the enemy. The Germans have not maintained the economic and financial structure of certain countries nor have they allowed relatively tolerable conditions of life for their populations from humanitarian motives. They have done so because it was in their interest to preserve the material resources of those countries and use them for their own war effort. Whenever a policy of rational exploitation presented small advantages they have resorted to plundering and have shown a complete indifference to the fate of the populations concerned.

Greece is an outstanding example of this second type of policy. This must be attributed to some extent to the fact that the resources of the country are limited and the contribution which they could have made to the German war effort correspondingly small. This, however, is not the whole explanation.

The Bulgarian economy, which was even less developed and diversified than the Greek economy, has been greatly strengthened under German control. Industrial production has been expanded, vast public works have been executed, livestock numbers have increased and the death rate, an index of the conditions prevailing in a country, has fallen.

Although Greece is an enemy and Bulgaria an accomplice,

the Germans might have made attempts at rational exploitation in Greece. The main reasons why they have not done so are the following: a) When the Germans occupied Greece, the country had already been economically exhausted by six months of hard fighting during which the Greeks threw all their resources unstintingly into the struggle b) The rational exploitation of the country in the midst of a hostile population would have required an effort which the enemy did not find possible or worth while to make. The price of the uncompromising attitude of the Greeks all along the line has been so heavy that the very survival of the nation is now in the balance.

We are convinced that the sacrifices made during this war will not be forgotten the day hostilities end. The United Nations have set up an organization which has been entrusted with the task of bringing aid and relief to the suffering populations of the Allied countries.

In satisfying needs Unrra will therefore have to take into account the privations and misery inflicted by the war and not merely pre-war standards of consumption.

London, May 1944.

Statement by the Greek Delegation to the
Ad Hoc Textile Sub-Committee.

The Inter-Allied Committee of Post-war Requirements which was constituted under the St. James' Palace Resolution was entrusted with the task of preparing estimates of the "kinds and amounts of food, raw materials and articles of prime necessity" which should be made available for the post-war needs of the countries liberated from Nazi oppression".

On the whole the Inter-Allied Committee has framed its estimates on the basis of the pre-war position of each country. Expected shortages were taken into account either by reducing the pre-war level of consumption by a certain percentage or by adopting the British war-time level of civilian consumption as the maximum level to be attained during the immediate post-war period. Finally special provision was made for exceptional needs, arising out of the conditions created by the war and by the enemy occupation.

There can be no doubt that the Minimum Imports Programme prepared by the Inter-Allied Committee constituted the best possible estimate of the essential post-war needs of the occupied countries of Europe. Moreover, by undertaking a thorough investigation of the pre-war position in the various countries concerned and making extensive use of the best expert advice available the Inter-Allied Committee has made an invaluable contribution to the study of Europe's post-war needs.

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is not, however, concerned with the same problem as the Inter-Allied Committee. Its task is much more limited and of a different nature. Unrra has been created in order to ensure "that immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people and that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services". (Preamble of the UNRRA Agreement).

It is therefore obvious that whereas the Inter-Allied Committee was dealing with the normal import requirements of occupied Europe Unrra is only concerned with ensuring more tolerable conditions of life to those who have suffered as a result of the war and of the enemy occupation. Since, then, Unrra's task is the satisfaction of minimum physical needs, criteria of pre-war levels of consumption and imports can no longer be applied in estimating the post-war requirements which Unrra will be called upon to meet. This is why Resolution 17 established the principle that "the Director General shall pay due regard to the degree of urgency of particular relief and rehabilitation requirements and to the extent of damage suffered by member Governments in a

part or the whole of their respective areas as a result of hostilities or of occupation by the enemy". This principle was never adopted by the Inter-Allied Committee. It is therefore obvious that all the estimates made by this Committee will have to be re-examined in the light of the Unrra Agreement and of the resolutions of its first Council.

It must also be borne in mind that the functions of the Committee of the Council for Europe are different from those of the Inter-Allied Committee. Whereas the Inter-Allied Committee had been concerned with estimating post-war import requirements the Committee for Europe can only recommend bases for estimating these requirements.

The task of the Ad Hoc Textile Sub-Committee is therefore to examine not the quantities estimated by the Inter-Allied Committee but the principles in accordance with which these quantities have been estimated and to decide whether these principles are in conformity with the Unrra Agreement and with the Resolutions of the first Council.

The Inter-Allied Committee divided the post-war requirements in clothing into two categories:

- a) An initial capital instalment intended to bring denuded wardrobes up to a reasonable level.
- b) Replacement needs for ensuring that this level will be maintained.

A. The Capital Instalment

The Inter-Allied Committee estimated the minimum wardrobe requirements on the basis of the following assumptions:

- a) The need for replenishing denuded wardrobes would be so urgent that no occupied country would be able to wait for its local industry to produce the articles of clothing needed by the population. The assumption that all occupied countries would have to import ready-made clothing or at least cloth in order to meet minimum wardrobe needs is an essential feature of the proposals made by the Inter-Allied Committee in connection with the Wardrobe List.
- b) Although it was recognized that needs would not be of the same urgency in all countries, it was decided that the difference would only be a difference of degree which could be met by the creation of a pool from which the needs of the countries in the worst position could be met.
- c) It was estimated that approximately 1/3 of the population in every occupied country would have to be provided with a set of essential clothing immediately after liberation.
- d) On the basis of these assumptions it was found that 17 British coupons' worth of clothing for adults and 12 or

13 for children represented the quantities needed in order to bring the denuded wardrobes in occupied Europe up to a reasonable minimum level.

Since the Minimum Imports Programme was submitted to the Allied Governments in June 1943 these original assumptions have had to be revised in practically all respects:

a) It has been established that many occupied countries will be able to meet their requirements in clothing from their own production and will not therefore need to import ready made clothing and cloth.

The Interim Textile Committee, recognizing this radical change in the position since the original assumptions were made, suggested that a country with the necessary available manufacturing capacity should be able to substitute in the Minimum Wardrobe List raw textile materials for ready made clothing and cloth.

This suggestion although constituting an entirely new approach to the problem of the capital instalment, was in agreement with the principles on which the work of the Inter-Allied Committee had been based. As already stated one of the main principles of the Inter-Allied Committee has been to estimate requirements on the basis of the pre-war level and pattern of consumption. In accordance with this principle import requirements had to take into account not only the physical need for protection against the weather and for essential cleanliness but also the reduction in the level of consumption which had taken place in the occupied countries.

UNRRA, however, is concerned only with the satisfaction of minimum physical needs. For the purposes of UNRRA, the fact that certain countries feel that they will be able to meet their needs from their own production means one of two things: either 1) that wardrobes have not been depleted to the extent that their populations cannot wait until articles of clothing become available from local production or 2) that their textile industries have been working under the German occupation. In this case it is also likely that a part of the quantities produced during the enemy occupation will have been available to the civilian population of the countries concerned and will thus have prevented a catastrophic deterioration in the clothing position of those countries. Finally it is likely that some stocks of raw materials and manufactured articles will exist in these countries at the time of liberation and may be used for the satisfaction of the most urgent needs of the population. It may happen that these stocks will be destroyed by the retreating enemy but in that case it is unlikely that the productive capacity will not suffer too.

The fact that a country is able to wait for the satisfaction of its needs in clothing is therefore rightly interpreted by the American Delegate as an indication that its population has not been reduced to the state of physical want with which UNRRA has primarily to deal.

b) The assumption made by the Inter-Allied Committee that the need for replenishing wardrobes will be more or less the same in the various occupied countries and that a 10 per cent pool would be sufficient to meet exceptional cases can no longer be maintained. Nor can the assumption

that only one in three persons will be in urgent need of clothing.

Reliable information shows that in certain countries the situation has become so desperate that a large proportion of the population goes about ragged and unshod.

In Greece a sharp deterioration in the clothing situation has taken place since the 17 coupon basis was adopted in December 1942.

Last summer the Swedish Relief Commission reported that 70 per cent of the children in the capital were in urgent need of clothing. It stated that an organization known as the Child's Wardrobe had provided clothes for more than 8,000 children but that unless the appeals made produced results the situation would become tragic in the next winter.

A survey carried out last year by the Relief Commission in five childrens' canteens revealed the following position:

<u>Canteens</u>	<u>No. of children</u>	<u>Without shoes</u>	<u>Without coats</u>	<u>With infectious diseases</u>
Place Eleftherias, Athens	386	20	120	30
Attalou 5 (Gouvas) Athens	770	650	650	4
Orfeos 56 (Gazochori) Athens	415	350	350	30
Ralli Laodikeias, Piraeus	737	400	400	40
Venizelou 82, Piraeus	546	250	250	125

The following extract from a recent report of the Swedish Relief Commission (May 1944) gives an idea of prevailing conditions:

"The geographical position of Greece may seduce one to believe that the climate of the country is so warm that the question of providing the people with shoes and clothes would not be of much importance in comparison with the problem of feeding them. True, the climate is hot in the summer, but the winters are rather cold. Greece is a mountainous country and, in the winter, large parts of it are covered with snow. This winter there were heavy snowfalls even in Athens. Only those who have experience of the severe winter climate in most parts of Greece can perhaps realize how much the people has suffered for want of clothes and shoes. The supply of these articles is quite insufficient and the prices are so enormous in relation to the income of the majority of the people that only very

wealthy persons can afford to buy clothes and shoes. It may be mentioned that a pair of shoes at present cost about 30,000,000 drachmas while the monthly salary of a university professor amounts to 10,000,000 drachmas. It goes without saying that the poor inhabitants of the mountainous regions and particularly those of the burnt villages are in great need of shoes and clothes. When the occupation troops burn a village as reprisals of some attacks on German lives or goods from the side of the partisans, the villagers have very often no time - or are even not allowed - to save their personal belongings. Half-naked and without shoes they gather together in caves and rock-shelters, if they are not able to take refuge in neighbouring villages. The need of clothes and shoes is, however, urgent all over Greece. On my inspections I have everywhere seen thousands of children dressed in thin rags and walking with naked feet in the snow. No doubt therefore that the question of clothes and shoes must be considered an important part of the relief work in Greece".

Under these conditions 17 coupons' worth of clothing does not correspond to the needs of the Greek population. Nor is it likely that these needs can be met from a 10 percent pool especially when it is recalled that there are nearly 30 million displaced persons who in many cases will also be in urgent need of clothing.

It is therefore obvious that the assumptions made by the Inter-Allied Committee are no longer valid in the light of recent information and of the principles governing the policy of Unrra.

In our view the Ad Hoc Textile Sub-Committee should make the following recommendations in connection with the Capital Instalment:

- 1) Ready-made clothing or cloth must be made available immediately after liberation in all cases where the clothing situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the populations concerned lack the minimum clothing required for protection against the weather and for essential cleanliness.

The impossibility to wait for the local production to meet these needs may be considered as a reliable criterion of the acuteness of the clothing situation.

- 2) A minimum level of clothing to which all the populations of occupied Europe must be raised (if supplies permit) should be recommended to the Unrra Council.

The Greek Delegation is unable to make concrete proposals on this subject owing to lack of expert advice but hopes that the experts of the Board of Trade and of other Delegations will make suggestions which will enable the Sub-Committee to agree on what this level should be.

- 3) The clothing position in each occupied country

should be determined by UNRRA in consultation with the Allied Government concerned on the basis of the available information. Although such a work will necessarily be of an approximate nature it will not be more so than other estimates made of conditions in occupied Europe.

By deducting available stocks from the UNRRA Minimum Level of Clothing determined under (2) the Director General will be able to estimate the requirements of each country and to take the necessary steps for procurement.

4) In view of the possibility of errors in estimating the needs in clothing of each country and of the fact that new needs will undoubtedly arise until the end of the war it would be advisable to create a reserve of ready-made clothing or cloth in order to meet contingencies. This reserve may be expressed as a percentage of the total needs for ready-made clothing or cloth as estimated under (3).

5) From the point of view of supply manufactured articles and raw materials are quite different commodities while transportation is unlikely to prove a limiting factor in the case of textiles. Therefore the provision of raw materials need not be delayed until Wardrobe needs have been met.

6) We agree with the American Delegate that the Director General should be empowered to make a uniform percentage reduction for all countries whenever requirements estimated as above exceed supply possibilities.

B.- Requirements in raw materials
for essential relief needs.

The Inter-Allied Committee has estimated that it would be necessary to import amounts of textile raw materials or yarn equal to the pre-war annual consumption of each country or to the British war-time level of civilian consumption whichever was the less.

The American Delegate has pointed out a) that "this basis gives the lowest level of supplies to those countries who had the least to start with and in which the clothing position is probably the worst", b) that before the British war-time consumption level is adopted by UNRRA it must be established that this level corresponds to the minimum urgent needs with which UNRRA is concerned c) that since the task of this Sub-Committee is to recommend bases for estimating relief needs in clothing the raw material requirements with which this Sub-Committee is concerned are those intended to meet the need for clothing arising in the UNRRA period. This need will not be entirely met by the capital instalment which "is only designed to meet an immediate need" and should therefore, if possible, be met by domestic processing of home produced and imported raw materials and d) that the needs for raw materials for purposes other than those of meeting urgent clothing needs should be referred to the Industrial Rehabilitation Committee.

The American Delegate has proposed that this Sub-Committee should express the requirements in raw materials in terms of a uniform level of consumption per capita related to minimum urgent needs for clothing.

In our view this new approach is a consistent application of the principles governing UNRRA policy and should therefore be adopted by this Sub-Committee.

We are unable to suggest what this per capita requirement in raw materials should be but have no doubt that with expert assistance it will be possible to determine it.

C.- Requirements in raw materials
for purposes other than relief.

It should be clearly understood that the recommendations of this Sub-Committee will refer exclusively to relief requirements. There can be no doubt that all the occupied countries of Europe will be anxious to restart their economic life as soon as possible, provide employment for their population and rebuild their export trade. The quantities of raw materials which will be provided by UNRRA for meeting relief needs will in some cases represent only a fraction of the total needs in raw materials of these countries.

In our view the extent of UNRRA's responsibility for providing raw materials for purposes other than relief should be determined by the Industrial Rehabilitation Committee. This problem requires a uniform solution applying to all raw materials and cannot therefore be dealt with by a Sub-Committee concerned only with textiles.

London, May 1944.
