

Cable File
New York Code Cables
Incoming and Outgoing

01/07/1961 - 30/07/1961

1/3

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SC
cc

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-0736

BOX 11

FILE 2

ACC. DAG 13/1.6.1.2.0

Incoming code cable

IMMEDIATE

To : Mac Eoin
From : Richye
Date : 30 sept 61
No : 6816

SECRET

Reference our 6802.

Unable to contact Pinto by phone today. Would be grateful if you would discuss and obtain his views on move arrangements of IAF Canberras. IAF have asked for air transport for 155 ton stores, ammunition etc. and 110 Officers and men. USAF could only offer 5 Globemasters for this airlift. In order to reduce overall travel time, USAF suggested a combined air and sea lift. The Indian Government rejected this arrangement on ground that this would split their IAF unit.

USAF have now agreed to increase their airlift by the additional use of 2 or 3 of the planes allotted to you provided you agree. We have arranged KLM air charter for personnel. However airlift for about 5 Globemaster loads is still lacking. We would like Pinto's views on scale of ammunition that must be airlifted. If adequate reserves are needed in the Congo and we are unable to guarantee procurement from Switzerland, could the Blatchford be used for this purpose? Can we use the Blatchford to bring anything else for IAF or the Indian brigade ? .

c.c. Gen Mac Eoin
Mr Linner ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : MacEoin
From : Rikhye, and Macfarquhar.
Date : 30 Sept 61
No. 6812

SECRET

Your A-2291. Concerning para 2, would like your and Linnars comments on this obviously delicate proposition. Your para 4 presumably overtaken by Bunches 6778.

ROUTINE.

SECRET

To : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Gen. Rikhye, New York.
Date : 30 September 1961.
No. : 6802

Reference ONUC 5643.

Glad to learn that JP 4 can be used by Canberras and sufficient supply is at hand. Canberra move is not yet finalized. To be effective, this move should be timely. IAF have asked for an airlift for 110 officers and men and about 150 tons of stores etc., which includes 96 tons of ammunition. We are considering moving personnel by air charter. We are investigating possibility of obtaining ammunition from Switzerland. Meanwhile, would appreciate Pinto's views on quantity of ammunition that should accompany Canberras or be made available directly from Switzerland. We understand that IAF have assessed ammunition requirement on 14 days combat bases. Is not this quantity too large as initial requirement for Congo and can it safely be reduced ?

We agree with use of Kitona Base as Canberra base. Who will be responsible for its protection ?

cc. Gen. MacEoin.

OIC ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE.

To : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Gen. Rikhye, New York.
Date : 30 September 1961.
No. : 6801

SECRET

Ref ONUC 5644.

We officially requested Ireland on 2 September to provide replacement for 35th Battalion. Arrangements are being made for USAF air rotation of these 2 battalions and repatriation of Irish infantry group.

cc. Gen. MacEoin.

OIC ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

Mr. Poynter

ROUTINE.

file

To : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Gen. Rikhye, New York.
Date : 29 September 1961.
No. : 6800

SECRET

Ref ONUC 5632.

Bunche is due to return tomorrow evening. Propose to send our comments after discussing with him.

*Deployment of UN troops
in view of departures
of contingents who are not
being replaced -*

cc. Gen. MacEoin.
OIC

*30
ix
61*

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE.

To : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Gen. Rikhye, New York.
Date : 29 September 1961.
No. : 6799

SECRET

Please advise Avn Pinto that I have booked a telephone call to speak to him Leo time between 0900 and 1200 hours on 30 September. I have urgent matters to discuss with him.

cc. Gen. MacEoin.
OIC ✓

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Mac Eoin
From : Richye
Date : 29 sept. 61
No : 6787

Reference ONUC 5597 and our 6753. Unistates reaction to our request for UHF control tower favourable. We intend request Canada for personnel for which please specify earliest your requirements.

010 ✓

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner
From : Rikhye
Date : 29 sept 61
No : 6786

SECRET

Reference our 6617. Clearances have now been obtained for 5 Swedish jets and 2 USAF transport aircrafts and they will leave Sweden as scheduled. Aircraft should arrive Stanleyville from Juba, Sudan on 3 october. We have informed Swedish mission that you are arranging for 15.000 litres fuel and Swedish military pilots to be present at Stanleyville and Coquilhatville.

o/e ✓

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE

To: Gen. MacEoin.
From: Bunche.
Date: 28 September 1961.
No. 6778.

Reference ONUC 5608.

We understand your concern but have impression that commitment has been made. Please convey to Khiari and O'Brien our desire to have fuller explanation as to reason for this joint observation, how it relates to the cease-fire and specifically what provisions of it, and assessment for advantages and disadvantages from point of view of ONUC interest.

cc Officer in Charge.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

ROUTINE

To: Gen. MacEoin.
From: Bunche.
Date: 28 September 1961.
No. 6764.

Cordier, Narasimhan and I are leaving evening 28 for Stockholm to attend funeral. We will be returning as quickly as possible. Please inform Khiari that if any crisis situation develops in his talks, he may employ tactics of playing for time on grounds that the President of the General Assembly, the President of the SECCO and Top Secretariat Echelon are all in Sweden for the funeral, and he must await their return for consultation and decision. In our absence, Macfarquhar, Rikhye and Urqutart will be on hand here and will get in touch with us in Sweden should this be imperative.

cc Officer in Charge. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Gen. MacBain,
Mr. Ahmed, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 28 September 1961.
No. : 6761

SECRET

ETA of IAF Canberras in Leo would depend on availability of sufficient JP one. USAF is considering an airlift. Meanwhile please advise progress on arrangements, including supply of JP one your end. Also advise availability fuel storage space in case USAF agree to airlift fuel.

cc. Gen. MacBain.

Mr. Ahmed.

Officer in Charge. ✓

IMMEDIATE.

PRIORITY.

To : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 28 September 1961.
No. : 6760

SECRET

Reference A-2286 and A-2285.


1. We agree entirely with Khiari's intention to give priority to prisoner exchange and we are confident that he will press hard on it, to be followed by issue of A 2 evacuation procedures.
2. Are we correct in assumption that Khiari's report on 27 September in para 2 of A-2286 relates only to his meeting with Kimba and not with Tshombe ?
3. It will be kept in mind, of course, that strength of our "bargaining" power with regard to key points we continue to occupy militarily is inescapably related to the strength of our legal (and perhaps moral) position in holding on to them for any indefinite period. We have in mind places other than airports, which are our lifeline.

cc. Officer in Charge. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To :MacEoin, Morrison
From :Bunche
Date :28 Sept. 61
No. 6753



Reference ONUC 5597.

United States mission has been requested to provide one MRN 12 UHF equipped transportable control tower, delivered Leo as soon as possible. Will keep you informed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

SECRET

To : Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 28 Sept 61
No. 6752

Reference ONUC 5558 and 5559. Hansen has returned to Ghana and is no longer available. Mazlan will leave by first October after full briefing in personnel matters. ETA later.

Information available here would indicate that Qazi has had no previous administrative experience and therefore would justify question as to his suitability for DCOS admin.


Our impression is that Mazlan should acquit himself satisfactorily as chief of personnel. Malaya is unable to offer a colonel. We understood you to be satisfied with Madan as chief of logistics, which was repeat was, we thought the basis for his extension being recommended. Since problem of obtaining services of officers of colonel rank from Africa and Asia continues to be difficult and as it would be inadvisable to increase Europeans in top posts, would it be possible to continue with existing arrangements query.

Mazlan will discuss other points raised.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : MacEoin
From : Bunche
Date : 28 Sept. 61
No. 6751



Reference ONUC 5475 and 5557.

Protection of airfields used by jets is obviously necessary. Question may be raised, however, whether Bofors L70 is best answer. It seems that few countries if any, have an activated Bofors L70 battery to spare. We are inquiring whether Irish and Swedes could provide personnel for more than four guns each. Shipment of a battery of 16 guns, with other heavy equipment, such as radar, towing vehicles and ammunition, must be undertaken by sea, owing to other USAF commitments for UN. Therefore, it will probably take at least a month after battery has been activated before unit can be operational in Congo. In view of this, are you convinced that Bofors L70 is practical query. Specialist advice is that L70 at best is mainly a deterrent. If so, could have machine guns with antiaircraft mountings by similar deterrent query.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Dumontet
From : Macfarquhar
Date : 28 Sept. 61
No. 6734

SECRET

American import credit. As you know, this has been given no publicity. Americans now wish to publish notice in terms given below in their official trade journal. Do you or Congolese authorities have any objections query.

Substantial increase in imports into the republic of the Congo to be licensed in October.

The rate of import licensing into the Congo will be increased substantially in October with the help of a recent US contribution of about Dollars Twelve point Nine Million tied to the purchase of US goods. While emphasis will continue to be given to commodities essential to stabilizing the economy of the Congo, the licensing office in Leopoldville is prepared to consider a variety of consumer goods. A list is being published by the licensing office which may be used as a guide for importers applying for licenses against the dollars Twelve point Nine Million for purchase of US goods.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : Ahmed
From : Harasihman
Date : 28 Sept 61
No. 6729

SECRET

Reference A-2278. Micuta was contacted in Geneva and has indicated unavailable for Congo service for at least 6 months for strong personal reasons.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

To : MacBain
From : Bunche
Date : 27 Sept. 1961
No. 6726

SECRET

Reference A-2282.

Please convey following message to Khiari: "

" We fully endorse line you have taken in talk on 26th with Kimba.

You will, of course, reaffirm to Tshombe that we have approved the cease-fire agreement which he and you signed, that we have respected it and will continue to do so. We expect Katanga authorities to do the same. In 6631 we have flatly rejected the draft terms presented by Mr. Tshombe, including his point 3. You will, of course, make clear to him that the UN troops are present in response to security council resolutions and that no one here or elsewhere can give any orders to those troops or exercise any authority in derogation of those resolutions.

You may give fullest assurance to Messrs. Tshombe and Kimba that the UN is not in Katanga to fight; hopes not to have to do so; will never itself start any hostilities, its weapons being for defensive purposes only; but that, if attacked, the UN force will certainly take all necessary measures to protect itself.

For our information, and looking ahead a bit, what do you envisage our intentions to be (or what should they be) with regard to positions we now hold militarily in Eville, such as the post office and radio station query. Are we occupying militarily any other such positions in Eville query. "

*Interim comments
sent RSB
on 12/7/61.
WRC*

*Was conveyed to Eville
see FC 575 of 28 ix 61
Q*

Incoming code cable

Miss Lett

SECRET

To : Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 27 sept 61
No : 6719

On bases recent experience in Katanga, you may have much clearer picture of gendarmerie weapons, size of units and strength of personnel of european origin deployed in various areas, Please forward earliest all available information.

*Core Commander
is acting on this
27
IX*

Priority

To : Linner, Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 27 sept. 61
No : 6717

SECRET

Ref. 6640, 6641, 6661.

1) Provided requested air clearances granted, dispatch of Swedish jets from Sweden to Leopoldville will be undertaken as follows:

Number of jets : 5

Type : J-29 Tunnan

Persons on board each aircraft : 1

Call signs : Swedish red one to five.

Swedish jets will be commanded by colonel Lampell. ETD Aengelholm, Sweden 30 september. Movement will take 5 days. Aircraft will arrive Stanleyville from Juba, Sudan 3 october. From Stanleyville, aircraft will proceed to Leopoldville via Coquilhatville on 4 october.

2) Swedish jets will be accompanied by 2 USAF C-124s, each carrying 11 personnel and 18 tons equipment. USAF C-124s will arrive Aengelholm, Sweden 29 september and depart with jets 30 september.

3) 15,000 litres fuel is required at Stanleyville, Coquilhatville and Leopoldville from 3 october (Fieldservice 6682). It is also desirable to have Swedish military pilots at Stanleyville and Coquilhatville at time of arrival of jets.

4) 4 Swedish transport aircraft will arrive later. You will be informed.

5) Your comments on the conditions laid down by the Swedish Government. reference our 6640, are urgently required.

C O P Y

SENT 26 SEPTEMBER 22.49 Z 1961

REC. 26 SEPTEMBER 09.05 Z 1961

FROM UNATIONS NEW YORK

TO ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

6696 DUMONTET YOUR ONUC 5397 PUBLIC WORKS STOP IN
REPLY TO DESEYNES HAMILTON APPEAL TO UNYUN FOR
VANDEROORD UNYUN REGRETS CANNOT SPARE HIM FOR FURTHER
ASSIGNMENT CONGO STOP THEREFORE PERSONNEL RECRUITING
DELISLE FOR POST CHIEF PUBLIC WORKS SECTION;

MACFARQUHAR

Incoming code cable

A 2281

Priority

To : Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 26 sept 61
No : 6695

SECRET

Our information on Katanga mercenaries appears to be out of date.
Please provide a list giving Names, nationalities and state of repatriation
after 28 august bringing up to date figures mentioned in your A-2117 and
A-2144.

c.c. Gen Mac Eoin
Mr Linner ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

To : MacEoin
From : Bunche.
Date : 26 Sept 1961.
No. 6687

SECRET

82

Reference ONUC 5549. Please immediately advise quantity of Indian ammunition to be airlifted. We have already arranged for Blatchford to transport seventy tons Indian ammunition from Bombay to Dar Es Salaam. The ship is due to Bombay about 28 September.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Ahmed, Leopoldville.
From : Fieldservice, New York.
Date : 26 September 1961.
No. : 6683

SECRET

&

Your 5529 Tomalin already recruited as ONUC's Chief of Security.

cc. Mr. Ahmed.
Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : ONUC, Leopoldville.
From : Field Operations Service, New York.
Date : 26 September 1961.
No. : 6682



52

Informed Swedish jets will require by 3 October 15,000 litres
JP-/MC-75 fuel at each following locations: Stanleyville, Coquilhatville
and Leopoldville. Advise supply situation.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 26 September 1961
No. : 6681

SECRET

Reference ONUC 5540.

Fighter and transport military aircraft obtained recently are only on temporary loan to ONUC. In addition to their national insignia, however, it would be advisable to have UN markings on wings and fuselages.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓

Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE.

PRIORITY.

To : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 26 September 1961.
No. : 6680

Sn

Reference ONUC 5539.

1. Agreed.
2. We will continue with our efforts to obtain sufficient helicopter crews.
3. We are making enquiries and will advise you shortly.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Ahmed, Leopoldville.
From : Fieldservice, New York.
Date : 25 September 1961.
No. : 6667

82

SECRET

We are informed that Mr. Julien has personal effects in addition to US currency in his villa. These were contained in a wall container behind venetian blind in master bedroom. We understand the villa is shared by Fieldservice Officer Holt. Advise.

cc. mr. Linner. ✓
Mr. Ahmed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Linner,
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 25 September 1961.
No. : 6664

SECRET

On evening 24th, press and TV reported that UN intelligence chief, Colonel Bjorn Egge, in Katanga had stated at Ndola that he has ruled out chances of sabotage by 99 percent. In the light of our previous exchange on this subject, we are disturbed. Please check and advise.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Narasimhan, New York.
Date : 25 September 1961
No. : 6666

You may recall that Micuta was extremely useful in Stanleyville. Do you foresee any use for him in the immediate future ? If so, we believe he could be made available. Grateful early reply.

Copy sent to Ahmed on 26.10.61

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY

To: Dr. Linner, Gen. MacEoin. *SL*
From: Bunche.
Date: 24 September 1961.
No. 6662.

1. In light of recent Katanga military experience, particularly, and with eye on possible future circumstances and needs, I now look at the force would be useful. We would like to have your views. The basic notion of the force as a body which initiates no military actions, launches no offensives and is not to intervene in the internal political affairs of the Congo is unchanged, of course.
2. Do we need greater ground mobility and flexibility, which could be obtained through armoured carriers, rather than greater infantry strength query.
3. To what ~~ext~~ent do we need additional bazooka-type anti-tankweapons for defence against AFV attacks query. In this regard, would light tanks be useful in addition to armoured cars query.
4. Are we adequate in infantry type of support weapons query.
5. We will soon be much more self-sufficient in air transport.
6. What may be needed as regards improved communications query.
7. The above questions are only suggestive. Could we conceive of an ultimately smaller force numerically though with much greater mobility and fire power potential and one protected by adequate air cover query. Will appreciate your views.

Dist. Dr. Linner.
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY

To: Dr. Linner, Gen. MacEoin. SL
From: Bunche.
Date: 24 September 1961.
No. 6661.

Reference our 6640 and 6641.

Swedish jets are planning to leave Stockholm 30 September. We are now arranging clearances via Germany and Sudan. Jets will be accompanied by 2 USAF aircraft. Further details and schedule will follow.

Dist. Dr. Linner.
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY

To: Dr. Linner, Gen. MacEoin. *SL*
From: Bunche.
Date: 24 September 1961.
No. 6660.

Reference our 6654.

1. Canadian C 119s will arrive Leo 26 September 1840z. Call signs VC102, VC116. One RCAF C 130 will support mission and return Europe. ETA Leo 0900z 26 September. Call sign VC303.
2. C 119s will have crew of 20. 49 extra ground crew and 12 technicians for grounded DC 3s will accompany aircraft. This personnel is put at disposal of ONUC and can be used as required.

Dist. Dr. Linner.
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

TO : Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 24 September 1961.
No. : 6659

SECRET

Lt. Col. Hansen of Ghana no longer available. Suggest Lt. Col. Mazlanbin Yunus of Malaya for Chief of Personnel post. He can leave for Leo this week.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

To : Mr. Khiari, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. MacFarquhar, New York.
Date : 24 September 1961.
No. : 6658

SECRET

Your A-2262 through 2266 judiciary have our immediate attention.
We welcome this request and shall do our best to fulfil it quickly.
We are in general agreement with the ministers statement on principles,
particularly that judiciary should derive its authority from Congolese Law
and be answerable to Congolese judicial hierarchy.

Preparatory action already taken and hope to reply in more detail
tomorrow after discussion with legal office and personnel.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

TO : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 24 September 1961.
No. : 6657

SECRET

Reference A-2267.

We do not intend to make a report on this but expect Khiari-Kjelgren will bring it up when the cease fire commission meets.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner, MacEoin
From : Bunche
Date : 24 Sept 61
No. 6654

SECRET

Canadian representative informs that in response to our request for aerial transport assistance, two C-119s with crews and maintenance personnel and also fitters for installation of radio equipment, prepared to depart for Leo on morning of Twenty-Fourth. Personnel totals 60 men . We have instructed them to proceed. ETA will be sent later.

INCOMING CDE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner
From : Bunche *h*
Date : 24 Sept. 61
No. 6653

SECRET

Today's press dispatches, which may be as inaccurate as usual, give impression of a "war of press conferences" between O'Brien and Tshombe. Suggest you convey to O'Brien inadvisability of engaging in exchange of accusations with Tshombe and desirability of seeking a cease fire also of words.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner *GL*
From : Bunche
Date : 24 Sept 61
No. 6652

SECRET

We know that Wieschhoff took with him on trip to Leo text of a revised version of your report to SecGen for period 21 February to 2 August, copies of which you had left on your visit to Headquarters. The intention was to have report approved by you and SecGen in course of the trip. Was it given to you and did it come up for discussion in Leo ? If not, we will send you copies and *h*solicit our views both on substance and on question of circulation now.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner *sn*
From : Bunche
Date : 24 Sept 61
No. 6651

SECRET

Further to my 6527, part A and B.

Substance of your A-2243 paragraph (a), and A-2232, has been conveyed orally to representative of Belgium as possible response to his government's communique. Result was a request to hold off publication of Belgian note and communique.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : MacEoin, Ahmed
From : Bunche
Date : 24 Sept. 61
No. : 6650

Reference ONUC 5404/5405/5406 and our 6517.

1. Quantity of ammunition requested from India amounts to 70 short tons. No commercial aircraft available for lift. USAF can only undertake lift of this ammo after ground crew, ammo and equipment for Canberas have been lifted from India to Congo. We have, therefore, advised India to load ammunition requested on Blatchford which is now in Bombay. Blatchford will then leave Bombay 24/25 with approximate ETA Dar-Es-Salaam 2/3 October. You will be informed of details.

2. If you have urgent need for small quantity of Indian ammo, please advise urgently and we will try to include that in airlift of Canberra ground crew and equipment.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : MacEoin, Ahmed
From : Bunche
Date : 24 Sept 61
No. 6649

82

SECRET

Reference our 6614.

IAF officers now arriving Rome AI-11 morning 23 September.
We have arranged their onward flight to Paris in the same aircraft
and thence AF-411 to Brazzaville ETA 25 September 1445 hours.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY

To: Gen. MacEoin.
From: Bunche.
Date: 23 September.1961.
No. 6645.

Reference ONUC 5486.

Press is pressing us for statement about these incidents. Is information given in your above mentioned message sufficiently confirmed for this purpose. If this is your judgement, it should be released simultaneously at Leo and New York. We also intend to forward it to International Red Cross.

cc Dr. Linner.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY.

To: Dr. Linner. *Lin*
From: Bunche.
Date: 23 September 1961.
No. 6644.

Reference A-2255 and 2260.

We note new arrangements and that they have been announced. Imagine Khiary shares our regret at unsettling direction of Civilian Operations again and will explain to Senior Consultants the political imperatives justifying Dumontet's temporarily heading CivOps. We understand reasons for decisions and necessity for prompt action. We are now taking no action on Mestiri. We wish Khiary and Kjellgren much success in this new and difficult assignment.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

ROUTINE.

To: Dr. Linner.
From: Bunche.
Date: 23 September.
No. 6643.

Reference A-2261.

Glad to know this and on that basis we shall make denials whenever occasion arises.

Incoming code cable.

Priority

To : Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 23 sept 61
No : 6641

SECRET

Reference 6549.

- 1) Sweden has agreed to provide helicopter pilots, ETD Stockholm 15 october.
- 2) They have also agreed to provide equipment for mortar platoon. They propose that personnel for this unit should be drawn from Swedish Congo battalion except for certain key personnel who will accompany equipment.
- 3) U.S. has agreed to airlift mortar equipment, 4.5 tons in same lift as troop carriers, ETD stockholm 28/29 september.

c.c. Gen Mac Eoin
Mr Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : MacEoin
From : Bunche
Date : 23 Sept 1961
No. 6640

SECRET

Reference our 6629 and 6589. The four Swedish jet fighter aircraft, J29 tunnan will be at disposal of Un of following conditions:

1. Detachment will be commanded by Swedish commander who is instructed to ensure that the tasks of group can be solved technically. Agreement from Swedish commander will be needed for each intended operation.
2. Group will need supervising radar with necessary operational and technical personnel. Radar range should be at least 200 kilometers.
3. UN must be responsible for air fuel; type of fuel JP1/MC-75/ . Estimated fuel consumption 300 cubic metres per month. Certain technical supply to be specified later will also be needed.
4. Detachment will also need transport vehicles for ground service and some navigation equipment to be specified later. Detachment will be composed of approximately 3 officers, 4 pilots, of different ranks, 2 W/O, 8 technicians, 10 privates and possibly some specialists.
5. Detachment will be accompanied by a chartered transair aircraft to facilitate transport of the detachment within the Congo.
6. US has agreed to support transfer of detachment from Sweden to Congo.
7. Your comments on Swedish request for technical and other assistance will be appreciated earliest.
8. All air component now arriving in Congo should be provided with adequate transport and ground facilities.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner and Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 23 sept 61
No : 6638

82

SECRET

Reference our 6558 and 6586.

- 1) Danish aircraft C-47 and C-54 will arrive leo 2100Z 25 september and 1000Z 26 or 27 september respectively.
- 2) Norwegian aircraft will arrive 1830Z 25 september.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

01-2274
24.9.61

ROUTINE

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 23 Sept 61
NO. 6637

SECRET

Following is gist of note dated 19 September from permanent mission of Portugal. The international press reports that United Nations aircraft, taking from Belgrade some of Leopoldville leaders, also carried Holden Roberto, who uses aliases of Rui Ventura and Jose Gilmore. This man is confessed leader of terrorists in Portuguese territory, whose crimes are said to include murder and torture. The Portuguese government believes that above-mentioned aircraft was in the service of the United Nations and a part of the United Nations force, and the flight of this passenger must certainly have had ONUCs previous authorization. The Portuguese mission requests information on this press report and the necessary clarifications. Please comment.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner and Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 23 sept 61
No : 6636

82

SECRET

Representative of Belgium on 22nd gave, at request of his Government, following information with request that it be transmitted to you.

"ont ete arretes a E'ville, Houpe et Deschuyetere et se trouvent actuellement au camp Martini a Leopoldville. Messrs Houpe et Deschuyetere demandent que leurs familles se trouvant a E'ville puissent etre rapatriees"

"Hilari, Ferlounge, Minet et Schutz ont ete transferees a Leopoldville. M. Linner jugera de leur sort et les fera probablement rapatrier dans leur pays. Selon les renseignements en procection au gouvernement Belge, ces personnes n'ont rien fait contre les forces des Nations Unies."

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Linner and Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 23 sept 61
No : 6635

82

Reference A-2259.

Yugoslav mission state that it is possible that Belgrade may have responded promptly to U.N. request and dealt directly with their Stanleyville attache. Belgrade is being asked for details. Meanwhile, if Yugoslav C-47s arrive in the Congo they should be given all assistance to move to Leo.

c.c. Mr. Linner
Gen Mac Eoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 23 Sept. 61
No, 6634

SECRET

A UPI release from Ndola reports:

" A United Nations officer said today investigators so far have turned up no evidence of sabotage or air attack in the plane crash that killed Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold monday.

A multi-nation investigation into the crash is continuing in strict secrecy. But Swedish Lt Col. Bjorn Egge, UN security chief in Katanga, told UPI that medical examination of the bodies' so far has shown no bullet wounds and that no bullet holes had been found in the wreckage.

" This appears to rule out an attack by the Katanga Fouga Jet fighter, " Egge said. " If there had been an explosion on board you would expect to find bits of wreckage strewn back along the line of flight. This is not so. All the wreckage is gathered largely in one area as you would expect if the plane hit the ground in one piece. " "

We have observed for some time past the frequency of statements issued by Egge to the press. The above statement attributed to him, if he actually made it, indicates surprisingly poor judgement, in that it rejudges and prejudices the ultimate findings of investigation. I feel that Egge must be admonished for this, if he did make the statements.

In view of this apparent habit of talking too much to the press, we must entertain serious doubts as to his suitability for membership of Katanga cease-fire commission. Please advise

Incoming code cable

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

Action taken *JS*

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 23 sept 61
No : 6632

Reference our exchange of cables on provisional cease-fire agreement.

1) You are authorized to confirm the provisional agreement at such time as you deem suitable or necessary. In giving this authorization, we stress the following points.

- SL & Khairi*
Re: inform Tshombe?
- A. We reject categorically as altogether unacceptable the draft terms of an agreement put forth by Mr Tshombe, as reported in A-2242.
 - B. The agreement is without prejudice to and cannot qualify ~~the~~ ~~provisionally~~ the security council resolution of 21 february or any other resolutions of the security council and the General assembly.
 - C. The agreement is strictly military, having application exclusively to the U.N. force in Katanga and the armed forces of Katanga. It has no repeat no political intent or purpose.
 - D. The agreement has no application outside of Katanga.

2) The "war damage" claims, of course, are unworthy of consideration and must be rejected.

à l'attention de français
à l'attention de Tshombe
à l'attention de M. TSHOMBE
vous pour le note verbal, dans un texte officiel

Incoming code cable

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

To : Linner *or*
From : Bunche
Date : 23 sept 61
No : 6631

Reference A-2236, 37 and 45. Following relates to Khiary's commentary.

- 1) We are in accord with points 8C roman 1, 8C roman 2 and 8C roman 3. Also with 8D and 8E.
- 2) As to the suggestions at end of commentary, we concur with 1). With relation to 2), we have already been taking the indicated action and will pursue it. With 3), we also agree and are sending a separate cable on it.

Incoming code cable

Priority

A 2234

To : Mac Eoin and Ahmed
From : Banche
Date : 22 sept. 61
No : 6630

2

SECRET

Reference ONUC 5486 and 5497.

- 1) Our understanding your messages is that Luluabourg is suitable only as temporary fighter base while N'djily is to be the main fighter base. assume plans are in hand for use of Kamina for this purpose should need later arise.
- 2) Indian and Ethiopian fighter aircraft need JP-4, and Swedish aircraft need JP-1. No response from Greece so far. In any event they are equipped with American type aircraft and would have requirements similar to Ethiopians. We fully realize logistical and technical difficulties of a mixed fighter unit but other considerations which you can well realize are also weighty. Our hope is that the presence of these fighters would be sufficient deterrent to prevent breakout of hostilities in Katanga.
- 3) We are informed that fighter aircraft ground units are arriving fully self-sufficient in personnel and ground equipment. Therefore, present need for technical officer should not arise. India is asked to provide a wing commander (fighter operations) for headquarters air unit.

c.c. Gen Mac Eoin
Mr Ahmed
Mr Linner ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : MacEoin, Ahmed
From : Bunche
Date : 23 Sept. 1961
No. 6629

SECRET

1. Reference ONUC 5497. In addition to military aircraft already made available, it is possible that Pakistan may offer us some. Sweden has just offered 4 transport aircraft. These aircraft have been made available to us on a temporary basis for the duration of the present emergency only. At the same time, it would be not always possible to find economic loads for larger USAF aircraft and in order to avoid their remaining idle they will have to be used for external airlift. With hoped for early change in your air situation, we would hope to revive use of chartered aircraft. In immediate future, however, primary dependence would remain on military aircraft.

2. While it may be possible to obtain aircraft of types other than C47, it is difficult to obtain military crews for them. Therefore, the UN military air transport will have to be primarily based on C47 s . We understand from missions that they are in a position to provide additional C47 crews on a temporary basis. We would therefore appreciate to know your views if we should obtain additional ~~xxxxxx~~ air crew and aircraft. Meanwhile Canada is being requested for ground personnel as requested.

3. A replacement for DC6B can be made available during first week October. Please advise if this type would be suitable.

SECRET

Incoming code cable

To : Linner *SL*
From : Narasimhan
Date : 22 sept 61
No : 6615

Reur A-2239.

We agree that if formal reply to Adoula becomes necessary, something on the lines of Khiary's letter of assurance to Tshombe would be in order.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Mac Eoin and Ahmed
From : Bunche
Date : 22 sept 61
No : 6614

82

Reference ONUC-5499.

Three indian air force Officers including one VIP arriving Leo
flight SN 529 at 0515 24 september.

c.c. Gen Mac Eoin
Mr Ahmed
Mr Linner ✓

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Linner *SL*
From : Bunche
Date : 22 sept. 61
No : 6611

Belgian representative reports signal from his Government to effect that information you have been conveying to Belgian Official in Leo, in pursuance of an "agreement" between S.G. and Spaak, has not been received since 7 september. They wish it resumed. Knowing nothing of the "agreement" or the practice, I said only that I could think of many good reasons why you were not getting around to this.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

SECRET

To : Linner and Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 22 sept. 61
No : 6610

Nigerian Government inform that they are unable to provide additional police personnel.

288

Incoming code cable

SECRET

To : Linner and Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 22 sept. 61
No ; 6607

India has agreed to contribute six Canberra aircraft in the intercept role. India is understandably concerned about security and logistics.

Air vice Marschall Pinto, air officer commanding, operations command, IAF, one group captain general duties and one signal Officer of Indian air force are due to arrive leopoldville on SABENA flight sunday. accommodation and reception arrangements should please be made. Pinto will return to India after making arrangements for the move of IAF fighter unit.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : Linner *h*
From : Bunche
Date : 22 Sept. 1961
No. 6603

SECRET

Further to my 6596. Major Sundh Will accompany the party.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner, MacEoin
From : Bunche
Date : 22 Sept. 1961
No. 6596

SL

SECRET

Reference 6589. Party arriving Leopoldville saturday on Sabena flight SN517. ETA 0640 hours local.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner *SL*
From : Bunche
Date : 22 sept. 61
No : 6591

SECRET

- 1)- For your information here is a report on meeting of advisory committee on the Congo on afternoon of 21st, which was convened at the request of certain delegations, meaning informally (to avoid "constitutional difficulties") and electing Barnes (Liberia) as chairman. Rikhye reported on military situation and on requests for fighter planes. We emphasized continued need for such aircraft.
- 2)- There were complaints about adverse press coverage of recent Katanga ~~and~~ events which gave rise to unfortunate public opinion reactions in certain countries. Jha (India) urged long-range perspective planning to prepare for possible similar contingencies in future. He also referred to use of Belgian Consulate in E'ville against Unations. Whereupon we informed committee of our demarche today based on your A-2232. In answer to Dadzie (Ghana), we made clear however that U.N. could not be used to enforce Gbenyes expulsion decret against the Consulate.
- 3)- Pakistan and Nigeria questioned reported U.N. statements that our operation was designed to bring to an end Katanga's secession. They also urged renewed attempts to bring about Leo-E'ville political conciliation.
- 4)- Narasimhan made a statement on the cease-fire agreement, describing it as purely military document, and emphasizing points in your A-2237. He pointed out that while under article 4 the jets could not be brought into Katanga, they could usefully be stationed outside.
- 5)- Senegal, United Arab Republic and Guinea wanted to know whether the central Government approved of the ~~cease-fire~~ cease-fire agreement; we stated

...../.....

that the Government had been kept informed and that there had been no negative reactions. We also conveyed substance of information in SecGen's A-2170. Boland (ireland) thought it inadvisable to put Government in position of having to give positive approval, and so did Liberia.

6)- Guinea and Ghana emphasized question whether agreement, especially clauses three and four, was compatible with continued implementation of SECCO resolution , and what restrictions it imposed on U.N. freedom of action. In answer, we noted that present U.N. forces in Katanga were adequate for continued implementation of SECCO resolution and suggested that forcible resistance thereto would itself be violation of cease-fire agreement with obvious consequences. The same went for possible attempts to re-inforce Katanga forces. Hence the importance of this opportunity to strengthen our equipment, and secure jets, outside Katanga. Diallo Telli seemed to be satisfied on these points, and Ireland endorsed them as well as the cease-fire itself. Nigeria also indicated approval of the agreement as a purely military document, and on similar understandings.

7)- Senegal wanted to know whether clause 4 might be used to inhibit Leo action to halt Katangan secession. We answered that the cease-fire was between the U.N. force and the Katangese and did not apply to ANC.

8)- In the end, the consensus in the committee was favorable, there being no really negative position. Ethiopia urged complete silence by all concerned about the more ticklish aspects of the information and interpretations we had conveyed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *SL*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 22 September 1961.
No. : 6589

SECRET

1. Swedish mission informs evening of 21st that Chief of Swedish Defence Staff, General Joeransson, and ambassador Dahlman will be leaving Stockholm on 22 September by commercial flight for Leopoldville. Their visit is connected with Swedish willingness to help strengthen ONUC and with situation of Swedish contingent, particularly in Kamina. One of the questions which they wish to discuss is the civil air transport organization of ONUC. They will also weigh our request for transport planes and anti-tank weapon units and helicopter pilots. The Swedish government's attitude on these requests is "positive in principle".

2. Swedish authorities expect their four jets with pilots and ground crews to be ready for departure about 29330 September. They will, of course, ask us to meet certain conditions as to radar, fueling facilities, etc, which we expect to receive in detail on the 22nd.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *82*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 22 September 1961.
No. : 6588

SECRET

Reference A-2230. Norwegian mission has been requested to extend tenure of Colonel Egge. They inform that new Norwegian Chief of Information should already have reached Leo. Suggest new officer should replace Egge in his present appointment and Egge be given special appointment in connection with duties in Katanga about which we invite your recommendations.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

82

To : Mr. Ahmed, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Hamilton, New York.
Date : 22 September 1961.
No. : 6587

SECRET

Your 5471. In view relatively early expiration date de Reynier contract and time and difficulty of establishing basis for termination under staff rules believe it would be in Unations interest to complete payments under contract. If he cannot be usefully employed you may release him from duty and provide return transportation. Subsistence allowance would cease after return journey. Please send us text of any statement you give him in explanation his early release so that we may use it with Swiss here whose continued cooperation vital.

cc. Mr. Ahmed.

Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner,
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 22 September 1961.
No. : 6586

8
SECRET

Reference our 6549 and 6558.

1. Denmark has agreed to provide one c54 and one c47 with reinforced crews, maintenance personnel and spare parts.
2. Four H19 helicopter pilots and eight H19 maintenance personnel will accompany aircraft.
3. Aircraft and personnel are at UN disposal until October 30, with a possible extension, and will depart Denmark within a very short time.
4. You will be informed about ETA Leo.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville. *82*
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 21 September 1961.
No. : 6566

SECRET

Reference A-2232.

In pursuance your para 2, information given to Belgian representative in oral demarche on 21 September with request that it be transmitted to his government, which he has promised to do.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : Linner, Ahmed
From : Cordier
Date : 21 sept 61
No : 6562

82

I transmit urgently following cable just received from Spinelli:
"please inform us most urgently if parents of Bill Ranallo remember having given him silver mdalion of ~~XXXX~~ St Christopher with chain. ON medalion following inscriptions "St Christopher protect us to Bill from Mum and Dad 12.25.56" (12 of december 56).

New subject.

Please urge Leo to send if not already done complete detailed list by special messenger. Without such official list legal identification procedure cannot start. For your personal information up to ten or eleven bodies would possibly be able to identify."

I have sent following reply to Spinelli : "closest friends of Bill confirm possession and constant use such medal. Am transmitting urgently to Linner Your request for list by special messenger. Thanks Information re identification.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PJ

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Ahmed, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Hamilton Fieldserv, New York.
Date : 21 September 1961.
No. : 6561.

SECRET

Your 5430. Once again, we are fully sympathetic with your situation and are doing utmost to dispatch additional personnel staff. Unfortunately, however, we have run into a snag as regards earlier plans for de Warlincourt replacement, which is essential if Geneva is to continue ONUC recruitment at reasonable pace. Still counting on his arrival by 15 October but earlier date unlikely. With regard to Fulcheri post in Leopoldville, we still hope you can solve this problem by internal staff shifts following early arrivals of Suecar, Habal and Syrov. As Osborne knows, experienced personnel officers are seldom found outside the office of Personnel, which continues to be extraordinarily pressed and has in fact been able to operate only through the use of inexperienced staff and extensive overtime both here and in Geneva. Bilinguality requirement naturally another restriction. For your administrative report 89 we are reluctantly agreeing to release Marjorie Campbell end October. Granting SPA to G5.

cc. Mr. Ahmed.

Mr. Linner. ✓

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 21 sept 61
No : 6558

*Please send copy
to From Commanders*

Ref. our ~~min~~ 6549. Norway has agreed to provide 2 C-119s with air and ground crews and also two helicopter pilots who will accompany aircraft. Aircraft will leave Norway 22 september 0900z, ETA Leo 25 september 1700z.

Incoming code cable

a-2247

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 21 sept 61
No : 6557

Reur A-2233, A-2236 and further to our 6555.

In the event you agree to immediate circulation of your addendum in A-2233 with text of provisional agreement in A-2235, would suggest dropping last paragraph of A-2233 pending confirmation of the provisional agreement. May we also assume that in the light of your A-2237, we would be justified in inserting word "continued" before "implementation of the SECCO resolution" in paragraph 5 to addendum, as redrafted in our 6550 to which you agreed in your A-2236.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

SECRET

To : Linner, Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
date : 21 sept 61
NO : 6556

82

U.S. Military here informs us that Liberia has requested U.S. to provide ammunition for Liberian contingent in the Congo. Such requests must be made only repeat only through our own channels. Please advise.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

Most Immediate

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 21 sept. 61
NO : 6555

Q-2241

21. IX - 61

Reference A-2237.

Agree your proposal in para 5. Please advise whether text of agreement may be included and circulated in your latest addendum, as a "provisional agreement", or whether it should be held during the 48 hour delay.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Dr. Linner. *h*
From: Bunche.
Date: 21 September 1961.
No. 6551.

Unless there is need for discussion, suggest you send by most immediate cable your final position on ceasefire after having seen original text, as indicated in our telex talk.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Dr. Linner.
From: Bunche.
Date: 21 September 1961.
No. 6550.

52

Reur A-2233.

1. Would suggest following redraft of beginning of para 5 if this is consistent with the facts:

*answered
in A 2236*

"The United Nations Special Emissary, Mr. Khiari, who had been despatched to NDola with a view to negotiating with Mr. Tshombe a cease-fire agreement without prejudice to the implementation of the secco resolution of 21 February 1961 and other secco resolutions on the Congo, had a four hours discussion with the Provincial President in the morning. Shortly after lunchtime etc."

2. Hope French original of cease-fire agreement will become available during the night. Please cable it urgently as we are holding circulation of this addendum until we can include official text of agreement. In that event para 7 would be dropped and para 6 reworded accordingly.
- by A 2235*

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *SL*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 21 September 1961.
No. : 6549

SECRET

1. Indian Defence Minister has agreed to forward to Delhi our request for 4 Canberras to support ONUC. If agreed to, senior IAF representatives will soon visit Leo to make necessary arrangements.

2. We have also requested Greece and Sweden for additional jet fighter aircraft.

3. In view of the cease-fire arrangements, Luluabourg would seem to be most feasible location for Our fighter base. Please examine various aspects of this and advise of any additional external logistical and technical support required. Would there be any likelihood of Adoula government displeasure at such use of Luluabourg airfield ?

4. Field service is taking action to procure additional aircraft and will contact you for advice on having 4 C-47s, grounded for some time in Leo, made airworthy soonest. Canada has been requested to assist in this task.

5. We must depend on Dakota aircraft for our air transport unit since it is not possible to obtain air crews for other types. Requests have been made to several countries for additional Dakota crews and ground personnel.

6. In addition to UAR, Yugoslavia, India and Pakistan, we have asked Scandinavian countries and Greece for military transport aircraft with crews and ground personnel for three to four weeks duration. India advises its inability to provide aircraft but will consider supply of additional crews.

7. We have asked Sweden and Ireland to examine possibility of reinforcing their battalions with infantry type of support weapons.

8. It appears that Sweden has now agreed to provide jets.

*Answered
in A 237//
21/9*

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

PRIORITY

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Narasimhan, New York.
Date : 21 September 1961.
No. : 6548

Q.2239
27.961

SECRET

Continuation our 6514.

Your A-2230 received and read with much interest. We are especially reassured to note paras 3 and 5, in view of our misgivings about tone and substance of recent communications from Adoula government, such as were transmitted in A-2220, A-2221, A-2228 and A-2229.

In the circumstances reported in your A-2230, do you still feel that formal reply to Adoula letter transmitted in your A-2221, raising for example the question of authority for UN to arrest, and transport to Leo, president and ministers of a Provincial government, is necessary ?

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY

Q-2234
21-9-61

To: Dr. Linner. *SL*
From: Bunche.
Date: 21 September 1961.
No. 6544.

US military here informed us that US authorities have had information from their Embassy in Leo that a request has been made from ONUC to US for 1250-pound general purpose bombs with contact fuses. We told US mission that we have no knowledge of any such request and that we could not consider it unless received from ONUC through our own channels.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY

To: Mr. Ahmed. *SL*
From: Fieldservice.
Date: 21 September 1961.
No. 6543.

Your 5431 appreciate your problem. Recruiting as Chief Security Officer Canadian Major George Tomalin, Deputy Command Provost Marshall, Headquarters Quebec Command and who served as UNEF's Provost Marshall in 1958 and 1959. Attempting secure his earliest release from Canadian army. Regarding your requested six Security Officers, Roger Soucy, Canadian, departing for ONUC today. Expect another Canadian available 25 September or earlier. Humberst and Keane scheduled depart UNCRU 6 October but requesting release earlier and will advise dates. Also requesting UNTSO provide personnel.

cc Dr. Linner.

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Dr. Linner, Gen. MacEoin. *Se*
From: Bunche.
Date: 20 September 1961.
No. 6542.

Reference ONUC 5382, 2185, and our 5634, 6423, 6425 and 6452.

1. One USAF C-124 departed Sweden 19 September and will arrive Leo 210100Z with approximately 10 tons ammo plus part of equipment requested in ONUC 5364.
2. Three USAF C-124s will depart Dublin 211200Z. ETA Leo first aircraft 221905Z. Second and third will follow at intervals of two hours. Aircraft are carrying 78,000 lbs Irish ammo.
3. Two USAF C-130s will depart Evreux 21 September and arrive Leo 22nd. ETA will be sent you later.
4. One USAF C-130 will arrive Leo from Addis Ababa in support of Ethiopian jet force.
5. One USAF C124, weekly supply flight aircraft, will remain in Leo.
6. Callsign for all aircraft "New Tape".
7. US requested to retain in Leo as many as possible of above mentioned aircraft for time being.
8. We have asked US Mission that their aircraft be placed in direct support of ONUC and direct contact should be established with senior USAF representative. Will confirm these arrangements.

Dist. Dr. Linner.
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Abbas, Addis Ababa.
Info : Mr. Linner,
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 20 September 1961.
No. : 6529

SECRET

Thanks your 369. Share your assumption about the C-130 and will inform US authorities here of Ethiopian view. Aircraft may be held at Addis until jets are ready to depart or proceed to Leo and return to Addis later. Will advise.

(Message sent to Addis Ababa by New York)

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *SL*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 20 September 1961.
No. : 6528

SECRET

Following message received from Abbas at noon on 20th:
"Ethiopian Chief of Staff informs me reconnaissance plane left for Stanleyville at 0400 hours local time this morning. American Embassy here informs that US Airforce C-130 is on its way to Leo through Addis. I presume this is the plane mentioned in my cable 359. If so this plane is coming too early as Ethiopians will not decide send jets before they know result after reconnaissance plane visit to Congo."

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *Ln*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 20 September 1961.
No. : 6526

SECRET

Ethiopian representative informs morning of 20th that Ethiopian reconnaissance aircraft, to precede jets as earlier reported, "departed last night", presumably for Albertville. We have no further information.

cc Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR LINNER
FROM : MR CORDIER
DATE : 20 Sept 61
NO : 6520 (ETATPRIORITE)

In addition information clear cable 6519. You should know that I just talked to Scott in Rhodesia who is assistant to lord Allport who informed me that 15 bodies have been placed in lead caskets in industrial cold storage awaiting post mortem wednesday to determine cause of deaths. British pathologist has come from London for this purpose. Secretary-generals body will be lying in state in Ndola wednesday noon briefly as mark of honor and respect by local officials. Bodies will be taken to Salisbury some time thursday and panam plane will therefore leave Salisbury either thursday evening or friday morning. I assume that time schedule would permit a thursday evening departure. We agreed that if situation there permits it it would be most appropriate for you to join the honor escort Stockholm or alternatively to attend the state funeral. We hope to give Stockholm earliest possible information on definite time of arrival.

Our investigation team will be flown to Ndola from Salisbury some time wednesday afternoon.

Julians doctor has cabled that he had 40% back burns, right hand and right arm are burned, right ankle is fractured, his condition is serious but not critical; he is still on danger list; he has a chance; he is conscious every now and then; they are keeping him under heavy sedation. Have advised mistress Julian to request her husband not to talk about plane accident. Will appreciate your seeing her at Leo to tell her that he should talk only to our investigators and to Ambassador Spinelli and in no sense for the press or to others who may divulge information to the press. It would seem highly desirable to move ^{him} out of the area as soon as his condition permits.

Scott also indicated that in long talk between Khiary and Tshombe there was reason for "guarded optimism". Both parties are studying a ceasefire draft tonight for resumption of meeting at 9 tomorrow morning.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 20 Sept 61
NO : 6515 (ETATPRIORITE)

Ref A-2219

1. Are O'brien and Maceoin fully satisfied about authenticity of report?

2. Action of kind suggested by O'brien and Maceoin clearly cannot be taken without putting Unations in a possibly indefensible position. You may recall in this connexion furor over suggestion that first shot was fired from Belgian consulate. We, meaning Cordier, Macfarquhar, Narasimhan and myself, question whether even more moderate action which you suggest should be taken prior to a strong demarche to Brussels on matter. Is it not possible that such a step might bring an end to such activities? Is it impractical, in meantime, to keep buildings goings and comings under close surveillance?

3. We note that O'brien and Maceoin ask permission to take suggested action "if these activities continue". How is it proposed to determine if this is or is not the case?

4. In our view, nothing should be done on our side to prejudice Khiari talks with Tshombe on cease-fire.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNEN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 20 Sept 61
NO : 6514

Reference A-2221.

We are considering this carefully and will give you our viewson
twentieth. We assume, in any case, there is no good reason to rush
reply to the difficult issue here posed. In meantime, hope you can
get across to Adoula idea that he should not be pressured into trans-
mission of communications which make obviously unrealistic demands
upon ONUC.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNEN, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 19 Sept 61
NO : 6508 (ETATPRIORITE)

US mission informs that ex-mercenary Michel Loare has contacted US military attache in South Africa and has indicated willingness to provide information. Please send questionnaire which we will forward through US mission.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. KEIARI
FROM : MR. MACFARQUHAR
DATE : 19 Sept 61
NO : 6507

Your ONUC 5425 American import credit. Cheque received and passed through Congo fund account on 15 September to monetary council account with Irving trust designated in our cable 4409. We had earlier authorized anticipatory licensing in our cable 6306.

cc. Linner

Difa Lachnit

TOP SECRET.

PRIORITY.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To: Linner.(ONLY)
From: Bunche.
Date: 19 Sept. 1961.
No.: UNNUMBERED.

Sh

Reference our unnumbered about jet fighters. Am deferring approach pending outcome of Khiary effort at NDola and in light of todays reports about cessation of fugas activity. The political implications of decision involved, as you are well aware, would run wide and deep.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

ROUTINE.

To: Mr. Linner.
From: Bunche.
Date: 19 September 1961.
No. 6489.

Reference A-2208.

O'Brien might be informed that it is inadvisable to refer to "our" radio.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

TOP SECRET. *sk*

PRIORITY.

To: Dr. S. Linner, (ONLY) Leo. *su*
From: Bunche, NewYork.
Date: 19 Sept. 1961.
No.: UNNUMBERED.

Question well raised and definite reply will be sent
shortly after further thought about a suitable formula.

TOP SECRET.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To: Dr. S. Linner, Leo. *sw*

From: Bunche, NewYork.

Date: 19 Sept.1961.

No.: UNNUMBERED.

Wish your most serious opinion on the following after thorough consideration and checking with such persons as you may consider appropriate. As you will see from the nature of this idea, I would never even broach it except in the context of a desperate situation such as that created by the marketings of the mercenary-piloted Katanga jet.

I have reason to believe that if a request were to be made the US would quickly send a squadron of jet fighters to dispose of the fugwbor fugas, as the case may be. This would be for the specific purpose of protecting against attack the US transport aircraft now en route to help us. The condition could be that with the fuga problem disposed of, the US jets would promptly pull out.

In this regard, as you have surmised from information from Addis, we are not likely to get quick action on the Ethiopian jets.

It would be possible also, of course, to ask the UAR for some jet protection.

No such approaches would be made, of course, without your concurrence.

PARA 2

(Underlined word subject to correction.)

Incoming code cable

a-1206

Priority

To : Linner *sk*
From : Bunche
date : 19 sept 61
No : 6483

SECRET

Do you have it in mind, until the Katanga crisis is over, to submit further addendas to the original report to the SECCO ? If so, when may next one, which I assume would include all confirmed information about the tragedy, be expected ? President of secco has today expressed desire that SECCO be kept up to date on Congo developments.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Linner *SL*
From : Bunche
date : 19 sept 61
NO : 6482

Reference ONUC 5401. Information has been immediately communicated to Addis Ababa.

a 1208

Incoming code cable

IMMEDIATE

To : Linner
From : Bunche
date : 19 sept 61
No : 6481

SECRET

Reference A-2204 .

Hope that Khiari can follow-up on this and arrange a solid end of fighting. Not clear about meaning of reference to "our own radio".

Incoming code cable

a 2207

Priority

To : Linner *a*
From : Cordier
date : 19 sept 61
NO : 6480

SECRET

As mark of honour and respect to Secretary General we have felt it desirable to send a senior official to Ndola to assist in practical arrangements regarding the bodies and to accompany Dag's body to Stockholm. For this purpose Spinelli will arrive in Salisbury 4.35 wednesday morning AZ flight 508 and will be flown by british military transport to Ndola. We are chartering a plane to bring bodies from Salisbury to Stockholm and New York. Spinelli will accompany plane as far as Stockholm. This on assumption of course that brother will wish to have body brought there, which we feel here would have been Dag's personal wish rather than to have it brought via New York.

No arrangements of course have been made in stockholm for any services nor have we taken any steps as to U.N. representation at such services except for Spinelli. We would be glad to have your views on those or other practical arrangements that you feel would be desirable or appropriate.

Incoming code cable

Priority

52

To : Linner
From : Bunche and Fieldservice
Date : 18 sept 61
No : 6471

SECRET

Reur A-2185 have nine DC-4s available which could be in Congo for service by 23 september approximately. Under prevailing circumstances in Congo, exceptionally high charges will amount to approximately 100,000 dollars per plane for fifteen day period, thereafter at hourly rate of ~~750~~ 750 dollars. Wish your advice before undertaking charter.

*sent to alamed
for action
19.11-*

Dr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
~~447~~
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 18 Sept 61
NO : 6457 (MOST IMMEDIATE)

Following message received early afternoon 18th from Abbas. Reads;
"Airforce definitely negative about Albertville because according to their information runway is only 1500 metres while at that height and temperature F-86 requires 2700 metres. Secondly navigational air known to be unreliable. Juba not (repeat not) suitable for jet operation because runway short and surface not stabilized and therefore dangerous for jet engines. I should repeat airforce insistence that unless refuelling takes place at Entebbe or at Nairobi as a less desirable alternative they cannot reach any point in the Congo. From these points they can reach Kamina but not (repeat not) Leo."

Please comment. Ethiopians ~~now~~ know of UK clearance for refuelling at Entebbe. Thus Juba no longer under consideration.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 18 Sept 61
NO : 6455 (ETATPRIORITE)

Reference ONUC 5392. Is there any assistance we can give re night landing facilities at Eville? If so, please give particulars and we will do our best.

*Being taken care
of by Joe Commander.
N. action from N.Y. required
any more.*

[Signature]

18
IX
2000 LT

INCOMING CODE CABLE

62 → 710

TO : MR. ABBAS ADDISABA INFORMATION DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 18 Sept 61
NO : 6454 (MOST IMMEDIATE)

Further my 578.

1. Ethiopian reconnaissance plane should proceed to albertville earliest to check on suitability of locating a fighter base. If conditions there should be considered unsuitable it should examine Luluabourge, as an alternative. Fuel etc. can also be place at Luluabourge. Speed is of utmost importance as bandit jet continues its costly marauding.

2. Please inform Ethiopian authorities that UN accepts responsibility for compensation in accordance with existing practices pertaining to military equipment, aircraft, stores etc..

cc. Dr. Linner, Gen Maceoin

For Dr Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 18 Sept 61
NO : 6452

US secretary of state has just informed me that three C-130s and one C-124 to assist our aerial transport are now repeat now en route to Leo.

Dr Linner
Air Commodore
has been given a
copy

18
IX
2180

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER for your information
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 18 Sept 61
NO : 6447 (MOST IMMEDIATE)

Following sent Abbas. UK representative has just informed that his government has granted clearance for 3 Ethiopian jets to overfly Kenya and Uganda and to refuel at Entebbe. The clearance for the 3 jets is explainable on the basis of the original request made. It may be assumed that clearance will also quickly be extended to the 4th jet, the 4 C-47s and the reconnaissance aircraft which was requested only on the evening of the 17th following receipt of your cable 359. Ethiopian representative here being informed.

New subject. You will share, I know, the extreme distress and shock we experience here at the news that Dags plane is missing.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE.

Dr Linner

To : Mr. Linner, Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 18 September 1961.
No. : 6446

SECRET

Further to my 6443.

1. Had telephone call night of 17th from UK mission relative to a message they had received from London indicating that Katangese jet had actually ceased activities. I emphatically assured them that this was not repeat not the case citing particularly activities of the jet on 17th reported in ONUC 5375 and A-2189.

2. Have also informed UK of call numbers of jets and C47s, and information about personnel and reconnaissance plane as reported to you in my 6443.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE.

Dr Linner.

To : Mr. Linner, Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 18 September 1961.
No. : 6444

SECRET

1. AP dispatches on evening 17th quote Irish government as announcing, on basis of a "report flashed to Dublin from Leopoldville by General Sean MacEoin", that Irish troops at Jadotville had been attacked on 17th by "vastly superior forces", that Irish were "overwhelmed" and their "position has changed drastically". MacEoin's SPECIAL REPORT in ONUC 5375, sent 172015Z, refers only to attacks on reinforcement companies. Please advise.

2. Have reinforcement companies returned to Eville ?

3. Another dispatch reports that Katangese anti-aircraft fire at Eville airport shot out an engine of Commander's DC6. Please advise.

4. It was also reported yesterday afternoon that Commander intended to make a flight last night to Eville.

cc. Mr. Linner ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

*Has been answered
by For Commander's Office.
on 18 IX*

[Signature]

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Dr Linner

To : Mr. Linner, Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 18 September 1961.
No. : 6443

SECRET

Following message just received from Abbas. This, I believe, was sent prior to receipt of my cable relaying to him MacEoin's instructions in ONUC 5372. Abbas message reads:

"Ethiopian Air Force say only route is Entebbe Kamina with essential stop for refuelling at Entebbe. Will overfly Kenya, Uganda and Ruanda Urundi. Air Force say landing other than Kamina technically impossible. Numbers of 4 fighters are: ET F86 253, ET F86 257, ET F86 254 and ET F86 256. Number of 4 accompanying planes are: ET C47 704, ET C47 705, ET C47 706 and ET C47 707. Number of crew and other personnel approximately 50. If clearance granted Ethiopian Air Force deem it necessary send reconnaissance plane to check facilities and establish if necessary communications channels. Ethiopian Air Force advises it is essential that following be secured in Kamina: 360,000 Litres fuel JP 4 military-F562, oil military-O-6082 grade 1010, hydraulic fluid military-O5606, alcohol military-A-6091, oxygen BB-O-925. In addition following types of equipment will be required: UHF-HOMER FRD 2 and ADF-HF, URN-5 and UHF GRC-32 B for tower. If these types not available in Kamina a C-130 cargo plane will be required to transport them from Ethiopia. In addition Early Warning System most essential to permit aircraft takeoff in case attacks. Your 574 Ethiopian authorities informed accordingly. No repeat no signal received as yet." Please comment and advise.

Mekki's reference to my 574 relates to A-2174 which I had relayed to him.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Linner, MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 18 September 1961.
No. : 6442

SECRET

Awaiting confirmation requested in my 6434.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓

Gen. MacEoin.

Incoming code cable

Dr. Lim

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SecGen
From : Bunche
date : 17 sept. 61
No : 6441

h

SECRET

Ref. A-2184

1) Your para one. We also having doubts about obtaining U.K. clearance and thinking of possibility of a Juba fuelling; have been exploring this with the Sudanese. Adeel reacted favourably and has sent a cable to his Government requesting clearance for overflight and refuelling at Juba for the Ethiopian jets.

2) Your para two. Have already advised Ethiopian ambassador and Mekki Abbas by cable of situation at Kamina and designation of Albertville as point of destination and base of operation on the basis of earlier cables from Mac Eoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

De Lomen

To : SECGEN, Leopoldville.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 17 September 1961.
No. : 6440

SECRET

Reference A-2178, para 3. Still no clearance from UK at 1245 PM ETD on 17th. I have talked with Pat Dean who could only say that no repeat no word had yet been received from London. But he promised to send urgent cable after I indicated that ugly talk was already in corridors about pithholding of clearance amounting to aid and comfort to depredations on a mercenary. Had to correct earlier suggestion of a lower member of UK mission that matter was "under discussion" with you in Leo, by emphazizing that in Leo you were supporting the request made from here.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

Dr. Lerner

To : SECGEN, Leopoldville.
From : BUNCHE, New York.
Date : 17 September 1961.
No. : 6439

SECRET

82

Reference A-2178. Tesfaye has cabled your message of appreciation to Emperor. Swedish and Indian representatives informed as per your para 4.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

Dr Linner

To : Linner, Leopoldville.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 17 September 1961.
No. : 6438

SECRET

Reference ONUC 5293, 5338 and our 6377. We note that news of plight of Irish company in Jadotville, received in Leo on 11 September, was not relayed to New York until 14 September.

Incoming code cable

Dr Linner

Most immediate

To : Linner
From : Bunche
Date : 17 sept. 61
No : 6436

82

SECRET

Recognize acutely critical nature of problem and we are immediately giving it highest priority and will do everything possible to get additional aircraft out there. Difficulties, of course, are obvious in view of current reluctance of our heretofore best source. Have approached U.A.R. and Ethiopia on question of military transport and propose to do same to Yugoslavia unless you perceive objection. Ethiopian representative very doubtful about their capacity. Would appreciate any suggestions that air Commander may have.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

To: Secretary General and Gen. Maceoin.
From: Bunche.
Date: 17 Sept. 1961.
No.: 6434.

Reference ONUC 5372, 5373. Mekki Abbas being instructed by cable to inform Ethiopian authorities and Ethiopian representative here also informed. Please confirm most urgently if word in above mentioned cables is signal promised in secgens A-2174. In any case, still awaiting British overflight and refueling stop clearance.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : SecGen
From : Bunche
Date : 17 Sept. 1961
No. 6432



Reference A-2173.

The pieces now all fit well and dirtily together. I love your last sentence for its balanced irony.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : SecGen
From : Bunche
Date : 17 Sept. 1961
No. 6429

SECRET

Reference A-2174 Ethiopian representative and Abbas have been informed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : MacEoin
From : Bunche
Date : 17 Sept. 1961
No. 6430

SECRET

Reference ONUC 5366. Does alternative Leopoldville mean in event Kamina should not be secure query. Assuming a refuelling. At Entebbe, would F86 jets be able to reach Leopoldville without an intermediate stop query.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE.

To : SECGEN, Leopoldville.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 17 September 1961.
No. : 6427



1. Following received night of 16 from Abbas. Reads : "Pleased report prime minister informed me that 3 or more jet fighters will be despatched soonest. I informed him suitable fuel available at Kamina. Chief of staff enquired if fuel suitable jet fighters F86 available. I could not answer. He said fighters cannot reach anywhere in Congo in one hop and requires permission to land for refuelling at Entebbe or other suitable place. Ethiopian authorities insist landing place where security repeat security and fuel ensured. Ethiopian authorities will not allow planes leave until you advise that landing permission in intermediate airfield has been secured. I cannot reach you by telephone until monday afternoon. And I suggest quickest way for you giving all necessary information to Ethiopian government through their liaison officer in Leo. I advise you repeat information to me in case of difficulties communication through Leo. Unquote

2. No response from UK as yet to our urgent request for clearances. We continue to press them.

3. Please advise about fuel for F86 aircraft and about security landing place.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Linner, MacEoin
From : Bunche
Date : 17 Sept 1961
No. 6426

SL

SECRET

Reference my 6415. Ethiopian representative pressing for Congo
airfield destination of Ethiopian jets. Please advise.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY *SL*

To : MacEoin
From : Bunche
Date : 17 Sept 61
No. 6425



Reference our 6374, 6379 and 6423. Ustates agrees to lift Swedish ammunition. Lift will commence when air clearances obtained.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

82

PRIORITY

To: Maceoin
From: Bunche
Date: 16 Sept 61
No. 6424

SECRET

Reference ONUC 5359.

We agree to postponement of Liberian, Ghanaian and Swedish rotation/repatriation, scheduled to commence last week of September. Matter taken up with countries concerned. Will keep you informed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

82
PRIORITY

To: MacEoin
From: Bunche
Date: 16 Sept 1961
No. 6423

SECRET

Reference our 6374 and 6379. Swedish mission informs that Sabena has cancelled charter for transport Swedish ammunition, on instructions from Brussels. In partial replacement, one Danish aircraft will depart Stockholm 17 September with some of ammunition. We have requested an aircraft for purpose from USAF, but have informed Swedish representative that we cannot be sure of this and that Sweden may proceed to charter a commercial carrier at UN expense if this should be considered necessary.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To: SecGen
From: Bunche
Date: 16 Sept 1961
No. 6422

SECRET

Reference A-2155. Cordier following up on suggestion your last paragraph referring to Reszon and Lippman.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To; SecGen
From: Bunche
Date: 16 Sept. 61
No. 6420

SECRET

Reference A-2152. Have conveyed to U Thant full substance your message. He has immediately cabled judge Aung Khine advising him to defer visit. We extended him privilege of UN code facilities. Since his talk with you, U Thant has not seen Aung Khine, who had not returned to Geneva at time of U Thant's departure. U Thant also intends to talk with Aung Khine by telephone.

IMMEDIATE.

To : Mekki Abbas, Addis Ababa.
Info : SECGEN, Leopoldville.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 16 September 1961.
No. : 6418

SECRET

Further to our telephone talk of 16th, Ethiopian representative has informed me that his government agrees to provide 3 jet trainer fighters with necessary crews and technicians for UN force in Congo. It being too late for them to be dispatched on 16th, they are being prepared for departure on morning of 17th. I have inquired of Leo as to the precise Katanga airfield to which they should be directed and will inform you as well as Ethiopian representative. Latter thinks it will expedite matters if you will handle details. Would appreciate therefore if you would ascertain and inform me soonest of route aircraft will take en route to Congo, which territories they will overfly, where they may wish fueling stops, call numbers of aircraft, number of personnel going along and any other relevant information. As indicated to you earlier, suitable jet fuel is available at Kamina.

Latest word from Leo underscores urgency of need for the jet planes in view of increasing terrorization of UN civilian planes by the Katangese Fuga jet.

We have already requested general clearance from UK for overflights of Kenya and Uganda and possible fuel stop at Entebbe.

(Message sent to Addis Ababa by New York)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

Mr. Fabry
ROUTINE

To; Linner, MacEoin
From: Bunche
Date: 16 Sept 1961
No. 6417

82
SECRET

Reference A-2037. Belgian representative informs that two of 17 foreign officers who it was agreed should stay on for a while are now ill at Kamina. Their names are commandant Mayence and Lieutenant Crotaeks. Belgian government requests that these two be repatriated as soon as possible.

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : SECGEN, Leopoldville
FROM : BUNCHE, New York
Date : 16 September 1961
No. : 6416

New York Times of 16 in despatch from Tanner in Leopoldville quotes Tombelaine as saying inter alia over Elisabethville radio on 15 September that "the UN is determined to stand by its decision to implement the Secco resolution of 21 February and to end the secession of Katanga". He is also quoted as saying that all "civilians caught as snipers will be shot in accordance with all recognized international usages". The broadcast was said to be monitored in Leopoldville.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

To : SECGEN, Leopoldville.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 16 September 1961.
No. : /~~6414~~ 6415

SECRET

Reference my 6414. To which airfield in Katanga should Ethiopian jets be directed.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

To : SECGEN, Leopoldville.
From : Bunche, New York.
Date : 16 September 1961.
No. : 6414

SECRET

SL

Reference A-2150 and 2153.

1. Tesfaye has informed me at eleven morning 16th that his Government has responded favorably to our request and will provide 3 jet trainer fighters. It being now too late to dispatch them on 16th, they will be sent off on morning of 17th, with technicians. Tesfaye has no details about where they will wish to stop en route. General clearance has been requested from UK for overflights and fueling stops.
2. In addition to cable sent to him, I talked by phone with Mekki at 6 morning of 16th and he undertook to see Prime Minister about request immediately. Asking him to obtain and inform us of details. Our major Alemu also talked by phone morning of 16th with Ethiopian chief of staff in support of request.
3. Swedish representative reports that request for jets is being very seriously considered in Stockholm. There are, of course, obvious technical difficulties as regards base and operations, and clearances, in view of distance factor.
4. India has agreed in principle, but point out that logistics problems for them are much more complicated than for Ethiopia.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SecGen
From : Bunche
Date : 16 Sept 1961
No. 6413

SECRET

Reference A-2154.

1. Have approached Harlan Cleveland directly and also Yost on request for Globemasters. Cleveland said he would pursue matter urgently "Both as to availability and policy". Could not be sure of reaching necessary people night of 15th but would be in touch with me first thing on morning of 16th.

2. I have feeling that we cannot be at all sure about getting USAF cooperation in an airlift from Stanleyville. A possible alternative with quick availability might be UAR, although they would probably not have Globemasters, if you see no objections. We will not, of course, relax pressure on Washington.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

To : SecGen
From : Bunche
Date : 16 Sept. 1961
No. 6411

SECRET

Reference A-2152. Will pursue matter with U Thant first thing morning of 16th. Narasimhan, incidentally, left on 14th on his planned speaking trip to Southwest. He was reluctant to leave but I urged him to go, having in mind particularly that you had concurred in his plan and that we could cover and absent member of the club for a short while.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : SECGEN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 16 Sept 61
NO : 6409 (MOST IMMEDIATE)

With reference to A-2156, para 6, we here would suggest deletion of wording in parentheses on grounds that this will be read as a thinly veiled threat of barbarous reprisal. Please advise urgently . Document will be out before seven on morning of 16th as S/4940/ADD3.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : SECGEN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 16 Sept 61
NO : 6408 (IMMEDIATE)

Reference A-2150 and 2153.

1. Have immediately followed up and receiving full cooperation from Tesfare, Rossel and Jha who are sending urgent cables to their governments and backing these up with phone calls.
2. Tesfaye suggested that UAR and Morocco also have jets and might well be willing to respond to an appeal from us. Will withhold any approach to them until advice from you.
3. Am also sending cable to Abbas asking him to approach Prime Minister in support of our appeal. Tesfaye thought this would be helpful.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : SECGEN
FROM : MR. CORDIER
DATE : 16 Sept 61
NO : 6405

Boland has informed me that Aiken proceeding to Leopoldville at once arriving Saturday night or Sunday morning. They assume he will have no trouble entry lacking visa. Purpose visit is to get direct report on developments Katanga. Election will take place Ireland in a few weeks.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. AHMED
FROM : FIELDSERVICE
DATE : 15 Sept 61
NO : 6403

Reur 5304 controller concurs that our 5760 replying to your 4740 already granted you sufficient flexibility of authority to pay 300 francs food allowance for small units where mess facilities not available and when not practical to apply rate of 125 CF. This subject to investigation by logistics and your staff as to feasibility of some future date of establishing and utilising mess facilities or applying the rate of 125 CF.

cc. Dr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN *SL*
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 15 Sept 61
NO : 6386 (ETATPRIORITE)

Austrian government requests transfer of Austrian medical detachment at Kamina to join other part of their unit at Stanleyville. They add that this unit ~~is~~ observing ONUC in a civilian capacity and would like it not to be involved in further fighting.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 15 Sept 61
NO : 6385

82

Ref my 6374 and 6377 Swedish government has chartered Sabena DC7C
call sign OOFFC for transportation of 10 tons of Swedish ammunition
to Leo. If necessary air clearances are obtained in time, aircraft will
arrive Leopoldville 18 September 1150z.

cc. Dr. Linner

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : LINNER/MACEOIN, LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : BUNCHE, NEW YORK
DATE : 14 September 1961
No. : 6382

Following cable sent to General Iyassu today:

"It now develops that visit to Berne would be premature at this stage. Therefore please travel directly. Make travel arrangements accordingly."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : Linner, Maceoin. *h*
From : Bunche
Date : 15 Sept 1961
No. 6379

SECRET

Reference my 6374 6377. Swedish mission inform that Swedish defense staff has accepted Sabena offer to transport ammunition for troops in the Congo. Aircraft will leave 17 September and arrive 18 September.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

To : SecGen
From : Bunche
Date : 15 Sept 1961
No. 6378

A-2150
A-2153

SECRET

One of most infuriating aspects of Katanga conflict, because we have no means of effective counteraction, is activities of the jet powered aircraft as reported in the addendum to the report and elsewhere. If you would consider it necessary and advisable it might be possible to obtain quickly 2 or 3 jet fighter aircraft with crews and technicians by urgent appeal to Ethiopia, India or Sweden.

cc. *Ma. Pargoulat*

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner, MaCceoin. *h*
From : Bunche.
Date : 15 Sept. 1961.
No. 6377

Reference my 6374. Following is full text of message reported to me by Swedish representative by phone this morning. Reads; "Cable from the Swedish Foreign Office September 15, 1961.

The defense staff informs that Headquarters Leopoldville requests urgent ammunition reinforcement from Sweden of caliber and type ammunition that is not available UN supply. Due to lack of time it is necessary that the shipment, weighing 10. tons, either be sent chartered commercial flight, or American transport plane which, according to the US Embassy Stockholm possibly may be made available on short notice if only request is made by UN. Imperative receive~~x~~ reply soonest if USAF-transport may be counted on and , in such case, data for flight European Base-Arlanda in order inform flight authorities. Return flight contemplated for use for repatriation wounded. Unquote

US authorities here have no word about approach.....to US Embassy in Stockholm."

!..... Some 35 ^{letters} ~~words~~ to the end of this cable are garbled and we are checking with NYK. As soon as received will deliver.

Code Clerk"

PRIORITY

To: Mr. Linner and Gen MacEoin. *h*
From: Code Clerk.

15 Sept. 1961.

Reference 6377 missing words at the end of the text.

Quote Us authorities here have no word about approach to US Embassy
in Stockholm Unquote.

SECRET

C O P Y

FROM UNATIONS NEW YORK SENT 15 SEPTEMBER 1961 16.12 Z

TO ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

6376 KHIARI YOUR ONUC 5280 PUBLIC WORKS STOP DELISLES
SENIORITY MAKES YOUR PROPOSITION DIFFICULT STOP HOWEVER,
WE ARE OFFERING HIM POST OF CHIEF ENGINEER ON BASIS OF
VAN DER OORDS RETURN STOP IF VAN DER OORD DOES NOT RETURN
MAY WE RECRUIT DELISLE AS HIS SUCCESSOR QUERY PARA ARE;
PR/11;

YOU ARRANGING VAN DER OORDS RETURN OR IS OUR INTERVENTION
NEEDED QUERY;

MACFARQUHAR

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Secretary General
From : Cordier
Date : 15 Sept 1961
No. 6375

SECRET

Fourie, South Africa, today expressed concern his government over arrest - as reported by British responsible for their interests in Congo - of South African civilians in Katanga. They mentioned particularly R J Hedges, P Vosloo and N Puren. They indicated that other civilians were also arrested and state that all those arrested were there on "Legitimate business" . They would like to know (1) Number, names and whereabouts of South African citizens arrested ; (2) Reasons for arrest; (3) What steps are envisaged for release and repatriation to South Africa and for the protection of their property ?

cc. Dr. Linner.

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Linner, Maceoin. *SL*
From : Bunche.
Date : 15 Sept 1961.
No. 6374

Swedish mission has just informed of inquiry received from Stockholm concerning a message from ONUC Headquarters, Leo to Swedish Defense Staff, Stockholm requesting dispatch most urgently by USAF or commercial aircraft ~~of~~ ^{up} of 10 tons of ammunition of types not available in Congo. Please advise. In meantime, although we have had no word about this, we have given O.K. to Sweden both for ammunition and for necessary airlift and are approaching USAF about latter.

SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Linner *HL*
From : Kelly, London.
Date : 15 Sept. 1961
No. 6372

A-2158

(Following message received 15 September from London as No. 512 for relay to ONUC Leopoldville. Original message sent Wednesday 13 September)

You may wish to inform the Secretary General that I was today called to the Foreign Office to discuss the Congo with specific relation to today's events in Katanga. Of course I explained I had no instructions to do so and could only listen, and that in any case I did not know the facts, but all these reservations proved unnecessary since Basil Boothby, head of the Africa department immediately showed strong sympathy with the UN position and in no way agrees with the viewpoint of right wing groups as expressed by Lords Salisbury, Clitheroe, Beaverbrook etc. Home is prepared to accept the explanation you gave Ricipes this morning for the outbreak of fighting in Elizabethville, but he will in any case be asking the Secretary General if he changed his mind since giving assurances to the UK permanent delegate that he hoped to settle the Katanga problem by peaceful means, and if so, what caused him to change. Hostile reaction from Salisbury, Beaverbrook etc. is to be expected, but the Foreign Office is confident of weathering it. Nicholson, president of UNA, will be a help in this respect. Boothby who had just left a meeting with Home seemed relieved that the Katanga problem appears now settled and may cease to be devil affairs relating to Africa. He regards the Belgian colonists as being solely responsible for Katangas attempted secession.

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : SECGEN, Leopoldville

FROM : NARASIMHAN, New York

Date : 15 September 1961

No. : 6371

Your A-2146. Document now being processed and will be
out first thing tomorrow morning.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

✓
TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN *SL*
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 14 Sept 61
NO : 6353

Note just received from Nigerian mission advises as follows:
"The Nigerian battalions now in the Congo will be due for rotation sometime in November. On the instructions of the government of Nigeria, the permanent representative regrets to inform the secretary-general that at the expiration of the term of service of the battalions now in the Congo, one battalion will be withdrawn and only one will be replaced. In effect, the second battalion, QONR, will not be replaced when it returns from the Congo in mid November, and there will be only one batalion from Nigeria serving in the Congo from that date.

In view of the fact that the withdrawal of one battalion will leave only one nigerian battalion in the Congo, the government of Nigeria also propose to withdraw the brigade headquarters at the same time

The government of Nigeria have taken this decision because of their reluctance to send back for a second tour of duty, after so short a period of rest, a battalion which had already completed a 6 months tour of duty there.

The government of Nigeria hope that the secretary-general will be able to make other arrangments to fill the gap which the withdrawal of one of the Nigerian battalions may cause".

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : SECGEN/LINNER, Leopoldville

SL

FROM : NARASIMHAN, New York

Date : 14 September 1961

No. : 6348

Your 2139, 2148, 2137. Report was caught in the nick of time (after internal but not external distribution had been made) and is being issued almost immediately in corrected form. Annexes II and III will be issued as S/4948/Add. 1 as soon as your answer to our query re Annex III has been received.

Text of report as in your cable save for minor editorial adjustments such as: Para 1, text of para A-2 of Secco resolution is quoted in full. Para 3, line 2, insert "Provincial" after "Katanga". Para 3, sentence starting "during the few hours that " insert "in violation of para A-1 of the Secco resolution of 21 February". After "tribal disturbances" para 9, sentence starting "most prominent among them" delete last two words "Algerian revolt" and replace by "recent revolt by French military elements in Algeria". Para 11, last sentence, insert "non-Congolese" in next to the last line between "requested that all the" and "officers of the Sûreté."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. LINNER *h*
FROM : MR. NARASIMHAN
DATE : 14 Sept 61
NO : 6344 (ETATPRIORITE)

A-2144

Reur A-2117.

Detailed totals as given add up to following grand totals:

Repatriated: 225, awaiting repatriation: 112, missing: 103. ✓

Also, total of French in C should be 20, rather than 21. Moreover, in paragraph Q, we presume that "grand ducale" refers to Luxembourg. As figures affect text of your report A-2137, paragraph 10, we are delaying publication of annex III pending correction of figures, which request most immediately, so that totals will check. Expect to issue annexes II and III as S/4940/ADD1 during 14 September.

INCOMING CLEAR

ONUC
LEO

6343 MOST IMMEDIATE *fr*

Linner Please transmit en clair most immediately French original of Tshombe's speech in A-2014 which is to be an annex to your report in A-2137.

NARASIMHAN

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : SEC GEN, Leopoldville
FROM : NARASIMHAN, New York
Date : 14 September 1961
No. : 6342

Your A-2135.

Belgian note verbale and communiqué will be circulated as S/4939 on assumption that this is proper way to "porter ce communiqué de presse à la connaissance des membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies" in absence cabled instructions to contrary document will be issued 10 A.M. New York time 14 September under heading "Note verbale en date du 13 septembre adressée au SecGen par le Représentant permanent de la Belgique transmettant un communiqué de presse du Gouvernement belge".

Footnote reading "la démarche en question n'a pas été reçue par le Secrétaire général" presumably refers to paragraph beginning "le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, Monsieur Hammarskjold, a immédiatement été interrogé afin de savoir, etc." and is being added accordingly.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner,
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 13 September 1961.
No. : 6337

SL
SECRET

Irish mission inform that press in Ireland on 10-11 September reported that an Irish company was surrounded by Katanga gendarmerie for 3 days and that O'Brien had refused to negotiate with Tshombe for their relief. Would appreciate information on situation in Jadotville over last few days.

cc Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen MacEoin.

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : SECGEN, Leopoldville
FROM : NARASIMHAN, New York
Date : 13 September 1961
No. : 6336

Following note verbale with attached communiqué received from Belgian Delegation. Belgian Delegation informed me that communiqué also handed to you in Leo. Would like to have your instructions on how to handle their request in paragraph 2 of note verbale. Text follows:

"Très urgent. Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général et à l'honneur de lui faire parvenir, sous ce pli, un communiqué de presse du Gouvernement belge au sujet des événements qui se sont déroulés ces derniers jours à Elisabethville. Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique serait reconnaissant à Monsieur le Secrétaire général de bien vouloir porter ce communiqué de presse à la connaissance des membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique saisit cette occasion de renouveler à Monsieur le Secrétaire général l'assurance de sa très haute considération". "Communiqué de presse du Gouvernement belge publié le 13 septembre 1961.

Suivant des dépêches reçues d'Elisabethville, M. O'Brien a déclaré ce matin au cours d'une conférence de presse que "le feu a été ouvert avec des armes automatiques par une vingtaine d'officiers belges se trouvant au Consulat."

M. O'Brien a ajouté que le Commandant indien de la compagnie qui attaquait la poste centrale avait rendu compte qu'un de ses hommes avait été tué par des coups de feu partant du Consulat "à environ 150 m. de la poste". De même source, il a été affirmé aux journalistes qu'une mitrailleuse était en batterie dans l'immeuble du Consulat. Dans une conférence de presse, tenue le 13 au matin à Léopoldville, le Premier Ministre Adoula a, par deux fois, affirmé que les coups de feu avaient été tirés par des civils des fenêtres du Consulat général de Belgique.

Les contacts qui ont pu être maintenus avec notre Consulat général ont permis une vérification immédiate de ces déclarations, et autorisent à déclarer de la manière la plus catégorique qu'elles sont dénuées de tout fondement.

Le Secrétaire général de l'ONU, M. Hammarskjöld a immédiatement été interrogé afin de savoir comment pareilles déclarations auraient pu être faites par son représentant au Katanga.

En fonction de sa réponse, le Gouvernement belge prendra les mesures qui s'imposent vis-à-vis de ceux qui répandent sans les contrôler des nouvelles d'une telle gravité. D'autre part, il a été également demandé à M. Hammarskjöld d'assurer la sécurité des ressortissants étrangers conformément au plan de protection exposé aux chefs militaires responsables des Nations Unies à Elisabethville, accepté et repris par eux au cours des réunions qui ont été tenues avec les représentants consulaires et M. O'Brien, le 2 septembre 1961. La responsabilité de cette sécurité est en effet reportée sur les forces des Nations Unies qui, par leur action, en ont dessaisi les autorités locales."

1...oming code cable

I M M E D I A T E

To : SecGen
From : MACFARQUHAR
Date : 13 Sept. 61
No : 6327

SECRET

Have story for what it is worth of very substantial Swiss bank account in favour of Katanga personalities. If Frasca has any corroboration Swiss might be requested to block account. No repeat no action taken here. In circumstances, Frasca might postpone departure for Vienna by few days to take look at this and other financial consequences of Katanga.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Ahmed, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Vaughan, New York.
Date : 12 September 1961.
No. : 6313

SECRET

Reur 5247 most grateful your understanding and consideration all facets procurement staffing problems. Subject your concurrence I plan to hold Lanser in New York for one week intensive briefing and indoctrination in HQ procurement practices. Under circumstances would you agree Lanser's round trip Leo New York official travel for briefing on CPO assignment and his wife's return New York Leo as dependant travel to join husband extending mission assignment.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Khiari, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. MacFarquhar, New York.
Date : 12 September 1961.
No. : 6306

SL

For Frasca.

Your ONUC 4912 secundo. Though cheque has not reached us American mission advise that payment of dollars 12.95 million has been authorized. You may therefore wish to proceed with import licensing before leaving for Vienna.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 12 September 1961
No. : 6304

SECRET

Reference A-2121. Have requested Tunisia for 3 officers
to be dispatched earliest to Elisabethville.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

IMMEDIATE.

To : Mr. Linner,
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. Bunche, New York.
Date : 12 September 1961.
No. : 6303

SECRET

Reference A-2127. Swiss army has facilities for complete range of training establishment of a high standard and is capable of fulfilling all ANC requirements. In a general discussion with the Swiss observer, reference was made to possible ANC requirements for officers and NCOs courses involving 50-60 trainees at a time, for courses of about 6 months duration.

Iyassu intends to discuss with Swiss authorities full range of facilities available, before he returns to Leo. At this stage, agreement in principle of the Congolese government to this arrangement is essential. Please advise soonest.

Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. KHIARI
FROM : MR. MACPARQUHAR
DATE : 12 Sept 61
NO : 6301 (ETATPRIORITE)

Your ONUC 5183 public administration consultant. Before we approach Chatti would you please consider possibility of his functioning as Secretary-general of Public Service Commission which would seem to be the appropriate place for handling all such questions in future. In any case we should first tie up loose ends about Dard which Linner proposed to discuss with you vide my COCA 253.

cc. Dr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN *SL*
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 12 Sept 61
NO : 6300 (ETATPRIORITE)

Reference ONUC 5122 and our 6269. Relatively, Katanga remains most important area. Therefore, consideration should be given to earmarking reserves that can be moved there urgently. With move of Gurkas out of North Katanga question of further withdrawals from there no longer arises. Furthermore, on basis of reasons given we agree that Malaysians should be left in Kivu for the present. This would reduce the choice of reserves for Katanga to the 3rd Battalion in Orientale. Incidentally, it is understood that withdrawal of an Ethiopian battalion is not likely to take place before first week of November.

With Gizenga in Leo only Lundulas future remains unresolved. Chances of gun running are considerably less now in Orientale whereas they continue to remain alive in South Katanga particularly in Kolwezi area. It would therefore be more appropriate to locate troops in South Katanga in preference to Eastern Orientale.

During my visit to Leo we should take up the future of the Belgian bases with the Congolese government. We do realize that once combat troops return to Matadi, and we agree they should be Nigerians, there will be insufficient troops available for Kitona as well. We should therefore negotiate reduction of UN commitments that should preferably not be beyond minimal custodian responsibilities. In this connection, employment of a small Nigerian police detachment should be examined.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER *SL*
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 12 Sept 61
NO : 6299 (ETATPRIORITE)

Reur A-2123. We fully endorse action regarding Belgian surete officers which we always have regarded as paramilitary personnel subject to A2.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER *82*
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 12 Sept 61
NO : 6298 (ROUTINE)

Reur A-2120. I have no views to express on your programme except to say that it seems prima facie will-conceived. I leave details of programme in your hands.

Thursday 11/30

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. AHMED
FROM : FIELDSEV
DATE : 12 Sept 61
NO : 6297 (ROUTINE)

Reur 5189. If Tombelaine does not take home leave on return Congo,
he will have to postpone it to 1962 and remain in the even cycle rotation
(rule 105.3h).

cc. Dr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER *h*
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 11 Sept 61
NO : 6295

Reference A-2121. Being taken up immediately.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : GEN. MACSOIN
FROM : GEN. RIKHYE
DATE : 11 Sept 61
NO : 6287

Ref ONUC 5240.

1
1. Rotation of 35/36th Irish battaion will be undertaken by air as already requested by Irish mission.

2. Reatriation of 1st Irish infantry group will be undertaken by air about 1 November. Details will follow.

cc. Dr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. LINNER *SL*
FROM : NARASIMHAN
DATE : 11 Sept 61
NO : 6283

(MOST IMMEDIATE)

Gibson-Parker has just telephoned from Paris that he has received your NO 2 and that after repeated efforts this message cannot repeat not be deciphered. As message contains indications of extreme urgency Gibson-Parker standing by for immediate repeat. If message is urgent as indicated would be useful if you repeated it also to New York in event that some defect in Paris deciphering unit responsible for this delay.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. KHIARI
FROM : MR. MACFARQUHAR.
DATE : 11 Sept 61
NO : 6281 (ROUTINE)

Our ONUC 5226 relief works programme. Increase in projects for outlying provinces most welcome. Position of additional title roman two supplies was reported in my cable 6196. If, as we expect, wheat flour is approved your finances through December 1961 seem reasonably easy. As we see it position in dollars is as follows

Your latest(July) report in Cunco 357 and 364 showed total spent, committed and allocated just under 3 million. Your new proposals for Orientale including government mission add 500,000. To meet this requirement of three and one dash half million (3 1/2 million) you have reported title roman two credits of 2.8 million. Adding Congo fund authorization of 1.63 million you have approximately 4 1/2 million already assured. The additional wheat flour will produce about another million and a half. Thus you would seem to have in sight about 2 1/2 million over and above present commitments and Oriental programme. Your actual expenditure of 1.2 million is well behind commitments.

If something more is immediately required to maintain the operation please let us know.

cc. Dr. linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

IMMEDIATE.

To: Dr. Linner, Gen. Mac Eoin. *SL*
From: Rikhye.
Date: 11 September 1961.
No. 6280.

Reference our 6182. Please expedite reply as cannot arrange
Iyassu visit to Berne without it.

Dist. Dr. Linner.
Gen. Mac Eoin.

Incoming code cable

PRIORITY

To : Linner *h,*
From : SecGen
Date: 11 sept 61
No. : 6272

SECRET

Re report on talks with Spaak. Congratulations to a good contribution to a smoother development. This expedition undoubtedly will prove most helpful, especially in the possible drama during the next few days. Details can be kept for our meeting.

Incoming code cable

PRIORITY

To : Linner *SL*
From : SecGen
date : 11 sept 61
No : 6271

SECRET

We have some qualms about Khiari's absence from leo to permit his visit to Elisabethville. In any event I would hope that he could be back by thursday to assist me with his ideas and evaluation regarding latest situation in Katanga.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner *SL*
From : SecGen
date : 11 sept. 61
No : 6270

SECRET

Reur A-2107 and 2109.

The speed of developments and the stage reached means that short of a change for the better in Katanga we are beyond the point of to return as regards your plans under 9-C. You are therefore authorised to pursue the policy, outlined by you also to the central Government, but we must impress on you the necessity in the course of its implementation to keep in mind the various views we have found necessary to express in the course of our exchange views of principles of which we know from your own cables that you share.

Incoming code cable

Priority

To : Linner
From : SecGen *sn*
Date : 11 sept 61
No : 6269

SECRET

Reur ONUC 5222.

Given the circumstances we have no objection against the arrangements you have made with the Ghurka battalion , which thus should remain in E'ville in spite of our previous instruction. We shall revert tomorrow regarding other military arrangements reported in this cable, as we wish to give them some further consideration.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

To : Linner *SL*
From : SecGen
Date : 11 sept 61
No : 6268

Reur A-2108.

Might it not be an idea, now that Tshombe gives some signs of breaking, to try to use my visit to leo as a face-saving device for him ?

Incoming code cable

SECRET

To : Linner *SL*
From : SecGen
Date : 11 sept 61
No : 6267

Reur A-2106.
Agree that Egge should not leave E'ville now.

245 Wednesday

I M M E D I A T E

To : Linner *52*
From : Sec Gen
Date : 11 Sept. 61
No : 6266

SECRET

Please transmit urgently to Adoula following reply to his letter transmitted by A-2112 :

" Le 10 septembre 1961

Excellence,

j'ai l'honneur d'accuser reception de votre aimable lettre du 10 septembre envoyee a la demande unanime du gouvernement central et m'invitant a venir a Leopoldville pour une echange de vue avec vos Ministres et vous-meme concernant l'aide et l'assistance des Nations Unies a la republique du Congo, sur la base des intentions de l'organisation que je vous ai confirmees dans ma lettre du 13 aout.

Il est vrai, comme vous le dites, qu'une telle visite presente des difficultes pratiques a la veille de l'ouverture de la session de l'assemblee generale, mais je m'empresse d'accepter l'invitation du Gouvernement, car je suis convaincu qu'un contact personnel et direct avec vous et avec tous vos ministres a ce moment serait de la plus grande valeur pour etablir sur une base ferme et claire le developpement de l'assistance de l'O.N.U. au

Gouvernement central. Nous nous felicitons des relations excellentes qui existent, et des consultations fructueuses inaugurees par votre Gouvernement avec les representants de l'organisation; en me rendant a Leopoldville sur votre invitation, j'espere pouvoir contribuer un peu plus, si peu que ce soit, a raffermir les liens si heureusement etablis par vous.

En vous remerciant tres chaleureusement de cette invitation, je desire vous exprimer aussi ma vive appreciation des mots aimables a l'egard de l' O.N.U. que vous avez bien voulu formuler dans votre lettre.

Acceptez, Monsieur le president du conseil, l'assurance de ma tres haute consideration.

Dag Hammarskjold, secretaire general des Nations Unies "

For your information and as oral comments to Adoula:

(continued)

I would be accompanied by Wieschhoff and Ranallo. We would leave with direct Panama flight next tuesday night and shall make arrangements for return bringing us back monday morning to New York.

We will publish Adoula's letter and this reply here at noon tomorrow.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To : Khiari only rpt only
From : SecGen
Date : 9 Sept. 1961
No. Unnumbered

SECRET

Reur unnumbered concerning conversation of 6 September between you and Kasavubu. Consider cooperation as suggested impossible. We cannot deal directly with chief of state, by-passing cabinet on political issue undoubtedly within its competence; this has general application after 2 August. It would further be illusion that such expert could be there in absolute secrecy, as his presence for 3 months would have to be publicly justified. This latter practical consideration, however, is not our real argument which is one of principle, but if we had had any temptation to act as suggested, we just could not have carried it through.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

To :Mr. Khiary
From :SecGen
Date :9 Sept 1961
No. 6259

SECRET

Reur A-2087.

Would appreciate earliest possible information whether arrangements have been carried through with indicated final dateline.

I M M E D I A T E

To : Khiary only
From : Sec Gen
Date : 9 Sept. 61
No : 6258

SECRET

Reur 2103 .

You will of course know that anyway, but I want to emphasize that there is one important additional argument for going ahead without waivering on political advisers in Leo. After the action which we have undertaken and continue in Katanga, at the request of and with full support of also the most conservative elements in central government, the central government undercuts our possibilities to act very badly if they do not follow through on political advisers in Leo. Retreat by central government on this question weakens our hand when , within our mandate, we try to do what they themselves consider necessary in Katanga. I hope Adoula sees this and appreciates that central government cannot afford applying two measures to question of foreigners, one valid in Leo and one valid in Elisabethville, without indirectly turning us into political tool in a sense and in a way which I cannot justify.

Most Immediate

To : Khiary only
From : SecGen
Date : 9 Sept. 61
No : 6257

SECRET

Further Re 2081, para 9C.

We note in your 2096 O'Brien's wish for authority "to react immediately to any incident consequent to this incitement which may involve loss of life, etc.", and that you are urgently elaborating detailed instructions which we have as yet not received. We further note in 2100, points 5 and beginning of 6, that you try to keep gendarmerie in line in case 9C has to be applied and that you share our hesitation re second half of 9C.

In later communication you say that you would appreciate receiving "authority to apply ~~the~~ 9C immediately after Khiary's return".

Finally, in 2103 you postpone to "une date ulterieure application essentielle du para 9C".

With quick changes of constellations and pending your elaboration of instructions, I believe that authority for specific step cannot now be given beyond what you can conclude yourselves from our 6158 and Schachter's memo. Specifically, however, you are authorised, at the moment you consider that necessary, to take control of radio station. The legal rationale in this case is as follows :

- A) SECCO resolution A-1
- B) Action presumably covered by authorisation from central government.
- C) Action taken in flagranti that is after repeated sendings of highly incendiary nature.

In all these respects the action has justification and validity which did not exist in case of similar action 5 September 1960 in Leo; this action was justified in SECCO solely on "emergency rights" ~~main~~ basis. With these new legal justifications and in view of last years action, we could even be accused of biased stand if we did not intervene against E'ville radio when clearly the only alternative; our justification for waiting is of course Tshombe's promise, and wisdom of waiting until other means fully tried, but we note now development according to your 2105 which indicates

that Tshombe's word in this as in other respects is worth nothing.

Generally speaking of course authorisation to use force in self-defense stands, which seems to cover "from O'Brien in 2096, with the proviso however that very much ground may be lost psychologically at the first shot from our side, if we can be accused of acting prematurely or in provocative way.

Finally, importance of standing in flagranti authorisation re trouble makers should not be under-estimated. Were one of those gentlemen for example to take active part in or lead a mob demonstration, they certainly can be apprehended.

In view of what you say in 2100, para 1, I wonder if Katangese in Leo could be stimulated to act as counter-weight to E'ville propaganda . They do so in the press and even better over Leo radio . The point seems to be reached when counter-fire is necessary and where it would be quite in order provided we continue to keep the exit door open for Mr T. What, if anything, has come out of the requests of the refugees reported in 2095 ? How on the whole do you manage to handle the refugees, and don't you need additional assistance, red cross people, etc. ?

INCOMING CODE CABLE

82
ROUTINE

File

To : Maceoin
From : Rikhye
Date : 9 Sept. 1961
No. 6256

SECRET

Ref ONUC 5213 and our 6058.

1. Liberian mission has informed us that 235 all ranks will be the total of the Liberian contingent in the Congo after next rotation. Therefore, we assume 230 troops will be withdrawn without replacement.
2. The government of Liberia have agreed to extension for captain Kamara for six months.

cc Mr. Khiary ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY.

To: Mr. Khiari.
From: Sec Gen.
Date: 8 September 1961.
No. 6252.

Reference first para of your A-1987 of 24 August reporting Englund's findings of Red Cross emblem on small arms cases. Matter was taken to notice of President of CICR. He is anxious to know whether we could give him any additional information regarding these consignments. In particular it would help him to know if those cases bore any inscription or other national emblem of any national Red Cross Society. Grateful if Englund could be asked for a report which may be cabled to us on receipt.

cc Dr. Linner.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY.

To: Dr. Linner.
From: Sec Gen.
Date: 8 September 1961.
No. 6239.

International press continues to carry many detailed stories concerning developments in E'Ville, occasionally attributing to UN officials statement which we are sure are not based on facts. Thus the "New York Times" of this morning refers to a shooting incident involving Indian troops and Brigadier Raja is as saying "that he had given orders to shoot back".

In view of the many sensitivities involved in the Katanga development, greatest care must of course be used by all in all their public relations. I am sure that all officers involved are fully aware of this requirement and I only bring it to your attention because of so many erroneous statements appearing in the press.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

SECRET

PRIORITY.

*mixt
illegl*

File

fr

To: Operations.
From: Kitona Base Commander.
Date: 8 September 1961.
No. Unnumbered.

Special sitrep number 1. Para 4.

Generally. Following information received from Banana: A Portuguese Navalcraft was observed outside Banana at approximately 071700 Local Time. While steaming towards Banana the Navalcraft shelled the Angola coast with artillery between 1730 and 1745 Local Time. This was observed from Kitona Base. On morning 8 September the Navalcraft was no longer visible from Kitona Base.

*will be reported to N.Y
by Force Commander
on 8 IX 61*

cc Dr. Linner.

2

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Ahmed, Leopoldville.
From : Mr. MacFarquhar, New York.
Date : 8 September 1961.
No. : 6230

SECRET

Your ONUC 5182. Field service confirm normal practice is definition of rate in dollars; in this case namely "local currency equivalent of 18 dollars". Thus there seems to be no administrative problem. Casual reference to early revaluation of Congolese franc is deprecated and "our future intent" not repeat not understood.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER ONLY
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 7 Sept 61
NO : UNNUMBERED

h

Reur unnumbered today regarding possible letter from Adoula; no repeat no observations on text.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 7 Sept 61
NO : 6210

Further to our 6181. Would additional battalion in Eville and something of approximate size in Jadotville and Kolwezi be useful back-stop? If so it is for you to decide on how troops could best be redeployed. Situation in Leo may perhaps now permit reduction of garrison in Kitona to a company and in Leo to 2 Battalions. If so consideration might be given to moving Swedish unit to Kolwezi and Jadotville with a company of Nigerians relieving them in Kitona. How important is it to maintain garrison in Bunia? Is it feasible to remove a battalion from Orientale? Might a battalion also be withdrawn from North Katanga at this time?

Psychological reaction to a reinforcement in South Katanga could be important. In our view reinforcements for Eville should be neither European nor Indian. Malayans would be very suitable although we realize they would have to be relieved first. endit.

cc. Linner, Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER *h*
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 7 Sept 61
NO : 6208 6209 (ROUTINE)

For your information transmitting herewith some observations on the legal aspects of the Katanga situation which have been prepared by Schachter and which I believe may be useful in the formulation of your own evaluations: "In the absence of more detailed information regarding the threatened hostilities, and the specific measures that are proposed to be taken by the United Nations troops, one cannot reach definitive legal conclusions on the issues raised by the recent cables. However, the following summary observations may serve as a guide for the time being.

1. The United Nations mandate to maintain law and order authorizes it to occupy positions and deploy troops to protect civilians in cases of inter-tribal warfare or in cases where there is a danger of violence.

2. Similar authority exists under paragraph 1 of security council resolution of 21 February 1961 to take preventive action where there is incitement to, or actions in preparation of, civil war.

3. Moreover, the United Nations force is clearly entitled to use the necessary force in self-defense in response to attempts to compel them to withdraw from positions or attempts to infiltrate and envelop such positions in a way as to jeopardize their safety. Such self-defense measures may also be taken to resist attempts to injure or abduct United Nations personnel.

4. Self-defensive measures by the UN force could also be justified where there is evidence of a clear danger that UN troops may be subject to imminent attack. In such cases, defensive action may be taken to disarm or detain those preparing the attack.

5. Whether or not reports of preparation for, or incitement to, violence justify the use of preventive or defensive force by United Nations troops can only be answered in the light of the specific circumstances. Obviously, mere criticism of UN action - even if vigorously stated - or demonstrations of a peaceful nature would not justify use of force by the United Nations. However, actual troop movements or well-confirmed reports of impending attack would warrant protective action by the United Nations troops. such

protective action

protective action would include the employment of such force as is necessary to meet the danger.

6. The mandate to maintain law and order and to prevent civil war may also justify, in certain circumstances, the closing of means of communication such as the radio station and airports, if circumstances clearly indicate that they are being used or may be presently used for civil war or unlawful purposes. The legal basis for taking such measure is of course strengthened when the competent authorities of the central or provincial government have requested or approved such measures.

7. Measures for the forcible apprehension and detention of individuals are clearly justifiable in the event that they are apprehended while engaged in military action or otherwise ~~in~~ in flagrante delicto. In circumstances which fall short of this, the problem is a difficult one to deal with in abstracto. The situation may be such as to warrant detention or the placing of a guard around the house if the individual involved is clearly engaged in incitement to immediate violence. On the other hand, to detain or apprehend a political leader without such justifying circumstances would appear to involve a violation of the ban against intervention in domestic political conflicts.

8. The difficulty referred to above is substantially overcome if both the provincial and central government authorities request United Nations assistance in effecting an arrest for the purposes of preventing disorder and civil war. It would appear doubtful, however, that an arrest order by the central government authorities alone against a provincial leader should, by itself, be a basis for enforcement action by the United Nations. This consideration would seem to apply even if the central government legally appointed a commissaire d'etat to enforce laws under article 184 of the basic law.

9. With respect to the commissaire d'etat, it is difficult to say that the appointment of that official to act in a province decisively changes the legal situation that otherwise applies to the United Nations in regard to conflicts between the central and provincial governments; that is to say, assistance in enforcing measures of the commissaire d'etat would have to have the same legal justification as taking measures requested by the central government in opposition to the provincial government. In other words, the intervention of a commissaire d'etat would not ipso facto remove the problem of interference in constitutional conflicts. Endit.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : GEN. RIKHYE
DATE : 7 Sept 61
NO : 6202

8

Would you consider early withdrawal of some administrative and support units of the Indian Brigade group that are not being fully employed possible? During my last visit Brigs Sartaj and Raja considered it feasible and promised to examine it.

Grateful for an early reply.

cc. Linner,¹Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*W. Tabor: cannot you find out
if v. Royen is still in
D. v. m.*

TO : DR. LINNER
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 7 Sept 61
NO : 6197 (ROUTINE)

I have had a call from senior and most experienced man in London outside government. He just wanted to mention, being in accord with Bank of England, that there is some worry about repatriation of Van Royen in Central Bank of Katanga for technical reasons. They do not want to discuss merits of case or role of Van Royen beyond saying that banking and financetransactions in Katanga are very much tied to this one man and that, therefore, professionally well qualified replacement is necessary if we want to avoid undesirable and unnecessary confusion in this field. Matter was in no way pressed and I have not impression that back of it is Katanga lobby, as the man approaching me in such respects is rather to be qualified as radical cynic. He wanted to inform me for what it is worth and I do the same with you.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. KHIARI
FROM : MR. MACPARQUHAR
DATE : 7 Sept 61
NO : 6196

My 5590 commercial imports under public law 480 r title 2, repeat 2. Americans inquire whether we have any objection to setting aside up to 5 percent of counterpart from any future supplies for allowances to families of married Congolese students holding ICA fellowships. Daily rate proposed is local currency equivalent of 2 dollars plus 25 cents for each child. Please advise. Presumably these fellows would not be government servants whose families, it is understood, receive husbands salary.

Americans inquire also whether they should reserve 500 tons of rice through February 1962 against a possible requirement for relief repeat relief supplies.

We are hopefully requesting 16800 tons of wheat flour under title 2 to carry you through december (your ONUC 4550) on assumption you have Congolese request. This is a ngop-gap arrangement pending negotiation of title 1 agreement and there are no further title 2 supplies in sight.

You need not approach Congolese authorities about acceptability of title 1 since we expect this to be done directly by Americans and we expect to be involved only in acceptance of counterpart. You will be kept informed as soon as we hear that washington accepts text proposed to them.

cc. Linner

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : LINNER, Leopoldville

FROM : SECGEN, New York

Date : 7 September 1961

No. : 6194

Spaak will be delighted to receive Khiari on Saturday morning at 11 AM. He should like to be advised concerning precise hour of arrival so that member of his Cabinet can personally welcome Khiari at airport.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

To : Linner
From : SecGen New York.
Date : 7 Sept 1961.
No. 6193

A-2101

Transmit separately cable just received from Spaak. It will interest you to compare notes. We would appreciate your his interpretation of most recent events as well as on his suggestions. If it can be shown that certain Gendarmerie elements are those persecuting Africans on racial basis and concretely cause part of the panic, such people of course can be apprehended Could Gendarmerie be persuaded to do this themselves ; Viewed from here they have given impression of not being back of such actions be single individuals or groups query.

NOTE: missing groups to be verified

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : LINNER, Leopoldville

FROM : SECGEN, New York

Date : 7 September 1961

No. : 6191

Following is my reply to Spaak's cable of today:

"Monsieur le Ministre, je vous remercie de votre télégramme de ce jour, donnant des informations qui vous sont parvenues sur les développements au Katanga. J'apprécie cet effort de votre part de partager avec nous les renseignements reçus. J'espère de notre côté pouvoir vous donner un tableau détaillé si la visite de M. Khiari à Bruxelles peut se réaliser samedi comme je vous ai suggéré. Haute considération. Dag Hammarskjold, Secrétaire général des Nations Unies".

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : LINNER, Leopoldville

FROM : SECGEN, New York

Date : 7 September 1961

No. : 6190

Following received today from Spaak:

"Secrétaire général Hammarskjold Nations Unies, New York. Je répondrai plus tard à vos deux lettres des 1 et 5 septembre. Je crois que mon devoir est de continuer à vous envoyer mes informations sur le Katanga. Je vous répète qu'elles proviennent de gens sérieux et désireux d'éviter tous incidents. On me dit que le plus grave danger à l'heure actuelle est la panique qui s'est développée chez les Balubas du Kasai. Celle-ci menace de s'amplifier et de créer ainsi aux forces des Nations Unies de très grandes difficultés. Suivant mes informateurs cette panique est une conséquence du désarmement trop rapide de la Gendarmerie katangaise dont quelques éléments indisciplinés se sont livrés à quelques exactions sur les Balubas. Ces exactions ont été à l'origine du mouvement qui est en train de se développer dangereusement. La deuxième crainte suivant mes informateurs provient de la situation créée par le départ massif de tous les officiers d'administration. Alors qu'à fin août soldes et ravitaillement ont été normalement distribués aux soldats la situation fin septembre risque d'être toute autre. Si les soldats ne reçoivent pas soldes et ne sont pas normalement ravitaillés les conséquences peuvent être très graves. Je pense donc qu'il serait sage de permettre à une cinquantaine d'officiers belges bien au courant des problèmes de rester au Katanga et d'assurer l'administration de la Gendarmerie. Ces officiers

pourraient revêtir la tenue civile et coopérer avec les Nations Unies ainsi que le prévoyait d'ailleurs le rapport Egge. Cette proposition est faite sur suggestion du Colonel Muke. Je me permets de vous conseiller de la prendre en très sérieuse considération. J'envoie Vandewalle à Eville pour discuter de ce problème avec O'Brien. D'après mes informateurs il est absolument faux que les officiers aient pris le maquis. Le 6 septembre seuls restent à Eville une trentaine d'officiers belges dont d'ailleurs la très grande majorité sont dès à présent rapatriés et les autres sur le point de l'être. Spaak."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Linner
From : SecGen New York.
Date : 7 Sept. 1961.
No. 6189

SECRET

A-2100

For your information and, use in proper context, I give you key argument as used to delegations yesterday.

Theoritically we face four alternative developments .

1. Tshombe accepts invitation and cooperates with central government, with the implication that whatever special status may be achieved for Katanga would be established with ⁱⁿthe constitutional framework and as a result of negotiations in constitutional form of the problem on new loi fondamentale; This would save Tshombe personally, although perhaps not all of his collaborators, and it would give Katanga the greatest degree of freedom that in the long run could be politically liable.

2. UN has to resort to "drastic measures", which increasingly would lead us to a kind of take-over of controls in various respects in Katanga, entirely against our wishes and with obvious objections in view of UN principles as we wish to maintain them; I is only because of the inacceptability of alternatives 3 and 4, that we, in case of lack of positive developments under alternative one, would have to assume responsibility for such aye policy.

3. In view of general political significance of Katanga , as evidenced in last year's developments, the central government will have to bow to pressures from the more extreme nationalists and try ANC operation against Katanga. Although in strict legal sense not a civil war action, it would in practice mean civil war with all the consequences in direction of spreading of conflict, sufferings for the people and sharp drop in prestige of UN in all directions.

4. The conservative elements resist nationalist efforts according to alternative 3, and this leads to a breakdown of the constitutional government of the character, although not in the form, of last year's break-up of the central government. Paras 3 and 4 are alternatives which must be squarely rejected, the only development which the UN can envisage is along the lines of 1 and 2 with the organisation being pushed further and further in direction of 2, if no evolution according to 1 takes place, and 3 and 4 represent a realistic threat.

./.

Contd from 6189.

My conclusions were that the governments approached will have a major interest in strongly supporting a development to 1, but should anticipate developments according to 2, and for that reason assume the responsibilities for what we have to do if they did not help in direction of 1.

The analysis was recognised as realistic, and it is of special importance that British Ambassador did not raise any objection. For the British, who of course have to take into account the Katanga lobby in parliament, the essential thing seems to be that we act in a way which does not deprive Tshombe of his legitimate legal status and, to all possible extent, makes it easier for him to act on constitutional assumptions and within constitutional framework. They are emphatic in not recognising secession contrary to the constitution on Tshombe as chief of an independent state with a position as such which it is our duty to respect. -

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To: Linner, Khiari *h*
From: SecGen
Date: 7 Sept 1961.
No. 6187

PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

My 6069 your ONUC 5112. Macfarquhar available to go immediately if you are ready for him. Absence of senior cabinet ministers may have impeded rapprochement with Adoula on philosophy of civilian operations paper of 7 August.

Secondly, although project detail is not repeat not essential at this time, your senior specialists should know the minds of ministers on general overall content of assistance.

Thirdly, study of first Chafanel report suggests he is ready to discuss definite recommendations in public finance field.

Fourthly, we have to fit into Frascas and Chafanel's movements.

Thus, depending on your reply, alternative dates apparently are next Tuesday's PAA flight or first days of October. Please advise.

INCMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITY

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : Linner Leopoldville. *h*

From : SecGen New York.

Date : 7 Sept. 1961.

No. 6185

SECRET

Reur A-2093

Suggestion quite agreeable to me but, obviously, visit requires arrangement with Spaak. We shall take the matter up immediately and cable result as soon as received.

Incoming code cable

Priority

82

To : Ahmed
From : Hamilton Fieldserv.
Date : 7 sept. 61
No : 6184

SECRET

Your 5100.

Grateful your agreement Syrovi and Habal not only because of our commitments to them but because we believe they will be genuinely useful.

We note that Tombelaine does not wish to remain beyond 15 september and that a replacement is needed. Quite understand your difficulty in releasing Fulcheri and furthermore feel that he could be better utilized in personnel. Recommend Succar (P-4) (UAR-Syria), ex-staff member of PSCA, who report ONUC mid-september. If this acceptable OPI request Tombelaine take brief home leave and report Headquarters by first november.

Erian was told clearly and repeatedly that he was subject to assignment in any administrative capacity and any locale decided by ONUC. Unless he is definitely needed in Boskovic operation, suggest you direct him undertake whatever assignment, provincial or Leopoldville, seems most suitable. Should he refuse please advise us and we will advise ICAO that he is being returned to them forthwith. You should know, however, that we had very good reports on Erian from ICAO and that we and TAB were favourably impressed during interviews.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

Priority

To : Khiary, MacEoin *sz*
From : Macfarquhar
Date : 7 sept. 61
No ; 6183

Our 6121 academic subjects in army school. Please ask Terenzio to show you Maheus reply 5705 to SecGen. Presume you will answer his questions directly and inform us.

Incoming code cable

SECRET

To : Linner, MacEoin
From : Rikhye
Date : 7 Sept. 61
No : 6182

At our request Swiss Government has agreed to provide training facilities to the ANC in Swiss military schools. Arranging for Iyassu to visit Berne on his way to Leo to examine facilities available and discuss connected arrangements. Please inform Congolese Government and obtain their agreement to this arrangement.

Incoming code cable

IMMEDIATE

To : Linner
From : SecGen
Date : 7 Sept. 61
No : 6181

SECRET

Further reur A-2081 slash 82. You may have considered reinforcing south Katanga urgently so as to be ready for any eventuality and also to impress those who may play with "resistance group" ideas. We shall revert to this question after discussion also with Bunche who will be back again tomorrow, but would appreciate your thoughts re this matter.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : DR. LINNER
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 6 Sept 61
NO : 6158 (MOST IMMEDIATE)

A-2093
A-2100

After first study of your 2081/82. We send following observations. Your views and suggestions will continue to be under our most seriousⁱ consideration.

We see this morning British, Americans, Belgians and may address a new written message to ~~the~~ Belgium. We see early this afternoon Canada, Sweden, UAR, Tunisia and Nigeria. All will be approached on lines of your cables with background in my letter of yesterday to Spaak.

Re specific points: Your para 6. We have no doubt that with propaganda for inter-tribal hatred and as things develop, para A one of resolution would entitle us to control of radio station as later indicated beginning of your para 9 charlie.

Your para 7. We are agreed that for the moment North Katanga as well as border control questions should be left aside.

Your para 8. First sentence noted. Second sentence: We consider it of special importance that central government proceed quickly with confirmation of a number of officer in gendarmerie. Third sentence: The role of Katanga parliamentarians is of course crucial both in Leo and in Eville; We note your initiative without being able to evaluate best timing for return.

Your para 9A. Question of diplomatic contacts here already covered. Whom would you envisage as available for one day mission to Brussels of your team? We note Leo intentions re Crener and Herckens.

Your para 9B. Continued pressure is of course strongly indicated. Final sentence: Such procedure seems justified in light of your para 1, but in order to avoid new outbursts accusing us of illegitimate use of force, etc., we must, before reporting to ultimative demand, take aye

new round with Belgians. Which

new rounds with Belgians. Which however can be done quickly and will be started at once.

Your para 9 charlie. First two sentences: Agreed in principle but very much will depend on how these steps are implemented; We regard it as of special importance that we avoid antagonising Gendarmerie and, if possible, get them with us. Will reject to second half of this para as it does require some consideration. It would naturally be most unfortunate if we have to go to this point, and it would ~~naturally/be/most/and~~ in practice amount to temporary occupation on behalf of central government in a way which at least comes close to "interference by force" in domestic affairs. But we agree with you that if the alternative is what you mention in para 10, we may have to take the responsibility also for such "interference" as the lesser of evils.

Kasavubu's stand noted: There are quite important decisions of a legal nature which would strengthen our possibilities of action.

Generally speaking: In our whole approach we should try to protect Tshombe's legitimate legal position and keep the door open for him to save it by cooperation with Leo within consitutional framework. He should understand that personally he has no alternative, and that irrespective of what UN may do.

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. AHMED
FROM : FIELDSERV
DATE : 6 Sept 61
NO : 6156

Reur 4849 purchase 25 additional small cars and 2 buses. Not clear what relationship this bears to 46 light cars for civilian operations and 2 heavy buses for military on Leo/1-018/ORD as discussed your 4693. Suggest we make no further purchase of vehicles until you are able to assess what results will be of possible reductions in the force.

cc. Dr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville. *h*
From : SECGEN, New York.
Date : 6 September 1961.
No. : 6149

SECRET

Belgian mission here expresses view that it would be most helpful in present situation if we could delay departure of Belgian doctors and chaplains in Katanga Gendarmerie. I feel that good case can be made for doctors, as probably quick replacement from our side in their case is difficult. Chaplains may by some be considered a luxury and also from other viewpoints case has weaknesses, but I feel that matter should be considered on individual basis. In both cases we must leave decision to you in light of your greater knowledge but taking into account views transmitted by Belgians.

Re Katanga we note today's ticker news re assembly and demonstration. Neither development seems very impressive as result of certainly very strong background pressures. Main thing seems to me to be to keep Gendarmerie out of politics which should be possible with proper treatment. My feeling is that this is a moment in the Katanga revolution where best policy is to remain strong but to sit tight and let the medicine do its work without, if possible, new injections.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *SL*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : SECGEN, New York.
Date ; 6 September 1961.
No. : 6148

SECRET

Reference your 5117 and our 5910, 6066.

I fully realise the pressures and circumstances under which you all are undertaking your arduous duties. It is, however, extremely important for us here to be fully informed of important military movements and events.

We should also, whenever possible, be informed of your proposed moves and plans in advance to enable us to send our views as necessary. This would enable us to coordinate all our efforts.

Would therefore greatly appreciate your immediately looking into the question of improving the reporting system.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *SL*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Gen. Rikhye, New York.
Date : 6 September 1961.
No. : 6147

SECRET

A-2091

Reference A-2079, ONUC 5121.

Assume UN escort provided to convey Lt. Col. Yangoye to Kabalo or Sentery area, on specific request of Congolese authorities to assist them in the maintenance of law and order.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, Leopoldville. *62*
From : SECGEN, New York.
Date : 5 September 1961.
No. : 6152

SECRET

On rechecking ONUC 5117 I find that we may have overstated Jadotville situation in letter to Spaak. I repeat our view that protection in Jadotville should not be reduced below original strength.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Mr. Linner, *de*
Gen. MacEoin, Leopoldville.
From : Gen. Rikhye, New York.
Date : 6 September 1961.
No. : 6146

SECRET

Reference our 5844 - 5 and 6065.

Awaiting reaction to above cables. In case you have not yet had an exchange of views with the Congolese, inform us of your preliminary reactions based on your knowledge of the situation and probable Congolese reaction without further delay. This can be followed by final recommendations after fuller discussions with the Congolese.

cc. Mr. Linner. ✓
Gen. MacEoin.