

UNAMIR

HAC - OPERATION TURQUOISE

11 NOV 1993 - 31 JAN 1994

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**COLLECTED MINE INTELLIGENCE
UP TO 31 JANUARY 1994**

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1. Introduction The mine and booby trap problem is confined to a small area of the northern part of the country. Mines were probably laid by both parties in the dispute, but the majority were probably laid by RGF to defend their static locations. RPF have laid harassment mines, to curtail RGF vehicle movement. The worst mine problem lies in the areas where the RGF have withdrawn, leaving mines and booby traps behind them. These were laid in tea and banana plantations, on open grassland and on tracks, and will be a serious threat to the local population, and incoming displaced persons or refugees.

2. Aim The aim of this paper is to bring out a data based mine intelligence collected so far.

3. Scope. The scope of this paper are as follows :

- a. Mine Clearance.
- b. Mine Awareness Training.
- c. Mine Used by Both RGF and RPF.
- d. Mine Field and Obstacles.
- e. RPF Mine Location.
- f. Location of Incident/Accident by mines and booby traps.
- g. Bridges Needing Major Repair.
- h. Roads with mines and roads which to be checked for mines.

4. Mine clearance Both the RGF and RPF claim to have the skills and equipment to remove the known mines in their areas, but this is probably not the case. The RPF have no electronic mine detectors and RGF have none operational. The first problem is to locate the main area of mine contamination. Mine clearance in Rwanda falls into the following broad categories:

- a. Clearance of routes and areas needed for Assembly areas, Cantonment Points and Integrated Training Centres, and their logistic support.
- b. Clearance of routes necessary for the humanitarian movement of food to feeding centres in areas of starvation.
- c. Clearance of routes necessary to the return of refugees from across the Ugandan border, and displaced persons from southern Rwanda, to their farms, plantations and homes in the north.

d. Clearance of villages, access roads and rural areas necessary to the nresettelmentof refugees and displaced persons.

5. Mine Awareness Training. Civilion casualties will be reduced if mine awareness training is carried out amongst the returning refugees and displaced persons, who have no local knowledge of mines in their home areas, and are therefore in real danger. Mine awareness training will also have to be an element of the plan for Rwanda. The UNCHR have made a study of mine awareness programmes, and they will be asked if they can carry out such a programme in Rwanda.

6. Mine Used by Both RGF & RPF. Mine used by both the faction are given below.

a. RPF MINES

(1) Anti Personnel Mines

Type	Description	Year of Fabrication	Country of Origin
AP M 18 A1	FRAGMENTATION	-	US (RGF)
AP POMZ 2	FRAGMENTATION	1958	SOVIET
AP.PMD-7st	WOODEN	1946	SOVIET
AP. PMN	BLAST MINE	1958	SOVIET
AP	PLASTIC	1957	KOREAN
AP.M35	PLASTIC	-	FRANCE
AP.TS. 50	PLASTIC	-	FRANCE
AP.M409	PLASTIC	1957	SOVIET

(2) Anti Tank Mines

AT.TM46	METALLIC	1946	SOVIET
AT.TM57	METALLIC	1957	SOVIET
AT.	TNT	-	SOVIET
AT.TMD-B	WOODEN	1945	SOVIET
AT.M15	METALLIC	1944	US(RGF)

(3) Explosives.

-	BANGALORE TORPEDO	1968	SOVIET
-	PE (NITRO -NOBEL)	-	SWEDEN

b. RGF MINES.

(1) ANTI PERSONNEL MINE.

(a)	Anti pers mine	-	TS50 (Italy)
(b)	Anti pers mine	-	NR 409 (Belgium)
(c)	Anti pers mine	-	PRB M35 (Belgium)
(d)	Anti pers mine	-	PMD 6 (Russia)
(e)	Anti pers mine	-	PMN (Russia)
(f)	Anti pers mine	-	NR 413 (Belgium)
(g)	Anti pers mine	-	M 2 A 3 (USA)
(h)	Anti pers mine	-	M18 A1 (S. Africa)

(a) Mine Anti Personnel TS 50 Anti pers mine
Underwater Illuminating Pressure Integrated mine

Technical Data

Weight : 186 gms
Weight of Explosive Material : 50 gms
Height : 5.5 cm
Pressure weight : 12.5 Kg

(b) Anti Personnel Mine NR 403 (Made in Belgium)

Technical - Tactical Data

Weight of explosives material : 54 gms
Height : 2.5 cm
Diameter : 8 cm
Pressure weight : 2 kg

(c) Anti Personnel Mine PMD 6 (Made in USSR)

Technical tactical Data

Weight of Explosives Material : 200 gms
Height : 5 cm
Diameter : 8 cm
Pressure Weight : 2 kg

(d) Anti Personnel Mine PMD 6 (Made in USSR)

Technical - Tactical Data

Weight of Explosives Material : 200 gms
Height : 5 cm
Length : 19.6 cm
Width : 8.7 cm
Pressure Weight : 2 kg

(e) Anti Pers Mine PMN (Made in USSR)

Tech / Tac Data

Weight : 600 gms
Weight of explosives : 215 gms
height : 5.5 cm
Diameter : 11.2 cm
Pressure Weight : 4.5 kg

(f) Anti Pers Mine M2A3 (Made in USA)

Tech / Tac Data

Weight : 1.360 kg
Weight of Explosives Material : 180 gms
Height : 13.5 cm
Diameter : 6.5 cm
Pulling Force : 1.5 to 5 kg
Pressure Weight : 4 to 9 kg

(g) Anti Pers Mine M 18 A 1 (Sharpnel)
(Made in S. Africa)

Tech / Tac Data

Weight : 340 gms
Height : 17 cm
Illumination Radius : 300 m
Duration of Illumination : 60 to 90 sec
Pressure Weight : 2 to 5 kg

(2) Anti Tank Mine M3

(a) Anti Tank PRB M3 (Made in Belgium)

Tech / Tac Data

Side : 23 cm
Height : 13 cm
Weight : 6.8 kg
Weight of Explosive material : 6kg
pressure weight : 250 gms

(b) Anti Tank Mine M6A2 (Made in USA)

Tech / Tac Data

Diameter : 33.7 cm
Height : 8.5 cm
Weight : 9.08 kg
Weight of Explosive Matreial : 5.4 kg
Pressure Weight : 160 kg

(c) Anti Tank Mine TM 57 (Made in USSR)

Tech / Tac Data

Diameter : 31.5 cm
Height : 9.5 kg
Weight of Explosive Material : 7 kg
Pressure Weight : 150 kg

COMBINATION MINES

1. ANTI - TANK MINES AND GRENADES
2. ANTI - TANK MINES AND XEPLOSIVE AND INCENDIARY
3. BOOBY TRAPS.

MODE OF MINE PUTTING

1. PLAN OF MINE FIELD.
2. LANDMARKS AND DIRECTIONS.

7. MINE FIELDS AND OBSTACLES : Attached with Annexure "A"

8. RPF MINE FIELDS LOCATION : RWANDA MAP 1:50,000

SL NO	NAME OF PLACE	COORDINATE
1.	MUSAGA	8050
2.	KINYABABA	7948
3.	KAYANGE	7945
4.	RUHANGA	8239
5.	GITOVU	7938
6.	BUNIGO	9434
7.	RUHANA	0228
8.	MURAMBO	0629
9.	SHAMGASHA	0730
10.	CYANATUBURA	0830
11.	KABONGOYA	1636
12.	GATETA	1736
13.	NYAGHAMDAGAZA	2136
14.	GITWE	2337
15.	RUKONO	5052
16.	-	2861
17.	NSHURE	2959
18.	MIYOVE	9621
19.	YARAMBA	9925

9. LOCATION OF INCIDENT/ACCIDENT BY MINE AND BOOBY TRAPS
Attached with Annexure "B"

10. BRIDGES NEEDING MAJOR REPAIR : RWANDA MAPS 1:50,000

	NAME OF THE PLACE	GRID REFERANCE
1.	KARAMBI	851 432
2.	PINIER	852 430
3.	GATSILIMA	154 414
4.	NDEGO	190 512
5.	MUTOJO	261 505

11. ROADS WITH MINE AND ROADS TO BE CHECKED FOR MINE :

(a) Roads With Mine

BYUMBA (0825) - RWIBISHEKE (1126) - MUKONO (1327) -
BWISIGE (1727)

(b) Roads to be checked for mine

BWISIGE (1727) - KUMURAMBA (2217) - NYAGHANGA (2420)
NGARAMA (2628) - RWATAHIKAONGONO (2638) - MIMULI (2847)
NYAGATRE (3656).

Annexture "A" to
Mine intelligence

MINE FIELD AND OBSTACLES

Serial No	Coordinate	Name of the place
1.	8050	MUSAGA
2.	7948	KINYABABA
3.	7945	KAYANGE
4.	8239	RUHANGA
5.	7938	GITOVU
6.	9434	BUNIGO
7.	0228	RUHANA
8.	0629	MURAMBO
9.	0730	SHAMGASHA
10.	3830	CYANTUBURA
11.	1636	KABONGOYA
12.	1736	GATETA
13.	2136	NYAGAHAMDAGAZA
14.	2337	GITWE
15.	2931	RUKONO
16.	5052	RUKONO
17.	2861	-
18.	2959	NSHURE
19.	9421	MIYOVE
20.	9925	YARAMBA
21.	5940	RWAMUCONCO
22.	6130	KAMIRAMUGEZI

23.	6025	NYAMABARE
24.	6320	NYAMASHURI
25.	3761	CAMPALA
26.	3659	MUNSHEKE
27.	3565	NYAJTARE
28.	3054	MUVUMBA
29.	2953	-
30.	2853	-
31.	2840	MIMULI
32.	2761	-
33.	2761	-
34.	2652	-
35.	2650	-
36.	2460	RUBILIZI
37.	2349	MUTUJO
38.	2251	-
39.	2252	-
40.	2035	GITORA
41.	2320	NYAJAHANGA
42.	EASTING 08 TO 16 AND 25 TO 27	BYUMBA, MUKONO, BWISIGE BISIKA, RWIBISHUKE,
43.	79 TO 90 AND 25 TO 43	MUSUBEYA, JIKORA, BUJILI RWERERE, RUTANGIRA, GASEKE, KNYONI

ACCIDENT CAUSED BY BOOBY - TRAPPED, MINES OR GRENADES

1. It gives the date and location of incidents and the number of reported injured people by the "Comte International de la Croix Rouge "(CICR)

DATE	COMMUNE	SECTER	CELLULE	OUTPUT
18/03/93	TUMBA	RUKORE	KIRAMBO	3B
20/03/93	GITUZA	NYABIHEKF		1B
13/06/93	MUKARENGE	NYABISHAMBI	RUGARAMA	1B
15/06 93	NAGARAMA	NAGARAMA		1B
18/06/93	NAGARAMA	GIHINDA	RUSHINGI	1B
20/06/93	MUVUMBA	RUKOMO	RUYONZA	1B
24/06/93	NAGARAMA	GATSIBO	NYARUKONI	1B
24/06/93	NAGARAMA	ANGARAMA	NYARUBUNGO	1B
25/06/93	NAGARAMA	KIGASHA	BAYIGABURIRE	2B
21/07/93	NAGARAMA			1B
23/07/93	MUKARANGE	NYABISHAMBI	RUGARAMA	1B
24/07/93	MUKARANGE	NYABISHAMBI	RUGARAMA	1B
25/08/93	MUKARANGE	NYABISHAMBI	RUGARAMA	1B
**/08/93	MUKARENGE	MUKONO	RWIBISHEKE	1B
**/08/93				1B
**/08/93				1B
**/09/93	BWISIGE			1B
01/09/93	MUKARANGE	MUKONO		2B
17/09/93	MUVUMBA	RUKOMO	BUKAMBA	7B
20/09/93	MUKARENGE	MUKONO	RWIBISHIKE	1B

10/10/93	KIBALI	RUBONA	MATABA	1B
17/10/93	BUYOGA	MWANZI	KAGANDU	1B
27/10/93	BWISIGE	BWISIGE		1B
19/11/93	KINYIAMI	BYUMBA		1B
26/11/93	CYERU	RUHONDO		3B+1M
28/11/93	KIBALI	NYANKENKE	BIRUMBA	1B
05/12/93	KIBALI	NTANKENKE	NYANAMO	1B
06/01/94	MUKARANGE	NYABISHAMBI		1B

NOTE : "B" MEANS INJURED AND "M"MEANS MORE (KILLED)

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS	LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
1. Ident. of assembly points, cantonment points and joint training centers (Art. 57); and their preparation After BBTG = Day J	1) Accomodation 2) Weapons Storage 3) Latrines 4) Fuel 5) Ablutions/Shower 6) Electricity 7) Medical Supplies 8) Water 9) Food 10) Clothing, Bedding, Transport, Postal, Kitchen support, Family visits, Welfare, Garbage, etc.	1) Recce of assembly points, cantonment points, joint training centers. 2) Put UNMOS at a point where physical preparation starts	1. Establish communication between all points and Headquarters	1) Roads 2) Bridges 3) Wells 4) Mine Checking	Check: 1. Available Infra for Instructions (Barracks, lodging, classrooms, latrines, electrical accessories, water provision, telephone) 2. Possibility of outside instruction area 3. Available Training Areas for Tactics 4. Available Trng. areas for shooting 5. Possibility for tented lodging <u>Decide on:</u> 1. Trng. programs 2. Materials needed for Instruction 3. Necessary transport (for Cmdr., Instructors, Men)
2. Demarcation of Assembly Zones (article 56) After BBTG	1) Negotiations for the new positions	1) When assembly points are chosen, assembly zones shall be demarcated 2) Supervision of RGF and RPF movements			
3. UN battalion deployment in DMZ Feb/March 94	1) Accomodation 2) After a 60-day period of self-sufficiency period, all kinds of supplies should be provided	1) Plan of patrols 2) Rules of co-operation with local authorities especially with National Gendarmerie 3) Deployment of two platoons in cantonment points	1) Communication system	1) Mine check 2) Wells	
4. Ident. and registration of administrative and support staffs in their respective assembly points and their eligibility for special leaves (Art. 58) BBTG + 3 months = Day K	1) How many of them for each party? 2) Should they be demobilized or sent on long-term leave? 3) How should they be paid? - demobilization allowance? - according to some kind of table of allowances? 4) Should they leave their weapons in assembly points or be registered without weapons? 5) Where are they going to work?			1) Because of the beginning of the rainy season, a lot of points should be defended against nature by sub-units of the engineering corps 2) This raises additional logistical and operational problems	

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS	LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
5. Assembly of 640 (Art.78) Instructors for National Armed Forces and National Gendarmerie Day K + 1	1) Transport of Instructors to Joint Training Centers 2) Organize group of International instructors (specially for Mine Clearance Plan) 3) How many international and how many Rwandese instructors	1) Gather instructors of both respective parties in their assembly zones 2) Conduct simultaneously transport from North and South to Joint Training Centers	1) Communication is vital		Determine: 1. Selection basis for Instructors coming from RGF and RPF 2) General or specialized formation 3) Branches and items to be instructed 4) Elaboration of instruction programs 5) Apportionment of the tasks and appointment to the Assembly Points 6) Training Centers for instructors to be determined and reced as in 1. above.
6. Movement of heavy weapons to cantonment points (Art.58)	1) Transport 2) Where to keep helicopters and aircraft	1) Secure transport of heavy weapons 2) Guarding of these weapons	1) Communication is vital		
O P T I O N 1	7.Transfer of 10% troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points (advance parties of each unit). Day K + 5	1) It is necessary to have precise information about tactical troops deployment and their rotation plans so that transport planning according to operational demands is possible.	1) Plan for platoon transport	1) Communication is extremely vital	
	8.Verification of the transfer by UNAMIR Day K + 6	1) Start food and water supply	1) Physical checking in garrisons and on front lines, and counting of soldiers in the assembly points by UNMOs.		
	9.Transfer of 30% troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points. Day K + 7, K + 9, K + 11				

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS		LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
O P T I O N 2	7. Transfer of Troops from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points Day K + 5	1. Transport	1. Plan of marches			
	8. Final verifi- cation of disengage- ment Day K + 6	1. Start food and water supply				

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS	LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
10. Verificati on of the transfer by UNAMIR Day K + 9, K + 10, K + 12	1. Start normal supply system				

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
1. Administrative preparation for payment of demobilization allowances (Art. 153) March - April 94	1. Rank recognition agreement has to be reached between the two parties March 94 2. Registration of those who are going to be demobilized April 94		1. Small EDP Subsection has to be established in all assembly points and Joint Training Centers. 2. Data Processing Factory has to be established in HQs a) March - training of 20 data entry clerks and checking of the software b) April-May cross checking		
2. Agreement on tables of allowances in Assembly Points, Joint Training Centers, National Forces, National Gendarmerie, and administrative and support staffs on special leaves from assembly points March 94	1. Support of negotiation and assistance for the BBTG 2. Preparation of supply system according to new tables of allowances.		1. EDP support		
3. Separate training for the members of the two opposition forces in their respective zones. April 94	1. Printing of syllabuses 2. Provision of copybooks and pencils	1. Supervision of the training; specially political and civic.			<u>During Recce, check:</u> 1. Available infrastructure - classrooms, barracks, Trng. areas... 2. Possibility of installation of outside instruction facilities 3. Available training areas for Tactics. Available training areas for shooting 5. Possibility for tented lodging - Plan training programmes

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
4. Registration of personnel vehicles mentioned in Art. 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, and 160; and for National Forces and National Gendarmerie			1. Small EDP subsection has to be established in all assembly points. 2. Data Processing Factory has to be established in HQs a) March - training of 20 data entry clerks and checking of software b) April - cross-checking		- Estimate mat. needed for instruction - Estimate need of Transportation - Estimate the costs of the training operation (see details in paragraph on integration)
5. Publication of lists of those who are going to be demobilized (Art. 149). The official beginning of the demobilization process. Day J + 4 months = Day L	1. Publication on the boards in each assembly point after approval by Army Command High Council 2. Propaganda in media				
6. Demobilization of category mentioned in Art. 155. This constitutes approximately 8500 men. L + 1 up to the end	1. Payment of demobilization allowances 2. Issuance of certificate a) Photo camera in each assembly point b) Photocopy machine in each assembly point 3. Transport 4. What to do with the rest - 25860 soldiers need to be demobilized	1. Supervision of the fate of demobilized soldiers by UNMOs, human rights agency, civilian police			

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
7. Transfer of categories mentioned in Art. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 to their specialized assembly points.	1. Transport	1. Plan of march 2. Conduct of this movement	1. Good communication is very important during this operation	1. Because of the rainy season eng. subunits should be deployed in sensitive points.	
8. Closing down of assembly points for 14900 beds (5-6 assembly points) L + 1 up to the end	1. Removal of UN property 2. Hand-over of the remaining property to the BBTG 3. Transport of light weapons to the remaining assembly points Opt. a) with soldiers Opt. b) separately Opt. c) to points appointed by BBTG or respective party (other assembly points)	1. Transport of light weapons and ammo from closed-down assembly points as in Option a, b, and c.			
9. Establishment of: - job training schools in remaining assembly points - French classes - civic classes Day L up to September	- Trucks and instructors for Driving Schools - Iron, tools and instructors for "Metal Work" project - fat, chemicals for "Scrap project" - tools for "Wells project" - teachers for French and civic classes				1. Close down only those APs with the poorest conditions for instruction 2. Move remaining pts. to other APs 3. Plan activities for those waiting for batches 2 or 3 in the APs 4. Plan activities for those who already achieved their batch 5. Choose between: a) send people under 4 to their units, or b) send people under 4 back to APs 6. Plan activities for those returning to APs (4 months for National Army - 6 months for Nat'l. Gend.)

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
10. Start of public works					1. Find projects which would give job training and instruction for occupations such as: (Mechanics, carpentry, barber, painting, blacksmiths, security personnel, tourist guides, waiters, fuel stations, Prison guards 2. Recruit teachers 3. Establish instruction programs 4. Estimate costs and eventually find sponsors 5. Find project which will accept demobilized military personnel after job training.
11. Hand-over of category mentioned in Art. 158 to the Secretariat for Rehabilitation and Social Integration	1. Almost all responsibilities can be transferred to BBTG				
12. Hand-over of category mentioned in Art. 159 to UNHCR	1. Almost all responsibilities can be transferred to UNHCR.				
13. Hand-over of categories mentioned in Art. 156, 157, 160 to UNDP September 94	1. Almost.....				
14. Continuation of demobilization process L - December 94	1. Closing down assembly points one by one. 2. Removal of UN property 3. Hand-over of the remaining property to the BBTG 4. Transport of ammo and light weapon 5. Transfer of people from closed-down points to the remaining points.	1. Org. of marches	1. Communication is important	1. Engineering support requirement	
15. Payment of demobilization allowances From Day K onwards	1. Preparation of the demobilized allowances pay book	1. Supervision by UNMOS of pay points which should be established in prefectures.	1. Assistance of EDP is necessary in the beginning of the operation.		

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
16. Demobilization of RPF Kigali Battalion Dec. 94		1. Notation of soldiers - how are going to be trained in Joint Training Centers.			
					<ul style="list-style-type: none">- During the stay of RPF Battalion in CND Kigali training, which is similar to the one that is given in the APs is to be planned- MILOBs will be present in CND to control this training- same items to be taught- similar daily programs

INTEGRATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
1. Establishment of the Army Command High Council (Art. 52) After Day J	1. New Administrative situation (see diagram)				1. Decide which items will be taught in different branches a. Military instruction: select among RGF, RPF, and Foreign syllabuses b. Political instruction: contact local and foreign universities for documentation c. Physical Training d. List of possible duties in the APs e. List of Welfare activities f. Plan maintenance activities 2. Designate instructors per AP 3. Distribution to APs of: Infrastructure, Furniture, Consummables, Didactic aids, Sports equipment, Misc. 4. Estimate costs and look for funding
2. Separate training of servicemen of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army (Art. 77) see Demobilization process point 3					
3. Designation of servicemen within their Units. (Art. 77) After Day L	1. Verification of 40% to 60% division of the posts and verification of 50/50 division of high rank posts		EDP has to be engaged	1. For the first batch, engineering support shall be sent because of the rainy season	See 2.
4. Joint Training of National Forces 4400/L to L + 8 weeks 4400/L + 10 weeks to L + 18 weeks 4000/L + 20 weeks to L + 28 weeks		1. Supervision 2. Organization and supervision of troops, weapons, and ammo movements		1. For the first batch, engineering support shall be sent because of the rainy season	See 2.

INTEGRATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
5. Joint Training of National Gendarmerie (Art. 142) 2000/L to L + 3 months 2000/L + 3.5 months to L + 6.5 months 1800/L + 7 months to L + 10 months		1. Supervision 2. Organization and supervision of troops, weapons, and ammo movements			Provide assistance to ACHC in working out Training programs, scales to be reached, individual and Collective tests, Outside Training periods
6. Posting of servicemen in their respective Units upon completion of the training of each batch (Art. 80)		1. Supervision			



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26488
24 September 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993. By paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Council urged the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement. Paragraph 11 of the same resolution requested me to report on the contribution the United Nations could make to assist the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the implementation of such an agreement and to begin contingency planning in the event that the Council decided that such a contribution was needed.

2. In my last report on Rwanda (S/26350), I informed the Security Council that the peace agreement between the Government of Rwanda and RPF had been signed at Arusha (United Republic of Tanzania) on 4 August 1993. I indicated that the Government of Rwanda and RPF had called for the establishment of a neutral international force to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. I informed the Security Council that I had decided to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, in order to examine the functions that such a force could perform and to assess the human and financial resources that would be needed to carry them out. I stated that, in addition to Rwanda, the mission would also visit Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa for consultations with the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Secretary-General of OAU.

3. The reconnaissance mission, comprising officials of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) visited Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993. Its senior officials visited Dar-es-Salaam on 1 and 2 September and Addis Ababa on 3 September.

I. THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

4. The Council's attention is drawn to the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement and to those of its six protocols that are relevant to the Council's consideration of the contribution the United Nations could make towards the implementation of the agreement (see S/26350, para. 20).

5. The Protocols of Agreement on Power-sharing provides that the institutions for the transitional period, up to the elections for a democratically elected Government, will comprise a broad-based transitional Government with the participation of all main political parties. The major parties identified in the Agreements are the Mouvement républicain pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND), RPF, the Mouvement démocrate républicain (MDR), the Parti social démocrate (PSD), the Parti libéral (PL) and the Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC). The Transitional Assembly will be composed of members appointed by the various political parties.

6. Article 7 of the Agreement provides that the transitional institutions will be set up in Kigali 37 days after the signing of the Agreement, i.e. on 10 September 1993. However, this was based on the assumption that a neutral international force would be deployed by that date and that, with the arrival of that force, foreign troops stationed in Rwanda would withdraw. At that point, in accordance with the Agreement, (RPF would deploy a battalion in Kigali) to ensure the protection of its political leaders and to enable them to participate fully in the transitional institutions.

7. The Protocol of Agreement on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions states that the duration of the transitional period will be 22 months, with the possibility of one extension, which would have to be approved by a majority of 60 per cent of the Transitional Assembly.

8. The Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, including the Gendarmerie, specifically requests the (assistance of a neutral international force led by the United Nations in the disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and retaining of the military personnel of the parties to be integrated in the national army.) It also calls on (the establishment of such a force to ensure the overall security of the country, especially the capital city of Kigali, as well as the protection of the expatriate community, and security of the continued distribution of humanitarian assistance.)

9. The Protocol defines the neutral international force as a United Nations-led force, integrating as necessary the current OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) and made up of countries representing a cross-section of the international community. The NMOG I force, made up of 50 personnel from OAU countries, monitored the cease-fire from July 1992 to July 1993. In early August 1993, the force was replaced by the NMOG II force, which is currently made up of 132 personnel from OAU member countries.

10. The Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons calls for the involvement of the United Nations in the repatriation of refugees and is elaborated upon below (see sect. III C).

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION

11. During its visit to Rwanda, the mission was led by Brigadier General Romeo A. Dallaire (Canada), Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). Between 19 and 31 August 1993, the mission held consultations with the President of Rwanda, General Juvénal Habyarimana, and with the Chairman of RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe,

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as well as with other senior members of the Government and RPF, including Mrs. Agathe Uwiliugiyimana, current Prime Minister, Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, Prime Minister-designate of the broad-based transitional Government, and Mr. Paul Kagamé, Vice-Chairman of RPF and Commanding Officer of its armed forces. The mission also met with members of the diplomatic community accredited to Rwanda, with representatives of United Nations agencies and programmes and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) executing humanitarian projects in the country. The reconnaissance mission also met with the OAU representative in Rwanda and the Commanding Officer of NMOG II.

12. During their visit to Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa, the senior officials of the reconnaissance mission were joined by Mr. Macaire Pédanou, my Special Representative at the Arusha peace talks. They held consultations with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and other high officials of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and, in Addis Ababa, with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of OAU, and his senior staff.

13. One of the major points raised by all those with whom the mission met related to the deployment of a neutral international force by 10 September, the date set in the peace agreement for the installation of the transitional institutions in Kigali. The concern of all parties was that, should the neutral international force not be deployed in a timely manner, a political vacuum might occur if the transitional Government was not established in Kigali. The mission responded by clarifying the decision-making process at the United Nations and by stressing that the dispatch of a peace-keeping force to Rwanda would depend on a final determination by the Security Council. President Habyarimana felt that it would be dangerous and hazardous to set up the transitional Government before the arrival of the neutral international force and emphasized that such a force should be strong enough to be credible. For his part, Colonel Kanyarengwe, Chairman of RPF, stated that it was imperative that the security of RPF be ensured by the United Nations and expressed his concern that the vacuum caused by the absence of a United Nations peace-keeping mission might be filled by paramilitary groups in the country.

14. After the reconnaissance mission explained that it would not be realistic to expect the deployment of the proposed neutral international force by 10 September, a number of alternative measures were put forward by the parties and OAU. In addition, the role that an enlarged NMOG might play in the implementation of the agreements was discussed. In this connection, it should be noted that the OAU Secretary-General explained to the mission that he was planning to enlarge NMOG II to a total of approximately 240 all ranks, and that OAU did not have the resources to sustain a larger force. Mr. Salim pointed out that, even for the enlargement of NMOG II to the size of a company, OAU would have to rely, for logistic support, on the contributions of the donor countries which had assisted in the establishment of NMOG I. Most importantly, Mr. Salim informed the mission that the mandate of NMOG II would necessarily be confined to monitoring the cease-fire.

15. Mr. Salim recalled that the mandate of NMOG II would expire on 31 October 1993, adding that if the Security Council authorized United Nations involvement in the implementation of the peace agreement, the expeditious deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force would be essential. With regard to the possible integration of NMOG II into such a force, Mr. Salim

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expressed the view that the United Nations would have to work out arrangements directly with troop-contributing countries.

16. It was also suggested that, since it was not feasible to meet the expectations of the two parties with regard to the deadline of 10 September for the installation of the transitional institutions, the United Nations should reassure the Rwandese people by giving a positive signal regarding its willingness to contribute to the restoration of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda. In this connection, in a statement issued on 10 September 1993 (S/26425), the President of the Security Council pointed out that the Council was aware of the hopes the Rwandese parties entertained regarding the assistance that the international community would provide for the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. The President of the Council in his statement also urged the parties to continue to honour the Arusha agreement in accordance with their commitments.

17. Many of those with whom the reconnaissance mission held consultations, including representatives of the diplomatic community, felt that the Arusha accords constituted the best way for the Rwandese people to work together towards peace and stability. They also stressed the urgency of implementing those accords so that the people of Rwanda could proceed with the challenging tasks of reconstruction and economic development. The mission reported that most Governments represented in Rwanda also anxious to see a sound economic recovery programme instituted expressed their willingness to assist the Rwandese people in carrying out the task of economic recovery.

18. During its stay in Rwanda, the reconnaissance mission visited the areas controlled by RPF in the north, as well as government military positions and outposts. It carried out a detailed survey of the forces of the parties, including their respective structures and equipment, troop dispositions and topography, by land and by air. It received detailed briefings from the NMOG II Commander on the present status and role of NMOG II in Rwanda.

19. The mission discussed with the parties the tasks envisaged for the neutral international force in the Arusha agreement in order to determine the contribution that could be made by the United Nations. In particular, the mission undertook an assessment of the essential requirements that would enable the proposed force to execute its monitoring functions in Rwanda. This included an assessment of the following areas: cease-fire compliance in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), establishment of cantonment and assembly areas for weapons and personnel, mine-clearance, security of humanitarian aid efforts, return of the refugees and displaced persons, disarming and demobilization of armed personnel and restructuring of the Rwandese Defence Forces and the Gendarmerie.

20. In regard to relief assistance, the mission worked out arrangements that could enhance the various aspects of ongoing humanitarian activities described below (see sect. III C).

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III. UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTION

A. Military aspects

21. The main provisions of the Arusha peace agreement relevant to the proposed United Nations peace-keeping mission (herein referred to as "the Mission") are contained in the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie. The principal functions of the Mission could be grouped in four categories: (a) to assist in ensuring the security of the city of Kigali, (b) to monitor the cease-fire agreement, including establishment of an expanded DMZ and demobilization procedures, (c) to continue to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to the elections, and (d) to assist with mine-clearance, including training and mine-awareness programmes.

22. Under article 64 of the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Mission would also be charged with the task of undertaking investigations either on complaints from the parties or on its own, of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to the agreement. In addition, the Mission would be called upon to provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons.

23. To ensure the effective conduct of the Mission's responsibilities, the Protocol calls for close cooperation and continuing consultations between the Force Commander, or his representative, the new Rwandese Defence Forces High Command Council and the "Conseil de Commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale". This will be ensured through the holding of regular joint working sessions at all relevant command levels.

1. Concept of operations

24. The Mission would be based on the concept of operations described below.

25. Owing to the presence of several battalions of government forces in Kigali and the introduction into the city of the RPF leadership with a fully equipped RPF battalion, the Mission would establish a weapons secure area in and around Kigali. This zone would be defined as an area of approximately 10 kilometres in radius from the centre of Kigali within which the military units would be required to store their weapons and ammunition, except in those cases previously agreed to by all parties. The security of the city would be accomplished in four ways. First, the Mission would deploy an infantry battalion throughout the Kigali area with the aim of providing security for the international airport, the RPF battalion compound and government buildings and to assist in the recovery of arms from civilians. The battalion would require a wheeled armoured personnel carrier (APC) company for emergency deployment both in Kigali and in the expanded DMZ. Secondly, the Mission would monitor and verify the securing of weapons and the movement of all forces from both parties in the Kigali sector through the use of infantry and military observers. Thirdly, in monitoring the activities involved in the establishment of the new Integrated Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie, the Mission would deploy liaison officers to the headquarters of these new forces. Fourthly, the Mission would take appropriate

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measures, as necessary, to assist in providing security for members of the transitional Government.

26. The Mission would monitor the cease-fire agreement through verification and control of the expanded DMZ and by the concentration, disarming, demobilization and integration of troops of both the parties and the Gendarmerie. This would be achieved by the deployment of military observers and a second infantry battalion (in addition to the two existing infantry platoons of NMOG II) in the DMZ and at the assembly points, cantonment points and integrated training centres. In accordance with the peace agreement, the responsibility for the identification of assembly zones, and thus the demarcation of the new DMZ, would rest with the Mission. A key task for the Force Commander would therefore be to confirm the proposed assembly zones, assembly points, cantonment points, integrated training centres and the demarcation of a new DMZ, in accordance with the agreement. From a total of 48 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres proposed by the two parties, the reconnaissance mission recommended that the number be reduced, subject to review by the Force Commander, to approximately 26 assembly and cantonment points and integrated training centres.

27. The reconnaissance mission conducted a survey of all armed forces in the country. The Rwandese Government declared it had an effective strength of 23,100 personnel deployed essentially in the northern part of the country and in the Kigali area. The RPF forces declared a strength of approximately 20,000 personnel concentrated north of the current DMZ. It was reported that the government Gendarmerie is made up of 6,000 personnel deployed essentially in the front lines. RPF does not have a gendarmerie. According to the Protocol, the process of demobilization of all of the forces and the Gendarmerie, and the subsequent training and integration of up to 13,000 personnel for the new National Army and 6,000 personnel for the new National Gendarmerie, is to be completed over a 7 to 9 month period. This process would commence on a date agreed to by the Mission and the transitional Government. The possible need to assist the parties with transporting their personnel, constructing shelters to accommodate the assembled troops and resupplying and/or feeding them would require special attention.

28. The approximately 35,000 (31,000 soldiers and 4,000 Gendarmerie) demobilized personnel who would not form part of the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie would benefit from vocational retraining and employment, in accordance with the Agreement, under the auspices of the Rwandese Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration and with the assistance of the United Nations programmes and agencies and NGOs.

29. The reconnaissance mission recommended that the Mission should have the capacity to provide escort and protection for humanitarian activities, as required, until relieved by the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie. It was also recommended that the Mission conduct essential force-related mine clearance. An overall mine-clearance programme is described in section III C below.

30. The effective execution of the Mission's tasks, as well as the rate at which they can proceed, depends not only upon the timely availability of resources, but also on the capacity of the local infrastructure (roads, fuel

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supply, power supply, communications, warehousing space and personnel accommodation), as well as the Mission's repair and maintenance capabilities. Taking into account the state of the existing infrastructure in Rwanda, it would be essential for an engineer company to be deployed expeditiously to assist in restoring basic infrastructure, including roads and bridges necessary for the work of the Mission.

2. Proposed Force structure

31. The military observers of UNOMUR, established under Security Council resolution 846 (1993), would come under the command of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda, while maintaining their monitoring tasks on the Uganda/Rwanda border. The Mission would incorporate elements of the NMOG II forces already in place in the current DMZ (see annex I) under its command at the earliest opportunity.

32. The Mission's operations would be divided into five sectors. There would be a Kigali sector and a DMZ sector. Two other sectors would be located with the government forces and RPF forces respectively. UNOMUR would constitute the fifth sector. The Mission would be supported by engineer, aviation, communications and medical units, as well as by the necessary logistic and administrative staff. The Mission's Force headquarters would be located in Kigali.

33. A Military Observer Group headquarters would be responsible for command and control of the Military Observer Sectors and for administering all military observers in theatre. It would consist of a total of 20 military observers and would be comprised of the traditional branches of military staff.

34. The Government forces, RPF forces and UNOMUR Sectors would be composed entirely of United Nations military observers. These three Sectors, through their military observer teams, would be responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the two parties. The military observer Sectors would be responsible for, inter alia, the following tasks: monitoring the observance by the two parties of modalities for the definite cessation of hostilities as provided for in the peace Agreement; monitoring the assembly zones and the preparation and maintenance of assembly and cantonment points; verifying the disengagement of forces, the movement of troops to assembly points and of heavy weapons to cantonment points; monitoring discipline of troops inside and outside assembly points; verifying inventories of weapons and ammunition of the two parties and monitoring operations for the separation of heavy weapons from light weapons; verifying the identification of military personnel in the assembly points; verifying the distribution of non-lethal supplies to troops in assembly points; monitoring the security of troops in the integrated training centres and monitoring the operations for the demobilization of servicemen and gendarmes.

35. The Kigali and the DMZ Sectors would each consist of an infantry battalion and military observers, who would perform tasks similar to those described in paragraph 34, as well as assist in arms recovery and verification through the use of checkpoints and patrols and in providing security at assembly and

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cantonment points. The DMZ Sector would also take under its command the two NMOG II platoons currently serving in Rwanda.

36. The two infantry battalions (800 all ranks each) must be capable of supporting themselves for at least 60 days. They would each consist of a heavy logistics company and four rifle companies.

37. The Mission would also need an engineer company consisting of 203 personnel which would be responsible, inter alia, for supervising the rehabilitation and repair of basic infrastructure to meet the Mission's operational requirements and for undertaking essential demining tasks, including explosive ordnance disposal.

38. The Mission's support elements would consist of a helicopter unit of 40 personnel and 4 utility helicopters and a light twin-engine aircraft, a movement control section of 20 personnel, a logistics company of 200 personnel and a medical platoon of 50 personnel.

3. Deployment schedule

39. The military personnel of the Mission would be deployed progressively as shown in Annex II and would conduct the operation in four phases.

40. Phase 1 would commence on the day on which the Security Council adopts the enabling resolution and would end on D-Day, the day on which the transitional Government is installed in Kigali. Given the time required to establish and deploy the proposed Mission, it is estimated that the transitional Government may not be installed until the end of 1993. The objective of this phase would be to establish the essential conditions needed to permit the secure installation of the transitional Government. The necessary command and control, service support, infrastructure and equipment would be put in place. This would require the immediate deployment of the military planning staff of the Mission headquarters (including approximately 25 military, 3 civilian police and 18 civilians). This phase would also see elements of the expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR observers continuing their respective mandates in the DMZ and on the Uganda-Rwanda border, but under command of the Mission. By the end of phase 1, the strength of the Mission would number a total of 1,428 military personnel, of whom 1,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 211 would be military observers (including 77 military observers from UNOMUR and 54 from NMOG II).

41. Phase 2 would commence on D-Day and last until D-Day+90 or when the process of disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Forces and Gendarmerie begins. This phase would see the continued build up of the Mission to its peak strength. The expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR would be fully integrated as entities into the Mission and would continue to discharge their mandates. The major activities during this phase would be to continue monitoring the DMZ and the Uganda-Rwanda border and assisting in providing security in Kigali, the demarcation of the assembly zones, monitoring the modification of the DMZ and ensuring that all preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration process are in place. While the agreement did not specify a date for the start of the demobilization process, it did estimate that one month would be required to set up the support elements needed to conduct this

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operation. However, the reconnaissance mission's estimate is that two to three months would be required to ensure that the infrastructure needed for demobilization is in place. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would include a total of 2,548 military personnel, of whom 2,217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 331 would be military observers.

42. Phase 3 would commence on D-Day+90, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process begins, and would last until D-Day+360, or when the process is completed. During this phase, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor the new DMZ with a second infantry battalion, and would continue to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border. It would establish approximately 26 assembly/cantonment points and integrated training centres, monitor the movement of large bodies of military personnel in and through the DMZ and assist in maintaining general security in the country. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would be in the process of reduction to approximately 1,240 all ranks.

43. Phase 4 would commence on D-Day+360, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process is completed. This phase would last about 10 months. It would see the further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level needed to assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections. During this phase, the monitoring of the DMZ and of the Uganda-Rwanda border would cease. The residual strength of the Mission would amount to approximately 930 military personnel, of whom 850 would be staff officers and formed troops and 80 would be military observers.

B. Civilian police

44. The Arusha peace agreement calls on the United Nations to assist in maintaining public security through the monitoring and verification of the activities of the Gendarmerie and Communal Police.

45. The law and order situation during the transitional phase would be dependent on several internal security considerations: possible political and ethnic tensions; the potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry after the demobilization of the forces of the parties; the easy availability of weapons; the possible disruption of the humanitarian aid effort; and the inability of local agencies to cope effectively with rising crime in the country, particularly in Kigali.

46. In accordance with the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie would be reduced from a strength of approximately 6,000 to a strength of 1,800 during the demobilization phase. All members of the Gendarmerie would be screened, along with RPF candidates, for positions in the new Gendarmerie or for complete demobilization into the community. The Gendarmerie would subsequently be reconstituted with a maximum force level of 6,000 all ranks.

47. In order to verify that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, a small United Nations civilian police unit, headed by a Police

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Commissioner, would be deployed in Kigali and the nine prefecture capitals and in specific police installations. It is estimated that a total of 60 police officers would be required. The police unit would consist of a headquarters of 10 officers, including a special investigation team; a Kigali district consisting of 20 personnel; and a provincial district consisting of monitoring teams for each of the prefectures (except Kigali), requiring a total of 30 personnel.

C. Humanitarian assistance

48. In addition to the provisions of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons, both the Government and RPF have indicated that international assistance will be essential in bringing about the successful implementation of the peace agreement. Humanitarian agencies will continue to provide assistance based on the principle of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

49. By March 1993, a total of 900,000 people, or approximately 13 per cent of the nation's population, had been displaced. The Secretary-General launched a consolidated appeal in April 1993 to meet the emergency needs of these displaced people. The international community has made cash and in-kind contributions of up to US\$ 100 million since January 1993. With the signing of the peace agreement, it is estimated that some 600,000 individuals have already returned to their homes. With their return, the emergency situation that arose earlier in the year has eased. For the estimated 300,000 people who remain displaced and continue to rely on emergency assistance in the camps, such assistance will continue to be provided.

50. If a United Nations operation is deployed in Rwanda, humanitarian assistance would need to be coordinated with the Mission's activities. Currently, the United Nations Resident Coordinator ensures coordination among United Nations agencies, and with the donor community and NGOs. He will continue to do so during the transitional period.

51. As a result of the decision of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in February 1993 on its programme for Rwanda, UNDP and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs will hold a Round-table Meeting on humanitarian assistance, which will include aspects of demobilization and reconstruction, in early 1994. In addition to local fund-raising efforts, the meeting will provide an excellent opportunity to solicit support from a larger number of donors and to inform them of the latest situation in the country. I hope that the donor community will continue to respond favourably to the financial needs in the humanitarian sector.

52. Regarding assistance to demobilized soldiers, a comprehensive programme catering to their needs is being studied using previous United Nations peace-keeping experience in other regions. The United Nations is encouraging the donor community to examine the possibility of pooling resources for the preparation and implementation of such a programme.

53. Finally, regarding the Rwandese who have taken refuge in neighbouring countries, the starting point of the implementation of the activities envisaged for the repatriation and reintegration of the returnees is the establishment of

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the transitional Government. UNHCR has been coordinating refugee activities and has been making advance preparations in the countries of asylum. The return of refugees will be regulated through tripartite agreements among country of origin, country of asylum and UNHCR. The establishment of national committees for repatriation and local integration is also foreseen, as is the establishment of a Commission for Repatriation under the transitional Government.

54. It has been recommended that an information campaign be launched both in the countries of asylum and in Rwanda to promote the provisions of the peace agreement. Information relating to refugees and the options offered to them (repatriation, naturalization or to remain as aliens), should also be part of this information campaign.

55. Mine-clearance has been earmarked as a priority to ease the constant threat to the lives of the displaced persons. It has also been pointed out that, with their removal, a more direct access by humanitarian agencies to areas needing assistance would be possible. This requirement is specifically addressed in article 40 of the Protocol on Refugees and Displaced Persons.

56. It has been estimated that a mine-clearance programme would be confined to a small area of the northern part of the country. The most serious mine problem however, would be the location and detection of mines in tea and banana plantations, as well as on open grassland and on tracks. At present, land mines already pose a serious threat to the local population. This threat will continue to increase as displaced persons return to their villages.

57. The reconnaissance mission recommended that the United Nations initiate a mine-clearance programme, including a survey of existing locations, a mine-awareness campaign for displaced persons and refugees and a training programme in mine deactivation for the government and RPF engineer forces. An engineer element should be included within the military component to provide a local mine-clearance capability on routes necessary to the Mission's operations. In addition, should the training programme for both parties be deemed unworkable or unsafe, a professional mine-clearance company would be subcontracted as has been the practice in other peace-keeping missions.

58. There will be a need to continue substantial humanitarian assistance activities in the future. The United Nations Resident Coordinator will continue to serve as the coordinator for these activities, working in close cooperation with all relevant organizations of the United Nations system. It is anticipated that a capacity would be established in the Mission for liaison and coordination with the humanitarian assistance programme, in particular with respect to adequate security as may be necessary for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and the process of demobilization and reintegration of armed forces into society.

D. Administrative aspects

59. The Mission would require an administrative component based in Kigali, with two regional offices. One regional office would be located in the northern city of Byumba. The second would be in Kabale, which is the present headquarters of UNOMUR. The administrative component would provide necessary support in areas

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of personnel, finance, procurement, communications, travel, compensation, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing, etc. In order to provide information to the general public on the activities of the mission, the Mission would seek access to an established radio station.

60. It is estimated that a total of 127 international staff (26 Professional and 101 Field and General Service staff) and 68 locally recruited staff would be required. These figures include the 17 international staff and 7 locally recruited staff currently working in Uganda with UNOMUR. The 26 Professional staff would include 4 political officers, 2 public information officers, 1 human rights officer and humanitarian assistance officers.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

61. In my report of 24 August (S/26350), I stated that the signing of the Arusha peace agreement had provided the Government of Rwanda and RPF with a political and democratic framework for resolving their conflict. The agreement gives the international community an opportunity to contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process. In this connection, I should like to acknowledge, with deep gratitude, the continuing efforts of the Facilitator, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Mwinyi, and of the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, to encourage the parties to abide by the commitments they freely entered into when they concluded the Arusha agreement.

62. The Rwandese people face extensive hardship and a critical economic situation. There is a strong grass-roots desire to see an end to the destruction and suffering brought about by a protracted conflict. Both sides seem determined to achieve a durable peace through disarmament, demobilization and national reconciliation. At the same time, there is serious concern over the possibility that any inordinate delay in establishing the transitional Government may endanger the peace process. These concerns have been expressed to my reconnaissance mission by the leadership of both sides, the resident diplomatic community in Rwanda, NGOs and, especially, the Secretary General of OAU. I therefore consider that the United Nations should respond positively to the appeal of the parties for assistance in the implementation of the peace agreement, especially since the mandate of the OAU NMOG II force will terminate by 31 October 1993.

63. The proposed United Nations Mission in Rwanda should be deployed without delay following Security Council authorization in order to allow for the prompt establishment of the transitional institutions. The immediate deployment of an advance party, including the Force Commander, would underscore the determination of the United Nations for the rapid build-up of the military presence needed in Kigali and of the logistic base for deployment of the force. The subsequent introduction of observers and formed units would enable the force to contribute to the implementation of the disengagement, demobilization and integration phase, while providing an adequate level of security and a credible United Nations presence. Finally, the reduction of the military and civilian police components should ensure that the operation is carried out in a cost-effective manner while contributing, at the same time, to the maintenance of the stability required for the period culminating with the elections.

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64. The UNOMUR observers currently deployed on the Uganda side of the Uganda-Rwanda border remain a necessary stabilizing factor. It is therefore considered that UNOMOR must continue to monitor that border until the end of the demobilization process. However, UNOMOR's chain of command and future logistics would be integrated into the proposed Mission.

65. I am encouraged by the restraint and desire for a lasting peace and national reconciliation shown by the parties since the signature of the Arusha peace agreement. They have demonstrated their goodwill by holding a number of joint informal working groups and by the support they provided to the reconnaissance mission in all of its fact-finding activities. The two parties also sent a joint delegation to the United Nations, which I met on 15 September. The joint delegation stressed to me the urgency of the establishment of a United Nations force, since the successful implementation of the Arusha agreement was predicated on its deployment. The delegation emphasized that, unless immediate action was taken to deploy the force, the implementation of the peace agreement would be seriously compromised as a result of the vacuum that would be created. I explained to the joint delegation that the decision regarding the establishment of such a force rested with the Security Council and that, even with the approval of the Council, it could take up to three months for such a force to be fully deployed. Under the circumstances, I urged the parties, in the interim, to respect the commitments they had undertaken in Arusha to work together for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country and to strictly adhere to the cease-fire.

66. In the light of the above, I recommend that the Security Council authorize the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR, with the mandate of contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government. This operation would be deployed according to the schedule described in section III of the present report.

67. I further recommend that the Security Council urge Member States to support the current United Nations aid effort in Rwanda. UNAMIR and the United Nations Resident Coordinator would closely coordinate their respective activities in this regard.

68. Should the Security Council authorize the establishment of UNAMIR, it would be my intention to appoint a Special Representative who would lead the Mission in the field and exercise authority over all its elements. The military component of the Mission would be headed by a Force Commander. The Mission would operate under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. I would report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of UNAMIR. All matters that might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Mission would be referred to the Security Council for its decision.

69. In accordance with established practice, UNAMIR would need to have freedom of movement, communications and inspection and to enjoy the other rights that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks in Rwanda. UNAMIR and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Should the Security Council decide to establish UNAMIR, it would be my

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intention to initiate consultations with the transitional Government with a view to promptly concluding a status-of-forces agreement along the usual lines.

70. In conclusion, I wish to stress that two essential conditions must be met to enable the United Nations to carry out its recommended role in Rwanda successfully and effectively. First, the parties must cooperate fully with one another and the United Nations in carrying out their commitments under the Arusha agreement. Secondly, the United Nations must be provided in a timely manner with the necessary human and financial resources. At a time of unprecedented financial constraints facing the United Nations, it is imperative that Member States be prepared to assume the obligations resulting from the new mandates they entrust to the Organization.

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Annex II

Deployment schedule and strengths by month - military component

	PHASE 1 Preparatory			PHASE 2 Broad-based Transitional Government			PHASE 3 Demobilization/integration									PHASE 4 Electoral										
MONTH	10. 93	11. 93	12. 93	1. 94	2. 94	3. 94	4. 94	5. 94	6. 94	7. 94	8. 94	9. 94	10. 94	11. 94	12. 94	1. 95	2. 95	3. 95	4. 95	5. 95	6. 95	7. 95	8. 95	9. 95	10. 95	11. 95
	M-DAY			D-DAY												E-DAY										
FORCE HQ	43	54													40										30	0
KIGALI SECTOR HQ	15												0													0
KIGALI INF BN		300	800																						675	0
KIGALI UNMOS	15	78				42							0													0
DMZ SECTOR HQ	18					15								0												0
DMZ INF BN					500	800								700	300											0
DMZ PL	60													0												0
DMZ UNMOS	36					18								0												0
UNMO GROUP HQ	20														80										80	0
UNOMUR SECTOR	77														0											0
RPF SECTOR				66		87							51	15	0											0
GOVT. SECTOR				51		87							51	15	0											0
ENGR COY		100		203						88			0													0
LOG COY		100		200										89	0											0
MED PL		50													0											0
MOV CTL	20															10									10	0
TOTAL	304 a/	928	1 428	1 748	2 248	548				2 433			2 216	1 84	240	930									795	0

a/ Of total, 191 are already in Rwanda and Uganda with NMOG II and UNOMUR.

Disengagement process

1. Identification of assembly points, cantonment points and joint training centers (article 57). December 1993.
1a. removal of assembly points
2. Demarkation of assembly zones (article 56). December 1993.
3. UN battalion deployment in DMZ. February/March 1994.
4. Identification and registration of administrative and support staffs in their respective assembly points and their eligibility for special leaves (article 58). 02 April 1994.
5. Assembly of 640 (article 78) instructors for National Armed Forces and National Gendarmerie, 60 % from RGF plus 40 % from RPF (article 74) in (option 1) separate Joint Training Centers or (option 2) one Joint Training Center. 03 April 1994.
6. Movement of heavy weapons to cantonment points (article 58). 05 April 1994.

Option 1

7. Removal of 10 % troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points (advance parties of each unit). One day. 06 April 1994.
8. Verification of this removal by UNAMIR. 07 April 1994.
9. Removal of 30 % troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points. 08 April 1994.
10. Verification of this removal by UNAMIR. 09 April 1994.
11. Removal of 30 % troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points. 10 April 1994.
12. Verification of this removal by UNAMIR. 11 April 1994.
13. Removal of 30 % troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points. 12 April 1994.
14. Final verification of disengagement. 13 April 1994.

Option 2

7. Troops removal from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points. 06 April 1994.
8. Final verification of disengagement. 07 April 1994.

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

1. Administrative preparation for payment of demobilization allowances. (Art. 153). March 94
2. Agreement on tables of allowances in assembly points, joint training centers, National Forces, National Gendarmerie and for administrative and support staffs on special leaves from assembly points. March 94
3. Setting up in the mustering zones (Annex) Op. 1. 02 April-13 April 94 or Op. 2 - 06-07 April 94
4. Separate training for the members of the two belligerent forces in their respective zones. Op. 1. 14 April - 14 May or Op. 2 - 7 April - 7 May 94
5. Registration of personnel which is mentioned in Art. 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and for National Forces and for National Gendarmerie. Op. 1. 14 April-14 May 94 or Op. 2 7 April- 7 May 94
6. The publishing of lists of those who are going to be demobilized (Art. 149). The official beginning of demobilization process. Op. 1. 14 May 94 or Op. 2 7 May 94
7. Demobilization of category mentioned in Art. 155. It means X% of 54,000 men in assembly points.
8. Movement of categories mentioned in Art. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 to their specialized assembly points.
9. Closing down some assembly points. It means liquidation of X% x 54,000 plus 6,300 beds.
 - a. movement of light weapons to remained assembly points
 - b. movement of those who are going to be trained in second and third batches of joint training for National Forces and National Gendarmerie to remaining assembly points.
 - c. establishment of job training schools in remaining assembly points.
10. Handover of category mentioned in Art. 158 to the Secretariat of State for Rehabilitation and Social integration or to the UNDP. Op. 1. 14 May 94 or Op. 2. 7 May 94
11. Handover of category mentioned in Art. 159 to UNHCR. Op.1 14 May 94 or Op. 2. 7 May 94
12. Handover of category mentioned in Art. 156, 157, 160 to UNDP.
13. Payment of demobilization allowances for all categories to be demobilized from 7/14 May until January 95.
 - a. Op. 1. In installments, for example in twelve

installments, so it means until January 96

b. Op. 2. One-shot deal.

14. Removal of light weapons from assembly points to the National Forces and the National Gendarmerie barracks.

a. 6,300 pieces 7/14 May 94 to joint training centers.

b. 33% of weapons 7/14 July 94 (NF) and 7/14 Aug 94 (NG)

c. 33% end of October 94 (NF) and end of Nov. 94 (NG).

d. The rest Dec 94.

15. Systematical closing down of assembly points until January 95.

16. Demobilization of Kigali RPF battalion Dec. 94.

INTEGRATION PROCESS

1. Establishment of the Army Command High Council (Art. 52).
January 94
2. The separate training of servicemen of the Rwandese
Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army (Art. 77) Op. 1 14
April-14 May 94 or Op. 2 7 April-7 May 94.
3. Designation of servicemen within their Units. Op. 1 14
May or Op. 2 17 May 94 (Art. 77)
4. Joint training of National Forces

4400 - 14 May-14 July 94
4400 - August- September
4400 - 15 Oct.-15 Dec
5. Joint training of National Gendarmerie (Art. 142)

2000 - 14 May - 14 Aug 94
2000 - September - November 94
2000 - 15 December - 15 March 95
6. The posting of servicemen in the respective Units upon
completion of the training of each batch. (Art 80)

UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

Distribution List

1000 (FC)
____Jan 1994

Formation of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) And its Working Groups

Reference : A. Arusha Peace Agreement , dated 4 August 93
B. UNAMIR, No. 1000 (FC), dated 12 Dec 1993
C. RPF - Proposed Amendments, dated 12 Dec 93
D. RGF - Minister of Defense, No. 3880 dated 16 December 1993

1. General

It has been agreed upon by both parties that the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), consisting of the most senior military decision makers of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), the (Rwandese Patriotic Forces (RPF), and UNAMIR, is essential before and during the life span of the Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG). Its mandate would be to monitor, discuss, provide direction, and be an open forum for conflict resolution on all military matters. In accordance with the responses received:

- a. The proposal for the formation of working groups as described in Reference B has been accepted without amendments by the RGF.
- b. The proposed amendment of the RPF (Reference C) related principally to formal objections rather than to the topics which have to be discussed. The RPF proposals include all the issues that were enumerated in Annex A of Reference B. Moreover they added several new, valuable proposals such as:
 - (1) The tracking of arms caches and neutralization of armed groups throughout the country, and;
 - (2) The recovery of weapons distributed to, or illegally acquired by civilians.
- c. UNAMIR Force HQ agrees that the above proposals shall be enumerated and subdivided into five categories of urgent and less urgent tasks to be accomplished. (see Annex A)

2. To avoid confusion with the Joint Commission, specified in Art. 79 of the military protocol of Reference A, the proposed name "Joint Military Commission" identifies the umbrella organization as described in para. 3 of Reference B.

3. The mandate of the JMC is to deal with all matters enumerated in Annex A. The UNAMIR Force Commander or his deputy will act as the chairman. He shall be assisted by the Chief of Plans Section who shall provide the appropriate secretarial and administrative requirements for the meetings. Its permanent membership shall comprise of three high ranking officers of both the RGF and RPF forces holding the following posts at the present time, and those officers of the Army High Command Council and the Gendarmerie National High Council under the BBTG:

- (1) _____
- (2) _____
- (3) _____
- (4) _____
- (5) _____
- (6) _____

4. The JMC will normally meet in NGONDORE, unless otherwise agreed upon by all parties, upon a written invitation of the initiating party. The invitation will include the agenda and all possible documents relating to the subject of the meeting.

5. The Working Groups

- a. The Working Group on Programs (WPG).

This WPG as created in accordance with Art. 79 of the military Protocol of Reference A, shall deal with matters under the jurisdiction of the Joint Drafting Committee, as stated in Art. 48. It shall deal with disciplinary regulations and with syllabi. The topics of these syllabi are already agreed on and are enumerated in Annex A.

- b. The Working Group on Training (WGT).

This WGT will deal with training separately from the points being considered by the Joint Commission in order to avoid any confusion. There is an over-all agreement on the matters to discuss in this working group (See Annex A).

- c. The Working Group on Operations (WGO)

The Working Group on "UNAMIR Matters", so called in the RPF proposition, deals mainly with operations and should therefore be called The Working Group on Operations. As already mentioned in para 1, there are urgent and less urgent matters to discuss. Some of them are already being handled, such as the deployment of the RPF battalion to KIGALI.

- d. The Working Group on Logistics (WGL).

The need for a Working Group on Logistics has been agreed on unanimously.

6. Other matters

There is tacit agreement that other matters which do not need immediate attention should be left to the Army Command High Council (ACHC) and the Command Council of National Gendarmerie (CCNG), as soon as these bodies begin functioning.

7. Responsibilities

- a. JMC.

The responsibilities of the JMC have been defined in Para 2.

- b. WGP.

The WGP will be jointly chaired by both the RGF and the RPF. An officer of the UNAMIR HQ planning section will attend these meetings as an adviser/observer.

- c. WGT.

The WGT should be organized under the same conditions as the WGP.

- d. WGO

UNAMIR HQ Planning Section will assume all responsibilities for the WGO.

- e. WGL

The WGL should be organized under the same conditions as the WGP.

8. Administration.

The organization of the meeting site, NGONDORE is a permanent responsibility of UNAMIR FORCE HQ. The NGONDORE SOP's, (in draft), will provide all details on the organization including administration and logistics of the meetings. Meanwhile, all parties are kindly asked to inform the UNAMIR Planning Section of planned meetings about 48 hours in advance.

Annex A: Tasks of the Working Groups of the Joint Military
Commission
Annex B: Diagram

Distribution List

Action

Information

External

Rwandese Government Forces - 3
Rwandese Patriotic Front - 5
National Gendarmerie - 2

SRSG
CAO
Political Adviser
IMCIVPOL

Internal

UNAMIR Force Headquarters List A

MAJ PODEYN
MAJ NATIOR

TO: FC
FROM: Chief of Plans
DATE: 10 January 1994
SUBJECT: OPS Order on The Two Parties Armed Forces
Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration

1. This is to inform you that Plans Cell is ready to start open discussion with all Section's Heads on matters regarding disengagement, demobilization and integration of the two Parties Armed Forces. (Please see attached Description of Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration Processes). The aim of these open discussions is to prepare Ops Order on this topic.

2. When you find reasonable following plan of work please appoint the dates of necessary meetings.

- a. First meeting: Date (First day)
 - Characteristics of the mission and situation by Plans Section.
 - Discussion.
- b. Introduction of Ops Order drafts: Date... (tenth day)
 - main body of Ops Order by Ops Section
 - annexes by Chiefs of Sections.
 - discussion.
- c. Promotion of Ops Order by COS: Date (twentieth day).

3. Plans Cell should occupy in this work the positions of the main ideas giver, data deliverer and coordinator. Ops should be responsible for final issue of this Order.

4. Regards.

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS	LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
1. Identification of assembly points, cantonment points and joint training centers (Art. 57); and their preparation January 94	1) Accomodation 2) Weapons Storage 3) Latrines 4) Fuel 5) Ablutions/Shower 6) Electricity 7) Medical Supplies 8) Water 9) Food 10) Clothing, Bedding, Transport, Postal, Kitchen support, Family visits, Welfare, Garbage, etc.	1) Recce of assembly points, cantonment points, joint training centers. 2) Put UNMOS at a point where physical preparation starts	1. Establish communication between all points and Headquarters	1) Roads 2) Bridges 3) Wells 4) Mine Checking	<u>Check:</u> 1. Available Infra for Instructions (Barracks, lodging, classrooms, latrines, electrical accessories, water provision, telephone) 2. Possibility of outside instruction area 3. Available Training Areas for Tactics 4. Available Trng. areas for shooting 5. Possibility for tented lodging <u>Decide on:</u> 1. Trng. programs 2. Materials needed for Instruction 3. Necessary transport (for Cmdr., Instructors, Men)
2. Demarcation of Assembly Zones (article 56) January 94	1) Negotiations for the new positions	1) When assembly points are chosen, assembly zones shall be demarcated 2) Supervision of RGF and RPF movements			
3. UN battalion deployment in DMZ March 94	1) Accomodation 2) After a 60-day period of self-sufficiency period, all kinds of supplies should be provided	1) Plan of patrols 2) Rules of co-operation with local authorities especially with National Gendarmerie 3) Deployment of two platoons in cantonment points	1) Communication system	1) Mine check 2) Wells	
4. Identification and registration of administrative and support staffs in their respective assembly points and their eligibility for special leaves (Art. 58) 02 April 1994	1) How many of them for each party? 2) Should they be demobilized or sent on long-term leave? 3) How should they be paid? - demobilization allowance? - according to some kind of table of allowances? 4) Should they leave their weapons in assembly points or be registered without weapons? 5) Where are they going to work?			1) Because of the beginning of the rainy season, a lot of points should be defended against nature by sub-units of the engineering corps 2) This raises additional logistical and operational problems	

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS	LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
5. Assembly of 640 (Art.78) Instructors for National Armed Forces and National Gendarmerie 03 April 1994	1) Transport of Instructors to Joint Training Centers 2) Organize group of International instructors (specially for Mine Clearance Plan) 3) How many international and how many Rwandese instructors	1) Gather instructors of both respective parties in their assembly zones 2) Conduct simultaneously transport from North and South to Joint Training Centers	1) Communication is vital		Determine: 1) Selection basis for Instructors coming from RGF and RPF 2) General or specialized formation 3) Branches and items to be instructed 4) Elaboration of instruction programs 5) Apportionment of the tasks and appointment to the Assembly Points 6) Training Centers for instructors to be determined and reced as in 1. above.
6. Movement of heavy weapons to cantonment points (Art.58)	1) Transport 2) Where to keep helicopters and aircraft	1) Secure transport of heavy weapons 2) Guarding of these weapons	1) Communication is vital		

	DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS	LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
O P T I O N 1	7. Transfer of 10% troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points (advance parties of each unit). One day-06 April 94.	1) It is necessary to have precise information about tactical troops deployment and their rotation plans so that transport planning according to operational demands is possible.	1) Plan for platoon transport	1) Communication is extremely vital		
	8. Verification of the transfer by UNAMIR 07 April 1994	1) Start food and water supply	1) Physical checking in garrisons and on front lines, and counting of soldiers in the assembly points by UNMOS.			
	9. Transfer of 30% troops with light weapons from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points. 08, 10, and 12 April 1994					
	10. Verification of the transfer by UNAMIR 09, 11, and 13 April 1994	1. Start normal supply system				

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS		LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
O P T I O N 2	7. Transfer of Troops from frontlines and garrisons to assembly points 06 April 1994	1. Transport	1. Plan of marches			
	8. Final verifi- cation of disengage- ment 07 April 1994	1. Start food and water supply				

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
1. Administrative preparation for payment of demobilization allowances (Art. 153) March - April 94	1. Rank recognition agreement has to be reached between the two parties March 94 2. Registration of those who are going to be demobilized April 94		1. Small EDP Subsection has to be established in all assembly points and Joint Training Centers. 2. Data Processing Factory has to be established in HQs a) March - training of 20 data entry clerks and checking of the software b) April-May crosschecking		
2. Agreement on tables of allowances in Assembly Points, Joint Training Centers, National Forces, National Gendarmerie, and administrative and support staffs on special leaves from assembly points March 94	1. Support of negotiation and assistance for the BBTG 2. Preparation of supply system according to new tables of allowances.		1. EDP support		
3. Separate training for the members of the two opposition forces in their respective zones. April 94	1. Printing of syllabuses 2. Provision of copybooks and pencils	1. Supervision of the training; specially political and civic.			<u>During Recce, check:</u> 1. Available infrastructure - classrooms, barracks, Trng. areas... 2. Possibility of installation of outside instruction facilities 3. Available training areas for Tac 4. Available training areas for shooting 5. Possibility for tented lodging 6. Plan training programmes
4. Registration of personnel vehicles mentioned in Art. 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, and 160; and for National Forces and National Gendarmerie			1. Small EDP subsection has to be established in all assembly points. 2. Data Processing Factory has to be established in HQs a) March - training of 20 data entry clerks and checking of software b) April - crosschecking		1 Estimate mat. needed for instruction 2 Estimate need of Transportation 3 Estimate the costs of the training operation (see details on paragraph 14) 4 Integration.

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
5. Publication of lists of those who are going to be demobilized (Art. 149). The official beginning of the demobilization process. (Beginning of May 94)	1. Publication on the boards in each assembly point after approval by Army Command High Council 2. Propaganda in media				
6. Demobilization of category mentioned in Art. 155. This constitutes approximately 8500 men. May 94	1. Payment of demobilization allowances 2. Issuance of certificate a) Photo camera in each assembly point b) Photocopy machine in each assembly point 3. Transport 4. What to do with the rest - 25860 soldiers need to be demobilized	1. Supervision of the fate of demobilized soldiers by UNMOs, human rights agency, civilian police			
7. Transfer of categories mentioned in Art. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 to their specialized assembly points.	1. Transport	1. Plan of march 2. Conduct of this movement	1. Good communication is very important during this operation	1. Because of the rainy season eng. subunits should be deployed in sensitive points.	
8. Closing down of assembly points for 14900 beds (5-6 assembly points) May 94	1. Removal of UN property 2. Hand-over of the remaining property to the BBTG 3. Transport of light weapons to the remaining assembly points Opt. a) with soldiers Opt. b) separately Opt. c) to points appointed by BBTG or respective party (other assembly points)	1. Transport of light weapons and ammo from closed-down assembly points as in Option a, b, and c.			

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
<p>9. Establishment of: - job training schools in remaining assembly points - French classes - civic classes</p> <p>May-Sept. 94</p>	<p>- Trucks and instructors for Driving Schools - Iron, tools and instructors for "Metal Work" project - fat, chemicals for "Scrap project" - tools for "Wells project" - teachers for French and civic classes</p>				<p>1. Close down only those AP with the poorest conditions for instruction 2. Move remaining peas to other AP 3. Plan activities for those waiting for batches 2 or 3 in the AP 4. Plan activities for those who already achieved their batch 5. Choose between send people under 4 to their units. Send them back to AP 6. Plan activities for those returning to AP (4 months NA - 6 months NGd)</p>
<p>10. Start of public works</p>					<p>1. Find projects who want to give job training and instruction (Mechanics, carpenters, bangers, painters, balcksmiths, security personnel, tourist guides, waiters, fuel stations, British guards 2. Recurit teachers 3. Establish instruction programs 4. Estimate costs and eventually find sponsors 5. Find project which want to accept demobilized military personnel after job training.</p>
<p>11. Hand-over of category mentioned in Art. 158 to the Secretariat for Rehabilitation and Social Integration</p>	<p>1. Almost all responsibilities can be transferred to BBTG</p>				
<p>12. Hand-over of category mentioned in Art. 159 to UNHCR</p>	<p>1. Almost all responsibilities can be transferred to UNHCR.</p>				
<p>13. Hand-over of categories mentioned in Art. 156, 157, 160 to UNDP</p> <p>September 94</p>	<p>1. Almost.....</p>				

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
14. Continuation of demobilization process June - December 94	1. Closing down assembly points one by one. 2. Removal of UN property 3. Hand-over of the remaining property to the BBTG 4. Transport of ammo and light weapon 5. Transfer of people from closed-down points to the remaining points.	1. Org. of marches	1. Communication is important	1. Engineering support requirement	
15. Payment of demobilization allowances From May 94 onwards	1. Preparation of the demobilized allowances pay book	1. Supervision by UNMOS in pay points which should be established in prefectures.	1. Assistance of EDP is necessary in the beginning of the operation.		
16. Demobilization of RPF Kigali Battalion Dec. 94		1. Notation of soldiers how are going to be trained in Joint Training Centers.			
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - During the stay of RPF Battalion in CND Kigali A Training, similar to the one that is given in the APs (separate training) is to be planned - MILOB will be present in CND to control this training - control this training - same items to be taught - similar daily programs

INTEGRATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
1. Establishment of the Army Command High Council (Art. 52 January 94	1. New Administrative situation (see diagram)				1. Decide which items will be taught in different branches a. Military instruction: select among RGF, RPF, and Foreign syllabuses b. Political instruction: contact local and foreign universities for documentation c. Physical Training d. List of possible duties in the APs e. List of Welfare activities f. Plan maintenance activities 2. Designate instructors per AP 3. Distribution to APs of: Infrastructure, Furniture, Consumables, Didactic aids, Sports equipment, Misc. 4. Estimate costs and look for funding
2. Separate training of servicemen of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Army (Art. 77) see Demobilization process point 3					
3. Designation of servicemen within their Units. (Art. 77) end of April 94	1. Verification of 40% to 60% division of the posts and verification of 50/50 division of high rank posts		EDP has to be engaged	1. For the first batch, engineering support shall be sent because of the rainy season	See 2.
4. Joint Training of National Forces 4400/ May-July 94 4400/ August-September 4000/ Oct.-Dec.		1. Supervision 2. Organization and supervision of troops, weapons, and ammo movements		1. For the first batch, engineering support shall be sent because of the rainy season	See 2.

INTEGRATION PROCESS	LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS	OPS PROBLEMS	COMMUNICATION AND EDP PROBLEMS	ENGINEERING PROBLEMS	TRAINING PROBLEMS
5. Joint Training of National Gendarmerie (Art. 142) 2000/ May-August 94 2000/ Sept-Nov 94 1800/ Dec-March 95		1. Supervision 2. Organization and supervision of troops, weapons, and ammo movements			Provide assistance to ACHC in working out Training programs, scales to be reached, Individual and Collective tests, Outside Training periods
6. Posting of servicemen in their respective Units upon completion of the training of each batch (Art. 80)		1. Supervision			


UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
U N A M I R

MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
M I N U A R

UNAMIR/AI/002
11 November 1993

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION

To: All HQs and Contingents Personnel, Civilian Police,
Military Observers and International Personnel in
UNAMIR and UNOMUR

From: P.O. Hallqvist
Chief Administrative Officer 

Subject: Within Mission Travel

1. All personnel planning duty travel away from their base station within the mission areas (Uganda/Rwanda) must complete a "Movement of Personnel" (MOP) form (see attached).
2. MOPs must be authorized and submitted to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) UNAMIR or Senior Administrative Officer (SAO) UNOMUR for approval. SAO/UNOMUR is delegated authority to approve MOP's for duty travel not exceeding 3 nights/days. Requests for travel in excess of 3 nights/days must be submitted to the CAO. MOPs must be submitted at least three working days in advance of travel in order to make the necessary accommodation/meal arrangements.
3. Personnel for whom the United Nations is responsible for the provision of accommodation/food must use accommodation facilities which are either provided to the UN free of charge, where the UN has concluded a contract with the hotel/restaurant or where a reduced rate for UNAMIR/UNOMUR personnel has been agreed.
4. At locations where accommodation cannot be provided by UNAMIR/UNOMUR, reimbursement **against receipts** up to a maximum of US\$40 per day will be made for hotel accommodation used for a maximum period of 14 days as per guidelines received from United Nations Headquarters. Reimbursement of food costs will be made up to a maximum \$10 per day. Payments will be made in local currencies at the prevailing United Nations operational rate of exchange.

5. Recipients of mission subsistence allowance (MSA) are, in principle, required to make their own arrangements for accommodation and meals when on duty travel; however, on request reservations/arrangements can be made on their behalf. Reimbursement as outlined at para. 4 above will only be considered if proof of retained accommodation at base station is accompanying the claim in the form of either a hotel receipt in the case of permanent hotel residence or a copy of the lease agreement in the case of private accommodation rented. Reimbursement of food costs will also be made in accordance with para 4 above.

6. Post facto requests will not be approved.

UNAMIR/UNOMUR

MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL

TO: CAO
SAO/UNOMUR

THROUGH: CMPO (Military Contingent Personnel)
CMO (Military Observers)

FROM: _____

In accordance with ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION AI/002,
authorization is requested for the following official travel:

NAME OF TRAVELLER: _____

RANK/POST: _____ ID CARD NO.: _____

DESTINATION: _____

PURPOSE OF TRAVEL : _____
(See Note 1 below)

ORDER/INSTRUCTION REFERRED TO: _____

DATE OF DEPARTURE: _____ DATE OF RETURN: _____

MODE OF TRAVEL: _____

TRAVEL AUTHORIZED BY: _____
(See Note 2 below) (Name) (Rank/Title)

ACCOMMODATION/MEALS AUTHORIZED AT: _____

APPROVED BY: _____
CAO/UNAMIR or SAO/UNOMUR

DATE: _____

- NOTES:
1. The purpose of travel must be clearly stated. "Duty" is not accepted as purpose of travel. Forms not completed in a satisfactory manner will be returned.
 2. Travel can only be authorized by a senior supervising officer (e.g. COS, COO, CLOGO, CMPO, CMO, SAO or equivalent)
 3. MOP's to be presented at least 3 working days in advance.
 4. POST FACTO REQUESTS WILL NOT BE APPROVED.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
U N A M I R

TO : Distribution List Date : 12 Dec 93
FROM : Lt Col Nazrul Islam Ref : MEETKM64
Chief of Staff
REF : FC's Staff Conference dated 11 Dec 93
SUBJ : USE OF KM 64 ON KIGALI- BUYMBA HIGH WAY FOR JOINT MEETINGS IN LINE WITH ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

1. Village NGONDARE (0529) at KM 64 on Kigali-Buymba road has been chosen as a neutral location for all joint meetings between the RGF, RPF and the UNAMIR and other UN Agencies on general matters and on specific subjects related to disengagement, disarmament, demobilization, training, etc of the armed forces of both parties. Ruhingari Prefecture building has been chosen as an alternative site.

2. The security, administrative and logistics arrangements for all meetings in these areas would be asunder :-

a. Plans Branch HQ UNAMIR. Chief Plans Officer Lt Col Van Put is the OPI for all activities related to use of these two locations by any Sections/branches of UNAMIR or any other Agencies. The Plans Branch is responsible to ensure following :-

(1) Arrangement of meetings as and when necessary or as and when ordered by the FC.

(2) Informing all concerned Rwandese parties, UN agencies and other concerned persons regarding the venue, date and time of the meeting and expected attendance.

(3) Preparation of the agenda for the meeting in consultation with the FC. Preparation of the minutes of the meeting and issuing it to all concerned.

(4) Giving early warning and written information to all concerned UNAMIR Military Component HQs, Civilian Police and Civil Administration indicating their tasks.

(5) Allocation of either of the sites for all levels of meetings.

(6) Informing DMZ HQ about the location, date and time of the meetings including the list of the attendance.

(7) Ensuring security of the area prior to the start of the meetings.

(8) Ensuring through DMZ HQ that local Prefecture have been informed, so that the venue is opened, cleaned and made ready for use.

(10) Ensuring that microphone/public address system has been placed and is operational. For the interim period, till UNAMIR has its own public address systems UNDP may be contacted for assistance.

(11) Ensuring that necessary and adequate furniture have been placed (specially in KM 64 location where there is no furniture at the moment).

(12) Arrange for translator/interpreter.

(13) Arrange for necessary press coverage in coordination with the Press Secretary of the SRSG. This will be arranged for meetings which are chaired either by the SRSG or FC and attended by very senior officials of all parties of Rwanda.

b. DMZ SECTOR. DMZ Sector will be responsible to provide physical security of the location and to escort the RPF and RGF officials. The specific tasks are :-

(1) As soon as information is received about any meetings in either of the locations, find out the details about the attendance, dates and timings of the meetings from the Chief of Plans.

(2) Arrange to secure the area at least 2 hours prior to the meetings. In KM 64 area arrange to permanently deploy at least a section of troops once the logistics arrangements have been sorted out.

(3) Arrange UNMO escorts for RPF and RGF delegations and escort them to the venue. No members of any parties shall be allowed to go the meeting venue without an escort.

(4) Arrange sweep and search of the area for mines and explosives by Force Engineers element. Till resources from Force Engineers are not available, Kigali Sector HQ will provide EOD team.

(5) Earmark two separate sites near to the conference venue for rest and placement of weapons of RGF and RPF escorts. Escorts will not be allowed to go inside the conference venue.

(6) No parties will be allowed to enter the conference location with any weapon or explosive. UNMO teams may be tasked to courteously check and monitor this.

(7) Detail UNMO Teams to monitor and patrol all approaches towards the conference site. Patrolling should start at least one hour prior to the conference and continue till all parties have left.

(8) Coordinate with local Prefecture to open the rooms needed for the conference and ensure its cleanliness and all other preparations for the conference well in time.

c. Kigali Sector. It will be responsible to :-

(1) Administrative arrangements in the form of carrying furniture, public address system etc to the meeting site at KM 64 as indicated by the Chief of Plans.

(2) Provide UNMO and armed escorts for SRSG and FC for attending these meetings. Armed escort shall be provided on specific security requirements and shall be coordinated by the Chief of Operations.

(3) Provide UNMO escort to all members of the UN Agencies involved in the meeting.

4. Management and Administration Division, UNAMIR. Meeting site at KM 64 on Kigali-Buyamba road would be a permanent site for all high level and working group meetings to implement important aspects of Arusha Peace Agreement. It would be participated by the SRSG, FC and other military officials of UNAMIR, officials of RPF and RGF, members of UN Agencies and other international donor agencies. Several such meetings have already taken place and many more would take place in every week throughout Phase 1 and 2 of UNAMIR operation. Logistics arrangements in the form of furniture, water, electricity etc are needed on a permanent basis for the meeting site. This aspect may be given due priority in the near future.

5. Regards.

Distribution :

Action :

External :

Sector Commander, KIGALI Sector
Sector Commander, DMZ Sector

Internal :

Chief of Plan

Information :

External :

CMO, MILOB HQ

Internal :

Force Commander
Press Secretary to SRSG
Chief Administrative Officer
Chief Ops Officer

C Log O
MA to FC
AMA to FC

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
U N A M I R

TO : Distribution List Date : 21 Dec 93
FROM : Lt Col Nazrul Islam Ref : MEETKM64
Chief of Staff
SUBJ : CONTROL AND COORDINATION CHECK LIST FOR THE USE OF
VILLAGE NGONDORE ON KIGALI-BUYMBA HIGH WAY AND
KINIHIRA SUB PREFECTURE BUILDING FOR JOINT MEETINGS IN
LIGHT WITH ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT

1. Village NGONDORE (0529) near KM 64 on Kigali-Buyimba road has been chosen as a neutral location for all joint meetings between the RGF, RPF and the UNAMIR and other UN Agencies on general matters and on specific subjects related to the peace process. Kinihira Sub Prefecture building will continue to be used as an alternate or over flow site.

2. The security, administrative and logistics responsibilities for all meetings in these areas will be as under :-

a. Plans Branch HQ UNAMIR. Plans Branch, HQ UNAMIR is responsible for :-

(1) Allocating either of the sites (which includes allotment by room in each site) for use as joint meeting place.

(2) Informing DMZ HQs about the location, date and time of the meetings including the list of the attendance or at least the organization and coordinator's name and appointment.

b. DMZ SECTOR. DMZ Sector will be responsible for following :-

a. (1) Security of either meeting places.

b. (2) Ensuring that administrative and logistics arrangements as per check list are completed well in time to receive meeting participants.

c. (3) Providing escorts to RPF officials as per escort SOP.

d. (4) Ensure that no party enters the conference venue with any weapon/explosive or armed escorts. Security personnel may be tasked to courteously check and monitor this. Details of escorts and their weapons are given in escort SOP.

B. KIGALI SECTOR AND MILOB GP HQ. They will be responsible to provide escorts as per Escort SOP.

3. Each UNAMIR Section/branch and out side organizations who requires to use either site for any meeting must ensure that :-

a. They have reserved the site at least 72 hours in advance with the Plans Section , HQ UNAMIR.

b. Following requirements, if needed at the meeting site, have been coordinated with the appropriate authorities :-

(1) Sound systems.

(2) Press.

(3) Translator/interpreter.

c. Escort arrangements have been coordinated and finalized with the appropriate Branches/HQs as per Escort SOP.

d. Check List given at Annex A to this instructions have been followed.

5. Check List Check list on use of the meeting sites is given at annex A.

4. Management and Administration Division, UNAMIR. Meeting site at NGONDORE on Kigali-Buimba road would be a permanent site for all high level and working group meetings to implement important aspects of Arusha Peace Agreement. Several such meetings have already taken place and many more would take place in every week throughout Phase 1 and 2 of UNAMIR operation. Logistics arrangements in the form of furniture, water, toilets, electricity etc are needed on a permanent basis for the meeting site.

5. Regards.

Annex

A : Check List

Distribution :

Action :

External :

MILOB GP HQ

Sector Commander, KIGALI Sector

Sector Commander, DMZ Sector

Internal :

Chief of Plan ✓

C Log O

Information :

External :

Resident Representative of UNDP
(Please intimate to all UN agencies and NGO)

Internal :

Force Commander
Political Adviser to SRSG
Press Secretary to SRSG
Chief Administrative Officer
Chief Ops Officer
MA to FC
AMA to FC

CHECK LIST
USE OF MEETING SITE

PLANS SECTION

1. ENSURE THAT ALLOCATION OF EITHER OF THE MEETING SITES (NGONDORE OR KINIHIRA) HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE CONCERNED AGENCY AS PER PRIORITY OF PLACEMENT OF DEMAND FOR USING THE AREA.
2. ENSURE THAT RELEVANT INFORMATION IS GIVEN WELL IN TIME TO DMZ HQ ABOUT THE CONFERENCE (DATE, TIME, LOCATION AND USERS IDENTITY INCLUDING ATTENDANTS LIST OR NUMBERS).
3. CHECK THAT USERS KNOW THE LOCATION, TRAVEL TIME AND SECURITY MEASURES REQUIRED FOR MOVEMENT.

OPS SECTION

1. ENSURE THROUGH THE LIAISON CELL THAT THE RPF AND RGF OFFICIALS FOLLOW THE ESCORT SOP FOR MOVEMENT.
2. ENSURE THROUGH THE LIAISON CELL THAT THE RPF AND RGF OFFICIALS KNOW ABOUT THE SCHEDULE OF THE CONFERENCE (IF AND WHEN THEY ARE REQUIRED TO ATTEND).

DMZ SECTOR

1. ENSURE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS PREPARATIONS (UNTIL PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT ARE MADE) SPECIALLY AT NGONDORE ARE MADE FOR THE CONFERENCE. SOME OF THESE ARE :-
 - A. INFORMING LOCAL PREFECTURE/SUB PREFECTURE.
 - B. UNLOCKING AND OPENING THE CONFERENCE ROOMS.
 - C. CLEANING THE VENUE.
 - E. ARRANGEMENTS OF FURNITURE.
 - F. RESTING AREAS FOR RPF AND RGF ESCORTS, UNMO ESCORTS AND DRIVERS.
2. CHECK THAT THE MEETING AREA HAS BEEN SECURED. FOLLOWING MEASURES ARE ANTICIPATED :-
 - A. PHYSICALLY GUARDING THE LOCATION BY UN TROOPS.

- B. NOT ALLOWING THE RPF AND RGF TO ENTER THE VENUE WITH ARMED ESCORT OR WITH ANY WEAPON/EXPLOSIVE.
 - C. NOT TO ALLOW ANY RGF AND RPF DEPLOYED TROOPS TO REMAIN WITHIN THE SECURED AREA.
 - D. CONTROLLING TRAFFIC AND MOB/ONLOOKERS.
3. ENSURE THAT ESCORTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AS PER ESCORT SOP.

MILOB GP HQ

- 1. ENSURE THAT ESCORTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AS PER ESCORT SOP.
- 2. CHECK THAT NO OFFICIALS AS PER ESCORT SOP (ATTENDING THE MEETING AND ARE TO BE ESCORTED) HAVE MOVED FROM KIGALI TO THE CONFERENCE SITE WITHOUT AN ESCORT.

KIGALI SECTOR HQ

- 1. ENSURE THAT ESCORTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AS PER ESCORT SOP AND NO ONE (ATTENDING THE MEETING) MOVES OUT OF KIGALI WITHOUT AN ESCORT.
- 2. ASSIST DMZ COMMANDER WITH TRANSPORT AND MEN IN ARRANGING LOGISTICS SUPPORT FROM KIGALI FOR THE CONFERENCE SITE UNTIL THE SITES HAVE INTEGRAL LOGISTICS BACK UP.
- 3. ASSIST WITH TRANSPORT AND MEN VARIOUS SECTIONS OF FORCE HQ (MILITARY COMPONENT) IN MOVEMENT OF STORES, EQUIPMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS TO THE MEETING SITES UNTIL THE SITES HAVE INTEGRAL LOGISTICS BACK UP.

USERS OF THE CONFERENCE SITE

- 1. ENSURE THAT EITHER OF THE CONFERENCE SITE HAS BEEN BOOKED AT LEAST 72 HOURS IN ADVANCE WITH THE PLANS SECTION, HQ UNAMIR.
- 2. GIVE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHILE BOOKING :-
 - A. DATE AND TIME OF CONFERENCE.
 - B. ATTENDANCE LIST OR AT LEAST THE NUMBER OF ATTENDANCE WITH NAME/DESIGNATION OF IMPORTANT ATTENDANTS.
- 3. ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED A CONFIRMATION OF YOUR BOOKING FROM THE PLANS SECTION.
- 4. ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE DEMANDED FOR ESCORTS TO THE OPS SECTION OF HQ UNAMIR AND HAVE COORDINATED IT WITH THE CONCERNED HQ (WHO IS TO PROVIDE THE ESCORT AS PER ESCORT SOP). DO NOT MOVE TO THE MEETING SITE WITHOUT AN ESCORT.

5. ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FOLLOWING (IF YOU NEED THEM) FOR THE CONFERENCE:-

- A. SOUND SYSTEMS. UNDP MAY BE ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE.
- B. PRESS COVERAGE. PRESS SECRETARY TO THE SRSG MAY BE CONTACTED.
- C. TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER. CAO OR HIS STAFF MAY BE CONTACTED. UNDP MAY BE ABLE TO HELP BECAUSE THEY HAVE GOOD INTERPRETERS.
- D. MAPS, CHARTS AND DOCUMENTS. SUCH DOCUMENTS WILL MADE AVAILABLE BY OPS AND/OR PLANS SECTION (DEPENDING ON THE SUBJECTS) FOR CONFERENCES TO BE CHAIRED EITHER BY THE SRSG OR THE FC.
- E. STATIONARY AND OFFICE EQUIPMENTS.
- F. TRANSPORTS.
- G. FOOD AND DRINKS.

6. ENSURE THAT ALL OFFICIALS/PARTICIPANTS REQUIRED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND ARE PRESENT IN THE CONFERENCE. FOR RGF AND RPF OFFICIALS CONTACT THE RESPECTIVE LIAISON OFFICERS THROUGH THE LIAISON CELL UNDER THE OPS SECTION, HQ UNAMIR.

7. CHECK THAT AN AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND CIRCULATED TO ALL CONCERNED WELL IN TIME.

8. ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE AN OFFICER/CONFERENCE SECRETARY TO NOTE DOWN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE.

PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS LIST DOES NOT COVER ALL PREPARATIONS TO BE MADE FOR MEETINGS. SPECIAL PREPARATIONS/ARRANGEMENTS MAY REQUIRE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES AND EFFORTS. UNAMIR USERS OF THE MEETING SITES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO PUT ACROSS THEIR REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO EITHER THE MILITARY COMPONENT OR THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT (DEPENDING ON THE RESOURCES ASKED FOR).

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

10 December 1993

To: CAO

Info: FC
COS
COps
CPlans

From: CLOGO

Subject: Repair and renovation works at 64th km
(negotiation site)

1. A reconnaissance was conducted by the Liaison Officer Maj. M. Pazik, Logistic Officer Maj. J. Bayer and the local contractor on 09 December '93 to the effect of necessary repair and renovation/adaptation works to be completed at the 64th kilometre of the Kigali - Ugandan border highway, i.e. at the permanent negotiation site earmarked to serve throughout the mission.

2. It was established during that reconnaissance that massive repair works have to be done before the site might be pronounced usable and operational in the light of existing needs and provisions established in relevant agreements. All the structures meant for holding negotiations - both plenary sessions and working groups - and accommodating guards as well as negotiators and visitors are in very poor condition and badly need renovation.

3. The local contractor was present during the reconnaissance and some technicalities were brought to his knowledge. He awaits, however, a formal requisition to be forwarded to him as for any indispensable renovation/construction works to be completed at the site.

4. Enclosed please find outlays of respective structures with lists of suggested renovation works to be carried out as well as the list of requested furniture and equipment to make the site operational:

- a. Annex A: 64th kilometre general overview;
- b. Annex B: UNAMIR Office Building (the negotiation site);
- c. Annex C: The restaurant (Amahoro Auberge);
- d. Annex D: Guard Squad accommodation;
- e. Annex E: Duty Officer's booth;
- f. Annex F: Accompanying structures on the other side of the road.
- g. Annex G: List of requested furniture.
- h. Annex H: Remarks


1. The 64th kilometre negotiation site consists of two structures adjacent to each other with one of them being the proper conference room and the other one being a restaurant & kitchen. Next to the kitchen there is a structure that might serve as a store room provided mine clearance were effected (see Annex A).

2. At the parking site there is a structure with no roof - that one could be used as a garbage pit for the whole compound (see Annex A).

3. It is advisable that the guard squad be accommodated on the opposite side of the road off the negotiation site. The "house no. 4" is an appropriate location to accommodate 10 - 12 men provided all necessary renovation work is done (see Annex D).


4. Duty Officer of the Day (DOD) could be accommodated in a small booth situated exactly opposite the main conference room. That small structure should be reinforced and equipped as it should become the communications centre for the entire compound (see Annex E).

5. On the same side of the road there are two buildings that could be used by advisers for their technical meetings (see Annex F).



Following renovation works are strongly suggested at the UNAMIR Office, i.e. negotiation site:


- a. The main negotiation room to be expanded with two small partition walls on the side opposite to the main entrance to be removed.
- b. A door to be installed between the main negotiation room and the adjacent rooms. The door should open from the main room into the internal corridor.
- c. Two wooden beams should be placed just under the ceiling of the main negotiation room along both side walls so that maps could be properly displayed on walls.
- d. The office room should be provided with solid doors and locks on **both** sides. At least 2 sockets should be fixed as electricity sources for xerox copiers, computers, UPS and other equipment to be installed there.
- e. Toilets should be fixed and equipped with one small size window to be pierced in the men's room. Sewage system for the toilets to be laid.
- f. Partition walls between the internal corridor and the main negotiation room and the toilets should be connected with the ceiling so that no empty space be left.
- g. All windows should be glazed and provided with thick wire net fixed at the outside wall surface. This should be considered a protection measure against any grenade assault.
- h. Roof has to be thoroughly checked and repaired over the whole structure.
- i. All rooms need painting or at least whitewashing.



Following renovation/adaptation works are suggested for the restaurant being a structure adjacent to the main negotiation site (UNAMIR Office):


- a. Roof to be repaired;
- b. Water network should be fixed so that kitchen be put at use and be operational at any time. In that regard a sink or a washing basin must be installed. Outflow of utilized water to be prepared at the external side of the compound.
- c. A cooker should be installed - the most suitable locations seems to be a small side room opposite the main entrance. In case the cooker is gas-operated it would be very easy to connect it with the gas cylinder placed outside.
- d. **Optional:** in case no gas cooker is installed and an oven is put instead a chimney would have to be erected in the same side room.
- e. Outside that structure - half way between it and the main negotiation site - a water tower with a water tank (approx. 1500 lts) should be installed so that permanent water supply be assured. Concurrently a shower facility should be fixed underneath to enable guards to cater to their ablution needs.
- f. One door has to be fixed and locks to be installed in both doors.
- g. Glass sheets and thick wire nets should be fitted at all the windows.
- h. A generator site should be prepared for two generators (one as the main energy source and another one as a reserve).
- i. Electricity network to be fixed.
- j. A chandelier to be installed in the conference room.
- k. Internal walls to be painted.

AMAHORO AUBERGE



Following renovation/adaptation works should be completed at the "House No. 4" earmarked as the most presumable accommodation for the Guard Squad to be permanently stationed at the negotiation site:

- a. 6 doors to be fixed.
- b. Roof to be thoroughly checked and repaired.
- c. Locks to be installed in all doors.
- d. Glass sheets and thick wire net to be installed at all windows nets should be placed at the outside wall surface.
- e. Internal walls to be painted.
- f. Electricity network to be fixed.





Following renovation/adaptation works should be done at the small booth located opposite the main negotiation site (UNAMIR Office) and the Amahoro Auberge:

- a. Walls to be reinforced and plastered anew.
- b. Floor to be laid.
- c. Electricity network to be installed.

Following renovation/adaptation works should be completed at accompanying buildings located across the road off the negotiation site:

- a. Roof to be repaired.
- b. Electric network to be fixed.
- c. Partition walls to be removed.
- d. Floor to be levelled.
- e. Internal walls to be painted.



Following furniture and equipment should be provided for all rooms:

- beds	- 12
- matrassaes	- 12
- mosquito nets	- 12
- chairs	- 60
- tables	- 10
- conference table	- 1
- chandelier	- 1
- whiteboards	- 3

Remarks:

1. Water supply remains the crucial problem for the negotiation site. An appropriate supply system has to be assured as local water sources may be insufficient. In case water is supplied by a water tank transports should arrive every second day.

2. The area around the negotiation site should be checked for mines and cleared.

3. It seems advisable that a gardener be employed to design and arrange the area.

4. Generators of not less than 15 KVA should be implaced.