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MEETING  
OF  
FOREIGN MINISTERS  
1959  
Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

СОВЕЩАНИЕ  
МИНИСТРОВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ  
ДЕЛ  
1959 г.  
Дворец Наций  
Женева

RÉUNION  
DE MINISTRES  
DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES  
1959  
Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

EM/DOC/31  
3 June 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A.A. GROMYKO  
ON THE BERLIN QUESTION

2 June 1959

We are continuing with the discussion of the Berlin question. At previous sessions of this Meeting, and also when the question was discussed in informal conversations, we have already had an opportunity of explaining the substance of the Soviet Government's proposals for a settlement of the Berlin problem. I hope that in the further examination of these proposals we shall discuss specific provisions in detail, in order to make it easier to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties. I intend also today to give some additional explanations regarding the Soviet Government's proposals on the Berlin question. First of all, however, I should like to dwell once more on the proposals which the Governments of the three Western Powers have submitted here on this question.

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that the danger to peace in Europe caused by the present situation in West Berlin can be removed on the basis of an agreed four-Power settlement which will answer the purpose of reducing international tension, take into account the actual situation as it has developed in Germany and be acceptable to the German Democratic Republic, in the centre of whose territory West Berlin is situated. The proposals concerning Berlin in the so-called package plan of the three Western Powers, however, in no way answer these purposes. They are quite unsuited to help us in the search for an agreed settlement of the Berlin question, as the Soviet delegation has quite clearly explained at this Meeting.

On 26 May, Mr. Herter, the United States Secretary of State, explained the position of the United States Government on the Berlin question in even greater detail than on 14 May.

Unfortunately this statement, too, could not but give rise to serious disappointment. It merely bore out the view that the Governments of the three Western Powers still adhere to positions which provide no basis whatsoever for an agreement.

What, in fact, did the United States Secretary of State propose here? What are the contents of the seven-point programme he has outlined?

By way of example, let us look at point I of these proposals. It envisages no more or no less than that East Berlin should be torn from the German Democratic Republic and be included, together with West Berlin, in "one indivisible area" which is to be placed under a four-Power occupation régime.

The Soviet delegation has repeatedly stated its views regarding these manoeuvres in regard to East Berlin, and there is no need for me again to point out how unrealistic such attempts to settle the Berlin question at the expense of the German Democratic Republic are. Their true purport can only be to make it more difficult to reach an agreement on the Berlin question.

The first point of the Western Plan further proposes that the four Powers, namely, the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France, should dictate to the Berliners the procedure for municipal elections and for setting up a City Government and drafting a Constitution for Berlin - and all this again under a foreign occupation régime.

Point II of the programme put forward by Mr. Herter makes it clear to those who might have any doubts on this score that the implementation of the three-Power Plan would by no means bring the inhabitants of Berlin an autonomous, independent life and freedom from foreign occupation. Here it is written in black and white that irrespective of the elections, the plebiscite or the Berlin Constitution, all of which are referred to in the Western proposals, the four Powers would have the right not only to maintain in this city any number of their troops they chose, but would also enjoy all the prerogatives of occupying Powers, including the right to rescind legislation or suspend its operation with reference to such considerations as, for example, "the prestige and security of Allied Forces, dependants, employees and representatives, their immunities and other requirements".

Truly, as we read these lines we begin to feel that we are making a journey into the past, that it is not our task to consolidate the foundations of a peaceful life in Europe and restore the rights of the Germans but to impose our will on them as if they were our enemies, relying on military force.

This impression of an anachronism is still further strengthened, if we study the subsequent points of the Western Powers' Plan. There we read that composite police patrols consisting of members of the armed forces of the occupying Powers are to appear in the streets of Berlin. It is proposed that questions in regard to assuring access to Berlin by land, by water and by air would be settled by the occupation Powers, too, as if the German Democratic Republic, on whose territory Berlin is situated, did not exist.

The last point, the seventh, of the Western Powers' Plan contains a vaguely formulated but significant hint that even the coming into force of a peace treaty with Germany will not necessarily free Berlin from foreign occupation.

We have thus been presented with a fully worked out and detailed programme for perpetuating the foreign occupation of West Berlin and extending the occupation régime to East Berlin as well. The proposal is made that we take no steps to normalize the situation in West Berlin but to redouble and in many ways aggravate the very factors which have turned this situation into a grave danger to peace in Europe.

But this is not all. The three-Power proposals are permeated with contempt for the idea that in both East and West Berlin there have been established two separate and different ways of life and that East Berlin is an integral part of the German Democratic Republic.

There is not even a hint here of solicitude for the population of Berlin or of concern about the actual conditions under which they are living, although without this it will of course be impossible to find a correct approach to the solution of the Berlin question.

Faced with such a plan, how can we regard it as indicating a desire to reach an agreed solution of the Berlin problem? I think that with the best will in the world it is impossible to draw such a conclusion. The logic of facts forces us to draw quite a different conclusion. This conclusion was formulated the other day with complete clarity and frankness by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, when he stressed that in the Western Power's Plan "there is not a single point for negotiation. These proposals are not based on any desire

to find a correct solution which could bring about the lessening of international tension which all peoples want".

The Soviet Government sincerely wants to find an agreed solution to the West Berlin question in the interests of bringing about a healthier international situation and consolidating peace in Europe, and it continues to hope that such is also the intention of the other participants in our Meeting. But if this is so, then it is essential to lay aside hopeless attempts to put forward plans which are known in advance to be unacceptable. It is essential to go over to a joint search for a reasonable solution which would answer the purposes that I have indicated and would not harm the interests of any of the parties concerned.

These aims cannot, of course, be achieved through attempts to break up the existing way of life in East or West Berlin, but only by jointly guaranteeing a status for West Berlin under which the administration of the city will be handed over entirely to its inhabitants and no foreign State at all will interfere in its affairs. It is also clear that no solution of the Berlin question can be correct and lasting unless it takes into account the legitimate rights of the German Democratic Republic.

We have heard it stated here that the German Democratic Republic "has no kind of mandate except that which has been given it by the Soviet Union". The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to make its position crystal clear on this point, so that in future in working out agreed solutions to the Berlin question we need not come up against further difficulties.

In view of the clearly incorrect interpretation of the nature of the relations existing between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, I must explain that the rights and functions which the Soviet Union once exercised in the eastern part of Germany in its capacity as an occupying Power have been handed over fully and in their entirety to the German Democratic Republic. In September 1955 a treaty was concluded between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, under which the Soviet Union did not reserve to itself any rights whatsoever limiting the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic either in internal matters or in foreign policy. No articles can be found in this treaty, for example, which remove from the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic questions relating to the unification of Germany or of Berlin, such as are known to exist, with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, in the Paris Agreements which the Western Powers have concluded with that State.

Even from a purely legal point of view then, the agreements between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic preclude the possibility of its being granted any kind of "powers" or "mandate" by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government respects the agreements which it has concluded with the German Democratic Republic, as it is ready to respect also those agreements which may, and we hope will, be concluded as a result of our discussion of the Berlin question if we all try to reach agreement. We do not think that our colleagues in the negotiations would be entitled to require from us any other attitude towards our international obligations. To attempt to treat the German Democratic Republic in the way that the representatives of the Western Powers are doing in their statements when we discuss the Berlin question would mean living in a world of ideas which are in their very nature alien to Soviet foreign policy; it would mean being a long way off from a true estimate of the essence of the Berlin question.

If we trace the development of Germany over the last ten years, it is not difficult to grasp the main content of the historical processes that have been taking place there: step by step the two German States have been establishing themselves. Each of these States has obtained international recognition. The German Democratic Republic maintains normal diplomatic relations with States of which the population comprises more than a third of mankind. But we have absolutely no intention of persuading our colleagues to establish diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. The working out of an agreement on the Berlin question and the diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic are two different matters. We are only inviting the Governments of the United States of America, Britain and France to use a maximum of realism in approaching the examination of so important and acute a problem as the question of West Berlin.

Let us assume that an independent political unit, whether a town or some other specially separated district, had grown up on the territory of some other State, and that this independent political unit was maintaining links with foreign States and was, moreover, using the land and air communications of the country in which it was situated. Could the status of that town or district conceivably be determined and given practical effect without the co-operation of the State concerned? Yet the attempt is being made to put the German Democratic Republic in precisely such a situation.

If the intention behind the statements on the necessity for some kind of "mandate" for the German Democratic Republic was that the legitimate rights of the German Democratic Republic should not be taken into account, this would create a great many artificial deadlocks in our negotiations; but such deadlocks can be avoided if we all appraise in a sensible manner the situation in Berlin and the legitimate interest of the German Democratic Republic in solving this question.

The representatives of the Western Powers frequently interpret the Soviet Government's proposal to give West Berlin the status of a Free City as meaning that the Soviet Union does not take into consideration the rights of the United States of America, Britain and France which derive from the fact of the capitulation of Hitler's Germany. But this is an incorrect interpretation. We do not think that the American, British and French troops were in Berlin in any sense unlawfully.

But the essence of the question now is not in the least that we should busy ourselves with examining the legal elements which are the result of the military defeat of Germany fourteen years ago. The necessity for changing the present situation in West Berlin is determined not by the validity or the non-validity of Allied documents of 1944 and 1945 with regard to the occupation of Berlin, but by the fact that this occupation itself, which once served as a symbol of the quadripartite occupation of Germany as a whole, has long ago become out of date, has taken on an artificial character and is to a large extent poisoning relations between States, including the great Powers which were formerly Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.

Cannot the fate of West Berlin, which has found itself in a special position in relation to the German Democratic Republic, be settled otherwise than on the basis of its occupation by foreign troops? The Soviet Government considers that this question can be completely settled by handing over the administration of West Berlin to its own inhabitants. Indeed, there are signs that other participants in our Meeting also are aware that it will be impossible to stay in occupation indefinitely.

The Foreign Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, has said here that the American, French and British forces are today in West Berlin "not as conquerors" but with the consent, as he maintained, of the majority of the population of West Berlin. Let us leave aside for the moment the question of

to what extent the inhabitants of West Berlin really desire the prolongation of the occupation of their city and how far in general it is possible to speak of the free expression of the will of the population while an occupation régime exists. At the present moment it is necessary to stress another matter - such a "legal basis" for maintaining the occupation régime as citing the agreement of the population is, of course, quite untenable from the point of view of international law.

What then follows from the arguments advanced here by the representatives of the Western Powers in support of the presence of their troops in West Berlin? One time they tell us that these troops are there on the basis of rights arising out of Germany's capitulation. Another time we are told that the troops of the three Powers are in that city "not as conquerors", but by agreement with West Berlin. If that is the argument, however, then what point is there in the reference to Germany's capitulation? Moreover, is it not clear that in this case the repeated references to previous agreements between the three Powers and the Soviet Union lose all sense? Needless to say, such a formulation of the question would, of course, in no way commit the German Democratic Republic, whose position on the Berlin question should not be a matter of indifference for the Western Powers.

This contradiction in the reasoning of the Western Powers is not a coincidence. It reflects the contradictions of the position itself which the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France adopt in the Berlin question. No matter how much one tries to tie up the ends, it cannot be denied that the occupation régime in West Berlin has become obsolete.

In seeking the preservation of the present occupation régime in West Berlin, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France are apparently afraid of budging from their occupation rights because they underestimate, for some reason, the possibilities of a different settlement of the Berlin question on a quadripartite basis. We would, however, again draw the attention of the delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France to the fact that the Soviet Union proposes that agreement be reached on a settlement of the Berlin question on a basis which would meet the interests of all parties and would not be detrimental either to the security or to the prestige of any State. None of the participants in this Meeting appears to dispute the need to change the present situation in Berlin. This is borne out also by the fact that our Governments have agreed to discuss the Berlin question at this Meeting.

In outlining our proposal for giving West Berlin the status of a demilitarized Free City we have repeatedly stressed that the Soviet Government is interested in providing such guarantees for the existence of a Free City of West Berlin and its links with the outside world as would ensure the lasting and unshakeable status of West Berlin as an independent political unit.

From the exchange of views on the Berlin question we have received the impression that it is the proposal for the withdrawal of the troops of the three Powers from West Berlin that gives rise to the greatest objections on the part of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd spoke about this at the meeting of 30 May. He tried to convince us that the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in West Berlin constitute the sole guarantee for the independence of the city on which the three Western Powers can at present rely. Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville expressed similar views during our conversations in the last few days.

It was precisely with a view to working out a mutually acceptable agreement on the Berlin question that the Soviet Government made two supplementary proposals for settling the question of foreign troops in West Berlin. We might agree that there should be a symbolic and precisely stipulated number of United States, United Kingdom, French and USSR troops in West Berlin. Inasmuch as the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France attach such importance to the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin, it would seem that they should have no objection to such a settlement of the question. This, if you like, is a compromise proposal which should suit all parties if there is a real desire for agreement.

Another possible alternative for a settlement of this question would consist in the replacement of the troops of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in West Berlin by limited contingents of troops of neutral States.

It goes without saying that in this we proceed from the assumption that the presence of the troops of the four Powers or of neutral countries on the territory of the Free City of West Berlin, must in no way be regarded as an occupation of that territory and that the foreign troops will not interfere in the domestic affairs of West Berlin. The legal status of such troops might be determined by a separate agreement.

Consequently, if there are any doubts about guarantees capable of protecting the Free City of West Berlin against interference in its affairs and of ensuring its unimpeded communication with the outside world, there will be no lack, on the part of the Soviet Government, of the desire to settle this question effectively together with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France and in agreement with the German Democratic Republic.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the consideration of the Berlin question that has so far taken place shows that the divergencies between the positions of the parties are substantial. The task for the Governments concerned is to make efforts to narrow the gap between the positions and to achieve an agreed solution. And if there is a real desire to reach agreement, then these efforts will, in our opinion, bear their fruit.

The Soviet delegation will, on its part, do its utmost to reach a settlement of the Berlin question on a mutually acceptable basis. We hope that the delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France will reciprocate. If a lasting solution of the Berlin problem is found as a result of our joint efforts, this will not only normalize the situation in Germany and Europe, but will be a hope-inspiring example for the future, a harbinger of co-operation between our Powers in settling other international problems that have become ripe for settlement.

Today we have heard the statement made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Grewe. The conclusion which suggests itself in connexion with this statement might be formulated as follows: the statement which the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has made confirms that we are correct in saying that the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is a drag on the participants in our Meeting. At the very beginning of this Meeting we expressed misgivings about the policy which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is following, including its policy in connexion with the present Meeting. To our deep regret these misgivings are being confirmed.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has attempted to present the matter as though sober-minded people - or, as he put it, sensible people - could not agree with the Soviet Government's contention that there are two German States in Germany and that the only way to unite Germany is by means of agreement between these two German States.

We do not know what the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany had in mind when he referred to such "sensible" people. But obviously he was thinking of such people as those who brought about the position when Germany was split into two parts. These very people whom you have called sensible, including those who are now laying down the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, are today reaping the fruits of their own policy.

Today there are two States in Germany - the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. However many speeches we deliver, however many statements we make trying to prove the contrary, hundreds or thousands of speeches and hundreds or thousands of statements cannot change the simple and unalterable fact that today two independent States have been formed on the territory of Germany and that there is only one road to the unification of Germany, namely, agreement between these two German States.

The sooner this is realized by those who have brought about the present situation in Germany and who bear the responsibility for splitting Germany into two parts, the sooner it is realized by the people who determine the foreign policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the better it will be.

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Дворец Народов  
ЖЕНЕВА

Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

HM/DOC/32

2 June 1959

ORIGINAL - ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY MR. SELWYN LLOYD,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

2 June 1959

Mr. Chairman,

In the course of the speech which you made and which has just been translated to us, you made some controversial statements. I am not going to argue again the question of the two German States because you know our views upon that, and I think you also know that not even all the speeches to which you referred would change our minds upon that issue. But I do want to take up one argument.

When you raised the question of the Western right to be in West Berlin, you said in effect that the Soviet Government had never stated that Western troops were in Berlin in an illegal manner. Well, it flows from that that we have the right to be there, the right which came from the capitulation of the German Government at the end of the war. And I think you accepted that proposition also in your speech. Well now, those fights can only be terminated by a peace treaty with a united Germany. You did say in your speech that there was now some contradiction in the Western position. You referred particularly to me and you said that really we had changed our ground and were claiming to be in West Berlin by virtue of an invitation from the West Berliners. As I know of old, you are a very skilful debater, but you really were putting an argument into my mouth which I had not used, because when I spoke about the will of the people of West Berlin I was not dealing with our rights but with the consequences of the exercise of our rights, and I will read again what I said:

"Our troops are not in Berlin for warlike purposes; they are not holding down an unwilling population. They are there as symbols of the interest which the Western Powers take in the fate of the inhabitants of West Berlin, and their presence is desired by the overwhelming majority of those inhabitants".

I then gave the figures. I was dealing with your comment that the presence of our troops ~~created a~~ dangerous situation. I was not dealing with the rights by which ~~we are there.~~ In fact I do not concede that the presence of our troops produces a dangerous situation. We think that the exercise of our rights to be in Western Berlin is in fact a factor for stability.

So I hope, Mr. Chairman, we shall not hear more of our having shifted our ground because we have not,

Now you did say, speaking more generally, that our proposals with regard to Berlin offer no basis for discussion. Well that is a very rigid position. I could say the same about your proposals, but I do not think really there is any useful purpose to be served by repeating the views already expressed. What we are looking

for are some constructive results from this discussion. You have said that it is the policy of the Soviet Government that the people of West Berlin should decide their own way of life - their own social system. Well they have freedom to do that now. You also have agreed that freedom of access to Western Europe from Western Berlin is really implicit in that freedom of choice.

Well, broadly speaking, there is today that freedom of access between Western Europe and West Berlin. But the reason why those freedoms - freedom to choose the social system and freedom of access - why they are real and thriving is because they are guaranteed by the Western Powers and by the presence of Western troops in West Berlin.

You did also say, Mr. Chairman, that we all agreed that things must be changed. Now I am not conscious that we have ever agreed to any such proposition that things must be changed, but what we do say is that no situation is perfect and no situation is incapable of improvement, and therefore I think the effective thing for us to do is to try to improve the situation within the framework which now exists and in a manner consistent with the maintenance of our rights. That I think is the practical work, and if in dealing with that we can come to some agreement between us, then I certainly agree with the sentiment at the end of your speech. Then we may be able to make progress in the spirit of the concluding remarks of Mr. Gromyko and some definite agreement here might lead to the wider agreements which could mean so much for the peace of the world.

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Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

to agree...  
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RM/DOC/33  
June 1959

STATEMENT BY MR. SELWYN LLOYD  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

June 1959

Mr. Chairman,

This conference has now been going on quite a long time. We have been patiently explaining our respective points of view to one another both at these formal sessions and privately. So far as I am concerned, I still hope for useful results.

With regard to Berlin, we have latterly had a certain amount of detailed discussion of that topic. The Soviet Government says that there is great tension in the situation in Berlin. We believe that, if the situation were left alone, there would not in fact be great tensions. However, if there are tensions, and you, Mr. Chairman, have described in your speech how some of these are created, if there are these tensions our plan is that they would be removed if Berlin were to be reunified. This would be particularly so if that reunification were, as it is in our plan, a stepping stone on the way to the reunification of Germany as a whole. Mr. Gromyko has, however, said that he cannot accept these proposals. We therefore have to deal with the situation as it is.

We have frequently stated what our purpose in Berlin is. Our purpose is to safeguard the freedom of two and a quarter million people. We want to ensure that they are not forced, or squeezed into subjection to a system alien to their ideals and aspirations, by military or political or economic pressure. That is our purpose simply stated.

You, Mr. Chairman, dealt with certain aspects of the Soviet proposals. I agree with what you said, and I would only add this: Mr. Gromyko's proposals either for the withdrawal of allied troops or the introduction of Soviet troops or the substitution of neutral troops, in our view, would undermine the confidence of the people of West Berlin in their future and thus defeat the purpose which both sides profess to have.

The withdrawal of allied troops would remove the symbol of the interest of the Western Powers in the future of West Berlin.

The introduction of Soviet troops alongside allied troops, would neutralise that symbol, and the substitution of neutral troops for allied troops would expose the West Berliners to the uncertain decisions of a number of unspecified countries without a definite or close interest in the situation.

In any case what real justification is there for suggesting that the West should abandon their exclusive right to station troops in West Berlin? For that is what these Soviet proposals amount to.

Nevertheless, we are willing to try to improve the present situation so as to eliminate the alleged or real causes of tension.

We have not had very much response from Mr. Gromyko yet to that approach. He seems to me to be very much where he was at the beginning of this conference.

Now I want to make this appeal to him today: to reconsider his position against the wider background. People everywhere want the two great Power blocs to develop the technique of living peacefully alongside one another. We believe that to be possible, provided there is good will and good faith on both sides. That has been my own basic belief ever since November 1951 when I first began negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union. Because we believe that, the British Prime Minister and I went to Moscow in February. It was in that spirit that we tried to have our conversations there. It was in that belief that we recently concluded new arrangements for greater contacts between the Soviet people and our own. It is because of that belief that we have recently made a Trade Agreement with the Soviet Government. There are some who think that we in the United Kingdom have tried to go too far and too fast in these matters. I do not agree. We wanted, for our part, to demonstrate our will to make specific and practical efforts to improve the situation. I believe that, if Mr. Gromyko will approach the matters dealt with in our Peace Plan with a similar outlook, then we can make specific progress at this conference.

If he will do that, even on one aspect of our problems, the Berlin aspect, it will pave the way for the further lessening of tensions, and for further arrangements made, with good will and in good faith, for living together in genuine peace. That after all is the outcome from our Meeting for which many millions of people are praying all over the world.

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RÉUNION  
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Rm/DOC/34  
6 June 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES  
ON THE BERLIN ISSUE,  
DELIVERED AT THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS  
5 June 1959

My purpose today is to indicate to the conference my Government's views on the Berlin issue - after having taken into account the discussions we have had during the past weeks.

I shall try to explain the objections we have to the Soviet Union's plan to impose a new status on West Berlin prior to the reunification of Germany.

I shall try to explain the reasons why we think that the Berlin proposal contained in the Western Peace Plan is a reasonable solution for the interim period prior to the reunification of Germany.

Before making these points, however, I would like to suggest that in dealing with the great political issues that concern us here, there may be a tendency to overlook the fact that the lives and liberties of more than two million persons are at stake in our deliberations.

To keep a good sense of proportion on this score let us not forget that the population of West Berlin is greater than the population of almost 20% of the Member nations of the United Nations. And it is estimated that the value of the goods and services produced in West Berlin last year exceeded the gross national product of more than half of the Members of the United Nations.

I

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has said that by the term the "Berlin problem" he meant "primarily the ending of the occupation in West Berlin". It seems that this definition minimizes the real dimensions of the Berlin problem. For us, the Berlin problem means maintenance of freedom for more than two million human beings who at the end of the war with the agreement of the Soviet Government came under the occupation authority of the three Western Powers.

Although our rights in Berlin stem from the war, our obligations arise from the trusteeship which we have undertaken to exercise for the people of Berlin until the reunification of their country removes this need for our protection. The past fourteen years have shown that West Berlin is encircled by hostile forces and that its independence and well-being are dependent upon the presence of the three Western Powers in the city and in the maintenance of the political and economic links between Berlin and the West.

I think that there is another fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and ourselves on this matter of Berlin. This difference derives from our different attitude toward the reunification of Germany. Although talking about the ideal of German unity and recognizing that German reunification is the real key to the Berlin problem, the Soviet Union has openly adopted a two-Germany policy, if not a three-Germany policy.

Now how does West Berlin fit into this policy of the permanent partition of Germany? The Soviet Foreign Minister gave us the answer on 30 May, in one of the most revealing statements made during the many plenary sessions we have held. I should like to quote from RM/DOC/29, dated 30 May, and I am quoting the Soviet Foreign Minister:

"If we are to speak frankly, the Soviet Government considers the creation of a Free City far from being an ideal solution of the West Berlin question. The most equitable approach to this question would be, of course, the extension to West Berlin of the full sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. I think that the German Democratic Republic, whose capital the division of the city continues to mutilate, could with the fullest justification demand such a solution of the question."

I am grateful to Mr. Gromyko for his willingness to speak so frankly. We thus have in his own words a clear and valuable statement of the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union regarding West Berlin.

I

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I think that there is another fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and ourselves on this matter of Berlin. This difference derives from our different attitude toward the reunification of Germany. Although talking about the ideal of German unity and recognizing that German reunification is the real key to the Berlin problem, the Soviet Union has openly adopted a two-Germany policy, if not a three-Germany policy.

Now how does West Berlin fit into this policy of the permanent partition of Germany? The Soviet Foreign Minister gave us the answer on 30 May, in one of the most revealing statements made during the many plenary sessions we have held. I should like to quote from RM/DOC/29, dated 30 May, and I am quoting the Soviet Foreign Minister:

"If we are to speak frankly, the Soviet Government considers the creation of a Free City far from being an ideal solution of the West Berlin question. The most equitable approach to this question would be, of course, the extension to West Berlin of the full sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. I think that the German Democratic Republic, whose capital the division of the city continues to mutilate, could with the fullest justification demand such a solution of the question."

I am grateful to Mr. Gromyko for his willingness to speak so frankly. We thus have in his own words a clear and valuable statement of the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union regarding West Berlin.

Under this policy the Soviet Union asserts that it would be most acceptable for West Berlin to be annexed to the so-called German Democratic Republic. Mr. Gromyko has made no bones about this. This is his preferred solution to the Berlin question. It is no wonder then that the Western Powers, who see in the reunification of Germany the only real solution to the Berlin issue, are having difficulty with the Soviet interim plan for West Berlin.

It may be useful to look at this admittedly "second preference" Soviet plan a little more closely.

Since the prime Soviet purpose is to remove the Allied presence from West Berlin it is not surprising that the key part of the plan is the termination of Western occupation rights. Even if, as is clearly not the case, the rest of the plan were acceptable to us this point alone would vitiate the entire scheme.

During the course of our talks about Berlin, this conference has clarified at least one important matter. The Western Powers' presence and their access to Berlin are a matter of right - they are not at the sufferance of any other authority - legitimate or otherwise. On 2 June Mr. Gromyko told us:

"The representatives of the Western Powers interpret not infrequently the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the granting of the status of a free city to West Berlin as if the Soviet Union disregards the rights of the US, UK, and France, which arise from the capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, but this is an inaccurate interpretation. We do not consider that the troops of the US, the UK, and France have turned up in Berlin by some sort of illegal means ..."

This is a constructive if somewhat tardy recognition by the USSR of our established and legitimate rights. All the historical facts support this juridical conclusion and exclude any other.

The second salient defect in the Soviet plan is that it would in effect compel the Western Powers to grant a measure of recognition to the so-called German Democratic Republic. No non-communist nation has recognized this instrument of the Soviet Union as an independent nation. I can assure you that we have no intention of recognizing the so-called German Democratic Republic as the price of a solution to the Berlin problem.

I should point out one other serious defect in the Soviet plan. Although purporting to terminate the occupation it would supplant the present régime by imposing in a real occupation spirit a new political status of the people of West Berlin. The USSR in its note of 27 November 1958, formally acknowledged that West Berlin must be granted the right to whatever way of life it wishes for itself - with one qualification "When the foreign occupation is ended". I cannot find any hint or suggestion in the Soviet plan that even though the "foreign occupation" would be ended under the Soviet plan the people of West Berlin would have any real voice in whether or not the proposed new political status should come into existence.

As a matter of fact the West Berliners have by an overwhelming vote endorsed their present way of life - and by that same vote they have in effect rejected the Soviet scheme. They are in a first rate position to judge for themselves the comparative merits of a free system and a communist system.

The USSR has vigorously urged that we impose this new unwanted status on West Berliners under the label of a "Free City". Surely by this time the USSR should have had enough experience with Governments not based upon the consent of the governed! This indeed is a curious proposal coming from the Soviet Foreign Minister who at the same time complains that the West Berliners are now being deprived by the Western Powers of rights contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

One final defect in the Soviet plan should be noted. In addition to the Western military presence, West Berlin owes its viability to its political, economic and social ties with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The entire thrust of the Soviet plan for West Berlin cuts into these ties and is clearly intended to establish a situation which will be but a "way-station" on the road to the preferred Soviet solution - that of annexation of West Berlin by the communist controlled authority in East Germany.

It seems to us that the term "Free City" is a complete misnomer.

There would be no freedom in this new status for the West Berliners and the new status would not cover a city but only a truncated two-thirds of a city.

The Soviet "second preference" proposal contains nothing or practically nothing different from the October 1958 Soviet proposal for changing the régime in West Berlin (as modified subsequently by Mr. Khrushchev). In this proposal the Soviet Union does not appear to make any effort at all to meet the views of the Western Powers, with respect to the essentiality of a clear maintenance of present Western rights in Berlin. It cannot form a basis for any solution of the Berlin issue raised by the USSR.

## II

In rejecting the USSR's second preference "Free City" proposal the Western Powers do not maintain that the present situation is ideal. We do not say that it cannot be improved in some respects.

In our concentration on Berlin we perhaps have tended to overlook the other important aspects of the Western Peace Plan. It would be an illusion, and a dangerous one at that, to believe that any long range Berlin solution can be reached in the face of a complete impasse on the central problem making for continuing European insecurity - that of a divided Germany.

The heart of the Western Peace Plan lies in its comprehensive proposal for the gradual reunification of Germany. The Plan makes provision as well for European security and concomitant arms control moves - and for an interim Berlin solution. But the continued dangerous division of Germany places great obstacles in the way of real progress on European security, arms control and Berlin. The unification of Germany is still our main task. We are confident that the solution proposed in the Western Peace Plan will stand the test of history and will be seen to offer reasonable answers to the great problems raised by the continuing division of Germany.

It seems clear from the worldwide appreciation which the Western Peace Plan has received that the Soviets' claim that it is but a device to generate disagreement has met the reception it deserved.

And so let us continue to look at these matters in parallel. In trying to improve the Berlin situation for the interim we must not do anything to put off the day when Germany is reunified. And in our striving for German unity we must not prejudice the position of West Berlin.

What is the interim Berlin proposal contained in the Western Peace Plan? It would in advance of final reunification of Germany permit the unification of the separated parts of Berlin. Free elections would be held throughout the city. The four Powers would guarantee the freedom of the city and access thereto pending the reunification of Germany. These happy developments would take place in the very first phase of the Western Peace Plan. Their accomplishment would be a good harbinger of that greater unity which under our Plan would follow shortly thereafter for all of Germany.

The USSR gave short shrift to the whole Western Peace Plan as well as its all-Berlin proposal. On 31 May we read in the Press that Mr. Khrushchev said at Tirane in Albania, and I quote:

"The 7-point Plan tabled by Mr. Herter does not contain a single element for negotiation. These proposals are not based on a desire to find a correct solution with a view to achieving that relaxation of international tension which all the peoples so anxiously await."

Foreign Minister Gromyko said in a plenary session of this conference, 2 June:

"Unfortunately, this statement could not fail to give rise to a feeling of profound disappointment. (This is the statement that I had made.) It only strengthened our view that the Governments of the three Western Powers continue to adhere to positions which offer no basis for the attainment of an agreement."

What then is the present situation? The USSR while recognizing existing Western rights in and to Berlin still puts forward its "second preference" plan as unveiled some months ago. It proposes that the Western Powers abandon their present rights in favour of the Soviet plan. This we will not do. We will have no share in imposing a new status on the West Berliners against their will. Such a new régime would make German unity more difficult to achieve since it would establish still a third part of Germany.

However, we recognize our responsibilities for keeping frictions between our two systems to a minimum. We recognize that Berlin, because of its unique situation, can be a source of friction. We are willing to search in good faith with the Soviet Union for some reciprocal improvement in the Berlin situation. However, it should be very clear that any improvement arrangement must meet these criteria: a) respect for existing Western rights of presence and access to Berlin and existing agreements concerning such rights since the Western presence is essential to maintain West Berlin's freedom; b) no recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic; c) maintenance of West Berlin's political and economic ties with the West.

### III

Should we accept the Soviet's Free City proposal? We cannot forget that this is not the first time that the Soviet Union has tried to put an end to a really free Berlin. Only three years after the war the USSR tried to starve the Free Berliners into the acceptance of a way of life which the Soviets would dictate. One remembers now that the Soviet's excuse then was that technical difficulties would not permit food or other traffic to flow into Berlin from West Germany. This time a more subtle approach is being attempted - the justification given is quite as transparent - to relax tensions, to remove "dangerous situations", to end an occupation which "the events of life passed by".

Our reading of recent history indicates that the proposed "Free City" would be but a disguise for gradual smothering of West Berliners' present freedom. In 1948 no one was really fooled by the "technical difficulties" alibi. In 1959, no one is being fooled by the fair label "free city".

This is no time to resort to a breach of solemn international agreements under the guise of "relaxation of tensions". If the Soviet Government will exercise the necessary degree of responsibility and recognize the legitimate rights of other nations, the situation in Berlin may develop in a tolerable fashion.

Today the world judges nations by their willingness to stand by their international obligations. The Soviet Government must recognize that Berlin is a solemn testing ground on which its intentions with respect to its international obligations are being watched.

In these troubled times, peace with justice is the greatest goal to which man can aspire. I hope the Soviet Union will be willing to demonstrate, by word and by deed, that it is ready to move toward that great goal.

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There is another phase of this same problem on which I wish to touch quite briefly. I had hoped that I would not have to bring up this subject but it has been made so clear to us that unless it is part of this record there will be an assumption from things that have been said here that West Berlin is a hotbed for all kinds of subversive efforts whereas the surrounding territory, and, in fact, East Berlin, is completely free from any such intent or operations.

We have been forced to listen here to allegations that the Western Powers are using West Berlin to carry on subversive activity and hostile propaganda against the USSR, the so-called German Democratic Republic, and other countries.

Now it is strange that the Soviet Foreign Minister should have been so sensitive as to these alleged activities and at the same time should have neglected to mention the highly objectionable activities conducted out of East Berlin. I should therefore like to place a few facts before this conference.

East Berlin is the site of one of the heaviest concentrations of subversive and spying activities in the world. On the part of the so-called German Democratic Republic alone it is reliably estimated that 26,000 officers, directing more than 200,000 agents and informers, are engaged in such activities detrimental to the interests of West Berlin and the Federal Republic, and countries beyond, including Scandinavia.

A mass of documentation supports the fact that East Berlin has been systematically abused over many years as a center of subversion, kidnapping, spying and numerous other hostile activities.

The goal of this centrally-directed effort at subversion is the complete overthrow of the existing constitutional and social order in West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

The recruitment of spies, agents and informers is done by every possible means, including the threat of reprisals against members of families residing in the so-called German Democratic Republic. The primary objective is, of course, subversion and espionage, including industrial espionage. But this is also part of a massive effort to infiltrate the West Berlin Government and Allied organizations in West Berlin as well as every other major organized activity, such as trade unions, works councils and youth groups. The very recent revelation of the existence of such a ring of agents directed from East Berlin within the West Berlin and West German Christian Democratic Union Party provides a good illustration of the scope of such activities.

Innumerable acts of force originating in East Berlin have been carried out against people in West Berlin.

The most sensational of these have been cases of kidnapping. Our own conservative calculations show there have been at least 63 actual cases, 31 attempted kidnappings and 21 probable cases since the end of the war. Although drugs were used in a number of instances, most of these kidnappings involved the use of brute force. A report just completed by the Senate of Berlin confirms our figures.

General subversive activities, incitement to sedition, and attacks on public order, directed from East Berlin comprehend a vast variety of activities. They are aimed at subverting the existing social, political and economic order in West Berlin, with seizure of control as their eventual objective. The East Berlin agents spread lies and rumors and conduct whispering campaigns. They send anonymous letters to wives or husbands to imply that their marriage partners are being unfaithful, or to suggest any one of a number of slanderous possibilities. They seek to sow confusion by spreading false and contradictory reports. They try to create terror through threats or false rumors and reports. They make massive attempts to infiltrate organizations in West Berlin.

In this vast effort they employ a great variety of means, including the use of individual operatives, the use of the Socialist Unity Party, which is still permitted to function in West Berlin, and the use of various mass organizations with headquarters in East Berlin, such as the "Free German Trade Union Organization", the "Free German Youth Organization" and the "German Culture League".

East Berlin is being misused as the center of an extensive campaign of slanderous personal vilification against the institutions and officials of the Allies and of the German authorities in West Berlin. This involves the frequent use of lies as well as outright forgeries. A good example of this is the current campaign of vilification by Press and radio against myself, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic, and other leading officials.

The fact that over 500 persons living or working in West Berlin were convicted of treasonable activities in a period from 30 August 1951 to the end of 1958 - an average of more than one a week - helps illustrate the scope and purpose of this attempt to subvert the existing order in West Berlin.

The apparatus of the so-called German Democratic Republic engaged in this evil work includes the Ministry for State Security, whose strength is 13,000 men. This is the basic overt and secret internal security arm of the régime. It also engages in clandestine operations against the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

One of its sectors is called Foreign Sector - Intelligence, with a strength of 500. The main mission of this bureau is to recruit espionage agents in the West. Its chief targets are the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Recruited agents are used not only to produce information but also for disruption and political action.

Another sector deals with counter-intelligence and has a strength of 12,000 staff members, in addition to 40,000 agents. This sector has two primary missions. First is counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within East Germany, using infamous informer system in all segments of society. Second is penetration of Western organizations, such as church organizations, West German parties and military and governmental offices. This bureau specializes in kidnappings by force or drugs and in coercing relatives residing in East Germany into luring refugees back to East Berlin where they are arrested.

Then comes the Ministry of Defense's office entitled Administration for Coordination. This is a cover designation for the military intelligence service.

It is responsible for clandestine procurement of intelligence on NATO military forces, especially the Federal Republic. It also uses coercion and corruption to recruit agents, mostly in the West.

The Ministry of Defense has another office called the Independent Department. This is responsible for the subversion of the West German armed forces. It disseminates subversive propaganda and engages extensively in falsification and harassment operations. One example of this harassment is the sending of forged Federal Republic death notices to mothers of West German soldiers.

The East German Mass Organizations also play a rôle in the unceasing effort to subvert West Berlin and the Federal Republic. They include the "Free German Trade Organization", the "Free German Youth Organization", the "Democratic Women's Federation", the "German-Soviet Friendship Society", and the "German Cultural League". All have special Western Sections whose primary functions are: to infiltrate parallel Federal Republic and West German groups, to recruit sympathizers and dupes, to promote communist subversive aims through massive written and oral propaganda, and to send so-called instructors to the Federal Republic and West Berlin on special assignments for agitation, disruption, and subversion.

The propaganda and agitation activity of Deutschlandsender, Berliner Rundfunk, Freiheitssender and East German TV has been violent and slanderous. Since this conference began its output has risen in vituperation and fallen in ordinary decency.

An organ of the so-called German Democratic Republic Council of Ministers generates publications, Press conferences, designed to label the Federal Republic as Nazi, militarist and thirsting for revenge.

All levels of the so-called German Democratic Government, down to townships, are given assignments to organize large-scale writing of propaganda letters to Federal Republic and West Berlin individuals and organizations.

In addition to the State functionaries, at least 8,000 party and mass organization officials are engaged full time in subversive operations against the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Many thousands more are employed part time.

It is difficult to estimate the amount of money expended on these nefarious activities, but it is conservative to say it totals many scores of millions of dollars. This is money that could well be spent on improving the standard of living of the people of East Germany, which is noticeably below the standard of the people of the Federal Republic.

I have given an all-too-brief description of a situation which is both scandalous and dangerous. It is a sad commentary on the ethics of the men who conduct these activities. Those men comprise the régime of the so-called German Democratic Republic, and that régime is neither German, nor democratic, nor a republic. More important still, it is a revelation of the determination of these men to achieve their objective by any means at hand. And that objective is to bring West Berlin and the Federal Republic under the control of an ideology which teaches that any means is legal and good which serves to impose it on the other peoples.

I sincerely regret having had to make these remarks. We need so much to concentrate on the major issues before us. But the matter on which I have spoken is not unrelated to these major issues. And I would not have raised it here had it not been for the repeated statements with regard to the activities that are being conducted in West Berlin and that are being considered a danger in the present situation.

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RM/DOC/35  
10 June 1959  
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STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

12 May 1959

I should also like to say a few words on the question of the possible participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia in this conference.

The question raised by the Soviet delegation is in my opinion more general than that of the proposed participation of the two countries.

Several countries are interested in the settlement of the German problem. Mr. Herter has mentioned a number of them which are neighbours of Germany and which were directly at war with that country and were invaded by it during the period of hostilities.

It is quite clear that the four Powers represented at this table are not the only ones interested in a German settlement and, in particular, in the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

When the time comes and the peace treaty is drawn up, it will have to be signed not only by the four Powers but also by the German Government and by all the other countries which were at war with Germany at the time.

This is an obvious point and I should like to add that it is not new. It was in fact made in a similar manner, if not in the same terms, at the time - a good while ago now, but certainly some of us will remember it - when, after the war, we made the first peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. The question of the participation of other States concerned was raised at that time; I refer to countries which would subsequently be called on to sign a peace treaty themselves; and over the years - it took two or three

years - we settled this question on terms which the Soviet delegation will certainly remember. We started by asking the other countries concerned to send us in writing their comments on the questions which interested them in the peace treaties under consideration. We then invited these countries to come and express their views orally at meetings of the Deputy Ministers whose job it was to do the preparatory work in drawing up the peace treaties in question. Then, in certain particularly important cases - I can remember at least one - we invited the countries most concerned to come and express their views directly before what was called at the time the Council of Foreign Ministers. The case I have in mind is the Trieste question in the peace treaty with Italy, where it was clear that, apart from Italy, Yugoslavia was more concerned than anyone else, and in particular more concerned than any of us. During the last stage in the drafting of the provisions of the peace treaty, Yugoslavia had been invited, along with Italy, to come and state her views before the four Foreign Ministers.

Finally, at a later period, once the four had finished their work and had given the finishing touches to the draft treaty, we all met together at a peace conference in Paris in 1946, where all the countries called on to sign the different peace treaties came together and had an opportunity of discussing the drafts and putting forward their views. I may say that in many cases the drafts which had been drawn up by the four Powers were modified so as to take into account the views expressed by the other countries.

I have not been saying all this simply to give a historical account and show how learned I am, but in order to say that the question is not new, and that in the past, the not so distant past, it was solved in ways which were at the time deemed satisfactory by the majority of the governments concerned.

I recognize that in this discussion on Germany the question appears in a somewhat different manner, first because a very much longer time has elapsed between the war and this very moment when we have reached the point of discussing the German settlement, and because the question of the peace treaty is not the only matter at issue. In reality there are other problems, even if there is a refusal to deal with them. High on the list of these problems is the reunification of Germany, which is not the same question as that of a peace treaty, and there is also, since the Soviet Government has raised it, the question of Berlin.

In my opinion all these problems are certainly bound up with the German settlement and are certainly bound up with the future peace treaty. But they are of a somewhat preliminary nature.

I shall be more precise on this point in a moment, but what I wanted to say now was that in my opinion we are not yet at a stage where we can start drawing up a peace treaty, and consequently we are not yet at the stage where we would normally invite other countries to express their views on a peace treaty to which they would have to be invited to add their signatures.

In reality, at the stage where we are now, the main responsibility - as we were reminded just now and as we have often been reminded in the past - the main responsibility falls upon the four Powers which, after the end of the war and following the capitulation of Hitler's Germany, took on the responsibility for the government of Germany at that time and today still have the responsibility for settling the German problem.

I believe this to be true in a particularly striking way for the Berlin question.

This question, as posed by the Soviet Government, is in reality an incidental one, or a question of circumstances. It exists because Germany has not yet been reunited and because there is still no peace treaty consequent upon reunification. The Soviet Government has told us that problems arise because of Berlin and will continue to exist in the conditions that I have just mentioned. But it seems to me strikingly clear that the only countries concerned in this problem are the four Powers which have special responsibilities in Berlin, which have certain rights to station troops there and which have also certain rights over the government of the city of Berlin in general, even if at the present moment that city is cut into two parts, West Berlin and East Berlin, as a result of differences among us which have been in existence for a long time now.

I think it would be difficult to dispute the fact that the Berlin question and also the question of reuniting Germany is the essential responsibility of the four Powers, I should say almost the responsibility of them alone.

I do not see how we can introduce Poland, Czechoslovakia or such other Powers as may be equally interested in the general and final settlement of the German question, like Belgium or Italy, into our debates on the subject of Berlin.

None of this, moreover, is new. We have very often debated it together. The last time we had occasion to speak of it was at the Geneva Conferences in 1955. Those two Conferences did not yield positive results. I note, however, that everyone at the 1955 Summit Meeting - the Directive from the Heads of Government to the Foreign Ministers shows this - agreed in saying that the responsibility for settling the German question was the fundamental responsibility of the four Powers.

Having said this, I find it necessary to look also at another aspect of the problem, since the question has been raised by the Soviet delegation. The question is: who, when the moment comes, is entitled to be associated with a German peace treaty or to be consulted in the discussions on such a treaty?

I entirely agree with what Mr. Gromyko has said concerning the fact that Poland and Czechoslovakia have in this respect every right to be consulted or to be associated with the final drafting of the treaties.

Poland in particular seems to me to have special qualifications in this matter, since she was the first country, at the beginning of the war, to be in fact at war, the first country to be occupied and partitioned, and she is undoubtedly the country which suffered most of all the countries which suffered from the war.

But as has already been said, there are other countries. It seems to me quite clear that Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium also have many claims to be associated - I should like to say every claim - in the German settlement which will come into existence one day.

There is another country I should like to mention as well - I alluded to it just now - namely Italy. Italy seems to me also to have a right to participate in working out the German settlement, and it is in our interest that she should be associated in our work. It seems to me that it would be very difficult to exclude from the German settlement, which will necessarily be of the greatest importance for Europe as a whole and which will very probably also contain provisions the effect of which will be felt on the organization of European security in general - it would be very difficult, I say, to exclude a country which, even if she is not a neighbour of Germany's, has nevertheless considerable importance in Europe by reason of her population, her geographical position, her historic tradition and for all kinds of other reasons as well.

These, Mr. Chairman, are the comments which I wanted to make very briefly and which explain the position we took towards the Soviet Government when the question was raised in the exchange of Notes that you mentioned.

We said at the time, that is to say in the last text which we sent:

"The French Government considers that Poland and Czechoslovakia, along with other States, are concerned in the settlement of certain problems which will be dealt with at the Conference.

It is therefore possible to envisage the participation of other countries at a certain stage in the negotiations.

The French Government, however, considers that at the beginning only the four Powers responsible for Germany should take part in the Meeting".

In other words, we, like you, recognize that Poland and Czechoslovakia have the right to be heard, to make their views known and in the end to take part in the decisions. We think that other countries have the same rights, in particular Italy, but we also think that at the present stage it would be best to start by discussing among ourselves the problems which arise, both because this is a good rule and also because there are certain questions which are really the first responsibility, sometimes the exclusive responsibility, of the four Powers represented at this table.

If you will accept our views, that is to say if you will agree to postpone the decision to a later date when the right moment arrives - and it is difficult at present to see exactly when that moment will arrive - you will make it possible for us to enter into discussion now on the problems which are before us under the best possible conditions.

I am well aware - you said this just now - that you did not raise this question for purely formal reasons. You said, moreover, that the custom and normal rule in our work is that decisions must be taken unanimously. In other words, you are not raising the question because you feel that you need allies in this discussion in order to support your position, and I entirely agree with you. The experience of all these recent years has shown that the Soviet delegation has no need of allies to defend its positions in the most forceful manner.

For this reason, if there is no problem of that kind, and it seems to me natural that there should be no such problem, I think that the best thing, finally, would be, as we proposed in our Note and as I repeat to you now, to hold up the examination of this problem until later.

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STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

14 May 1959

I would like to say a word, if Mr. Gromyko will allow me, in reply to him, since he has called me in question, although in a kindly manner. I should like to make two remarks. The first is that in the exchange of notes with the Soviet Government we have never - I speak for the French Government - spoken of the idea that the representatives of the two German Governments should sit at the conference of Foreign Ministers. We have, if my memory is correct, always said that there would be "German advisers", who would be invited for purposes of consultation.

My second remark is that I entirely agree that we should recognize the fact that Germany is divided, that there are, if you like, two Germanys: there is an Eastern Germany and there is a Western Germany. But from recognizing this fact - which is a fact, and a patent one - to saying that the French Government recognizes the so-called Government of Eastern Germany there is a step which, for my part, I cannot manage. We recognize the Government of Western Germany, but we do not recognize the régime in Eastern Germany, and we do not recognize in any way that the designated representatives of a Government which we recognize are sitting at this table, or rather near to this table. I say this as the representative of the French delegation and not as Chairman of this meeting, but I should like to make this clarification in reply to what our Soviet colleague has said.

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STATEMENT MADE BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

21 May 1959

Mr. Chairman,

With your permission I would like to reply briefly to some of the remarks that were made by our colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in his statement yesterday afternoon.

I have no intention whatever of engaging in a controversy with Mr. Gromyko, but I think that some clarifications are necessary, especially as we are now at a stage of our conference where we explain our points of view to one another in an endeavour to clarify them, and it seems to me particularly important, at this stage, that there should be no misunderstandings between us.

Yesterday I had in fact the impression that a number of things which I had said in a previous statement on the Soviet Draft or on the Plan of the three Western delegations had not been fully understood by Mr. Gromyko.

Those are a few comments that I wished to make.

Mr. Gromyko was surprised that we - myself in particular - should have deemed unexpected the criticisms which he levelled against what we call our Peace Plan and he said to us: 'Nevertheless, you have been well aware of the position of the Soviet delegation all along; it has been stated repeatedly in the past; there is nothing that could be unexpected for you and you know that we do not at all agree to the proposals that you have submitted and that beforehand we did not agree to them.'

That, I think, is beyond dispute. We have, indeed, been aware of the position of the Soviet Government for a long time and especially after the exchanges of Notes which have taken place since 27 November 1958, and we know how remote it is from our position in regard to the German question and the solution of the German problem.

But I should like to draw attention to two points; the first is that just as we are aware of the point of view of the Soviet Government, so also the Soviet Government is aware of our point of view and it knows that this point of view is not the same as its own.

My second point is that we have met precisely because the points of view are different, and we have met precisely in order to try to see whether there is any possibility of our narrowing the gap between them so as to come to some agreement or to some compromise that might consolidate, in one way or another, the situation in Europe. And secondly, it is normal, since we are here to try to see whether there is any possibility of finding something in common between us, that either side should state its point of view.

What surprised me personally the other day was not at all that Mr. Gromyko should say that he does not agree with the Plan submitted by the Westerners, but rather the categorical manner in which he said so and the assertion that this Plan could not even constitute a basis for discussion between us.

If it is not possible to take as a point of departure in our discussions, either for our Soviet colleagues or for the Westerners, the positions of both sides, I do not very well see what the subject of discussion can be. Obviously it is necessary - and it is what both sides are doing at present - that we should state our views in regard to the solution of the problems that had been raised, and it is on this basis that the discussion should then be carried on between us.

Our Soviet colleague also said - and it is something I very carefully noted - that his delegation would do everything to try to find points of agreement, to try to bring the points of view closer together. That is a very good statement. For my part, I am very glad to hear it. I hope that it will enable us to find some bases of agreement.

There is a 'but' however: while this was said with a sincerity which seemed to me quite obvious, it was said in a context which was that of the Soviet proposal concerning the peace treaty and the consecutive question of Berlin.

Does that mean that the Soviet delegation is prepared to make concessions, to show a conciliatory attitude in the discussion of its Draft Peace Treaty, provided that we have accepted beforehand its positions of principle and its point of departure? In other words, is it a question of discussing a rapprochement of the points of view in order to implement the Soviet proposals or of discussing a rapprochement of the points of view on questions of principle?

I note in this respect that at this stage of our conference we have not yet reached the point of discussing texts; we are at a stage where, on both sides, we are discussing our positions of principle. That, I think, is a very important matter and I should be very glad to have on this point, if possible, some clarifications on the part of the Soviet delegation.

That is the first comment that I wished to make.

There is a second which concerns the question of the peace treaty. There, I think that we have not been well understood by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. He said in his intervention of yesterday that I had stated the other day that the question of the peace treaty did not arise; that there was no question of a peace treaty; that matters were very well as they were and that there was no need to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. Here, I think, there is a misunderstanding.

I have never said that the question of a peace treaty did not arise. I spoke of the conditions in which we should envisage a peace treaty and I said substantially that as long as the situation in which we are continues, that is to say in a situation in which there are two Germanys, plus Berlin, there is no reason to think that it is possible, necessary, or even useful to conclude a peace treaty.

Mr. Gromyko said to me: 'But it was not the Soviet Government that invented this question of the peace treaty; the question of the peace treaty derives from the fact that we were at war with Germany, and if you go back into the past and look for those who were responsible you will find that it is Hitler's Germany that is responsible for the fact that the question of the peace treaty arises.'

I fully agree with him on that point. It is obvious that if there is a question of a peace treaty it is because we were at war, and if we were at war it was for historical reasons which Mr. Gromyko has summed up in a word. Everybody knows them and I do not need to hark back to them.

But what is the situation at the present time?

Mr. Gromyko has told us that if we now made a peace treaty with each of the two parts of Germany existing at the present time we would obtain a good many advantages. He cited a number in the field of general policy, such as the relaxation of tension in Europe. Then he spoke of two particular questions which are, in fact, of very great importance. These two particular questions are the following; first, our colleague has said that the conclusion of peace treaties with the two Germanys will provide us with a very good basis for the reunification of Germany; and, secondly, the conclusion of a peace treaty will make possible the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and the liquidation of military bases, thus making a very considerable contribution to the consolidation of security in the European continent. Those are, in fact, two very important points on which I think we should state our views very clearly.

The first point is that of reunification. We have been told by the Soviet side that the conclusion of a peace treaty is the best way to promote the reunification of Germany.

That is not our point of view and we see matters differently, that is, we understand in a different way what would be, from the point of view of the two Germanys, the consequences of a peace treaty with each of them. It is quite clear that these consequences would be purely and simply the recognition of the régime of the German Democratic Republic by those of the Governments represented at this conference, and other governments which would also sign the peace treaty, which at present have no intention of recognizing it and have not done so hitherto.

I say by the way, and I do not at all wish to enter into a controversy on this question, because it is quite useless, that we do not recognize the régime of the German Democratic Republic, fundamentally because we do not consider it to be a régime that represents Eastern Germany. We do not consider it representative because it did not come into being as a result of what we call free elections. But I say this by the way, I do not insist, and I merely wished to mention that from the point of view of the reunification of Germany the only consequence of two peace treaties with each of the Germanys would be, from our standpoint, the recognition of the régime of the German Democratic Republic. For my part, I do not think that, even if this recognition were possible, it could move the question of the reunification of Germany a step forward. It seems

to me, on the contrary, that recognition of that régime would be a further step towards perpetuating the situation which exists in Germany at the present time and which, as everybody says and thinks, is unsatisfactory.

The second problem is that of the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and the liquidation of bases, which would be a second happy consequence of the conclusion of this peace treaty with the two Germanys.

That is indeed an important question. I am not sure, for my part, that that is the right way to approach a problem which is an essential problem for peace. This essential problem for peace is the problem of the balance of power in Europe. In the imperfect world in which we live, I believe that everyone agrees in recognizing that one of the foundations of peace, so long as there is no true peace, is the maintenance of a certain balance of power in Europe and in the world at large. I believe this is the only thing that can lead to a certain stabilization of the relations between what we are nowadays still obliged to call the two worlds, that is to say between East and West; so long as these two worlds exist, so long as there is what has long been known as the "cold war", it is not possible to imagine that we shall find ourselves in a situation in which peace is assured unless there exists a certain balance in the division of power between the two worlds. I believe this is particularly true as regards the continent of Europe. Because of the war and the disasters which followed it, a great unbalance was caused in the continent of Europe, in the importance of the different countries of this continent, and in their relationships with one another. I believe that if we want to succeed one day in stabilizing the situation in Europe in a lasting manner it will be necessary to act so as to establish the foundations for a stable equilibrium in Europe. These foundations, unfortunately, do not yet exist. This means that the equilibrium in Europe must of necessity be maintained by other methods and other measures. But the problem nevertheless exists, and I do not think it can be regarded as though it were not the concern of everyone.

I believe that it is in the interests both of the Soviet Government and of the Governments of Western Europe that a balance of power should exist in the continent of Europe; that this balance of power should be, as it is at present, ensured simultaneously by Europe and from outside Europe, or that it can one day be ensured in a stable manner by a re-arrangement of the relations among

the different countries of the continent; however it may be, I do not think that it is in anyone's interest to disturb the balance of power which exists at present, has existed for fifteen years now, and has been shown by experience to ensure, after a fashion, the stability of the continent.

Since this is the case, I do not think that the conclusion of two peace treaties with the two Germanys would be a realistic or useful manner of approaching the problem. If there are questions to settle in this sphere it must be done in another context, and I do not believe that such important questions for the peace not only of Europe but of the world in general should be approached through the subterfuge of these peace treaties. I believe that these are problems which are related to other problems, of a world character, about which I might say in a general way that they are of the nature either of general disarmament or of an overall discussion between both sides on what our future relations could be. But once again I believe that it would not be wise to try either to settle this problem, or to change abruptly the elements of this problem, by bringing in anything so artificial as two peace treaties with Germany.

Moreover, this is a question which we ourselves have considered. I said a word about it the other day. When we drew up the draft which we have submitted to this conference for the attention of the Soviet delegation we considered this question. In any case, we think that on the day when a settlement of the German question comes about it will have to come on the basis of German reunification. But no matter, settlement of the German question in any case raises very serious problems for the balance of power in Europe, that is to say, for world peace, problems which make it necessary that a certain number of questions in the sphere of what is called European security and disarmament should be settled at the same time as the German question.

Here, then, are the few general remarks which I wanted to put before my colleagues, and in particular my Soviet colleague, in order to make explicit the points which I perhaps did not make sufficiently clearly the other day.

There remains one point which Mr. Gromyko touched on in his speech yesterday, and which I have not yet mentioned. I mean the allusions to a number of articles in his Draft Peace Treaty about which I myself had spoken. I do not want to reply on this point because I believe that we have not yet arrived at a point here when

we can discuss the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with the two Germanys. When I spoke of a number of articles during my speech my purpose was primarily to show in as specific a manner as possible the reasons why I thought that a peace treaty with the two Germanys was pointless at the present moment, since in reality, as I said again a moment ago, there are only two problems which remain to be settled, namely, the frontiers of the reunified Germany and the military and security problems, and these problems can arise only in the context of German reunification.

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STATEMENT MADE BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

22 May 1959

Mr. Chairman,

I propose to make a statement which will supplement the explanations already given by my British and American colleagues with regard to the draft submitted by the Western delegations.

Yesterday Mr. Selwyn Lloyd spoke about the question of reunifying Germany. Mr. Herter has just spoken about the problems of security and disarmament. To complete the series of explanations that we owe you in submitting our draft and in asking you to examine it carefully, we must further address you on the subject of the solution that we propose in regard to Berlin.

I should like to say, first of all, that if we have mentioned the Berlin question in our draft this is not because we thought that it was absolutely necessary to do so. We could have confined ourselves to the general provisions which we have envisaged in respect of reunification, and Berlin would have naturally, and in a way automatically, found a place among those provisions, so that at the end of the process it might again become the capital of a united Germany.

We thought it necessary to make special mention of Berlin because it was found that in the various Notes which the Soviet Government has sent us since November 1958 the Berlin question was repeatedly raised, and in a manner which I may without exaggeration call insistent.

This Berlin question was raised by the Soviet Government in a way we did not expect, for in the Notes which it sent us the Soviet Government said that it thought

there was such a problem, that there was an abnormal situation in Berlin, which it sometimes called an abscess or a cancer, and that it would be well to remedy this abnormal situation as quickly as possible. Here was one of those urgent and ripe problems which it was essential to solve.

We thought that since Berlin was the subject of anxiety on the part of the Soviet Government it was necessary, in the draft which we had to prepare for this conference, to tackle the problem and to see if we could not try to settle it in a special way, on terms which would be satisfactory to everybody.

That is the reason why, in our general draft, we have a special chapter on Berlin, which you will find as paragraph 2 in the first stage. But as you can see if you take note of this paragraph, the steps we propose cover both the first and second stages that we had in mind for the process of German reunification.

Since this is the case, I should like to speak first about the legal aspect of the problem, because the other day you yourself, Mr. Chairman, raised this question when, speaking on behalf of the Soviet delegation, you told us that our proposals were absolutely untenable, because what we had in mind was to detach Berlin from the territory of what is called the German Democratic Republic.

There is a point of law here, on which it is necessary to be quite clear, for we have not the same opinion as the Soviet delegation on this matter. We, indeed, think - and there are certain texts which support our view - that after the war Germany was divided into five parts by the four occupying Powers. There were four occupation zones, which were allocated to each of the four Powers, and there was moreover the district of Greater Berlin. I think the first text on this matter is a declaration dated 5 June 1945, but before that, in 1944, there were other provisions, which even then referred to the special régime for Greater Berlin; and, as you will remember, an Allied Control Authority was provided for at that time, called in Russian the Kommandatura, which was made up of representatives of the four Powers mandated to occupy the four sectors of Berlin and having the responsibility for jointly controlling the administration of the city of Berlin.

This régime, of course, no longer exists at the moment. It disappeared a very long time ago. Greater Berlin is in fact divided into two parts - East Berlin and West Berlin. Each of these has its municipal authority and each is controlled by certain Powers which formerly occupied Germany: East Berlin by the Soviet authorities and West Berlin by the American, British and French authorities.

But this development, which is due to the unhappy circumstance of the too numerous disagreements which have arisen among us these many years, does not change the fundamental legal character of the situation, which is, so long as there is no government for Germany as a whole and so long as things remain as they are, that the whole of the territory of Greater Berlin is in a special situation. We now have in Germany, Western Germany, the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, which is made up of the former occupation zones of the United States of America, Great Britain and France, and we have Eastern Germany, which is made up of the former occupation zone of the Soviet Union; and then we have this special thing, the city of Greater Berlin, which is not attached to anything.

This is so true that so far as the three Western Powers are concerned, when the Federal Republic of Germany was created nearly ten years ago, we took great care to say to this new Federal Republic that the western part of Berlin, for which we had and still have responsibility, must not be attached to it. This is something sui generis and it remains sui generis to this moment. The government of West Berlin has no direct link with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The territory of West Berlin does not form part of the territory of the Federal Republic. Matters have stood thus for the last ten years, and we have never at any moment thought that they should change pending the general settlement which will one day be necessary. The point here is that when we make a specific proposal in our draft for the settlement of Berlin we are not wronging anybody. We are only taking the situation as it still is at the present moment as our point of departure.

The second point that I would like to mention, without insisting on it otherwise - but it is a point which has its own importance - is that, as you have certainly noticed, the proposals we have put to you concerning Berlin are proposals in the context of a reunification of Germany as a whole. We have provided for special arrangements, but the fact is that this reunification of Berlin is to be brought about to some extent in parallel with - a little ahead of, but in parallel with - the reunification of Germany as a whole: so that once it was truly reunified Berlin would be an interim solution pending the reunification of the two parts of Germany. This would be an interim solution which would anticipate the final solution, the object of which would be, while to some extent keeping the four Powers in control of and with responsibility for Berlin as a whole, to meet the anxieties which you have told us about on several occasions.

I do not want to say that we admit that these anxieties are well founded, but I do mean that we have taken the trouble to allow for them, even if we may, one way or another, debate about them very objectively.

Here, then, is the spirit in which we have drafted our proposals. I think I need not spend a long time on the details of these proposals. The suggestion is that Greater Berlin be reunified, in anticipation, as I have told you, of the reunification of Germany, by putting East Berlin and West Berlin together under a single government appointed through free elections. But one point that I do want to mention is that, ex hypothesi, once this is done - that is to say, once there is a government for the city of Berlin as a whole - just as the four sectors of Berlin would be reunited, so too would the four Powers meet to control this new organization to the extent that would be necessary.

For this we have drawn on a precedent which is as familiar to the Soviet Union as it is to ourselves, the precedent of Austria. We have provided that the elected council of Berlin, which will have the task of administering the city, will be subject to the supreme authority of the four Powers until German reunification is achieved, and we explicitly state that this authority would operate according to the same voting procedure as was in use in Vienna at the time of the quadripartite régime. Until the final settlement of the Austrian problem, we did in fact keep a right of control over the administration of the city of Vienna by the local municipal authority, and we thought when we drafted our proposal that the application of such a system to the city of Berlin would permit the Soviet Union to exercise, jointly with the other Powers, a certain control over the situation in the city of Berlin as a whole. We did this in view of the fact that experience showed us that this régime in the city of Vienna functioned, I believe, in a satisfactory manner, without causing very great difficulty for any of us. That is the gist of what I wanted to say on this Berlin matter.

To sum up, we propose to the Soviet Government that it join us in resolving the problem of Greater Berlin by reunification and by an appropriate measure of joint control, which would give everybody the guarantees to which each may be entitled until such time as reunification allows the re-establishment of full German sovereignty over German territory as a whole. At the same time, we thought that if it was a question of reunification it would be natural to start with the city of Berlin, since this is really the easiest, or, not to be too optimistic, the less difficult thing, because in the first place it happens that this is a

small territory, and secondly, since the beginning, fourteen or fifteen years ago, the two parts of the city of Berlin have after all kept up fairly close contact with each other. The inhabitants continue to come and go, the Underground continues to operate across the whole city, as do the surface trains, and all this constitutes material conditions which to some extent facilitate the operation that we have in mind.

I think I have nothing more to say on this matter, which is on the whole relatively simple. Of course, like my colleagues, I am at your disposal if you want to ask for further detail on the proposals which we are submitting to you.

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STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

25 May 1959

Mr. Chairman,

I should like to say just a few words in connexion with the statement which has just been made by our colleague, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. I have no intention of replying to the whole of this long statement, which I listened to very carefully and which raises many problems. In particular, I shall say nothing about the second part of this statement, which concerns a number of provisions which are contained or could be contained, if necessary, in the Draft Peace Treaty with the two Germanys which has been drawn up by the Soviet delegation.

As I said a few days ago, we have not got to the point of discussing the clauses of a peace treaty; we are still, in my opinion, discussing the fundamentals, that is to say, the principles which must guide our work in connexion with a settlement of the German problem as a whole, and we all of us here agree, I believe - correct me if I am wrong - that this common ground has not yet been found.

The comments that I want to make are for the purpose of clarification, and they naturally concern the question of the peace treaty.

Mr. Gromyko said the draft tabled by the three Western delegations showed that we were hostile to the idea of concluding a peace treaty with Germany. This is an

In the present state of affairs - that is to say, with Germany divided into two parts - we for our part consider that the military questions and questions of security were settled by us in agreement with our allies and in agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, when several years ago - in 1954 and 1955 - we defined the new military status of Western Germany. We did this, as everyone knows, by means of two main arrangements at the moment when we accepted the reconstitution, up to a certain point, of an army in Western Germany. Moreover, no one will dispute the fact that a great country like Western Germany must necessarily have armed forces. At the same time as we accepted these arrangements, we first accepted the admission of Germany into the Atlantic Pact and then concluded what are known as the Paris Agreements, which have been frequently mentioned here, whereby the limits to be set to the rearmament of Western Germany were defined.

I say that this was defined in a special manner because it was done with the full agreement and complete co-operation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in a matter of this kind this condition is not only useful but necessary. If we want to formulate arrangements of a lasting nature it is essential that they be accepted with good grace by the country to which they apply. In this particular case, not only were these arrangements accepted with good grace but some of them were even made on the initiative of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr. Gromyko has with good reason twice replied to me: 'But we do not know these Paris Agreements. First, we do not consider them satisfactory and, secondly, the Soviet Union is not a party to them and consequently does not know what they are about, and they do not give her any special guarantee in relation to a situation where these Agreements do not exist.'

I may note in passing that the Soviet Union is, indeed, not a party to these Agreements; nor is the United States of America a party to them. These are Agreements which have been concluded between seven Western European countries and which are, in a way, their property. We reached agreement with Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, to define this régime, the principles of which I mentioned just now. Again, as I said, it is true that the Soviet Union is no more a party to these Agreements than is the United States. For my part I believe that they represent at present an entirely satisfactory solution to the question of the conditions of

a military nature which can be envisaged for Western Germany as it is at the moment, that is to say, in the absence of German reunification. It will not be in place to raise the problem of the future until the territorial status of Germany is altered, that is to say, until the two parts of Germany are united in a single State.

This is evidently not the opinion of the Soviet delegation, and when I have expressed it on several occasions in the past, Mr. Gromyko has replied that it does not satisfy him and that it is necessary, in order to counter the danger of militarism and revanchisme in Western Germany, to have a peace treaty such as the Soviet Government proposes.

This brings me to the question that I wanted to put quite simply and frankly: is this, in a word, the reason why the Soviet Government puts so much stress on asking us to conclude a peace treaty with the two parts of Germany? In other words, is it the case that the Soviet Government's interest in this peace treaty, in the absence of reunification, lies in a desire to extend a certain degree of control by its Government over the military status of the Federal Republic of Germany?

This is what I myself have inferred from the very full and frank explanations we have been given by our colleague from the Soviet Union.

In this case the peace treaty appears rather differently from what I, for my part, had imagined and from what I mentioned at the beginning of my speech: I mean it no longer looks like putting a final seal on a political settlement, not only for Germany but even for Europe as a whole, because the final settlement of Germany will have consequences for the entire political shape of our continent. It now becomes something different. It becomes, in short, a matter of expediency which the Soviet Government thinks it opportune to advocate for the reasons I have mentioned.

I believe, and at the risk of repeating myself I must say it once more, that it would be a mistake to take this road. The peace treaty with Germany, when it does come, will be a very important thing and there are two things which will be particularly important in this treaty: first, as regards procedure, the provisions of this treaty should be accepted in a really free manner by all the parties and in particular by the German Government, for that is the only way we shall be able to make it a valid treaty, that is to say, a treaty which can last; secondly, as regards substance - as I have already said twice - a peace treaty with

a Germany that has been reunited and is in its final form will be a very important thing for Europe. The future of the whole European continent will to some extent depend on it; it will result in a new equilibrium - I am sorry to use this expression again - in the European continent. European security as a whole will turn on the settlement of this matter, and consequently we must approach it very seriously and in the conviction that we are doing something essential for world peace.

I do not think that to sign a peace treaty with the two parts of Germany, partly for reasons of expediency, would be anything of comparable nature or importance.

This is one further argument that I should like to put to the Soviet delegation in order to try and explain to them how the French delegation is approaching this truly essential problem.

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STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

30 May 1959

I should like to make some remarks on the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement. What I have to say will, of course, not constitute a reply to that statement as a whole, as you yourself said, Mr. Chairman, in connexion with your own speech.

There were many things in Mr. Gromyko's speech and I shall need some further reflection before replying to all that he has said. My remarks will be made easier by the fact that you, Mr. Chairman, have already made certain comments which I had intended to make myself. I do not want to repeat these, especially as I should certainly do so in a much less satisfactory way than you yourself expressed them.

My few remarks are as follows:

First I was struck by the somewhat dramatic picture which Mr. Gromyko painted of the present situation in West Berlin, which he makes out to be a centre for intrigues, agitation and espionage, a sort of an advance post in the cold war; all this, he says, is creating a state of instability, uncertainty and danger in the middle of Europe. Moreover, in previous explanations, Mr. Gromyko had explained to us at length his anxieties over the possibility that there might be incidents resulting from the fact of this abnormal situation in West Berlin, which essentially derives from the fact that for fifteen years after the war, against all reason, the state of occupation has been maintained in that part of the former capital of Germany.

I have noted this statement carefully and I intend to think about it. There is, however, one comment which immediately springs to mind, namely, that this régime has now been in existence for fourteen years and to my knowledge there has been only one event, one occasion which has given rise to a serious incident. That was when, ten or eleven years ago, in 1948 and 1949, the Government of the Soviet Union instituted what was called at the time the blockade of Berlin, which did indeed create a serious situation in Europe and in the world in general and which for a year was a source of grave anxiety. But this did not result from incidents, machinations or activities which either the occupying forces in West Berlin or the inhabitants of West Berlin could have provoked. Since that affair, which was happily ended by agreement among the four Powers, I believe that no grave or even serious happening has occurred in West Berlin. There may have been incidents of an everyday kind, but these are things that happen everywhere in the world, and I do not think that peace has thereby been endangered at any moment; the proof is that - I am still speaking from memory and subject to confirmation - I have no recollection of the Soviet Government's having made any approaches or protests to the three Western Powers which have troops stationed in West Berlin, or of its having undertaken any action whatsoever to try and put an end to incidents or situations which might have become dangerous to world peace. In reality the problem came into existence in a somewhat unexpected, a somewhat abrupt, a somewhat sudden manner at the end of 1956 when the Soviet Government sent its first Note, which indeed raised in dramatic fashion the question on which Mr. Gromyko has just expounded to us, in broad outline, his Government's point of view.

At the time I refer to, that is to say six months ago, and on many occasions since then, this question of Berlin was raised by the Soviet Government under conditions which I might call rather peculiar, in the sense that at the same time as the Soviet Government was putting before us proposals for the establishment of a Free City in West Berlin, proposals which were to end the present dangers, it was accompanying its proposals with the statement that if they were not in the main accepted by the Western Powers, the Soviet Government would on its own account take measures, not to put into effect all its proposals, but to put into effect that part of those proposals which lay within its control. That is to say, for the Soviet Government it was a matter of freeing itself from the responsibilities which were incumbent upon it under the terms of our agreements for guaranteeing freedom of access between the western part of Berlin and the western part of Germany.

I must admit - and I do so willingly and with satisfaction - that at no point in his speech did our Soviet colleague revert to that idea; but I am obliged to say that there are other views being expressed in the name of the Soviet Government in different countries in Europe and that we sometimes hear the question expounded in a different manner. For us this is a source of anxieties that I cannot conceal, and if it is possible I should be glad to have some comment on this point from our colleague.

I do not want to labour the point, and at all events we are now here at this conference table engaged in negotiations. Until a few days ago these negotiations were directed, as both sides from the start intended they should be, to the settlement of the German problem as a whole. We have all of us put forward our points of view at length. I think that the discussion has not been useless, but we have now arrived at a point where we must recognize that our positions have not, for the moment, come closer together. That is why a few days ago we asked Mr. Gromyko what we were now going to do, and Mr. Gromyko replied very simply, 'Well, let us talk about the Berlin question'. We said to him 'Tell us what you have to say on this question of Berlin, explain to us what is worrying you on this matter and what your claims are and we shall listen to you, we shall try to understand your point of view; and if there is a possibility of our coming to an arrangement we shall not refuse to do so, because we have one wish, namely, to see that no incidents or difficulties can occur, and if there is really a risk of incidents or difficulties from Berlin, let us see what we can do to remedy this for the sake of peace and security in Europe'.

Incidentally, this is a rather different position from that which our Soviet colleague took just now, in a very categorical manner, on the subject of what we ourselves have proposed on Berlin. He has told us, with regard to our position on Berlin - which is nevertheless a quite natural one - just what he told us about our position concerning Germany as a whole, namely that this position did not even provide a basis for discussion.

This being so, and since we have arrived at this point in our negotiations, there is one thing that must be avoided above all, namely that there should be any misunderstandings among us. One such misunderstanding could be the assumption that since we did not refuse to discuss the Berlin problem we are in agreement with the Soviet delegation's premises, namely that the occupation status and the present régime in Berlin are to be condemned and that they must be renounced.

The occupation status is certainly an abnormality; but, as Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said a moment ago, everything is abnormal in Germany, and I cannot see that this is particularly more abnormal than the other things we can observe on German territory and which remain unsettled fifteen years after the war. Nor is the Soviet position which has been put before us a normal solution. It is no more normal to have a Free City of West Berlin, not occupied by the three Western Powers, than to have one part of the city of Berlin occupied by these same three Western Powers, as at present.

As this is our position, the question raised by the Soviet delegation - namely, how to find a compromise - must be judged on its merits.

In the discussion which we are now having - which has in fact been going on for the last forty-eight hours - the term "compromise" is not appropriate, because a compromise is something intermediate between the demands of one side and the demands of the other, and it happens that in this matter we are not demanding anything. We did not raise the Berlin question. We are not asking that the present status be altered. We do not think that it is causing any very special danger to world peace and to the peace of Europe in particular. All that we are saying is that we are ready to examine such proposals as the Soviet Union has to make, in a generous and peaceful spirit.

Again on this question of principle, of point of departure, I do not think there can be any misunderstanding between us, because in the various exchanges of Notes which took place before this conference met the positions were very clearly stated on both sides. I will cite by way of example only the French Government's Note of 31 December 1958 in reply to the first Note from the Soviet Government dated 27 November; in that Note we said very clearly that the proposal to make West Berlin a Free City was from our point of view unacceptable, as was the idea that the Western garrisons in Berlin should be withdrawn.

In fact the establishment of a Free City, which would be demilitarized, that is to say evacuated by the Western troops which are at present stationed there, would amount - Mr. Gromyko mentioned this and I have indeed said it already - to creating between us in a more or less formal manner a third German State and thereby reverting in an indirect manner to the procedures which were previously proposed to us for settling the German problem as a whole; I mean the procedure of a peace treaty with different parts of Germany. It would be a State which, because it would be demilitarized, would in the long run obviously be at the mercy of the

German authorities in the eastern part of Germany and behind these authorities the Soviet Government. This is a point that we must not overlook. Mr. Gromyko, moreover, has himself said that the best solution to the West Berlin question would be its absorption by the Deutsche Demokratische Republik. That is a statement which gives me cause to think, and makes me feel that the present status of Berlin, even if it is an old one, is not so out of date as might be thought, and the guarantees which we are offered for maintaining the present way of life in West Berlin are, as Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has well said, paper guarantees, and a very different thing from the presence of three small Western garrisons.

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RA/DGC/41

10 June 1959

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A. A. GROMYKO  
ON THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD  
TO THE QUESTION OF WEST BERLIN AND AN ALL-GERMAN COMMITTEE

10 June 1959

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers is examining two important questions - the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin problem. The settlement of these questions would be of enormous significance in consolidating peace in Europe, and not only in Europe.

On both these questions the Soviet Government has put forward specific proposals for the consideration of the Meeting - a Draft Peace Treaty with Germany and a proposal to give West Berlin the status of a demilitarized Free City. In the course of discussion both on the Berlin question and on the question of a peace treaty, the Soviet side has gone some way to meet the point of view of the Western Powers on a number of essential points.

The French, United States and United Kingdom delegations, however, have in fact preferred to evade the question of a peace treaty, since they have not shown any desire to examine the most important points in the Soviet Draft Treaty on their merits, nor have they put forward on their own account any proposals whatsoever on the content of a peace treaty with Germany.

We have already spent a fairly considerable time in discussing the Berlin question, or more precisely the question of the situation in West Berlin. Unfortunately, it is impossible to say that there has been any success on this question either. The main obstacle here is that the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France are doing their utmost to maintain

at all costs in West Berlin an occupation régime which has long ago outlived its purpose and which has led to the fact that today, fourteen years after the end of the war, the situation in West Berlin has become dangerous and a source of constant international tension. We have spoken about this more than once and for the time being there is no necessity to dwell on the point again at length.

The Soviet Government is continuing to make efforts to obtain a mutually acceptable solution to the West Berlin question and also to the question of a peace treaty with Germany - the two questions for the examination of which the present conference was convened.

In its efforts to contribute to the success of our negotiations the Soviet Government has taken yet another important step in this direction. We are submitting, for examination by the participants in our conference, new proposals by the Soviet Government, which have been agreed with the Government of the German Democratic Republic.

These proposals are as follows:

The USSR, taking into account the position of the Western Powers, is prepared not to insist on the immediate and complete abolition of the occupation régime in West Berlin. The Soviet Government could agree to the provisional maintenance of certain occupation rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin, but on condition that such a situation would exist only for a strictly limited period, namely one year.

During that time the two German States would make arrangements for the establishment of an all-German committee composed of representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on a basis of parity (one to one).

The committee must help to broaden and develop contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and prepare concrete measures for the unification of Germany, as well as examine questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Should the proposal for the establishment of the committee be unacceptable to one or the other German State, then the four Powers could recommend the Governments of both German States to choose a form of co-operation acceptable to them with a view to solving the problems referred to.

In order not to postpone indefinitely the conclusion of a German peace treaty, a definite period should be set for the work of the all-German committee or some other body, namely, one year, during which the committee or some other body must reach an agreed decision in regard to the questions of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany.

The provisional recognition of certain occupation rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin is possible if agreement is reached on an interim settlement of the West Berlin question on the basis of the following provisions:

- (a) the Western Powers shall reduce the number of their armed forces and armaments in West Berlin to token contingents;
- (b) all hostile propaganda from the territory of West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries shall cease;
- (c) all organizations in West Berlin engaged in espionage and subversive activities against the German Democratic Republic, the USSR and other socialist countries shall be liquidated;
- (d) the Western Powers shall undertake not to locate in West Berlin any atomic or rocket installations.

In the event of the conclusion of the aforesaid agreement the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the maintenance of the communications of West Berlin with the outside world in the form in which they now exist.

Such an agreement as a whole, including the question of maintaining the communications of West Berlin with the outside world, would constitute the provisional status of West Berlin. This status could be guaranteed, firstly, by the four Powers (on the basis of the protocol on guarantees submitted by the Soviet delegation) and, secondly, by the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which has expressed in principle its agreement to respect the agreed provisional status of West Berlin. If the Western Powers consider this appropriate, the question of guarantees could be settled either in a joint agreement on the provisional status of West Berlin or in a separate document. Either document could be registered in the United Nations.

If agreement should be reached on giving West Berlin the status of a demilitarized Free City in accordance with the proposal previously put forward by the Soviet Government, then the guarantees in regard to the unimpeded communication of the Free City with the outside world would be maintained so long as the unification of Germany has not been achieved.

In order to supervise compliance with the obligations arising out of the aforesaid agreement on the provisional status of West Berlin for the parties thereto, the Soviet Government proposes the establishment of a supervisory body composed of representatives of the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France. This body would have to keep a watch to ensure that there is no violation of the agreement in regard to the aforesaid questions on the part of West Berlin, and take appropriate measures to secure the implementation of the agreement regarding the provisional status without in this connexion affecting the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic.

The Soviet delegation must declare that if the Western Powers do not accept to carry out the minimum measures we have indicated in regard to West Berlin within the transition period of one year, the Soviet Union will not accept to confirm its agreement to the continuation of the occupation régime in West Berlin.

If the Western Powers or the Government of Western Germany obstruct the achievement, within the period indicated, of agreed solutions to the questions relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty, then the Soviet Union, along with other interested States which fought against Germany, will be compelled to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

This step would be forced on us, inasmuch as it would prove impossible, because of the position taken by the Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, to conclude a peace treaty with the two German States or even with a confederation of these States, should they form one, as well as with these States themselves.

Such is the content of the new proposals made by the Soviet Union, which it puts forward in the light of the exchange of views which has taken place here on the questions under examination.

As the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, has already stressed more than once, and as the Soviet delegation has stated here, the USSR is sincerely concerned to reach agreement with the Western Powers, and is concerned to find a solution to the questions we are discussing, on a basis of mutual agreement. It is indeed for this purpose that the Soviet delegation has come to Geneva. The Soviet Union is consistently striving for an agreed solution to the West Berlin question and for a peace settlement with Germany.

We have been guided by precisely this desire in bringing forward the new proposals which I have outlined.

If these proposals were implemented, what would be the consequences for the situation in Germany and in Berlin?

Let us first turn to the proposal for an all-German committee.

The idea of establishing such a committee should not, we feel, be alien to the Governments of the Western Powers, which have themselves spoken in favour of the establishment of such a body. We consider that the adoption at our conference of the recommendation to establish an all-German committee would mean passing from words to deeds, and would give a good start to the preparation of conditions for the final settlement of questions affecting Germany.

Of course, there could be no other basis on which this committee could be organized than that of parity between the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany; this is the generally accepted procedure for any negotiations between parties with equal rights.

The delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France have stated here more than once that their Governments wish to reach a just and lasting peace settlement with Germany. The establishment of an all-German committee charged with the task of helping to extend and develop contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, discussing and working out specific measures for the unification of Germany, as well as examining questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty, would make it possible to avoid breaking off the work on a peace treaty, which has been started here in Geneva, and to set the continuation of this work on practical lines here and now.

We should realize, however, that one of the parties - and the present position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany gives more than adequate grounds for these misgivings - may try to drag out indefinitely the work of the all-German committee in fulfilling its tasks and may thereby postpone the conclusion of a German treaty to the more and more distant future. In order to deprive those who are opposed to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany of this possibility, we consider it essential to stipulate in advance that the all-German committee or some other body established by agreement between the two German States must reach an agreed decision with regard to the questions of the peace treaty and the unification of Germany within one year.

It is clear that if the all-German committee were to work as it should and both parties forming it were to show their good intentions and desire to reach mutual understanding, then that very fact would mean that at the peace conference one point of view instead of two points of view could be put forward on the part of Germany. Consequently, even given the present position of the Western Powers with regard to the representation of Germany during the preparation and signing of a peace treaty, there is nothing to prevent the green light from being given for the final stage of this work, the convening of a peace conference of States which were at war with Germany. At the same time, the proposal to give the all-German committee definite tasks connected with the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany, reflects the opinion which has been expressed by all those taking part in this conference that the peace treaty must not be dictated to the German people.

There can be no doubt that in the event of our reaching agreement here on the establishment of an all-German committee a powerful impetus would be given to efforts directed towards the rapprochement of the two German States. Within the framework of this committee, the two German States could agree on the development and extension of the mutual contacts which the Western Powers, too, recognize as essential. The all-German committee would ensure the prerequisites to enable the German people finally to reach a solution of their chief national problem, the restoration of the country's unity. In this connexion, we proceed from the assumption that the Governments of the USSR, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France recognize it as right and proper that both German States should reach agreement on the way to restore the unity of Germany.

The fact that one of the German States - the German Democratic Republic - has already spoken in favour of talks between the two German Governments and of the establishment of an all-German body will make it easier to implement this proposal.

We should like to give some further explanations also in connexion with our new proposals on the Berlin question.

The Soviet Union has been and still is opposed in principle to the maintenance of the occupation régime. Even though we are nevertheless ready to agree to the provisional maintenance by the three Powers of certain occupation rights, provided some of the consequences and manifestations of the occupation régime in West Berlin which are most dangerous to peace are eliminated, we are doing this only for the sake of agreement. It should be borne in mind that the Western Powers are not prepared at present to renounce their occupation rights in West Berlin.

We must stress, however, that when the Soviet Government agrees to the provisional recognition of certain occupation rights of the Western Powers and to West Berlin's maintaining its links with the outside world in their present form, it has every reason to expect that in return definite steps will be taken to help bring about a healthier situation in Berlin immediately.

The steps which we have suggested represent the minimum that must be done, in view of the real situation in Berlin and in Germany as a whole.

Reducing the numerical strength of the Western Powers' armed forces in West Berlin to token contingents would mean a positive step in the required direction. The value of this measure would consist mainly in the fact that it would constitute evidence of the Powers' readiness to work together towards normalizing the situation in West Berlin for the sake of reducing international tension, and particularly tension in Europe and in Germany.

The obligation to refrain from locating atomic and rocket weapons in West Berlin would provide confirmation of the statements which the Foreign Ministers of the USA, the United Kingdom and France have made at this conference that there is no intention of allowing West Berlin to be used as a military bridgehead for NATO.

The cessation of hostile propaganda coming from the territory of West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and the other socialist States, and the liquidation of all the organizations in West Berlin which are engaged in illegal subversive activities against these States, are an elementary condition for bringing about a calm situation in Berlin and normal relations between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic.

If the participants in our conference recognize that West Berlin must serve not aggressive and subversive ends but the purposes of developing peaceful co-operation between States, then the measures which we have suggested should not meet with any objections.

The Soviet Government considers that it would be against common sense to prolong the occupation régime in Germany fourteen years after the end of the war, as well as against the interests of maintaining peace and reducing international tension.

The main idea in the new proposals made by the Soviet Government is to put right an abnormal situation, in West Berlin and in Germany as a whole, which is fraught with the danger of military conflict.

In suggesting a positive programme for the solution of questions affecting Germany, including the peace treaty and Berlin, the Soviet Government is doing everything possible to ensure the success of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers. In this the Soviet Government has once again shown its desire to find a solution to the problems burdening international relations, so that the trenches which have been dug in the "cold war" may be filled in for ever.

It is our deep conviction that the position taken by the Soviet Union on the questions under discussion here also reflects the attitude of the overwhelming majority of the German people and of the peoples of other European countries who are disturbed by the fact that the absence of a settlement of these questions is one of the basic causes of the "cold war" between Allies who fought together against Hitlerism and defeated it at the cost of heavy sacrifices.

The Soviet Government expects that its desire to find a basis on which the positions of the States interested in the question of a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin question can be brought closer together, and to achieve at this present Meeting tangible results in solving these questions, will meet with support from the other participants in this conference.

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RIA/DGC/42  
10 June 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY MR. SELWYN LLOYD, SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

10 June 1959

Mr. Chairman,

I listened to Mr. Gromyko's important speech with great interest.

That interest is hardly surprising in view of the importance of the issues which we are discussing - their importance for the peace and stability of the world.

I confess that I am surprised by Mr. Gromyko's statement. To say what he has said today in the form in which he has said it and at this stage of our talks seems out of tune with the spirit of those talks.

During the early months of this year, in the spring and early summer, we made some progress towards a détente, as compared with the situation as it was in November and December of 1958. The time limit of 27 May was removed; there was agreement to negotiate; there was agreement on a Foreign Ministers' meeting; there was high hope of a Summit meeting, although the realists knew that every dispute or difference between the great Powers could not be settled at a single meeting.

That was the background against which I, for my part, have approached the formal and the private meetings during the past five weeks. I believe that my Western colleagues shared that approach and that we had with us the good wishes of world opinion.

Mr. Gromyko's speech today smacks to me of a threat - of a take it or leave it attitude. I may be wrong. I sincerely hope that I am. But I believe in

speaking in very frank terms on these occasions. If this is meant as a Diktat then Mr. Gromyko mistakes the character of the people to whom he is speaking. We are not impressed by that kind of approach.

We came here to negotiate - to explore the possibility of concessions for counter-concessions. We were prepared to examine very patiently our differences.

We wanted to explore areas of possible agreement. I am convinced that such areas of possible agreement do exist provided there is good will and good faith on both sides.

That exploration has been taking place, slowly I concede, but in a good atmosphere. And I had high hopes of progress - of a limited success for our talks.

Today's speech has come as a surprise. Is it an abrupt indication from the Soviet Union of the wish to terminate our negotiations? I sincerely hope that that is not so.

Mr. Herter has analysed these proposals of the Soviet Union. I agree with that analysis.

I have nothing to add to it today but I shall want at a later meeting to make my considered comments on the matters referred to in Mr. Gromyko's speech and to express my opinion about the situation in which we find ourselves.

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RM/DOC/43  
11 June 1959  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
ON BERLIN  
DELIVERED AT THE SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS  
10 June 1959

I have listened with close attention to the statement which the Soviet Minister has just made. It contains an extraordinary proposal.

My surprise is not lessened by the fact that in the private meeting of the four Foreign Ministers yesterday Mr. Gromyko outlined to us the main points of his new proposal. I then asked for a copy of the document from which he was reading in the light of its significance. I was told that no document could be made available for study. The Soviet Foreign Minister wanted to unveil his proposal today in a plenary session.

Let me say now categorically that Mr. Gromyko's proposal is wholly unacceptable to my Government and cannot be taken as a basis for discussion.

It is unacceptable on two grounds.

First, because of its substance.

Mr. Gromyko proposes four conditions which the Western Powers must accept in order to maintain any forces in Berlin, even for a limited period.

First, these garrisons must be reduced to what Mr. Gromyko has described as "symbolic" contingents. Their arms are also to be restricted. I might here say that I thought we had all agreed and assumed that 11,000 allied troops in a community of over two million people, surrounded by hostile territory and ringed by

nearly thirty East German and Soviet divisions, could only be described as symbolic. Mr. Gromyko has stated on several occasions that they have no military significance. But we are now told that they must be drastically reduced.

Secondly, the Soviet Foreign Minister stipulates that all propaganda conducted in West Berlin must be stopped. No distinction is made between legitimate news and comment, on the one hand, and hostile propaganda, on the other. We have no intention of curtailing essential freedom of speech, which is the proud possession of the West Berliners and the envy of all who can read or listen in the Soviet zone. However, we have made clear that we are prepared, consistent with this freedom, to take part in reciprocal measures to reduce tension in the Berlin area from this source. We note, moreover, that there is no mention of curtailing the vicious propaganda which emanates from East Berlin.

Thirdly, all organizations in West Berlin engaged in espionage and subversion must be liquidated. I pass over this curious proposal by reminding the Soviet Foreign Minister of the ugly facts and figures contained in my statement of 5 June at this conference on the subject of massive Soviet and East German subversive and terroristic organizations located in or operating through East Berlin. We have indicated, however, our willingness on a reciprocal basis to use our best efforts to discourage activities in the Berlin area which might threaten public order.

Finally, the Soviet Foreign Minister calls on the three Western Powers to assume a unilateral obligation not to station atomic or missile facilities in West Berlin. I am at a loss to understand this condition. Perhaps Mr. Gromyko realized that if it were not embodied in an otherwise unacceptable package, we could readily agree if it were clearly reciprocal.

It goes without saying that the sum and tone of these conditions are improper for presentation in a serious negotiation between sovereign States.

The second and even more important reason why this proposal is wholly unacceptable is because of its threatening nature. It seeks to establish a limit of twelve months for the continued rightful presence in West Berlin of the United States and its allies, the United Kingdom and France. During that twelve-month period an effort would be made to force a confederation of Germany on Soviet terms. Failure of this effort would result in the signature of a separate peace treaty by the Soviet Union with the so-called German Democratic Republic - a treaty which the Soviet Union pretends would extinguish our rights.

Obviously, we cannot accept a time-limit of twelve months for life expectancy of the rights which we and our allies acquired as a result of the capitulation of Hitler's Germany. They are not rights which were granted us by the Soviets. They are not rights which the Soviets can cancel, assign or modify. They are rights which we retain and will feel free to exercise so long as Germany is divided and the free people of West Berlin look to us for their protection.

Mr. Gromyko's fundamental point is this attempt to establish a deadline for expiration of our rights in and to Berlin and for the time in which a German peace treaty can be negotiated. And these negotiations must end in the result the USSR demands.

This is the same element of duress that was contained in the Soviet note of 27 November 1958, which we and our allies flatly rejected. We did not agree to this conference until that duress had been removed.

What prompts the Soviet Government now to attempt to reinstate a time-limit? The USSR should know by now that the United States will never negotiate under deadlines, threats, or duress.

I am quite sure that Mr. Gromyko knew this before he made his statement here today. Must we now conclude that he made this statement in order to interrupt the process of negotiation on which we have been engaged since 11 May?

I deeply regret the introduction of such pressure tactics into our negotiations.

We and our French and British allies came to Geneva last month in the desire to negotiate seriously in a genuine effort to resolve major problems. These problems - and at the forefront of them is the division of Germany - have for years created a state of uncertainty in Europe.

This uncertainty was artificially heightened last November by the sudden Soviet creation of a Berlin crisis, with new and serious tensions. Until the Soviets created that crisis, ten years of relative tranquility had passed - ever since the end of the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1949.

We came to Geneva hoping to achieve some progress toward the solution - partial if not complete - of these problems. If some progress proved possible we looked forward to a Summit meeting as the next step toward a more secure, peaceful and just world.

We put forward the Western Peace Plan to deal with the problem of a divided Germany. We had worked over these proposals long and carefully. They met, we believe, to a substantial degree the objections the Soviets had made to our plans for German reunification put forward in 1955.

The Soviet Foreign Minister rejected the Western Peace Plan out of hand.

Despite this rejection we have held a series of private meetings which, at the request of the Soviet Foreign Minister, dealt with the problem of Berlin. The first of these talks was held in the aircraft in which we four Foreign Ministers flew back to Geneva from John Foster Dulles's funeral.

During these discussions we made clear to the Soviet Foreign Minister why his "free" city proposal for Berlin was unacceptable. Despite our exposition of our own proposal for a united Berlin, Mr. Gromyko refused seriously to discuss it. In fact, Premier Khrushchev said publicly immediately after our presentation that "the 7-point Plan tabled by Mr. Herter does not contain a single element for negotiation".

Accordingly, we proceeded to discuss an interim solution for West Berlin to last until the reunification of Germany. We sought such an interim solution in good faith within the limits of our respective positions.

In the course of these private meetings the Western Powers expressed their willingness to examine the situation with a view to relieving in reasonable fashion any legitimate worries of the USSR.

We agreed that the situation of West Berlin is abnormal. So is the situation of Germany. It is abnormal for a city and for a country to remain divided fourteen years after the end of the war.

We felt that improvements could be made in the existing situation in Berlin.

We made concrete suggestions.

We expressed a willingness to see what practical arrangements might be made to meet the Soviet Government's expressed desire to relieve itself of certain access responsibilities which it is now obliged to carry out by virtue of certain agreements with the Western Powers.

Until yesterday's meeting we had some slight basis for hoping that we might arrive at a practical agreement which would give satisfaction to the Soviet position, without prejudicing our rights, and would provide added assurance for the freedom of access for civil and military traffic.

Yesterday, however, in our private meeting, Mr. Gromyko without warning shifted the entire basis of our discussion from an interim solution for Berlin pending Germany's reunification to the extraordinary proposal he has just repeated.

Before closing, let me record one curious circumstance of our discussion over the past two weeks on Berlin. The Soviet Foreign Minister has constantly refused, despite all our efforts, to discuss East Berlin.

Surely Mr. Gromyko remembers the Allied Protocol of 12 September 1944, which states that: "Germany, within her frontiers as they were on 31 December 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers." This Protocol was later amended to provide a fourth zone of occupation in Western Germany and a fourth sector in West Berlin for France.

As is well known, the Soviet Government has taken certain actions with respect to Eastern Germany and East Berlin - actions which the Western Powers never agreed to or approved. East Berlin the Soviets now refuse to discuss. As a result of their own unilateral action they assert it to be an integral part of the so-called German Democratic Republic. Having purported to dispose unilaterally of their own sector of Berlin, they seek to achieve our removal from the three western sectors of Berlin. This is consistent with the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement of 30 May 1959: "the fairest approach would be to extend to West Berlin the full sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic".

The latest Soviet proposal appears to have set us back not just to 11 May, when this conference opened, but to November 1958, when the Soviet Union fabricated the Berlin crisis and insisted that its terms be accepted by 27 May 1959.

We are unwilling to negotiate under this threat. I hope, therefore, that the Soviet Government will reconsider its position.

I would much prefer to continue these talks, as long as there is any real prospect of progress - either to improve the situation in Berlin or toward an agreed solution for Berlin as a whole.

I hope that we will be able to pick up again the parted strands of these negotiations free from any hint of duress.

In this event, I remain ready to join in seeking an agreement consistent with the honor of all of our countries and one which would pave the way for a useful meeting of the Heads of Governments.

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RM/DCC/44  
11 June 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

STATEMENT MADE BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

10 June 1959

I should like to state briefly my reactions, what I feel in regard to the proposals made at the beginning of this session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, proposals which relate both to the German problem as a whole and the particular situation of Berlin.

These proposals are not new to us since we were already acquainted with them at yesterday's private meeting, during which Mr. Gromyko more or less outlined what he has said this afternoon. During yesterday's meeting I had already had the occasion to indicate that my first reaction in face of these unexpected proposals was essentially one of surprise. And I must say that after twenty-four hours of reflection, and after having listened very attentively again today to the statement of our Soviet colleague, I am still as dismayed as I was yesterday.

I am dismayed both by the manner in which these proposals have been put to us and by their tenor. It is exactly twelve days tomorrow that we have been discussing, among the four delegations represented at this conference, the problem of Berlin. We entered into this discussion at Mr. Gromyko's instigation when after more than two weeks of meetings both sides had reached the conclusion that, in the present state of affairs, it was really very difficult to envisage the possibility of agreement between us on the German problem as a whole. That is the conclusion which I think all of us recorded with great regret but which, we felt, our delegations really could not escape.

It was in these circumstances that we accepted to open the discussion on a more specific, more restricted question, that of the various problems which the Government of the Soviet Union raised, more than six months ago now, in regard to the present situation in Berlin.

This discussion was started in very different circumstances from those in which the discussion on the German problem was carried on, since by common agreement we arranged in practice both to carry it on in private meetings and to direct it essentially to the specific problems that could arise. Thus our positions were explained by both sides and very thoroughly. We then heard the proposals made by Mr. Gromyko on behalf of his Government and we ourselves expounded very clearly, I think, and unequivocally, what we might be disposed to do.

This discussion was difficult, sometimes animated, but it had the merit of being specific, and until Monday evening, I think, it had led us to a situation in which we found very important points of disagreement on the one hand, and on the other hand certain points on which it seemed possible that an agreement could be achieved. It was, in short, a fairly normal situation in the middle of a very difficult international negotiation, and we had no reason, for our part, to think that it would be suddenly interrupted. We had, moreover, some good grounds for hoping that, if it could be still carried on, perhaps it would have been possible to record some results in the end.

However that may be, we met yesterday with the idea, on the part of the Western delegations, in any case on the part of the French delegation, that we were going to carry on our discussion on the bases on which we had started it fifteen days ago, and to continue to try and see if it was possible to reach agreement.

And to our surprise, we were faced without warning with a new proposal on the part of the Soviet delegation, a proposal completely different from everything that we had discussed during two weeks.

So much for the method. I now turn to the substance. I said that this proposition is completely different from the questions discussed during two weeks because, if one analyses it, the main point consists in what it says on the question of the German problem as a whole, and what is then put forward in regard to Berlin is in some way the complement of this overall proposal.

What is being proposed in regard to the German problem as a whole is the Soviet position, practically in its entirety, with which we are very familiar since it was amply explained by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union during the first weeks of this conference. I believe that what is being proposed to us can be very simply reduced to the three essential points in this Soviet position, namely:

- (1) the reunification of Germany by agreement between the two parts of Germany which exist at present;
- (2) a peace treaty, to be concluded with these two parts of Germany;
- (3) the establishment of a Free City of Berlin and the withdrawal of the Western forces from Berlin.

I should like to explain my opinion on the first of these points, that is to say, reunification by agreement between the two parts of Germany, because I think that this has been presented in a way which in fact merely disguises the Soviet delegation's original position. We are told, indeed, that the idea of an all-German committee which we put forward could be inferred from the Western proposals on reunification; but in reality it is only the name which is being proposed since this committee, which by definition would be based on parity of representation, would in fact be a meeting of a commission representing the two German Governments which exist at the present moment, whatever juridical status we accord them; these two authorities, with equal representation, would have to discuss jointly the conditions for reunification.

Consequently, the first part of the proposal which Mr. Gromyko has submitted to us is aimed at settling the whole German problem or at least at initiating the settlement of the German problem as a whole on the basis of the Soviet proposals with which we are familiar. Assuming that these conditions are accepted, it is proposed further that there should be a short period during which the present status of West Berlin would be abolished. For a year Western token garrisons would remain, under certain conditions, in Berlin pending their complete withdrawal at the end of the twelve months. Communications between West Berlin and Western Germany would continue to be guaranteed during that period of one year in the same way as they are now, that is to say, on the basis of valid treaties which we have signed with the Government of the Soviet Union and which are still in force.

This, I believe, represents the two aspects of the proposal which has been put to us and I am very sorry to have to note that this proposal is accompanied or at any rate seems to be accompanied again by a threat which is in reality a double threat. The first threat which has not been formulated explicitly but which can be read between the lines is that if the agreement which is proposed to them is not accepted by the Western Powers very serious doubts will arise with regard to the maintenance of free communications between West Berlin and Western Germany. Then, secondly, if the agreement is accepted, there is again the threat of a deadline, a one-year deadline. This threat, too, is a double one. If no agreement has been reached between the two parts of Germany within a year the Soviet Government would consider itself compelled to sign a peace treaty with Eastern Germany. Further, if there is no agreement on the establishment of a Free City of Berlin from which the Western garrisons have been withdrawn at the end of one year, then there would no longer be any guarantees with regard to communications between West Berlin and Western Germany. Such, I believe, is the essence of the proposal so unexpectedly put to us by Mr. Gromyko, analysed as objectively as possible. It was said just now - I believe it was our colleague Mr. Herter who said it - that we seem to be going back to the beginning of May 1959 and perhaps even to November 1958. We do indeed seem to be going back. It also looks as though the four or five weeks we have just spent in this conference have really been spent in vain. I must say that for the French delegation this is a great disappointment. Like my colleagues of the United States of America and the United Kingdom we came here with a will to negotiate and in the hope of finding a way, if not to settle all the important problems that we are facing, at least of finding some kind of arrangement which would make it possible to bring about a very real improvement in the relations between our countries and the Soviet Union. I must say that after what we have been told yesterday and today I myself no longer know exactly where we are and it seems to me that a very serious situation has been created.

We shall again think over what we have been told, think over this situation, and in the next few days we shall see what the final outcome of this conference will be.

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RM/DOC/45  
12 June 1959  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
REGARDING EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES,  
DELIVERED AT THE ELEVENTH SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

25 May 1959

The Chairman will once again recognize himself as the representative of the United States Government to follow up the remarks that Mr. Gromyko has just made.

I fully agree with Mr. Gromyko that our discussions here should lead to successful negotiations, but I do think that the issue which has been raised here this afternoon should require a little further clarification for the record.

Mr. Gromyko has on numerous occasions pointed to a growing revanchist and militaristic spirit in Germany and has indicated that the United States Government has been supporting this and that NATO has been supporting it. I think I ought to point out a few facts, and I think that Mr. Gromyko cannot claim that facts can be presented in any other than an objective way. They have to be refuted with facts.

On 19 May, Ambassador Grewe pointed out that Mr. Bolz himself stated that as early as 1956 the so-called German Democratic Republic had an army of 120,000 men. As is well known, the Federal Republic of Germany at that same time had just begun to create an army - in 1956 it had only 10,000 men under arms. If an impartial observer were to be asked whether, under these circumstances, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany or of the so-called German Democratic Republic had first given evidence of "militaristic tendencies", he could hardly avoid the obvious conclusion.

But I can go farther on these figures. The rearmament of the Federal Republic and its incorporation into the Western defense system was in fact preceded by a much earlier rearmament of the Soviet zone of occupation. Let us look at the record.

On 1 August 1946, there was established a so-called "German Interior Administration" for the purposes of centralizing all Soviet zone police forces. In December 1946, the Soviet military administration in Germany ordered the activation of German border police, a police force quartered in barracks, whose strength at that time was 2,600 men. Exactly nine years later in 1955, the same border police took over the "exclusive protection of the borders". Its strength at that time was approximately 34,000 men.

On 15 December 1945, the People's Police authorities were established at the Land level. The strength of the People's Police was approximately 50,000 men. On 3 July 1948, there began the activation of armed alert police formations quartered in barracks. On 15 September 1952, these formations were officially designated as the "People's Police quartered in barracks". Their strength rose to approximately 104,000 men.

On 12 July 1952, the second party convention of the SED decided to "organize armed forces". At the same time, existing forces were grouped in divisions and the "Association for Sports and Technology" was set up. On 18 January 1956, the "People's Chamber" passed the law for the creation of the National People's Army. The preparation having been completed, the camouflage designation of "People's Police quartered in barracks" was abandoned.

We now find that the strength of the various military and para-military organizations in the so-called German Democratic Republic is approximately as follows:

- 1) National People's Army - 100,000 men.
- 2) Border Police - 40,000 men.
- 3) German Alert Police - 20,000 men.
- 4) Transport Police - 10,000 men.
- 5) Special Purpose Units - 7,000 men.
- 6) SED Workers' Combat Groups - 300,000 men.
- 7) Association for Sports and Technology (pre-military training) - 250,000 men.

Now, just let me relate those for a moment to the active forces in the Federal German Republic as of the present time.

Today there are in that country - three times as numerous in population as is the so-called German Democratic Republic - 235,000 men under arms, a frontier guard of 12,000, police in barracks of 14,000. In relation to the size and population of the two units, the armed forces in the so-called German Democratic Republic run four to five times that in West Germany.

I merely cite these facts because I think they should become a part of the record of our discussion.

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RL/DOC/46  
12 June 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY MR. SELWYN LLOYD,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

12 June 1959

I said on Wednesday after listening to Mr. Gromyko's speech that it seemed to me to be out of tune with the spirit of the talks as they had developed up to that moment. I would like today to develop this point. At the outset of the conference each side made comprehensive proposals for the solution of the German problem and connected questions. The Western Powers put forward their Peace Plan, a new set of proposals to which much thought had been devoted and which among other things were designed to meet the various criticisms which had been levelled against the position taken by the Western Powers in 1955. Included in the Peace Plan was a detailed and carefully worked out proposal for the unification of Berlin as the first stage of the process which would lead to the unification of Germany as a whole. These proposals were new. Those tabled by the Soviet Government at the outset of the conference were not new. So far as its Free City proposal was concerned, it simply repeated with certain variations what had been suggested to us in the Note of 27 November. As for Germany as a whole, the Peace Treaty tabled by the Soviet delegation was the same as that attached to the Soviet Government's Note of 10 January, which in its turn faithfully reflected a number of earlier proposals put to us in previous years. That was the position in the opening stages of this conference. As you all know, the result of our debates was that neither side felt able to accept the proposals made by the other. We went over the ground exhaustively and failed to make real progress.

We both agreed that Germany should be reunified. But we failed to agree about the way in which it should be done. We both agreed that there should at some stage be free elections in Germany. But we failed to agree about the stage in the reunification process at which such elections should be held. We both agreed that there should be a German peace treaty. But we could not reach agreement upon the procedure for negotiating and concluding such a treaty. The fact that we still differ on these wide issues does not, in my view, mean that we can put them aside. These problems must be reviewed from time to time. We ought from time to time to see whether it is possible to bring our positions closer to each other. Time may bring about the possibility of new agreements: what appears insoluble now may prove soluble later. This is the thought behind the idea of a continuing exchange of views on these great issues.

It was at the end of this stage of our discussion that we began to talk about the possibility of making limited improvements in the situation in Berlin, we having rejected the Soviet Free City proposal and the Soviet delegation having rejected our proposal for the reunification of Berlin. During the fortnight ending last Tuesday we talked almost exclusively about Berlin because there did at least seem some chance that adjustments or improvements could be mutually agreed upon, in a situation which neither side regarded as satisfactory. Mr. Gromyko had described the position in Berlin as abnormal. We have never disputed that description and have always told him that we took no pleasure in the existing situation, though we regarded its continuance as being the consequence of the failure of the four Powers to reunify Germany. In this way the efforts of the conference, which had begun in a broad field, became concentrated for a time on a particular point, namely, how to improve the existing situation in Berlin when each side had rejected what the other side had put forward as a solution possible at this time. Although no agreements had been reached, we were beginning to have some understanding of each other's points of view.

And yet it was at this moment that the Soviet delegation came up with a set of proposals which brought the whole dialogue back to the position from which it had started and indeed to the position in which we found ourselves last November when the present crisis was started by the Soviet Government's Note of 27 November. The wheel seems to have come full circle and after five weeks or so we find ourselves back at the beginning. Mr. Gromyko tried to make fun of us on Wednesday for appearing to be indignant at his having taken a new initiative without warning.

But it was not the newness of his initiative which caused indignation. On the contrary it was its staleness for, as Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville pointed out on Wednesday, there is nothing new whatever about the elements of which the new Soviet plan is composed. Mr. Gromyko has shaken his kaleidoscope and produced what looks like a new pattern, but the pieces of glass are all the same and very murky they are at that. There is the old threat made in November that the Soviet Government would turn their responsibilities over to the so-called German Democratic Republic and leave it to us to deal as best we could with a régime with which we have no relations and which he knows that we cannot for sound reasons recognise as a lawful government. The threat is a double one, as Mr. Couve de Murville pointed out. If we do not accept the plan the threat is that they will carry it out at once. Even if we do accept the plan the threat remains, a threat which would be carried out at the end of the year. The all-German committee which is a feature of the plan, constituted as it would be on a basis of parity as between East and West Germany, is simply a device for compelling the Federal Government to negotiate directly with the authorities of East Germany on a governmental basis. It is in short a revival of the Soviet thesis that the reunification of Germany must be negotiated between the Federal Government and the Government of the so-called German Democratic Republic.

But my intention this morning is not so much to analyse the latest Soviet proposals as to explain my view of the background against which they have to be judged.

First I will deal with the question of rights. Rights can be of two sorts. Firstly those flowing from a basic position, e.g. the capitulation of Nazi Germany, and secondly rights flowing from specific agreements, in other words contractual arrangements. The Western Powers have rights of each sort with regard to West Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev has admitted those rights are well founded. He said on 20 March: "Yes, I believe that the United States, Britain and France do have lawful rights for their stay in Berlin. These rights ensue from the fact of German surrender as a result of our joint struggle against Germany." It is true that after saying that Mr. Khrushchev put forward the proposition that those rights could be extinguished by the Soviet Union signing a peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic. We do not accept that proposition.

We say that unilateral action of that sort would not only be without legal effect but that it would strike a vital blow at the mutual confidence which we are trying to create. There is thus a difference of opinion between us on this question

of rights. How can we deal with this difference of opinion? One way might be to say nothing about rights in any agreement which we might negotiate. That would present us with a number of difficulties. Suppose we were to reach agreement on all the other points at issue but say nothing about rights, would the question of rights be raised again in a few weeks or months by the Soviet Union? Would the Soviet Union in six months' time sign a peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic which they would again contend would put everything into the melting pot? That is the difficulty about saying nothing about rights. This difficulty has been very much under our consideration. But there are other possibilities. We certainly had not said our last word, nor did I have the feeling that Mr. Gromyko had said his last word. I still believe that it is not beyond the wit of man to devise a formula to deal with this point provided it is understood that we, the West, for our part cannot give up, whittle down or derogate from our rights or from our juridical position.

I now come to the possibility of improved arrangements relating to the situation in Berlin designed to obviate future misunderstandings, uncertainties or friction. In approaching this task both sides have had, I believe, two agreed purposes which should have made the task easier and more feasible. These purposes are that the people of West Berlin should have freedom, the freedom to choose their system of society, and secondly that their free access to what Mr. Gromyko described as the "outer world" should be maintained - for individuals, for materials, for goods and services. With those agreed objectives in mind we have considered three topics:

- (1) Western troops in Berlin;
- (2) activities in Berlin, to use one word to cover a comprehensive field; and
- (3) arrangements for safeguarding free access.

As to troops, the Soviet Government object to occupation troops in West Berlin. They say that the occupation status is outmoded, outlived. Whether they feel that there is something derogatory to their dignity in having these small detachments of Western troops in the midst of an area under their control, I don't know. Whatever may be the feeling, what are the facts? It is agreed by both sides that a few thousand troops in an undefended town over 100 miles away from their nearest support and in the middle of some hundreds of thousands of Soviet and East German troops are no military threat whatsoever.

However, to try to meet the Soviet point of view we offered not to increase the number of Western troops in Berlin and we said that in certain circumstances we were prepared to consider a reduction. That in my view was a very fair proposition, a new and bona fide concession offered in a sincere attempt to reach agreement. We accepted the idea of a ceiling.

The second head is that of "activities", subversion, propoganda, etc. We have said that we are prepared to agree to try, on a reciprocal basis and subject to the preservation of ordinary human rights, to stop anything which would be likely to cause a breach of public order or affect the rights of the others. We have said that we thought that any arrangements made under this head should cover the Greater Berlin area. The Soviet feel that in that formulation there would be an implicit acceptance of our idea of the reunification of Berlin. Accordingly we are ready to alter our formulation so that the arrangements would be defined as covering both parts of Berlin. It is essential in our view that there should be this reciprocity. The Soviet Foreign Minister, if I understood him correctly, agreed that there was something in this proposal of ours but he did not himself put forward anything under this head until the plan told us privately on Tuesday and in formal session on Wednesday. It was significant that in it no reference at all was made to reciprocity on these matters. We are still prepared to try to work out a formula with the Soviet Union under this head of "activities" in Berlin.

The third matter is the arrangements for access. There are many agreements dealing with this matter covering traffic of various types. In our view the Soviet Union cannot unilaterally tear up these agreements. We recognise however that the Soviet Union wishes to cease to perform certain functions connected with access procedures. We had useful discussions upon these matters and again I believe that there is the possibility of an agreement between us.

Mr. Gromyko has frequently posed the question: to what sort of a West Berlin is this access going to be given? His attitude to many of the matters to which I have referred, so he has said, depends upon the nature of the West Berlin which will exist.

I will try to answer his question. It will be a West Berlin which does not contain any military threat of any sort to the Soviet Union or to East Germany. There was a reference in Mr. Gromyko's speech to the possibility of putting nuclear weapons or missiles into West Berlin. The idea is really so ludicrous as to hardly require an answer. It will be a West Berlin in which the Western troops are there

as a symbol of the continuing freedom of the West Berliners. In the future, as in the past, their presence will in no way interfere with the internal administration or life of the city. They will be there as a symbol, passionately desired by the people of West Berlin themselves. It will be a West Berlin in which there will be safeguards for the freedom of its people to decide their own way of life. It will be a West Berlin in which we hope, provided there is the necessary reciprocity, that there will be no incitement to violence against, or subversion of, its neighbours, no kidnapping incidents, no fear of raids across the sector boundary and no concern about freedom of access, no fear that they will be squeezed into submission to some régime alien to their aspirations or their ideology.

To sum up, before Mr. Gromyko spoke on Tuesday and Wednesday I had the feeling that we could between us find a way of presenting the juridical position in a manner acceptable to both sides. Over improved arrangements affecting life in West Berlin and access to it we had made progress - slow progress, I admit, but after all we are dealing with knotty problems, which have baffled us or our predecessors for the past ten years or so. Limited progress seemed to be possible on a limited front. But it could have been progress, the turn of the tide, and it would have made possible the consideration in a rather different atmosphere at this or other levels of the wider problems affecting peace and stability in Europe.

Mr. Gromyko's contributions on Tuesday and Wednesday seemed to me to wipe out or cancel all the work of the last fourteen days. I suggest to him and to my other colleagues that we should forget those two days and get back to real business, to real negotiations.

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RL/DCC/47  
13 June 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A. A. GROMYKO

12 June 1959

Mr. Chairman,

I think it is natural that I sometimes wait to hear the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers on a question under consideration and then express my views. Probably it is better so from the standpoint of organizing the work of our meetings, otherwise I should have to intervene each time after any one of you has spoken. For this reason I thought I could intervene and make some comments now, after having heard the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and the short statement by Mr. Herter.

With regard to the question of how the Soviet proposals should be understood, I have already explained this several times. Half a dozen times at least, I remember. I do not know why giving explanations six times is considered better than five, or ten times better than nine. I think that repetition does not change the situation. We have stated, and only yesterday I said in a talk with Mr. Herter, that it would be wrong to represent our proposals as a threat, an ultimatum or a Diktat. Such terrible words have been used both at our meetings and in the Press.

Our proposals are a statement of the Soviet Government's position, as the Soviet Government conceives the basis on which efforts should be made to achieve a solution both of the Berlin question and the question of an all-German committee. You are familiar with our proposal for an all-German committee, and I will not go into it in detail, although I shall say a few words about it later on in a certain connexion.

We regret that so far the Western Powers have not shown any positive attitude towards our proposals, whether on the West Berlin question or on the question of an all-German committee. I hope that the explanations which we have given so far, as well as my present explanation, will eliminate the question as to what the new proposals of the Soviet Government represent, and that we shall not go on using at our official or informal meetings such words as threat, Diktat or ultimatum.

Our proposals contain provisions for the establishment of a provisional status for West Berlin. Why does the Soviet Government put forward such a proposal? Because the three Western Powers have stated that they are opposed to the immediate taking of decisions that would alter the position in West Berlin; that is, they are opposed to the liquidation at present of the occupation régime in West Berlin. In these circumstances, the Soviet Government considers that the proposal to maintain some occupation rights of the Western Powers for a definite period - that is, one year - is justified, and that it facilitates the possibility of reaching agreement, if, of course, the Western Powers have a desire to reach agreement.

We have repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet Government is against perpetuation of the occupation régime, of the occupation system in West Berlin. We cannot put our signature to any document which would, in one way or another, be conducive to perpetuating the occupation régime in West Berlin, and it seems to us that there should be no lack of clarity in regard to the Soviet Government's position on this question after the number of statements made by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, and after the many explanations we have given on behalf of the Soviet Government in the course of this conference.

Our colleagues sometimes tell us that the Western Powers also are not in favour of perpetuating the occupation régime in West Berlin. Sometimes they even say they are against the perpetuation of the occupation régime in West Berlin. In clarifying their idea, they point out that what they have in mind is the maintenance of the existing régime in West Berlin only until Germany is unified. But since the unification of Germany on the basis of their proposals is impossible, since the three Powers are not in fact anxious to bring about the unification of Germany, or even to facilitate the possibility of unifying Germany, the situation is not altered. To say that the three Powers are against perpetuation of the occupation régime in West Berlin and at the same time to say that the system existing there must be maintained until Germany is unified, is tantamount to being in favour of perpetuating the occupation system in West Berlin, in view of the position adopted by the Western Powers on the question of the unification of Germany.

The course of our discussions both at the formal sessions and at the restricted informal meetings has shown that the present situation in West Berlin, the occupation régime, is to the liking of the Western Powers, the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom. But I think that it ought to be quite clear to the Governments of the three Powers that this situation is not to our liking, it is not to the liking of the Soviet Union nor of the German Democratic Republic, nor of many other States. Our attitude to the present situation is moreover based on facts: namely, that the present situation in West Berlin, the occupation régime, represents a great danger for the entire situation in Germany and in Europe, since under the present conditions West Berlin has become a dangerous hotbed of frictions and conflicts between States, including the great Powers.

Many examples might be given, many specific facts which confirm this point of view, but I shall not take up your time, and besides I think that you are all sufficiently in possession of the specific facts to be able to think this matter over. If you were to make an objective approach to assessing the situation in West Berlin I think your assessment would have to coincide with ours.

Fourteen years have gone by since the end of the war, and the occupation régime has become outdated. A different settlement for West Berlin is required, a settlement which would meet the interests of all the States concerned.

This is how we have posed the question at the Geneva conference. In view of the fact that the situation in West Berlin is assessed in one way by the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and a number of other States and in a different way by the Western Powers, we have also suggested that an agreed solution be sought, which would meet the interests of all those taking part in the present conference and of all the States concerned.

Sometimes we are told that the Soviet Union cannot but admit that the presence of occupation troops in West Berlin, a comparatively small body of occupation troops, cannot constitute a military factor likely to cause the Soviet Union any anxiety. But if this is so it may be asked: why then are the Western Powers holding on to West Berlin, to the present régime, and why do they want to keep their troops there? The argument cuts both ways. It is sometimes said that the troops of the Western Powers must be present in West Berlin in order to ensure the existence there of the social system which has developed in West Berlin, and which is different from the social system which has developed in the German Democratic

Republic. No one will deny that the systems are indeed different, but it may be asked why it is necessary for the social system in West Berlin to be supported by American, British and French troops, why guns, machine-guns and rifles are needed to support the social system in West Berlin. Yet nobody is in fact threatening the existing social system in West Berlin.

It seems to me that either one of these two arguments, if you take them separately, shows that the position of the Western Powers in wishing to preserve the occupation régime is untenable, while if we take these two arguments together the full untenability and inconsistency in the positions taken by the United States, the United Kingdom and France on this question are even more apparent.

Concerning the all-German committee. Why are the three States not in agreement with our proposal for an all-German committee? Sometimes when they express their negative attitude towards this proposal they say that the period of one year which we suggest would be inadequate for the work which this committee is to do. But your own proposals also contained references to a period, although a somewhat longer one; you mentioned two and a half years. This means, in principle, since it is a question of establishing some sort of period for the work of the all-German committee, that you too have accepted the idea of some kind of limited period. You say a year does not suit you. But you do not name any other period, and you simply declare these proposals of the Soviet Government unacceptable.

It may be that what you do not like is that these proposals provide for the formation of a committee on a basis of parity, although it is true that you do not say very much on this point. It is impossible not to admit that the principle of parity provides the only real basis for agreement on this question. Because the approach which was expressed in your proposals in regard to the question of an all-German committee can in no sense be called a realistic approach so far as the composition of this committee is concerned. The Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Bolz, spoke very well and convincingly on this question at our meeting yesterday.

We are sometimes told that it is impossible to agree with the principle of parity because the size of the population in the Federal Republic of Germany is different from that in the German Democratic Republic. But we think that this argument is utterly remote from reality. In the first place it does not correspond to the actual situation which exists in Germany, and in the second place it in no way corresponds to those principles which have been established in the sphere of

State representation in international life and in international relations. You cannot deny that States which are different from one another as regards the size of their population are represented in the United Nations; yet each of these States has one vote and they all have equal rights. Finally, if we take also ourselves who are sitting here at this table, we too represent States in which the size of the population differs, but it does not enter anyone's head to use this circumstance as a reason for demanding that there should be any kind of difference in our votes when any particular question is discussed.

The parity principle is realistic and the only well-founded principle which can form the basis for the establishment of an all-German committee.

It has been said that our proposals with regard to the tasks of this all-German committee are not quite to your liking. We have suggested that the tasks of this committee should be to discuss the question of German unification and the question of a peace treaty. Well, what more appropriate questions are there for discussion in an all-German committee? Name them. Surely no one will deny that the most acute, the most important and most perturbing questions for the German people, and not only for the German people, are precisely these questions, the question of the unity of Germany and the question of drawing a line under World War II, that is, the question of reaching a peace settlement for Germany.

I again draw attention to the point that the Governments of the Western Powers have for some reason begun to lose interest in the question of an all-German committee. Such a position is, to say the least, unintelligible. We should like to assess this as an indication that the three Western Powers are still thinking over this question and that maybe they will show a positive attitude to our proposals.

In discussing questions in the course of our conference, especially the Berlin question, which throughout the recent period and especially throughout the last two weeks has naturally been the centre of our attention, the Western Powers have, in short, taken such a position.

They want to maintain the occupation régime in West Berlin at all costs. Accordingly, they say to us: either you accept our proposals or there will be no agreement. This was clearly expressed in the first version of your proposals. It was also expressed in your second version. It has also been expressed in the statements and comments with which you have accompanied the introduction of these proposals in the course of our talks. The re-arrangement of words or phrases, commas or full stops has in no way changed the position. We have declared this openly more than once.

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But the truth is that our proposals are in fact new. We are convinced that you too are well aware of this. You know that the one-year time-limit did not figure in our earlier proposals; nor was there in our earlier proposals this link which we now propose to establish between the settlement of the Berlin question and the work of the all-German committee, a link on which we now suggest reaching agreement for the sake both of settling the Berlin question and of facilitating the work of the all-German committee, if the approach is to be made from the standpoint of facilitating the work of this committee and in particular of drawing up proposals in connexion with the unification of Germany and the peace settlement.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has declared that our proposals about not permitting atomic and rocket weapons to be located in West Berlin are little short of ridiculous. But would it not be truer to say that it is not the question of not permitting atomic and rocket weapons to be located on the territory of West Berlin which is ridiculous, but rather the attempt to minimize the importance of this question? You may say that it is self-evident that the Western Powers do not intend to locate rocket and atomic weapons on the territory of West Berlin; you may put forward other arguments. This is understandable, although it is impossible to agree with it. But it is quite impossible to understand assertions that a proposal about not permitting rocket and atomic weapons to be located on any particular territory is ridiculous. Finally, if you think that it is self-evident that atomic and rocket weapons should not be located in West Berlin, then why do you have this negative attitude towards the proposal of the Soviet Union? It would seem that there could be no motive for doubting that this proposal is well founded.

In conclusion, it may be said that the representatives of the Western Powers, both at yesterday's session and at today's session, have in the main repeated their position, the essence of which is to preserve the occupation régime in West Berlin. They are trying as before to obtain the Soviet Union's agreement to the prolongation of the occupation régime for an unlimited period or, in other words, to the perpetuation of the occupation régime. Such agreement cannot be obtained from our side. The Soviet Union, the Soviet Government will not accept this. We cannot sign any document which would have as its purpose the perpetuation of the occupation régime in West Berlin.

Let us rather look more attentively around us. Let us look at what is happening in Germany and in Europe. Let us take into account the fact that fourteen years have gone by since the end of the Second World War and the situation has radically changed. Let us therefore seek agreement on this realistic basis. Let us be more objective and let us not pursue an unjustified and one-sided policy on this important matter. I repeat that there is no lack of will on our part to facilitate agreement but it does not depend entirely on us. It depends on all who are taking part in these negotiations.

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Em/DCC/48  
15 June 1959  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

12 June 1959

I did not ask for the floor at the beginning of our session today because I did not see what I could be in a position to add, on behalf of the French delegation, to the explanations which I gave at the end of our last session.

I must say that since then, and again during our meeting today, I have not seen that anything new has happened to enable me to go back on the view I took the day before yesterday. However that may be, as things stand at present and after what has been said in the course of today's meeting, I should like to make a few very brief remarks, mainly to express a feeling, and then to ask a question.

My feeling - I cannot pretend otherwise - is one of discouragement, perhaps of weariness and also of anxiety. We have heard from our colleague, the Soviet Foreign Minister, a number of explanations with regard to the proposal which he put before us on Monday, explanations which in point of fact are a repetition of all his Government's propositions on Germany and on Berlin, propositions which have been expounded during the four or five weeks of this conference without much result. These propositions in their entirety have been repeated in the packet - to take up the expression used so many times during the first weeks of this conference - which was submitted to us on Tuesday.

I am not very clear what positive result the repetition of such arguments, which could be followed by a repetition, on our side, of our own arguments, could lead us to in the present state of our deliberations. That is why I cannot help having a certain feeling of anxiety at the end of today's session.

I said the other day that a serious situation had been created and I must say very frankly that today I do not see how it can appear any less serious.

That is the feeling I wanted to express. I shall further ask permission to put a question. This question refers to what the Soviet delegation, during our restricted meetings and in the course of these recent plenary sessions, has repeatedly called the indefinite prolongation of the occupation régime. This is the major accusation levelled against us. We are accused of liking this occupation régime and of wanting to maintain it indefinitely, to the undoubted detriment of the German people.

The question has often been raised and has often been debated. I, for my part, have had several occasions to tell Mr. Gromyko that, to the contrary of what he seemed to think, we did not particularly like the occupation régime. It is not for our pleasure, nor is it for our advantage, that we are asking to maintain our rights in Berlin. We are doing it because there has been no settlement of the German problem, and because in the absence of a settlement of the German problem we do not see any reason to modify the status which exists today, and because we think - I said this not long ago - that it is in this particular case - that is to say in the bad situation of there being no settlement of the German problem - the lesser evil.

I shall not insist on the fact that, after all, those who may complain the most, and with most justification, of an occupation régime are those who are being occupied. Those who are being occupied in this case are the inhabitants of West Berlin, and I have never heard that they are asking for the present régime to be abolished.

However that may be - and I now come to the question I wanted to ask - the Soviet delegation is proposing that we make new arrangements with regard to West Berlin. Among the arrangements which have been suggested to us are provisions relating to the presence of troops in West Berlin. There are the three famous variants which the Soviet Foreign Minister has put forward in the name of his Government: the first is total evacuation by everybody; the second is occupation by token contingents of American, British, French and Soviet troops; the third is occupation by neutral contingents.

To my mind, there is a legal mystery here. I cannot see what explanation can be found for the fact that if there are three Western garrisons in Berlin, which are in any case token forces as regards their strength, this is an

occupation régime, but that if there are four garrisons, that is to say, the three Western garrisons plus the Soviet garrison, that is no longer an occupation régime. There is something here which is quite beyond me. The idea is that we make an agreement on the establishment of these four garrisons by the great Powers. On what basis can we make an agreement if not on the basis of the rights which we hold from the unconditional surrender of Germany, and what will be the result of this agreement if we come to an understanding on this basis except to convert the occupation status as it is today into a new occupation status with four Powers instead of three? Once again, to my mind, there is something quite mysterious here and I fail to see what legal reasoning the Soviet delegation could use to convince us that an occupation by the three Western Powers is an occupation régime, which is consequently doomed by time, while an occupation by the four Powers is not an occupation régime and is consequently acceptable and can be maintained until Germany is reunited.

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RL/DOC/49  
13 July 1959  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES

13 July 1959

At the opening of the second session of this conference a brief review of the first six weeks will be helpful in gauging where we now stand and how we should continue our deliberations.

The discussions during the first six weeks revealed certain points of agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. But even more clearly it showed that the positions taken at the close of the first series of meetings were so far apart that any significant agreement seemed virtually impossible unless time were taken for reflection and reconsideration. It was clear that successful negotiations would require a change in the approach to the problems with which we were dealing. Therefore we proposed a recess in the hope that the Soviet Union would consider the gravity of the situation we were facing and would return to the next phase of the conference ready to continue our discussions in a realistic and understanding manner.

From our earlier discussion we found that the Foreign Ministers all agreed that Germany should be reunified, that there should be free elections held for this purpose and that there should be a final peace settlement at the earliest practicable time. They were unable to agree, however, on procedures for achieving these ends.

The Western Powers presented a Plan for German reunification which would be permanent because it would be freely accepted by the German people and would bring about a peace settlement which would assure Germany's neighbors that their security interests would be thoroughly safeguarded. The Plan was based on the conviction that a lasting settlement of the major cause of European instability must rest on consent and mutual confidence.

The Plan therefore provided the German people with the right of self-determination through the mechanism of free elections. However, it took account of the views of the Soviet Union by proposing a transitional period during which plans for free all-German elections and for the development of closer contacts between both parts of Germany could be developed by a German mixed committee.

The Plan also provided a basis for the discussion of regional security in Europe and disarmament which both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have recognized as forming an integral part of the problem of achieving a permanent program for the stabilization of Europe.

Unfortunately the Soviet Union has so far refused to consider this Plan as a basis for discussion. On their part they proposed that a peace treaty be signed on the basis of the two areas into which Germany has been divided. Their proposal contained no specific provisions for the reunification of Germany. On the contrary, they insisted that reunification be worked out by the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic within the framework of a confederation plan which would have denied for the foreseeable future to the population of the eastern part of Germany the right of choosing its government through free elections. This plan would perpetuate by formal international agreement the continuation in office of the unrepresentative régime which is now in power in Eastern Germany and which holds no proper mandate to speak for all or any part of the German people. The more the Soviet proposal was expounded the clearer it seemed to us that it would result in the permanent partition of Germany.

A refusal on the part of the Soviet Union to discuss German reunification and European security in terms consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter calling for free determination also blocked progress towards a solution of the Berlin crisis which had been precipitated by the Soviet Union last November.

In planning and establishing the four-Power occupation zones for Germany in 1944 and 1945 the four victorious Powers had given Berlin a special status intended to last until the conclusion of a peace settlement with an all-German government. In line with the original intentions of the four Powers and with the dictates of logic the Western Powers considered the natural solution of the Berlin problem to be the reunification of Germany. However, in view of the fact that the Western Peace Plan provided for a transitional period of two and a half years before German reunification would take place the Western Peace Plan also included an interim plan for Berlin which

would unite the two parts of the city through free all-Berlin elections and would thus serve as a model in miniature for the reunification of the entire country in which the Western Peace Plan would culminate.

In presenting this interim plan the Western Powers emphasized that they must preserve unimpaired their ability to protect the integrity of the city and to safeguard the population of Berlin from pressure and intimidation until reunification eliminates the hostile forces by which Berlin is encircled.

We attached particular importance to this matter because of the importance which the people of Berlin attach to it. In a series of overwhelming votes, the last in December 1958, the West Berlin voters have expressed their belief that the freedom of the city requires the protective presence of Western troops, the maintenance of the city's economic, financial and cultural ties with the West and unrestricted access to and from the city by land, water, air and communication channels.

It is important to note in this connection that in the course of the conference Mr. Gromyko specifically admitted the validity of Western rights in Berlin.

Owing to the impasse reached by the end of the second week of the conference in the discussion of general plans for reunification and European security the discussion shifted to the narrower question of whether some agreement could be reached which would reduce the dangers inherent in the Berlin crisis which the Soviet Union had precipitated.

On 26 May I outlined in some detail the Western proposal for an interim Berlin settlement providing for all-Berlin elections, the establishment of an all-Berlin government, the maintenance of forces in Berlin by the four Powers, the level of which could be the subject of an agreement between the four Powers, and the guaranteeing of free and unrestricted access to Berlin for all persons, goods and communications. This proposal was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Government. On 31 May Mr. Khrushchev said that "the seven-point program does not contain a single element for negotiation".

On 1 June Mr. Gromyko then outlined a Berlin proposal which was basically a reiteration of the Soviet so-called "Free City" plan which had been spelled out in the Soviet Note of 27 November 1958.

This was of course incompatible with the obligations of the Western Powers towards the population of West Berlin. It would have deprived West Berlin of the protection afforded by the Western forces - either by eliminating them or by reducing

them drastically and introducing Soviet forces into West Berlin. It would have involved a specific termination of the Western rights in Berlin and the establishment of a status for West Berlin in which the city would have been entirely dependent upon verbal or written assurances extended to it by the Soviet Union and the so-called German Democratic Republic.

Furthermore, Mr. Gromyko made the acceptance of this new status for the city of West Berlin which the Soviet Union had proposed the basic condition for discussing any Western proposals on the city.

During the next few days discussions continued in private on the Berlin problem; considerable progress was made in isolating the questions which each side considered of special importance. These discussions were then reflected in a new series of more limited proposals which were put forward in the closing weeks of the first phase of the conference. It is worth while summarizing these proposals briefly.

On 4 and 8 June the Western Foreign Ministers gave Mr. Gromyko talking papers which discussed the possibility of supplementary arrangements in Berlin within the recognized framework of Western rights in the city. They indicated that they could accept the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Berlin which it must be pointed out is an offer of no real significance, in view of the fact that the city is surrounded by some 26 divisions of Soviet and East German troops and vast military installations. They also were willing to declare their intention not to increase the combined total of their own forces in the city. They might also be able to reduce their forces to the extent that developments in Berlin and the maintenance of their responsibilities permitted. Measures consistent with fundamental rights and liberties might be taken in both parts of Berlin to avoid activities which might disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests of the several parties. They held that continuing rights of access to Berlin, both Allied and German, must be recognized by the Soviet Government as well as free access between East and West Berlin but were prepared to agree that access procedures could be carried out by German personnel on the understanding that existing responsibilities remained unchanged. Disputes on access should be settled between the four Governments, who could establish a quadripartite commission in Berlin to facilitate the settlement of such disputes. Arrangements agreed on were to remain in force until German reunification.

On 10 June Mr. Gromyko presented new proposals which he characterized as providing for the temporary maintenance of certain Western occupation rights in West Berlin for a limited period of one year. During this period an all-German committee

was to be established on a basis of parity for the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic to promote greater contacts between the two parts of Germany, to prepare for German reunification and to consider a peace treaty. He further stipulated four requirements in West Berlin: the reduction of Western forces and armaments to token levels; the termination of hostile propaganda against the so-called German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; the liquidation of all alleged organizations for espionage and subversion against the so-called German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; and a ban on atomic or rocket installations. The Western Powers pointed out that this proposal was unacceptable, apart from its unreasonable content, because of its threatening nature. It sought to establish a limit of twelve months for the continued rightful presence of the Western Powers in West Berlin. The attempted imposition of such a time-limit was immediately rejected by the Western Powers.

On 16 June the Western Powers made additional proposals including an assurance they would continue to arm their forces in Berlin only with conventional weapons. They declared that their Governments would from time to time consider the possibility of reducing such forces if developments in the situation permit. They also proposed that all disputes which might arise with respect to access be raised and settled between the four Governments and that a quadripartite commission be established to examine any difficulties arising out of access and to facilitate their settlement. Unless subsequently modified by the four Powers the arrangements agreed to were to continue in force until the reunification of Germany.

On 19 June Mr. Gromyko proposed the extension of the time-limit specified in his proposal of 10 June from one year to eighteen months. However, the new Soviet proposal as presented to the Foreign Ministers reserved to the Soviet Government freedom of unilateral action at the expiration of that period. Mr. Gromyko seemed to maintain that it was the view of his Government that the Western Powers, upon signing such an agreement, would acquiesce in the liquidation of their rights in Berlin and the abandonment of their responsibility for maintaining the freedom of West Berlin. Furthermore the Soviet Government at the highest level declared its intention to conclude a peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic if no agreement on a peace treaty was reached by the all-German committee proposed within eighteen months. The Soviet Government has also clearly stated that in its view such a treaty would extinguish Western rights in Berlin.

Since then the Soviet Foreign Minister, in a statement on 28 June, asked a rhetorical question, "Does not the fact that the Soviet Union is proposing to hold new negotiations on West Berlin after the expiration of the terms provided for in the agreement - if by that time the all-German committee does not succeed in its work - speak for itself?"

The very purpose of drawing up international agreements is to avoid reliance on facts that speak for themselves. Our purpose in the coming negotiations will be to try to reach understandings which can later be reduced to writing to minimize the danger of subsequent differing interpretations.

I remain convinced that a satisfactory long-range solution to the German and Berlin problem can be found if we realistically face the dangers created by the artificial division of this great country and seek to eliminate them by a plan for reunification within the framework of a general agreement on security which will guarantee all countries of Europe against the dangers of irresponsible actions endangering the peace. This our Western Peace Plan would accomplish.

My Government hopes that we will make the measure of progress needed to warrant a subsequent meeting of Heads of Government. I believe that the best promise of such progress lies in an early return to restricted sessions. I propose to my colleagues that our next session be private.

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RA/DOC/50  
13 July 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY THE RT. HON. SELWYN LLOYD,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

13 July 1959

When the conference went into recess on 20 June I agree with what has been said that all delegations were, I think, in a state of some uncertainty and my impression at any rate was that the different texts before the conference at that stage needed further study in an atmosphere of greater relaxation. It was not only that we had been working without a pause for six weeks - it was that we really needed an interval for thinking.

When the conference went into recess the main documents which we had under study were the Western paper on Berlin handed to the Soviet delegation on 16 June and the Soviet paper on Berlin handed to the Western delegations on 19 June.

In addition to these two important documents we had the Western paper handed to the Soviet delegation on 19 June which commented on the Soviet proposals of the same day. We had Mr. Khrushchev's speech also made on 19 June (or rather, at the time of the recess, we had the first indications of what Mr. Khrushchev had said) and finally we had the statement issued by Mr. Gromyko late at night on 19 June. None of these latter documents had been evaluated or seriously discussed at the time of our recess.

Since the conference went into recess a further relevant matter has been the speech made by Mr. Gromyko on 28 June.

These are the papers and statements which I suggest we ought to have before us in the first place. Our first objective ought to be to eliminate the points of uncertainty which arise on these papers and to see how the positions of the two sides can be brought closer together and this process should be facilitated by the fact that there is common ground between the two papers of 16 June and 19 June. So far as we see it, I do not think it is necessary to proceed on the basis either of one paper or of the other paper. It seems to be quite feasible to study the questions at issue point by point.

So much for the immediate task before us. When I say that we ought to address ourselves to the papers and statements upon the Berlin question, I do not mean that we have abandoned our interest in the wider questions. Speaking last week in the House of Commons in London I said that we were seeking to achieve three things at this conference. Firstly some progress towards the reunification of Germany; secondly the reaffirmation of the right of the people of West Berlin to choose their system of society and also the acceptance of the need for satisfactory arrangements for the free access to West Berlin upon which their freedom of choice depends; and thirdly a reduction in tension and an improvement of stability in Europe.

There are many ways, I know, of defining our objectives. I think the definition which I have just given to you is not inaccurate. But of course those three objectives do not exclude the contribution to world stability that would be made by some agreement between us. Therefore I approach this further series of meetings with some hope of success. We are not prepared to give way on matters of principle, for example, the freedom of the people of West Berlin. Subject to that, we genuinely seek agreement, and we will try to play our part in seeking to achieve such agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with your suggestion about a private meeting, provided my other colleagues also agree.

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RM/DOC/51  
13 July 1959  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A.A. GROMYKO

13 July 1959

We have returned to Geneva and have again assembled in this hall in order to continue negotiations and to try to find mutually acceptable solutions to those important questions for the consideration of which the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs was convened. We have to conclude the consideration of the questions concerning Germany and above all to work out measures to remove the dangerous situation in Berlin, which is a source of constant anxiety for the fate of peace in Europe. There still remain to be considered also several other questions which have been raised in the course of the talks by one or other of the participants and are of no small importance from the point of view of reducing international tension and strengthening peace.

As a result of the three weeks recess, the work of the Meeting has been somewhat delayed. But as the saying goes, there is no evil without some good. During the recess the participants in the talks had an additional opportunity to think over and weigh carefully everything that has been said and proposed at the Meeting hitherto, and to form in that way a more accurate idea of the positions of the sides. We hope in particular that after the recess the Ministers of the three Western Powers have come here with a clearer understanding of the Soviet Union's proposals.

The talks at the end of the first stage were obviously characterized by haste, which was particularly shown in the evaluation of the latest Soviet proposals by the delegations of the Western Powers. We recall that when these

proposals were submitted on 19 June the delegations of the three Western Powers replied, two hours later on the same day, by requesting a recess as the result of which our work has been delayed for three weeks.

Already at the end of the first stage of the work of the conference, we expressed the hope that the initial reaction to our proposals was merely the result of a preliminary, but not unbiased, acquaintance with them, and that the Governments of the Western Powers would give them more careful and serious study. Our colleagues promised that this would be done. Subsequently it began to be realized more and more in the West too that the Soviet Government's new initiative increased the chances of an agreement being reached. It is to be hoped that there will now be a more objective and realistic approach to the Soviet proposals, the purpose of which is to lay down a basis for further fruitful work by the Meeting.

The Soviet delegation suggests that we start from where we, strictly speaking, interrupted our work, namely, by discussing the Soviet proposals submitted on 19 June. Allow me therefore to remind you of the main contents of these proposals.

We propose that an agreement be concluded on the interim status of West Berlin. This would include agreement on the following matters:

- reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the three Western Powers in West Berlin to token proportions;
- cessation of subversive and hostile propaganda activities originating in West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries;
- prohibition of the stationing of atomic or rocket weapons in West Berlin.

Supervision over compliance with the relevant undertakings in regard to these matters could be carried out by a committee set up for this purpose and composed of representatives of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

In the event of such an agreement being reached, the system of communications with West Berlin in use at the present time would be maintained.

The agreement on the interim status of West Berlin would be for a period during which an all-German committee or other body acceptable to the Germans, to be composed of representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, would be able to discuss and work out specific measures for the development of contacts between both German States, and consider questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany. For this a year and a half would be quite sufficient. If during that time both German States are unable, within the framework of the all-German committee or in any other

way, to reach agreement on the above-mentioned questions, then the States participating in the 1959 Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers would have to resume consideration of the West Berlin question.

Such is the gist of the latest Soviet proposals. It can easily be seen that these proposals go a considerable way towards meeting the positions of the other participants in these negotiations, as they have been explained here in the statements of the delegations concerned. In fact, if what the Soviet Government proposes in regard to Berlin is compared with the proposals put forward by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on 16 June, it will be seen that the proposals are not so very far from one another, and if the Governments of the Western Powers really wish to reach an agreement, then there is a basis for it in the Soviet proposals.

The proposals of the Soviet delegation mention the need to reduce the strength of the foreign armed forces in West Berlin and the prohibition to station atomic and rocket weapons there. It is easy to imagine the great significance that the implementation of these measures aimed at normalizing the situation in West Berlin would have for the strengthening of confidence between States. Nobody can deny that an agreement to reduce the number of foreign troops in West Berlin to token proportions and to prohibit the stationing there of atomic and rocket weapons would substantially relieve the tense situation in Berlin and in Europe as a whole. One cannot under-estimate the fact that in so far as the aforementioned measures would be the result of an agreed decision by the Powers, this by itself would be of considerable positive significance. The reaching of such an agreement in regard to West Berlin would bring about more favourable conditions for resolving in the future on an agreed basis any questions that may arise so as to serve the cause of strengthening peace.

We further propose that hostile propaganda and subversive activities carried on from the territory of West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries should be stopped. The need for such measures derives from the fact that hostile subversive activities against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries are being carried out day by day from the territory of West Berlin. These are aimed at increasing tension in the relations between States, and at stirring up hatred and strife between them. Thus, if one looks at things objectively, it is impossible to deny the good grounds for the Soviet Union's proposals on this question.

This question is also touched upon in the proposals of the Western Powers, but this is done in a form which can by no means be regarded as acceptable. The essence of the matter is in fact distorted in these proposals, since an attempt is made to put on almost the same level the situation in East Berlin and the situation in West Berlin, which has actually been turned into a base for systematic subversive, sabotage and espionage activities, above all against the country in the centre of which it is situated.

If an example is needed of how the territory of West Berlin is being used for the purposes of subversive activities and of increasing tension in the international situation, especially in Europe, such an example was given quite recently during the recess in the work of our Meeting. While the question of West Berlin is being considered at the Meeting and the Ministers of the three Western Powers quite rightly assert that West Berlin is not at all a part of the Federal Republic of Germany, the West German authorities arrange a demonstration by holding the election of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin, and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France take these actions of Bonn under their protection although they cannot but know that such actions are a provocation.

This example alone speaks eloquently enough of the fact that West Berlin is being used as a tool for inflating the "cold war" and shows how urgent has become the need to bring about a healthier situation in that city.

Experience shows that the people in Bonn are placing their stakes on hindering by all means the reaching of agreement between the interested States participating in the Geneva Meeting and are today carrying on this same line of theirs which is hostile to the cause of peace. They are making considerable efforts to stir up dissensions between the participants in the negotiations and do not stop at direct provocations in connexion with the West Berlin question. All this gives us reason to believe that a sober approach to the questions which are the subject of our talks is alien to them.

Is not evidence of this to be seen in the delirious statements of some of the statesmen of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that West Berlin is territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and is almost a suburb of Bonn? It is obvious that such statements can only be made by people who have lost all capacity to evaluate the situation in Germany and Europe soberly, who are blinded by their own hostility towards the German Democratic Republic, which has shown that it is a staunch champion of the cause of peace and of the genuine national interests of the Germans.

Such people realize, of course, that their assertions to the effect that West Berlin belongs to the Federal Republic of Germany are an absurdity that can only cause any man of common sense to smile. That does not embarrass them very much. Why? Because in stirring up dissensions between the Powers they are striving to seek their own advantage in these dissensions and contradictions.

This attitude of certain circles in the West German capital proves to us once more how important are the questions of a peace treaty with Germany and the liquidation of the occupation régime in West Berlin, which is being used as a source of tension and a centre for provocations and subversive activities, which have been particularly intensive of late. Such use, during our Meeting, may be said to be distinctly of the nature of a demonstration.

What in the first place divides our positions regarding the Berlin question? The United States, the United Kingdom and France are striving to maintain, or more accurately speaking, to perpetuate the occupation régime in West Berlin, whereas the Soviet Union is in favour of liquidating it, inasmuch as this liquidation is urgently required in order to bring about a healthier situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole.

We proceed from the assumption that the occupation régime established in the first years after the war cannot be maintained for ever, that it is necessary to do away at last with all the residues of the Second World War. If this is not done, West Berlin will continue to be a source of tension and dangerous conflicts. Only those persons can be in favour of perpetuating the occupation régime who would like to keep Europe shuddering in a state of war fever and who would like to keep the clouds of the threat of war hanging constantly over it.

True, the reply is given to us that the Western Powers do not wish to maintain the occupation régime in West Berlin indefinitely but only until Germany is reunited.

But such retorts could only mean anything if any progress was actually observable in regard to the unification of the two German States. The Foreign Ministers of the three Powers know quite well that this is not so. Moreover, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, not to speak of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, are doing their utmost to oppose even one step being taken in the direction of a rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, without which any talk about the unification of Germany was and remains a hollow sound and nothing more.

So with the present state of affairs and with such a policy on the part of the Western Powers in the German question, what difference is there between the present proposals of these Powers and the striving to perpetuate the foreign occupation of West Berlin? To perceive any difference here is only possible if one disregards the elementary rules of logic and shuts one's eyes to the actual policy of the Western Powers in the German question.

Whoever wishes to understand correctly the position of the Soviet Union on the Berlin question must remember one thing: the Soviet Union was, is and will be implacably and fundamentally opposed to the life of West Berlin being thrust forever into the stocks of foreign occupation. Under the present conditions, when there has arisen in West Berlin a social order different from that existing in the German Democratic Republic, a just solution of the question would be to convert West Berlin into a Free City under appropriate guarantees for its independence and communications with the outside world. As regards the question of guarantees, to our surprise the representatives of the Western Powers, who have invariably emphasized their interest in maintaining the existing social order in West Berlin, have shown, one may say, complete indifference to the establishment of any guarantee of non-interference in the internal affairs of West Berlin. This fact alone shows the real value of the assertions that the Western Powers are guided by concern for the fate of the population of West Berlin.

It can only be regretted that the Western Powers have not been able to evaluate the proposal for a Free City on its merits, although they recognize that the present situation in West Berlin is abnormal and that steps must be taken to improve it.

What do the basic objections voiced by the Governments of the three Powers against conferring the status of a Free City on West Berlin amount to?

It is argued, firstly, that the proposal is unacceptable to the Western Powers because it does not guarantee the preservation of West Berlin's existing way of life.

Secondly, it is alleged that the proposal for a Free City does not guarantee the freedom of West Berlin's communications with the outside world.

Yet anyone acquainted with the contents of the Soviet Union's proposals cannot but be aware that these two arguments are absolutely without foundation, that they are beside the point. The Soviet proposals proceed precisely from the assumption that the population of West Berlin must be assured of the full possibility of having whatever social order it wishes itself. With regard to West Berlin's communications with the outside world, the Soviet proposals provide that the maintenance of these communications must be guaranteed.

To remove every possible doubt, we proposed to the Western Powers that the agreement on West Berlin should be buttressed by the most reliable guarantees known in international practice.

We proposed that the United Nations should be given a part in implementing these guarantees. Unfortunately, however, the Governments of the three Western Powers, which had previously dropped courtesies to the United Nations on more than one occasion and like to speak of the importance of that organization, took up a very different attitude when they were actually faced with the proposal that the United Nations should be given a part in the settlement of one of the most important international problems. In this instance, they expressed complete indifference towards the United Nations and almost disdain of it.

If the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have shown no interest in settling these questions in connexion with the proposal for a Free City, the conclusion is inescapable that in reality they are concerned not so much with preserving the communications of West Berlin with the outside world or that city's existing social order, which is threatened by no one, but with the continued maintenance of their own order in West Berlin: with the occupation régime, which has long become out of date.

There being such a difference in the positions of the participants in our Meeting, a way out may consist in the meantime in coming to an agreement on an interim status for West Berlin, and reaching an understanding now on the most urgent practical steps which would contribute to a reduction of tension in West Berlin and in Germany. Such an approach is suggested in the latest Soviet proposals.

We set the period of validity of the provisional agreement at eighteen months, having in mind that during this period the all-German committee will be able to do useful work, that such a time-limit will create the conditions for a radical solution of the German question, and consequently also of the Berlin question, through the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Our proposals provide that new negotiations should be held on the expiry of the time-limit set in the agreement, if during that period the all-German committee does not achieve positive results. In this connexion, the question is sometimes asked whether this proposal means that on the expiry of the time-limit to be set by the parties to the agreement only one way will be left open: unilateral action by the Soviet Union. Yet it is common knowledge that we propose that negotiations should be held when the period of validity of the temporary agreement expires.

If the Soviet Government intended merely to act unilaterally on West Berlin, it could resort to such action already now. We are not doing this, but we are proposing that an interim status for West Berlin should be jointly worked out; we are proposing the establishment of a special body consisting of the representatives of the four Powers to supervise compliance with the undertakings which would have been assumed by the parties to the agreement with regard to the measures to be carried out in West Berlin. As Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government, has repeatedly stated, we prefer to settle the question on an agreed basis, jointly with the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It is obvious that our proposal for subsequent negotiations by no means bears out those who would like to give a false picture of the Soviet Union's position in the Berlin question.

We are told that it would be better not to speak of time-limits at all in this connexion. But this is tantamount to requiring the Soviet Union to agree that the occupation of West Berlin should be perpetuated, a proposition which it cannot and never will accept, for reasons which we have repeatedly stated. To put the question in these terms means to remove the ground from under any possible agreement.

However urgent and important the task of working out an agreement on West Berlin is in itself, it is of course far from covering all the unresolved questions relating to Germany and, above all, the central, key problem: the conclusion of a peace treaty. If we could reach agreement on an all-German committee, one of whose basic tasks would be to examine problems relating to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty, this would considerably facilitate the efforts of the States concerned to achieve a peaceful settlement with Germany and in that way draw a final line under the past war in Europe. At the same time, this would make it very much easier to reach an agreement also on the Berlin question in the sense of a final settlement thereof through the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

The establishment of an all-German committee would enable both German States to take an active part in the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and at the same time to begin practical work on widening contacts and bringing about a rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Germans, and the Germans alone, are competent to discuss and settle questions relating to the methods of bringing about a rapprochement between the two German States, and to talk about the reunification of Germany without such a rapprochement - this must again be repeated - is a mere waste of words.

To agree on the establishment of an all-German committee means in practice to help the two German States in achieving that co-operation with each other which would enable them to work out a common attitude on questions relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. That is why we propose that the possibilities opened up by the establishment of an all-German committee should be exploited to the full. One would think that such a proposal should be supported by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, but unfortunately the Western Powers have so far not shown a positive attitude in this regard.

Sometimes we are told that the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany is a matter falling within the competence of the four great Powers alone and therefore cannot be discussed by the representatives of the two German States. It is, of course, indisputable that the Powers which were the main partners in the anti-Hitlerite coalition during the Second World War are responsible for a peace settlement with Germany and are obliged to do everything to speed up such a settlement. But does this mean that the question of a peace treaty with Germany concerns only the four great Powers? Of course not. Thus, for example, it cannot be denied that the Germans have a direct and natural interest in the shape of the peace treaty with Germany.

We do not, of course, propose that the Germans alone should concern themselves with the preparation of a peace treaty, that they should, as it were, conclude a peace treaty with themselves. A draft treaty must of course be agreed among the main States concerned, and in the first place among the participants in the present Meeting.

More than that: the Soviet Government, as is well known, is proposing that a draft peace treaty with Germany should be considered at a peace conference to be attended by all States which took part with their armed forces in the war against Hitler's Germany. In particular, the Soviet Government has more than once stressed the vital interest of Germany's neighbours, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, in the settlement of questions relating to Germany, including the question of a peace treaty with that country. But there can be no doubt also that the Germans themselves - having regard, in particular, to the fact that two German States exist - should discuss between themselves questions relating to the preparation of a peace treaty and concerning them directly.

Let us illustrate this by an example. When the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with Germany was discussed at our Meeting, we heard assertions to the effect that some clauses of this Draft amounted to discrimination against Germany. But if there are apprehensions on that score, although they are quite groundless, why not give the Germans themselves an opportunity of dealing with the problem and expressing their joint views, which would be the views of Germany as a whole?

If the question of discrimination is raised, it must be admitted that it is precisely the objections of the Western Powers against an examination of questions relating to the preparation of a peace treaty by German representatives in an all-German committee which distinctly smack of discrimination against the Germans.

Needless to say, we cannot ignore the fact that the way to a rapprochement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, to an understanding between them on a peace treaty and on the reunification of Germany, is by no means an easy one. With the years, dissensions have accumulated. For ten years, the two German States have developed in different directions and, we must say frankly, in opposite ones. It is inconceivable that across the gulf which has been created, lasting bridges can be built without the necessary preparatory work, which is why we recommend the establishment of an all-German committee and propose a definite and limited time to be set for its work. But bridges can be built and the work of the all-German committee can bring forth its fruit, as soon as both sides express a wish to collaborate with each other.

If the work of the all-German committee or of any other body acceptable to the Germans is successful, the first step will have been taken towards the conclusion of a German peace treaty and with the settlement of this problem the Berlin question, too, will be finally solved.

As far as we can judge from the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers, what arouses their objections is the principle of parity proposed by us for the establishment of the all-German committee. In this connexion, it may be useful to define once more the position of the Soviet Union on this question.

In our opinion, the only correct course would be to adopt a settlement of this question which would not place one side in a more advantageous position than the other. In other words, the two sides should have equal rights and equal opportunities, as in all conversations between equal partners. We consider that the Government of the German Democratic Republic is adopting a realistic and entirely justifiable attitude in this question. What matters is that neither party should be able to impose its will on the other, that questions should be solved by agreement between the two sides, and it is precisely this requirement which the principle of parity and equality of the two sides in the work of the committee satisfies.

But it may however happen that the all-German committee will fail to justify the hopes which have been placed on it. This possibility is by no means to be excluded, having regard to the present position of the Adenauer Government, which has long and firmly acquired the reputation of being opposed to any rapprochement between the two German States, of being opposed to any reduction of international tension. In point of fact, every new step, every new action of the Federal German Government on the international scene, including the policy pursued by its representatives at our Meeting, is a further confirmation of how alien the interests of a reduction of tension, of genuine international co-operation are to the Federal German Government.

To judge by all the evidence, nothing frightens the groups responsible for West Germany's policy so much as the prospect of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, of a rapprochement between the two German States with a view to their reunification, or an ending of the armaments race and of the "cold war".

On the other hand, nothing so gladdens the groups which determine the present foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and which are steering West German development in a militarist direction as the ever denser network of atomic and rocket bases in which their country is becoming enmeshed, as the clang of metal from which weapons of destruction are again being forged, as the increased tension in relations between States.

Such a policy on the part of the Federal German Government must of course inevitably give rise to apprehension among those who are interested in the strengthening of peace and who therefore desire the conclusion of a peace treaty. It is obvious that if the all-German committee should not succeed in achieving positive results in the examination of questions relating to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty, the task of concluding a peace treaty with Germany would become not less, but more, urgent. A question which must be settled, if truly peaceful conditions are to be created in Europe, cannot be left open indefinitely.

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to reaching agreement on the questions under consideration at the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The proposals of the USSR bear witness to the fact that the Soviet Government is continuing its endeavours to narrow the gap between the positions of the parties and to ensure success in the work of the Meeting. We are entitled to expect that the Governments of the Western Powers for their part will show a willingness to reach a mutual understanding, and will go along the path of fruitful discussion of the Soviet Union's latest proposals. This would enable our Meeting to turn at last to the preparation of concrete decisions.

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RÉUNION  
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RM/DCC/52  
13 July 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

13 July 1959

I have little to say after the statement which has just been made by Mr. Herter on what happened during the first phase of our Meeting. This statement summarizes very fully, I think, not only what happened, but also the positions of the two sides.

It seems to me that now that we are resuming our work there is no need for long preliminary explanations. Since we adjourned we have had a relatively short interval, during which nothing fundamental and even nothing remarkable has happened that is likely to modify substantially the positions of the various delegations as they were during and at the end of the first part of the Meeting.

This first part of our Meeting, which lasted a long time, continuing over six weeks, was given up to long debates intended, in short, to seek a solution of the crisis which originated in November 1958, at the time when the Berlin question was raised somewhat dramatically by the Government of the Soviet Union.

To overcome the crisis, we could, it seems to me, envisage two methods, and it is these two methods which have been successively considered by the Meeting.

The first method, which was obviously by far the better, was to try to agree jointly on some settlement of the German problem as a whole. Clearly, such a settlement implied a settlement of the Berlin problem, that is to say, the reunification of Germany should automatically put an end to the special régime in Berlin as it exists today.

It was this German problem as a whole which was the subject of discussion throughout the first part of our Meeting, and only when we arrived at the conclusion that we were still very far from any agreement did we turn to an examination of the other method likely to extricate our Governments and the world as a whole from the existing crisis. This other method consisted in the search for some very much more limited arrangements concentrated on Berlin.

It was in these circumstances that, in the second part of the Meeting, that is for three or four weeks, we tried to find out whether we could reach between each other, between the Western and the Soviet side, an agreement which would have enabled us to maintain the city of West Berlin in the situation in which it now is, that is to say, in freedom.

There is no need for me to recall the proposals which have been made on either side. I shall merely note that as far as we are concerned we wanted to maintain the status of West Berlin as long as there was no settlement of the German problem as a whole to justify its disappearance. At the same time, we were prepared to accept a number of adjustments which in practice might have allayed the apprehensions shown by the Soviet side.

As regards the Soviet side, we had the impression that all the while we were discussing this practical arrangement, that is to say, up to 9 June, its positions on the status were not entirely clear, that there was an ambiguity which made it difficult for us to draw any conclusions regarding the Soviet Government's real attitude. Then we had a new proposal on 10 June, finally amended on 19 June, that is to say, on the eve of the day when we separated. It threw an entirely new light on the discussion. It did so for two reasons, I believe. The first is that we saw reappear, more or less clearly, but reappear all the same, the threats which had previously been made regarding the maintenance of our positions in Berlin; the second is that we saw, at the eleventh hour, the manifestation of a desire to link, in some way, certain problems relating to the German question as a whole with the problem of Berlin itself.

All this created in our minds both confusion and a bad impression, and it was in those circumstances that we proposed the adjournment which was decided upon and on the expiry of which we have returned here today.

We are now going to resume our discussion. I fully agree with our Chairman in proposing that this discussion should be resumed immediately in private meetings.

It seems to me that this would be the best method of discussing the matter, perhaps of achieving results, and I think that this is probably the first question on which we shall now have to adopt a definite position. Later, when we effectively resume discussion, we shall have to determine the method we are going to use and also the subject of the discussion itself. All this raises a number of questions on which I think there is no need to dwell at this stage, but which, in my view, are of very great importance from the outset.

This, Mr. Chairman, is what I wanted to say very simply at the beginning of the resumption of our work. I reserve the right to revert later to the question of the procedure we are going to use in order to resume our work, should this question be raised.

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STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

15 July 1959

When Mr. Gromyko, at the private meeting on 9 June last, presented to his Western colleagues, in connexion with the discussion that was then under way on the Berlin problem, some new proposals the submission of which led to the decision to interrupt our work on 19 June, we had the impression that the Soviet delegation was suddenly taking a considerable step backwards and jeopardizing the very fate of the conference.

This impression resulted above all, of course, from what was put forward on the subject of Berlin, namely, maintenance for a strictly limited time of the present status of West Berlin, in consideration of a certain number of adjustments; at the end of the period envisaged, that is to say, at the end of one year, nothing would have been in existence any longer if the Western Powers had not accepted the Soviet plan of 27 November 1958 for the establishment of a demilitarized Free City.

These proposals were subsequently modified to some extent under conditions that are well known and on the subject of which there still exists a certain number of misunderstandings. All this will no doubt be the subject of discussion in our subsequent work and I do not intend to say any more about it today. What I wish to try to explain, on the other hand, is that there was another basic reason for the impression that the Soviet document of 9 June made on us, a reason which the rectifications made on 19 June failed to modify in any way. This reason is, of

course, the suggestion made by Mr. Gromyko that an all-German committee be established under certain conditions and that its establishment be closely linked to the already precarious arrangement proposed for Berlin. I will remind you of the terms of this proposal:

"The two German States would make arrangements for the establishment of an all-German committee composed of representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on a basis of parity.

"The committee must help to broaden and develop contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and prepare concrete measures for the unification of Germany, as well as examine questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

"Should the proposal for the establishment of the committee be unacceptable to one or the other German State, then the four Powers could recommend the Governments of both German States to choose a form of co-operation acceptable to them with a view to solving the problems referred to.

"In order not to postpone indefinitely the conclusion of a German peace treaty, the definite period should be set for the work of the all-German committee or some other body, namely, one year, during which the committee or some other body must reach an agreed decision in regard to the questions of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany."

Incidentally, this period of one year which was mentioned in the first Soviet plan was subsequently increased to 18 months.

As far as I am concerned, I must say quite frankly that I did not understand how such a proposal could be put forward in the context of what was then being discussed and at the stage which the conference had reached.

You will remember that at that time we had been talking for six weeks on the Berlin question, and we were discussing it because by common agreement we had come to the conclusion that it would have been useless to continue at that time the talks which had been going on since 11 May on the subject of the German problem as a whole. This problem was, of course, the first and main subject of our conference. To settle it, or simply to be on the way to a settlement, would have made it

possible to eliminate at one go all the difficulties encountered or raised in regard to Berlin. It is clear that we shall have to resume this discussion, the outcome of which is essential for the future of both Germany and the whole of Europe. But we were compelled to note that for the time being the points of view of either side were in no way drawing closer together, and that is why we agreed to talk about Berlin. We talked about Berlin in a concrete manner for 15 days, meeting of course with very great obstacles, but finding nevertheless certain possibilities of agreement, in short, under the normal conditions of rather difficult international negotiation.

And suddenly, at the end of 15 days, without apparent reason and without explanation, we found ourselves faced with a proposal which included in the same text two questions of so different a nature by their implications as that of Berlin and that of Germany as a whole, linking the one to the other and taking us back in fact, after a month, to the first days of our conference.

That is why I should now like to put to the Soviet delegation a first question, which is the following: what are the reasons which impelled it to act in this way, that is to say, to add difficulties to difficulties, to link together problems which are nevertheless quite distinct, in short, as I have just said, to jeopardize the whole negotiation?

I realize quite well that I shall be told, of course, that the fate of Berlin is linked to the fate of the whole of Germany and that it is logical, if the two parts of Germany are asked to discuss reunification, to link the status of Berlin to the outcome of that discussion. But that is a mere semblance of logic. Mr. Gromyko - as he made it clear in his intervention of 13 July - hardly labours under any illusion regarding the possibility of an agreement and, moreover, foresees in advance the failure of the negotiations, by proposing in this hypothesis the opening of new negotiations on Berlin.

Now for my second question. Does the Soviet delegation think that by asking for the establishment of an all-German committee it is not posing again the whole of the German problem, and is not thereby instigating the reopening of all the discussions which led to the failure I have just mentioned?

Here, in fact, it is by no means a question of a mere decision regarding procedure, namely, the establishment of a committee, but of the adoption of a definite position on all the questions that are of the utmost importance in determining the future fate of Germany.

Indeed, we find again all the principles which Mr. Gromyko, and many others before him, has expounded as bound to be the basic principles of a German settlement: recognition of the two German Governments on an equal footing, exclusive competence of these two authorities to discuss reunification, preliminary character of the peace treaty which must be concluded immediately with the two Germanies.

This simple enumeration suffices to show all the implications of the Soviet proposal and to make it clear why it reopens the whole of a debate which for the time being is hopeless. I am fully aware that we shall be given the answer that the Westerners themselves advocated, in their overall Plan for Germany, the establishment of an all-German committee composed of representatives of the two parts of Germany. Why, it is asked, do they now refuse this committee for the sole reason that it is advocated by the Soviet delegation?

That, as a matter of fact, is putting the question in a very arbitrary manner. The proposals we made on the subject of an overall settlement of the German problem, and which, I emphasize, still hold good, were quite different. In drawing up these proposals we made a very great and sincere effort to take into the fullest account the preoccupations of our colleagues. It was in this spirit, and in the hope that it would be understood, that we modified considerably the previous plans so as, in particular, to provide for all the possible periods and transitions and to associate the Germans to the fullest possible extent in the implementation of the measures for reunification. This was done, of course, without prejudicing the essential principles to which we remain attached, and which are, briefly stated, that reunification must take place in freedom, that is to say, in short, by means of free elections.

In order to associate the Germans with the reunification process, the Western Plan provides for the establishment of a committee composed of representatives of the two parts of Germany. The number of these representatives takes into account to a large extent the respective populations of the two parts of Germany. Moreover, the committee has a well-defined assignment, which is to prepare within a certain time-limit an electoral law, on the basis of which the elections will be held which will give practical effect to reunification. It is a question of a well-defined programme. It is a question, above all, of truly bringing about reunification through an agreement achieved beforehand, and not of entering into discussions which, it may be thought in advance, have little chance of producing any concrete result.

In recalling all this, it is by no means my intention to engage in or to reopen a controversy which would be useless at the point we have now reached. I should simply like to explain the reasons why, very obviously, the Soviet proposal concerning the establishment of an all-German committee really raises fundamental difficulties. For my part I am by no means unwilling, if it is desired, to resume discussion of the German problem as a whole. I would stress that in doing so we would digress considerably from the goal which, by common agreement, we had set ourselves more than a month ago, namely, to come to some arrangement on the problems which the Soviet Union has raised in regard to Berlin. On Berlin, also, I am ready to carry on the conversation, and the Western delegations have made definite offers on that subject in the document which they submitted on 16 June last. But I do not see how it would be possible to enter with any prospect of success into a simultaneous discussion on the two questions mentioned in the Soviet plan. Mr. Gromyko, in his statement of 13 July, spoke of his concern that our conference should be able to turn at last to the preparation of concrete decisions. Nobody shares that concern more than I, and it is precisely for that reason that I have deemed it necessary to express my anxieties and to put to the Soviet delegation a number of questions regarding a suggestion which it made and which, to speak frankly, does not seem to me to be likely to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement.

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RÉUNION  
DE MINISTRES  
DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES  
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EM/DOC/54  
16 July 1959  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
DELIVERED AT THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS  
16 July 1959

INTRODUCTION

At yesterday's plenary meeting, I suggested that we end the discussion of whether or not there is any essential link between procedures looking to solution of the problem of the continued division of Germany and procedures looking to arrangements for Berlin to last until reunification of Germany.

Instead, I proposed that we might, with greater profit, consider the substance of the Berlin proposals made by the Western Powers and by the Soviet Union. I suggested that when we resumed today we should consider these proposals, point by point, so that a clear understanding of each position would be assured and further useful negotiations made possible.

I would now like to do just this.

A convenient starting point is to consider the three-Power paper on Berlin, handed to the Soviet Foreign Minister on 16 June 1959. This paper was developed by the Western Powers after a detailed and prolonged discussion in private sessions with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

This paper was a genuine effort to meet views expressed by the Soviet Foreign Minister on a number of occasions.

As I indicated yesterday, this three-Power paper was ignored by the Soviet Foreign Minister without any discussion of its specific points. The alleged reason given by Mr. Gromyko was that these proposed arrangements would require the USSR to reaffirm the occupation rights in Berlin of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

The fact is that these Western rights, which on a number of occasions have been recognized by the USSR as legitimate in origin and continuing in fact, derive from the war and from solemn post-war agreements ratified by the USSR. Nothing that the USSR is now being asked to state or do would add to or detract from these rights, nor from Soviet responsibilities.

We have gone far to meet an earlier proposal of the Soviet Foreign Minister that a solution of the Berlin problem should deal with specific arrangements. I hope that, in the light of this clarification, the Soviet Foreign Minister will realize that his earlier reason for ignoring the Western proposals was without basis.

I turn now to the specific elements of the 16 June paper:

I

First, it expressed the willingness of the three Western Powers to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present level, which is approximately 11,000 men. It proposed that forces in Berlin be armed only with conventional weapons.

The Western Powers would also declare that their Governments would consider from time to time the possibility of reducing their forces if developments in the situation permitted.

The Soviet Foreign Minister had proposed earlier that the Western contingents in Berlin be reduced to token levels. (The word "token" is defined in the English dictionary as "something that serves as a symbol, or something given or shown as a guarantee of one's authority"). Surrounded by Communist forces, some thirty or forty times more numerous, a contingent of 11,000 men under this or any other definition can only be considered a token force.

And by agreeing not to increase - and to consider possible reductions in - this level, the Western Powers proposed to give further assurance that these forces would remain but token contingents.

II

Secondly, the 16 June paper proposed that there should continue to be free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by sea and by air, for all persons and goods - including those of the Western forces in Berlin. The procedures applicable would be those in effect in April 1959.

This proposal should be acceptable to the USSR since its own proposal of 19 June also specifies that "for the duration of the agreement, the communications of West Berlin with the outside world will be preserved in the present shape".

Correspondence between Western and Soviet views also appears to exist in connection with the three-Power proposal for a quadripartite commission, which would consider any difficulties arising in connection with access procedures with respect to Berlin.

III

Thirdly, the 16 June paper proposed that measures be taken consistent with fundamental rights and liberties to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs, of others.

Mr. Gromyko claims that tensions in Berlin are a source of great concern to the Communists. He insists that provision must be made for their reduction if there is to be an acceptable solution for Berlin's future until Germany's reunification.

It is common knowledge, the evidence for which I have previously cited in some detail, that East Berlin is a hotbed of subversive activity. Accordingly, the Western proposals for Berlin call for reciprocal measures to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might disturb public order.

Surely the USSR, with its constant emphasis on parity of treatment, will understand the need for parity of responsibility in this instance.

Let me say now that the Western Powers categorically rule out of consideration any one-sided restraints as part of a Berlin solution until reunification. If there are to be agreed restraints they must be reciprocally applied in both parts of this city where tensions are alleged to exist.

If these reciprocal restraints are to be applied in an even-handed fashion, our experience with international agreements to date suggests that it would be well to provide for verification of their fulfillment.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, in his recent statement on 28 June, charged the Western Powers with paying only lip service to a United Nations rôle in connection with Berlin. He then said, "...when, in the course of the talks, the delegations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR declared the readiness of their Governments to guard West Berlin from all outside interference, the Ministers of the Western Powers somehow suddenly lost interest in the problem. They did not want to speak of the participation of United Nations in the guarantees, although from the rostrum they frequently speak of the organization's rôle. But, as we see, speaking about it is one thing, and respecting it in practice is another thing".

Even as the Soviet Foreign Minister was making this baseless charge, my Government was giving serious consideration to the possibility of a significant United Nations rôle in connection with Berlin. We may wish later, when detailed negotiations begin, to suggest that the four Powers responsible for Berlin consider a request for the Secretary-General of the United Nations to establish an adequate staff in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city, for the purpose of reporting on propaganda activities which might either disrupt public order or seriously affect the rights of others.

I believe and have reason to hope from recent public statements of the United Nations Secretary-General that he would be responsive to such a request for this form of United Nations participation in a Berlin settlement.

I hope that the Soviet Union will consider this possibility of establishing an international scrutiny over one aspect of the life of this city which is of such importance to both the Communists and the free world.

#### IV

Fourthly: The final point of the Western proposal is the provision that these arrangements concerning Berlin will continue in force until the reunification of Germany.

This principle was repeatedly accepted by Mr. Gromyko in our earlier private discussions. He acknowledged that any agreement reached at the conference concerning Berlin should last until Germany was unified. But then the Soviet proposals of 9 and 19 June apparently changed this position. It seems to call for an agreement to expire after a brief specified period.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this is a point on which the true interests of all our countries coincide. Each of our countries has an underlying interest in the preservation of peace. And I cannot conceive that the cause of peace would be

served by any agreement which merely ensured that the Berlin crisis would be revived after a short interval.

We have so far faced two major international crises over Berlin - one in 1948, when the USSR tried to starve the city into submission, and now again in 1959. Each of these crises has posed a serious threat to peace. Still another crisis in the future would revive this danger, perhaps in more acute form.

This possibility may, in fact, grow with each crisis - as tensions over Berlin cumulatively increase.

And even if war should be avoided, such recurring crises cannot help but prevent that relaxation of tensions which the Soviet Union professes to desire. It is impossible to build relations between our countries on a sound and businesslike basis if these relations are to be periodically thrown into an uproar by Soviet threats to Berlin and by the Soviet Union's attempted reopening of past agreements covering Berlin.

I hope that Mr. Gromyko will weigh these thoughts carefully, from the standpoint of his own country's self-interest, if from no other. I hope that this weighing will lead him, as it has led me, to conclude that his original view was correct - that the accord on Berlin should last until reunification.

Now that the issue of Berlin has been raised once more, and now that relations between our countries have been profoundly disturbed by this fact, we would be remiss in our duty to the peoples of the world if we did not settle that issue once and for all on a basis that will endure until a solution of the German problem is accomplished.

#### CONCLUSION

These then, Mr. Chairman, are the four main points in the Western proposal concerning Berlin:

1. No increase of forces in Berlin.
2. Guaranteed free access to Berlin.
3. Measures to avoid disturbing activities in either part of Berlin.
4. Agreement that these arrangements should last until German unification.

Taken together, I believe that these four points offer a sound basis for successful negotiations at this conference. I hope, therefore, that the Soviet Foreign Minister will now discuss them - seriously, substantively, and one by one - so that we can get on to an agreement.

It does not matter whether he does this on the sole basis of our proposals or not - so long as he addresses these four points, which seem to me the pillars on which any acceptable Berlin agreement must rest.

I hope that he will not avoid discussing these points by turning to other subjects - like procedures for German unification - which we can discuss separately if it seems useful at this conference.

I hope that he will not avoid this discussion by throwing out bogus slogans like "Free City", and that he will concentrate on specific improvements in the Berlin situation, rather than on changes in terminology.

And finally I hope that he will not avoid discussing these points by making generalized and misleading attacks on the Western proposal which comprehends them - claiming to perceive in that proposal requirements and consequences other than those spelled out in these four points.

None of these attempts at evasion would be worthy of the serious problems and the over-riding need which we face.

The problem is that of devising arrangements for Berlin which will preserve the city's freedom and guard against future crises over this issue until Germany is reunified.

The need is to fulfill the hopes which peoples around the world have placed in this conference by reaching a measure of agreement on such arrangements, so that by having made real progress we can proceed promptly to a meeting of the Heads of Government, where other issues can be discussed.

I have tried, Mr. Chairman, to show how the problem could be met in a way consistent with the interests and honor of all our countries.

It is for Mr. Gromyko to determine whether we can now begin serious negotiations which will fulfill the need.

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RM/DOC/55  
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY THE RT. HON. SELWYN LLOYD,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

16 July 1959

I would like to say something on behalf of the delegation of the United Kingdom.

As my colleagues know, we returned here on Monday, 13 July, and my own view is that we have not achieved very much since then. I do not presume to award the blame but I would like to try to follow Mr. Herter in the attempt to assess the situation in which we now find ourselves. I would echo what he said about the Western proposals and the need for further consideration of them. Mr. Gromyko has never really commented on them at all. The first question which he asked, I think it was yesterday, was why hadn't we answered the Soviet proposals of 19 June. But he has never really commented on our proposals of 16 June. So therefore I think that his first question of yesterday was perhaps a bit of a joke.

Now I want to try to review this situation. I think there is common ground between us that certain confusions did arise with regard to the Soviet position on 19 June. There have been certain clarifications since then - the document published in the middle of the night of 19 June, Mr. Gromyko's speech of 28 June and his further speech of 13 July. And in order that there should be no misunderstandings between us I want to state what I believe the position to be and unless Mr. Gromyko contradicts me on any particular point, that is what I shall assume it to be.

First of all on Berlin. The two sides agree that interim arrangements should be made, provided they are satisfactory. As to what those arrangements should be, the position seems to me as follows. First of all, on force levels. The West say that their forces should be limited to their present strength with a provision for reduction if developments permit. The Soviets say that the Western forces should be reduced to symbolic numbers, symbolic contingents. Well, Mr. Herter referred to the present strength of the Western contingents and we had several arguments in the first phase of our conference about their accepted level. I think we took the view that their existing level is in fact symbolic. Whether we can get from one symbolic level to another symbolic level by a symbolic reduction, I don't quite know. But I don't propose to go further today into that somewhat metaphysical argument.

With regard to armaments, both sides agree that the Western forces in Berlin should only be armed with conventional weapons.

A third matter is that of activities. The Western Powers agree that measures should be taken to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might disturb public order, seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others. The Soviet position is that there should be termination of subversive activities directed from West Berlin against the D.D.R. and other socialist States.

The fourth matter is the duration of any such interim arrangement. It seems agreed that these interim arrangements should last for a limited time. The Western position is that they should be terminated on reunification, unless this view is subsequently modified by four-Power agreement. The Soviet position is that they should continue for one and a half years or for some such other period which could be agreed, but they stated quite specifically in the first statement of 19 June "the question of a time limit is a matter neither of major importance nor of principle to us".

With regard to access, the Western position is that the procedures which were in effect in April 1959 should continue, but German personnel could carry them out. This position is without prejudice to existing responsibilities and disputes should be settled by a four-Power commission with German advisers. Freedom of movement would also continue between East and West Berlin. The Soviet position is that communications of West Berlin with the outside world would be preserved in their

present shape. The phrase they used was "for the duration of the agreement" the communications with West Berlin and the outside world will be preserved in the present shape.

Now on the face of it it is not clear what "for the duration of the agreement" means, but I think it has been cleared up since, because in addition to the matters to which I referred, levels of forces, armaments, activities and the length of time for which the interim arrangements would last and the question of access, there are two further matters of great importance. The first is what would happen at the end of the period of the duration of the agreement. According to the Western Plan Germany will ex hypothesi have been reunified and Berlin will become its capital. The Soviet position is that at the end of the period fixed for these interim arrangements, if agreement has not been reached in some way (and I come to that question next), if agreement has not been reached then we resume these negotiations, and pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations as Foreign Ministers the situation will remain unaltered. As I understand it, no unilateral action will be taken by either side pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations. In parenthesis I would like to add that we are completely dedicated to the proposition that further developments should be the result of negotiation and not be dictated by one side.

That is what happens at the end of the period of the interim arrangements. The position, as I understand it, is quite clearly that these negotiations will be resumed and no unilateral action will be taken by either side pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations.

I now come to the final point and that is negotiations during the period of the interim arrangements. The West have always maintained that if there is agreement about the interim period the four Governments will continue to negotiate about German reunification and European security, whether they do it through the ordinary diplomatic channels or through Foreign Ministers' meetings or meetings of Heads of Government. That process of discussion and negotiation will continue. The Soviet position is that an all-German committee should be established on the basis of parity and should discuss contacts, reunification and a peace treaty. I think it is clear from the Soviet statements that their position about an all-German committee is not completely inflexible because in Mr. Gromyko's statement of 10 June he does say that if the proposal for the establishment of

the committee be unacceptable to one or the other German side, the four Powers could recommend the Governments of both German sides to choose a form of co-operation acceptable to them with a view to solving the problems referred to. And then again in the Soviet paper of 19 June it is said there that if during the agreed period no solution of the question of reunification of Germany can be reached within the framework of an all-German committee or otherwise, then the participants of the Geneva conference of Foreign Ministers should resume consideration of the West Berlin question. So there would seem to me to be indicated in these two statements to which I have referred an element of flexibility; also it seems to me to be implied from the Soviet position that the operation of the committee or some other arrangement would not exclude negotiations between the four Powers both about a peace treaty and about reunification.

One further matter was referred to in Mr. Gromyko's speech either on Monday or on Wednesday - the occasion upon which he raised the matter of United Nations participation and he rather chided us for having discounted that possibility. I endorse what Mr. Herter has said today upon that theme.

Now, gentlemen, I have tried to set out under these various headings what I understand to be the position of the two sides. I hope I have got it right. It does not make me despair of the possibility of an agreement at all, but I do want to know whether I have got it right or whether I have in some way misinterpreted or misrepresented the position. I think that if what I have said is correct then we ought to think it over, discuss it with one another and see whether we can advance towards agreement.

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ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENTS MADE BY MR. A.A. GROMYKO,  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

15 July 1959

I

Mr. Chairman,

We have already drawn attention to the fact that so far the delegations of the Western Powers have not given any definite reply to the latest proposals of the Soviet Government in regard to an agreement on an interim status for West Berlin and on an all-German committee. We should like to know how this is to be explained.

Now I have a second question. How can one explain the fact that the delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, who at the beginning of the conference were in favour of setting up an all-German committee, began to lose interest in this idea after the Soviet side had put forward a concrete proposal regarding the establishment of such a committee and its tasks and this question thus came on to the practical level? The explanations given by the representative of France failed to dispose of this question.

A third question. We should like to know whether the delegations of the three Western Powers agree that the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and of the Federal Republic of Germany in an all-German committee should have equal rights and the same opportunities and that questions should be decided by agreement between the two sides. If, however, they continue to object to this, then let them explain what it is the Western Powers fear when they oppose the

principle that neither of the sides represented in the committee should be placed in a privileged position when decisions are taken? What sort of body for negotiations will it be if there are to be established in it beforehand more favourable conditions for one of the sides than for the other?

I should like to put one more question. The representatives of the Western Powers have repeatedly stated that a peace treaty must not be imposed upon Germany. It is well known that the Soviet Union has always supported this view. Precisely for this reason it proposes that the Germans should work out in an all-German committee their point of view on questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a German peace treaty. Why do the Western Powers not support this proposal?

These questions arise for quite understandable reasons. We should like to ascertain in this connexion what the real position of the Western Powers is. I repeat, the explanations which have been given by you, Mr. Chairman, by no means dispose of these questions.

## II

I must say that we should like to hear the replies to our questions first. They concern the Berlin question and our proposals which were submitted for consideration at this conference. As you know, they were not submitted today. The Western Powers have had an opportunity to think over these proposals for at least several weeks. As regards an all-German committee, this question, as is well known, did not arise today either. We have been discussing it for a considerable length of time. For this reason our questions concerning this problem are not of an artificial nature; they really do arise and we are seriously interested in the replies to them.

We should like to know more fully the position of the Western Powers on these questions and particularly, of course, in regard to the latest proposals of the Soviet Government.

## III

In connexion with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's remark, I should like to say the following:

We have repeatedly tried to explain to our colleagues in the negotiations that there is a logical link between the question of West Berlin and the question of an all-German committee and its work, and that this link is by no means artificial. It seemed to us that after our repeated explanations and statements, including those

made during the recess in the work of our conference, there should be no lack of clarity regarding these questions. But if nevertheless some questions arise, and if they are not put forward in order to drag out our negotiations, but in order to clarify the real situation and our position, and apparently that is so - we have no reasons to believe that it is not so - then I should like to give an additional explanation on this subject.

When the questions of West Berlin and a peace treaty were discussed there arose also the question of an all-German committee; consequently, we are not raising this question for the first time in the course of the work of this conference. If an attempt is being made here to make it appear that this question was raised by us unexpectedly, then this attempt is absolutely groundless. There is nothing unexpected in this. Both these questions - the question of West Berlin and the question of an all-German committee - have long been within our field of vision and have long been put forward in the course of the work of our conference.

Now with regard to the logical, I would even say vital, link between both these questions. Who will deny that if a positive result were achieved in an all-German committee as a result of negotiations between the two German States, covering also the questions of a peaceful settlement with Germany and of a peace treaty with Germany, there would be provided the possibility of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, and the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would also mean the final solution of the Berlin question, or more precisely the West Berlin question?

We have repeatedly stressed this idea and endeavoured to make our statements in this regard as clear as possible.

This has also been repeatedly explained very convincingly in the statements made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev.

You may say: very well, that is how it would be if a positive result were achieved in the work of an all-German committee.

Yes, we too may say that that is how it would be if positive results were achieved in the work of an all-German committee.

But how can one say in advance, before the committee is set up, that it is impossible to achieve positive results in that committee? But perhaps these positive results may indeed be achieved. In fact, unless the committee is set up and both German States are given an opportunity of conducting negotiations on these questions, it cannot be known whether positive results are possible or impossible.

We do not know on what grounds it would be possible to foretell the results of the work of the committee.

To anyone who has any doubts it should be clear from our additional explanations that between the two questions, namely, the West Berlin question and the question of an all-German committee, there is not an artificial, far-fetched link but a logical, vital one.

I do not know whether our explanations will satisfy Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville and those who have any doubts on this score. But that is the way we understand this question. I hope that after this explanation of ours we shall receive replies and explanations in regard to the questions that have been put by us, the replies to which are, quite understandably, of the greatest interest to us. As regards your question, Mr. Chairman, this is how I understand it: you ask whether our proposal regarding an all-German committee means that we are thereby raising the question of the discussion of the German problem as a whole, including the problem of German unity. I think that there can be only one reply to this question - no, it does not mean that. To discuss the question of German unity, a question which must be discussed by the Germans, means to conduct fruitless negotiations, and we think that that is hardly in the interests of all concerned.

With regard to the question of a peace treaty, we are prepared to discuss this question at any time, because the question of the importance of the peace treaty not only is not diminishing but, on the contrary, is increasing.

In our opinion, however, the question of an all-German committee can be successfully and fruitfully discussed without discussing other questions.

#### IV

I fail to understand why everything in the Soviet proposals concerning an all-German committee and its tasks is not clear to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd even tries to perceive some contradiction between our proposals for the establishment of an all-German committee and article 22 of our Draft Peace Treaty with Germany. As a matter of fact there is no contradiction here nor can there be any. Article 22 of our Draft reads:

"The Allied and associated Powers acknowledge the right of the German people to re-establish the unity of Germany".

Does not the proposal to set up an all-German committee go in the direction of providing the German people with an opportunity to exercise this right? It is precisely in this direction that it goes. If anybody has another opinion as to whether the German people should be given the right to consider and decide on their own account questions concerning Germany, including those relating to German unity, then that is another matter. The Soviet Government has no such doubts. The Soviet Government assumed and continues to assume that purely German questions - and questions relating to German unity are such - must be considered first and foremost by the Germans themselves.

We know that the Western Powers have another approach to this matter. We do not agree with this approach and consider it unjust towards the German people. We have made a good number of statements on this subject and there is hardly any need to repeat them.

The same article 22 of the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty states further that the Allied and Associated Powers express their readiness to render to both German States every assistance in the achievement of this aim on the basis of a rapprochement and understanding between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Precisely the adoption of the proposal for the establishment of an all-German committee and of appropriate recommendations to both German States - the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany - would be one of the forms of assistance to be rendered to both German States.

Where is the contradiction here? There is not only no contradiction whatsoever here but complete accordance between this article of our Draft and our proposal for an all-German committee. In making our proposal for an all-German committee we are precisely pursuing the aim that the four Powers should render assistance to the Germans in starting negotiations between themselves for the consideration of questions relating to Germany. The Western Powers, we know, have another point of view in this regard. They want to take into their own hands the settlement of questions relating to Germany, precisely those questions which the Germans alone are competent to consider and settle. The proposals made at one time by the Ministers of the three Western Powers regarding a plebiscite and the tasks of an all-German committee are in fact founded on the striving of the Western Powers to take into their own hands the consideration and

settlement of questions falling within the competence of the Germans alone. We cannot agree to such proposals, since they are aimed at infringing upon the rights of the German people and are incompatible with the elementary requirements of justice and respect for the rights of the Germans. I will say nothing about the fact that this would really be discrimination against the German people, moreover, the grossest form of discrimination.

I have tried to explain to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd that between our proposals for the establishment of an all-German committee and the proposals contained in article 22 of the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty there is no contradiction, nor could there be any; the complete accordance between those two documents is quite evident.

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16 July 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

16 July 1959

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the floor. I had, I must say, no intention of speaking today because I had expressed yesterday what was, at the present stage of our negotiation, the gist of my preoccupations, and I had put two questions to the Soviet delegation in that regard.

I have listened with great attention, of course, to what Mr. Gromyko stated yesterday concerning the Soviet proposals of 9 and 19 June last. In his explanations I did not find very much in the way of answers to the questions we are concerned with in regard to that part of these proposals which concerns the Berlin régime. I found, on the contrary, some fairly precise, or at least fairly clear, answers to the questions I had put yesterday on the subject of the all-German committee.

These questions reduced themselves essentially to the following:

Does the Soviet delegation realize the difficulty it has added to an already difficult negotiation regarding Berlin by putting forward the proposal for the establishment of this all-German committee?

I had asked moreover whether the Soviet delegation realized that by putting forward this proposal it was thereby raising again the whole of the problems and discussions relating to the German question as a whole, which we had discussed at the beginning of this conference without making much headway in bringing the points of view closer together.

The answers which I have just heard show first of all that the Soviet delegation makes the establishment of this all-German committee, in the context of an arrangement regarding Berlin, a very precise condition and therefore knowingly accepts the very great difficulty which it has created in this regard.

Furthermore, the Soviet delegation fully realizes that in proposing the establishment of this committee it raises all the problems relating to the German question as a whole by asking us to accept, no less, the Soviet point of view. What has been said regarding the two Governments, or so-called Governments, existing in Germany, the necessity of the problem of reunification being discussed exclusively between these two organizations which is implied in regard to the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two parts of Germany, all this seems to me unfortunately quite clear. Once again, I should like to draw the attention of the Soviet delegation to the extent of the difficulties which it has created in regard to the success of our negotiations by adopting this attitude.

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20 July 1959

ENGLISH ONLY

STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

16 July 1959

Corrigendum

Page 1, second paragraph, line 2: instead of "yesterday", read: "today".

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20 July 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
PRESENTING A NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL  
ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION

20 July 1959

Mr. Chairman,

Introduction

As indicated in my statement of 16 July, I had hoped that we might concentrate on the specific elements of an interim agreed Berlin arrangement to last until German unification - deferring until later in our deliberations further discussion of procedures for attaining German unification.

This had seemed a necessary course since Mr. Gromyko had adamantly refused to discuss the problem of German reunification when the Western Powers pressed for earlier consideration of this question by the conference. Because of this refusal, we had been unable to make progress in our discussions of the overall German question and had moved on to a review of the situation in Berlin.

The Soviet proposal for a committee of free and Communist Germans interrupted our discussion of measures which might be taken in Berlin. It thereby confused two separate issues with consequent delay in the work of this conference. Mr. Couve de Murville has already pointed this out at our meetings on 15 and 16 July.

Mr. Gromyko, however, refuses to drop this new insistence that we now consider the Soviet proposal regarding procedures for future efforts to achieve German unification.

Since we agree that this is an important - although separate - question, I shall today set forth a new proposal of the Western Powers as to the procedures for promoting German unity which given the circumstances holds the greatest promise. I hope to show that this proposal provides a sound basis for further consideration by the Foreign Ministers of this question, in which we have a great and continuing interest.

I

To this end, I intend to take advantage of Mr. Gromyko's suggestion that we should, if we cannot accept his proposal for a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans, offer some alternative proposal for future discussions of German reunification. Before I do so, however, let me review briefly where we now stand in our consideration of this matter.

The Western Peace Plan which was first submitted to this conference more than two months ago is a phased plan for achieving German reunification. If accepted by the Soviets, it will most certainly lead to early reunification of Germany. This Plan provides for a mixed German committee. This committee would operate within the framework of the most comprehensive program yet submitted to solve the problem of German reunification on the basis of free determination by the German people.

The mixed German committee in the Western Peace Plan would be established after the four Powers had taken a final decision on early reunification and on the process whereby it could be achieved. Its major task would be to prepare a draft law providing for free elections which would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany. If the committee could not agree on such a law, its members from the Federal Republic and East Germany would prepare alternative draft laws, to be submitted to a plebiscite as alternatives. Acceptance by a majority of the population of both parts of Germany would be required for the approval of a specific electoral law. This provision was intended to assure maximum freedom of choice for the population of the so-called GDR. On the basis of resulting free elections, an all-German assembly would be chosen to draft an all-German constitution. The all-German government formed on the basis of that constitution would be responsible for negotiating an all-German peace treaty.

Thus, in the Western Peace Plan, the mixed German committee would represent one step in a truly democratic process whose fulfillment would assure German unity in freedom and a peace settlement with a German government representing all of the German people.

What Mr. Gromyko has done is to pull this one feature of the Western Peace Plan out of its context, changing its composition and its task, and then relating it to the Berlin question in a way which distorts the correct approach to both the Berlin problem and the problem of Germany as a whole.

The mixed German committee was included in the Western Peace Plan as one of a number of important innovations which responded to Soviet criticisms of the proposals made by the Western Powers at Geneva in 1955. We have no doubt that a number of other provisions included in this effort to take account of Soviet views would also be attractive to the Soviet Government if taken out of context.

The Soviet Union is now suggesting that the Western Powers should agree to the isolated establishment of a German committee with a time-limit to its deliberations. This would not be in return for Soviet agreement to a plan which would assure German unification. It would merely be in return for a statement that the Soviet Union, for a very limited period of time, would not violate its existing solemn commitments with respect to Berlin.

The USSR proposal has, moreover, so altered the context of this part of the Western Peace Plan that its acceptance would now perpetuate the division of Germany, rather than assure its unification.

The Soviet proposal does not provide for an agreed process which would lead to reunification. And it is perfectly clear to every one of us in this room that unity in freedom would not be the clearly accepted goal of all its members. For the authorities of the so-called GDR have made evident time and time again that they are not prepared to work out plans which would permit reunification on any basis that would not result in the communization of the FRG regardless of the will of the people.

Mr. Gromyko has insisted that we cannot predict what his German committee would achieve. For my part, I can predict with confidence that, on the basis of available evidence and experience, and under the conditions proposed by Mr. Gromyko the committee would surely and quickly deadlock.

There is not the slightest hope that the committee would call for the selection of an all-German government on the basis of free elections. One half of the committee would be composed of representatives of a régime which is aware that free elections conducted within its borders would inevitably lead to its disappearance. We can be equally sure, on the other hand, that the representatives of the Federal Republic would not sacrifice their freedom by accepting proposals whose clearly demonstrated purpose is to undermine that freedom.

For the reasons which I have just given, the all-German committee proposed by the Soviet Foreign Minister in his statement to the plenary session of this conference of 10 June and repeated by him in his proposal of 19 June is totally unacceptable.

Let me further point out that his proposal would constitute a substantial abandonment by the four Powers of their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany.

The basic responsibility for the solution of these matters, so gravely affecting not only Germany but all Europe and indeed all the world, must be placed where it belongs - on the representatives of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. This conforms to common sense and to the solemn written commitments which Prime Minister Bulganin concluded with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Faure, and Prime Minister Eden, when the four Heads of Government reaffirmed their recognition of this common responsibility at the Summit Conference of 1955. It is in the interest of each one of our countries that this responsibility should be fulfilled, so that we can be assured that Germany will be reunified on terms which strengthen the peace of the world.

The intention of the Soviet proposal, furthermore, is to obtain an unwarranted measure of respectability for the régime which has been imposed upon the people of East Germany. I am speaking of the so-called German Democratic Republic. That régime has no mandate from its people. It lacks that true independence which is a basic attribute of a sovereign State.

The purpose of the Soviets in putting forward the proposal is all too clearly to perpetuate the partition of Germany.

I repeat, therefore, that this proposal is not acceptable.

II

In rejecting the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee, however, the Governments of France, Great Britain and the United States refuse to abandon their fourteen-year-old effort to achieve the reunification of Germany in freedom. This is a responsibility which they share with the Soviet Union.

The Western Peace Plan testifies to our continued search for the means to this end. It also testifies to our willingness to meet Soviet criticisms of past plans. Unhappily, Mr. Gromyko rejected the Western Peace Plan, despite its patent reasonableness and workability.

We must not flag in our efforts, notwithstanding rebuffs, rejections and obstructions thrown up in our path. The German people want reunification. Justice demands it. Indeed, all those who have a stake in future peace demand it.

The Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and the United States, ever since the Soviet Foreign Minister rejected the Western Peace Plan, have been considering how the three of us together with our Soviet colleague could best continue to discharge our responsibility for the German question as a whole, which includes the matter of reunification and a peace settlement with Germany. I say a peace settlement with Germany, rather than with two parts of Germany as the Soviets propose, because there can be no peace settlement unless all of Germany is represented in its negotiation by the freely chosen government of a reunified Germany. The Soviet Union itself recognizes this principle, at least in form, when it speaks of a peace treaty with Germany - even though what it goes on to propose are peace treaties with parts of a divided Germany.

The three Western Foreign Ministers have concluded that there is a sensible and businesslike way of continuing a common search for the road to reunification and a peace settlement with Germany.

Our proposal is as follows:

"The Geneva conference of Foreign Ministers, as at present constituted, shall continue in being for the purpose of considering the German problem as a whole. It should also consider questions relating to the extension and development of contacts between the two parts of Germany. For these purposes the conference shall meet from time to time at such level and at such place as are agreed. The conference may also make special arrangements for the consideration of particular questions arising out of its terms of reference as defined above."

This proposal would enable representatives of our four Governments to keep under continuing discussion a problem which is of major importance to each of us, to the German people, and indeed to peoples throughout the world. It will permit a thorough consideration of the Western Peace Plan - the most comprehensive Plan yet developed for solving the problem of divided Germany.

It would enable the four Powers to utilize German advisers following the practice adopted by the present conference.

It would provide, by its terms of reference, for this conference to consider all the subjects which the Soviet Foreign Minister catalogued in his proposal of 19 June. He proposed then that the all-German committee - and I now quote - "should promote the extension and development of contacts between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany."

The three Western Powers submit this proposal, after careful and serious deliberation, in an effort to meet the desire of the Soviet Foreign Minister that we here agree on a method for continuing discussions looking to German unification - but in a manner that is consistent with our respective responsibilities. The USSR Foreign Minister has offered to accept any procedure for considering the problem of divided Germany which is acceptable to the Germans. I am informed that the procedure here proposed is acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany, the legitimate authority representing 51 million Germans.

I hope that the Soviet Foreign Minister will consider this proposal carefully.  
Thank you.

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СОВЕЩАНИЕ  
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RÉUNION  
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RM/DCC/59  
20 July 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY THE RT. HON. SELWYN LLOYD,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

20 July 1959

As Mr. Herter has said, he introduced this new paper on behalf of the three Western delegations.

It is a short paper but not the less important on account of that. Therefore I should like, following the speeches of Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville, to explain how I myself see the background to this paper and its significance.

I will begin by tracing briefly what has happened during the present conference.

At the outset, two main sets of proposals were put forward. On the Western side, there was the Western Peace Plan. On the Soviet side there was the Draft Soviet Peace Treaty including the proposal for a demilitarised "Free City" of West Berlin. Both were "package deals"; both dealt with all-German questions, both plans including interim settlements for Berlin. When I use the word "interim" in this connexion, what I mean is plans to operate pending the re-establishment of German unity.

For two weeks we argued in vain around this table. Neither side would accept the proposals of the other. The reasons are known to everyone here.

So we concentrated on the question of arrangements for Berlin. This did not mean that we had abandoned our aim of an all-German settlement, which would ipso facto settle the Berlin question. It meant that, since we had been unable to make progress on the wider question, we agreed to try to deal with the narrower question. This seemed to be the sensible thing to do. We hoped that, if we could reach an agreement on this issue, that would of itself be a substantial achievement; it might prove a turning point, which would open the way to the wider agreements which would mean so much for peace and stability in Europe.

When the conference went into recess on 20 June, we had two main papers before us. We had the Western paper of 16 June; and we had the Soviet paper of 19 June.

Although there were serious differences between the positions expressed in these two papers and in the accompanying explanations, the two papers did for the most part deal with the same issues.

These were:-

1. Force levels in Berlin
2. The armaments of forces in Berlin
3. "Activities" in Berlin
4. The duration of any agreement on Berlin
5. Access to West Berlin
6. The position at the end of the agreement
7. Arrangements to handle discussions about wider German problems, including the association of representatives of both parts of Germany with those discussions.

All these points were dealt with in the positions of the two sides, as set out in those papers, with the exception of the last point. This is of course a point of great importance, to which I will return.

We on the Western side are ready further to discuss all these points and to see what exactly is the position of each side upon them and how our positions can be brought closer together. On one or two points we are in virtual agreement. For instance, about the armament of the Western forces in West Berlin. On other points, uncertainty still exists. This is true for instance as regards what would happen at the end of an agreement on Berlin.

Obviously we cannot determine how near we are to an agreement or how far away from it we are until we have been over the whole ground. Nor can we determine the chances of agreement on any particular point until each side clearly understands the position of the other side.

A case in point is the issue which I have just mentioned, namely, what would be the position at the end of an interim agreement on Berlin. On this issue, according to the Western paper of 16 June, at the end of the period Germany would have been reunited and Berlin would have become its capital. This is the same inference which is to be drawn from Article 25 of the original Soviet proposal for a peace treaty.

But in the Soviet statements of 10 June and 19 June there was put forward a different conception, the conception of an interim arrangement for West Berlin, subject to a fixed time-limit. That raised two sets of questions - what would happen during the fixed interim period and what would happen at the end of it? On that last point I stated in my speech of 16 July what I understood the Soviet position to be. This is what I said then:

"The Soviet position is that at the end of the period fixed for these interim arrangements, if agreement has not been reached in some way, then we resume these negotiations, and pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations as Foreign Ministers, the situation will remain unaltered. As I understand it, no unilateral action will be taken by either side pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations."

In the Debate in the House of Commons on 8 July, Mr. Bevan, speaking for Her Majesty's Opposition, put the point in these words. He said:

"There is no suggestion as far as I can see that we should abandon our occupation rights in Berlin if we agree to a time-limit. All they (the Russians) say is that the two sides take up their respective positions at the end of the period, as they take them up now."

Mr. Gromyko has not been willing to say whether this is the right interpretation or not. But I tell him quite frankly that unless this point is cleared up in such a manner as to leave no doubt or ambiguity, I do not see how agreement is possible.

It may be asked why the Western Powers are prepared to contemplate any agreement about Berlin which has as its terminating point a fixed date rather than the fact of German reunification. It is certainly not because we are prepared directly or indirectly to allow our position or the freedom of West Berlin to be thereby undermined. The answer is that we regard our willingness to contemplate an interim solution of this kind as an important attempt to get round one of the

major difficulties confronting us. But obviously we cannot consider an interim arrangement of this kind until we are certain what the position will be at the end of the stated term. Otherwise we should be signing a blank cheque.

To sum up what I am trying to say on this point, we regard our attitude to this new Soviet position as constructive and conciliatory. We feel that partly for that reason and partly because of the tremendous issues at stake, we are entitled to an unequivocal answer on the point which I have put.

What is the Soviet attitude to our discussions generally? Mr. Gromyko has said that he is not prepared to deal with the first six points which I enumerated earlier, until No. 7 has been dealt with, namely -

"Arrangements to handle discussions about wider German problems, including the association of representatives of both parts of Germany with those discussions."

Apparently we are expected to make agreement on this point a condition precedent to everything else.

We think this attitude unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Western delegations have tried to go some way to meet it. We have introduced our new paper today, as a constructive initiative, a serious attempt to come nearer to agreement. Let me try to explain what I mean.

I should like first to state my objections to the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee. My objections to it are threefold: juridical, practical and procedural.

The juridical objection, as I see it, is that the Soviet proposal involves the recognition de jure of the partition of Germany.

In other words we give the force of law to the division of Germany in perpetuity. If anyone really wants to do that, let him come into the open and say so.

Or, if I may put a question, is that the construction that we are to put on Mr. Khrushchev's speech in Poland on 17 July? He then said, if the record I have is correct:

"The Western border of the socialist countries lies where the border between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany lies. We regard this border of the GDR as our common frontier, as a line dividing the world of socialism from the world of capitalism. This border is for each of the countries of the Warsaw Alliance, and for the whole of the socialist camp, as inviolable and sacred as the borders of each of our countries. We have said more than once that we shall fight for that frontier against any foe who may try to encroach against it."

Well, if that is really a statement of the considered Soviet opinion on the question of the reunification of Germany, it does not seem to me to be a very promising bridge for an all-German committee, designed to work upon the problem of German reunification.

My second and practical objection is that no sensible person can suppose that if the four Powers abrogate their duties and responsibilities in these matters any agreement on the major questions would be reached. We believe that if progress on reunification is to be made the assistance of the four Powers is required. I cannot believe that a procedure of the kind proposed by the Soviets would do anything but make reunification and the problem of European security more difficult. If we, the four Powers, with our responsibility, wash our hands of the problems and say that the representatives of the two parts of Germany must be shut up together to solve them, I cannot believe that any progress towards agreement on any of the major questions will be reached. We do not want just new institutions or new formulas. We want practical progress. The Soviet proposal for an all-German committee will not lead to this.

My third and procedural objection to the Soviet proposal is that if accepted it could be used as a means of pressure upon West Berlin. It could be said that failure in the all-German committee must lead to changes in Berlin and to the modification of the position of the people of West Berlin. Equally the threat to the people of West Berlin could be used as a means of what we would regard as quite unfair pressure in the discussions of the all-German committee.

So much for my view of the Soviet proposal. I now turn to the new Western proposal. The first advantage which I see in it is that it is flexible. It does not set narrow limits to items such as the level of the discussions proposed or their place or their timing.

The second advantage is that it does not involve shelving the all-German question or of relegating it to a body where it would languish. One advantage of our proposal is that these talks would be under our own supervision as Foreign Ministers. We should be keeping an eye on them. If they seemed to be going wrong, we could intervene. When necessary we could resume the talks ourselves at Foreign Ministers level.

The third advantage which I see in our proposals is that the last sentence of our new paper provides a means by which this conference can make experiments of a procedural kind. If one experiment does not work, then it is open to us to try another. Mr. Gromyko said the other day that we cannot force the representatives of either part of Germany to do what they do not want to do. I quite agree. We have got to find something which is acceptable to both.

To sum up, I would say that what Mr. Gromyko may feel tempted to describe in our proposals as their imprecision is a strength not a weakness: it has to be interpreted not as vagueness but rather as a willingness to discuss and negotiate. The test of our proposals is the extent to which the Soviet Government feels able to co-operate in making them succeed.

We hope that Mr. Gromyko will consider our proposals carefully. I would not wish to press him for an immediate reply. If, on the other hand, he now seeks any clarification, I will do my best to provide it.

As I pointed out on 16 July, Mr. Gromyko has indicated that there is some flexibility in the Soviet position. On 10 June he said that if the proposal for the establishment of the all-German committee were unacceptable to one or the other German side the four Powers could recommend the Governments of both German sides to choose a form of co-operation acceptable to them. In the Soviet paper of 19 June there are the words: "within the framework of an all-German committee or otherwise". I am encouraged by this and feel that with good will it should be possible to find common ground between us.

In all these discussions it has been our purpose to come closer to an agreement which would make a real contribution to a lessening of tension in Europe. I hope that Mr. Gromyko will feel able to approach our proposals in the same spirit.

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RM/DOC/60  
22 July 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A.A. GROMYKO,  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

16 July 1959

Mr. Chairman,

Apparently it is difficult to avoid repetition, because we have been discussing the problems before this conference for a considerable period of time, one may say, for almost a whole week. My remarks will therefore include a certain amount of repetition. In these remarks, however, I shall try to take into account what the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers have said at our recent sessions, including today's session.

It seems to us that the time has come - and, in our opinion, it had come before today - for our discussion to assume a more tangible form, that is to say, it is time we tried to find a basis for an understanding between the participants of the conference on the questions under discussion. With this in mind, we can only welcome the appeals - particularly those of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom - that we should try to find a possibility of bringing the positions of the parties closer together and reaching agreement on the questions under discussion.

As regards the Soviet Government's position, we have repeatedly stated from the outset that it sets itself the task of promoting an understanding. The proposals submitted by the Soviet Government - and this applies to all our proposals - were above all intended to facilitate an agreement between the participants of the conference both on the question of a peace treaty with Germany

and on West Berlin. The desire to facilitate agreement also underlies our latest proposals, which, as regards the substance, have not yet been studied in full because the representatives of the Western Powers, on receiving these proposals, came to the conclusion - a hasty one, in our opinion - that it was necessary to interrupt the work of the conference. However that might be, whether it was a good thing or a bad thing, the suspension took place; we have now resumed our work and must endeavour to use the available opportunities and to reach an understanding on the questions under discussion at the conference.

At recent sessions we have heard some critical remarks regarding the Soviet Government's latest proposals. In our opinion, these criticisms are a result of a misunderstanding or insufficiently attentive, insufficiently objective examination and study of our proposals. In particular, these criticisms, apparently, are due to the position of the Western Powers regarding the maintenance of the occupation régime in West Berlin. This question - the attitude to the occupation régime in West Berlin - is the main question of principle dividing us. There is a very great difference between the position of the Western Powers, on the one hand, and that of the Soviet Union and a number of other States, including the German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, and we have never concealed this. Moreover, we have frankly and repeatedly declared that the Soviet Government can never - in no case and in no circumstances - agree to a perpetuation of the occupation régime in West Berlin. Having regard to the need to find a way out of the situation which has developed, we submitted several proposals, including a proposal for the creation of a Free City of West Berlin. Unfortunately, these proposals did not meet with the support of the Western Powers. Our latest proposal was dictated by the desire to increase still further the possibility of reaching agreement between us. It is only thus that our proposal is to be understood. In submitting it, the Soviet Government hoped that it would be duly appraised, that this desire, these efforts of the Soviet Government would find due understanding on the part of the Western Powers.

Hence it is with regret that we are now compelled to state that our proposal has still not met up to this day with proper understanding on the part of the Governments of the Western Powers, although at the same time we note that today - such is our impression - there is no longer a completely negative attitude to this proposal of the Soviet Government, that it is beginning to be understood -

albeit slowly - that the Soviet Government's proposal will make it easier to narrow the gap between the positions of the parties and to reach agreement. It seems to us that we are now confronted with some specific questions with which we should deal without any further delay.

What are these questions? They are the following.

It seems to us that we must reach an understanding - and apparently we all more or less agree on this - on the need to conclude an interim agreement on the question of West Berlin. Since it has not been possible to reach agreement on the question of establishing a Free City of West Berlin we should, in the Soviet Government's opinion, take advantage of the existing possibility and come to an understanding on the conclusion of an interim agreement on West Berlin.

I shall not repeat the contents of our proposals on this question; you are quite familiar with them. We would only express the hope that the Western Powers will adopt a more objective attitude to our proposals relating to the contents of an interim agreement. Here, at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, we have to reach an understanding on the question of the period for which such an agreement is to be valid. In our opinion this is an extremely important question. You are well aware of our proposal on this point. To our mind, it provides an appropriate basis for an understanding.

We must also reach an understanding on the question of establishing an all-German committee. As we have already pointed out, we are surprised that, as the discussion at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers proceeds, the attitude of the delegations of the three Western Powers, not to speak of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the proposal for establishing an all-German committee is becoming increasingly cooler. Yet it is common knowledge that at the outset the Western delegations themselves made a similar proposal for the establishment of such a committee. From the very outset we did not oppose the establishment of an all-German committee. We were opposed to the idea of linking together all questions relating to Germany: the problem of European security, the problem of disarmament, etc.; but we expressed a positive attitude to the idea itself of the establishment of an all-German committee.

To the extent that we began to advocate the idea of the establishment of an all-German committee, the Ministers of the Western Powers for their part showed an increasingly cool, so to speak, attitude towards that idea.

In our opinion, this question has not become irrelevant; it is still with us, and if we truly wish to help the two German States to come closer together we cannot but admit that the establishment of such a committee is necessary.

I should like to express my satisfaction at Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's remark to the effect that he appreciated the fact that the Soviet delegation admits the possibility of solving the question of negotiations between the two German States in a manner which would not necessarily provide for the establishment of an all-German committee, and that some other form of negotiation between the two German States would also be possible. We have said from the very outset that we admit also some other acceptable form of negotiation between the two German States. This increases the possibility for reaching agreement on this question. If the idea of a committee, as such, for some reason raises doubts, let us talk about it, let us ponder how we can find some other form acceptable to both German States.

In our opinion, a form unacceptable to one of the two German States cannot be imposed. It is true that, to judge from statements in the Press - I do not know to what extent they reflect the situation accurately - the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is firmly opposed to the idea of negotiations between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. If this expresses the Federal German Government's real position, we can only express our regret. We fear that this appears on the whole to reflect the position of the Federal Republic of Germany, since at our conference no statements have been made giving any ground for assuming that this is not so. If, nevertheless, this is not so, we shall be only too pleased. If the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany adopts a negative position on this question, if it is in principle opposed to any negotiation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic, then what remains for us, the other participants of the negotiations? If all of us favour, in principle, the idea of negotiations on the basis of equality, let us all jointly try to persuade the Federal German Government that such negotiations will not be detrimental either to the Federal Republic of Germany or to the other participants of our conference, or indeed generally to the cause of peace in Europe and throughout the world. Let us by our joint efforts try to persuade to this effect Chancellor Adenauer, Mr. Brentano, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Grewe and the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany as a whole, and all those who have any doubts in this matter.

It is sometimes said that the tasks which we propose as the aims of the work of an all-German committee - or, should some other form of negotiation be adopted, as the aims of the negotiations between the two German States - are unsuitable. It seems to us, however, that such doubts are unfounded and unconvincing. We consider that during these negotiations the question of a peace treaty should be discussed. Why does this proposal give rise to doubt? No one can deny the Germans the right to express an agreed point of view of the two German States on the question of a peace treaty. I remember that at one of our talks Mr. Herter said something like this: the United States cannot agree to a situation in which the question of a peace treaty would be considered by the Germans and not by the great Powers, the victors of the past war. We explained at the time, and we now deem it necessary to repeat, that consideration of the question of a peace treaty by means of negotiations between the two German States is not the last stage, but is only one of the stages in the preparation and the conclusion of a peace treaty. After the Germans - if they should reach agreement among themselves - have presented their common point of view on the question of a peace treaty, the great Powers, and all other States which, with their armed forces, took part in the war against Germany - provision is made for this in the Soviet proposals - should consider the question of a peace treaty and should sign such a treaty after agreement has been reached.

There is consequently no danger whatsoever of the Germans reaching agreement among themselves on some basis which would be detrimental to any great Power or all the three great Powers - there can be no question of that. Such a danger is completely excluded.

In these circumstances, what reasons are there for opposing the idea that one of the tasks of negotiations between the two German States should be the consideration of the question of a peace treaty and the presentation, if this should be possible, of an agreed, joint point of view on the question of a peace treaty? Taking the whole of this into account, it seems to me that everyone would merely stand to gain from a situation in which the Germans would present their agreed point of view on the question of a peace treaty.

Let me now turn to the question of German unity. Much has been said about this, both during our conference and outside it and also in the exchange of Notes between our Governments. The Western Powers have publicly declared that they

attach great importance to the question of German unity. You are fully aware of the Soviet Government's position on this question, and there is accordingly no need for us to state that position again. Briefly, however, I can say that it amounts to this: questions relating to German unity cannot be solved by other Powers, other States - these questions can be settled, and agreement on them can be achieved, only by the Germans themselves, because this is a German question, and this is particularly so in the existing situation, when there are two German States, whether some people like this or not.

The question arises: why should it be bad if in an all-German committee, or in some other form, the two German States consider steps to solve the problems of German unity? There is nothing bad in this. If, as a result of the negotiations which they will enter into, the Germans make progress in the matter of German reunification, this would merely benefit both the Germans themselves and the other States and the cause of peace as a whole.

All this, it seems to us, is not difficult to achieve. But we have repeatedly told the Western Powers that they talk about wishing to promote the reunification of Germany and at the same time oppose any steps intended to bring the two German States closer together.

However, inasmuch as the Governments of the Western Powers are still opposed, at least judging from their officially declared position, to a rapprochement between the two German States, their positions on this problem are still contradictory - to put it mildly - inconsistent, and we are compelled to note this afresh.

I should like to express the hope - and I wish to say so to Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville - that the Ministers of the three Western Powers have not said their last word on this question, that they will still weigh this question, still ponder it, and that they will perhaps also reach the conclusion that negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany are feasible in some acceptable form on the basis of equality and that such negotiations would not only not be detrimental to any of our countries but, on the contrary, serve a useful purpose.

We shall be glad to hear the views of the representatives of the Western Powers if and when they have any suggestions.

We have held the view that the question of an interim agreement on West Berlin and the question of the establishment of an all-German committee are related, that a link between these two questions is not artificial, but logical, imposed by reality itself. We spoke of this at the previous session, and I shall therefore not repeat what I said.

We consider that agreement on these two questions - which are linked by reality - would be useful for a satisfactory settlement of either question and for all of us.

I now turn to the question of the strength of the armed forces in West Berlin. We have said that the Soviet Government attaches great importance to this question, on which agreement must be reached at our Meeting of Foreign Ministers. We also have to reach agreement on the question of ending the subversive activities carried on from West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist States. It is common knowledge that attempts have been made to complicate this question by various reservations. We feel, however, that even those who have recourse to such reservations know perfectly well where in reality - if we speak of Berlin - such subversive activities originate.

Reference has also been made here to that part of the Soviet proposal which relates to the need to prohibit the stationing of atomic and rocket weapons in West Berlin.

On the whole, if we understand the position of the Western Powers correctly, here, too, it seems to us, there is a basis for an understanding.

We should therefore reach agreement on this question also at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

There are thus quite specific questions on which we should exchange views from a practical angle and reach agreement. I may, of course, be told that we have exchanged views more than once. This is true. We have done so more than once. But we are now calling for a practical discussion of these questions, taking as our starting point the need for reaching a definite understanding. We have already been discussing these questions, but often this was done in such a way - particularly at the so-called private meetings - that the same questions were asked and the same answers were given. Matters progressed very slowly. Not

everything, of course, depends on us, but so far as anything depends on us we are calling for a more practical approach to the matter and for a speedier settlement of the question.

As regards the manner of discussion, it is hardly very important whether these questions are debated at open or at restricted meetings. If there is a desire to reach agreement, the manner of conducting the negotiations will not raise any difficulty.

I cannot refrain from making a few comments in connexion with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's and Mr. Herter's statements.

For some reason Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, referring to the first question which we asked yesterday, saw fit to call this question a joke. I would remind you that our question was this: how are we to explain the fact - I am not quoting but merely giving the contents of the question - how are we to explain the fact that the Governments of the Western Powers have still not replied to the latest Soviet proposal? I do not know by what approach to the matter it would be possible to call this question a joke. If we were to follow this example and call your questions jokes - say, for example, the questions asked yesterday by Mr. Couve de Murville - then all questions would have to be called jokes. In that case the answers to them would also have to be regarded as jokes and then we shall have a whole series of jokes. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, of course, knows perfectly well that this is not so. We should like the statements made by any of us at the conference to be treated with respect. I mention this in passing, as I am convinced that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd also knows quite well that he said this, apparently, in the heat of controversy.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd then went on to say roughly this: "I shall ask a few questions and give a few explanations, and if Mr. Gromyko does not refute what I say, I shall consider that matters are as I have said". This is tantamount to drawing conclusions regarding the position of the Soviet Government from what has not been said, rather than from what has been said. We suggest that our position should be understood on the basis of what we say, on the basis of our statements. That is what we do with regard to the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers.

This, too, I mention only in passing.

I hope that the remarks I have made today, together with my previous statement, will remove some doubts and obscure points, if Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had any. If there remain any other points that are not clear we can have a further exchange of views on the questions under discussion, since we have not met for the last time today.

Mr. Herter today saw fit to recall some of the history of the Berlin question, but we cannot, of course, agree with his presentation of history. It is not the Soviet Union that has created the so-called Berlin crisis; the crisis was created by the situation existing in Berlin. The situation is such that fourteen years after the end of the war an occupation régime still exists in that city. This is the main reason for the difficult and at times dangerous situation that has developed in West Berlin. Mr. Herter says that also in future we have to reckon with the possibility of the situation in Berlin getting worse and with the possibility of some new crisis arising in connexion with the Berlin question. I must say that the Soviet Government is, on the contrary, precisely seeking to preclude that possibility, to prevent such a situation from arising in the future, and it is this end that our proposals are intended to serve.

It seems to us that this may be achieved by means of an understanding - and we have repeatedly said that we prefer this method - between the participants of this conference on certain agreed steps in regard to the Berlin question. It was for this purpose that we submitted our proposals for an interim agreement on the question of West Berlin and the establishment of an all-German committee.

In his statement Mr. Herter said that during the exchange of views on the Berlin question we made statements to the effect that any agreement on the question of West Berlin should remain in force until the reunification of Germany. I must correct this statement of Mr. Herter's and provide some necessary clarification. You cannot deny that when we spoke about this question we pointed out that it was possible to come to an agreement which would remain in force until German reunification. But we made it clear all along that we had in mind a solution agreed among the participants of the conference on the basis of an understanding reached between us. When we spoke of measures that would remain in force until German reunification we spoke of specific measures. What were they? Our proposal for the establishment of a Free City of West Berlin fully met the requirements set forth.

At that time our proposal for an interim agreement on West Berlin had not yet been made. At that time you had before you only our proposal for the establishment of a Free City of West Berlin:

I merely wished to remind the Ministers of the position as it really was:

Let me now turn to the rôle of the United Nations. We stressed repeatedly that the Soviet Government is prepared to include the United Nations in an agreement on guarantees of the status of the Free City. I think that all of you will remember as well as I do that we were speaking of giving the United Nations a part in supervising compliance with an appropriate agreement on guarantees in connexion with the Soviet Government's proposal for the establishment of a Free City of West Berlin. We very much regret that both the question of guarantees and the idea of giving the United Nations a part in supervising observance of the guarantees, of the implementation of the system of guarantees, were left suspended and were not supported by the Western Powers. These questions are, of course, interrelated. The position of the Western Powers on one question flows from their position on the other question. Finding the proposal for a Free City unacceptable, the Western Powers concluded that the inclusion of the United Nations was unacceptable, too.

We regret both these attitudes. When we speak of bringing in the United Nations, the question must be considered in specific connexion with the purpose for which it was proposed to include the United Nations. After all, you would not agree to giving the United Nations a part in supervising United States military bases and military bases in other countries. You would express surprise and ask: what has supervision over bases to do with the United Nations? We spoke of the United Nations and the part it was to be given in connexion with a specific proposal.

Mr. Herter hinted that the question of giving the United Nations a part in discharging certain functions may be taken up again in future, that we may revert to this question. We cannot say anything about this because we do not know in what connexion it is proposed to revert to it. Perhaps we shall do so when we consider the question of a Free City and of defining the functions of the United Nations in supervising the status of the Free City. I repeat, I cannot

say anything about this because I do not know in what connexion it is proposed to revert to the question of bringing in the United Nations.

These are the points we wished to make at this meeting. We should like to end with the appeal with which we began: let us move the discussion into practical channels, having regard to the need for reaching an understanding on specific questions relating to an interim agreement on West Berlin and to the establishment of an all-German committee, or the adoption of some other method of negotiation acceptable to us all, on questions which concern both German States and, as it seems to us, cannot but concern each of the States represented at this conference, and not those States alone.

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Женева

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RM/DOC/61  
22 July 1959  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A. A. GROMYKO  
20 July 1959

First of all, I should like to deal with some of the latest remarks made by Mr. Grewe, and, precisely, with the statement that the proposal which the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Western Powers have submitted today for the consideration of the conference, meets the wish of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. That, apparently, is actually the case. This circumstance alone speaks for itself. If nothing else could be said about this proposal, this statement alone of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany shows what purpose this proposal answers. We all know what the position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany amounts to, both on the question of a peace treaty and on the question of the unity of Germany. During the whole of our conference the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany has not had a good word to say for our proposal regarding a peaceful settlement with Germany, nor for the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the establishment of an all-German committee, a proposal aimed at assisting the rapprochement of both German States, or for several other proposals on which we are convinced there is a possibility of reaching agreement, if, of course, there is a desire to do so. We very much regret that the situation has come about in which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is putting more and more obstacles in the way of agreement between the Governments in question. It seems to us that the only people who are likely to be delighted

with such a situation are those public leaders in Western Germany who are opposed to a peaceful settlement, to whom the interests of a peaceful settlement in Europe, European security and the true interests of German unity are of no concern.

I should like to make a few brief remarks regarding the new proposal of the Western Powers, with the reservation that since it is only today that we have heard about this proposal we reserve the right to state our views concerning it later on, if necessary, in more detail. Nevertheless, it is necessary to state even now, at least basically, our attitude to this proposal in order that the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers may be in no doubt as to our position and that all of us may have a more accurate idea of where we stand in connexion with this proposal.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that the proposal which has been submitted today for the consideration of our conference, and the proposal which was submitted by the Soviet Government in agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic and in face of categorical objections on the part of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, are based on completely different approaches, and on completely different principles. We must not lose sight of this fact and much less ignore it when discussing the question of how negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany could be arranged or how it would be possible to contribute towards the solution of the problem of a peaceful settlement with Germany, as well as the problem of re-establishing the unity of Germany.

It is not quite clear to us why the representatives of the Western Powers are trying, as their statements show, to make it appear that the only difference between these proposals is that merely another procedure is now being proposed for the consideration of the relevant questions relating to Germany. In other words, an attempt is now being made to make it appear that the new proposal of the Western Powers merely concerns the question of procedure for the consideration of particular questions relating to Germany. It seems to us that these attempts do not reflect the actual situation and are groundless. It is a question of absolutely different, I would say, diametrically opposed approaches to the solution of the problem of how such questions as that of a peaceful settlement with Germany and that of German unity should be considered.

The Soviet Government's proposal provides that the four Powers should render definite assistance to the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany with a view to making it easier for them to enter into the appropriate negotiations. We on our part have submitted a proposal concerning the tasks of such negotiations, as well as concerning the specific questions which should be discussed in the course of such negotiations, namely, the questions of a peace treaty, German unity and contacts. The Soviet Government's new proposal provides precisely for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The proposal of the Western Powers, however, provides for something absolutely different, namely, that all these questions, such as the question of a peace treaty and the question of German unity, should be put into the hands of the four Powers. Both German Governments would thereby be deprived of the opportunity of considering these questions by means of negotiations. We may be told that since it is proposed to have the present Geneva conference continue its work for a long time in the future, consequently the representatives of both German States, in the capacity of advisers, will also have the opportunity of expressing their views in regard to these questions. But all this does not in the least settle the question under consideration, because in that way it is proposed to put this question into the hands of the four Powers and to deprive the Germans themselves of the opportunity of discussing it and, if it should be possible, of presenting on the questions of a peace treaty an agreed point of view, which we, the great Powers, could take into account when the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is finally settled.

As regards the other main problem, the question of German unity, it hardly needs to be said that our approach to this question differs radically from that of the Western Powers. We are convinced - and this follows from the situation that has developed in Germany - that German unity can only be achieved organizationally through a rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

That, in brief, is the difference between the proposal submitted by us on the question of an all-German committee and the proposal submitted today on behalf of the Western Powers.

It seems to us that if we wish at least to understand where we stand today in connexion with this proposal, we should first of all realize that there is a radical difference between these two proposals and that they are based on absolutely different principles. Of course, someone or other is pleased with this situation; the persons who are pleased with it are those who do not want a settlement either in regard to a peace treaty or in regard to the question of German unity. But we frankly express our dissatisfaction in this respect, since the Soviet Government is sincerely striving to render assistance to the two German States in solving the problem of German unity. As regards the question of a peace treaty, we are prepared at any time to co-operate with the other great Powers and with the Governments of both German States with a view to concluding a peace treaty with Germany as speedily as possible.

We have repeatedly emphasized that, in submitting our proposal for the establishment of an all-German committee, we admit the possibility of choosing other ways of arranging for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, which would be acceptable to all the participants of our conference and, above all, to both German States. We note with satisfaction the statements made by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Herter to the effect that they have observed elements of flexibility in the Soviet Government's position on this question. It is a very good thing that this flexibility has been observed. It is absolutely clear, however, that you under-estimate the significance of the flexibility of the Soviet Government's position on this question. As regards the proposal submitted today for the consideration of the conference, one may say that you are simply disregarding the existing possibilities contained in the Soviet Government's proposal regarding an all-German committee or (I stress this word) regarding some other possible and acceptable method of arranging for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is sometimes said to us: name such acceptable methods of arranging for negotiations. We have named one of them. I can repeat briefly what we have said, namely: in our opinion one of such methods might be negotiations initiated here in Geneva between the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, but without any control or supervision on the part of

the great Powers, negotiations which could be continued in other places or in another place, by agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. We have in mind negotiations which would be conducted on the basis of parity, on the basis of equal rights. But apparently this method turned out to be not altogether suitable to the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers, since, judging from all the evidence, they have not shown any interest in this proposal. Well then, let us try to find some other acceptable method which would be a basis for agreement both between us and between the two German States. We do not refuse to seek for some other acceptable methods of arranging for negotiations. But it is impossible to regard the proposal which has been submitted here today, as an indication of a desire to find some other acceptable method, since, as we have already pointed out, the Western proposal and our proposal are based on absolutely different and diametrically opposed principles. Of course, if we are going to conduct negotiations in that way it will be very hard to find any common language.

In general it must be pointed out that the idea of an all-German committee has undergone, as we have already indicated, an amazing metamorphosis. At the beginning, the representatives of the Western Powers put forward the question of establishing an all-German committee. True, they linked this question, quite unjustifiably, with other questions, including the problem of disarmament, the problem of European security and several other problems. Subsequently the Soviet Government, on its part, submitted its well-known proposal on this subject. But as soon as we submitted this proposal, the interest of the Western Powers in the idea of establishing an all-German committee immediately began to abate.

If it was possible to put forward this proposal artificially linked, quite unjustifiably, with other problems, then why is it impossible to accept an appropriate decision regarding an all-German committee or some other acceptable form of negotiation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany without an artificial link with other problems? It seems to us that if the idea of an all-German committee was good at the beginning of our negotiations, it cannot be bad today. We do not refuse either tomorrow or after tomorrow to seek for some other acceptable method of arranging for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of

Germany on the basis of the principle of parity and equal rights. But we must recognize that any proposal such as that which has been submitted today cannot, of course, be a basis for agreement on this question, since the Soviet Government can in no case agree to the four Powers taking into their hands the question of the unification of Germany. We have repeatedly stated that this question can only be settled through a rapprochement between the two German States.

Of course, if we go so far in the proposals concerned as to base them on the internal systems existing in the German Democratic Republic and in the Federal Republic of Germany, there will not be any basis at all for any solution nor even for a fruitful discussion of the relevant questions.

The system existing in the German Democratic Republic is not to the liking of many public leaders in the capitalist countries. That is well known to everybody. This system is particularly not to the liking of the States Members of NATO, which have drawn Western Germany into their military group. On appropriate occasions we have repeatedly stated our attitude to the system existing in Western Germany. But if today we are going to base our positions on our attitude towards the internal systems in the German Democratic Republic and in the Federal Republic of Germany, we shall not be able to move a single step forward. Furthermore, the reason why, strictly speaking, we are discussing the question of an all-German committee or of other acceptable forms of negotiation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany or the problem of a fruitful examination of questions relating to Germany is that two German States are in existence and that their systems are different, that their internal conditions and social structure are not alike. If this were not the case, there would not be any question of the need for a rapprochement between the two German States, there would not be, in any case, any complications and difficulties in this question and, consequently, there would probably not arise, at least in the form in which it has arisen, the question of the need to arrange for negotiations between the two German States. The reason why we are seeking for possibilities of arranging for such negotiations is that there is an enormous difference between the system existing in the German Democratic Republic and the system existing in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Hence it seems to us that it would be better to leave aside this aspect of the question. If I were to follow Mr. Herter's example, I could say much more regarding the internal system of the Federal Republic of Germany both as regards liberty and as regards other characteristics of the internal system of the Federal Republic of Germany. But I do not think that that would be useful. We should have no difficulty on our part in finding strong words for these characteristics. But that would hardly contribute to bringing about a businesslike atmosphere in our conference. This is not the first time that we have spoken about this. We spoke about this at the beginning of our conference when the relevant questions were being discussed. Our conviction has not changed. Unfortunately I note that, on and off, attempts are being made to exacerbate our discussion. We should like to prevent this in the future.

It has been said here that the proposals of the Western Powers are in accordance with the principle of liberty. It seems to us, however, that such a statement misses the mark. How can the new proposal of the Western Powers be reconciled with the principle of liberty for the German people? What sort of liberty is it, when the Germans are denied the opportunity of sitting at the same table and discussing the questions existing between them? What sort of liberty is it, when it is proposed that the Western Powers should take into their hands questions which are of interest above all to the Germans themselves?

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has referred to the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR at Szczecin on 17 July, with the reservation that in his opinion he was citing it correctly. I must say that you, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, gave on the whole a correct quotation from the statement made by the Head of the Soviet Government, but in quoting it you draw incorrect inferences. You try to draw the inference that the Soviet Government under-estimates the significance of a settlement of the problem of German unity. Nothing of the sort. The Head of the Soviet Government pointed out that there are two German States in existence - the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany - and that this fact must be taken into account. There are two independent German sovereign States in existence. The Soviet Union, together with other socialist States, has assumed in regard to the German Democratic Republic definite obligations under the Warsaw Treaty and is determined to carry them out exactly and to the end, like all other obligations. It is impossible not to take all this into account. It is to this that the Head of the Soviet Government drew attention. But it would be wrong to

make this appear as though the Soviet Government thereby underestimates the significance of the question of German unity. Our proposal regarding an all-German committee which is aimed at a rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany shows precisely that we attach significance, and moreover great significance, to this question, but we are in favour of approaching realistically the solution of the problem of German unity.

That, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, is how the matter stands in regard to the statement made by the Head of the Soviet Government at Szczecin on 17 July.

I think that the preliminary remarks which we have made will suffice for the start. As I have already stated, we reserve the right to revert once again, if necessary, to this proposal of the Western Powers, but we should like the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers to have, from the very outset, a clear idea of our position in regard to their proposal, so that there may not be any illusions on this score.

Briefly, I should like to conclude my statement by expressing the wish that a search be made for such methods of negotiation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany as would be acceptable to all of us and at the same time would not be based on the one-sided approach to these questions which is manifested in the latest proposal of the Western Powers.

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RM/DOG/62  
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STATEMENT MADE BY MR. A. A. GROMYKO  
AT THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

22 July 1959

At our conference there has been going on for some time now an exchange of views on the possibility of arranging for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, for the purpose of examining questions of vital importance to the German people such as the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the working out of measures for the restoration of national unity and the development of contacts between the two German States.

In the course of this conference the Soviet delegation has repeatedly shown the need for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, both from the standpoint of the problem of strengthening peace in Europe and from the standpoint of the national interests of the German people, and it is now hardly necessary to deal with this question in detail. Moreover, none of the participants of the Meeting has denied the importance of a peace settlement with Germany.

The Western Powers, however, have not gone beyond this admission. As soon as the conference began to consider specific proposals intended to provide a businesslike basis for the solution of the problem of a peace treaty with Germany, two diametrically opposed approaches to this problem at once emerged. On the one side, there was manifested a steadfast desire to set about a practical solution of the task of a peace settlement without any delay, on the basis of the actual situation which has developed in Germany. On the other side, there was a manifest tendency to evade the conclusion of a German peace treaty by every possible means, to defer any decision on this problem for an indefinite period.

These two divergent policies were also reflected in the statements of the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany at this conference. It would seem natural in such a situation that the representatives of the two German States should get together and try to consider possible means for overcoming the existing disagreement and for working out a single German standpoint on the question of a peace treaty. What objection can there be to this? Would it perhaps in any way be detrimental to the four States which bear the primary responsibility for a peace settlement with Germany? Not at all. On the contrary, negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic would merely be useful both for the Germans themselves and for the great Powers, because they are interested in the strengthening of peace in Europe.

However, to judge by all the evidence, the Governments of some Powers do not desire either the normalization of relations between the two parts of Germany or the restoration of healthy conditions in Europe as a whole. It looks as if they are frightened at the very idea that it might be possible to take any step in that direction. How is this to be explained? Apparently, there can be only one explanation: the Governments of the Western Powers intend, today and in the future, to follow a policy designed to maintain the heavy burden of the aftermath of the past war, which is exacerbating relations between many States, including particularly the Great Powers, and to maintain unsettled conditions in Europe,

At the present time the question of a peace settlement with Germany is a good yardstick for measuring the sincerity of the statements of various Governments regarding their desire to reduce international tension and to bring about conditions for a durable peace, because the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is inseparable from the accomplishment of these aims. One would like to think that the Governments of the Western Powers will most seriously weigh the consequences to which their negative attitude to this vital question may lead.

The Soviet Government's proposal for negotiations between the two German States provides for discussion between the representatives of the two parts of Germany, also of the problem of German reunification. We are persistently pressing for negotiations and a rapprochement between the two German States because in the present situation there is no other way at all to restore German unity. If anyone pretends that a reunification of Germany can be achieved by outsiders, can be brought about from outside by means of issuing some sort of instructions to the Germans, this can only be make-believe.

Any projects which ignore the fact of the existence of the two German States - States which have developed, moreover, in different directions for many years - are known beforehand to be impracticable, and are unrelated to the actual situation in Germany and in Europe and can in fact only serve the purpose of placing additional obstacles in the path of German reunification.

The sole approach to the restoration of German unity now lies in a rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. We have said this before, we are saying it now and we shall continue to say so in future. To assert otherwise would ignore existing reality and would be intended merely to throw dust in people's eyes.

It should be pointed out that a realistic understanding of how the reunification of Germany can be achieved in the present situation is now increasingly gaining ground even in the West, also among important Government leaders of the Western Powers. We can merely regret that there is complete silence on this point here at Geneva, apparently on the assumption that our conference is not a suitable place for the exposition of such sober views. Yet where else except at this conference which is considering problems relating to Germany, should the language of realism be spoken, the language of a sober assessment of the situation in the search for approaches to an agreement on questions affecting the vital interests of the German nation and of great importance for the maintenance of peace in Europe?

The Soviet Government, it will be remembered, is also proposing that one of the subjects for consideration at the negotiations between the two German States should be the question of developing contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The proposals submitted at this Meeting by the Western Powers also referred to contacts. The statements of the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers and particularly of the representative of the Federal Republic made it clear, however, that they understand the question of contacts between Germans in their own way. They would like to talk only about relations of a strictly technical nature which have in any case long existed between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic.

The fact, however, that such problems as a peaceful settlement with Germany and reunification are still unsolved calls for the promotion of contacts of a totally different kind between the two German States. How can the Germans work out

a common attitude to these basic problems, if contacts between the two parts of Germany are confined, as has been suggested here, to such questions as tramways and postal and telephone communications? At present the situation is such that the Adenauer Government, with the support of the three Western Powers, shies away from any proposal which opens up the possibility of businesslike negotiations between the Germans on questions of really common national significance for them.

We have heard it said here that if the Germans were to enter into negotiations, either in an all-German committee or in any other way acceptable to them, this would even lead to a deepening of the division in Germany. It is amazing what groundless arguments the adversaries of a rapprochement between the two parts of Germany resort to in trying to present their attitude in a more favourable light. How would the division be deepened if a joint German platform is to be worked out on questions relating to a peace treaty and to German reunification? Since when has the removal of disagreements between Germans come to mean a "deepening of the division" of Germany? Such logic is utterly unsound.

Even if one is an extreme pessimist and assumes the very worst, namely, that as a result of such negotiations the representatives of the two parts of Germany will not be able to find a common language, the situation would remain the same as it is now. But even in this case there would be an advantage in the negotiations, because the two sides would begin to understand one another's position better and would more clearly see the difficulties they have to overcome. But why should we necessarily assume the very worst?

The arguments regarding some sort of deepening of the division of Germany in the event of negotiations between the Germans are thus artificial from beginning to end and merely show that the arsenal of the adversaries of any rapprochement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany has completely run out of weapons.

What are we to infer from the fact that the Governments of the Western Powers, not to speak of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, persistently oppose the establishment of an all-German committee or the holding of any negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic in some other form acceptable to them? The inference is clear: they are opposed both to the conclusion of a peace treaty and to German reunification, although in words they are not averse to displaying their concern for the settlement of these problems, particularly the problem of German unity.

One cannot both speak of one's desire for German reunification and at the same time oppose any step for a rapprochement between the two German States.

Recently the delegations of the Western Powers submitted here the proposal that instead of arranging for direct negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers should be converted into some sort of permanent institution within the scope of which perpetual negotiations - with no time-limit whatsoever - would be held; the great Powers would concern themselves with the consideration of purely German problems, relating to the reunification of Germany, while the representatives of the German Democratic Republic and of the Federal Republic of Germany would discharge the auxiliary duties of "advisers".

We have already made quite clear our position on this proposal of the Western Powers. We are not criticising it merely from a desire to argue, but because it not only cannot lead to a settlement of the problems before us but also does not move matters forward one inch. Only the enemies of a peace settlement with Germany and of German unity can be gratified at the submission of this proposal - and only they are expressing their gratification.

In this proposal we find, strictly speaking, a clear expression of the Western Powers' basic attitude to the German problem. They would like the Four Powers to sit on top of a sort of pyramid and to dictate their will on such questions as the drafting of German laws, the holding of elections and referendums in Germany, etc., and the Germans would merely appear in the role of obedient executors of this dictate. Yet the authors of these proposals are still talking about freedom for Germany! If this is freedom, it can only be freedom for foreign Powers to impose their decisions on the Germans.

The matter is not changed one iota by the fact that the Adenauer Government and its delegation at our conference are prepared to accept any solution that infringes upon the interests of the Germans in the negotiations on important questions relating to the ways to be taken for Germany's future development, however humiliating such solutions might be for the German people.

Another fact, too, is noteworthy. At the first phase of our conference, the three Western Powers themselves submitted proposals providing, in particular, for negotiations between the representatives of the two parts of Germany on political questions. It is true that under these proposals, the negotiations were to be supervised and directed by the four Powers. But in the present context this is

not important. What matters is that the Western Powers themselves propose political negotiations between the representatives of the two parts of Germany. When, however, a proposal for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany was submitted by the Soviet Union, it was suddenly argued that such negotiations would be harmful and even dangerous, that they would lead to a "consolidation of the German Democratic Republic", to "a deepening of the division of Germany", etc. In other words, what only a few weeks ago was right is, in the view of the Western Powers, wrong today:

What happened is, of course, not that the role of such negotiations could change in the course of a few weeks, but that in the first instance the Western Powers expected to impose their will on the German participants of the negotiations, whereas in the second instance it is proposed that the Germans should discuss their problems and adopt their decisions freely without any pressure from outside, or in other words, that they should not merely carry out the will of others.

In essence, the latest proposals submitted by the Western Powers are intended to prevent the creation of the only possible basis for efforts directed at German reunification. These proposals are of course no basis for discussion. We cannot but conclude that they were submitted not in order to seek a way to agreement, but merely, as is openly admitted in the Western Press, in order somehow to counter the Soviet proposal that negotiations should be arranged between the two German States in some form acceptable to themselves, in order to avoid discussion of that proposal.

We regret that the Soviet Government's proposal for the formation of an all-German committee should have met with a negative response on the part of the Western Powers. We do not, however, wish to give up all hope that a form of negotiation acceptable to both German States will be found. We proposed a number of variants for that purpose, including the establishment, to begin with, of contact between the two German delegations at our conference, such contact thereafter to be continued elsewhere by agreement between the two parties. We have also heard other proposals here. At the last session, Dr. Bolz, the Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic, made a number of suggestions regarding the form of negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. These suggestions, we are convinced, are sufficiently flexible and deserve serious study.

To put it briefly, the question of negotiations between the Germans can in no way be regarded as having lost its urgency. The Soviet delegation, for its part, is prepared to continue its attempts to find an agreed solution to this problem at our conference. We should like to think that the Western Powers will adopt a more constructive attitude in regard to practical ways for bringing the two parts of Germany closer together.

As we have already explained to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, we have no objection to a parallel exchange of views on questions relating to an interim agreement on West Berlin. Such a method of considering the questions before us would enable us to appraise, in a more realistic manner, the difficulties we have to overcome, to elucidate existing possibilities for reaching agreement and to give effect to these possibilities.

In conclusion, I should like to deal with one question relating to an interim agreement on West Berlin.

Speaking of West Berlin and of an interim agreement on this question, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, in his statement of 20 July, wondered what would be the position while a provisional agreement was in force and also during the negotiations which, under the Soviet proposal, were to take place when the agreement had expired. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd asked the direct question whether there was no danger that one of the parties might take unilateral action during that period. A similar question was asked also by Mr. Herter.

We feel that after what we have said in this regard, the Soviet Government's position on this point should be quite clear. In case there should be any doubt, however, I consider it necessary to make the following declaration.

During the period of validity of an interim agreement on West Berlin, and during the negotiations to be held at a meeting of the Governments participating in the Geneva conference, for the purpose of reviewing the question of West Berlin, the Soviet Union will take no unilateral action. We assume, of course, that the other parties to the agreement would not permit any violations of the agreement either.

I hope that there will no longer be any ambiguities on this subject.

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BM/DOC/63  
22 July 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
DELIVERED AT THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

22 July 1959

I would like to speak very briefly, on behalf of the United States delegation, on one matter. And that concerns the linkage which the Soviet Union is seeking to establish between the questions of German unification and an interim Berlin arrangement. This matter was referred to again by Mr. Gromyko in the speech he has just concluded.

This attempted linkage illustrates a very real difference which, I believe, lies at the root of much of the difficulty we are now having in reaching agreement at this conference. That difference arises out of the basic fact that the free world pursues a strategy of consent in international affairs, while the Communists pursue a strategy of duress.

For example, the Soviet Union created this year's Berlin crisis with a threat that, if the Western Powers did not accept their Berlin proposal by 27 May, the Soviets would attempt to extinguish Western rights in Berlin. This was an application of the traditional Communist strategy of duress. It did not succeed.

The Soviet Union is now engaged in another application of this strategy of duress in an effort to capitalize on the Western Powers' desire to end the Berlin crisis.

The Soviet Union is saying, in effect, that it will end the Berlin crisis - for a while - but only at a price. That price is Western acceptance of the Soviet proposal that the problem of a divided Germany be put in the hands of a committee of Communist Germans and free Germans. We are told, at least implicitly, that if this price is not paid - if we do not agree to the formation of this committee - the USSR will try to make our position in Berlin impossible.

If accepted, this Soviet proposal would result in still a third, and even more dangerous, application of the strategy of duress.

The committee of Communist and free Germans would be given but a short time to solve a difficult problem, with which the four Powers have wrestled unsuccessfully since the war. Failure in its task would be assured by the basic fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government and of the so-called German Democratic Republic have made crystal clear that they will never agree to reunification of Germany under conditions which did not assure the communization of the Federal Republic. Such a committee would have no chance of success.

And what is the price of failure?

Significantly, the USSR's proposal for a Berlin arrangement includes the termination of the arrangement at the same time scheduled for the expiration of the life of the "mixed committee". The price for the Federal Republic of Germany and for the Western Powers would thus be another threat to their West Berlin brothers in freedom. The price of failure for the East Germans would, by the same token, be the prospect of another attempt by their Soviet friends to help East Germany annex West Berlin.

This then would be the final element of the three-stage strategy of duress in which the Soviets are now engaged, if we accepted the Soviet proposals for an all-German committee and for an interim Berlin arrangement with the same time-limit.

In devising these proposals, the Soviet Government has constructed an ingenious device whereby it clearly hopes to apply pressure on the Western Allies eventually to accept changes injurious to their rights and interests in respect of either Berlin or Germany - or preferably both.

Mr. Gromyko has made this intent quite evident in the present negotiations.

First, he suggests that the all-German committee be given a year and a half in which to complete its labors. If at the end of that time it fails to agree, then, Mr. Gromyko explains, there will be no point in its continuing to discuss German

unity and the Soviet Union will enter into new negotiations about Berlin, and apparently about a German peace treaty, too, with the Western Powers.

Mr. Gromyko has given us certain assurances that no unilateral action will be taken during these subsequent negotiations. He has been careful, however, to say nothing about what will happen if these negotiations fail - as the Soviet Union can quickly cause them to do.

He has thus refused to give us any assurance that the Soviet Union will not, soon after expiration of the year and a half period which he has proposed, sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic - a treaty which the Soviet Union would then claim extinguished all Western rights in Berlin.

The coincidence of the expiration dates for the interim agreement on Berlin and on the life of the all-German committee must thus, according to Soviet calculation, ensure one of two results.

Either the Federal Republic will capitulate in the all-German committee to any and all demands of the so-called German Democratic Republic in an effort to avert unilateral Soviet action in Berlin, or the Soviet Union will use the lack of progress in the all-German committee as the pretext for confronting the three Western Powers with what the Soviets would expect to be an impossible situation in West Berlin.

In effect, what the Soviet Union is proposing to do is to hold for ransom a whole city - two million human beings. And the Soviet Union even suggests that we should become its unwitting accomplice in this deal by agreeing to the very arrangements which would make this possible.

This, in brief, is why the Soviet Union proposes that the questions of the all-German committee and of any interim agreement on Berlin be inextricably linked.

This in brief also is why the Western Powers reject this linkage.

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ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

STATEMENT MADE BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE  
AT THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

22 July 1959

Mr. Chairman,

At this stage of the discussion I should like merely to make a few remarks, and if we meet again tomorrow I should like to ask permission to go into the substance of the problem now under discussion at greater length.

I say on the substance of the problem now under discussion because it is clear that what we are discussing is the German problem as a whole. I think in this respect that it is right, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union pointed out at our Monday session, to say that there are fundamental divergences between the positions of both sides. I have the impression that we are very far from what appeared to be, or what was put forward as being, at the end of the first phase of the conference or at the beginning of this present phase, the question of this famous all-German committee. The establishment of this committee was put forward as a simple decision of procedure which did not raise any difficulties of principle, since it was proposed by the Soviet delegation, and which thus joined up with a proposal made by the Western delegations themselves in the Plan which they submitted at the beginning of the conference.

That was a way of presenting the matter concerning which I ventured to say, at our session of 15 July, that it did not appear to me to correspond to reality, because as a matter of fact, in proposing the establishment of this all-German committee in connexion with the discussion of the Berlin problem the Soviet delegation reopened the whole discussion on Germany which had been the subject of our debate during the first weeks of the conference in May. Just now when listening to Mr. Gromyko and also when listening to him on Monday, I had the impression of being carried back to about 15 or 20 May, when we were exchanging views on the respective merits of a system which consisted in making two peace treaties with a non-reunified Germany and of a system which would consist in making a peace treaty with a reunified Germany.

That is how, as I ventured to foresee last week, we find ourselves brought back to the beginning of the conference and engaged in discussing all the problems concerning the solution of the German question, and we note once again that the differences in the positions of the delegations are truly fundamental.

If it is desired to resume discussion of this German problem, I have already indicated, and I say so again, that so far as the French delegation is concerned it is quite prepared to agree to it. What it simply would not like, what it could not endorse, is that this discussion of the German problem as a whole should be linked to the discussion of the particular problem of Berlin. As I have already said and as others also have said, those are questions of two entirely different categories. It is not a good method to deal with them together. That can only create confusion and, moreover, it is not possible to establish a link between the solution of the one and the solution of the other.

That is the first remark that I wished to submit anew; I now want to make a second.

Mr. Gromyko has just told us - and it is a statement which each of us cannot but endorse - that he hoped that it would be possible to bring the positions closer together and to find solutions showing agreement between us. But immediately afterwards he gave an example of his possibilities by showing what was the degree of "flexibility" of the position of the Soviet delegation, an example which does not seem to justify these hopes.

He told us in fact that he is ready to envisage, outside the establishment of an all-German committee, any solution which would make it possible to arrange for direct conversations between the two parts of Germany on the problem of reunification and subsequently on that of the peace treaties.

It is a praiseworthy indication of flexibility, but it does not take us very far, because if each of us says that he is ready to show flexibility on the details and on the procedure provided he receives 100 per cent satisfaction on the substance I do not see very well how we shall ever be able to succeed in reaching agreement.

An all-German committee - in the parity conception which has been submitted to us - is a commission of representatives of the two parts of Germany. A discussion at Geneva between the representatives of the two parts of Germany is also a meeting between the two parts of Germany and I do not see how that differs from an all-German committee. Any solution which may be found for arranging for discussions between the two parts of Germany - whatever title will be given to it - will lead exactly to the same result. I do not see how - whether one or the other formula is adopted - it will enable the Western delegations to agree more readily with the views of the Soviet delegation. I should like to say, incidentally, that in submitting last Monday the well-known plan for continuation of the conference, with a view to discussing the whole of the German problem and also to developing contacts between the two parts of Germany, we took care to respect the positions of all concerned. We did not ask Mr. Gromyko to abandon the position which we know he has maintained for a very long time. We also took care where we are concerned not to abandon ours. We consider that as long as we fail to reach agreement the discussion must be continued, but that it is not a good method to ask one party to accept forthwith, 100 per cent, the position of the other.

I had almost the same reaction - and I say this even more incidentally because neither today nor at present is the subject of our discussion the question of Berlin - I say I had the same reaction as I had when I heard our colleague give his reply to the questions which had been put to him previously by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and also, I think, by Mr. Herter in regard to what would happen at the expiration of a possible provisional or interim agreement on Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko has told us:

"During the period of validity of the agreement and during the negotiations which would follow the expiration of this agreement, it is understood that the Soviet Government would take no unilateral action."

That is a statement which it gave me pleasure to hear but which did not surprise me. I have never thought, for my part, that if the Soviet Government concluded

with us any agreement whatever, it could take, during the period of validity of that agreement, any unilateral action that would be contrary to the terms of the agreement. In the same way, I have never thought that when we are in negotiation with the Soviet Government the latter could take, in regard to the question under discussion between us, any unilateral action of any kind.

As a matter of fact, that was not the question that was put. The question put was whether, in the hypothesis that we found ourselves in agreement with the Soviet Government on some interim arrangement for Berlin, that arrangement would mean that during the period of its validity and subsequently, as long as a new agreement was not reached, our status and our rights in Berlin, in so far as they would not be modified by the arrangement concluded, would continue to exist.

That is the question that was put and to which we have not yet received any reply.

Those, Mr. Chairman, are the two remarks that I wished to submit.

I should like to say in conclusion that the French delegation, for its part, has no objection to the conversation being carried on now on the German problem as a whole and that, if it is desired, at our next session, I am quite ready to explain further the position of France on this matter which is so important for Europe and the world.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY MR. SELWYN LLOYD,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

23 July 1959

We have been discussing how to handle the wider German problems. A fundamental difficulty about this arises from the different approach of the two sides to the question of German reunification. The Soviet attitude is that there are now two German States and it is up to these two States to discuss the question of reunification. It concerns them alone. If at the end of a stated period neither German side has changed its views, the question of reunification will be put on one side, the partition of Germany into two separate States will be recognised and separate peace treaties will be signed with those two German States. That is what I understand to be the Soviet position and unless I am contradicted I shall assume it to be so.

The Western objections to this approach to the problem are as follows. First of all, it puts an end to the responsibility of the four Powers. This collective responsibility of the four Powers is something to which in the past the Soviet Government have frequently subscribed. It is not just a legal argument. It is a practical matter. Unless the four Powers actively interest themselves in bringing about German reunification it will not happen.

I wonder sometimes whether we do not confuse ourselves by the words we use. When I talk about it being a four-Power responsibility I do not mean that it is solely a matter for the four Powers. Obviously, it is a matter upon which Germans are entitled to have views, and have strong views, and have means of expressing their views. We cannot dictate to an unwilling German population the form in which their institutions should be modelled or how precisely reunification should be brought about, but we have to assist them and help them and be prepared to take initiatives to do so. And there is the further very practical matter that unless there is agreement in general between the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers reunification will not take place. Therefore my first objection to the Soviet plan is that it appears to be an attempt to remove the matter altogether from the cognizance of the four Powers.

Our second objection to the Soviet proposal is that in view of what I have said earlier there is no incentive to the East German members of the committee to make any concession, or indeed any real attempt to secure agreement in the committee. I say this because in the event of deadlock at the end of the stated period of the discussions in the committee, the D.D.R. would under the Soviet formulation get exactly what it wants, namely, the formal recognition of the East German régime as a separate sovereign State.

There is a third objection which I state in moderate terms, meaning no discourtesy to anybody, but in fact the East German régime's policy is decided in Moscow. The suggestion that it is an independent régime based on the freely expressed wishes of the East Germans bears no relation to the facts. Accordingly, if this idea of an all-German committee were accepted it would mean that the representatives of the Federal Republic would in fact be negotiating with nominees of the Soviet Union. The effect of such an arrangement would be that the United States, France and the United Kingdom would have been skilfully eliminated from the discussions. The Soviet Government say that they want reunification to be settled between Germans and without the intervention of any of the great Powers. In fact what the Soviet Government are proposing is that it should be settled between themselves and the Germans without the intervention of the Western Powers.

Those are three objections to the Soviet proposals.

There is another principle which we believe. That is that the German people must have the fullest say possible in the process of reunification. This is why the West has always insisted that there must be, at the earliest possible moment, free and independently supervised elections throughout the whole of Germany. Only in this way can we discover the genuine wishes of the German people.

This idea was incorporated into the Western Peace Plan. In deference to Soviet views we agreed to postpone free all-German elections for up to two and a half years. We also proposed the formation of a mixed German committee whose essential task was to draft an electoral law for the whole of Germany. But the fundamental difference between the idea of a mixed German committee in our Peace Plan and that of the Soviet-proposed all-German committee is that in our Plan neither side could nullify the work of the committee by refusing to co-operate. In the last resort the German people themselves would make the decisions on how reunification could best be achieved.

I now want to say a word about the position of our negotiations. The 11th of May seems a long time ago. In the British Note of 26 March we defined our conception of the task of the conference as follows:

"The purpose of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting should be to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible, and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer."

We began by an exhaustive attempt to expound the comprehensive plans of both sides - the Western Peace Plan and the Draft Soviet Peace Treaty. After that we turned to the problem of Berlin. That was not remarkable or unreasonable because it was the Soviet Note about Berlin of 27 November which really set up the chain of events which led to the calling of this Foreign Ministers' conference.

In our discussions we have now an interim plan for Berlin sketched out. It is not agreed, but it is there in outline, with certain ingredients in it - force levels, armaments, activities and duration. It is agreed, I think, that during

the period of any such interim arrangements there must be uninterrupted access to West Berlin for military and civilian traffic. So far as what happens at the end of the period, I asked Mr. Gromyko a question about this. I asked him whether I was right in stating the Soviet position in the following terms:

"The Soviet position is that at the end of the period fixed for these interim arrangements, if agreement has not been reached in some way, then we resume these negotiations, and pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations as Foreign Ministers, the situation will remain unaltered. As I understand it, no unilateral action will be taken by either side pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations."

Mr. Gromyko gave the following answer yesterday:

"During the period of validity of an interim agreement on West Berlin, and during the negotiations to be held at a meeting of the Governments participating in the Geneva conference, for the purpose of reviewing the question of West Berlin, the Soviet Union will take no unilateral action. We assume, of course, that the other parties to the agreement would not permit any violations of the agreement either."

I regard that answer as an answer to my question, confirming what I understood to be the Soviet position.

Of course the further point arises which was raised both by Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville yesterday about what happens if there is no agreement in the subsequent negotiations. I want to make it clear, when I say that I regard Mr. Gromyko as having answered my question, that that statement does not mean that I must be regarded as agreeing expressly or impliedly in any shape or form that the Soviet Union have the right at any time to take unilateral action over Berlin. I do not accept the position that our rights can be extinguished by unilateral action by the Soviet Union.

To sum up, at the end of the interim period, if no agreement has been reached in the meantime, we are in exactly the same position as we are in today over rights and everything else to do with Berlin.

I say therefore that there is an interim agreement for Berlin sketched out in outline for us. And I believe that it should be possible here or at some other meeting, perhaps at another level, to get final acceptance of this interim agreement.

The trouble which we are now facing is the relationship of that agreement to wider discussions of the German problem as a whole. We certainly agree that discussions should take place. Mr. Gromyko's position at one stage seemed to be that he insisted that the only way to handle these discussions was in an all-German committee. I have already given reasons why we cannot accept that. At one time, as it was fairly widely known, the Western view was that a new commission should be set up with German advisers to which this matter would be remitted. Mr. Gromyko indicated that that would be unacceptable.

We therefore are now putting forward a method of proceeding which is neither the Soviet proposal nor the original Western idea of which I have spoken. It is a method which permits of complete flexibility and it involves agreement from time to time on how to proceed. Perhaps we may get defined a little more precisely before these meetings are finished as to what the method of proceeding would be. Our formula permits of any combination or permutation of the delegations here in this room today, to meet from time to time for purposes which could be defined precisely or left general.

Nothing is compulsory. Nothing is forbidden. It seems to me an admirable method of handling this matter, of bridging the gulf which is between us over the question of an agreement on interim arrangements on Berlin and the discussion of the wider German problem. I say again that I hope Mr. Gromyko will reconsider his attitude to it.

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STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

23 July 1959

Since our conference was resumed on 13 July we have already on several occasions heard Mr. Gromyko explain the reasons why his Government was asking for the establishment of an all-German committee. I have myself pointed out several times that this proposal raised once again the German problem as a whole, that is to say all the difficulties which we have already discussed at length and on which it has not been possible so far to reach any agreement. I think that it would be useful, in order to make clear the position of the French delegation, to take the question up again now in a precise manner in order to try to determine as objectively as possible the actual situation.

What Mr. Gromyko proposes to us is to arrange, in one way or another, no matter which - and on this point, I have already noted, he shows the utmost goodwill in regard to the choice of the formula - for discussions between the two parts of Germany. The subject of these discussions would be three-fold: reunification, the outlines of a peace treaty, and the development of contacts between both parts. I merely mention the latter point by way of a reminder: it does not seem to be of any interest in itself to the sponsors of the proposal, since it would only be justified to the extent that the political conversations on the two other questions would be accepted. There remain, therefore, reunification and the peace treaty. I shall have something to say on that later on,

but I should like first of all to draw attention to a point which is for the time being, on account of its political consequences, the main one.

It concerns the insistence of the Soviet delegation on bringing face to face, in an inter-governmental conversation, the representatives of the Federal Government of Germany and those of the Pankow régime. That is the first aim that it is intended to achieve, namely, to induce not only the Government of Bonn but also the Governments of the three Powers to give, in the text of an agreement, if not official recognition, at least a sort of international status to an authority which they have hitherto refused to consider as being the valid and authorized representation of the population of Eastern Germany. Thus a régime which has in fact been imposed would be consolidated on the external level. The existence of two Germanies would be sanctioned and there would be no difficulty in passing to the next stage which is, after reunification has been definitely abandoned, the conclusion of a peace treaty with each of the two German Governments thus formally established. I say: after reunification has been definitely abandoned, because that is what the suggestion to assign to an all-German committee the task of discussing the problem comes down to in reality. This suggestion is based on the idea that this is a task which no longer in any way concerns the four ex-Occupying Powers. From the moment that recognition de jure and de facto is given by these Powers to the existing German Governments, it is for the latter to discuss a matter which interests first and foremost the German population.

A first remark which comes to mind immediately is that this Soviet position has the appearance of logic, and it would indeed be in conformity with logic if it were truly a matter of getting the authorized representatives of the German people to discuss their fate and future. We know that this is by no means so, because the Pankow régime is not at all representative. The Western Powers would definitively relinquish the rights and duties which devolve upon them at the present time and finally would agree simply to recognize as legal the permanent division of Germany.

The point at issue, in fact, is that of putting an end to the actual situation which has existed for more than ten years, in which Germany is divided into two absolutely opposed régimes, but in which also, through lack of the legal sanction which is being asked of us today, all the possibilities are safeguarded for the future.

No one can be under the slightest illusion regarding the prospects that would be opened up by negotiations between the two parts of Germany on the reunification of that country. They would be negotiations between interlocutors who speak, despite the appearances, two completely different languages. There is no prospect that it will be possible to find a basis for any agreement between them on what could be the future régime of reunified Germany. This is so well-known that it is suggested to us even now that the solution likely to be envisaged would be that of a sort of vague confederation, letting the two States existing today continue to exist exactly as they are. The negotiation would only be a mere semblance and would end in failure and this failure, arranged in some way beforehand, would make it possible to close definitively the chapter on reunification.

This - it has already been said - is not merely an interpretation of the proposal that has been made to us, but emerges from Mr. Gromyko's statements themselves. An eight month time-limit is proposed for the work of the all-German committee. At the end of this period, if by then agreement has been reached, everything will be all right. But it has already been seen that such an hypothesis is improbable. In reality there will inevitably be an impasse. What will happen then? Well, the four Powers will meet and pass on to the next stage which is that of the preparation and signature of a peace treaty or rather treaties with two sovereign and independent German States. There will no longer be any question of reunification.

All this is abundantly clear. Yet we are being persistently told in reply that the Western Powers themselves proposed the establishment of an all-German committee and that it ill befits them to criticize an idea which is theirs, for the sole reason that the Soviet Government has taken it up and made it its own.

My colleagues of the United States and the United Kingdom and myself have dealt at length with this reply. However, we must revert to it again since we do not appear to have been understood. In the last analysis, I think, the basic difference between the two proposals amounts to this.

The Soviet proposal is to hand the final decision on reunification over to the two existing authorities of the two sides, both of them regarded as representative, that is as having the right to speak and to take decisions on behalf of the German people. No other means are available, if these two authorities do not reach agreement. We know in advance that they will not reach agreement. This no doubt means that the German people, duly represented, do not accept reunification.

The Western proposal, too, provides for discussion between German representatives from either side of the demarcation line. But these representatives are given no powers to take a final and irreversible decision. They are to prepare for the consultation of the authority which is to be the supreme arbiter, namely, the entire German people. This is the essential difference between the Soviet proposal and ours. We do not intend, for our part, to empower any Government whatever to decide on the conditions of reunification. We do not have to side with the one or the other. There is in fact only one arbiter: the German people; it is they who must decide as between Bonn and Pankow; it is they who must say who truly represents them, and it is they who will finally determine their destiny.

This is also why the dispute on whether the Allied Governments still do or do not retain the right to discuss reunification is a false dispute, a mere matter of words and appearance. Things being what they are, this is not the issue. The point is on what method the four Powers will agree in order to arrange for the discussion, and subsequently the carrying out of reunification. It is useless to argue that these Powers are no longer competent to discuss reunification among themselves and thus to impose their will on the German people. They are responsible - and this is not denied by any of us, including Mr. Gromyko - for deciding, as I have said, on the method of reunification, which is the essential decision. According to whatever decision is taken, reunification will or will not take place. The choice is simple: should reunification be entrusted to the two existing German authorities or to the German people on the basis of freely organized elections? The adoption of the first or the second method will determine whether Germany is to remain divided or to be reunited. The Soviet delegation proposes the first method - we, for our part, have always maintained that we could only accept the second.

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RÉUNION  
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Palais des Nations  
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RM/DOC/67  
23 July 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
DELIVERED AT THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

23 July 1959

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset let me ask for your indulgence if in the few remarks that I am about to make I cover some of the same ground which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd just covered so clearly and directly in dealing with the question of the so-called all-German committee. If some of my remarks appear to be repetitive, it is I think only an indication that we feel very strongly on the points which have been brought out during the course of the discussions.

This conference is seized, as you pointed out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, with two separate issues: what should be the procedures for future discussion of the problem of Germany as a whole and what should be the terms of an interim arrangement for Berlin.

Yesterday I indicated why my Government could not accept the Soviet proposal for linking these two problems under an arrangement which would leave the Soviet Union free, after a specified period, to take unilateral action against Berlin if there were lack of progress toward German unity.

Any interim arrangements which thus permitted the Berlin crisis to be revived after a short interval would establish, for all practical purposes, exactly the kind of tie between an interim arrangement for Berlin and the question of German unity which could be exploited to apply pressure both on the German people and the three Western Powers on the two issues.

Since I believe that these two issues - however important each of them may be - should not thus be linked in any conference agreement, I also believe that it would be more orderly for this conference to address them separately. I gather that this procedure is agreeable in view of Mr. Gromyko's statement of yesterday that we should exchange views pertaining to an interim solution on Berlin, in order to evaluate "the difficulties which we have to overcome and to clarify those possibilities which exist in order to arrive at an agreement and to realize those possibilities."

If we are to discuss these two questions separately, I would like today both to conclude my previous discussion of the Soviet proposal for a mixed German committee and to indicate where I believe that this discussion leaves this conference as far as its future work is concerned.

I will begin, Mr. Chairman, by summarizing the principal reasons why the Soviet proposal for a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans is unacceptable to the Western Powers.

Mr. Gromyko has tried to give the impression of surprise at our refusal to agree that such a committee would, as he put it in his proposal of 19 June, "promote the extension and development of contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany."

With an air of reasonableness, he told us that nothing would be more logical than arranging for the Germans to get together to discuss and agree on matters vitally affecting their own future. He went on to suggest that it is only blindness, obstinacy, and revanchist-mindedness which stands in the way of the four Powers reaching agreement on his proposal.

When we pointed out that the outcome of any such confrontation of representatives of the Federal Republic and of the so-called German Democratic Republic would be an early and total deadlock, Mr. Gromyko asked how we could be sure of the outcome before we had given the proposal a trial.

We have explained to Mr. Gromyko that we can be sure of the outcome for the simple reason that the highest personages of the Soviet Government and of the so-called GDR have made crystal clear that they will never agree to the reunification of Germany under conditions which did not guarantee the communization of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The all-German committee, under the terms of reference proposed by the Soviet Union, is thus not worth the trial because the outcome of the experiment is entirely predictable in advance.

It is also not worth the trial for three other reasons:

First, by the device of this proposal, the Soviet Government very cleverly seeks to have its cake and eat it, too.

The Soviet Government tells us that reunification is none of our affair and that we should turn this over to the Germans to work out among themselves. This is a strange position for the Soviet Union to take when its own national interests are so clearly identified with the terms and conditions under which Germany will be reunified.

How does Mr. Gromyko resolve this problem? For, despite all its protests to the contrary, I cannot believe that the Soviet Union is actually willing to renounce its interest in the manner and terms of German reunification.

The answer is very simple if, as Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has pointed out, one understands the relationship between the men who head the régime of the so-called German Democratic Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union. This relationship is such that it is impossible for representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic to pursue a policy which is contrary to that which the Soviet Union considers to be in its own interest.

The negotiation in any all-German committee would thus not be a free one between two free governments. It would be a negotiation between one free Government - the Federal Republic of Germany - and representatives of a régime who were, in fact, only speaking for the Soviet Union.

This leads me to the second of the three reasons we reject the Soviet proposal.

If that proposal were put into effect, the three Western Powers would be compelled to abdicate their responsibility for assuring German reunification under conditions which would enable all Germans freely to determine the form of their own government. This, again, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has developed. Equally important, they would have to abdicate their common responsibility for creating a reunited Germany in a framework of European security which would assure that war would not erupt again in the center of Europe, as it has twice in our own lifetime.

These are responsibilities and interests which the four of us share. They have been confirmed in past four-Power agreements, the latest of which was reached on 23 July 1955, when Chairman Bulganin subscribed, along with President Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden, and Mr. Faure to a document which included the following words: "The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

No one can dispute that this language squarely reserved responsibility for German unification to the four Powers. We do not propose here to enter into an agreement which sets this responsibility to one side.

The Soviet proposal would both maintain the Soviet Union in a position of responsibility and control in regard to German reunification and exclude the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States from exercising the role in this process which their own interests require.

The third reason that we reject the Soviet proposal is because it would amount to our announcing to the world at large that we considered the régime in East Germany to be on a basis of equality with the freely chosen Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This for obvious reasons we are not willing to do, and the Soviet Government knew that we were not willing to do so when it framed this proposal.

For these reasons - as well as because its labors would be doomed to failure from the start - we cannot accept the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee.

There are thus, as I see it, two basic difficulties with which this conference is confronted, apart from the very important problem of the terms of an interim agreement on Berlin.

First, the Soviet Union's insistence which I have just discussed, that we must agree to its proposal for a mixed German committee - or to some variant which would have the same effect.

Second, the Soviet Union's attempt to so arrange matters that the Western Powers will be exposed to unilateral action in Berlin after a specified period, if there is no progress toward German unity.

There is clearly little hope for success of this conference unless each of these obstacles can be overcome.

The Western Powers have made constructive proposals to meet each of these difficulties.

First, they have suggested that the present conference continue its consideration, with German advisers, of the questions of German unification, a peace treaty, and inter-German contacts. This would permit the range of issues that Mr. Gromyko has in mind to be discussed, in such forms as may be judged appropriate, but without abrogating the basic four-Power responsibility that the USSR has repeatedly acknowledged in the past.

Second, the Western Powers have indicated their willingness - whether or not an agreement is here concluded on procedures for future discussions of German unity - to enter into an interim Berlin agreement which is not tied to a coterminous time-period for work on German unification. It should be clear however that the arrangements provided for by such an agreement could be altered, if it came up for review, only by negotiation - not by force. The Western Powers call for consent, rather than duress as the means of possibly revising any temporary Berlin arrangements into which they might enter.

I believe that these Western proposals go far toward meeting some of the views that have been expressed by Mr. Gromyko and that they offer a sound basis for agreement.

I must say, in all candor, however, that I see no evidence that Mr. Gromyko regards them as anything but milestones in a negotiating process that leads inexorably toward agreement on Soviet terms. He appears to mistake the moves that we have made to meet him half-way as signs of weakness, which can be exploited through continuing pressure.

I want to assure Mr. Gromyko, in all seriousness, that this is not the case.

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Palais des Nations  
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RM/DOC/68  
27 July 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A. A. GROMYKO  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

23 July 1959

Mr. Chairman,

As always, we have listened attentively to the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France. Our impression after these statements is that the Governments of the three Western Powers are using a one-sided appraisal in their approach to the Soviet Government's proposal on the question of an all-German committee or other possible forms of negotiation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. They approach the appraisal of this proposal of the USSR absolutely unobjectively, with a plan prepared beforehand, with a conception formed in advance, instead of approaching it with due regard to all that we have said on this question, because it is precisely the Soviet Government or the Soviet delegation which can say best of all what are the reasons and motives by which the Soviet Government is guided in submitting this proposal.

In the main the arguments which have been repeated here are those which have already been put forward repeatedly in connexion with our proposal, but their repetition does not make them any more convincing. Having heard today's statements by the representatives of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, we have come to the definite conclusion that these arguments are just as unconvincing and unfounded as they were before. Many of them show that the representatives of the Western Powers are giving full scope to their feelings of hostility towards the German Democratic Republic rather than to sober assessment of the situation which

has developed in Germany and in Europe. This must be said above all in regard to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's statement that the policy of the German Democratic Republic is allegedly decided in Moscow. He made that statement, obviously, in the hope that the objections against acceptance of the Soviet proposal for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany would in that case look more respectable.

But it seems to us that it is just the reverse. It is not the first time that, in speaking of the friends and allies of the Soviet Union, recourse has been had to the assertion that the policy of the States in question is decided in Moscow. Evidently what is referred to here is the unity of aims, the views held in common in the field of external policy, in the struggle for peace and for reducing international tension. But the Soviet people and the Soviet Government, as well as the peoples of other socialist States, including the German Democratic Republic, take a pride in the unity of our actions in the struggle for peace and the reduction of international tension. And since our internal system has been mentioned, I must say that we are proud of the fact that we are working together for a single aim, namely, the construction of a socialist and communist society in our countries.

We, the Soviet people, and, I am persuaded, the peoples of other socialist States also, including the German Democratic Republic, do not intend to accept or ask for anybody's advice as to what way we should take in advancing the cause of socialist and communist construction.

For this reason we should like to appeal to our colleagues when discussing this question not to give rein to their feelings of hostility towards any particular State, including the German Democratic Republic.

It also seems to us that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, in touching upon this question and resorting to this argument, was paying a definite tribute to propaganda reasons.

Mr. Herter also said something similar. He, for instance, has already resorted more than once to the assertion that if the Soviet Government's proposal for negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, through the establishment of an all-German committee or some other acceptable method is adopted there will arise the danger of "communization" of the Federal Republic of Germany. I do not know why, if the Federal Republic of Germany enters into negotiations with the German Democratic Republic, this would lead to the communization of the Federal Republic of Germany. This question was and remains a riddle.

When the three Powers, in their over-all plan, submitted the proposal for political negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, having moreover in view an artificial link between this question and other questions, this, it appears, did not lead to the "communization" of the Federal Republic of Germany. But if the Soviet Government's proposal providing for the discussion by the Germans themselves of questions relating to the unification of Germany, the conclusion of a peace treaty and contacts is adopted, this, it appears will lead to the "communization" of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Finally, it may be pointed out by the way that this is indeed a fine internal system, namely, in the Federal Republic of Germany, if this internal system, after the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany enter into direct negotiations with the representatives of another State, namely, the German Democratic Republic, will become communist by virtue of this fact alone!

Mr. Herter hinted that the intention to "communize" the Federal Republic of Germany in connexion with the establishment of an all-German committee had been stated in some form by the Soviet Government and its Head. We have already stated that the Soviet Government's position on any particular question, including questions relating to Germany, is not expressed by any particular foreign statesmen or in their communications and interviews which are published in the foreign Press and for which we cannot bear any responsibility, but it is expressed by the representatives of the Soviet Government, the official representatives of the Soviet Union. It is evident from these remarks what value is to be attached to the assertions to which, unfortunately, Mr. Herter has resorted and, moreover, not for the first time. It seems to us that such arguments as those to which recourse has been made during our discussion lowers the level of our debate. We follow attentively the ideas expressed here by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Herter, Mr. Couve de Murville, Dr. Bolz and Mr. Grewe, and we try to draw some conclusion regarding the possibility of reaching agreement at this conference. But when we hear the statements of some Ministers, then there really arises an enigma as to what is uppermost in their statements: the search for possibilities of reaching agreement or the desire to complicate our discussion?

The thought even occurs to us: perhaps we are being deliberately provoked in order to complicate our negotiations and to worsen the situation at our conference. But I will say straight out that, although it is sometimes no easy matter, we have refrained from making such a negative contribution to our discussion.

Mr. Couve de Murville has expressed the view that the German people should be given the opportunity to settle by themselves questions relating to the problem of the reunification of Germany. This thesis is correct, absolutely correct. And the Soviet Government takes precisely as its starting point the need to give effect to this thesis, when it proposes that the four Powers should render assistance to the two German Governments in arranging for negotiations between them. As regards the position of France, of the French Government, in particular at our conference, it is acting, unfortunately, in precisely the reverse direction, for it is quite impossible to reconcile statements concerning the need to give the German people the opportunity of settling by themselves questions relating to the unification of Germany, with the incessant rejection of any step that would facilitate a rapprochement between the two German States. We venture to say frankly once again that the real policy of the Western Powers is not the desire to contribute towards a rapprochement between the two German States and, consequently, towards the solution of the problem of the unification of Germany, but a desire to create and pile up more and more new obstacles in the path to a settlement of this problem, as well as in connexion with the problem of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

These are the remarks that we wished to make in connexion with the statements of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville. Of course, if one desired, one could also dwell on many other arguments and reasonings which have been put forward in these statements, and give tit for tat in the way of sharp words. But we do not think that there is any need for this. We should welcome it if our colleagues also had such an approach to the matter and to our negotiations.

If I have understood the situation rightly, my colleagues, and in particular Mr. Herter, express their willingness to pass on to an exchange of views in regard to an interim agreement on West Berlin. At our session yesterday the opinion was expressed that it would not be a bad thing if we continued in a parallel way to exchange views both on this question and on the question of an all-German committee and other possible forms of negotiation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. As far as we, the Soviet delegation, are concerned, we are prepared to do so today, tomorrow or whenever it suits the other Ministers.

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5 August 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
DELIVERED AT THE TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

5 August 1959

Mr. Chairman,

As we come to the end of the second phase of the Geneva talks, I think that it will be useful to summarize briefly the course of the negotiations and the prospects that lie ahead.

I

I regret that, despite the hopes held at the start of this conference, we have not been able to reach an agreement.

These discussions started in Geneva to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

They took place because the Soviet Union last year suddenly announced that, unless the Western allies accepted its proposal for a change in the status of Berlin, it intended to change the situation in Berlin unilaterally after 27 May.

The three Western Powers rejected this proposal, and stated that no useful discussions could take place against the background of a Soviet strategy of duress.

After the Soviet Union removed the threat by indicating that the date of 27 May was not significant, the four Powers agreed to meet in Geneva to try to deal with these problems through negotiation. This is what I call a strategy of consent.

The Western Powers approached this task in good faith. They genuinely sought to find an agreed solution to the problem which the Soviets had raised. They continued this effort, earnestly and vigorously, for the better part of the last three months.

## II

The conference agenda gave first place to the question of Germany. The Western Powers agreed that this question was of overriding importance. At the start of the meeting, they proposed a Western Peace Plan to achieve German reunification through the free choice of the German people. This Western Peace Plan was acclaimed throughout the world as a constructive offer.

The Soviet Union never gave this plan a moment's serious consideration.

The reason was clear: The Soviet Union knew that German reunification in freedom would end Communist rule in East Germany.

Instead, the Soviet Union proposed, in effect, that the four Powers formalize the division of Germany by signing separate peace treaties with the two parts of Germany. This the Western Powers refused to do.

## III

The Foreign Ministers then turned to the question of Berlin to see if they could agree on an interim Berlin arrangement.

A good deal of the time in those negotiations was spent in an effort to find out what Mr. Gromyko's position was on certain points. On the central problem of "rights" we never did succeed in finding out. This made our talks more like a research expedition than that free interchange of views, which is necessary to fruitful results.

This Soviet manner of negotiation may have resulted from the contradiction between the Soviet Union's ostensible and actual purposes in this conference.

The Soviet Union is, as far as I can determine, not really interested in "improving" the situation in Berlin. It is interested in getting the Western Powers out of Berlin. Apparently continued competitive co-existence of freedom and Communism in Berlin is unrewarding to the Soviet Union.

The key to our differences about Berlin is thus not so much in the specific issues we have discussed as in the basic question of whether or not the West Berliners are to remain free.

The Soviet proposals to date have seemed to us to be designed gradually to annex these people to the Communist system against their will. This cannot be permitted.

We are willing to enter into an interim arrangement with the Soviet Union which will assure a continued prospect of freedom for Berlin. Such an interim arrangement might include five elements, which I shall discuss in turn.

IV

First, force levels in Berlin.

We proposed statements noting the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin and making known the intention of the Western Governments to limit their forces in West Berlin to their present level and to consider from time to time the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit.

The Soviet Union refuses to accept any reference to its projected withdrawal of forces from Berlin - another indication of its consistent position of non-reciprocity - and proposes to drastically reduce our forces in West Berlin below the approximately 11,000 men now stationed there.

Why is the Soviet Government so anxious to reduce these forces drastically?

The Soviet Foreign Minister says that Western forces should be only symbolic. The total Communist forces in East Germany are of the order of 500,000 men, not counting another 350,000 so-called Workers' Militia. In other words, Western forces in Berlin are less than 2% of the forces that surround them.

Clearly, the Soviet Union is proposing a drastic reduction of Western forces not for the reason given, but as the first step toward total withdrawal of Western forces. When the period specified in an interim agreement had expired, it would then call for still another reduction. And so on, until we no longer had any forces in Berlin.

This situation would not be substantially altered by a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Berlin. These forces would merely be stationed a few miles outside the city limits. To withdraw Western forces from Berlin would be an entirely different matter.

The real difference between the Soviet Union and the Western allies is thus not as to the level of Western forces in Berlin. It is whether Western forces should stay in Berlin, or eventually be withdrawn.

We are determined that adequate Western forces will stay in Berlin as long as they are wanted by the peoples of West Berlin and are essential to their protection.

V

The second element of a possible interim Berlin arrangement involves the arms for the forces in Berlin.

The four Powers are agreed in principle that nuclear weapons and missile installations shall not be located in West Berlin. Some differences over phraseology still exist, but should not prove impossible to resolve. The Western Powers have never had the slightest interest in or intent to deploy such weapons in West Berlin. This provision was added to the Western proposal for an interim Berlin arrangement specifically to meet asserted Soviet concerns.

VI

The third element of an interim arrangement involves restraints on certain unfriendly activities in Berlin.

The Western proposal is that measures should be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in, the internal affairs of others.

The Secretary General of the United Nations would be requested to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any propaganda activities which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing principles. And the four Governments would consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

The Soviet Union's position on such activities differs from this Western proposal in two major respects:

First, the Soviet Union suggests much more extensive restraints on activities in West Berlin than in East Berlin. We insist that both parts of the city be treated even-handedly.

Second, the Soviet Union proposes that a four Power commission have the right to "supervise" and "assure the implementation" of restraints on West Berlin without any corresponding inspection of East Berlin. This proposal is obviously unacceptable because of its discriminatory nature.

We recognized, however, the desirability of some inspection machinery. To meet this need and thus narrow the difference between the Soviet Union and

ourselves on this point, we added to our proposal the suggestion for a UN presence in Berlin which I have described.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's rejection of this proposal and his labelling it as "artificial" in our private sessions has been, to my mind, one of the more regrettable results of this conference. If there is ever to be real progress toward peace based on justice, there must surely be a strengthening of the main instrument that is available to us for international co-operation - the United Nations. In walking away from any possibility of a UN role under an interim Berlin arrangement, the Soviet Union has evidenced an attitude toward the United Nations which cannot help but make the search for peace more difficult.

#### VII

The fourth element involved the question of the duration of any interim agreement on Berlin and the position at the end of that agreement.

The Soviet Union's presently avowed aim is to "change" existing Berlin rights and responsibilities. Since we are determined that this aim shall not be achieved without our consent, it was important that the Western Powers have some assurance that any arrangements here agreed upon did not have that automatic effect.

It will be recalled that the interim agreement offered to the Soviet Union on 16 June was to last until the reunification of Germany. And in the preamble to that agreement it was recognized that:

"\* \* \* pending reunification, the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects \* \* \*"

Mr. Gromyko objected to any agreement lasting until the reunification of Germany and the Western Foreign Ministers then changed their offer to provide that:

"The arrangements \*\*\* can in the absence of reunification be reviewed at any time after five years by the Foreign Ministers conference as now constituted, if such review is requested by any of the four Governments."

Mr. Gromyko again objected, stating that under this formulation the arrangements here agreed to would continue if, after such a review, the Foreign Ministers' conference was unable to reach agreement upon changes. He insisted that any arrangements agreed here expire by their terms after a specified period.

This Soviet position had to be examined in the light of Mr. Gromyko's categorical refusal to answer the question frequently put to him, both in plenary and in private sessions, as to the status of the rights and responsibilities of the four Powers with respect to Berlin in the event that the Foreign Ministers were unable to reach agreement in any subsequent negotiations.

It was necessary also to review that proposal in the light of repeated statements by Mr. Khrushchev, as well as by Mr. Gromyko, that the Soviet Union was somehow entitled unilaterally to void the rights of the Western Powers with respect to Berlin by signing a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic. On June 10, for example, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR was not prepared to insist on "immediate and complete abolition" of the occupation regime in West Berlin, but would agree to the provisional maintenance of certain of these rights on condition, and I quote, "that such a situation would exist only for a strictly limited period, namely one year". While he has since failed to repeat this frank avowal of purpose, he has equally refused to renounce or deny it.

In the most recent discussions with Mr. Gromyko, the Western Foreign Ministers indicated that they were prepared to consider interim arrangements relating to Berlin under an agreement which would expire after a specified period. At the same time they made it unmistakably clear that neither the agreement nor its expiration would be in derogation of the now existing rights and responsibilities of the Western Powers with respect to Berlin. They insisted that an appropriate statement to that effect be included in any agreed arrangement which would expire after a specified period. There are several ways in which this assurance could be expressed. The Soviet Union should be willing to agree to one of those ways if, as Mr. Khrushchev said in his speech of 28 July, the Soviet Union is seeking agreements which do not do any "moral or material damage to either side."

At no time - and I wish to emphasize this point - at no time did we ask the Soviet Union to perpetuate or reaffirm our rights. There was no need for us to do so. These rights, which on a number of occasions have been recognized by the Soviet Union as legitimate in origin and continuing in fact, derive from our victory in the war. The manner in which they would be exercised was specified in solemn post-war agreements entered into by the Soviet Union. Nothing that the Soviet Union was asked to state or to do at Geneva would add to or detract from those rights or from Soviet responsibilities. The only thing that was contemplated here was a modification of the agreements spelling out how those rights are to be exercised.

In view of our heavy responsibilities for the more than 2,000,000 inhabitants of West Berlin, which I have recently reaffirmed on behalf of my Government, we feel that we are entitled to a plain answer to the question:

"At the end of the period specified in any interim agreement with respect to Berlin, will the Soviet Union maintain that this agreement has weakened our rights or not?"

Mr. Gromyko's only reply has been, "Let us not answer that question." He seems to be saying, "Let us wait and see."

Any such answer is totally unacceptable to my Government, which on repeated occasions has made it plain that it does not intend to enter into any agreement which could be interpreted as an express or implied weakening of those rights.

#### VIII

The fifth element involves civilian and military access to and from West Berlin.

The three Western Powers propose that free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. Freedom of movement would continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access would be raised and settled between the four Governments. The latter would establish a quadripartite commission which would meet in Berlin to examine in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and would seek to settle such difficulties. The commission might make arrangements, if necessary, to consult German experts.

The language of the Soviet proposal on this point is much briefer than that of the Western Powers. Its formulation has some elements which are unacceptable to us. But, as I understand it from our discussions and leaving the issue of the quadripartite commission aside, the substance of the Western position on civilian and military access to and from and within Berlin during an interim arrangement for Berlin is not unacceptable to the Soviets. I trust that my understanding is correct.

#### IX

A final question involves the arrangements to get on with discussions concerning the all-German problem, including the association of both parts of Germany in those discussions.

We believe that the German question is important and pressing. We propose that it be the subject of continuing discussion by this Foreign Ministers' conference, as presently constituted, though, perhaps at a different level and place.

This procedure would enable the four Powers to discharge responsibilities in regard to this question which they have repeatedly acknowledged.

It would enable German advisers to play a role which has been devised and tested in the present discussions.

It would permit us to proceed flexibly with, as Mr. Lloyd said on 23 July, "any combination or permutation of delegations here in this room", agreeing from time to time on the specific procedures to be adopted in the light of our developing work.

The Soviets, by contrast, originally insisted on linking an interim arrangement for Berlin to the establishment of a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans which would negotiate about the all-German question including the matter of a peace treaty.

This was an unrealistic proposal and I hope that the Soviets have come to recognize it as such.

Not only is there no logical tie between the work of such a committee and an interim Berlin arrangement, but the basic idea of having a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans is only valid if it is part of a phased process which will lead to German unification whether or not that committee reaches agreement. The reason for this is simply that, unless it is part of such a larger process, the committee is certain not to reach agreement. The Communist members of the committee will reject unification in freedom, and the representatives of the Federal Republic could not accept unification on any other basis.

For these reasons, the Western proposal seems a more promising approach to this question.

X

These then are the differences and the areas of agreement that have been defined in the past few weeks. I believe that the work of the conference has been useful in isolating these points, which could lead to a Berlin settlement.

I would hope, therefore, that we will resume our negotiations, at a date to be determined by our Governments in order to address these differences, one by one. If we can reconcile these differences, this should lead to an agreement which will give real hope for a secure position for the free people of West Berlin. This should also permit a start to be made on overcoming the continued division of Germany.

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1959 г.

Дворец Наций  
Женева

RÉUNION  
DE MINISTRES  
DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES  
1959

Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

REA/DOC/70  
5 August 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

STATEMENT BY MR. COUVE DE MURVILLE,  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

5 August 1959

After three months of discussions, this last plenary meeting of our conference provides each of us with the opportunity to sum up his views and perhaps to say also a few words on the prospects for the near future. That is what I would like to do, in my turn, as briefly as possible, on behalf of the French delegation.

In the first place and at great length we talked about Germany as a whole. We did that first by mutual agreement and directly, then indirectly when the Soviet delegation raised, in connexion with Berlin, the question of setting up an all-German committee, while linking it with an interim arrangement on the former German capital.

The Western delegations on their part tabled a comprehensive plan providing for several stages and dealing jointly with the German question and with European or general security problems which are unanimously recognized as being tied to the solution of the German question. Fundamentally, we believe that reunification should be brought about through free elections, that a peace treaty should then be concluded and that steps should in any case be taken in order to ensure that the union of the two parts of Germany will not in any way prejudice security in Europe but, on the contrary, contribute to strengthen it methodically. We may conceive all kinds of stages and contemplate all types of interim solutions in order to bring about compromises which become more and more difficult as time goes by. The only point on which it seems that we cannot compromise is this principle: since its

destiny is at stake, the German people must have the last word in this matter. No government, and least of all one which is not representative, may set conditions and decide in the last resort.

It has become apparent here once again that the Soviet Government does not share the point of view of the Western Governments. All of us know, moreover, that the issue is the fate of the present regime in Eastern Germany. Such is the actual reason why, as before, we have not been able to agree. We shall have to come back to it, trusting in the normal evolution of men and positions, in order that a situation should finally prevail in accordance with natural law and therefore with the interests of peace in Europe. We, for our part, are ready to resume discussions at any time.

As long as there is a German question, there will be a question of Berlin. Only the reunification of Germany will make it possible to unite the two parts of the city at present divided and to bring about in both halves of Berlin the same political, economic and social regime.

There is a point on which, I think, we are in agreement with the Soviet Union: as long as this aim is not achieved, the Western part of Berlin must remain as it is now. It must keep its democratic regime which corresponds to the unanimous will of its population.

Where we do not agree is when, from the Russian side, emphasis is put on the dangers that would arise from this situation and when, to remedy them, we are asked to accept radical changes in the present status. We do not believe that the situation in Berlin is the source of serious tensions, so long as it is respected by both sides. On the contrary, we believe that the very modifications proposed could lead to difficulties by substituting a precarious situation for one where order and stability have prevailed for the last fifteen years.

However, we did not refuse to consider the Soviet delegation's concern about Berlin and from the very start we have shown readiness to examine with them all practical steps likely to do away with the risks which they alleged existed. While discussing a practical arrangement we were concerned about two things: not to discard any measure compatible with the normal exercise of our own responsibilities in Berlin; not to prejudge in any way the solution of the German problem as a whole nor to impair a juridical situation which is the only actual guarantee for maintaining freedom in West Berlin.

That is why we could not accept to establish any link whatever, between a modus vivendi for Berlin and the already mentioned Soviet proposal to set up an all-German committee whose terms of reference would be to discuss reunification and a peace treaty. Such a proposal was wholly in conflict with our own views on the solution of the German problem. I spoke at length on that subject and I need not revert to it. Furthermore it was completely opposed to the spirit in which we contemplate the Berlin arrangement.

Likewise, we indicated firmly that we could not accept any text which could mean or imply that by signing an Arrangement we were relinquishing the rights which we hold as a result of historical circumstances which followed the end of the war and by virtue of agreements concluded since then with the Soviet Union. On this essential point we finally failed because we could not get the Soviet delegation to take an unequivocal stand on the question we put to them, simple as it was.

It may be necessary for me to be more specific on that since we might have to discuss it again in the future.

During the first stage of the conference we already contemplated concluding an arrangement on Berlin which would have remained valid until German reunification. Then, on 10 and 19 June, our Soviet colleague put before us a new proposal. It limited in particular the term of the agreement to one year, then to eighteen months. On this point the conference went into its first recess. When we resumed our discussions in July we did not reject the possibility of an agreement limited in time. It never meant however that we at any time envisaged accepting a modification of the juridical situation at the end of the said term.

Our draft of 28 July was devised in that spirit: it was suggested that after five years new negotiations should take place on the Berlin issue. Pending an agreement, the concluded arrangement would have remained in force. We thus believed that we were meeting the wishes of our interlocutors since we intended to keep in force, during the new discussions, the already considerable limitations to which we would have agreed.

Mr. Gromyko clearly pointed out to us that he was not satisfied. He wished to sign an Arrangement valid for a definite period. The Arrangement would lapse at the end of the said period and a new agreement would be negotiated.

We accepted to follow this line and we were thus naturally led to ask him a question: what would be the situation between the end of the given term and the conclusion of a new arrangement? It seemed to us obvious that this situation would be the status quo ante, namely, the present one. We could never get our colleague to confirm this interpretation. That is why we could not reach agreement.

I do not contend meanwhile that once this point was settled and any link suppressed between Berlin and an all-German committee, it only remained to sign the agreement. We had quite a few things to settle as regards the other parts of the arrangement, in particular the contingents of Western garrisons in Berlin, the reciprocal limitation of propaganda or subversive activities, the duration of the agreement to come. It does not seem unlikely, however, that solutions could be found once the questions of principle are solved.

Such, in the view of the French delegation, are the conditions in which we are today ending the second phase of our conference. By common agreement we have decided to interrupt our discussions now because we are faced with certain basic difficulties which we are unable to iron out for the time being. Doubtless, for the solutions to become ripe, there will be necessary a period of reflexion which, for each of us, will take place in a wider context than that which was ours in Geneva.

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Palais des Nations  
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RM/DOC/71  
6 August 1959

ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

STATEMENT BY MR. A. A. GROMYKO  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

5 August 1959

The participants in the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers are today summing up the work accomplished. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to dwell on the basic results of our negotiations.

Not only in the States whose representatives are in this room, but also in other countries the peoples have followed the course of the Geneva negotiations with unrelenting attention. This is only natural, for at our Meeting we have considered important international problems the settlement of which will very greatly affect the destinies of the world.

The work of our conference has been largely devoted to endeavouring to find ways for the settlement of two complex unresolved questions remaining as a legacy from the Second World War: a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. No one capable of assessing the situation objectively will deny that so long as these questions remain unsettled they will impede the establishment of the conditions for lasting peace in Europe.

The whole development of international relations, the whole situation in Europe, still affected as it is by the consequences of the past war, indeed life itself, set with increasing insistence before the Powers which fought Germany as well as before the two German States the ever more pressing task of preparing and concluding a German peace treaty. With every day that passes this task becomes more urgent.

The other very acute and overripe question discussed at our conference was the question of West Berlin. It would be hard to find another place anywhere in the world constituting so malignant and dangerous a knot of contradictions between States, so permanent a source of friction between them, as West Berlin. More than fourteen years after the end of the war the foreign occupation regime still remains there. The territory of West Berlin is used for disruptive activities aimed against various States and principally against the State in the heart of which Berlin is situated, namely the German Democratic Republic.

The fact that the representatives of the four great Powers have met round the conference table after several years' interruption in order to make new efforts to settle the questions connected with the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin is itself very significant.

We should not fail to note also the important fact that for the first time representatives of both German States, of the German Democratic Republic and of the Federal Republic of Germany, have participated in the examination of questions affecting Germany. That means that a realistic approach to the problems of Germany is making headway with increasing assurance. Whereas not so long ago the idea prevailed in some quarters in the West that the Germans could be kept as far as possible in the background away from negotiations, it has emerged clearly from the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers that questions touching on the vital interests of the Germans cannot be settled without the Germans themselves, without the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany participating in discussions on those questions.

The significance of the 1959 Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers lies primarily in the fact that serious attempts have been made here to bring closer together the positions of the States on the most important unresolved international questions.

I believe my colleagues will agree when I say that the work of this conference has been done in a businesslike atmosphere, with a frank exchange of views, and has resulted in a better understanding of the positions of the participants.

It must be said quite frankly that after many years of "cold war" the participants in this Meeting came to the conference table with an onerous legacy which impeded the establishment of relations based on confidence and mutual understanding which are so necessary for fruitful negotiations.

Meticulous and persistent work was required in order to bring to light what was common to the different positions of the participants of the conference. To what extent has our conference coped with that task? How useful has its work been? We shall get an answer to these questions, if we evaluate objectively the results of the discussion on each of the questions considered.

In his statement today, Mr. Herter attempted to give a review of what took place at our conference. However, the picture that emerged is one-sided and bears little resemblance to the true facts. That applies both to the question of a peace settlement with Germany and to the Berlin question. Who could take his words seriously when he claims that the Soviet proposals were designed to annex West Berlin, to formalize the division of Germany, and so on? There is, of course, nothing in common between this allegation and the true state of affairs, and those who, from motives of cheap propaganda, say the opposite are well aware of it.

Let us first consider the Berlin question, on which, in our opinion, the most tangible rapprochement between the positions of the different sides was achieved. There can be little doubt that our conference has progressed towards a realistic approach to the settlement of questions affecting West Berlin.

In general, it may be said that all the participants of this conference have recognized the need to change the situation in West Berlin.

The all-round exchange of views has led above all to agreement being reached in regard to the range of questions affecting West Berlin which must be covered by an appropriate interim arrangement. By mutual agreement it was decided that this arrangement must cover, in particular, the strength of the armed forces of the three Powers in West Berlin, a ban on atomic weapons and guided missiles on the territory of West Berlin, the prohibition of disruptive activities and hostile propaganda, access to West Berlin, a specific time limit for this arrangement to remain in force and subsequent negotiations on West Berlin.

As a result of the exchange of views, it can now be noted that all the participants of this conference have agreed that the interim arrangement must be definitely limited in time. For the Soviet Union this is of fundamental importance, since, as we have more than once pointed out, it is unable to put its signature to any document perpetuating the existing occupation regime in West Berlin.

Great importance attaches to the fact that it has been agreed that an arrangement concerning West Berlin shall include provisions prohibiting the stationing of any forms of nuclear weapons and missile installations in West Berlin.

In discussing the Berlin question, all the participants based their arguments on the principle that the way of life chosen by the population of West Berlin should not be disrupted. This principle is clearly safeguarded in the Soviet proposal for a Free City, which would, as the Soviet Government is more firmly convinced every day, be the most equitable solution to the question of West Berlin in the present circumstances. Our subsequent proposals for certain interim measures with regard to West Berlin are also based on this principle.

We can express only satisfaction at the fact that during these talks it has been acknowledged that it is essential to settle the question of inadmissible subversive activities and hostile propaganda. The Soviet Government has raised this question on several occasions, stressing that it is high time to put an end to a state of affairs in which West Berlin is a centre for subversive activities and hostile propaganda systematically conducted against a number of States and primarily against the German Democratic Republic.

In connexion with the anxiety expressed by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom over the question of safeguarding access to West Berlin, the Soviet Government, in agreement with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, has announced that when the appropriate provisional arrangement is concluded, and during the operation of this arrangement, communications between West Berlin and the outside world will be maintained in the same form as they now are.

In dealing with the question of access to West Berlin, Mr. Herter has referred to the Soviet Union's acceptance of the Western Powers' standpoint on this question. We have agreed that the existing arrangements for access to West Berlin shall be maintained, by which we mean the arrangements which actually exist at present, and not the proposal which has been put forward by the representatives of the Western Powers with regard to this question. Moreover, no-one can interpret our standpoint on this question, or on any other question, except ourselves.

Another positive result of our conference is that all those taking part have agreed that further negotiations on West Berlin shall take place after the expiration of the term of validity of the interim arrangement.

In speaking about the results of the work done at our conference and in noting that our positions have been brought closer together in respect of a number of questions, we cannot of course ignore the fact that on certain matters there are still a good many differences between the participants.

One problem on which the two sides have not yet managed to reach a common point of view, and one which will play an important part in the process of reaching an appropriate agreement is the question of reducing the number of foreign troops in West Berlin.

The representatives of the Western Powers have in principle announced their readiness to take steps to reduce their armed forces in West Berlin. But this is clearly not enough, for such a declaration by the three Western Powers is rather a declaration of good intentions, while the situation in Berlin calls for definite action and, since we are concerned with an agreement, for definite commitments.

While we have reached the common view that the arrangement must have a provisional character, and that there must be further negotiations on the question of how long it is to remain in force, the participants of this conference have not yet been able to agree on an actual term for this arrangement. The Soviet Government, as you are aware, proposes that this term should be a year and a half, bearing in mind that at the end of this period the negotiations between the two German States would also have been concluded. We have several times explained that the question of the term during which the provisional arrangement should remain in force is from our point of view neither a major one nor one of principle.

But of course this question must be settled in accordance with the realities of the situation in Germany, and the 18 months' term suggested by us fully meets the requirements of that situation.

It must be assumed that the Governments of the three Western Powers will take a more realistic position in future than they are taking now in proposing to extend the term of operation of the arrangement for as long as five years. It is self-evident that the Soviet Union cannot agree to this.

Further negotiations are needed also on the question of the forms and methods to be used for supervising the fulfilment of commitments undertaken by the parties to the arrangement.

Our approach to an interim arrangement depends on whether a decision is taken that direct negotiations will be conducted between the German States with a view to a peace settlement and the reunification of Germany, or whether this question is to remain open as before, and the present position maintained, with no political negotiations of any kind between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, even though the necessity for such negotiations is becoming more urgent every day, especially with regard to questions affecting the peace treaty. In the Soviet proposals, these two problems - that of negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and that of the interim arrangement regarding West Berlin - have been treated in their natural interdependence. It must not be forgotten that if, as a result of the work done by an all-German committee or in the course of negotiations between the German States in some other form which is acceptable to them, the possibility of concluding a peace treaty with Germany should arise, this would mean that the Berlin question had also been finally settled.

We cannot of course exclude the possibility that in view of the Federal German Government's stubborn refusal to contribute towards a rapprochement between the two German States, negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany may not lead to the desired results. Should this be the case, the Soviet proposals provide that the participants of the Geneva conference should undertake further negotiations on West Berlin.

To judge from all the evidence, the Western Powers would like to restrict the scope of the talks to an interim arrangement affecting only West Berlin, and would prefer not to raise the question of negotiations between the two German States. They are, it seems, disposed to settle only those questions in which they themselves have a direct interest; meanwhile other questions, of greater substance from the standpoint of the common interest in consolidating peace and of the necessity of drawing a final line under the Second World War by concluding a peace treaty with Germany, would be set aside.

It cannot be said, however, that the exchange of views on the subject of negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany has been fruitless. One fact that deserves attention, for example, is that the Western Powers have in fact recognized the necessity for negotiations between representatives of the two German States on questions which, if the suggestion of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic were adopted, would be examined in an all-German committee; I mean questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the discussion and working out of specific measures for the reunification of Germany and the development of contacts. The Western Powers have thus taken a certain step in the direction of acknowledging the part that both German States must play in settling these questions, although they have not been consistent in this, since they do not conceive of such negotiations between the Germans being conducted otherwise than under the aegis of the four Powers.

I may remind you that in the proposals put forward by the Western Powers themselves during the first stage of the work of this conference, the idea was advanced that an all-German committee should be established and that negotiations on political questions should be conducted in this committee between the representatives of the two parts of Germany. If the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France are now suggesting that such questions should be made the subject of negotiations between the six Powers represented at the Geneva conference, this shows only that the Powers I have named are still a long way from repudiating their inclination to interfere in such purely German affairs as the problem of German reunification and the working out of a common point of view between the German States with regard to the peace settlement with Germany. Of course, no matter how great may have been the difficulties encountered by our conference in trying to reach agreement on the question of negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as regarding the interdependence between an interim arrangement and the adoption of a decision regarding the aforesaid negotiations, we cannot sit back and fold our arms. Both these questions have arisen out of the realities of life, and the lack of progress in settling them can mean only one thing - that these questions still remain open.

We consider it particularly important to weigh up the results achieved by our conference with respect to a German peace treaty. Until this question is

settled it is impossible to eliminate the vestiges of the Second World War, which are weighing heavily on the situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole.

Delay in bringing about a peace settlement with Germany makes it impossible to remove altogether the consequences of the last war in Europe, which are continuing to cause uncertainty and complications in relations between many States and which constitute a threat to the security of the nations of Europe. At the same time we must not forget the feelings of the German people, who are still being denied a peace treaty more than 14 years after the end of the Second World War.

We can state that as a result of the detailed and thorough exchange of views which has taken place at this conference, the necessity and importance of concluding a peace treaty which would ensure the peaceful development of Germany and give the German people its rightful place in the family of nations has been confirmed.

It is to be regretted, however, that the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers have not gone further in acknowledging the significance of a German peace treaty, with the result that our conference has not been able to make any progress in settling this pressing problem of today.

In view of the fact that the question of a peace treaty with Germany is becoming increasingly urgent, the Soviet Government offered a Draft Peace Treaty for the consideration of the present conference. This Draft, or at least a great many of its more important provisions, was the subject of discussion at our conference. We regret that the Western Powers were disinclined to recognize the necessity of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, in view of the actual situation which has developed in Germany. We regret that they want as before to preserve the existing situation in Germany, which as a result of their policy has been split into two parts, one of which, Western Germany, is steadily being converted into a military jumping-off ground for NATO and into a militaristic State.

The participants of the Geneva conference are undoubtedly well aware of the Soviet Union's position with regard to a peace treaty with Germany. Our view has been put forward many times in speeches by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet delegation has frequently contributed statements clarifying this subject and tried to convince the representatives of the Western Powers that it is essential to take practical steps in regard to the preparation of a German peace treaty without further delay.

To brush aside the necessity for settling such a problem as the conclusion of a German peace treaty is impossible. Whether anyone likes it or not, the problem of a peace settlement with Germany is put forward by life itself and a solution for it will be found. This is a point which the Soviet Government and its Head in person have made many times.

In summing up the actual results of the present negotiations then, we are led to the conclusion that the detailed and frank discussion of the problems which we were commissioned to examine by our respective Governments has helped to clarify many aspects of these problems. A great many misunderstandings have been cleared up and the positions of both sides have become more definite. This is of course a valuable thing in itself, for it will substantially facilitate the further examination and settlement of matters on which there is disagreement. But this is by no means all. On many questions the two sides have come closer together, as we have rightly mentioned in our communiqué.

With all this, of course, we should be wrong if we failed to see that there are still disagreements among the participants of this conference, and indeed substantial ones, including major questions of principle, above all the questions of a German peace treaty and of direct negotiations between the two German States.

The Soviet Government assumes that this obliges the States represented at our conference to make further efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions. Matters on which the Ministers have failed to reach agreement can perhaps be examined and settled at a meeting of Heads of States.

Our conference, then, has done a good deal of work and this work has unquestionably been useful.

It is no secret that there are still influential groups here and there in the West which are calculating on exacerbating conflicts between States and increasing international tension. They are happy only in the oppressive atmosphere of the cold war. Nothing terrifies them more than the fresh air of international détente and the restoration of co-operation between States. It is understandable that these people do not like any step which makes agreement between States easier and, as though trying to encourage themselves and hoodwink others, they cry out about failure and deadlock, prophesy the breakdown of subsequent negotiations, and so forth.

Any negotiations can, of course, be made to fail if there is no wish for agreement. No great efforts are needed to wreck them; all that is needed is the absence of readiness to come to terms with the requirements of life and with reality. But it must be said outright that if there are people who are calculating in this way, responsibility for the consequences will rest upon their shoulders. In the past there has been no lack of readiness on the part of the Soviet Government to help in finding mutually acceptable solutions. This applies to the Berlin question as well. But of course, it does not all depend on us.

It is common knowledge that in the course of our conference the opponents of international agreement have done their best to put spokes in the wheels, trying now one way, now another to hamper the work of the conference. Everyone knows who these inveterate pessimists are. I shall not be giving away any secrets if I say that the roots of the policy which is aimed at wrecking a rapprochement between States must be sought primarily, in many respects, in certain circles in Western Germany. All this only confirms once more that obstacles are being deliberately put in the way of a relaxation of international tension.

The Soviet Government attaches prime importance to the settlement of the important questions which have been examined at our conference. In order to succeed in building a lasting peace it is essential to do away with the vestiges of the last war, which exist in the form of the non-settlement of the question of a German peace treaty and the continuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

The development of relations between certain States represented at our Meeting is of great importance for the improvement of the entire international situation. This year, one of the first international events to bring a noticeable access of warmth into the atmosphere which generated the "cold war" was, as we all know, the talks which the British Prime Minister, Mr. MacMillan, and Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, had with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, and other members of the Soviet Government during the British statesmen's visit to the Soviet Union.

At the moment important events are taking place in the development of Soviet-American relations. After an exchange of visits by a number of statesmen, among which we must give first mention to the visit of the First Vice-Chairmen of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Mr. Mikoyan and Mr. Koslov, to the United States of America, and the visit of the United States Vice-President Nixon to the Soviet Union, and after the exchange of exhibitions, which marks a step towards acquainting the peoples of both countries with the life of the other, it has now been agreed that the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, should visit the United States and that the United States President, Mr. Eisenhower, should visit the Soviet Union.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the coming meetings between the Soviet and the United States leaders. In the present circumstances these meetings will have historic significance, and this is recognized throughout the world.

Those who have taken part in the Foreign Ministers' Meeting will report on the results of its work to their respective Governments, which will be able to examine the results achieved and to decide on the next step in examining the problems which have constituted the agenda of this conference. As we arranged, agreement will also be reached on the time and place for a resumption of the work of the Foreign Ministers' conference as now constituted.

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RM/DOC/72  
5 August 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY MR. SELWYN LLOYD,  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

5 August 1959

Agreement to have this meeting of Foreign Ministers was reached after considerable preliminary negotiation. Since 11 May except for a short interval, we have been discussing questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. We have now decided to bring this phase of our meetings to an end. It is not a final end; the draft communiqué upon which we have agreed shows clearly the intention of both sides to renew these discussions.

It is natural that before we recess we should take stock of the situation.

I believe that there are two tests to be applied to any conference. Firstly, whether it results in any specific agreement of value, secondly, what is its impact upon the course of international events, upon the international atmosphere, upon the prospects for agreement in the future.

I will take the first test first. The Western side came to the conference with three objectives. Firstly, we wished to make some progress towards the reunification of Germany, secondly, we wished to secure reaffirmation of the right of the people of West Berlin freely to choose their own system of society. We regarded free access between West Berlin and the outside world as an essential element to ensure that freedom of choice. Our third aim was to achieve some reduction of tension and some improvement of the prospects of stability in Europe.

With regard to German reunification, all four Governments have affirmed their recognition of the right of the German people to restore their national unity.

All four have professed their belief in German unity and free elections and the conclusion of a peace treaty which will regularize the position in central Europe. The Western Powers have not been able to agree with the Soviet Union on how to make progress towards that goal. I do not propose to review in any detail the substance of the comprehensive plans put forward by the two sides. Mr. Herter, Mr. Couve de Murville and I have explained at length the merits of the Western Peace Plan. Mr. Gromyko, for his part, has expounded the merits of the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty. I record again our belief that we will never be able finally to determine this problem without recourse to the freely expressed wishes of the German people as a whole, all 70 million of them.

Apart from clear statements of our respective positions, we did not make progress towards the reunification of Germany.

I believe that it was realistic then to consider the problem of Berlin. That was the immediate matter which had led to our conference. Again it is true that we have not reached a concrete agreement. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that our discussions about Berlin have been of benefit. We have clarified and narrowed down the issues. We have got away from the conception of unilateral action within fixed time limits. We have been trying to deal with these matters by negotiation and we have affirmed our intention to continue so to do.

There has been common ground between us to the extent that both sides have asserted their desire to maintain the freedom of the people of West Berlin to choose their own system of society. The Soviet Government have put forward their idea of a free city. Our doubt about that has been whether in fact the Soviet plan would preserve this free choice for the West Berliners. We are not prepared to accept arrangements which might mean continuing pressures on the people of West Berlin and would ultimately involve them in the surrender of their freedom of choice. We have maintained our conviction that the presence of Western troops in Berlin is necessary as a symbol of our continued commitment to the freedom of West Berlin. As we have pointed out many times, the presence of our troops is desired by the overwhelming majority of West Berliners.

Mr. Gromyko has made it quite clear that his purpose is to bring to an end the occupation status of West Berlin, whether or not reunification has taken place. He considers it outmoded and outlived. We are quite prepared to do that when reunification takes place, but not before. That has been the basic issue between us on Berlin.

There being no prospect of either side accepting the other's point of view on this matter, we turned to consider an arrangement for a kind of standstill for a fixed period. We have examined the position to see whether modified arrangements could be agreed, acceptable to both sides, and which from the point of view of one side or the other could be regarded as an improvement in the present situation. The Western side has shown its willingness to negotiate on the basis of a limitation of our forces in West Berlin. We have been prepared to agree that the armaments of our forces there should continue not to include nuclear weapons or missile installations. Complaints have been put forward about hostile propaganda and subversive activities emanating from West Berlin. We, for our part, have made reference to what emanates from East Berlin, but the Western side has been prepared to agree on a reciprocal basis that, to use a neutral expression, "questionable activities" in Berlin should be reduced. On the question of the duration of the agreement, we were willing to agree to a period of five years. The Soviet proposal has been for 18 months, but they have said that they do not think the actual length of time of the agreement is a matter of importance or principle. The Soviet Government has stated its willingness to maintain free access. Mr. Gromyko has also said that they will take no unilateral action during the period covered by the agreement, or during the phase of negotiations which no doubt would follow.

Within this framework I have always been optimistic that a limited agreement of this sort could be achieved. Perhaps I have been more optimistic than some of my colleagues.

What then has been the cause of our failure? We have so far been unable to reach agreement on what would be the position at the end of the period. The way I put it in my speech of 23 July was:-

"To sum up, at the end of the interim period, if no agreement has been reached in the meantime, we are in exactly the same position as we are in today over rights and everything else to do with Berlin".

On 20 July, I quoted the words of the Opposition spokesman in the House of Commons when speaking on this matter on 8 July. Mr. Bevan said:-

"There is no suggestion as far as I can see that we should abandon our occupation rights in Berlin if we agree to a time limit. All they (the Russians) say is that the two sides take up their respective positions at the end of the period as they take them up now."

Mr. Gromyko has never publicly or privately accepted either of these statements as accurate. Of course any situation is affected by the passage of time. We cannot expect the rest of the world to stand still because there is an agreement for a fixed term about Berlin. But the Western side wishes to feel that it would approach the next phase of negotiations about Berlin in the same position as it is in today. In other words, we would not be deemed to have altered our position, except as strictly defined by this limited agreement. The Soviet Government advocated an agreement for a limited period on the ground that during the period progress might be made on German problems as a whole, which would affect for the better the prospect of a final settlement for Berlin. It seems to me reasonable that if that is their purpose, they should accept the broad proposition that at the end of the period, if there has not been such progress leading to agreement, we re-assemble on the same basis as we have been talking here. That would seem to us to be of the essence of a standstill.

We have argued out this matter at such length between ourselves publicly and privately without carrying conviction to the other side, that I feel it a good thing that there is to be a pause in the discussions. I hope that during such a pause the Soviet Government will be able to reflect upon this matter and settle something which is of importance, but nonetheless fairly simple. In short, I hope that after a careful study of our discussions the Soviet Government will find it possible to give us the kind of assurance which we have sought.

There has been one other matter which we have discussed at some length. Mr. Gromyko put forward his proposal for an all-German committee. We stated clearly our objections to his proposal. We indicated what we considered to be a reasonable method of continuing discussions about these wider German problems without calling upon either side to concede any point of principle. Our feeling was that this conference, as at present constituted, might continue in being for the purpose of facilitating the consideration of the German problem as a whole, meeting at whatever time, or level or place that might seem appropriate.

Mr. Herter has already referred to the words I used on 23 July. I said:-  
"Our formula permits of any combination or permutation of the delegations here in this room today, to meet from time to time for purposes which could be defined precisely or left general. Nothing is compulsory, nothing is forbidden."

Mr. Gromyko did not feel able to accept this proposal. Again I hope that he will reconsider his position.

I have tried to set out my assessment of the course of our discussions according to the first test which I laid down for any conference, that of whether specific agreements have been concluded. No specific agreement has been concluded but we have not made it more difficult for later agreement and if we are patient I think we may achieve it after there has been an interval in the discussions. The second test which I have suggested should be applied to any conference is its impact upon the course of international events and upon the prospects of future negotiations. Failure to reach agreement has in the past filled people with a feeling of foreboding about the future and has increased tension. It has seemed to make a crisis inevitable.

I do not believe that any sensible person could possibly have that feeling about the end of this phase of these negotiations. The atmosphere between the four of us has been friendly; the discussion has been temperate; there has seemed to be a genuine desire to find some common ground, while holding fast to what we regard as positions of principle; we have not made these stubborn problems more difficult of solution in the future.

In the last 48 hours we have had a remarkable example of the way in which the atmosphere has improved. The British Government welcomed very much the statement that Mr. Khrushchev is to visit the United States and that President Eisenhower is to visit the Soviet Union. We have always believed that personal contact between the leading statesmen and the peoples of our various countries can play an important part in establishing conditions for genuinely peaceful co-existence. We believe that the visit which Mr. Macmillan paid to the Soviet Union, on which I accompanied him, resulted in better relations between the Soviet Government and the British Government. I agree with what Mr. Gromyko has said on that point. I am sure that such a pattern of personal contacts is likely to bring a further reduction of tension and the kind of

According to this second test, I assert that our meetings here in Geneva have been of substantial value. We have failed to reach final agreement on particular matters, but we have been able to make a real contribution towards the creation of the correct atmosphere for the further international discussions which we know must follow.

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MEETING  
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1959

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СОВЕЩАНИЕ  
МИНИСТРОВ ИНОСТРАННЫХ  
ДЕЛ  
1959 г.

Дворец Наций  
Женева

RÉUNION  
DE MINISTRES  
DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES  
1959

Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

RM/DOC/73

5 August 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE CHEF DU DEPARTEMENT POLITIQUE FEDERAL  
BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SESSION OF THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS  
HELD ON 5 AUGUST 1959

5 August 1959

Your Excellency,

At the session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers held today, my colleagues asked me, as Chairman of the session, to express to you our sincere thanks for the helpful and hospitable manner in which we have been received in Switzerland. We are all very much aware of the extent to which the arrangements made by the various responsible authorities have facilitated our work and contributed to making our stay here a pleasant one.

My colleagues and I will be most grateful if you will be good enough to convey our thanks to the President of the Confederation and to the Federal Council. I am writing separately to the authorities of the Republic and of the Canton of Geneva.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration and esteem.

(Signed) Selwyn LLOYD

Monsieur Max Petitpierre,  
Chef du Département Politique Fédéral,  
Berne.

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1959

Palais des Nations  
GENÈVE

RM/DGC/74  
5 August 1959

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL D'ÉTAT  
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE ET CANTON DE GENÈVE BY THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE SESSION OF THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS  
HELD ON 5 AUGUST 1959

5 August 1959

Mr. President,

At the session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers held today, my colleagues asked me, as Chairman of the session, to express to you the gratitude which we and our delegations all feel for the help and hospitality which have been extended to us in Geneva.

I should be grateful if you would convey this message to the State Council of the Republic and of the Canton of Geneva, to the Mayor and Administrative Council of the City of Geneva, and to all the other authorities who have contributed to the smooth running of the arrangements for the Meeting.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my high consideration and esteem:

(Signed) Selwyn LLOYD

Monsieur Dupont,  
President of the State Council of the  
Republic and of the Canton of Geneva,  
Geneva.