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CNR 434 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 1 AUGUST 1994
 NUMBER: **2415**
 SUBJECT: Major General Guy Tousignant

1994 AUG -1 P 5:05
 UNATIONS
 OPERATIONS

Attached, please find MGen. Guy Tousignant's biographical sheet. Kindly consult with authorities on his appointment as the new UNAMIR Force Commander.

We would like to write to the Security Council early next week.

Best regards.

We may formally inform Rwandan govt

Shahmery/leher
S-P

ED
FC

The Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations



CNR 434 P2/4
La Mission Permanente du Canada
aupres des Nations Unies

One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza
885 Second Avenue, 14th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10017

28 July 1994

Mr. Kofi A. Annan
Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations
Room S-3727B
United Nations Secretariat
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Mr. Annan,

As a consequence of our recent discussions concerning the return to Canada of MGen Dallaire, Canada is pleased to nominate MGen Guy Tousignant for the appointment of Force Commander of UNAMIR. A copy of his biographical sketch is enclosed to assist you in your consideration of this proposal.

Should you confirm the appointment of MGen Tousignant, we anticipate that he will be available to be in theatre by the 15th of August for a hand over of duties from MGen Dallaire.

Yours sincerely,

David M. Malone
Ambassador and
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

MAJOR-GENERAL G.C. TOUSIGNANT,
 OMM, CD

COMMANDANT, NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

MAJOR-GÉNÉRAL G.C. TOUSIGNANT,
 OMM, CD

COMMANDANT DU COLLÈGE DE LA DÉFENCE
 NATIONALE



Maj.-Gen. Guy Tousignant was born on April 19, 1941 in Sherbrooke, Que. He enrolled in classical studies at Séminaire Saint-Charles, and then at the University of Sherbrooke, Faculty of Educational Science where he completed his formal education. In 1962, while still in Sherbrooke, he was commissioned with the Canadian Officers Training Corps at the University of Montreal.

In January 1963 he became a member of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. During his early years of service, he instructed at the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps School in Montreal. While there, in 1964, he obtained his parachutist's wings with the 1st Battalion of the Royal 22e Régiment. In 1966 he went to Trois-Rivières Recruiting Centre where he was a recruiting officer and then Detachment Commander. This was followed by a posting to Germany as a logistics officer with 4 Service Battalion and 1st Battalion 22e Régiment from 1968 to 1971.

In 1971 he returned to Canada. He served as an instructor at the Canadian Forces School of Administration and Logistics at Borden, Ont., until he was promoted to the rank of major in 1973. After his promotion, he became the Administration Company Commander at the

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En janvier 1963, il se joint au "Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps" (RCOC) de la Force régulière. Ses premières années de service sont à titre d'instructeur à l'école des magasins militaires de Longue-Pointe à Montréal. En 1964, il fait une courte visite à Valcartier (Qc) alors qu'il obtient ses ailes de parachutiste avec le 1er Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment. En 1966, à Trois-Rivières, il sert comme officier recruteur et commandant du détachement. Cette mutation est suivie d'un stage en Allemagne, soit au 4e Bataillon des services et au 1er Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment comme officier de la logistique de 1968 à 1971.

En 1971, le brigadier-général Tousignant retourne au Canada pour y être muté à l'École d'administration et de logistique des Forces canadiennes à Borden (Ont.), comme instructeur jusqu'à sa promotion au grade de major en 1973. Il devient alors commandant de la Compagnie

(over)

(verso)

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He was promoted lieutenant-colonel on June 5, 1979 and became the Senior Staff Officer (Administration) of 5 Canadian Brigade Group at Valcartier, Que. A year later, on June 20, 1980, he was appointed Commanding Officer, 5e Bataillon des services du Canada. While in this appointment he assumed the functions of Base Technical Services Officer for Canadian Forces Base Valcartier. In 1982 he returned to NDHQ in the Directorate of Procurement and Supply Services. In May 1983 he was made an officer of the Order of Military Merit.

On July 11, 1983 he was promoted to the rank of colonel. A month later, on August 15, he was appointed Commanding Officer, 25 Canadian Forces Supply Depot in Montreal where he remained until 1986. He then returned to his military studies at the National Defence College. In July 1987 he was appointed Command Comptroller at Land Force Command in St. Hubert (Que.).

On June 22, 1990, he was promoted brigadier-general and on July 19, 1990, he was appointed Base Commander of Canadian Forces Base Borden in Angus, Ont. He was promoted major-general and appointed Commander of the National Defence College in Kingston, Ont., in 1993.

Maj.-Gen. Tousignant is married to Shirley Haddock of Pender Harbour, B.C. He has two children, a son, Sylvain who is a captain in the Royal Canadian Artillery, and a daughter, Michelle.

Defence Information Services
OTTAWA - (613) 993-6481

February 1993

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Il est promu au grade de lieutenant-colonel le 5 juin 1979, et occupe le poste d'officier supérieur d'état-major administration au Quartier général du 5e Groupe-brigade du Canada à Valcartier. Un an plus tard, soit le 20 juin 1980, il est désigné commandant du 5e Bataillon des services du Canada, tout en remplissant les fonctions de chef des Services techniques de la Base des Forces canadiennes Valcartier. En juin 1982, il retourne à Ottawa et comble le poste de Directeur - Obtention de matériels et services d'approvisionnement des Forces canadiennes. En mai 1983, il reçoit l'Ordre du mérite militaire.

Le 11 juillet 1983, il est promu au grade de colonel. Un mois plus tard, le 15 août, il est désigné commandant du 25e Dépôt d'approvisionnement des Forces canadiennes à Montréal jusqu'en 1986. En 1987, il suit le cours du Collège de la Défense nationale pour ensuite occuper le poste de contrôleur du Commandement de la Force terrestre à Saint-Hubert (Qc).

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février 1993

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février 1993

CNR 434 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 1 AUGUST 1994
 NUMBER: **2415**
 SUBJECT: Major General Guy Tousignant

1994 AUG -1 P 5 05
 UNATIONS
 OPERATIONS

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We would like to write to the Security Council early next week.

Best regards.

We may formally inform Rwanda govts

Shahmy Jleha
 P.P.

ED.
 FC

The Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations



CNR 434 P2/4
La Mission Permanente du Canada
aupres des Nations Unies

One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza
885 Second Avenue, 14th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10017

28 July 1994

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Under-Secretary-General for
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Room S-3727B
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New York, N.Y. 10017

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Yours sincerely,

David M. Malone
Ambassador and
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

CNR 433 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
 DATE: 1 AUGUST 1994
 NUMBER: 2414
 SUBJECT: Visit to UNAMIR

IMMEDIATE

UN AUG - 1 P 5 05
 UN OPERATIONS

Please find attached a self-explanatory note from the Permanent Mission of the UK. Col. Manners-Smith has requested that UNAMIR provide confirmation on whether MP Sir David Steel's plane will be allowed to land on 3 August. Steel will be met by the OXFAM Representative in Kigali.
 Your kind reply will be appreciated.
 Best regards.

ARR 1000


SRSG/FC - 1100

can we? So

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5 AUG 94



CNR 433 P2/2



United Kingdom Mission
to the United Nations
New York

One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza
(885 Second Avenue)
New York, NY 10017

Mailing Address:
PO Box 5238

New York, NY 10160-5238

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Facsimile: (212) 745-9316

1 August 1994

Ms Isel Rivero
Room S-3650
DPKO
United Nations
NEW YORK NY 10017

(by fax)

Dear Ms Rivero,

VISIT TO UNAMIR

The Rt Hon Sir David Steel MP wishes to fly by private jet from Lilongwe to Kigali on the morning of Wednesday 3 August. He will be accompanied by his assistant, Dr Vader, and pilot, Mr A Buckingham. He plans to be met in Kigali by the local Oxfam representative, Robert Amulet.

Could you please confirm whether the proposed visit will be feasible given the conditions at Kigali airport. If it is feasible I would be grateful for formal UN clearance for the visit.

*Yours ever,
Cedette Ramsey.*

(for) M C H Manners-Smith
Colonel
Military Adviser

TOTAL P.002

SRSG

(FC)

CNR 431 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 28 July 1994
NUMBER: 2401
SUBJECT: UNAMIR ACCOMMODATION

UNAMIR
84 JUL 29 04 58

Your MIR 1454 of today will be carefully studied by DPKO's Field and Logistics Division. Further information may be requested from UNAMIR. Will give substantive response as soon as possible.

Regards.

① SRSG
There is some tension
language/arguments here. The
minus of 17 Jul does not
reflect several comments that
I have asked to be
in corporate. Some ③ MIR 1452
of the data is not attached.
That between executive director,
CEO and myself, we pass drafts
for signature before your approval.

②
CAS
Can I see
that MIR 1454 please?

29/7

1994 JUL 28 P 10 32

UNAMIR
COPIES

This situation will
continue to evolve. In a
week's time we should send
another report - up to date. If we
can't get the situation in better
shape we will have to
or an alternative hotel!

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-270

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN, SRSG, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar Khan

DATE: 28 JULY 1994

No. OF PAGES: 9 MIR 1454

SUBJECT: LOCATION OF UNAMIR'S HEADQUARTERS

94 JUL 28 18 51
UNAMIR

1. The following is a report relating to the location of UNAMIR's Headquarters. In making my recommendations, I have taken into account:

- The existing accommodation and the facilities likely to become available in the future.
- The security situation in Kigali.
- Future scenario in Kigali related to location of UNAMIR Headquarters.

The Existing Accommodation

2. In the crisis situation that developed in Rwanda, UNAMIR's offices were closed down and the Amahoro Hotel, adjacent to the stadium, has served as the defacto headquarters and residence for officials serving with UNAMIR. The SRSG and officials assigned to UNAMIR thus reside and have their offices on the third floor of the Amahoro Hotel. The military contingent occupy the ground and first floors. There is no water and food is limited to army rations. Generators provide electricity. Living conditions are therefore basic and spartan. There is also a limitation on space at the Headquarters and accordingly only essential officials are able to locate at Kigali. The remainder of UNAMIR's office is located in Nairobi in 5 different buildings in the UN complex at Gigiri. A small unit functions at Entebbe.

The Security Situation

3. Although the civil war in Rwanda is over, the security situation will remain dangerous for some time. There is widespread looting in the capital, no effective law and order and there is a possibility of guerrilla raids and sabotage in the capital from the regrouped RGF extremists. Booby traps and mines left by the retreating RGF forces would need also to be

de-fused. It is evident therefore that a return to the status quo ante bellum is not possible when UN officials were free to rent accommodation anywhere they chose in town. The security situation demands that all UN officials, civil, military and representatives of agencies should locate their offices and residences in easily defended premises such as hotels, cluster of villas, housing estates etc.,

Accommodation available in Future

4. The attached report which has been drawn up after consultations between the civil and military elements of UNAMIR, gives an indication of the premises likely to become available for offices and residences. In the main, the following premises would appear suitable:

i) **The construction of pre-fabricated units** being constructed between the Amahoro Hotel and the Stadium. The Amahoro Hotel "current, de facto headquarters" combined with the pre-fab would then become the permanent office headquarters of UNAMIR. The advantage of the pre-fab extension being that it would be part of an already securely defended area.

RPi: /BBG
has been
that can
plate hotel
for our use
is not
acceptable.
Then it will
not be "secure".
we may have
to find an
alternative!

ii) **The Meridian Hotel.** A complete take over of the Meridian Hotel would provide office space and residence for UNAMIR officials, both civil, military and agencies. The hotel is close to the Headquarters and would be easily secured. At present the hotel is in poor condition having been shelled and occupied by refugees. Refurbishing the hotel would take approximately 2 months after the restoration of water and electricity.

iii) **The Diplomat and Chez Lando Hotels**

The hotels would serve as residences for our officials, Milobs, Civpol and Agency officials. Their repair and refurbishing would be relatively easy and could be completed within a month of the restoration of water and electricity. These premises would also serve as residences for the large number of UN experts, technicians who would be temporarily located in Kigali. They would also be easily secured.

iv) **Belgian Military Complex of Villas**

The Belgian Military Complex of small villas provides an excellent, secure residence for our officials. These villas are relatively new and can be made operational within 2-3 months. The villas are small, compact and contain ideal, non-family accommodation for about 55 persons. The complex can be secured.

Timing of move

5. Kigali is a devastated city with no water, food, power, banks, shops, markets or facilities. Thus, apart from the serious security situation it will take some time for basic facilities to become available. Provided the present lull in actual fighting continues, I do not expect basic facilities to be available in Kigali before 2 months. Once power, water and communication are restored and we are able to engage in repairing and refurbishing properties that we decide to acquire, it would take 2-3 months before they can be made ready for occupation (Items at para 4 (iii) may be ready sooner). A final move to Kigali would thus have to take into account this time-constraint.

②

3/9

Officer's Mess in Nairobi

6. I would strongly recommend that the UN rents a residential villa in Nairobi to serve as an Officer's mess for staff serving at UNAMIR Camp Headquarters in Kigali. As Kigali Headquarters provides only basic accommodation (office and residence combined in one room with no storage or cooking facilities), an officers mess in Nairobi would provide accommodation for short stays in Nairobi for staff on transit from or to Kigali. The mess would provide storage space for baggage, clothes etc., It would also serve as a place for receiving dignitaries (eg, Ambassadors) or for holding conferences. All officers mail, messages and occasional family meetings could also be arranged at the officers mess. As visits to Nairobi are inevitably frequent the officer's mess would provide an alternative to expensive hotels for visiting on transit officers. Officers utilizing mess facilities could be asked to pay a proportion from their MSA. The Officer's mess could be available for UN officials on transit rather than the insecure, expensive hotels in Nairobi. The officer's mess would have several bedrooms, a lounge, dining room, staff quarters and security. The cost of renting a suitable villa would not be exorbitant.

Recommendations

7. Taking the above factors into account, the following recommendations may be considered for approval.

- a) UNAMIR Headquarters should function from Kigali (Amahoro Hotel). The camp office, consisting of essential staff, must continue to function from the temporary accommodation (office and residence combined) available in Kigali.
- b) Given limitations of space, only the essential staff should be located in Kigali.
- c) The remainder of UNAMIR staff should be located in Nairobi. This would be a temporary sub-office. As and when office and residential accommodation becomes available in Kigali, the staff and offices at Nairobi may be transferred to Kigali. The exact timing of movement may be left for UNAMIR HQ to decide. Eventually, only a small essential sub-office may remain in Nairobi, on a need to have basis. The same would also be the case with Entebbe.
- d) The timing of this move from Nairobi to Kigali would take between 2-6 months, depending on actual conditions in Rwanda
- e) Due to security reasons, all UN residences and offices must be located in secure premises.
- f) An Officers mess may be rented in Nairobi for use of visiting staff from Kigali. It could also be used for UN officials on transit to Kigali.

8. Best wishes



TO: Mr. S. Khan, SRSG

FROM: Ally Golo, OIC Administration

DATE: 17 July 1994

RE: UNAMIR Plan for Accommodation, Offices and Facilities in Kigali

The following is an analysis of potential short and medium term accommodations and office space in Kigali for UNAMIR Civilian Staff, Contractors' Staff, Military Observers, UN CIVPOL, Staff Officers and Contingent Troops. The analysis is based on figures from the projected strength of UNAMIR personnel table as decided upon or submitted as part of our budget proposal using the deployment schedule as anticipated (see Annex 1), as follows:

Category	Total	Kigali
1. Civilian Staff	119	80
2. Contractor Staff	85	85
3. Military Observers	320	150
4. CIVPOL	90	25
5. Staff Officers	30	30
6. Contingent Troops	5,500	?

Due consideration has also been given to the status of each group of personnel, United Nations responsibilities and practices, and the situation in Rwanda as perceived today by this office. The following scenarios are proposed for your review:

a. Office Space

Given UNAMIR experience with the evacuation of its personnel, it is of paramount importance that offices required for all branches be collocated to the extent possible both in Kigali and in sectoral headquarters. To this end, the following is suggested:

Alternative 1

- Amahoro Hotel (present UNAMIR Headquarters) - this infrastructure does not have the capacity to accommodate the Office of the SRSG, Division of Administration and the Force Headquarters. However, additional offices could be constructed in the space between Amahoro Hotel and Amahoro Stadium. This possibility should also include a catering capability. It is estimated that the construction of wood frame offices may be completed within 2 months.



- Village Urugwiro - the facilities within this compound are very suitable for office space. There is also sufficient land in the compound for building additional offices to accommodate sections or units if required. It is to be noted, however, that RPF may not grant the use of this facility. It is suggested, however, that representation be made to the highest level of RPF Structure/Government for use of the compound, free of charge.

b. Accommodation

This issue is presented in line with different status of personnel or groups of personnel, as follows:

Group 1

- International Civilian Personnel, MILOBS and CIVPOL - this category of personnel is in receipt of MSA and should make its own arrangements under normal circumstances. In view of protracted security situation, however, it is recommended that the bulk of the staff required in Kigali be accommodated in a single location. To this end the Hotel Meridien should be acquired, under specific arrangements, for a period of 6 months initially. Please note that Headquarters New York is in contact with the managing agent of the hotel and is awaiting communication from UNAMIR to pursue efforts towards finalization of contractual arrangements.

Group 2

- Staff Officers - This alternative pertains mainly to accommodations. On the basis UN responsibility to provide accommodations for staff officers it is suggested that UNAMIR acquire the use of either Hotel Diplomat or the Belgian Cooperative Village. Catering services should be made available in either one of these facilities as required.

Group 3

- Troops - As per the UN practice troops are accommodated in tents with dining facilities. Arrangements are underway to acquire a self-contained 500 man camp. However, the Force Commander may request additional infrastructure for tactical deployment. In this connection, preference should be given, at this stage, to locations owned by the government. Should this option not satisfy the force's needs considerations should be given to infrastructure for which UNAMIR previously contracted prior to the outbreak of the war. The views of the Legal Office of Headquarters are required in this regard.

c. Warehouses/Workshops

Preference should be given to previously contracted locations such as Logistics Compound, Rwandex, IVECO, etc. Some storage facilities should also be acquired in and around the airport. Please note that UNAMIR presently has the ability to erect Rubb Halls for storage purposes.



Infrastructure, such as Chez Lando, are being actively considered subject to legal and contractual circumstances.

Preliminary meetings between UNAMIR and RPF representatives took place and the attached Annex 2 provide indications as to how best our demarche should be undertaken.

Submitted for your review and guidance.

cc: FC
ED

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Annex 1

Estimated strength of personnel for the period 5 April to 9 December 1994

	Authorized strength	4 April 1994	April 1994	May 1994	June 1994	July 1994	August 1994	September 1994	October 1994	November 1994	December 1994	Additional proposed	Total proposed
Military Personnel Specialists	1,078	624	109	109	109	109	459	609	759	1,076	1,076	0	1,076
Military Personnel Infantry	4,060	1,600	350	350	350	680	1,330	2,330	2,930	3,730	4,060	0	4,060
Sub-total Military	5,138	2,124	459	459	459	989	1,789	2,939	3,689	4,806	5,136	0	5,136
Military Observers	320	328	328	323	303	261	295	315	320	320	320	0	320
Civilian Police	90	47	47	15	15	15	40	65	90	90	90	0	90
Professionals and above	26	18	18	18	18	19	28	40	52	65	79	53	79
Field Service Staff	43	39	36	36	35	40	47	54	64	79	103	60	103
Senior General Service	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	7	12	17	14	17
General Service Staff	44	32	27	27	23	28	36	53	68	82	96	52	96
Security Officers	3	2	1	1	1	5	9	13	17	22	22	18	22
Sub-total Civilian Int'l	119	92	83	83	78	93	124	163	208	260	317	196	317
Locally Recruited Staff	68	60	13	12	12	12	57	127	197	262	380	312	380
Sub-total Civilian Staff	187	172	96	95	90	105	181	290	405	542	697	510	697
UN Volunteers	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	40	70	94	94	94	94
Consultants	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Contractual Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	5,733	2,871	930	892	867	1,370	2,325	3,649	4,574	5,852	6,337	604	6,337

Professionals and above


	Authorized strength	4 April 1994	April 1994	May 1994	June 1994	July 1994	August 1994	September 1994	October 1994	November 1994	December 1994	Additional proposed	Total proposed
USG	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
ASG	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
D-2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
D-1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	1	3
P-5	4	2	2	2	2	2	3	5	8	11	15	11	15
P-4	10	4	4	4	4	4	8	12	16	20	24	14	24
P-3	7	6	6	6	6	6	10	14	18	23	29	22	29
P-2		2	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	5	5	5	5
TOTAL	26	18	18	18	18	19	28	40	52	65	79	53	79

Ref: CAUSER\SSHEET\ONUM02\BUDGETS\REVMAOCT\DEPLOY

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UN Assistance Mission In Rwanda

TO: Ally Golo, OIC Administration
Maj. General Romeo Dellaire, FC

FROM: Philip Mitnick, CBMSO 

INFO: Col. Tikoka
Lt. Col. Austdal, CPLAN
Maj. McComber, CLOGO

DATE: 17 July, 1994

RE: Status of Infrastructure Acquisition

A meeting was held on 16 July 1994 with UNAMIR Civilian Staff, UNAMIR Military Staff Officers, RPF Property Inventory Officer and the RPF Liaison Officer. The purpose of the meeting was to identify properties that could be used by UNAMIR as accommodation, offices and stores.

The RPF agreed to the following interim policies regarding to the use of properties by UNAMIR:

- **Privately Owned Properties:** UNAMIR may reoccupy many of the properties that it previously leased during the first mandate period. The terms of occupancy will be the same as those agreed upon under the original lease. A written agreement will be established between the RPF and UNAMIR regarding the interim use of such properties. The agreement will state the date of vacancy and re occupancy by UNAMIR. UNAMIR will begin the use/occupancy of said structures as of Monday 17 July 1994. The agreement will extend through the end of the current Mandate period. UNAMIR will attempt to locate the rightful owners of these properties. Once the owners of these properties are located UNAMIR will renew its contract with said owners, or vacate properties at the discretion of the owners. UNAMIR will pay the owners of the property in accordance with previously agreed upon lease terms and for the total period of occupancy. The RPF agree to UNAMIR's interim occupancy of the following structures as of Monday 17 July 1994:

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| 1. Centre Christos | 11. Former Log Base |
| 2. Chez Lando | 12. Hotel Mille Collines |
| 3. Hotel Meridien | 13. UNDP Building |
| 4. Former Belgian BN HQ | 14. UNICEF Building |
| 5. Former Kigali Sector HQ | 15. Belgian Cooperative Village |
| 6. Former CIVPOL HQ | 16. Former SRSG's Residence |
| 7. Kabuga Hotel | 17. Former UNAMIR Garage |
| 8. Hotel Diplomat | 18. Former MILOBS HQ |
| 9. IVECO | 19. Former UNAMIR Stores (Movie Theater) |
| 10. RWANDEX | 20. Former Comms Workshop |

Additional information about the proposed use of these properties and notes about special conditions of occupancy are included in Annex 1, Infrastructure.

- **Government Owned Properties:** UNAMIR may continue to occupy facilities that are covered by agreements with the former government. UNAMIR may occupy some additional government owned facilities in accordance with agreements made during the course of this meeting (see below).



Ally Goto, OIC Administration
17 July, 1994
Page 2

UNAMIR will provide RPF with a copy of the section of the UN Charter covering use by the UN of member government owned properties. The RPF agree to UNAMIR's occupancy of the following properties as of Monday 17 July 1994:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Amahoro Stadium | 3. Kigali Hospital |
| 2. Amahoro Hotel | 4. Byumba Stadium |
| 3. King Faisal Hospital | 5. Military Academy |

In addition, the RPF will investigate the use by UNAMIR of the following additional properties:

- 1. Military Training Area

The following additional notes pertain to the use of subject properties:

- 1. Centre Christos - UNAMIR and RPF will attempt to contact the Catholic/Jessuit order that are owners of this facility in order to establish terms of occupancy. UNAMIR has no prior contractual arrangements with said property.
- 2. Hotel Chez Lando - UNAMIR will assess the condition of the property in order to determine with necessary repairs are feasible and can be completed quickly. If the property is desirable UNAMIR and RPF will attempt to contact members of the Lando family in order to establish terms of occupancy.
- 3. Hotel Meridien - Representatives of the Hotel will visit in the near future to assess the work necessary to bring it into operating condition. UNAMIR and RPF will meet with these representatives in order to establish terms of occupancy. The RPF may require that a certain block of rooms be reserved for members of the new government and/or visiting dignitaries.
- 4. Hotel Mille Collines - Representatives of the Hotel will visit in the near future to assess the work necessary to bring it into operating condition. UNAMIR and RPF will meet with these representatives in order to establish terms of occupancy. The RPF may require that a certain block of rooms be reserved for members of the new government and/or visiting dignitaries.
- 5. Hotel Diplomat - Representatives of the Hotel will visit in the near future to assess the work necessary to bring it into operating condition. UNAMIR and RPF will meet with these representatives in order to establish terms of occupancy. The RPF may require that a certain block of rooms be reserved for members of the new government and/or visiting dignitaries.
- 6. Kabuga Hotel - UNAMIR may occupy that section of the Hotel which it formerly used. The office block will be retained for the RPF. The RPF may take possession of the entire structure at the end of this mandate period as the structure may be nationalized.
- 7. Military Academy - UNAMIR may occupy the facility for 6 months at which time the arrangement will be reassessed.
- 8. Military Training Area - RPF will consult with commanding officers responsible for this area before making commitment.
- 9. Trafipro - UNAMIR and RPF will set up a meeting with WFP in order to determine their needs with respect to warehousing in this facility. UNAMIR representatives will RECCE office space in this complex in order to determine whether it can be used by civilian staff or staff officers.
- 10. Byumba Stadium - This facility will be used for the Eng Coy. An additional 200-250 person camp will need to be set up on the stadium grounds. It has been suggested that one or more surplus Weatherhaven camps are available in stores at UNOSOM.



SRSG

FC


CNR 430 P1/2

UNAMIR
84 JUL 29 04 57

UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS
1994 JUL 28 P 10:02

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE 28 JULY 1994
NUMBER 0' 2396



SUBJECT: Security Council Informal Consultations

Attached please find subject summary for today.
Best regards.



CNR 430 P2/2

28 July 1994

SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

1. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation informed the Council that his government was making equipment available for humanitarian activities. This equipment consisted of 30 trucks (including drivers). Other assistance was being contemplated the extent of which would be announced on the 2 August in Geneva.
2. The Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom confirmed his country's offer of a self contained specialized unit (500) to assist UNAMIR until such time as it reached its full operational capacity.
3. Gharekhan also informed the Council that Zaire had agreed to allow the operation of an FM/SW radio station by the NGO Reporters without Borders.
4. On Burundi a draft Presidential Statement will most likely be approved tomorrow.

UNAMIR

94 JUL 29 04 53

SRSG

FC

CNR 429 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLEUNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS
1994 JUL 28 P 10:02

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 28 July 1994
NUMBER: 2395
SUBJECT: FRENCH MINISTER'S VISIT

1. The French Mission here would like to arrange a meeting with you (in Goma on French zone on Sunday, 31 July) for Mrs. Michaux-Chevry, Minister for Humanitarian Aid and Human Rights.
2. Kindly let us know by return cable whether this would be feasible so that we can inform French Mission on Friday (their fax with Minister's schedule attached).

Regards

@
SAGE
I have informed
the French LO that
we could not make
it.

29/7

I am sorry
message to NY.

307

CNR 429 P2/2

**MISSION PERMANENTE DE LA FRANCE
AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES**

NEW YORK, 28 July 1994
N° 107/MPF/CM

TELECOPIE

Expéditeur From	: Colonel BASTIEN TPH. (212) 702 49 85	NUMERO DE FAX 19 1 212 421 68 89
Destinataire(s) To	: DPKO	NUMERO DE FAX 963 64 60
Pour	: MS RIVERO	
Objet Subject	: VISIT OF A FRENCH MINISTER IN GOMA AND RWANDA	
Référence(s)		
Nombre de pages y compris celle-ci	: 2	
Texte THIS FAX TO INFORM YOU THAT A FRENCH DELEGATION LED BY MRS MICHAUX-CHEVRY (FRENCH MINISTER TO THE HUMANITARIAN AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS) WILL GO TO BURUNDI, GOMA AND RWANDA FROM JULY 30 TO AUGUST 1ST. SATURDAY JULY 30 : VISIT IN BURUNDI. PROJECT : - 08.00 AM : ARRIVAL AT Bujumbura - 09.45 AM : MEETING WITH MR OULD ABDALLAH, SGRS FOR BURUNDI AT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE - 10.30 AM : MEET NGOS - 11.30 AM : GIVE TO NGOS A LOAD OF 40 TONS OF FOOD BROUGHT BY MRS MICHAUX-CHEVRY AIR PLANE - 12.30 AM : LUNCH WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF NGOS AND UN AGENCIES - 02.30 PM : MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF UN AND NGOS - IN THE AFTERNOON, VISIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI SUNDAY JULY 31 : 09.15 AM ARRIVAL AT GOMA THE REST OF THE DAY SHOULD BE ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS : - MOVE TO GIKONGORO AND VISIT KADUHA AND RUKONDO REFUGEE CAMPS, AND MEET UNAMIR MILITARY OBSERVERS. - MEETING WITH M. SHARYAR KHAN, THS SRSG FOR RWANDA - AT LUNCH TIME, AT GIKONGORO, MEET FRENCH MILITARY PEOPLE FROM THE TURQUOISE OPERATION AND REPRESENTATIVES OF NGOS - IN THE AFTERNOON, MOVE TO CYANGUGU AND VISIT THE FRENCH MILITARY HOSPITAL. - GO BACK TO GOMA AND VISIT THE HOSPITAL AND ORPHANAGE - PRESS POINT - AROUND 09.00 PM, TAKE OFF FROM GOMA INBOUND FRANCE.		

245 East 47th Street 44th Floor - NEW YORK, NY 10017
Tph. (212) 308 5700 - Fax. (212) 421 6889

PAGE 1

SRSG

FC

CNR 428 P1/10

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

'94 JUL 29

04 52

1994 JUL 28 P 9 13

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 28 JULY 1994

NUMBER: 2393

SUBJECT: Burundi

Attached, please find Ould Abdallah's sitrep on Burundi number 54/94, a progress report prepared by DPA, as well as a copy of a letter from F.I.D.H. (Paris) which is self-explanatory.
Best regards.

copy sent to
M. Gen Towsignant

CNR 428 P2/10
Page 1 of 2

OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 28.7.94

(00)

Ref:BU/SRSG/0294

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH SRSG BUJUMBURA AOA
FAX No: 1-212-963-50-65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) (871) 151 33 62 (Inmarsat) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 21 32 00 (hotel) 871) 151 33 61 (Inmarsat. after 5pm GTM)
ATTN:	CC. MR. K. ANNAN, USG/DPKO MR. H. KITTANI, USG/DPA
SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 054/94	No OF PAGES: 2

1. Political situation remains fragile as the extremist faction within the Opposition still reject compromise. These few civilians, certainly with a hidden agenda, are opposed to progress in negotiations on the Presidential succession. Though they are becoming singled out and identified as "hardliners" opposed to return to normality and thus exposed politically, they have not yet given any sign of flexibility. The large majority within the Opposition, Army high command and most members of Civil Society are opposed to the behaviour of this faction. Furthermore, these extremists started transferring their destabilizing activities from Bujumbura to rural areas by involving young radical students in ethnic fighting. Reports received from the countryside indicate that more than 100 people have been killed and about 200 houses burnt during this past week.
2. Tomorrow, they plan to organize a "dead city" (i.e. preventing commerce and daily activities from taking place) from which violence is not excluded against the administration of Internal Security. We approached the Army and other leaders, calling on them to do their best to prevent this demonstration from taking place. The former President Bagaza's political party (PARENA) is also implicated in this demonstration. This demonstration could, however, be called-off as the Head of Internal Security, a close associate of President a.i., has resigned today from his position precisely under pressure from this extremist faction. Given that these extremists use threats and blackmail, no one seems able to confront them openly, thus most people call on us to publicly denounce them. Consequently, I believe denunciation of this extremist faction by Security Council in a statement by its President is absolutely necessary.
3. The impunity enjoyed by this faction is a threat to a successful conclusion of ongoing negotiation on Presidential succession and permanent danger lingering over peace and stability. Moreover, it is encouraging extremists within the majority (Hutu) not only to resist further concessions by President a.i. but to organize themselves for what they call legitimate defence. To add pressure on extremists, we are encouraging, in close cooperation with representatives of donor countries, moderates from National Assembly and other circles, to meet together to constitute visible force to reckon with. It is, however, not easy to materialize positive results due to this impunity. Again denunciation by Security Council of this faction would constitute a valuable contribution to peace and stability.

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Page 2 of 2

4. We convened a meeting with representatives of major aid agencies: UNDP, World Bank, USAID, Cooperation Francaise, Caisse Francaise de Developpement, and Cooperation Belge to devise a strategy intended to explaining Burundese from all political origins, economic and financial situation of their country. The budget situation, in particular salaries, is very critical and political leaders should be made aware of their responsibilities in this connection. Beyond its impact on security and stability, unnecessary prolongation of negotiation on Presidential succession is having disastrous effects on the finance and economy. These representatives already held two meetings with groups of local businessmen and members of political parties.
5. In cooperation with a Geneva-based NGO we are organizing a visit to Burundi by former Presidents MM. Olusegun Obasango (Nigeria) and Amadou T. Touré (Mali). They intend to stay for one week to discuss with different segments of the Burundese society the urgent need for peace, security and stability. Though the visit is not necessarily timely, we accepted to assist in its organization. We also met with and assisted two delegations: Physicians for Human Rights (Boston) and Mr. Michel Dottridge, Head of Africa Services from Amnesty International.

A. Ould Abdallah
28 July 1994

28 July 1994

AOA

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Revised

CNR 428 P4/10

Note to Mr. Gharekhan

BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON BURUNDI

Introduction

1. Despite the many warnings that Burundi was about to follow the path of its neighbour, it has so far succeeded in avoiding a crisis. The situation is nevertheless fragile but generally speaking it has not been explosive. The interim President was able to leave the country, while political negotiations on the presidential succession were still going on, to attend the OAU summit. He has throughout appeared confident that the situation was under control, even though it sometimes became tense as the constitutional deadline of 12 July approached.

2. Since the fatal plane accident on 6 April, in which President Ntaryamira lost his life together with the President of Rwanda, the Secretary-General has been closely monitoring the situation in Burundi. From the very beginning, his Special Representative, Mr. Ould Abdallah, tried to persuade the Burundese that the death of their President ought to be seen as an accident rather than in a political context. His efforts have had some success.

3. Since the beginning of the Rwandese crisis, the Government of Burundi's position has been to observe strict neutrality, while condemning the genocide, and to support implementation of the Arusha accords, with Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister. However, the two ethnic groups have inevitably followed closely what was happening to their kin in Rwanda.

4. The Rwandese crisis has thus had a serious impact on:
1) security conditions, 2) the political situation.

Security conditions

5. Many rumours of impending coups have circulated in Bujumbura and an actual coup was foiled on 25 April. As a consequence, the capital has remained tense and many foreign residents have chosen to leave the country. Repeatedly the army was given orders to resolve security problems (for instance, by establishing check points around Hutu neighbourhoods, to ensure that weapons did not enter) and both the interim Hutu President of the majority and the Tutsi Prime Minister of the opposition addressed messages to the population, informing them of the measures which had been decided.

6. The northern Bujumbura neighbourhoods of Gasenyi, Kamenge and Kihama, three largely Hutu-populated areas, harbour armed activist groups, some politicized and related to the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU), some anarchists or

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independents and some opposed to the national army which is perceived as a Tutsi army. The Government has finally succeeded in disarming those groups, especially in Kamengé. The armament of those groups was perceived by the Tutsi minority as a threat to their very survival, and by some majority extremists as a way to protect themselves from the army. Hence, the persistent call of the Government for disarmament.

7. The security problem has been at the centre of the interim President's worries. He has invested a lot of his time and energy in stressing to the Hutu population the need to cooperate with the army. He toured capital neighbourhoods delivering conciliatory speeches and calling on recently displaced persons to return to their homes.

8. The climate of insecurity is perceived as being to a great extent linked to the investigation into the October 1993 massacres which was launched by the Government. The Hutus see this investigation as biased and directed only against them and claim that it ignores the civilians and military personnel who were involved in the attempted coup. On the other hand, the Tutsis consider that the investigation is also biased and ignores the perpetrators of the massacres which followed the attempted coup.

9. Persistent broadcasts from Rwandese Hutu radios inciting the Hutus in Burundi to take up arms against the Tutsis have had a negative impact on security in the northern provinces. It is hoped that an end will be put to those damaging broadcasts without any further delay.

Political situation

10. Since the negotiations were launched on 30 May, political life in Bujumbura has centered around the presidential succession. At first, it had been hoped that the new President would be inaugurated in time for him to attend the OAU summit in Tunis. Then, it was hoped that he would be in place for the national holiday, on the first of July. Lastly, it was expected that a consensus candidate would emerge by 12 July, the constitutional target date which the political parties had set for themselves.

11. The political negotiations have proved very difficult. They are characterized by continuous manoeuvres of some of the Tutsi opposition and the lack of flexibility of the Hutu majority. The main focus of the negotiations is the preconditions set by the Opposition and the programme of the Government. Progress was therefore slow and it appeared very quickly that the constitutional deadline could not be respected and that the Government would have to request the Constitutional Court to extend the interim period.

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12. On 11 July, a crisis, and especially a dangerous political vacuum, were avoided when the Constitutional Court extended by three months the interim period. The interim President continued his discussions with party leaders on the programme for the future government. Agreement was reached on power-sharing concerning the territorial administration and the diplomatic missions. The Opposition obtained 6 provinces plus Bujumbura while the majority kept 9 provinces. The Opposition obtained 9 diplomatic missions, including New York, while the majority kept 13.

13. The discussions concerning the organization of the government are more difficult. The majority wishes to focus on a short and mid-term programme for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country, while the opposition intends to introduce fundamental constitutional reforms and wishes in particular to limit the powers of the President.

14. Even though it is recognized that the interim President should not have waited until 30 June to accelerate negotiations on the presidential succession, it is felt that he has now made sufficient concessions to the opposition and the latter should be encouraged to refrain from continuing to ask for additional concessions from Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU).

15. There is much mistrust between the majority and the opposition. FRODEBU is convinced that the Tutsi opposition, counting on the support of the army, is embarked on an operation to strip it of its June 1993 gains. Some of its partisans called directly on the population to stand ready and firm to fight hard for the preservation of those gains. On the other hand, the opposition parties, mostly Tutsis, concerned by the October massacres and the killing of their kin in Rwanda, insist on political guarantees to ensure a significant participation in government affairs.

16. The negotiations are clearly taking longer than necessary. Each time progress is made and one issue is solved, the negotiators add to the agenda some additional item of minor relevance. To show that he has no intention of being a silent accomplice to their political games, the Special Representative has not attended the last three meetings of the political parties negotiating the presidential succession.

17. Another element which complicates the situation is the fact that former President Bagaza (a Tutsi) has formed a new opposition party, Parti pour le redressement national (PARENA), which openly advocates separate homelands for Hutus and Tutsis. This idea, which has been acclaimed by some Tutsis in Burundi, suggests that former President Bagaza may also be exploiting the uncertain political situation to make a come-back.

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Human rights

18. The publication on 5 July, in Brussels and Paris, of the report of the group of NGO's (including Africa Watch and the Ligue internationale des droits de l'homme) which visited Burundi in February to investigate the October 1993 events has had an impact on the security situation. A number of leading personalities are named in this report as authors of or accomplices to the coup and the ensuing massacres. Political circles have therefore shown a certain degree of excitement following that publication.

C 19. The Special Representative has not failed to remind the political leaders of their persistent calls for an international and neutral investigation of the October events. He has stressed the danger of expecting a comprehensive report to blame one side totally and clear the other, or vice-versa. Finally, he has urged them to assume their responsibilities for their calls for an international investigation.

The refugee situation

C 20. Though dramatic, the refugee situation is still manageable. About 100,000 Rwandese refugees have arrived in the northern Burundi provinces during the last few days. The security of those refugees is, unfortunately, not always guaranteed. UNHCR reports frequent killings by either elements of the security forces or Tutsi civilians. It is hoped that the OAU officers, now deployed in a number of provinces, will play a deterrent role. Presently, 5 officers are in the provinces of Muyinga and Kayanza and 4 officers are in Gitega. This week, an additional 2 teams, of 4 officers each, will be deployed in the provinces of Cibitoke and Mukamba. The remaining officers of MIOB (Mission d'observation de l'OUA au Burundi which consists of 30 officers - 10 from Burkina Faso, 10 from Mali, 5 from Niger and 5 from Tunisia) are staying in Bujumbura to address logistical, administrative and other issues.

Activities of the Special Representative

21. From the moment he took up his post, Mr. Ould Abdallah played an instrumental role in urging the main players on the political stage to act in an atmosphere of cooperation.

22. In close cooperation with countries like Belgium, France, Sweden and the United States, to name only a few, he organized or co-organized several national events: a conference on governance and democracy and a women's march for peace in January, a conference on priority issues and a marathon-cross for peace in April and lastly, in cooperation with the Swedish Institute for

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- 5 -

African studies, a conference on national dialogue in Burundi in May.

23. Furthermore, Mr. Ould Abdallah organized the visit which the High Commissioner of Human Rights paid to Burundi on 9 and 10 May, before proceeding to Rwanda. He organized for him and his delegation a number of meetings with the main actors of the political scene, including former President Buyoya, and a group of ambassadors.

24. On 12 June, Mr. Ould Abdallah received the team headed by the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, Mr. Degni-Ségué. Since the team was unable to visit Rwandese refugee camps in Burundi, due to security reasons, the Special Representative organized for them a meeting in Bujumbura with people conversant with the situation in Rwanda.

25. Lastly, the Special Representative travelled to Nairobi to participate in a donors meeting and met with Mr. Brian Atwood, the President of USAID. On that occasion, he made a first contact with his counterpart in Rwanda, Mr. Khan. The two Representatives have agreed to maintain close contact and meet on a periodical basis.

26. A high-level delegation from Amnesty International arrived in Bujumbura yesterday. As the Security Council may know, Amnesty International recently launched a worldwide campaign aimed at obtaining the dispatch of a UN-OAU mission of unarmed military observers to monitor the human rights situation.

27. From the very beginning, the Special Representative has been closely involved in the political negotiations regarding the presidential succession and his guidance and advice have been sought by the main political leaders. He has been in constant contact with the interim President and the Prime Minister. Despite the many difficulties he has encountered, he was able to demonstrate his impartiality and constantly insisted that he was supporting only dialogue, peace and stability.

Conclusion

28. The fact that the Government did not disintegrate following the death of President Ntaryamira on 6 April gives no cause for complacency.

29. The situation in Burundi is potentially as volatile as in Rwanda. This is why the Secretary-General is following it very closely and is being briefed, on a daily basis, by his Special Representative.

30. It is the Secretary-General's hope that the international community will continue to support strongly the on-going

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political dialogue and will react with extreme care to repeated warnings of an imminent outbreak of general violence in Burundi. These could well reflect the political games currently played in Bujumbura.

31. According to the latest report of the SRSG, some members of the opposition parties are continuing to block the negotiation process and are demanding more concessions. On 23 July, they gave clear indications that they would not accept the interim President, Mr. Ntibantunganya, as President, nor perhaps any other candidate from FRODEBU. Our assessment of the situation is that the interim President, discouraged by this attitude or fearful for his life, might give up. Such decision could lead to a desperate Hutu uprising. Civil war would then be difficult to avoid.

32. The Security Council might accordingly wish to review the current situation and consider issuing a presidential statement warning extremists against continued blockage of the negotiations on the presidential succession and encouraging the moderates on both sides to maintain their efforts.

DPA
26 July 1994


F.I.D.H. FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES LIGUES DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL
DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
الدراسة الدولية لحقوق الانسان

Paris, le 22 juillet 1994

M. Boutros BOUTROS GHALI
Secrétaire Général
ONU

Fax 19 1 212 963 21 55



Mr. Annan
Mr. Boutros
AS
HA
IR

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Vous n'êtes pas sans savoir le rôle nocif et détestable qu'a joué dans les événements tragiques du Rwanda la Radio RTLM, dite Radio libre des mille collines.

Depuis quelques semaines déjà une nouvelle radio libre, RUTOMORANGIRO, appartenant au PALIZEMUTU (parti extrémiste hutu du Burundi) émet le même type d'appels au meurtre basés sur des thèses racistes, prétendant que deux peuples vivent dans cette région, les bantous et les nilotes, que jamais ils ne pourront s'entendre et qu'il faut donc que l'un des deux disparaisse de la carte de toute la région.

La FIDH tient à exprimer sa plus vive inquiétude face à cette situation qui ne fait qu'accentuer les problèmes et attiser les haines et la violence. Elle en appelle à votre organisation pour que toutes les mesures soient prises pour mettre un terme à l'expression tant de la Radio libre des mille collines qu'à la Radio Rutomorangiro, qui émet, semble-t-il, de la région de Bugarama (Rwanda). Les propos tenus par ces radios ne peuvent qu'encourager les conflits interethniques, aujourd'hui et demain. Les faire taire participe d'un début de retour à la paix tant au Rwanda, qu'au Burundi, sans oublier le Zaïre. Il nous paraît également indispensable que les responsables de ces appels au meurtre soient également soumis à des procédures judiciaires pour crime contre l'humanité et violation des droits de l'homme.

En effet, il nous semble que les appels au meurtre proférés par ces deux radios ne peuvent qu'aller à l'encontre de l'action prônée par l'ONU dans cette région du monde. Pour ce qui nous concerne, nous considérons que la seule véritable solution humanitaire consiste à permettre à tous les déplacés et réfugiés de la région des Grands lacs de pouvoir rentrer chez eux en leur assurant la paix et les aides nécessaires à la reprise d'une vie normale.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, en l'expression de ma considération distinguée.

Daniel JACOBY
Président de la FIDH

14 PASSAGE LUMIN, 75010 PARIS, FRANCE. TEL. 33 (1) 40 27 14 26, FAX 33 (1) 40 27 14 26

SRSG

(FC)

CNR 424 P1/2

UNAMIR
94 JUL 28 04 39

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO KHAN, SRSG, KIGALI
FROM ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE 27 July 1994
NUMBER 2379

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT: SECCO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

Attached for your information please find subject summary for today.

[Handwritten mark]

1994 JUL 27 P 8 17
UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE
HS

CNR 424 P2/2

27 July 1994

SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS

1. At today's meeting Gharekhan provided an update on the humanitarian situation in Rwanda based on Hansen's report to the Secretary General.

C 2. The Representative of France emphasized that on a question of general policy the new government should continue to appeal to the refugees to return and in this regard that UNAMIR "should assist in upgrading the signals of the broadcasts of the radio operating from Kigali". He indicated that no information on incidents within the Protected Zone had been relayed to him in spite of press reports to the contrary. However, he mentioned that elements of the RPF had plundered and pillaged in certain areas close to the Protected Zone though these incidents could be isolated.

3. The Representative of the US informed the Council that her Government had decided to dispatch a reconnaissance mission to Kigali to study the feasibility of expanding and strengthening humanitarian aid to Rwanda. Close co-ordination with UNAMIR would be maintained and she would report regularly to the Council on the progress of such activities.

C

SRSG

(FC)

CNR-423 P1/2

UNAMIR UNITED NATIONS
OUTGOING CODE 27 15 39
1994 JUL 27 AMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 27 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2374

COPY

SUBJECT: Visit of the Tunisian Secretary of State for African Affairs

1. As per attached note dated 26 July 1994, the Permanent Mission of Tunisia has advised us that ~~Mr. Fayala~~, Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be travelling to Kigali via Nairobi. Mr. FAYALA is scheduled to ~~arrive in Kigali~~ the 28th of July, that is tomorrow. We are trying to ascertain from the Permanent Mission approximate ETA and transport means.

2. The Permanent Mission wishes UNAMIR to provide transport for Mr. FAYALA Nairobi-Kigali-Nairobi.

Best regards.

C

++ CYD ++
15:30 5502
JUL 26 1994 08:53

UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK
P.2

PERMANENT MISSION OF TUNISIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
31 BEEKMAN PLACE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

البعثة الدائمة للجمهورية التونسية
لدى منظمة الأمم المتحدة
بنيويورك

CNR-423 P2/2

URGENT

NO 272

New York, le 26 juillet 1994.

La Mission Permanente de la Tunisie auprès des Nations Unies présente ses compliments au Département des Operations de Maintien de la Paix de l'ONU et a l'honneur de l'informer que S.E.M. Sadok FAYALA, Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Africaines se rendra à Kigali (Rwanda), via Nairobi, le Jeudi 28 Juillet 1994.

En l'absence de toute autre connexion possible, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la République Tunisienne souhaite savoir si les Responsables de l'ONU peuvent assurer le transfert de M. Sadok FAYALA de Nairobi à Kigali, aller-retour, et ce, par le moyen de transport utilisé par les Nations Unies. Le départ de M. FAYALA pour Kigali étant programmé pour jeudi 28 juillet.

La Mission Permanente de la Tunisie serait hautement reconnaissante d'une réponse diligente du Département des Operations de maintien de la Paix de l'ONU, à ce sujet.

La Mission Permanente de la Tunisie saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Département de Maintien de la Paix les assurances de sa haute considération.

Département des Operations
de Maintien de la Paix
New York.



SRSG

FL

CNR 421 P1/4

UNAMIR

94 JUL 27 04 48

94 JUL 26 P 4 30

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE 26 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2368
SUBJECT: SECCO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

Attached please find subject summaries for 25 and 26 July 1994
for your information.
Best regards.

W

C

CNR 421 P2/4

26 JULY 1994

SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

1. At today's informals the situation in Burundi took center stage. However, Gharekhan did provide the Council with information on UNAMIR's deployment status and referred to his telephone conversation with the SRSG. Gharekhan also reiterated that the new government in Rwanda considered the four troop contributing countries mentioned by France as personae non grata.

2. Only the Permanent Representative of Oman referred to Rwanda expressing his personal satisfaction at Kagame's statement to the press concerning his reassurances to the returnees that they would not be screened at re-entry points. He also expressed satisfaction with Kagame's declaration that returnees could return to their properties and that the new government would welcome human rights monitors as well as the Commission of Inquiry. This declaration dispelled misgivings and rumours concerning expropriations.

3. Gharekhan provided the council with an extensive verbal report on Burundi which at the request of Council members will be distributed as an information paper later tonight. Copy of this paper will be faxed to you as soon as it is finalised. The Council will be discussing a draft Presidential Statement in the next day or two with a view at issuing it on Thursday, 28 July.

4. All Representatives who spoke drew analogies between the situation in Burundi and Rwanda. The Representative of France referred to the conspicuous similarities in political stalling and ethnic tension which had been prevalent in Rwanda prior to the plane crash; this trend was now evident in Burundi. The Representative of Oman wished the Presidential Statement to serve as a warning to members of the new government in Rwanda. The two countries were bound by cause and effect; any untimely action by the new government in Rwanda could trigger a catastrophe in Burundi.

4. Other speakers who supported the preparation of a Presidential Statement were Spain, New Zealand, Djibouti, US, Nigeria and the UK.

25 July 1994

CNR 421 P3/4

SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

1. Following Mr. Gharekhan's daily briefing on Rwanda in which he indicated that it was unlikely that UNAMIR would be deployed to coincide with French troops withdrawal, the Representative of France restated that Operation Turquoise would begin thinning out by the 31 July and that it would do so in three phases. He urged the Secretariat to deploy forces from UNOSOM to Rwanda. He also repeated that a number of African countries participating in Operation Turquoise were willing to remain under UNAMIR and that the Transitional Government of National Unity had removed their objections to these countries' participation.

2. Nigeria, Oman and New Zealand also expressed their disappointment concerning UNAMIR's deployment. The Representative of Nigeria suggested that the planning team now in Zimbabwe should visit western and other states which had the capacity to provide equipment to UNAMIR. The Representative of Oman added that the Transitional Government of National Unity should abide by the Arusha Peace Agreement which stipulated that the BBTG would be in office only 18 months. He further asked information concerning the timetable of the Commission of Inquiry.

3. The Representative of New Zealand thanked the United States State Department for the briefing conducted on Sunday and for having taken the initiative to share the list of equipment requirements needed by UNAMIR.

4. The United States Representative referred to the humanitarian activities being carried out in Goma, Zaire. He remarked that only four of the eight essential packages for the emergency were on board. The missing elements included engineering capacity for road servicing and road security as well as refueling and sanitation facilities. He remarked that the most pressing assistance now required was the immediate deployment of UNAMIR.

5. Mr. Gharekahn in replying to questions indicated that the Commission of Inquiry would be imminently constituted and informed the Permanent Representative of France that contrary to the information he had received, the Government of National Unity had reiterated to UNAMIR their reservations concerning the participation in UNAMIR of African countries who had participated in Operation Turquoise.

NOTE TO MR. C. GHAREKHAN

CNR 421 P4/4

RWANDA

Preparations for the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR have continued both at Headquarters and in the field. At Headquarters, there has been extensive exchange of views with Permanent Missions with whom the Secretariat has shared the plans and requirements for the deployment of the force. Yesterday, a Troop and Equipment Contributors' Meeting was held. As noted before, a number of countries have offered troops: Ghana (800), Ethiopia (800), Zimbabwe (800), Zambia (800), Tunisia (500-600), Nigeria (300), Mali (200), Malawi (120), Canada (300) communication unit, and Australia (300) medical unit. However, most of the troops from the African countries need equipment before deploying. DPKO sent two missions to a number of these countries to assess their equipment requirements.

A list of equipment required has been provided to Permanent Missions. Despite all efforts made by the Secretariat, it has not been possible to obtain all the equipment for the troops offered. It has now been decided that the best way to proceed could possibly be to pair a troop contributor with an equipment contributor. In this regard, the Ghanaian battalion has been paired with the equipment leased from the US. However, UNAMIR has advised that the Ugandan army has refused clearance for the 50 M113 APCs presently located at Entebbe to be trucked to Kigali. These are the APCs which are supposed to be provided to the Ghanaian battalion. The issue is being taken up with the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations. Elements of this battalion are already in Kigali.

The equipment offered by Belgium would be paired with the Malawi contingent. France has offered to provide some equipment to the African troops in Operation Turquoise when they join UNAMIR, that is, Senegal, Togo, and Congo but has not made any decision as to how to undertake financial assistance to the troops. There has been contrary information as to whether the new Rwandan Government would accept troops that are currently serving in Operation Turquoise. Consultations are underway to clarify the situation. The Ethiopian battalion has identified only a few equipment deficiencies and preparations for its deployment appear to be progressing well. The Nigeria's request for compensation has been resolved and its contingent should now be available for early deployment to Rwanda. Israel has advised that it is prepared to consider request from the UN to provide a number of M113 APCs under lease arrangements for UNAMIR. Details are being negotiated with the Secretariat.

Although the situation in Rwanda has dramatically changed, UNAMIR's operational concept has not changed but there will be a readjustment in terms of deployment of troops. It was essential for UNAMIR to contribute to a secure environment in Rwanda in order to lure the refugees back home. The crisis in Rwanda had starkly shown how ill-equipped the international community really was for peace-keeping and humanitarian emergencies.

DPKO
26 July 1994

SRSG.

FC

CNR 420 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 26 July 1994
NUMBER: 2367
SUBJECT: UNAMIR OPERATIONS

UNAMIR
94 JUL 27 04 49

1994 JUL 26 P 4 26
D.H. TONGS
DPL J. MS

1. Thanks for your MIR 1427 of 27 July received this morning.
2. DHA is following up on main points in para 2. Re para 2d (ICAO report not received), you would be informed that Canada is sending airfield control team. Re para 2f, Australia has confirmed medical contingent. Re para 2g, FALD is pursuing helicopter requirements. US announced today that it will base humanitarian relief military headquarters in Kigali, which will facilitate your coordination requirements.
3. Thanks for info in para 3. Press reports quote Zairian officials as stating that they will continue to disarm RGF personnel in their territory. We would appreciate report on Rwandan Prime Minister's meeting with Zairian President in Mauritius. Please let us know if Government is considering policy for absorption of RGF personnel into army subject to whatever screening they consider necessary.
4. It is the SG's intention to urge France to extend its presence in Protected Zone in case UNAMIR does not have personnel by mid August to assume responsibility. We await word from you on Government's position on West African contingent being equipped by France.

Best regards.

SRSg

(FC)

OUTGOING CODE CABLE NAMIR

CNK 041/ CNR 419/P1/2

94 JUL 27 04 48

TO: HANSEN USG DHA NAIROBI
KHAN SRSg, KIGALI

FROM: HANSEN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

NUMBER: 2364

DATE: 28 JULY 1994

Blind

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UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS
94 JUL 26 P 8:33

MOST IMMEDIATE

Doug Stafford, Assistant Administrator of USAID, called this afternoon in connection with your request to Brian Atwood regarding US assistance for immediate disposal of cholera contaminated corpses. He said that before they could take up the matter with the National Security Adviser, which he was asked to do within the next two hours, it was necessary to obtain more detailed information regarding the problem and a quantification of requirements. Given the urgency of the matter he requested for an immediate response. He said that he had discussed it with Gerald Walzer of UNHCR, who was not aware of the proposal and did not have any details. Stafford also wanted an assessment of capacity available in the field.

As we could not reach you on the telephone, we spoke to SRSg Khan who provided us with more details. He informed us that there were an estimated 15,000 corpses near the Goma airport. Given the volcanic terrain and the fact that large scale burials could contaminate subsoil and underground water, the best possible solution would be to incinerate them. He did not anticipate any ethnic/religious impediments but suggested that with the help of WHO whose medical advise would be essential, this activity could be carried out in close cooperation with the Government of Zaire.

CNK 041/ CNR 419 P2/2

- 2 -

We further learned from Michael Mahdesian that UNHCR, with the support of NGOs had been burying corpses in six sites where mass graves could be dug without fear of contamination. UNHCR told him that they would need one bulldozer and six flat bed trucks for each of these sites. We suggested that the US military review these arrangements and determine whether these are adequate for addressing this pressing problem. To date we have not been able to obtain any further information from WHO. Military Adviser, General Barril would review UNAMIR potential capacity, particularly support that DPKO has been receiving from governments so far to see what they may be able to do in this regard.

We have conveyed the information provided to us by SRSG Khan to USAID and have requested that the US military consult with General Lafourcade. You may wish to follow this up prior to your departure from Nairobi tomorrow with WHO and others. We would greatly appreciate receiving further details to enable us to pursue this matter.

Kevin Kennedy has been asked to call you tomorrow morning Kigali time to discuss this matter as well as questions relating to division of responsibilities among relief agencies within Rwanda, particularly relating to IDPs, as well as on the strengthening of the capacity of UNREO.

Regards,

1994-07-27

01:07

PAGE = 02

CNR 406 P1/2


OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 21 JULY 1994
 NUMBER: 2319
 SUBJECT: UNAMIR's tasks

UNITED NATIONS
 1994 JUL 21 P 8:53

PA
we
Reply sent 25/7/94

1. Our thanks to Dallaire for his very useful military assessment received last night which is being studied.
2. As discussed on weekend, you might start to focus on broader anticipated tasks for UNAMIR in emerging situation. What conditions might crystallize on the border with Zaire and in the French zone, and what operational conditions UNAMIR would face in these areas are questions of particular concern. It is clear that the demands on the Force Commander will be much more complex in this probably hostile environment than in the areas under full control of RPF.
3. There are press reports that fully formed and armed RGF units crossed into Zaire, and it would be useful to know whether you have confirmation of such movements. If this is so, then regrouping of dispersed RGF soldiers would be likely. Might these lead to attempts at reactivating military attacks against RPF from bases in Zaire? What would you propose UNAMIR's role to be in such an eventuality? Does RPF have the capacity to establish full control in the present French-protected zone? If not, what conditions should be anticipated and how should UNAMIR be prepared to act?
4. We would value your views on how UNAMIR could support humanitarian assistance operations in addition to providing



JNR 406 P2/2

- 2 -

protection. We shall be coordinating with DHA here and will keep you advised of strategies for coping with this unprecedented crisis, and would appreciate being kept informed of your contacts with humanitarian agencies on the ground and their plans. Could large refugee camps be established on the Zairean side of the border once some control has been established, or are these agencies considering the establishment of such camps inside Rwanda until refugees can be returned to their homes or return to other secure areas for resettlement? In the latter case, UNAMIR may have to include in its planning security for such camps and security for groups being transported to other points.

5. We also look forward to receiving from you, after your talks in Dar Es Salam and Kampala, your assessment of how a process towards a durable political settlement could be reactivated. Much would depend on the attitudes towards the Arusha agreements of RPF and Tanzania, as well as whatever political regrouping the former government can manage.

Best regards.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~ 06 44

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 20 JULY 1994
 NUMBER: **2296**

SUBJECT: French Political Mission

1. The Deputy Permanent Representative of France has confirmed today the request made through your common liaison channels for UNAMIR's assistance and support for the high-level French political mission due to arrive in Rwanda tomorrow at 0710 hrs via aircraft GLAM Falcon 50 COTAM 0006.

2. He has confirmed that the officials arriving are as follows:

- a) Mr. Bertrand DUFOURCO, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- b) General GERMANOS, Deputy COS of the Army;
- c) Mme. Catherine BOIVINEAU, Deputy Director, Central and East Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- d) Two communications technicians; and
- e) 1 army officer.

3. Arrangements to meet with members of the Transitional Government of National Unity have already been conveyed to you; however, they would like confirmation that appointments have been made with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, as well as yourself and the Force Commander.

4. The Deputy Permanent Representative recalled that the French Government was counting on UNAMIR's providing transport and security. Please confirm all of the above as soon as possible.
 Best regards.

SRSB *PC*

1994-07-21 01:03 PAGE = 01

CNR 406 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 21 JULY 1994
 NUMBER: 2319
 SUBJECT: UNAMIR's tasks

1994 JUL 21 P 8:53

*I have discussed
with Mr. Riza. by tel.
of 23/7 answers down
of 4/8 parties. Riza
broadly agrees with
anwar Hagen, 21/7/94*

1. Our thanks to Dallaire for his very useful military assessment received last night which is being studied.

2. As discussed on weekend, you might start to focus on broader anticipated tasks for UNAMIR in emerging situation. What conditions might crystallize on the border with Zaire and in the French zone, and what operational conditions UNAMIR would face in these areas are questions of particular concern. It is clear that the demands on the Force Commander will be much more complex in this probably hostile environment than in the areas under full control of RPF.

3. There are press reports that fully formed and armed RGF units crossed into Zaire, and it would be useful to know whether you have confirmation of such movements. If this is so, then regrouping of dispersed RGF soldiers would be likely. Might these lead to attempts at reactivating military attacks against RPF from bases in Zaire? What would you propose UNAMIR's role to be in such an eventuality? Does RPF have the capacity to establish full control in the present French-protected zone? If not, what conditions should be anticipated and how should UNAMIR be prepared to act?

*I shall
send a
separate
cable.*

*(Disarmed)
according to
Gen Dallaire*

*Zaire's
not keep
secret
border -
Rizungu*

4. We would value your views on how UNAMIR could support humanitarian assistance operations in addition to providing

yes

CNR 406 P2/2

- 2 -

protection. We shall be coordinating with DHA here and will keep you advised of strategies for coping with this unprecedented crisis, and would appreciate being kept informed of your contacts with humanitarian agencies on the ground and their plans. Could large refugee camps be established on the Zairean side of the border once some control has been established, or are these agencies considering the establishment of such camps inside Rwanda until refugees can be returned to their homes or return to other secure areas for resettlement? In the latter case, UNAMIR may have to include in its planning security for such camps and security for groups being transported to other points.

5. We also look forward to receiving from you, after your talks in Dar Es Salam and Kampala, your assessment of how a process towards a durable political settlement could be reactivated. Much would depend on the attitudes towards the Arusha agreements of RPF and Tanzania, as well as whatever political regrouping the former government can manage.

Sent
No camp
yet!

Best regards.

CNR - 399 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

TO: S. KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

184 JUL 20 05:06

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 19 JULY 1994

NUMBER: 2290

SUBJECT: Military/Humanitarian Situation in Rwanda

③ pc
comment 2
SRS for
action p.
over
20
27/7

1. Thanks for your report on installation of Government of National Unity. Gratified to know that SecGen's message was well received. We look forward to your reports on Government's efforts to stabilize conditions and encourage return of refugees.

can be
replied

2. In this connection, it would be useful to know what your Liaison Officers in Goma are reporting on conditions there.

Media reports indicate that, in midst of appalling humanitarian crisis, RGF and Zairian troops are harassing, even terrorizing, refugees. Do your officers confirm this? Is there danger of ethnic confrontations or clashes among refugees in border areas?

④
D. K. K. K.
Answers
Goma.

for complete
reply
21/7

3. Reports on situation in French controlled zone also requested. What is impelling refugee exodus into Zaire when RPF is not threatening this zone?

⑤
23/7

ju

4. Please also report on prospects of radio broadcasts by new Government to reassure refugees. Can radio stations be quickly reactivated? Did Atwood indicate US could help in this regard? Will refugees in Zaire be able to hear such messages (do they still possess radios)?

5. Your assessment on stabilising of military situation along borders with Zaire, and around French controlled zone requested.

6. We continue to press Governments for required equipment. Your revised operational plans awaited.

ED
21/7

Best regards.

CNR 392 P1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1994 JUL 16 04:56
IMMEDIATE

TO: SHAHARYAR KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2260
SUBJECT: Cease-fire and Transitional Government

1. Many thanks your MIR 1365 and your earlier briefing on telephone today which was conveyed to SecGen.
2. The direction that RPF is adopting is encouraging. We look forward to the announcement of the cease-fire over the weekend and the establishment of the Transitional Government on Monday, as notified by RPF representative here. We are in full agreement with the steps to be undertaken after the cease-fire, as proposed by you to RPF, and realize that you have a major undertaking before you to try and ensure that they are implemented in the right spirit.
3. You will have seen the State Department announcement of today effectively cutting links with the "Interim Government" on the other side. This probably will encourage a number of governments, especially in Africa, to recognize the Transitional Government headed by Mr. Twagiramungu.
4. SecGen received RPF invitation to swearing-in of Transitional Government. He authorizes you to attend. He would like you to read out a message from him supporting national reconciliation, the end of conflict and the restoration of peace, the return of refugees and resettlement in their homes and the reactivation of the political process in the framework of the

CNR 392 P2/3


- 2 -

Rwanda under the leadership of a broad-based transitional government. The statement should not imply "recognition" of the Government, even though Twagiramungu no doubt will interpret it as such. You are best placed to draft the statement, and we would request that it be sent in an "immediate" cable to reach here by 9.00 am New York time tomorrow (Saturday). We hope to have the approved statement cabled back to you by Sunday. The statement should be 3-4 minutes' reading time and should be drafted in the language in which you consider you should speak at the installation.


5. The urgent priority following the cease-fire and the installation, of course, will be the overwhelming refugee crisis. We note your MIR 1366 of today to Hansen who will be making every effort to coordinate relief operations. An essential element will be to counter RGF's inflammatory propaganda and you might let us know what possibilities exist. Is RPF using radio broadcasts to reassure the population on lines of point 3 of your paper on measures after cease-fire? Is it advisable for UNAMIR to use radio time on local stations?

6. The French have made clear that they are determined to withdraw as quickly as possible, starting by end of July. They had asked us whether they could hand over the Interim Prime Minister and some of his colleagues, who are in French security zone, to UNAMIR. We see serious difficulties, both practical and legal. First, it clearly would be exceeding the present mandate of UNAMIR. Second, we do not wish to be landed with a bundle of Najibullahs in a dubious legal situation in another land-locked country, this time in central Africa. We would appreciate your urgent views and recommendations for examination at Headquarters.

Best regards.



CNR 392 P3/3




FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



New York, 15 July 1994

H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations
Room S-3800
New York, New York 10017

HA
IR



C
Your Excellency,

We have the pleasure to inform you that an agreement between Rwandese political parties on the formation of a new broad-based Government of national unity has been reached.

de // The new Government will be sworn in at a ceremony in Kigali on Monday, 18th of July 1994, at 12.00 o'clock, Rwanda time.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandese people have the honour and pleasure to invite you to attend the ceremony.

Kindly accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of our highest regard.

For: The Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

Claude Dusaidi
Rwandese Patriotic Front
Representative to the United Nations

SRSG

FC

e

CNR 391 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2250

UNAMIR

104 JUL 16

0455

JUL 15 P 7:00

ADIR
17/7

1. At this morning's informal SECCO consultations, Mr. Gharekhan provided a situation report on Rwanda, copy of which is attached for your information. Members of the Council requested additional information on humanitarian activities, which DHA will provide this afternoon, as well as the prognosis for the promised unilateral cease-fire by the RPF/COS to you. The United States asked France to continue to provide reports on developments, especially regarding safe areas. The French representative referred to his delegation's verbal report provided yesterday and reiterated that his Government had already stated that it was not desirable for former Rwandese Government officials to enter safe areas, unless the Council thought otherwise. He invited the Council to provide comments on this issue if it wished to do so.

2. In reply to a question posed by Oman, Mr. Gharekhan indicated that the reasons for the massive influx of refugees into Zaire was caused both by the advance on Ruhengeri by the RPF and the inflammatory propaganda broadcast by Radio Rwanda.

3. The President of the Council requested Mr. Gharekhan to advise the Council this afternoon if a unilateral cease-fire was declared by the RPF today.

Regards.

CNR 391 P2/2

NOTE TO MR. C. GHAREKHAN

RWANDA

Today, the SRSG transmitted the statement by the President of the Security Council to Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu who was designated in the Arusha Agreement as Prime Minister of the broad-based transitional government, and to General Kagame, the Chief of Staff of the RPF. In a follow up discussion with General Kagame, the SRSG was assured that the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire by the RPF was imminent and that a broadly based government will be formed within a few days. General Kagame also said that both soldiers and civilians who had fled the country were welcomed to come back. The Force Commander plans to go to Goma tomorrow to meet with the Chief of Staff of the Rwandese Army, General Augustine Bizimungu, to discuss with him the modalities of implementing the cease-fire.

The whereabouts of the interim government are unknown. However, a few ministers have been seen in Gisenyi, Goma and Cyangungu. There is still a large stream of displaced people moving towards Goma, Zaire as well as towards the Humanitarian Protected Zone. Kigali City is reported quiet. Civilians continue to return to their homes from a number of camps around the country. UNAMIR has assisted with the transportation to Kigali of 881 displaced persons from a camp in Byumba in the north of the country. It is expected that another operation of this kind will be carried out today. A Special Envoy of the UNHCR has arrived in Kigali today.

Preparations and planning for the deployment of expanded UNAMIR have continued both in the field and at Headquarters.

DPKO

15 July 1994

194-07-15 21:45 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

030 F01

SRSG

FC

ONK 390 P1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KISALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2249

UNAMIR
194 JUL 16 04:53 P 1/3

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE PRESS STATEMENT CONCERNING RWANDA

As mentioned to you this morning, please find attached for your information the statement issued today at 11:30 by the White House Press Secretary concerning the interim government of Rwanda.

Regards.

994-07-15 21:46

JUL-15-94 FRI 13:58

07/15/94 12:09

07/15/94 12:08

5602

IO OFFICE ADM.N SERVICES

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

PHX NO. 2026476/19

AFRICAN AFFAIRS

NSC PRESS OFFC

AFRICA

CNR 390

P.02

030 F02

002/003

001/001

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

July 15, 1994

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

In an effort to bring an end to the fighting and growing humanitarian disaster in Rwanda, the Clinton Administration has closed the Embassy of Rwanda and ordered all personnel to leave the country. Representatives of the so-called interim government of Rwanda must depart within five working days.

The White House also announced that it will begin consultations with other United Nations Security Council members to remove representatives of the interim government from Rwanda's seat on the council. The State Department declared that representatives of the Interim Government will be denied access to any Rwandan government financial holdings in the United States.

"The United States cannot allow representatives of a regime that supports genocidal massers to remain on our soil," President Clinton said.

Noting that the ongoing fighting is creating an even more perilous humanitarian disaster in Rwanda and along its borders, the White House appealed to all forces to agree to an immediate cease-fire. It called on all responsible parties to begin serious talks on forming a transitional government that will lead to genuine power sharing.

The White House applauded the French effort to protect Rwandans at risk, and said the United States would continue to press for rapid deployment of the UN peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) to replace the French. It appealed to the international community to redouble its efforts to deploy these U.N. forces.

The White House again insisted that those Rwandans responsible for genocidal killings and other crimes against humanity be brought to justice. It said it hoped that the United Nations would act swiftly -- under the Security Council Resolution that established a U.N. Commission of Experts -- to create a War Crimes Tribunal.

-R005-

*** CYCY ***

394-07-15 21:48

5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

030 P03

JUL-15-84 FRI 13:59

TO OFFICE ADMIN SERVICES

FAX NO. 2026476/19

P.03

07/15/84 12:10

2020855070

AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CNR 390 P3/3

2003/003

07/15/84 13:01

2

NSC PRESS OFFIC

+++ AFRICA

2002/002

As the crisis in Rwanda has unfolded, the United States has taken a leading role in efforts to protect the Rwandan people and ensure humanitarian assistance. It has:

-- Provided more than \$98 million in relief, including food, medicine and supplies for international organizations and private relief agencies.

-- Flown about 100 Defense Department missions into the region to airlift relief supplies.

-- Strongly supported an expanded UNAMIR; airlifted 50 armored personnel carriers to Kigali to support the UN peacekeepers; and committed to equipping the U.N.'s Ghanaian peacekeeping battalion.

1984-07-15 21:52

PAGE = 02

SRSG

FC

UNAMIR

94 JUL 15 04 46

CNR 389 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, RWANDA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 14 JULY 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2247
SUBJECT: SECCO Meeting

IMMEDIATE

① FC
② Die note, 15/7
keep and rechecked by WDFC
15/7

The SECCO met in a formal session today, 14 July, called by France and adopted the attached statement by the President. In earlier informal consultations, all Members expressed the need for an immediate cease-fire, and their concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Rwanda. They stated that priority must be given to mobilizing all available resources to urgently provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in distress. They also emphasized the need to reactivate the political process in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Many Members referred to the news reports received here in New York to the effect that the Interim Government had moved into the French protected zone. Mr. Gharekhan provided the Security Council with the information contained in the attached notes. He also stated that the Secretariat and UNAMIR had received unconfirmed reports concerning the move of the Interim Government into the French-protected zone. The Council will again hold informal consultations on Rwanda tomorrow morning. Kindly provide us, by start of business tomorrow, with any information that you may have concerning the movements of the Interim Government. Greatly appreciated Kabia's availability late at night to brief Kapungu on the latest developments and clear the many rumours circulating among Council members in the wake of the fall of Ruhengeri. Regards.

sh.

who?

CNR 389 P2/4

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council is alarmed by the continuation of fighting in Rwanda, which is causing a massive exodus of the population. This situation may lead very quickly to a further humanitarian disaster and endanger the stability of the region, since the flow of these refugees is seriously affecting the neighbouring countries.

In the light of this grave situation, the Security Council:

- Demands an immediate and unconditional cease-fire and invites the parties to report to the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) on their actions in this respect;
- Urges the resumption of the political process in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement and calls upon the countries of the region, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to contribute actively to it;
- Reaffirms the humanitarian nature of the secure area in the south-west of Rwanda and demands that all concerned fully respect this. It will keep the matter under close review;
- Urges also Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to mobilize all available resources in order urgently to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in distress;
- Calls upon Member States to provide the necessary contributions in order to ensure the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR in the immediate future.

The Security Council is determined to follow very closely the development of the situation in Rwanda and remains actively seized of the matter.

14 July 1994

CNR 389 P3/4

I

NOTE TO MR. C. GHAREKHAN

RWANDA

ph?
The preparations for the deployment to the expanded UNAMIR of the Ethiopian infantry battalion of 800 and of a Nigerian company group of 308 are progressing relatively well. France and Mali are consulting on the possibility of France assisting Mali in its preparations for the deployment of its contingent of about 150 troops. However, despite the efforts by Nigeria and Ethiopia deployment planning for the expanded UNAMIR has not advanced beyond the preliminary stage at this time. The Secretariat is still negotiating with the troop contributing countries in an effort to help them solve their equipment deficiencies.

The Prime Minister-designate, Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu arrived in Kigali today and immediately consulted with the SRSG. He agreed with the SRSG that a cease-fire was absolutely necessary in order to avoid exacerbating the human tragedy in Rwanda; and that if it was not possible to have an agreed cease-fire then it was preferable for the RPF to declare a unilateral cease-fire. The Prime Minister-designate is now in the process of consulting with the RPF on these questions as well as on the setting up of a broadly based government.

no more so than South
The RPF has captured Ruhengeri. Thousands of displaced people are moving towards Gisenyi and Goma as well as into the Humanitarian Protected Zone. Many people who had been displaced from Kigali are returning to the city. There is need of extensive humanitarian assistance especially in the Gisenyi area and in Kigali as well as in the Humanitarian Protected Zone. The Multinational Force continue to provide humanitarian assistance in the Zone. Yesterday, 13 July, the Rwanda Aid Organizations in Kigali met at the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office in Kigali for their first coordination meeting. A Mission, composed of representatives from DHA and UNICEF, has just visited the Gisenyi-Ruhengeri area and has reported that without a cease-fire, it was impossible to assist the people in that area.

monitored.

DPKO
14 July 1994

CNR 389 P4/4

II

NOTE TO MR. C. GHAREKHAN

UPDATE ON RWANDA

As reported this morning, the RPF has captured Ruhengeri and thousands of people have been moving towards Gisenyi and Goma, Zaire. The massive exodus of people from Ruhengeri actually began on 11 July when the RPF launched a massive attack to take control of the city. An estimated 150,000 people are moving to Mukingo close to the Zaire border in the north.

If the RPF continues its advance farther west towards Gisenyi, the fighting could provoke a mass influx of up to 500,000 people into Zaire. At present, reports indicate that the number of affected people in the northwest is estimated to be 700,000, and in the southwest about 1,900,000. The humanitarian situation in the northwest and southwest of Rwanda is described as catastrophic. UNHCR has taken measures to alleviate the situation in Goma where an emergency team was sent yesterday. Relief aid for about 150,000 people is also prepositioned in Kampala. *→ why isn't it here?*

UNAMIR has received information that the RGF continue to withdraw into Gisenyi and Goma and that members of the militia have also been seen in Goma.

Radio Rwanda which is controlled by the Interim Government has contributed to the situation of panic among the civilian population by repeatedly calling on people to abandon their homes in order to escape what it calls Tutsi-led massacres.

UNAMIR is reinforcing its liaison team at Operation Turquoise Headquarters in Goma. It is also sending a team from its humanitarian cell into Gisenyi-Ruhengeri area to assess the situation.

DPKO
14 July 1994

07-14 21:41

5602

GRSG

FC

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

021 FU

CNR 388 P1/2

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 04 45

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 14 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2238
SUBJECT: SITREP FROM BURUNDI


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14 JUL 14 P 5:50

Attached for your information, please find copies of SITREP numbers 51/94 as received from Ould Abdallah.
Regards.

[Handwritten notes: 2 cos, Info, V, 15/7]



OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 13.7.94

Ref BU/SRSQ/0273

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA - UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH SRSQ - BUJUMBURA AOA/
FAX No: 1-212-963-50-65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) (871) 151 33 62 (Inmarsat) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel) (871) 151 33 61 (Inmarsat, after 5pm GMT)
ATTN:	CC. MR. K. ANNAN, USG/DPKO MR. H. KITTANI, USG/DPA
SUBJECT: SITREP No 051/94	No OF PAGES: 1

1. Situation remains generally calm despite shoot-outs yesterday between Army and Hutus radicals in province of Kayanza. Political situation also remains quite though we are still assessing impact of agreement signed late yesterday by party leaders on power sharing of provincial administration and diplomatic missions. In that agreement opposition obtained administration (Governors and heads of communes) of capital city Bujumbura plus six provinces: Bujumbura rural, Bururi, Kayanza, Muramvya, Muyinga and Rutana. It also got 48 communes. Majority obtained nine provinces: Bubanza, Cibitoke, Cankuzo, Gitega, Karuzi, Kirindo, Makamba, Ngozi and Ruyigi plus 78 communes.
2. Concerning diplomatic missions and consulates, opposition obtained: Beijing, Brussels, Cairo, Dar es-Salaam, Nairobi, New York, Pretoria, Stockholm and Bukavu, Zaire (consulate). Majority kept Addis Ababa, Bonn, Geneva, Kampala, Kinshasa, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Riyadh, Roma, Tokyo, Washington and Kigoma, Tanzania (consulate). As indicated in SITREP 050/94 we are very concerned of impact on PRODESU basis of this power sharing, especially on manner by which ambassadors and provincial governors have been removed. Most of them - formerly provincial employees, are very close to their political and ethnic basis which will resent their dismissal. Therefore and while we are not totally convinced by the way this agreement is implemented, we asked interim President and majority leaders to fully explain it to their followers. We requested opposition leaders to moderate their appetite and to show restraint so that not to embarrass majority leaders. Prominent members of civil society were also requested their assistance to help explain the agreement.
3. Negotiations should resume tomorrow on programme and organization of future Government. Discussions will not be easy. Therefore, we spent most of today making contacts with various political leaders and military officers, asking them not to forget the main objective of the whole exercise: election of a new President. A new target date should be determined as the extension of interim period, if not used positively, could lead to instability. All sides made promises that a President should be in place before end of July.

A Ould Abdallah
13 July 1994
AOA/

SRSG

FC

Col. Yachee

CNR 387 P1/3

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 194 JUL 14

04-51

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE FOR COLONEL YACHEE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 13 JULY 1994

NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2234

SUBJECT: Germany - request for assistance

1994 JUL 13 P 10:22

1. Please find attached a self-explanatory communication from the Permanent Mission of Germany, requesting evacuation assistance for five German and five Rwandese nuns.
2. We hope that UNAMIR will be able to provide the requested assistance, as security conditions and resources allow.

Best regards.

HAC
I thought we
did this one?
17/7

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK
Recd 2 2-1
8/7/94 KA/C entral

002 FUS

CNR 387 P2/3

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ced. HA
LK

600 Third Avenue, 41st Fl.
New York, N.Y. 10016

8 July 1994

Detlev Graf zu Rantzau
Ambassador

Mr Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary General
Department for Peace Keeping Operations
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Under-Secretary General,

The German Foreign Ministry has instructed me to transmit to you the enclosed letter of Mother Christel Agnes GLASER of Goma, Zaire of 7 July 1994.

In this letter, Mother Christel Glaser of the Catholic Bonifatius Institute informs that ten of its members - five German and five Rwandese nuns - who were last seen in Save/Butare on 1 July 1994 had been brought to the north of Rwanda by members of the RPF. The Institute requests that the United Nations assist in evacuating the nuns.

I would be most grateful if the United Nations could contact, through UNAMIR, the RPF forces in Rwanda in order to facilitate an early evacuation of the nuns to Goma.

Yours sincerely,



CNR 387 P3/3

Mère supérieure Christel Agnes GLASER
 Mission St. Benoit
 B.P. 50
 G O M A / Z A I R E

Goma 07-07-94

A QUI DE DROIT de l' O N U

Nous sommes une communauté avec des membres rwandaises et allemandes, dont dix restent au Rwanda dans la zone occupée par la FPR.

Il s'agit des sœurs suivantes:

1. HAHN Barbara
2. ZIMMERMANN Ilse
3. JANISON Ingrid de nationalité allemande
4. MAIER Margareta
5. UETLER Maria
6. MUSHONGANONO Christine
7. MUKOHARUGO Liberata
8. MUKANDOLI Vestina de nationalité rwandaise
9. UMUWANENZA Christine
10. MUKAMUGOMA Francina

Le dernier contact direct avec elles était à SAVE/Butaro, le 07-07-94. Par le Coix rouge/Bujumbura nous avons appris, qu'entre temps elles étaient déplacées par la FPR vers le nord du pays. Mais nous avons aucune précision, où elles se trouvent actuellement.

Toutes avaient exprimé -lors de notre dernier contact- le désir de quitter le pays. C'est pourquoi nous adressons notre désir à vous comme organisation internationale. Nous demandons votre aide pour évacuer les sœurs du Rwanda aussi vite que possible; Deux entre elles sont déjà avancées de l'âge, leurs forces physique et psychologique sont épuisées par trois mois de tensions et d'angoisses. Nous espérons votre aide

Christel Agnes Glaser
 Christel Agnes Glaser, mère supérieure

cc Ministre des Affaires d'Étranger d'Allemagne

RECDMT C 07

1994-07-14

02:29

PAGE = 02

SRSG

FC

UNAMIR

15 JUL 14

CNR 386 P1/2

04:46

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
DATE: 13 July 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2233

SUBJECT: Consultations on Transitional Government

1. Re your telcon with Riza today on your contacts with the parties, we understand from statements made during the past few days by RPF leaders and by the Prime Minister-designate that, contrary to the provisions of the Arusha agreement, the proposed "broad-based" transitional Government would exclude the MRND (party of the late President). It also seems that the RPF will not accept that the President for the transitional period be a member of the MRND and that it wishes to modify in its favour the composition of the new national army. In addition, the Chairman of the RPF has been quoted as saying that there will be no cease-fire until the RGF stops the massacres, accepts responsibility for the mass killings and agrees to bring to justice those associated with these killings.


2. The desire of RPF to use its military achievements to secure political dividends is, of course, understandable. However, you may wish to encourage them to bear in mind the fact that a durable solution to the tragedy which has engulfed Rwanda can only be based on national reconciliation among all sections of Rwandese society. In turn, a genuine process of national reconciliation cannot be built on defeat and humiliation, especially when those who are about to be humiliated belong to the same ethnic group as the vast majority of the population.

/...

- 2 -

3. While it is legitimate to exclude individuals suspected of having committed or incited atrocities against the civilian population, the exclusion from the transitional Government of political parties listed in the Arusha agreement may not be conducive to achieving national reconciliation and long-term stability in the country. You may wish to advise the RPF that it would be easier for them to achieve these goals if they continue to be guided by the spirit, if not the letter, of the Arusha agreement. You could refer, in this connection, to the Protocols on "power sharing" of 30 October 1992 and 9 January 1993. You may also draw the attention of the RPF to the fact that the various Security Council resolutions on Rwanda, including resolutions 925 (1994) and 929 (1994), have repeatedly stressed the importance of the Arusha agreement as a basis for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda.

4. Once a transitional Government is established, UNAMIR would be prepared to work with that Government, if it is accepted by all parties, with a view to promoting an early cease-fire, the safe and orderly distribution of humanitarian assistance throughout the country and the resumption of the political settlement process. However, should the RPF refuse to accept the transitional Government, UNAMIR would necessarily have to continue its contacts with the de facto authorities of the present "interim Government", until a Government acceptable to all parties is established. Best regards.



07-13 22:38

5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

037 P01

SRSG

FC

CNR 385 P1/3

UNAMIR
194 JUL 14 04:46

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 13 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2223
SUBJECT: Humanitarian crisis

1994 JUL 13 P 8 40

Attached copy of a letter dated 12 July 1994 addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of Medecins Sans Frontieres for your information.

Best regards.

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②

HAC
Jys.

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OKC
17/1


INTERNATIONAL OFFICE
BUREAU INTERNATIONAL

Bld. Leopold II 209
1080 Brussels
Belgium

tel 32-2-426 55 52
fax 32-2-426 75 15
telex 20226



MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES



Mr. Hansen
a Mr. Amundsen
Mr. Goulding
H.R.
CNR 385 P2/3
CC 11113-1

Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies
New York, N.Y.10017

Bruxelles, le 12 Juillet 1994

HA
IR

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Médecins sans Frontières dont 120 expatriés travaillent sur la crise rwandaise et qui débute actuellement une mission d'assistance médicale pour 200.000 déplacés dans la zone Gikongoro, située dans l'Ouest du Rwanda, voudrait attirer votre attention sur les points suivants.

L'arrivée subite de près de 2 millions de personnes dans les zones Ouest du Rwanda crée effectivement un problème humanitaire sans précédent. Bien que répondant nous-mêmes en urgence à la situation humanitaire qui se présente dans l'Ouest du Rwanda, nous pensons que l'effort international est voué à un échec rapide, tant sur le plan humanitaire que politique, si les déplacés sont contraints de rester où ils se trouvent.

Au plan humanitaire, devant l'afflux de centaines de milliers de personnes, et quels que soient la réponse et l'effort international indispensable, la situation va se détériorer très rapidement. Ni les associations humanitaires privées, ni les agences de l'ONU ne pourront faire face à un tel drame de façon satisfaisante. Il ne s'agit évidemment pas de baisser les bras - toutes les ressources disponibles doivent être mobilisées d'urgence et nous nous y employons au maximum - mais de veiller à ce que la communauté internationale puisse fournir une réponse, humanitaire et politique, satisfaisante au sort de ces millions de déplacés.

Sur le plan sanitaire, nous pensons que la seule façon de venir rapidement et significativement en aide à ces centaines de milliers de personnes est de leur permettre de rentrer rapidement chez eux. Nous vous sollicitons afin de prendre de toute urgence toutes les initiatives politiques afin que ces déplacés puissent rapidement rentrer dans leur région d'origine et qu'ils puissent y bénéficier d'une protection et d'une aide humanitaire conséquente. Nous vous demandons également de faire en sorte que les Nations-Unies dans leur ensemble gardent un rôle leader et déterminant, à la fois dans la réponse politique, afin d'éviter qu'un seul pays n'agisse seul, et dans la réponse humanitaire en mobilisant les agences spécialisées du système des Nations-Unies.



L'indispensable effort humanitaire ne doit pas masquer la logique politique qui a été et est toujours à l'oeuvre dans ce cas unique de génocide, comme l'a très bien montré le rapport de Monsieur R. Degni-Ségui sur la situation des droits de l'Homme. Nous sommes en présence d'un acte exceptionnel : un génocide systématiquement perpétré. L'impunité ne doit pas être accordée aux responsables de ce génocide et l'effort international, politique ou humanitaire, doit veiller à ne pas apporter le moindre soutien et la moindre caution aux auteurs de ces crimes contre l'Humanité.

Vous remerciant de votre attention, nous vous prions de croire, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, à l'assurance de notre haute considération.

C

Dr Jacques de Milliano
Dr Jacques de Milliano
Président du Conseil International

Dr Alain Destexhe
Dr Alain Destexhe
Secrétaire Général

cc. Membres du Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies

C



FC

SRS9

CNR 384 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE UNAMIR

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

DATE: 12 JULY 1994

NUMBER: 2219

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRELAND

1994 JUL 13 05:04

1994 JUL 12 12:09:30

C The Permanent Mission of Ireland has conveyed to Rivero their deep appreciation to UNAMIR personnel in Kigali and Nairobi for the assistance provided in looking after Ms. Lydia ITETERE who arrived in Ireland last night. They requested that this message be conveyed to you and your staff.
Best regards.

②
HAE
well done chops.
Thanks.
H
13/7

C

SRSG

FC

OUTGOING CORE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 12 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2218

SUBJECT: Request for information on Mr. Adolph NIYIGENGA

CNR 383 P1/2
UNAMIR
194 JUL 13 05
1994 JUL 12 10 43 30

As per attached fax, the Permanent Mission of Belgium is requesting information on the whereabouts of Adolph NIYIGENGA who, they say, is working for UNDP in the refugee camps of Butare, Cyangugu and Gikengero.

Rivero has explained that UNAMIR as yet has no access to the western zones of Rwanda. However, you might inquire with the DHA or ICRC staff in Kigali as to Mr. NIYIGENGA's situation.

Thank you for your assistance.
Best regards.

② HAE
your support
13/7

CNR 383 P2/2

PERMANENT MISSION OF BELGIUMTO THE UNITED NATIONS

809 United Nations Plaza,

New York, N.Y. 10017.

Fax. : (212) 599 - 6843

Tel. : (212) 599 - 5250

DATE : 11 July, 1994 No. : 514

FROM : Thomas Baekelandt,
Counsellor.

TO : Mrs. Rivero,
United Nations.
Fax No. (212) 963-6460

SUBJECT : Rwanda. Request for information.

PAGES : Cover page

T E X T

Dear Mrs. Rivero,

Family in Belgium is requesting information concerning the whereabouts of Mr. Adolph NIYIGENGA, working for the UNDP in the refugee camps of Butare, Cyangugu and Gikengaro.

This mission would greatly appreciate any information that we could further to the family in Belgium.

Paul Noterdame,
Ambassador.
Permanent Representative of
Belgium to the U.N.

FROM: BELGIAN MISSION U N 101 1 212 9636464 JUL 11 1994 10:20AM #93 P.01

994-07-13 01:56

++ CYCY ++

5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

003 P12

SR59

(FC)

CNR 382 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 12 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2217
SUBJECT: SITREPS 49 AND 50 FROM BURUNDI

UNAMIR

94 JUL 13 05 00

1994 JUL 12 20 43 30

Attached for your information, please find copies of SITREP numbers 49 and 50 as received from Ould Abdallah.
Regards.

②
re
13/7

CNA 382 P2/4

OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 12.7.94

Ref BU/SRSG/02/1

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH SRSG BUJUMBURA <i>A.A.</i>
FAX No: 1-212-963-50-65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 60 (office) (871) 151 33 62 (Immamat) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel) (871) 151 33 51 (Immamat, after 5pm GTM)
ATTN:	CC. MR. K. ANNAN, USG/DPKO MR. H. KITTANI, USG/DPA
SUBJECT: SITREP No 050/94	No OF PAGES: 1

1. Finally, constitutional deadline for electing a new President has not been met. However we are relieved that there is no political vacuum, as Constitutional Court, yesterday, extended by three months interim period. Interim President continued discussions with party leaders on programme for and organization of future Government. Agreement was reached on power sharing concerning territorial administration and diplomatic missions. Opposition obtained six provinces plus Bujumbura while majority kept nine provinces. Concerning diplomatic missions, opposition obtained nine including New York while majority kept thirteen.
2. Opposition has insisted on immediate implementation of this decision in particular to recall back Ambassadors posted in Washington, Paris, Geneva, Nairobi, Kigali, Brussels and Consul general in Bukavu (Zaire). They are accused of being more representatives of an ethnic group - Hutu - and a party, FRODEBU, than of Burundi. However, it is not yet confirmed that provincial Governors accused of similar behaviour have been recalled. Our main concern is degree of acceptability by Hutus of these concessions made to opposition.
3. Discussions concerning organization of Government should be very difficult. Majority plans to address a programme for short and mid-term action on rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country while opposition intends to introduce fundamental constitutional reforms, in particular limits on President powers. Here again our concern is acceptability by FRODEBU basis of opposition demands and capacity of interim President to sell them to his party. An other concern we share with diplomats is when a President would be in place. We reminded Burundese that time is not their ally and that the three months extension is not meant to be fully used. If a President could be elected in a week or ten days everything should be done to meet that target for the benefit of Burundi. We gave this message to all leaders and western diplomats also plan to deliver it to both sides.

A. Ould Abdallah
12 July 1994

A.A.

OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 10.7.94

Ref BU/SRSG/0267

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH SRSG BUJUMBURA AOA1
FAX No: 1-212-963-50-65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) (871) 151 33 62 (Inmarsat) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel) (871) 151 33 61 (Inmarsat, after 5pm GMT)
ATTN:	CC. MR. K. ANNAN, USG/DPKO MR. H. KITTANI, USG/DPA
SUBJECT: SITREP No 049/94	NO OF PAGES: 2

1. Though party leaders are still meeting this week-end to finalize peaceful settlement on presidential succession, political situation has become very fragile and even worrying. Opposition extremist elements - taking the political system hostage - are pressing hard on Government for what looks more than normal political advantages. We wonder if, by these demands, they are not exposing their country to violence. We told selected members of those extremists the risks they are taking and responsibility they would bear personally in case of explosion.
2. Interim President should himself have accelerated negotiations on presidential succession much early than wait until 30 June. However, even if interim President should be blamed for this unnecessary delay, Opposition present tactic of posing almost each day additional hurdles on the road to normality is not acceptable and should be denounced privately and publicly. Opposition asked for implementation of 11 preconditions (now 13). Interim President has reached an agreement with it on these preconditions and on how and when to implement them. Then Opposition requested their effective implementation before discussing programme of Government and an agreement on future Government. Most of issues contained in this programme are identical or closely related to the 13 preconditions. Finally, as discussion is progressing on these issues, Opposition has given hints that it will come with proposals including one limiting future President constitutional responsibilities and an other rejecting candidacy.
3. Furthermore, it seems now clear that one of Opposition objective is to oppose election of a President within constitutional interim period (12 April-12 July). Being in a difficult position due to proximity of the deadline and to avoid constitutional vacuum if a President is

CNR 382 14/4

2.

not elected by 12 July, Government on Friday 8 July requested, on urgent basis and for case of force majeure, Constitutional Court extension of interim period. If Court extends this period, tension will lessen and leaders should agree on a comprehensive programme: name and mode of election of future President (by the Assembly), his programme of work and distribution of responsibilities within his Government and at other levels (diplomacy and provincial administration, etc.).

4. Despite interim President and his entourage optimism, there is however real possibility that Constitutional Court decides that there is no "case of force majeure" to justify extending interim period. Such decision could trigger ethnic explosion. Supporters of FRODEBU (leading party in the House: 64 deputies out of 81) would see such Court response as a "civil coup" denying Hutu presidential mandate gained in June 1993 elections. FRODEBU has consistently claimed that October coup attempt is being implemented step by step since its "failure" last fall. Opposition extremist elements, most of them ethnically close to Constitutional Court, plan to make public accusations against interim President. They would circulate tapes recording subversive discussions he is supposed to have had with extremist Hutus now in exile in Europe. Recording conversations, fabrication of all kinds of "proofs", etc. are very popular here and their veracity never questioned.
5. To avoid power vacuum, detrimental to FRODEBU, National Assembly is prepared to adopt constitutional amendment on Monday in case Constitutional Court response is not positive (rejection of Government request). Afraid of return to normality, Opposition extremists, taking the system hostage, are determined: a) not to accept credible compromise; b) to reject any role for the Parliament (amending the Constitution); and c) to go all the way, even to civil war, as they are deeply involved in October 1993 coup attempt and thus afraid of impact on them of return to normality. They rather turn down their country than be exposed to judgement. We spoke to three of this tiny group of civilians involved in October coup attempt, appeasing and at the same time warning them of consequences of their present behaviour. A number of Western diplomats, especially US and German Ambassadors, were also very helpful in talking to them on similar terms. However, if situation does not cool down, we will request public statement from Secretary General or Security Council addressed to these civilian putschists in terms to be discussed later today or Monday 11 July.
6. Negotiations are going on this Sunday afternoon under chairmanship of interim President. We are exercising various political and economic pressures on party leaders to meet constitutional deadline. In particular we are bringing to their attention political, economic, financial and humanitarian assistance losses if Rwanda, which despite its disastrous situation, agrees on a Government before Burundi. We are also envisaging other alternatives to ensure peaceful settlement in case deadline is not met.

A. Ould Abdallah
10 July 1994

AOA

SRSG

(FC)

CNR 381 P1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE UNAMIR

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 12 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2216

94 JUL 13 04 59

1994 JUL 12 P 4 30

SUBJECT: Communiqué concerning a meeting between the President and the Secretary-General of the OAU

Please find attached for your information, copy of the communiqué dated 7 July issued for the occasion of a meeting held in Tunis between the current President and Secretary-General of the OAU.

Best regards.

W

UNR 381 P2/3

PERMANENT MISSION OF TUNISIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
31 BEEKMAN PLACE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

البعثة الدائمة للجمهورية التونسية
لدى منظمة الأمم المتحدة
بنيويورك

**TEXTE DU COMMUNIQUE RELATIF A LA SEANCE
DE TRAVAIL TENUE PAR
M. LE PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI
PRESIDENT EN EXERCICE DE L'OUA, AVEC LE
DR. SALIM AHMED SALIM, SECRETAIRE GENERAL
DE L'OUA**

TUNIS, LE 7 JUILLET 1994

SOUUCIEUX D'ASSURER LE SUIVI DES RESOLUTIONS DU TRENTIEME SOMMET DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE ET DE METTRE AU POINT UN PLAN D'ACTION AFRICAIN ET INTERNATIONAL, EN COORDINATION AVEC LES CHEFS D'ETATS AFRICAINS FRERES, LE PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI PRESIDENT EN EXERCICE DE L'OUA, A INVITE M. SALIM AHMED SALIM SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'OUA POUR UNE SEANCE DE TRAVAIL QUI S'EST TENUE LE 7 JUILLET AU PALAIS DE CARTHAGE.

AU COURS DE CETTE SEANCE, IL A ETE PROCEDE A UN TOUR D'HORIZON DES PRINCIPAUX PROBLEMES DE L'HEURE SUR LA SCENE AFRICAINE ET NOTAMMENT DES CONFLITS PERSISTANTS DANS CERTAINES REGIONS DU CONTINENT.

SUITE AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU CHEF DE L'ETAT POUR UN SUIVI ATTENTIF DES DEVELOPPEMENTS DE LA SITUATION DANS CES REGIONS ET COMPTE TENU DES CONSULTATIONS INTENSES QUE CELA IMPLIQUE, IL A ETE DECIDE QUE LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'OUA SE CHARGE DE CONVOQUER L'APPAREIL CENTRAL DU MECANISME DE PREVENTION, DE GESTION ET DE REGLEMENT DES CONFLITS POUR UNE REUNION AU NIVEAU DES MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DANS LES DELAIS LES PLUS BREFS.

CONCERNANT LE CONFLIT AU RWANDA, L'ACCENT A ETE MIS SUR LA NECESSITE DE METTRE A EXECUTION LES RESOLUTIONS DU SOMMET ET NOTAMMENT L'ENVOI DE TROUPES AFRICAINES DANS CE PAYS, DANS LE CADRE DE LA MINUAR II, DANS LE BUT DE METTRE FIN AUX COMBATS FRATRICIDES ET DE GARANTIR LE RETABLISSEMENT DE LA SECURITE POUR FACILITER LA

CNR 381 P3/3

MISE EN OEUVRE DES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA.

DANS CE CADRE, LA NECESSITE D'INSTAURER LES CONDITIONS PROPICES A L'ENVOI DE CES TROUPES, EN CONCERTATION ET EN COORDINATION ENTRE L'OUA, L'ONU ET LES AUTRES PARTIES CONCERNEES, A ETE EGALEMENT MIS EN RELIEF.

CONVAINCU DE L'IMPORTANCE DE LA CONJONCTION DES EFFORTS DE LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE TOUT ENTIERE, AU REGARD DE TOUS LES PROBLEMES QUI INTERESSENT LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE DANS LE MONDE, LE PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI A ADRESSE UN MESSAGE AU SOMMET DU GROUPE DES SEPT, LE G7 QUI SE TIENDRA A NAPLES (ITALIE) LE 9 DE CE MOIS, Y REITERANT LA DISPOSITION DES ETATS AFRICAINE A HONORER LEURS ENGAGEMENTS EN FAVEUR DE L'ENVOI DE TROUPES DANS CE PAYS, DANS LE CADRE DE LA MINUAR II ET INVITANT LE GROUPE DES SEPT A APPORTER SON SOUTIEN AUX EFFORTS DES PAYS AFRICAINS POUR LA REALISATION D'UN REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE ET URGENT DE CE CONFLIT, EN FOURNISSANT LES MOYENS ET LES EQUIPEMENTS NECESSAIRES A L'ENVOI ET AU DEVELOPPEMENT DES FORCES AFRICAINES DANS CE PAYS, AVANT LA FIN DU MOIS EN COURS, DANS LE CADRE DE L'OPERATION DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX AU RWANDA.

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CNR 380 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
94 JUL 13 04 57

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 12 JULY 1994
NUMBER: 2215

SUBJECT: Evacuation of nuns

1994 JUL 12 P 9 30

The Permanent Mission of Germany has requested UNAMIR's assistance in the evacuation to GOMA, Zaire, of 10 nuns (5 German, 5 Rwandese) who are in RPF held territory.

As you will see from the attached correspondence, the RPF relocated the 10 individuals from Butare to an unspecified location in the north of Rwanda.

Your demarches and follow-up with the RPF would be highly appreciated. Kindly keep us informed.

Best regards.

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Pres action
HAC
15/7

*Please take
necessary follow-up
action - Thank
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8 H A*

TELEFAX	DATE	PAGES (INCL. COVER)
No. 1	8 July 1994 /	3

From: Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations
600 Third Ave, 41st Fl., New York, NY 10016

Telephone: (212) 856-6200
(212) 856-6272 (direct)
Fax: (212) 856-6280
Telex: 177105 saun ut

To: Mr Hédi ANNABI, FAX: (212) 963-9222 /

Director
Africa Division
Department for Peace Keeping Operations
United Nations

Object/Message:

Request for UN assistance for the evacuation of German and
Rwandese nuns in Rwanda

Dear Mr Annabi,

please find annexed the letter of my Ambassador to Under-Secretary
General Kofi Annan in which we ask the United Nations to contact
the RPF in order to facilitate an early evacuation of five German
and five Rwandese nuns from RPF-held territory in Rwanda.

You will also find the original request for UN-assistance by
Mother Christel Glaser of Goma, Zaire who gives the names of the
nuns and provides further details.

Yours sincerely,

Steffen Rudolph

Steffen Rudolph
Minister

Recd. 11 July 94 - AA

zept

600 Third Avenue, 41st Fl.
New York, N.Y. 10016

8 July 1994

Detlev Graf zu Rantzau
Ambassador

Pol 381.66

Di/pz
gesp.: Bo0807An

Mr Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary General
Department for Peace Keeping Operations
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Under-Secretary General,

The German Foreign Ministry has instructed me to transmit to you the enclosed letter of Mother Christel Agnes GLASER of Goma, Zaire of 7 July 1994.

In this letter, Mother Christel Glaser of the Catholic Bonifatius Institute informs that ten of its members - five German and five Rwandese nuns - who were last seen in Save/Butare on 1 July 1994 had been brought to the north of Rwanda by members of the RPF. The Institute requests that the United Nations assist in evacuating the nuns.

I would be most grateful if the United Nations could contact, through UNAMIR, the RPF forces in Rwanda in order to facilitate an early evacuation of the nuns to Goma.

Yours sincerely,

sign. Detlev Graf zu Rantzau

- 2) Bitte ausfahren
3) zdA

Mère supérieure Christel Agnes OLAMEN
Mission St. Benoît
B.V. 30
COMA / ZAIRE

Cora 07-07-94

A QUI ON DROIT de l'OND

Il y a une communauté avec des membres rwandaises et allemandes, dont dix
sont au Rwanda dans la zone occupée par la FPA.

Il s'agit des personnes suivantes:

1. HART Barbara
2. ZIMMERMANN Ilse
3. JANSON Ingrid de nationalité allemande
4. KAISER Margarete
5. UETTER Maria
6. MUSHOMOHONO Christine
7. MUKAMUGO Liberte
8. MUKANDOLI Vestina de nationalité rwandaise
9. UMUYANEZA Christine
10. MUKAMUGOMA Francine

Le dernier contact direct avec elles était à SAVE/Butaro, le 07-07-94. Par la
Croix rouge/Bujumbura nous avons appris, qu'entre temps elles étaient déplacées
par la FPA vers le nord du pays. Mais nous avons aucune précision, où elles
se trouvent actuellement.

Toutes avaient exprimé -lors de notre dernier contact- le désir de quitter le pays.
C'est pourquoi nous adressons notre désir à vous comme organisation internationale.
Nous demandons votre aide pour évacuer les personnes du Rwanda aussi vite que possible.
Deux entre elles sont déjà avancées de l'âge, leurs forces physique et psychologique
sont épuisées par trois mois de tensions et d'angoisses.
Nous espérons votre aide

Christel Agnes Olamen
Christel Agnes Olamen, mère supérieure

cc Ministre des Affaires d'Etranger d'Allemagne

SR54

(FC)

CNR 379 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
194 JUL 13 04 55

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 12 July 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2214
SUBJECT: The OAU and Rwanda

1994 JUL 12 P 0330

Please find attached, for your information, a letter dated 9 July 1994, addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Tunisia and forwarding the text of a joint communiqué issued following a meeting in Tunisia between Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Chairman of the OAU, and Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the OAU. Regards.

②
Chairman O
Information
13/7

PERMANENT MISSION OF TUNISIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
31 BEEKMAN PLACE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

CNR 379 P2/4
البعثة الدائمة للجمهورية التونسية
لدى منظمة الأمم المتحدة
بنيويورك

NO. 256


New York, le 9 Juillet 1994.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de transmettre à votre attention le texte du communiqué publié à Tunis à la suite d'une séance de travail tenue le jeudi 7 juillet 1994 par le Président Zine El Abidine BEN ALI, Président en exercice de l'OUA, avec le Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, Secrétaire Général de cette Organisation, au sujet des situations de conflits en Afrique et notamment au Rwanda et de la nécessité d'instaurer, en concertation avec l'ONU et les autres parties concernées, les conditions propices pour l'envoi de troupes africaines au Rwanda dans le cadre de la MINUAR II.

Le Président a adressé au Sommet du G7 de Naples un message dans lequel il invite notamment les sept pays les plus industrialisés à fournir les moyens et les équipements nécessaires pour le déploiement, avant la fin du mois courant, des forces africaines au Rwanda.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma parfaite considération.



Abdellah
Slaheddine ABDELLAH
Ambassadeur
Représentant Permanent

S.E.M. Jamsheed K.A. MARKER
Président du Conseil de sécurité
New York.

PERMANENT MISSION OF TUNISIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
31 BEEKMAN PLACE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

CNR 379 P3/4
البعثة الدائمة للجمهورية التونسية
لدى منظمة الأمم المتحدة
بنيويورك

TEXTE DU COMMUNIQUE PUBLIE A LA SUITE
DE LA SEANCE DE TRAVAIL TENUE PAR
M. LE PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI
PRESIDENT EN EXERCICE DE L'OUA, AVEC LE
DR. SALIM AHMED SALIM, SECRETAIRE GENERAL
DE L'OUA

TUNIS, LE 7 JUILLET 1994

SOUCCIEUX D'ASSURER LE SUIVI DES RESOLUTIONS DU TRENTIEME SOMMET DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE ET DE METTRE AU POINT UN PLAN D'ACTION AFRICAIN ET INTERNATIONAL, EN COORDINATION AVEC LES CHEFS D'ETATS AFRICAINS FRERES, LE PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI PRESIDENT EN EXERCICE DE L'OUA, A INVITE M. SALIM AHMED SALIM SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'OUA POUR UNE SEANCE DE TRAVAIL QUI S'EST TENUE LE 7 JUILLET AU PALAIS DE CARTHAGE.

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CNR 379 P4/4

MISE EN OEUVRE DES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA.

DANS CE CADRE, LA NECESSITE D'INSTAURER LES CONDITIONS PROPICES A L'ENVOI DE CES TROUPES, EN CONCERTATION ET EN COORDINATION ENTRE L'OUA, L'ONU ET LES AUTRES PARTIES CONCERNEES, A ETE EGALEMENT MIS EN RELIEF.

CONVAINCU DE L'IMPORTANCE DE LA CONJONCTION DES EFFORTS DE LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE TOUT ENTIERE, AU REGARD DE TOUS LES PROBLEMES QUI INTERESSENT LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE DANS LE MONDE, LE PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI A ADRESSE UN MESSAGE AU SOMMET DU GROUPE DES SEPT, LE G7 QUI SE TIENDRA A NAPLES (ITALIE) LE 9 DE CE MOIS, Y REITERANT LA DISPOSITION DES ETATS AFRICAINS A HONORER LEURS ENGAGEMENTS EN FAVEUR DE L'ENVOI DE TROUPES DANS CE PAYS, DANS LE CADRE DE LA MINUAR II ET INVITANT LE GROUPE DES SEPT A APPORTER SON SOUTIEN AUX EFFORTS DES PAYS AFRICAINS POUR LA REALISATION D'UN REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE ET URGENT DE CE CONFLIT, EN FOURNISSANT LES MOYENS ET LES EQUIPEMENTS NECESSAIRES A L'ENVOI ET AU DEVELOPPEMENT DES FORCES AFRICAINES DANS CE PAYS, AVANT LA FIN DU MOIS EN COURS, DANS LE CADRE DE L'OPERATION DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX AU RWANDA.

SRSG

(FL)

CNR 378 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
1994 JUL 13

04:54

1994 JUL 12 P 9:30

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 12 July 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2213
SUBJECT: Secretary-General's progress report

1. As you are aware, resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June and 929 (1994) of 22 June requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council by 9 August a report on the progress made by UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, including progress towards a cease-fire and the resumption of the political settlement process, the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR and the humanitarian situation. We feel that, apart from the usual sections on the political, military and humanitarian aspects, it would be appropriate to include a brief narrative on the liaison and coordination activities between UNAMIR and the French-led force. // *
2. In accordance with established procedures, this report must be submitted to the Secretary-General for his approval by 30 July 1994 at the latest. We would therefore be grateful if you could send us a draft by close of business on Wednesday, 20 July, so that the various Departments concerned at Headquarters can have an opportunity to review the draft before it is submitted to the Secretary-General. Many thanks and best regards.

②
Dr Kasia
There is 3 weeks between
these dates, plus time for our
production here. There is
noiculars, your help please
13/7

PM 13
CNR-278 P1/3

1994 JUL -8 P 1:15

FL only

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE FOR COLONEL YACHEZ, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 8 JULY 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2176
SUBJECT: Spain - request for assistance

1. Please find attached a request from the Permanent Mission of Spain for the evacuation of a Rwandese national, Sister Speciose Mujawayezu, a member of the religious order "Vita et Pax". She is believed to be located in an International Red Cross camp in the area around Kigali.
2. The Spanish authorities are prepared to give Sister Mujawayezu a visa to enter Spain.
3. It would be appreciated if you could, subject to security conditions and resource limitations, provide possible evacuation or protection assistance to Ms. Mujawayezu and give us any information about her whereabouts.

Best regards.

②
HAC
Please action
u
MFC
9/7

JUN 24 '94 02:55PM

RECEIVED
OASG/DPKO

ACTION:

JUN 24 1994

INFO:

FECHA

NUEVA YORK, 24 -06-94

A : SRA. ISEL RIVERO
RESPONSABLE DE RUANDA
DEPTO. OPERACIONES MANTENIMIENTO PAZ

DE : JUAN JOSE URTASUN
CONSEJERO DE EMBAJADA
MISION ESPAÑA ANTE NN.UU.

NLM. DE PGS : 2

FAX N° : 963-6460


ASUNTO: : EVACUACION RUANDA RELIGIOSA "VITA ET
PAX"

ESTIMADA SRA. RIVERO:

LAS AUTORIDADES ESPANOLAS AGRADECERIAN CUALQUIER
AYUDA QUE MINUAR PUDIERA PRESTAR PARA FACILITAR LA
EVACUACION DE LA RELIGIOSA RUANDESA SRA. SPECIOSE
MUJAWAYEZU, PERTENECIENTE AL INSTITUTO RELIGIOSO
"VITA ET PAX", QUIEN SE ENCUENTRA, AL PARECER, EN UN
CAMPAMENTO DE LA CRUZ ROJA INTERNACIONAL SITUADO
EN LAS PROXIMIDADES DE KIGALI

LAS AUTORIDADES ESPANOLAS ESTAN DISPUESTAS A
OTORGAR EL VISADO DE ENTRADA EN NUESTRO PAIS A LA
SRA. MUJAWAYEZU.

AGRADECIENDOLE VIVAMENTE CUALQUIER AYUDA QUE
PUEDA FACILITAR UNAMIR A LA CITADA RELIGIOSA, ASI
COMO CUALQUIER INFORMACION SOBRE SU PARADERO, LE
SALUDA ATENTAMENTE


JUAN JOSE URTASUN

UNAMIR
OUTGOING CODE CABLE
1994 JUL -8

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 7 July 1994
NUMBER: 2166
SUBJECT: UNAMIR - Meeting of Troop Contributing Countries

1994 JUL -7 P 8:30

1. * Please find attached a Note for the File on a meeting of troop-contributing countries for UNAMIR, which was held this morning.
2. The troop-contributing countries were briefed on the current status of troop and equipment contributions, and some more pledges were received from various countries.

Best regards.

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②
Cms
a. discussed. a rep
to N.Y. on training women + children
to UNAMIR, including morning contribution
to UNAMIR to see how plan.

17C
14/7

NOTE FOR THE FILE**Rwanda: Meeting of Troop-contributing Countries**In Attendance:

- | | |
|--------------|-----------------|
| 1. Argentina | 11. Mali |
| 2. Australia | 12. New Zealand |
| 3. Austria | 13. Netherlands |
| 4. Canada | 14. Nigeria |
| 5. Ethiopia | 15. Romania |
| 6. France | 16. Russia |
| 7. Ghana | 17. U.S.A. |
| 8. Italy | 18. Zambia |
| 9. Japan | 19. Zimbabwe |
| 10. Malawi | |
- Brazil?
Botswana?
Cote d'Ivoire?*

A meeting of troop-contributing countries for UNAMIR was held today.

France again defended its humanitarian intervention in Rwanda and its creation of a safe zone and stated that it would in any event withdraw by the end of its two-month mandate in August (but preferably earlier), by which time it hoped a complete transition to a reinforced UNAMIR would have taken place. A copy of the statement made by the representative of France is attached.

M General Baril gave the meeting a detailed update on the status of contributions for UNAMIR from various countries. The deployment of the additional Ghanaian troops had begun and was expected to be completed by mid-July. Every effort would be made to deploy the Ethiopian, Zimbabwean and Nigerian contingents by the end of July.

Japan announced its decision to contribute \$3 million for the procurement of equipment such as vehicles, etc.

Italy stated that the transport aircraft it had offered should be ready for deployment within a week.

is it up?

- 2 -

Netherlands stated that, pending the approval of its Parliament, details of its contribution of equipment were still being worked out.

Mali offered 5 Civpol for UNAMIR. It would forward a letter to that effect.

Malawi expressed its eagerness to deploy troops in UNAMIR, and was looking to discussing contributions with a team which DPKO had offered to visit Malawi.

Mr. Annan asked the Governments of troop-contributing countries to consider the scenario of an entry of the troops and equipment through Kigali if the airport was opened soon. This would facilitate a speedy deployment.

Mr. Riza, in response to a question from Ethiopia regarding diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Rwanda, explained that political and diplomatic efforts could only be effective after a ceasefire was in place.

The meeting, which was called to order at 11:10 a.m., rose at 11:55 a.m.

Kingsley Moghalu
Kingsley Moghalu
7 July 1994

NEW YORK, LE 7 juillet 1994

RWANDA

JE NE REVIENDRAI PAS SUR LE DEPLOIEMENT DE L'OPERATION FRANCO-SENEGALAISE TURQUOISE DONT LA PRESSE S'EST FAITE LARGEMENT L'ECHO.

JE TIENS SIMPLEMENT A VOUS DONNER QUELQUES PRECISIONS SUR LA ZONE HUMANITAIRE SURE CREEE CONFORMEMENT AUX DISPOSITIONS DE LA RESOLUTION 929, AINSI QUE SUR LES OBJECTIFS QUE LA FRANCE S'EST FIXEE.

TOUT D'ABORD, JE VOUS INDIQUE QUE 2555 HOMMES SONT ACTUELLEMENT ENGAGES DANS L'OPERATION TURQUOISE, DONT UNE BONNE PROPORTION, IL CONVIENT DE L'INDIQUER, EST EMPLOYEE PAR LA FORCE DES CHOSES, A DES TACHES DE SOUTIEN LOGISTIQUE. LA ZONE HUMANITAIRE SURE COMPREND LES DISTRICTS DE CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO ET LA MOITIE SUD DE CELUI DE KIBUYE, INCLUANT L'AXE KIBUYE-GITARAMA JUSQU'AU COL DE N'DABA COMPRIS. LA CARTE CORRESPONDANTE EST A LA DISPOSITION DES REPRESENTATIONS INTERESSEES.

C JE TIENS A RAPPELER L'ESPRIT DE LA CREATION DE CETTE ZONE. IL S'AGIT DE PROTEGER LES POPULATIONS CIVILES CONTRE L'ACTIVITE D'ELEMENTS MENACANTS. LA STABILISATION DE LA SITUATION DEVRAIT PERMETTRE D'AMELIORER SUR LE PLAN HUMANITAIRE UNE SITUATION QUE L'ON PEUT QUALIFIER DE CATASTROPHIQUE. LA POPULATION DANS CETTE ZONE A PLUS QUE DOUBLE EN QUELQUES SEMAINES (NOUS ESTIMONS A PLUS DE 400 000 LE NOMBRE DE REFUGIES). LES BESOINS SONT ENORMES, QU'IL S'AGISSE DE NOURRITURE, DE MEDICAMENTS, DE PANSEMENTS OU DE MOYENS DE PROTECTION CONTRE LES ELEMENTS. JE RAPPELE QUE C'EST L'HIVER AU RWANDA. IL S'AGIT D'UN PAYS MONTAGNEUX ET LES PLUIES SONT ABONDANTES EN CETTE SAISON.

POUR REpondre PAR AVANCE A CERTAINES INTERROGATIONS, JE SOUHAITERAIS PRECISER LES GRANDES LIGNES DES MESURES QUI ONT ETE MISES AU POINT CONCERNANT L'ACTIVITE D'ELEMENTS ARMES A L'INTERIEUR DE LA ZONE :

- LES FORCES GOUVERNEMENTALES A L'INTERIEUR DE LA ZONE, QUI NE DOIVENT PAS CONSIDERER LA ZONE HUMANITAIRE SURE COMME UNE ZONE REFUGE, DOIVENT S'ABSTENIR DE TOUTE ACTIVITE A CARACTERE MILITAIRE. BIEN ENTENDU, CES DISPOSITIONS S'APPLIQUENT EGALEMENT AUX MILICES.
- LES FORCES DU FPR NE DOIVENT PAS PENETRER DANS LA ZONE. SI, DU FAIT DU TRACE DE LA LIGNE, CERTAINS ELEMENTS SE TROUVAIENT A L'INTERIEUR DU PERIMETRE AINSI DELIMITE, ILS DEVRAIENT S'ABSTENIR, AU MEME TITRE QUE LES FORCES GOUVERNEMENTALES, DE TOUTE ACTIVITE MILITAIRE.

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PAGE 2

- SE POSE LE PROBLEME DU RAVITAILLEMENT DES FORCES GOUVERNEMENTALES HORS ZONE. A PARTIR DE LA ZONE HUMANITAIRE, SEULES LA NOURRITURE ET L'EAU SONT AUTORISEES A Y TRANSITER.

TANT LES FORCES GOUVERNEMENTALES QUE CELLES DU FPR ONT ETE INFORMEES DE CES DISPOSITIONS. ET NOUS AVONS CONSTATE AVEC INTERET QUE LE FPR A ANNONCE QU'IL NE CHERCHERAIT PAS LA CONFRONTATION AVEC LES FORCES DE L'OPERATION TURQUOISE.

QUE SOUHAITAIT LA FRANCE LORSQU'ELLE S'EST ENGAGEE DANS CETTE OPERATION ET QUE SOUHAITE-ELLE MAINTENANT ?

TOUT LE MONDE SAIT QUE DEVANT L'APATHIE DE LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE A REAGIR AUX MASSACRES DES DERNIERS MOIS, LA FRANCE A PRIS LA DECISION D'INTERVENIR EN VUE DE PROTEGER LES POPULATIONS MENACEES, DE QUELQUE ETHNIE QUELLES SOIENT, CONTRE TOUTE FORME DE MENACE ET NOUS SOUHAITONS ETRE RELEVES LE PLUS TOT POSSIBLE PAR LA MINUAR RENFORCEE.

C DANS L'ENSEMBLE, L'OBJECTIF DE L'OPERATION TURQUOISE A ETE ATTEINT. PUISQUE NOUS AVONS SAUVE DES MILLIERS DE GENS ET QU'AUCUN MASSACRE N'A EU LIEU DANS LA ZONE QUE NOUS CONTROLONS.

NOS TROUPES NE CONSTITUENT EN AUCUN CAS UNE FORCE D'INTERPOSITION. IL N'EST PAS QUESTION POUR NOUS DE PRENDRE PART. JE FAIS OBSERVER, POUR REpondre A DES CRITIQUES QUI ONT ETE FORMULEES, QUE L'ESSENTIEL DES TROUPES DES FORCES ARMEEES RWANDAISES NE SE TROUVENT PAS DANS LA ZONE DE SURETE, QUI NE DOIT PAS ETRE CONFONDUE AVEC LE REDUIT DU NORD-OUEST OU SE TROUVENT RETRANCHEES LES TROUPES HUTUS. JE SOULIGNE EN PARTICULIER QUE CETTE ZONE NE COMPREND PAS LE DISTRICT DE GISENYI QUI EST LE SIEGE DU GOUVERNEMENT INTERIMAIRE AUTO PROCLAME.

C NOS OBJECTIFS N'ONT PAS CHANGE. NOUS SOUHAITONS TOUJOURS ETRE REMPLACES DANS LES MEILLEURS DELAIS PAR LA MINUAR RENFORCEE. NOTRE MANDAT AYANT ETE FIXE A DEUX MOIS, NOUS QUITTERONS LE RWANDA AU PLUS TARD FIN AOUT. ET NOUS SOUHAITERIONS, DANS LA MESURE DU POSSIBLE, NOUS RETIRER AVANT CETTE ECHÉANCE. LE PREMIER MINISTRE A RECEMMENT INDIQUE QUE NOUS COMMENCERIONS UN DESENGAGEMENT DES LE 31 JUILLET. JE RAPPELLE QUE NOUS SOMMES AU RWANDA AFIN DE CONSTITUER UN RELAIS DANS L'ATTENTE DU DEPLOIEMENT DE LA MINUAR RENFORCEE.

AU NOM DE MON GOUVERNEMENT, COMPTE TENU DE LA GRAVITE DE LA SITUATION SUR LE PLAN HUMANITAIRE, JE LANCE UN APPEL A L'ENSEMBLE DES ETATS MEMBRES DE L'ORGANISATION POUR QU'ILS VIENNENT A NOS COTES AIDER LES POPULATIONS EN DIFFICULTE SUR LE PLAN HUMANITAIRE. NOUS AVONS DEJA ACHIEMINÉ PAR VOIE AERIEUNE PLUS DE 400 TONNES DE MATERIELS ET DE NOURRITURE, MAIS

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PAGE 3

COMPTE TENU DE L'AMPLEUR ET DE L'URGENCE DU PROBLEME HUMAINITAIRE, NOUS AVONS BESOIN DE L'AIDE DE TOUS. JE LANCE EGALEMENT UN APPEL POUR QUE LES ETATS MEMBRES DE L'ORGANISATION METTENT A DISPOSITION DE LA MINUAR RENFORCEE LES HOMMES ET LES MOYENS MATERIELS AUTORISES PAR LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE. J'INSISTE SUR L'URGENCE DE CE PROBLEME. IL Y VA DE LA RESTAURATION D'UNE PAIX DURABLE DANS CE PAYS.

SUR LE PLAN MILITAIRE, VOUS SAVEZ TOUS QUE LA SITUATION S'EST STABILISEE, ET TOUTES LES PARTIES SEMBLANT DESORMAIS DISPOSEES A ENTAMER DES NEGOCIATIONS POUR LA CONSTITUTION D'UN GOUVERNEMENT SUR LA BASE DES ACCORDS D'ARUSHA.

NOTRE PAYS, L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET L'ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE SONT EN CONTACT AVEC LES DIFFERENTES PARTIES RWANDAISES ET NOUS AVONS BON ESPOIR QU'UN Cessez-le-feu GENERAL SOIT RAPIDEMENT AGREE, ET QUE CE PAYS RETROUVE ENFIN LA PAIX.

JE PRECISE QUE LE RAPPORT DEMANDE A LA FRANCE EN APPLICATION DU PARAGRAPHE 10 DE LA RESOLUTION 929 A ETE ADRESSE AVANT HIER AU SECRETAIRE GENERAL.

JE TERMINERAI EN VOUS RAPPELANT QU'EN TOUT ETAT DE CAUSE, FIN AOÛT, CONFORMEMENT AU MANDAT QUI NOUS A ETE CONFIE, IL N'Y AURA PLUS AUCUN SOLDAT FRANCAIS AU RWANDA DANS LE CADRE DE L'OPERATION TURQUOISE

L'URGENCE A DEPLOYER LA MINUAR RENFORCEE EST PLUS URGENTE QUE JAMAIS.

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CNR 369 P1/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK
DATE: 6 July 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR:2160
SUBJECT: Security Council Consultations on Rwanda

1994 JUL 9 - 10F 1454
5:11:45

Please find attached a self-explanatory note for the file on today's SecCo Informals on Rwanda, during which the safe zone established by the French-led force was extensively discussed. Best regards.

C

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Secur

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there. Please give
copy to D-2/HAC/COO.
done | (also see if Mr. Gale is
getting there).

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Note for the fileRwanda: Security Council Consultations

The Security Council met in consultations on Rwanda this morning and afternoon. The President called the attention of the Council to the letter which France had sent to the Secretary-General concerning its desire to establish a safe zone southwest of Rwanda.

The President said his consultations had concluded that Members simply wished to acknowledge the letter submitted by the Secretary-General transmitting the French letter without any reference to Security Council resolution 929 (1994).

China stated that it had no objection to a short letter by the President acknowledging the Secretary-General's letter as long as it was understood that the Security Council had no obligation in relation to the creation of the safe zone by France.

France repeated the highlights of Operation Torquise as contained in its report to the Security Council, and argued the case for a safe haven. The zone which they had established stretched from Cyangugu to Kabuye. No military operations would be allowed in the safe zone. Some of the militia in the zone had already been disarmed. France urged that the Special Rapporteur and the High Commissioner for Human Rights visit the zone to interview any criminals that may be in the zone.

In the afternoon session of the consultations various delegations stated their views, summarized below, on the concept of a safe zone.

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

Nigeria described the creation by the French force of a humanitarian safe haven in Southwest Rwanda as a "fait accompli", and referred to Security Council resolution 929 as "the reluctant decision of a divided council". All efforts by the international community should be geared towards deploying an expanded UNAMIR on the ground as soon as possible. The recent letter from France to the Secretary-General on the activities of Operation Torquise was not at variance with Nigeria's position. From a humanitarian point of view, one could not oppose the French intervention, but this should not prejudice UNAMIR. The safe haven should be administered in a strictly neutral manner. Nigeria called for a special statement by the Security Council to the media on this matter, in order to show transparency in the Council's activities.

- 2 -

Russian Federation stated that the safe haven zone should be completely demilitarized, and only the French and Senegalese troops therein should bear arms. In this context, it did not understand why the French had allowed armed (Rwandan Interim Government military) units within the zone. Armed units responsible for past massacres should not be present in the safe zone, as such presence could rekindle the conflict. Russia believed that an area comprising one third or one quarter of a country was not a safe area. It was "something else", and the size of the area should be reduced. It requested from the Secretariat an explanation of how the safe area would affect the deployment of UNAMIR.

Argentina stated that the establishment of the safety zone was aimed at a real need - the flow of refugees to that area and their need for protection. It suggested a UNAMIR observer presence in the area, and offered to provide medical assistance within the zone.

New Zealand recalled that it had abstained from resolution 929 out of concern for its possible effects on UNAMIR. Although it was now reassured by the French report to the Security Council, New Zealand had not foreseen that the Security Council would authorize the setting aside of such large tracts of land for a safe area. It endorsed the request by Russia for an explanation from the Secretariat on the implications of this development for UNAMIR.

Spain expressed its view that the expression "all necessary means" in resolution 929 included the right to create a humanitarian safe area. Spain believed that Operation Torquise had so far proceeded in an evenhanded manner and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

United States in its statement took note of French assurances of a neutral non-interpository role by its forces. It was encouraged to learn that the inflammatory radio broadcasts condemning UNAMIR had stopped within the last 24 hours, and urged the quick deployment of UNAMIR II.

Brazil expressed doubts as to whether the concept of safe zones was envisaged by resolution 929, but regarded the creation of the zone as a present "fact of life". However, it did not exclude the need for a new resolution on this subject at an appropriate time.

Czech commended France for its "timely initiative" and said the multinational force was saving lives. Noting that certain sentiments had been expressed concerning the motives of France, Czech said that two weeks into the operation, it saw no evidence that the operation was anything other than humanitarian. It therefore supported the French intervention, and also endorsed

- 3 -

the request for an explanation by the Secretariat on the implications of the safe areas for UNAMIR.

United Kingdom agreed with Nigeria that deploying an expanded UNAMIR was a matter of priority, and assessed the present situation in Rwanda as being "much less depressing" than hitherto.

France, responding to the various statements, thanked those who supported its recent actions, and challenged anyone to prove that its intentions were contrary to its stated humanitarian objective. Its position was that the Security Council had in advance (in resolutions 925 and 929) authorized safe areas under the phrase "all necessary measures" and so a new authorization was unnecessary. France responded specifically to various statements by Nigeria and Russia, and estimated the size of the safe area to be 15 per cent of Rwandan territory, which was "not that big". It denied knowledge of any Rwandan armed groups near the French troops. If such armed groups existed, they would be neutralized.

Oman expressed concern about the RPF's intention to form a government, and stated that a message should be sent to the RPF that any government to emerge in Rwanda should be in consonance with the Arusha Agreement.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

Kingsley Moghalu
Kingsley Moghalu
6 July 1994

1994-07-07

03:55

PAGE = 04

UNAMIR

194 JUL -6 13 52

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 5 July 1994
 NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2153
 SUBJECT: Report on operation "Turquoise"

1994 JUL -5 P 10:00

... Please find attached a report on operation "Turquoise" submitted by the French Permanent Mission, in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 929 (1994). This report and the map annexed to it were received here this evening and will be issued as a Security Council document tomorrow. Regards.

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Pierre Fangers

Date

From

OPERATION TURQUOISE

1 - DISPOSITIF

Le dispositif de l'opération TURQUOISE est placé sous les ordres du Général LAFOURCADE qui dispose d'un Poste de commandement interarmées de théâtre (PCIAT) implanté à GOMA et relié au Centre opérationnel interarmées de PARIS.

Ce dispositif comprend les éléments suivants :

- un sous-groupement de forces NORD de 3 unités de combat à KIBUYE,
- un sous-groupement de forces SUD de 2 unités de combat à CYANGUGU,
- un sous-groupement spécialisé constitué de 4 éléments à BUKAVU,
- un déploiement d'avions de combat à KISANGANI,
- trois bases de transit à BANGUI, LIBREVILLE et DOUALA.

Le dispositif dispose actuellement d'un effectif de 2300 militaires français et 32 sénégalais.

2 - COMPOSITION DE LA FORCE (effectifs prévisibles)

2.1 - Moyens interarmées

- un poste de commandement interarmées (PCIAT - effectif 305),
- un élément militaire médical d'intervention rapide (EMMIR - effectif 46),
- un détachement spécialisé disposant de 5 hélicoptères (effectif 220)
- trois détachements du Service des essences des armées (effectif 35)

2.2 - Moyens de l'Armée de l'air et de la Marine nationale

- un élément de 4 MIRAGE FICR, 4 MIRAGE FICT, 1 ATLANTIC, 2 C135FR, 2 CASA 235, 5 avions cargo tactiques (C130, C 160), 2 hélicoptères SA330 (SAR). L'effectif total est de 340.

2.3 - Moyens de l'Armée de terre

- quatre compagnies d'infanterie motorisée (effectif 580),
- un escadron d'automitralleuses légères de 12 véhicules (effectif 130),
- une section de mortiers lourds de 6 pièces (effectif 70),
- une section de génie (effectif 25),

- un bataillon de soutien logistique partiellement acheminé et en cours de déploiement (effectif prévu 450),
- un détachement de l'Aviation légère de l'armée de terre (ALAT) disposant de 3 hélicoptères PUMA (effectif 60),
- deux états-majors tactiques (effectif 62),
- une compagnie de commandement et de service (effectif 150).

2.4 - Moyens de la Gendarmerie nationale
 - un détachement prévôtal (effectif 10).

2.5 - Moyens étrangers
 - une section d'infanterie sénégalaise (effectif 32).

D'autres éléments fournis par divers pays d'Afrique pourraient être intégrés à la force. Une antenne chirurgicale belge est attendue.

3 - LIEUX ET MODE DE DEPLOIEMENT

Initialement mise en place à GOMA et BUKAVU le 22 juin 1994, la Force a ensuite reconnu plusieurs axes :

- au nord, à partir de GOMA, en direction de KIBUYE et du col de NDABA,
- au sud, à partir de BUKAVU, dans le secteur de la forêt de NYUGWE et jusqu'à GIKONGORO et BUTARE.

L'opération a comporté :

- des actions préliminaires (mesures d'alerte et de prépositionnement de moyens en Afrique centrale) du 16 au 21 juin 1994,
- des actions initiales :
 - * mise sur pied d'une base opérationnelle avancée à GOMA et d'une plate-forme aérienne à KISANGANI du 21 au 24 juin 1994,
 - * reconnaissance de camps de réfugiés à CYANGUGU et dans l'ouest du RWANDA du 22 au 25 juin 1994,
 - * déploiement progressif de la force sur les axes de progression précités du 24 juin au 4 juillet 1994.

4 - EVALUATION DE LA SITUATION

La mission à but humanitaire confiée à la France s'avère délicate, notamment dans le centre et le sud de la zone reconnue par la Force TURQUOISE.

Jusqu'au 2 juillet 1994, nos troupes ont pu agir sans incident à l'intérieur de la zone gouvernementale à partir des villes zaïroises de GOMA et BUKAVU.

Par la suite, la poussée du Front patriotique rwandais a provoqué un nouveau flux de réfugiés. Ceci nous a conduit à définir une zone humanitaire sûre pour les réfugiés à l'intérieur du triangle CYANGUGU-KIBUYE-GIKONGORO.

|| 7

Le problème humanitaire dans cette zone atteint aujourd'hui des proportions considérables qui exigent l'implication de l'ensemble de la communauté internationale. Des centaines de milliers de personnes déplacées tutsies et hutues ont besoin d'une aide urgente. La protection apportée par la France devrait permettre son déploiement le plus rapidement possible.

5 - ACTIONS HUMANITAIRES ENTREPRISES

5.1 Protection et Organisation des camps de réfugiés :

La force TURQUOISE mène une action de protection autour de 2 camps :

5.11 NYARUSHISHI, camp déjà existant et regroupant 8 000 personnes (Tutsis). La garde est assurée par les Forces armées rwandaises et les soldats TURQUOISE (1 section).

*Okabou →
uluse? →*

5.12 BISERERO, camp créé et protégé par les forces françaises (1 000 tutsis depuis le 1er juillet).

5.2 Activités humanitaires :

5.21 Situation générale :

Depuis l'entrée au RWANDA de la force TURQUOISE, on estime à 850 000 le nombre de réfugiés répartis en plus de 50 camps en zone gouvernementale.

Au sud du pays, de nombreux réfugiés se déplacent vers GIKONGORO (mouvements vers l'ouest) et vers le BURUNDI (mouvement vers le sud).

de Lors de sa visite sur place, M. ARTURO HEIN, directeur du bureau d'urgence de l'ONU pour le RWANDA, (en poste à NAIROBI) a fait part de son appréciation très favorable sur la mission et les modes d'action de l'opération TURQUOISE.

5.22 Actions entreprises :

Installation d'un élément médical militaire d'intervention rapide (EMMIR) à CYANGUGU (depuis le 5 juillet).

Livraison de 37t de fret d'aide humanitaire gouvernementale française et distribution dans les régions de KIBUYE et GIKONGORO. 400 tonnes sont prévues dans les jours à venir.

Evacuation de 1 325 personnes.

Les moyens suivants ont été demandés à l'UEO .

- un stock de 35t de médicaments (renouvelable toutes les 3 semaines),
- 400t de vivres non périssables,
- vêtements et couvertures pour 200 000 personnes.

5.3 Domaine des droits de l'homme :

Des violations flagrantes des droits de l'homme ont été constatées directement par les soldats français ou ont fait l'objet de récits par les populations civiles. Ainsi, les forces TURQUOISE ont découvert des charniers dans les régions de CYANGUGU et KIBUYE. Par ailleurs, des corps appartenant vraisemblablement à des personnes d'origine tutsie ont été trouvés près de BISESERO.

L'ensemble des informations pertinentes recueillies sera ultérieurement transmis aux experts de la Commission d'enquête créée par la résolution 935 et au Rapporteur spécial.

6 - APPRECIATIONS SUR LE DEROULEMENT DE L'OPERATION ET EVENTUELLES DIFFICULTES RENCONTREES

C L'opération TURQUOISE se déroule conformément à la résolution 929 de l'ONU.

Les forces françaises ont fait preuve d'impartialité sur le terrain en sauvant de nombreux rwandais hutus ou tutsis d'une mort certaine. Cette impartialité commence à être reconnue par le FPR qui a laissé se réaliser l'évacuation de 1000 personnes de BUTARE même si un incident mineur a eu lieu.

Certaines difficultés demeurent. Pour l'instant, les ONG et les institutions internationales relaient très peu l'action des forces TURQUOISE, notamment dans le sud. Dans ce domaine, comme dans celui de la participation au soutien logistique de notre intervention, peu de promesses se sont concrétisées. Même si il est dissuasif vis-à-vis des milices ou des forces armées impliquées dans le conflit, notre dispositif n'en demeure pas moins insuffisant au regard du nombre de personnes déplacées à soutenir.

C * D'autre part, les difficultés pour maîtriser la situation militaire extrêmement tendue ne sont pas négligeables. Ainsi, l'hostilité possible des Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) et des milices hutues à notre égard pourrait multiplier les risques qu'encourent déjà nos forces du côté du FPR. La participation de pays tiers à l'opération constituerait une aide appréciable à nos efforts.

Enfin, l'effort militaire supporté presque intégralement par la France ne saurait se prolonger sans l'espoir sérieux d'une relève par la MINUAR(II). Or, la plupart des offres de contribution demeurent incertaines ou assorties de conditions ou de délais peu compatibles avec une prise en charge de notre mission dans les deux mois qui viennent. La France en appelle donc à l'ensemble des Etats membres pour que le déploiement de la MINUAR renforcée devienne rapidement une réalité.


ZONE HUMANITAIRE SURE AU RWANDA

**DISTRICTS DE CYANGURU, GIKONGORO ET MOITIE SUD DE CELUI DE
KIBUYE, INCLUANT L'AXE KIBUYE-GITARAME JUSQU'AU COL DE N'DABA
COMPRIS**

oOoOoOo

HUMANITARIAN SAFE AREA IN RWANDA:

**DISTRICTS OF CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO AND SOUTHERN HALF OF
KIBUYE DISTRICT INCLUDING KIBUYE - GITARAMA ROAD UP TO N'DABA
PASS.**



UNAMIR.

194 JUL -6 13 52

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 5 July 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2153
SUBJECT: Report on operation "Turquoise"

1994 JUL -5 12 10:00

... Please find attached a report on operation "Turquoise" submitted by the French Permanent Mission, in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 929 (1994). This report and the map annexed to it were received here this evening and will be issued as a Security Council document tomorrow. Regards.

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OPERATION TURQUOISE

1 - DISPOSITIF

Le dispositif de l'opération TURQUOISE est placé sous les ordres du Général LAFOURCADE qui dispose d'un Poste de commandement interarmées de théâtre (PCIAT) implanté à GOMA et relié au Centre opérationnel interarmées de PARIS.

Ce dispositif comprend les éléments suivants :

- un sous-groupement de forces NORD de 3 unités de combat à KIBUYE,
- un sous-groupement de forces SUD de 2 unités de combat à CYANGUGU,
- un sous-groupement spécialisé constitué de 4 éléments à BUKAVU,
- un déploiement d'avions de combat à KISANGANI,
- trois bases de transit à BANGUI, LIBREVILLE et DOUALA.

Le dispositif dispose actuellement d'un effectif de 2300 militaires français et 32 sénégalais.

2 - COMPOSITION DE LA FORCE (effectifs prévisibles)

2.1 - Moyens Interarmées

- un poste de commandement interarmées (PCIAT - effectif 305),
- un élément militaire médical d'intervention rapide (EMMIR - effectif 46),
- un détachement spécialisé disposant de 5 hélicoptères (effectif 220)
- trois détachements du Service des essences des armées (effectif 35)

2.2 - Moyens de l'Armée de l'air et de la Marine nationale

- un élément de 4 MIRAGE FICR, 4 MIRAGE FICT, 1 ATLANTIC, 2 C135FR, 2 CASA 235, 5 avions cargo tactiques (C130, C 160), 2 hélicoptères SA330 (SAR). L'effectif total est de 340.

2.3 - Moyens de l'Armée de terre

- quatre compagnies d'infanterie motorisée (effectif 580),
- un escadron d'automitralleuses légères de 12 véhicules (effectif 130),
- une section de mortiers lourds de 6 pièces (effectif 70),
- une section de génie (effectif 25),

- un bataillon de soutien logistique partiellement acheminé et en cours de déploiement (effectif prévu 450),
- un détachement de l'Aviation légère de l'armée de terre (ALAT) disposant de 3 hélicoptères PUMA (effectif 60),
- deux états-majors tactiques (effectif 62),
- une compagnie de commandement et de service (effectif 150).

2.4 - Moyens de la Gendarmerie nationale

- un détachement prévôtal (effectif 10).

2.5 - Moyens étrangers

- une action d'infanterie sénégalaise (effectif 32).

D'autres éléments fournis par divers pays d'Afrique pourraient être intégrés à la force. Une antenne chirurgicale belge est attendue.

3 - LIEUX ET MODE DE DEPLOIEMENT

Initialement mise en place à GOMA et BUKAVU le 22 juin 1994, la Force a ensuite reconnu plusieurs axes :

- au nord, à partir de GOMA, en direction de KIBUYE et du col de NDABA,
- au sud, à partir de BUKAVU, dans le secteur de la forêt de NYUGWE et jusqu'à GIKONGORO et BUTARE.

L'opération a comporté :

- des actions préliminaires (mesures d'alerte et de prépositionnement de moyens en Afrique centrale) du 16 au 21 juin 1994,
- des actions initiales :
 - * mise sur pied d'une base opérationnelle avancée à GOMA et d'une plate-forme aérienne à KISANGANI du 21 au 24 juin 1994,
 - * reconnaissance de camps de réfugiés à CYANGUGU et dans l'ouest du RWANDA du 22 au 25 juin 1994,
 - * déploiement progressif de la force sur les axes de progression précités du 24 juin au 4 juillet 1994.

4 - EVALUATION DE LA SITUATION

La mission à but humanitaire confiée à la France s'avère délicate, notamment dans le centre et le sud de la zone reconnue par la Force TURQUOISE.

Jusqu'au 2 juillet 1994, nos troupes ont pu agir sans incident à l'intérieur de la zone gouvernementale à partir des villes zaïroises de GOMA et BUKAVU.

Par la suite, la poussée du Front patriotique rwandais a provoqué un nouveau flux de réfugiés. Ceci nous a conduit à définir une zone humanitaire sûre pour les réfugiés à l'intérieur du triangle CYANGUGU-KIBUYE-GIKONGORO.

|| 7

Le problème humanitaire dans cette zone atteint aujourd'hui des proportions considérables qui exigent l'implication de l'ensemble de la communauté internationale. Des centaines de milliers de personnes déplacées tutsies et hutues ont besoin d'une aide urgente. La protection apportée par la France devrait permettre son déploiement le plus rapidement possible.

5 - ACTIONS HUMANITAIRES ENTREPRISES

5.1 Protection et Organisation des camps de réfugiés :

La force TURQUOISE mène une action de protection autour de 2 camps :

5.11 NYARUSHISHI, camp déjà existant et regroupant 8 000 personnes (Tutsis). La garde est assurée par les Forces armées rwandaises et les soldats TURQUOISE (1 section).

*Kabon →
where? →*

5.12 BISERERO, camp créé et protégé par les forces françaises (1 000 tutsis depuis le 1er juillet).

5.2 Activités humanitaires :

5.2.1 Situation générale :

Depuis l'entrée au RWANDA de la force TURQUOISE, on estime à 850 000 le nombre de réfugiés répartis en plus de 50 camps en zone gouvernementale.

An sud du pays, de nombreux réfugiés se déplacent vers GIKONGORO (mouvements vers l'ouest) et vers le BURUNDI (mouvement vers le sud).

du Lors de sa visite sur place, M. ARTURO HEIN, directeur du bureau d'urgence de l'ONU pour le RWANDA, (en poste à NAIROBI) a fait part de son appréciation très favorable sur la mission et les modes d'action de l'opération TURQUOISE.

5.2.2 Actions entreprises :

Installation d'un élément médical militaire d'intervention rapide (EMMIR) à CYANGUGU (depuis le 5 juillet).

Livraison de 37t de fret d'aide humanitaire gouvernementale française et distribution dans les régions de KIBUYE et GIKONGORO. 400 tonnes sont prévues dans les jours à venir.

Evacuation de 1 325 personnes.

Les moyens suivants ont été demandés à l'UEO :

- un stock de 35t de médicaments (renouvelable toutes les 3 semaines),
- 400t de vivres non périssables,
- vêtements et couvertures pour 200 000 personnes.

5.3 Domaine des droits de l'homme :

Des violations flagrantes des droits de l'homme ont été constatées directement par le soldats français ou ont fait l'objet de récits par les populations civiles. Ainsi, les forces TURQUOISE ont découvert des charniers dans les régions de CYANGUGU et KIBUYE. Par ailleurs, des corps appartenant vraisemblablement à des personnes d'origine tutsie ont été trouvés près de BISESERO.

L'ensemble des informations pertinentes recueillies sera ultérieurement transmis aux experts de la Commission d'enquête créée par la résolution 935 et au Rapporteur spécial.

6 - APPRECIATIONS SUR LE DEROULEMENT DE L'OPERATION ET EVENTUELLES DIFFICULTES RENCONTREES

L'opération TURQUOISE se déroule conformément à la résolution 929 de l'ONU.

Les forces françaises ont fait preuve d'impartialité sur le terrain en sauvant de nombreux rwandais hutus ou tutsis d'une mort certaine. Cette impartialité commence à être reconnue par le FPR qui a laissé se réaliser l'évacuation de 1000 personnes de BUTARE même si un incident mineur a eu lieu.

Certaines difficultés demeurent. Pour l'instant, les ONG et les institutions internationales relaient très peu l'action des forces TURQUOISE, notamment dans le sud. Dans ce domaine, comme dans celui de la participation au soutien logistique de notre intervention, peu de promesses se sont concrétisées. Même si il est dissuasif vis-à-vis des milices ou des forces armées impliquées dans le conflit, notre dispositif n'en demeure pas moins insuffisant au regard du nombre de personnes déplacées à soutenir.

D'autre part, les difficultés pour maîtriser la situation militaire extrêmement tendue ne sont pas négligeables. Ainsi, l'hostilité possible des Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) et des milices hutues à notre égard pourrait multiplier les risques qu'encourent déjà nos forces du côté du FPR. La participation de pays tiers à l'opération constituerait une aide appréciable à nos efforts.

Enfin, l'effort militaire supporté presque intégralement par la France ne saurait se prolonger sans l'espoir sérieux d'une relève par la MINUAR. Or, la plupart des offres de contribution demeurent incertaines ou assorties de conditions ou de délais peu compatibles avec une prise en charge de notre mission dans les deux mois qui viennent. La France en appelle donc à l'ensemble des Etats membres pour que le déploiement de la MINUAR renforcée devienne rapidement une réalité.

ZONE HUMANITAIRE SURE AU RWANDA

**DISTRICTS DE CYANGURU, GIKONGORO ET MOITIE SUD DE CELUI DE
KIBUYE, INCLUANT L'AXE KIBUYE-GITARAME JUSQU'AU COL DE N'DABA
COMPRIS**

oOoOoOo

HUMANITARIAN SAFE AREA IN RWANDA:

**DISTRICTS OF CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO AND SOUTHERN HALF OF
KIBUYE DISTRICT INCLUDING KIBUYE - GITARAMA ROAD UP TO N'DABA
PASS.**

E/O 12

CNR 365 P 1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 1 JULY 1994

NUMBER: 2145

SUBJECT: Combatants who seek refuge with UNAMIR

1. Re your MIR-1174 and 1250 on the above, we wish to stress that the mandate of UNAMIR, as defined by resolution 925 (1994), contains no provision regarding the protection of combatants. We recognize, however, that the individual combatants who place themselves hors de combat and seek refuge with UNAMIR have created a de facto situation, which needs to be addressed.

2. Accordingly, any arrangement devised by UNAMIR under which these combatants stay within the UNAMIR compound can only be ad hoc. The establishment of these arrangements should not lead to a situation where UNAMIR becomes a party to a conflict regarding the presence of the individuals concerned in its compound.

3. We have consulted with the Office of Legal Affairs and with ICRC here on this issue and believe, as they do, that UNAMIR should contact the ICRC delegation in Rwanda, with a view to working out arrangements which could be implemented when it becomes necessary to transfer these combatants to those claiming them. It is our understanding that such arrangements should involve the following:

/...

②
D/C
HSC
I do not agree
with para 4, HSC
prepare a come back
in our SOP.

Reply sent
to Mr ANNAN
12/13/94

2/7

7/90

CNR 365 P 2/2


2 -

(a) ICRC and UNAMIR should receive from the parties solemn commitments to apply the "Standard Memorandum" provided to them by ICRC regarding applicability of humanitarian laws to the conflict in Rwanda;

(b) ICRC and UNAMIR should keep a record of individual combatants turned over to the faction which claimed them, and

(c) ICRC should assume responsibility for the supervision of these combatants.

4. In the light of the above guidance, we are of the view that the establishment of the Standard Operating Procedures outlined in your MIR-1174 may no longer be necessary. As the issue is a sensitive one grateful you consult us regarding all developments relating to this matter. Regards.



UNAMIR
JUL -2 04:50
5502
UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK
E/012
CNR 365 P 1/2
JUL -1 P 11:27
JUL -1 P 11:27
JUL -1 P 11:27

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

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FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 1 JULY 1994

NUMBER: 2146

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I do not agree with para 4. HAc prepare a come back on our SOP.
DKC HAc
cc 2/7
7/20

CNR 365 P 2/2

- 2 -

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(b) ICRC and UNAMIR should keep a record of individual combatants turned over to the faction which claimed them, and ✓

(c) ICRC should assume responsibility for the supervision of these combatants. ✓

4. In the light of the above guidance, we are of the view that the establishment of the Standard Operating Procedures outlined in your MIR-1174 may no longer be necessary. As the issue is a sensitive one, grateful you consult us regarding all developments relating to this matter. Regards. *huy*

SECRET 5502

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS NEW YORK

005 PVI

FL

E/DIR

CNR 364 P1/6

UNAMIR 50
JUL 2 1994

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, RWANDA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 1 JULY 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR 2140
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Security Council on Rwanda

1994 JUL -1 P 10 30

Attached is the summary of today's Security Council Meeting on Rwanda and Resolution 935 (1994) adopted at that meeting. Also attached is a letter from the RPF to the President of Security Council.

done / @
Summary
copy to DRC, Minister
and copy for RPF to meeting
notes and resolution 935.

4
DRC
2/7

CNR 364 P2/6

Meeting of the Security Council on Rwanda - 1 July 1994

The Security Council unanimously adopted today the attached Resolution on Rwanda. Spain, the United States, Czech Republic and France, spoke before the vote while New Zealand, China, the United Kingdom, Argentina and Pakistan spoke after the vote. All representatives except that of China declared that the atrocities in Rwanda since 6 April 1994 constitute genocide which must be condemned. They stated that it was important that the atrocities be investigated in order to determine the facts. Individuals who had planned, perpetrated and or abetted in the commission of such acts must be brought to Justice. Spain emphasized that the genocide had been perpetrated against one ethnic group. New Zealand said that the aim of the United Nations was not to seek retribution but justice. The United States said the implementation of Human Rights should be an integral part of any United Nations actions in Rwanda.

The Czech Republic and China emphasized that everlasting peace in Rwanda could only come through a political settlement based on the Arusha Agreement. China added that while it had voted for the Resolution it wanted to note that the Security Council should respect the mandates of other UN bodies and thus, reserved its position on the reference in the Resolution to the Human Rights Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda. It further emphasized that the creation of the Commission of Experts should be regarded as an exception called upon by the special situation in Rwanda and not a precedent. Pakistan was of the view that the Resolution sets the necessary precedent and warns individuals who trample on the Human Rights of their citizens that the international community would not be silent.

France promised to provide the Commission of Experts with whatever information on acts of genocide its forces may collect during its operation in Rwanda. The United Kingdom, France, and Argentina condemned "Radio Milles Collines" for calling on people to commit genocide as well as for its hostile broadcasts against UNAMIR and its Force Commander. They demanded that these broadcasts should stop.

1 July 1994

cc: SRSG
Gen. Dallaire

CNR 364 14/6

S/1994/775
English
Page 2

Recalling that all persons who commit or authorize the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for those violations and should be brought to justice,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information submitted pursuant to the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or the efforts of other persons or bodies, including the information made available by the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide;

2. Calls upon States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to grave violations of international humanitarian law, including breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, committed in Rwanda during the conflict, and requests States, relevant United Nations bodies, and relevant organizations to make this information available within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution and as appropriate thereafter, and to provide appropriate assistance to the Commission of Experts referred to in paragraph 1;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission of Experts, and further requests the Secretary-General, within four months from the establishment of the Commission of Experts, to report to the Council, on the conclusions of the Commission and to take account of these conclusions in any recommendations for further appropriate steps;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General and as appropriate the High Commissioner for Human Rights through the Secretary-General to make the information submitted to the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda available to the Commission of Experts and to facilitate adequate coordination and cooperation is maintained between the work of the Commission of Experts and the Special Rapporteur in the performance of their respective tasks;

5. Urges all concerned fully to cooperate with the Commission of Experts in the accomplishment of its mandate, including responding positively to requests from the Commission for assistance and access in pursuing investigations;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

CNR 364 15/6



New York, July 1 1994

H.E. Jameed K.A. Marker
President of the Security Council
United Nations

Your Excellency

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to reiterate its total opposition to French intervention in Rwanda.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to point out that since the launching of Operation Turquoise, there are frequent flights over our territory by planes which refuse to respond to our control tower at Kigali airport.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front further wishes to inform the international community that it has reliable information that such planes overflying our territory have intentions to bomb our military installations.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front calls for an immediate end to such flights and warns that all planes that overfly our territory without prior clearance by our control tower will be at risk of being attacked as enemy aircraft.

The Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to reiterate its strong objections to French intervention in Rwanda and repeats its warning that this intervention will lead to an escalation of the conflict since France's real intentions are to intervene in the conflict on the side of the Rwanda Government forces and force a political solution in favour of the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda.

Page 2

CNR 364 P6,6

The Rwandese Patriotic Front:

1. Calls upon the international community to use its influence to restrain France from this course of aggression against the victims of genocide.
2. Reiterates the determination of its members and the Rwandese people at large to resist this French aggression by any means possible.
3. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of French troops from Rwanda and calls upon the United Nations Secretary-General, the United Nations Security Council and Member States to expedite the deployment of UNAMIR II established by resolutions 918 and 925 (1994).

In view of the fact that the Rwandese Patriotic Front is opposed to Operation Turquoise, it wishes to inform the Security Council that it will review its position regarding participation in UNAMIR by all countries that intervene in Rwanda alongside the French.

Kindly ensure circulation of this letter to all members of the Security Council as an official note of the Council.

For: The Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front



Claude Dusaidi

Rwandese Patriotic Front Representative to the United Nations

c.c. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
All members of the Security Council

FC

E/O 12

CNR 363 F1/4

UNAMIR

194 JUL -1 04:41

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, RWANDA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 30 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2114SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

JUN 30 10 00 AM '94

SHAW

Attached is the summary of the discussion in today's Security Council Consultations on Rwanda.

① FC
Pce note on your arrival
JW
01/7
DSC

② Mr. Miller
Very short
fuzzy on this one.
Do we have any experience
with such a commission
of experts?
DSC
4/7

③ Mr. Miller
It's approved. Please
have your division
consider. Do we involve
our CIPOL?

④ We are ready 2/7
to help if
we are approved
by the UN

FC

E/O 12

CNR 363 P1/4

UNAMIR

194 JUL -1 04 411

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, RWANDA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 30 JUNE 1994

NUMBER: UNAMIR: 2114SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS

1994 JUN 30 12 14 00

Attached is the summary of the discussion in today's Security Council Consultations on Rwanda.

①

FC

Pse note on gov arrival

JW

01/7

DSC

②

McNulken

Very short

pages on this one.

Do we have any experience with such a commission of experts?

DSC

NOTE ON
SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS
30 June 1994

RWANDA

The Security Council continued its consultations today on a draft resolution which, if adopted, would establish a Commission of Experts to investigate the atrocities in Rwanda. At yesterday's consultations, China had requested deletion of any reference to the High Commission for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on Rwanda. The President had requested China and Spain to consult on this issue before today's meeting.

Today China noted that, regarding the draft resolution (sponsored by Spain), its concerns had not been taken care of. China was waiting for instructions from its capital. Government. Spain stated that the first version of the text was distributed three weeks ago. Delegations had had a chance to review it. The time had come to reach a decision, and a vote on the resolution should be taken this afternoon or tomorrow. China responded that although it was included on the consultation list, actual consultations had not yet taken place. He called for consultations to take place today.

The President noted that there appeared to be a need for further consultation. This should be finalised as soon as possible. Spain expressed readiness to continue with consultations, but wished to note that adopted resolutions of the Security Council, were not always presidential texts; they could be delegation-sponsored texts, as in this instance. Spain called for a vote on the draft resolution this afternoon or tomorrow morning. China agreed with Spain on the need for a vote today or tomorrow.

It was agreed that the Council will take up Rwanda tomorrow.

30 June 1994

cc: SRSQ



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/775

29 June 1994

ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND SPANISH

Argentina, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda,

Reaffirming, in particular, resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994), which expanded the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and stressing in this connection the need for early deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to enable it to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21) in which the Security Council, inter alia, condemned all breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalled that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible,

Recalling also the requests it addressed to the Secretary-General in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 April 1994 and in resolution 918 (1994), concerning the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640), in which he noted that massacres and killings have continued in a systematic manner throughout Rwanda and also noted that only a proper investigation can establish the facts in order to enable the determination of responsibility,

Welcoming the visit to Rwanda and to the region by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and acknowledging the appointment, pursuant to resolution S-3/1 of 28 May 1994 adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,

Expressing once again its grave concern at the continuing reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, including acts of genocide, have been committed in Rwanda,

290614 (N)

/...

Recalling that all persons who commit or authorize the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for those violations and should be brought to justice,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information submitted pursuant to the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or the efforts of other persons or bodies, including the findings of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide;

2. Calls upon States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to grave violations of international humanitarian law, including breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, committed in Rwanda during the conflict, and requests States, relevant United Nations bodies, and relevant organizations to make this information available within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution and as appropriate thereafter, and to provide appropriate assistance to the Commission of Experts referred to in paragraph 1; //

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission of Experts, and further requests the Secretary-General, within four months from the establishment of the Commission of Experts, to report to the Council, on the conclusions of the Commission and to take account of these conclusions in any recommendations for further appropriate steps; //

4. Also requests the Secretary-General and as appropriate the High Commissioner for Human Rights to make the information submitted to the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda available to the Commission of Experts and to ensure that adequate coordination and cooperation is maintained between the work of the Commission of Experts and that of the Special Rapporteur;

5. Urges all concerned fully to cooperate with the Commission of Experts in the accomplishment of its mandate;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
