


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ACTION *Ag*  
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Most immediate

Note to Mr. Eliasson



Quarterly report to the Security Council on ISAF operations

1. Please find attached the quarterly report by NATO on ISAF operations in Afghanistan, covering the period from 1 May to 31 July 2013. As is the usual practice, NATO has requested that the Secretary-General make the report available to the Security Council.
2. We have also attached a draft letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council conveying the report. I would be grateful if you could bring the draft letter to the attention of the Secretary-General for approval.

Hervé Ladsous  
13 September 2013



*Pvt-In41000*

13 September 2013

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to convey the attached communication dated 12 September 2013, which I received from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

BAN Ki-moon

His Excellency  
Mr. Gary Quinlan  
President of the Security Council  
New York



SECRETARY GENERAL  
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL  
Anders Fogh Rasmussen

SG(2013)0285

13 September 2013

Dear Secretary-General,

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 and 2069, I attach a report on ISAF operations covering the period from 1 May 2013 to 31 July 2013. I would appreciate you making this report available to the UN Security Council.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Annex

His Excellency  
Mr. Ban Ki-moon  
Secretary-General  
United Nations Headquarters  
United Nations Plaza 2  
New York, NY 10017

## **NATOS 38TH QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE OPERATIONS**

### **1. Introduction**

a. This report, pursuant to the request under the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2069 (2012), informs the UN Security Council on the progress of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission covering the period from 01 May to 31 July 2013.

b. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in accordance with the relevant UNSCRs.

c. NATO welcomes the strong commitment and participation of additional UN member nations to support this UN authorised mission, particularly in providing advisors and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). UN member nations are also invited to provide funding support to the ANSF.

d. The quarter was marked by a significant waypoint in the ISAF campaign when on 18 June at the Milestone 2013 ceremony, the ANSF assumed lead responsibility for security nationwide. ISAF is now in support of the ANSF and has shifted to a train, advise and assist role, conducting independent operations mainly for force protection purposes and IED clearance.

e. Much work still needs to be done, with international community support, to develop a sustainable ANSF and guarantee the security gains for the long term. SACEUR assesses that the NATO campaign is on track to meet its objectives.

f. Since the last report the total number of ISAF troops continued to decrease in accordance with NATO redeployment planning. As of 1 August 2013 a total of 77,000 ISAF personnel are in theatre<sup>1</sup>, provided by 28 NATO nations and 20 non-NATO nations.

g. ANSF casualties have increased, reflecting the expansion in operations and as the insurgency recognises the importance of this fighting season in the lead up to the 2014 transition and elections. ANSF almost doubled their casualties compared to the previous quarter<sup>2</sup>. ISAF suffered 873<sup>3</sup> casualties, including 54 Killed in Action (KIA) and 574 Wounded in Action (WIA) (the rest being Non-Battle Deaths or Injured). For ISAF, this is a significant decrease compared to the same period in 2012 (104 KIA and 1,482 WIA). Despite the numbers of ANSF casualties, it is assessed that their force levels are sustainable based on current recruiting and retention.

h. The Taliban remain resilient but have been unable to achieve their objectives despite a number of high profile attacks, which adversely affect the perception of security. At the end of the quarter, it is clear that the ANSF have the tactical advantage over the Taliban.

i. Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) continue to be of significant concern. The total number of CIVCAS this quarter is 56%<sup>4</sup> higher when compared to the same period in

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2012. This is attributable to a 67% increase in CIVCAS caused by the insurgents. Overall, it is assessed that the insurgents were responsible for 88% of the civilian combat-related deaths, primarily through the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and complex attacks. The distribution of ISAF, ANSF and insurgent caused CIVCAS this quarter shows a similar pattern to the 2012 annual trend, with the exception of a rise in insurgent violence against Afghan civilians. ISAF has put considerable and effective effort into reducing CIVCAS and mitigating their effects by reviewing directives and operational procedures, promoting transparency and implementing active CIVCAS mitigation measures that can include compensation or assistance to the victims or their families. ISAF is also working with the ANSF to enhance their CIVCAS mitigation efforts and building capability to conduct counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations more effectively. Furthermore, following UNAMA's mid-year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, ISAF in close coordination with UNAMA, have expanded efforts to counter the risks to the population of unexploded ordnance. ISAF is also helping to establish and monitoring the full implementation of an Afghan CIVCAS Mitigation System.

## **2. Security Situation**

a. Violence trends in relation to previous quarters have fluctuated with enemy-initiated attacks (EIA)<sup>5</sup> having risen in Regional Command–East (RC-E), RC–North (RC-N) and RC–West (RC-W), but fallen significantly (by 20% compared with 2012 levels) in RC–South (RC-S) and RC–Southwest (RC-SW). It is assessed that part of the rise in violence in some areas is because of the expansion of ANSF security posture. Most importantly the violence is increasingly taking place away from the population centres. For example, the top ten most violent districts account for approximately 35 per cent of EIAs, but contain only 3% of the Afghan population.

b. The insurgents have been unable to tactically win against the ANSF, despite their repeated attempts to do so and as a result, insurgent attempts to disrupt ANSF and ISAF operations have not impeded the mission. Where insurgents have had moderate success is in high profile attacks specifically aimed at distorting the overall perception of security as part of their information campaign. However, in all of these attacks the ANSF have successfully responded to the incident. According to a recent (July 2013) survey, Afghans generally have a positive perception of security conditions and they perceive that the government is leading the effort to improve security. However, the population's security needs are not considered to be fully satisfied.

c. At the beginning of the quarter the Taliban announced the start of Operation *Khalid bin Walid* with five goals: to increase violence; to degrade ANSF capability; to exercise Freedom of Movement; to defend support zones and to influence the Afghan population. The insurgency has been unable to achieve their stated goals and the ANSF has demonstrated persistent tactical advantage on the Taliban. The transition process has not been impeded or reversed.

## **3. Afghan National Security Forces**

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<sup>5</sup> EIA comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, to include executed attacks only (improvised explosive device (IED) explosions / mine strikes).

- a. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) have continued to go from strength to strength reaching their final staffing target (352.000). They are on track to complete fielding of their forces by the end of 2013 and development continues to focus on enhancing capability and professionalism. The ANSF are increasingly capable and proactive in conducting security operations and commanders are improving their understanding and integration of combined arms, despite continuing challenges with sustainability. Logistics, C-IED, operational intelligence and fire support are some of the challenges that the ANSF are facing. Recent polling illustrates that the Afghan population views the ANSF as a capable force, although many feel that they require coalition assistance. Polling has also illustrated a decrease in the number of respondents who feel 'very' or a 'little unsafe', while the number feeling 'safe' has increased.
- b. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) made significant progress this quarter. They contributed to the success of the ANSF in the areas of intra-theatre airlift, transport, Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations, fires delivery and support to training. However, AAF aircraft and equipment fielding will take longer than the other ANSF services due to the time required to train personnel and procure aircraft and equipment. The AAF is currently dependent on outside assistance and funding for its sustainment, and this situation will continue even beyond 2018, when the fielding of urgently needed new equipment is planned to be complete.
- c. It is assessed that throughout the quarter the Afghan Local Police (ALP), local defence forces, as part of layered security operations with other elements of the ANSF, have frustrated insurgent's attempts to influence key population areas. However, ALP levels of training remain lower than mainstream ANSF units, resulting in operational risks. These risks continue to be partially mitigated through close monitoring by advisors. In many areas the ALP is often the only connection between the rural population and the GIRoA. Where closely coordinated, the layered security concept (ANA and Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) supporting ALP in contact) has demonstrated its effectiveness. This quarter ALP manning grew to 23,551 troops deployed in 117 districts. Recruiting continues to exceed attrition, so that ALP manning should continue to increase
- d. The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), established as a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) to replace Private Security Companies (PSCs) after their disbandment, provides security to convoys, development sites, embassies and ISAF bases. They have continued to increase in capacity with more than 400 working contracts in place. However, their ability to develop further capability remains a challenge and the force is being increasingly targeted by the insurgency; particularly in their convoy security role.
- e. Finally, the development of the ANSF healthcare system, critical to sustaining the ANSF, continues to show improvement. Medical leadership is actively engaged in the development of hospital capabilities. An Inter-Ministerial Health Council has started developing greater health cooperation and the ANSF are now managing their pre-hospital care for less serious casualties, but still need limited Coalition support for very serious casualties and medical transportation by air. The AAF has significantly improved their average response time to medical emergency requests and increased the number of missions flown by over 125%.



**4. Civil-Military Interaction**

**a. Governance support**

(1) The NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) continues to be actively engaged with the wider International Community. He notably contributed to activities that address governance and corruption, including the International Contact Group Meeting on 14 May 2013 and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Senior Officials' Meeting on 03 July 2013.

(2) Senior NATO officials regard the 2014 Afghan Presidential elections and to a lesser extent Provincial Council elections, as the most critical events of the next 18 months in Afghanistan. On request of the Independent Election Commission (IEC), ISAF has provided assistance in security planning and continues to meet regularly with GIRoA and international stakeholders to maintain situational awareness of progress within the electoral process. Within means and capabilities, ISAF remains prepared to provide planning and logistical support to address gaps in GIRoA and IEC capabilities at their request. Commander ISAF assesses that the ANSF are capable of securing the elections.

(3) ISAF continues its support to security ministries in countering and preventing corruption. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat (CJIATF-S) have worked closely with the GIRoA in establishing mechanisms in the security ministries on transparency, accountability, and have supported the establishment of a series of transparency and accountability oversight committees in ANSF Corps-level commands. ISAF continue to be closely engaged with Transparency International (TI) whose second visit of 2013 took place at the end of the quarter. TI observed progress in the MOD with the establishment of transparency and accountability structures, but reported that the MOI had made comparatively little progress in this respect. Corruption is one of the greatest threats to progress in Afghanistan as well as to government legitimacy and public confidence.

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(1) The NATO-Afghanistan Transformation Task Force (NATTF) of HQ ISAF has worked to analyse all tasks currently performed by ISAF, prioritise them and identify those that could be terminated at the end of the ISAF mission, those that could be transferred to the potential NATO-led follow-on mission and those that could be offered for transfer to the Afghan Government or to the International Community (IC). The transfer of relevant ISAF tasks to GIRoA is a necessary step towards transitioning full responsibility and sovereignty into Afghan hands.

(2) NATTF has worked in close cooperation with the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), GIRoA and UNAMA, to identify GIRoA capability gaps (e.g. Afghan telecommunications, justice sector, managing and operating the civil aviation system and border enforcement operations). In coordination with the SCR and ISAF, NATTF is presenting these identified gaps for discussion within the NATO military chain of command and across the International Community.

c. HQ ISAF is providing strategic advice to the Ministry of Education (MoE) to develop capacity and capability for tailored literacy, skills training and adult education for ANSF. This includes facilitating the development of the National Literacy Department (NLD), Security Forces Literacy Strategy and the Literacy Trainers programme. Advisors are working with the MoE to standardise the long-term Literacy Trainers curriculum, to be implemented prior to the end of 2014. Security ministries are being advised to synchronise their efforts with the NLD for literacy teacher certification and evaluation, curriculum development, and testing and evaluation of soldiers and policemen.

## **5. Redeployment**

a. During this reporting quarter, the ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) have continued with redeployment of their personnel and equipment. This activity continues to be coordinated by ISAF and executed by the contributing nations. To date, all personnel and the vast majority of equipment have been redeployed primarily by air movements. Movement along the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) has continued to improve, while air and multimodal Lines of Communication remain accessible.

b. NATO HQ's diplomatic efforts continue to help ensure that Northern and Southern redeployment GLOCs are available with NATO-brokered and bilateral transit agreements in place. Nevertheless, challenges remain, with most of them being complex border and customs procedures, bureaucracy and regulations. NATO HQ supported by ISAF is working on these challenges to ensure that the equipment being shipped out of Afghanistan is in full compliance with the transit nations' regulations.

## **6. Afghan–Pakistan Border situation**

a. The total number of confirmed border incidents for the period is 56% lower when compared to the same period in 2012. Seventy percent of these incidents were in the Border Coordination Zone (BCZ), while 30% were Cross Border Incidents. The majority of the incidents are along the PAK-AFG border.

b. The refurbishment of the Goshta/Mohmand border gate by the Pakistani Military (PAKMIL) created significant tensions with the GIRoA. It caused the cancellation of some tactical military coordination and other higher level meetings and visits between the two countries. ISAF continued to pursue frequent dialog with both sides.

c. Effective ANSF/PAKMIL coordination is essential in order to apply pressure on Taliban safe havens and reconstitution in the border area. Afghanistan and Pakistan have taken constructive steps this quarter to increase military-to-military cooperation. In particular, military representatives of both sides have met to coordinate regarding security in the border zone.

## **7. ISAF Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1612**

a. ANSF gender integration made little progress this quarter. ISAF advisors continue to mentor the Ministry of Defence Assistant for Personnel and Education to reduce the emphasis on ethnicity balancing in order to accelerate gender integration.

b. Children in Armed Conflicts:

(1) GIRoA has expressed its willingness to improve the situation for children, but needs training, advice and assistance to achieve progress. ISAF has supported



the MoI in developing and implementing an awareness campaign against recruitment of children and in establishing an alert mechanism to report on incidents of child recruitment. ISAF also supported a nation-wide awareness campaign for the prevention of child recruitment and assisted in the development of specific child protection training materials for the ANSF. At the end of the quarter, NATO SCR and ISAF facilitated the visit of a UN HQ and UNICEF delegation whose purpose was to review the Action Plan on Under Age Recruitment. The SCR Office facilitated a series of meetings with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and ISAF legal advisors responsible for advising the Afghan government on training and recruitment in the security forces. The UN mission had contacts with GIROA, ISAF and the ANSF and observed that whilst some progress has been made, further progress was still required. The Afghans demonstrated political will to make progress and as a result, a task force consisting of the relevant ministries, including the MoD and MoI, will be formed.

(2) ISAF personnel involved in recruiting, training, or partnering with ANSF personnel are required to report serious human rights abuses of children to their chain of command for onward reporting and action, as appropriate. The recent release of an e-Learning module (ADL 166 "CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT") - developed through NATO-UN cooperation - is an important practical tool to raise awareness and create skills to address child protection among NATO (ISAF) troops.

(3) UN SCR 1612 and its follow-on resolutions are included into ANSF training and advising in for example the basic human rights training from the Gender Directorate at the Ministry of Interior in close cooperation with NTM-A, focusing on child rights and child soldiering.

## **8. Conclusion**

This quarter marks a clear and cognitive shift as ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces have entered the final phase of a transition process that started with NATO forces in the lead, to NATO forces partnered with Afghan forces, to an Afghan lead, with ISAF now operating under a security force assistance construct. The ANSF have proven capable of effectively securing the Afghan people and are on track to effect full security transition by the end of 2014. Commander ISAF assesses that the ANSF will emerge from the summer both confident and credible in the eyes of the Afghan population. SACEUR assesses that sustaining this confidence will be critical in securing the elections next year and in guaranteeing long-term stability and security in the region. The continued support of the International Community will be important in this endeavour.



SECRETARY GENERAL  
LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL  
Anders Fogh Rasmussen

ACTION *Latsons*  
COPY *LDSG*  
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*AG*



SG(2013)0285

13 September 2013

Dear Secretary-General,

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 and 2069, I attach a report on ISAF operations covering the period from 1 May 2013 to 31 July 2013. I would appreciate you making this report available to the UN Security Council.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Annex

His Excellency  
Mr. Ban Ki-moon  
Secretary-General  
United Nations Headquarters  
United Nations Plaza 2  
New York, NY 10017



*ALB 164/2013*

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a. ANSF gender integration made little progress this quarter. ISAF advisors continue to mentor the Ministry of Defence Assistant for Personnel and Education to reduce the emphasis on ethnicity balancing in order to accelerate gender integration.

b. Children in Armed Conflicts:

(1) GIRoA has expressed its willingness to improve the situation for children, but needs training, advice and assistance to achieve progress. ISAF has supported the MoI in developing and implementing an awareness campaign against recruitment of children and in establishing an alert mechanism to report on incidents of child recruitment. ISAF also supported a nation-wide awareness

campaign for the prevention of child recruitment and assisted in the development of specific child protection training materials for the ANSF. At the end of the quarter, NATO SCR and ISAF facilitated the visit of a UN HQ and UNICEF delegation whose purpose was to review the Action Plan on Under Age Recruitment. The SCR Office facilitated a series of meetings with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and ISAF legal advisors responsible for advising the Afghan government on training and recruitment in the security forces. The UN mission had contacts with GIRoA, ISAF and the ANSF and observed that whilst some progress has been made, further progress was still required. The Afghans demonstrated political will to make progress and as a result, a task force consisting of the relevant ministries, including the MoD and Mol, will be formed.

(2) ISAF personnel involved in recruiting, training, or partnering with ANSF personnel are required to report serious human rights abuses of children to their chain of command for onward reporting and action, as appropriate. The recent release of an e-Learning module (ADL 166 "CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT") - developed through NATO-UN cooperation - is an important practical tool to raise awareness and create skills to address child protection among NATO (ISAF) troops.

(3) UN SCR 1612 and its follow-on resolutions are included into ANSF training and advising in for example the basic human rights training from the Gender Directorate at the Ministry of Interior in close cooperation with NTM-A, focusing on child rights and child soldiering.

## **8. Conclusion**

This quarter marks a clear and cognitive shift as ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces have entered the final phase of a transition process that started with NATO forces in the lead, to NATO forces partnered with Afghan forces, to an Afghan lead, with ISAF now operating under a security force assistance construct. The ANSF have proven capable of effectively securing the Afghan people and are on track to effect full security transition by the end of 2014. Commander ISAF assesses that the ANSF will emerge from the summer both confident and credible in the eyes of the Afghan population. SACEUR assesses that sustaining this confidence will be critical in securing the elections next year and in guaranteeing long-term stability and security in the region. The continued support of the International Community will be important in this endeavour.