

[2 CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>51120</u>
BOX	<u>44</u>
FILE	<u>4</u>
ACC.	<u>1998/0218</u>

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:
A:

DTC

FROM:
DE:

Lhm -

Room No. - No de bureau

Extension - Poste

Date

21-10-94

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE DISCUSS?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER ?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

The SRSG would like to
have your comments.
Have you seen this?

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 21 October 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 3418

UNAMIR
1994 OCT 21 12:32OCT 21 PM 10
UNATIONS
OPERATIONSSUBJECT: Report of the technical team

Many thanks for your MIR-2098 of 17 October and MIR-2128 of 19 October on the above. We wish, at the outset, to express our appreciation for the detailed analysis of the situation in the camps provided by the technical team. We would also like to thank you for your very useful comments on the team's report and for your thoughtful recommendations.

2. The report confirms that the most effective way of ensuring the safety and security of the refugees in the camps would be to separate them from the former RGF political, military and militia personnel. The report also underscores the fact that the organization and conduct of a military operation aimed at achieving this separation would be a rather complex and costly, if not impossible, enterprise requiring enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. We have also noted that such an operation would require an element of "speed and surprise" which is probably not achievable in a UN context, unless the operation is undertaken under the command and control of a Member State.

3. It can be safely assumed that, under present circumstances, the Security Council would not be inclined to establish a Chapter VII operation to separate the ordinary refugees from the others. Even if the Security Council were prepared to create such an operation, it is unlikely that we would find volunteers to provide the kind of troops and equipment that would be required to carry it out.

/...

- 2 -

4. We therefore feel that, instead of focusing on the issue of separation, it may be preferable to adopt a less ambitious, or perhaps an incremental, approach to the problem. We wonder for example whether it would be possible to identify practical measures to progressively improve the situation in the camps. One possibility would perhaps be to put in place a security mechanism relying mainly on military/police personnel provided by Zaire, on the understanding that they would be trained/supervised and supported logistically and financially by the international community, either through the United Nations or through bilateral arrangements.

There
about
asked

5. As discussed, we would therefore be grateful if you could ask the members of the technical team to propose such measures, preferably in consultation with UNHCR which has primary responsibility for the camps. It would be helpful if the measures identified by the team could be accompanied by an estimate of the personnel and logistic support required to implement them. We would thus be in a better position to move forward with the preparation of the further report and recommendations which the Security Council has requested from the Secretary-General on this issue. It would be appreciated if we could receive your proposals early next week. Regards.

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CNR 617 P2/2

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