

VIA E-MAIL

University



644c  
CRO

July 27, 2007

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

THOMAS W. AND SUSAN B. FORD

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

We all consider it a great honor and privilege to have you with us in San Francisco. I especially enjoyed having the opportunity to talk with you about our initiative to seek a world free of nuclear weapons.

Enclosed is a copy of the *Wall Street Journal* op-ed to which you referred along with a supplementary paper identifying the subjects of our next conference. As you can see, this is a careful effort to put in place the building blocks necessary to achieve the objective in a safe and secure way.

You mentioned the fact that you have reorganized the disarmament division in the United Nations and have appointed a new director of its work. We would be pleased to have his attendance at our meeting here on October 24-25.


I believe the appearance of our governor at the U.N. General Assembly can be a helpful and motivating event in the work on global warming. I congratulate you on inviting him as I am certain his remarks will be full of content and that he will be an inspirational figure.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

The Honorable Ban Ki-moon  
U.N. Secretary-General  
United Nations  
First Avenue at 46<sup>th</sup> Street  
New York, NY 10017





VIA E-MAIL

Handwritten: KMC-mailed to OPA for info. (8 Aug)

ACTION COPY

Handwritten: To Central

Handwritten: 1/1/0 (0/1)

University



July 27, 2007

GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
THOMAS W. AND SUSAN B. FORD  
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

We all consider it a great honor and privilege to have you with us in San Francisco. I especially enjoyed having the opportunity to talk with you about our initiative to seek a world free of nuclear weapons.

Enclosed is a copy of the Wall Street Journal op-ed to which you referred along with a supplementary paper identifying the subjects of our next conference. As you can see, this is a careful effort to put in place the building blocks necessary to achieve the objective in a safe and secure way.

? not authored

You mentioned the fact that you have reorganized the disarmament division in the United Nations and have appointed a new director of its work. We would be pleased to have his attendance at our meeting here on October 24-25.

I believe the appearance of our governor at the U.N. General Assembly can be a helpful and motivating event in the work on global warming. I congratulate you on inviting him as I am certain his remarks will be full of content and that he will be an inspirational figure.

(Schwanenberger)


With my very best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

George

George P. Shultz

The Honorable Ban Ki-moon  
U.N. Secretary-General  
United Nations  
First Avenue at 46<sup>th</sup> Street  
New York, NY 10017





Kaori Minami/NY/UNO

09/08/2007 09:42 AM

To Ioan Tudor/NY/UNO@UNHQ

cc Yeocheol Yoon/NY/UNO, Sanghwa Lee/NY/UNO@UNHQ,  
Sebastien Lawson/NY/UNO@UNHQ

bcc

Subject A letter from George Schultz

Dear Ioan,

For your information, please find attached below a letter from George Schultz, Stanford University, inviting Mr. Duarte to a meeting on 24-25 October. Perhaps they have already sent him something separately?

Thank you.



George Scholtz.pdf

Kaori Minami  
Scheduling Office of the Secretary-General



AUG - 7 2007

FORMAT FOR  
PRINTING  
sponsored by**TOSHIBA**  
Don't copy. Lead.\*

January 4, 2007

**COMMENTARY****A World Free of Nuclear Weapons**

By **GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER and SAM NUNN**  
*January 4, 2007; Page A15*

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.



Ryan Irizana

North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium -- potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.

Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?


\* \* \*

Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution."

Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."

Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane,

**DOW JONES REPRINTS**

 This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, use the Order Reprints tool at the bottom of any article or visit: [www.djreprints.com](http://www.djreprints.com).

- [See a sample reprint in PDF format.](#)
- [Order a reprint of this article now.](#)

good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.

Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.

What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.

But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago -- the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons.

\* \* \*

What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.

First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.

The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include:

- Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
- Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.
- Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.
- Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.
- Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
- Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.
- Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.
- Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples.

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.

*Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.*

*A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer.*

URL for this article:

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html>

**Copyright 2007 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved**

This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our [Subscriber Agreement](#) and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit [www.djreprints.com](http://www.djreprints.com).

**SUBJECT: Follow-on to Reykjavik I Conference**

Issues to be addressed in a follow-up Reykjavik II Conference in order to implement the program outlined in the op-ed piece:

- *Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby **reduce** the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.*

Do an analysis of the technical/political actions necessary to move toward a situation where deterrence would be maintained entirely with a Responsive Force (as defined by the current Nuclear Posture Statement) without an operationally deployed force.

- *Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.*

Review the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world, particularly vis a vis rogue nations and terrorists. How many deployed and how many reserve warheads and weapons are needed? What rates of reductions in numbers make sense as we are working our way toward creating conditions amenable to zero nukes? Procedures for verifying compliance with negotiated agreements will have to be developed. Discuss actions to be taken jointly with Russia to amend the Treaty of Moscow, or to negotiate another agreement to ensure further reductions in US and Russian nuclear forces. Discuss actions to be taken jointly or severally with other de jure and de facto nuclear weapons states.

- *Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.*

These should be repositioned for maximal safety and security as rapidly as practical while verifiable protocols for their elimination are negotiated. As a first step, Russia and the US should negotiate an exchange of data concerning short-range nuclear weapons and agree on basic standards for protecting such weapons from illicit transfer.



- *Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.*

The U.S. has maintained a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent with an aggressive stockpile stewardship program without relying on UGTs over the past decade. Recent major advances in instrumentation for surveillance and computer simulations have lead to enhanced understanding of nuclear explosion science and have enabled us to incorporate improvements leading to increased confidence in the reliability and effectiveness of these weapons. Further advances, including NIF (National Ignition Facility) will soon be available. In addition there has been continuing progress in the ability for world-wide detection of very low-yield underground nuclear tests performed covertly in an effort to violate a CTBT. Under a CTBT the integrated worldwide resources for detecting and characterizing nuclear explosions will be further enhanced (as emphasized in the reports by General Shalikashvili and by the National Academy of Sciences). An ability to verify nuclear explosions is important independent of whether there is a comprehensive test ban or not. An in-depth review of these advances should be prepared and presented to the Senate with public hearings.

- *Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.*

This calls for continued strengthening and extension of the Nunn-Lugar program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in terms of resources, leadership and diplomacy on an international scale. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 should be universally endorsed and assigned the highest possible priority in USG policy.

- *Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.*

This calls for an enhanced diplomatic effort to generate an international cooperative program to develop a means for guaranteeing the availability of nuclear fuel for peaceful uses for all countries while retaining safeguards against the further spread of technology for uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing. The sticking point of differences between nuclear and non-nuclear capable societies will have to be addressed as a most difficult and important challenge to progress. The concept of a working system should be developed for further negotiation. This should be considered an essential part of a new contract between those states that have nuclear weapons and those that are being asked to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons.



- *Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.*

This is a challenge for verifying, policing, and enforcing mechanisms confirming the cut-off under the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and developing technical alternatives to using highly enriched uranium in research and civil commerce installations around the world. This is an appropriate task to be addressed under the GTRI.

- *Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.*

This is a call for continued high priority diplomatic efforts with appropriate security assurances, and perhaps including efforts to expand regional nuclear-free zones.

In addition to these eight bullets in the WSJ op-ed, it will be important to address requirements for “effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples”, as called for in the op-ed piece. Effective measures would require both important technical and diplomatic efforts. These include developing and implementing cooperative international early warning systems and limited but effective defenses against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to protect against the potential of a cheater developing a low level nuclear missile threat. Discussions and agreements to codify reasonable and enforceable limitations on anti-satellite developments and on long range missiles under the Missile Threat Control Regime (MTCR) will also be required, as well as addressing political and technical requirements for monitoring and verifying such agreements.

Finally, of course, at the highest political level, meaning at the presidential level for the United States, a serious international diplomatic initiative will be needed that endorses the vision of a nuclear-free world and energizes a cooperative process toward achieving the world that “ought” to be from the world that “is” today.

Date 8/06/07

## **HOOVER SHIPPING/EXPRESS REQUEST**

**FROM: George Shultz**

**TO: The Honorable Ban Ki-moon  
U.N. Secretary-General  
United Nations  
First Avenue at 46<sup>th</sup> Street  
New York, NY 10017**

### **DOMESTIC**

FIRST CLASS (PRIORITY) \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

PARCEL POST (4<sup>th</sup> Class) \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

SPECIAL 4<sup>th</sup> CLASS BOOK RATE \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

### **UPS**

Ground \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

### **INTERNATIONAL**

#### **AIR**

AIR PARCEL POST (custom tag needed) ☐

#### **SURFACE**

PRINTED MATTER (<4 lbs.) \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

PRINTED MATTER-BOOK (<11 lbs.) \_\_\_\_\_ ☐

PARCEL POST (custom tag needed) ☐

### **EXPRESS MAIL**

(NEED AUTHORIZATION SIGNATURE)

☒ **UPS**

☐ **X Next Day Air**

☐ **Second Day Air**

☐ **Other/U.S. Mail Express (P.O.Box)  
Federal Express**

**REASON FOR EXPRESS SERVICE:  
(If shipping through Hoover)**

\_\_\_\_\_

### **PAYMENT**

☐ **Hoover Account**

**AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE  
(Sponsor)**

\_\_\_\_\_

☐ **Personal**   ☐ **Check**   ☐ **Credit**  
**Phone #** \_\_\_\_\_

### **PAYMENT**

☐ **X Hoover Account**

**AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE  
(Raisian's Office)**

\_\_\_\_\_

☐ **Personal**   ☐ **Check**   ☐ **Credit**

**\*FOR USE BY MAIL CLERK\***

**TOTAL WEIGHT \_\_\_\_\_ #OF PKGS \_\_\_\_\_**

**INITIALS OF SHIPPING CLERK \_\_\_\_\_**