UNAMIR

MISCELLANEOUS

29 APR 1995 - 26 FEB 1990

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[2 CONFIDENTIAL]
RH/WG JULY 2009

③ COS

Sir as per your request yesterday to have a look at this matter today. Thank you sir

Capt HM
SO to COS
28.2.96.

SO to COS

Thank you. Please keep this till we are asked to comment on this by the FC

BCH
28/2

COS ①

Sir this is the answer Col TIKOCA issued to CAO. I believe it is a purely military subject matter though. I thought it would be better if you ~~ha~~ were generally appraised of it. The query, though, was addressed to A|FC not to the civilian component. I hope CAO will brief A|FC or is A|FC aware that the case is so being handled?

② SO

Thank you sir

Seen
BCH
27/2

BF 281000hrs. Capt HM
SO to CO
27.2.96

96

To: Ms Susan Mathews
Chief Admin Officer

From: Isoa D Tikoca
PAO, OSRSG

Date: 13 February 96

Subj: UNAMIR 1, CONGOLESE MILOBS QUERY ON WEAPONS(COE) AND MSA

STATEMENT BY COLONEL I.D.TIKOCA (rtd) EX-CMO, UNAMIR 1

Somewhere around the 13 July 1994, the then Force Commander, Maj Gen Dallaire received a communique from the Rwandese Patriotic Army that all Francophone Countries serving with UNAMIR must leave Rwanda at once.

After the discussion I had with the FC, I started to move the Military Observers from the Francophone Countries, which included the Congolese into Nairobi to await further orders. The move have to be done fast to avoid any further complications with the RPA and to protect the safety of the Francophone Officers.

On the 16 July 94, I received fax number 1160 from my SMPO based in Nairobi requesting the Congolese Pistols to be returned as soon as possible as they would be returning to Congo on the same day. Efforts to send them the pistols on the same day was impossible as the only mode of travel authorised by the RPA then was by road through Uganda.

On the afternoon of the 16 Jul 94, I contacted Mr Golo and also some Finance staffs in Nairobi by phone requesting them the possibility of delaying their return as we are still trying to locate the pistols which was secured by the logistic officer in a safe/magazine, at the former Milob Group Headquarters, some 10 minutes drive from the FHQ. The road that lead to the Milob Grp HQ was heavily used during the war and was covered with UXBs. Mr Golo and the Finance staff insisted that the Congolese must depart on that same day and UNAMIR Administration will be incharge of the delivery of these pistols to the Congo Defence Force. I informed Mr Golo that this arrangement is NOT in conformity with the Congolese Military Rules and Regulation and breaching of such rule is purnishable by Military Law, especially when these pistols were individually issued to the Officers, Mr Golo stated that he will not be responsible for paying MSA to the Congolese from 17th Jul onwards. With great reluctance, I transmitted Mr Golo's message to LtCol Moigny.

LtCol Moigny replied that it would have been alright if there's daily direct flight for Brazaville but this was not the case as 4there was only one direct flight to Brazaville from Nairobi on every Saturday. (Sats, 16 & 23). He then requested to communicate directly with the Force Commander.

On the evening of the 18 July, I reported to the Force Commander that we were able to locate the pistols but one was still missing with three magazines. I then asked the Force Commander on what transpired out of their discusssion with LtCol Moigny, He replied that the earlier we can move the pistols across to Nairobi the better.

Early morning of the 19 Jul I sent a Milob to deliver the pistols and my note to LtCol Moigny in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Congolese Milobs did not leave Nairobi till the 23 Jul 94 as that was the next available direct flight after the 16 Jul flight.

These are all the facts that I can recollect reference the subject above.

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATION UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU R

UNAMIR-MINUAR

TO : COL LD TIKOCA
POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICER

FROM : SO TO COS

DATE : 15 JAN 96

SUBJECT : COMPLAINTS BY CONGOLESE OBSERVERS - UNAMIR 1

1. We are in receipt of a complaint from LT COL PAUL VICTOR MOIGNY who was the Commander of the Congolese Military Observers to Rwanda from 1 Nov 93 to 23 July 1994 during UNAMIR I.

2. It is alleged that the Congolese Observers were given a very short notice to repatriate from Rwanda via NAIROBI, to the extent that they did not travel with their personal weapons to Nairobi and that MSA was not paid to them by the UNAMIR Finance Office (then in Nairobi) for Seven (7) days.

3. It is further stated that they were repatriated to NAIROBI on 16 July 1993, and that they were given only a day's notice to move. Consequently, their personal weapons (24 Makarov Pistols and 48 Magazines) which were then secured at HQ UNAMIR in Kigali, were left behind. However, on 19 July 1994, while they awaited repatriation, they received only 24 pistols and 43 magazines. Besides, other allegations are that the Congolese Observers were not paid MSA for Seven (7) days (USD$700.00) yet they stayed on in Nairobi from 16 until 23 July when they were finally repatriated to Congo.

4. The present CMO does not have details of the allegedly missing pistol, 05 magazines and non-payment of USD$700.00 to each of the Congolese Observers.

5. Would greatly appreciate if you could kindly furnish COS with background information that would assist resolve the matter.

HM

HM MUZYAMBA
Capt
SO To COS
Ext 1111

G6

UNAMIR - REGISTRY
Action to :
1 COS
2
3
4
27 FEB 1996
☐ - Action completed
☐ - Acknowledge

UNITED NATIONS
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UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX NO 1754

PAGE 1 OF 1

MIR NO

MISC NO 1670

| | |
|---|---|
| TO : SUSAN MATHEWS.<br>CAO<br>UNAMIR, KIGALI | FROM : Y DMETRIOS<br>~~CAO~~ CALO<br>UNAMIR, NAIROBI |
| ATTN : COS, DCOS(SP),CMO,<br>SMPO, FMO,WELFARE OFFR | DATE : 26 FEB 95 |
| FAX NO : | PHONE :<br>FAX : 254-622668 |
| ORIGINATOR : MAJ ARORA | SECTION : FORCE COORDINATING TEAM, NAIROBI |
| SUBJECT : FCT WEEKLY REPORT | |

***SEEN SLIP***

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | DCK | 27/2 |
| SO TO COS | BN | 27/2 |
| | | |
| | | |
| CC | | |

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

**UNAMIR -MINUAR**

**FORCE COORDINATING TEAM WEEKLY REPORT**
**AS ON 23 Feb 96**

1. **General.** The FCT performed its duties as enunciated in the charter of duties. There was official movement between KIGALI and NAIROBI and FCT provided all assistance to concerned personnel.

2. **RECEPTION & TRANSPORTATION.** The FCT provided transport to all personnel on official visit to Nairobi and extended assistance to personnel transiting through Nairobi.

3. **HOSPITALIZATION & PATIENT MOVEMENT.** The details are as under:

(a) Lt Col B S Ndiaye was succesfully operated in Nairobi Hospital for Trabeculectomy both eyes. After his post surgery management he was sent back to Kigili.

(b) Cpl Bwalya Zacks, ID No M7827 who was admitted in Nairobi Hospital has since been discharged and sent back to Kigali.

(c) Maj S Dare admitted in Nairobi Hospital for Slip Disc was discharged from the Hospital on 23 Feb 96.

5. **VISITS**. The Force Commander paid a visit to Nairobi during the week. Maj J K Bansal, the Force Welfare Officer also visited Nairobi during the week.

6. **POUCH & REGISTRY**. No Change.

7. **EXPENDITURE FROM PETTY CASH**. No amount is held by FCT.

8. **MISC**. NTR.

G6

UNAMIR
MILITARY POLICE MILITAIRE
KIGALI RWANDA

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

# MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

## INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: CO Indbatt

FROM: Force MP Coy

INFO: MA to FC
COS

DATE: 26 Feb 96

SEEN SLIP

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | bcll | 27/2 |
| SO TO COS | Hm | 27/2 |
| | | |
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SUBJECT: SUBMISSION OF STATEMENTS FOR OUTSTANDING CASES

1. The incidents which happened in the Brown and Root Camp on 09 Feb 96 (involving the loss of a VCR) and on 15 Feb 96 (an accident of Intersec veh) are still outstanding, awaiting statements from the sentries on duty.

2. On two different occasions when MP's approached the sentries for their statements, they put it across that their Coy Commander was going to submit reports as regards the incident and accident respectively. On the night of the accident (15 Feb 96), the sentries refused to co-operate with the visiting MPs. They refused to make statements. They claimed that their OC was asleep, and as such, he cannot be disturbed. Up till this moment, investigation is still pending.

3. In view of the above, you are requested to send the affected personnel so that we can conclude our reports.

4. Please acknowledge receipt.

Seen bcll

SA DARE
Maj
FPM/CO Force MP Coy

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SEEN SLIP

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
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| COS | [illegible] | 23/2 |
| SO TO COS | [illegible] | 23/2 |
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| CC | | |

DATE: 22 February 1996

Dear Colonel Odom,

I have received your letter of 16 February 1996 concerning the incident involving yourself and Mr. Joseph Lombardo of UNAMIR on 2 February 1996.

At the outset I should like to confirm that it is clear that the incident occurred on US diplomatic facilities and at a time when the UNAMIR staff member concerned was off duty. It is acknowledged that, in these circumstances, neither the UNAMIR Military Police nor the UNAMIR Civilian Security Section has jurisdiction in the matter.

Having received your statement and that of other US Embassy staff members regarding details of the affair, I believe it is only proper that I should provide you with Mr. Lombardo's description of the incident. What is particularly disturbing is his allegation that he was physically assaulted. Accordingly, I attach a copy of his memorandum to me dated 3 February 1996.

After reviewing all the documentation, I am persuaded that this was indeed a most regrettable incident and that to pursue it further would not simply be counter-productive but could have unnecessary and unwelcome negative implications. It is thus my fervent hope that the parties involved will agree to let the matter rest and that the exceptionally happy and cooperative relationship which has always existed between the US Embassy and UNAMIR may continue to flourish.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

**Susan Matthew**
**Chief Administrative Officer**

Lt. Col. Thomas P. Odom
US Defense Attache
Embassy of the United States of America
Kigali, Rwanda
P.O. Box 160
Kigali, Rwanda

cc: SRSG
Force Commander
Chief of Staff
Mr. Lombardo

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**MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA**

***INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM***

DATE: February 3, 1996

TO: S. Matthew
Chief Administrative Officer

P. Ischlika
Chief Security Officer

FROM: J. Lombardo
STO/CFSA

SUBJECT: **ASSAULT ON MY PERSON BY TWO PEOPLE AT THE AMERICAN CLUB BAR/RESTAURANT**

The following is written as an incident report and my statement pertaining to a physical assault on my person yesterday, February 2, 1996 at approximately 2340 at the American Club Bar/Restaurant. The following has been submitted to the investigative team of the MP Company at 1130 hours today.

On Friday, February 2, 1996 at 2340 hrs while I was talking to a friend at the bar of the American Club Bar/Restaurant, I was assaulted by Colonel Tom Odom. As I was speaking to my friend Kerrie, (Tel#85015) Colonel Odom, who I understand is the Military Attache to the American Embassy, yanked the bottle out of my mouth and my hand, hitting me in the mouth with the bottle, spilt the beer all over me in the process, and then smashed the bottle on the ground and told me to "get out right now".

Having seen him in the bar on another occasion with a holstered weapon, and taking into account the shots of alcohol I saw him drinking with his friends - fearing further assault - I decided to leave. Apparently, my decision to leave came a little too late, for before I had a chance to turn around, a man I only know as 'Robin' grabbed me by the arm, squeezing until I was flinching with pain when one of my friends told him to stop and that physical assault was not called for. The same person, who was also doing shots of alcohol with Colonel Odom, along with the other bartender, 'Will' followed me to the parking lot and literally chased the car out on to the street, telling me he was going to "make me eat my glasses".

I arrived at my home gate and proceeded to unlock it, not with the usual small amount of anxiety about would-be thieves taking advantage of the late hour - but of having been followed home by a drunken American Colonel and his friends who intended to finish the assault and battery that they had started at the American Club. I believe there are enough troubles and tension related to the current UNAMIR liquidation without having to fear an unprovoked assault by a senior member of the American Embassy in Kigali. Just as the assault on an American and two Dutch Tribunal members this week by the RPA was reprehensible, so is a senior US Embassy staff member assaulting a Canadian who has been working with UNAMIR in Rwanda for over 16 months. I am made to understand that the American Club Bar/Restaurant is considered American Soil. If this is the case, I would like to press formal charges against the Colonel, and 'Robin' within the appropriate judiciary system.

OIS

Chief of Staff

G6

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

No 3000.1/FC-34

To: Lists A, B, C & D

From: Brig KS Sivakumar
Acting Force Commander

Date: 17 February 1996

Subject: REPORTING OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS/THEFTS

1. It has come to our notice from investigations and the findings of certain Boards of Inquiry that some personnel are resorting to incorrect/false reporting of traffic accidents/property thefts as a cover-up measure to avoid payment/disciplinary action. Such actions not only show us in bad light but also reflect poorly on personal discipline and integrity.

2. To avoid any embarrassment at a later stage, you are requested to ensure that such incidents are reported correctly.

3. Regards.

***SEEN SLIP***

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | 20/2 |
| SO TO COS | | 17.2.96 |
| | | |
| | | |
| CC | | |

G6 FILE 1/4

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR

P.O. Box 749, Kigali, Rwanda
Tel: 250-84265/6/8/9 Fax: 250-86877 Rwanda
Tel: 212-963-3582 Fax: 212-963-3090 USA

UNAMIR 1996 JAN 30 P 6:54

UNAMIR 1996 JAN 30 P 7:48

# TELEFAX COVER SHEET

| | |
|---|---|
| OUTGOING FAX NO: 502 | DATE: 30 January 1996 |
| TO: **Monseigneur Andre Sibomana**<br>**Pere Vjecko Curic**<br>**Diocese de Kabgeyo a Rwanda**<br>**ITALY** | FROM: S. Matthew<br>Chief Administrative Officer<br>UNAMIR<br>Kigali, Rwanda |
| INFO: Mrs. Anne Leroy 62101 | REPLY FAX: 212-963-3090 |
| FAX: 00-39-66-79-40-53 | SUBJECT: SETTLEMENT OFFER |

MSC-116 COPY SENT TO Mme Leroy on 31/1/96 @ 0900hrs.

Included in this transmission is the written offer sent by UNAMIR to the Diocese on 26 January, 1996 in respect of rental payments for UNAMIR's use of the Diocese's premises. To date, we have received no acceptance of our offer from your appointed negotiator, Mrs. Anne Leroy. She has stated that she is unable to complete the negotiations and that talks could only be concluded upon your return to Rwanda which we are informed will now be 13 February, 1996 rather than 3 February, 1996 as previously understood during UNAMIR's discussion with you on 20 January, 1996. In the circumstances, we request your urgent faxed acceptance of our offer and concurrent instructions to Mrs. Leroy to release the UNAMIR crane truck and generators currently impounded by the Diocese.

UNAMIR has acted in good faith since the beginning of the misunderstanding on 19 January, 1996 and I believe our efforts demonstrate UNAMIR's intention to come to a quick and mutually acceptable settlement with the Diocese. You will understand that the continued impounding of UN equipment is impeding UNAMIR's ability to carry out the mandate given to it by the UN Security Council. We therefore urge you to cooperate in resolving these matters as quickly as possible.

We look forward to receiving your early response.

Best regards.

COS
FYI
CCSA/STO
2/1/96.

| | |
|---|---|
| DRAFTED BY: S. Matthew | CLEARED BY: S. Matthew |
| NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 4 | |

GAO

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2/4

***OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER***

P.O. Box 749
Kigali, Rwanda
20 January, 1996

Father Vjeko
Adminstrative Officer
Diocese Giterama

Dear Father Vjeko,

This letter is written to express UNAMIR's intent to enter into discussions with the Diocese of Giterama to resolve the issue of back rent and/or repairs due as a result of UNAMIR's occupation of the sites managed by the Diocese of Giterama. UNAMIR resolves to settle the matter in the most timely fashion possible.

I would like to take this opportunity to apologize for any misunderstanding that has been caused by UNAMIR's actions yesterday and ask that you consider favorably our request for the releasing of the crane truck.

Yours Sincerely,

S. Matthew
Chief Administrative Officer

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3/4

***OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER***

P.O. Box 749
Kigali, Rwanda
26 January, 1996

Mrs. Leroy
Kabgeyo
Fax Number: 62101
Page 1 of 1

Mrs. Leroy,

This fax is written as confirmation of your telephone conversation of this morning with Mr. Lombardo whereby UNAMIR offered the Diocese US$50,000.00 (50,000.00 United States Dollars only) for the entire period of UNAMIR's occupation of all the Diocese's premises up to 15 January, 1996. This is UNAMIR's formal, all inclusive offer made in response to the revised bill that was delivered by you yesterday, 25 January, 1996 to Mr. Lombardo.

Please confirm acceptance by fax to enable us to process the documents for payment. You will be required to sign a release form when the cheque is paid to you. Once this offer is accepted please inform the appropriate authorities to allow free passage to our vehicle and personnel.

Yours Sincerely,

Susan Matthew
Chief Administrative Officer

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

# Inter Office Memorandum

**FSA Unit**
**Loiret Centre**
**MILOB HQ**
**BUTARE**

**24 Jan 95**

To: Ms. Susan Mathew
CAO, UNAMIR HQ, KIGALI.

Through: Joe Lombardo
FSA CO-ORD, UNAMIR HQ, KIGALI.

From: Brian Palmer
FSA Sectors 2, 3A, 3B, 4, 5C.
(Rwandatel 30720).

Subject: **INCIDENT REPORT, DIOCESE GITERAMA, 19 JAN 96.**

**Introduction.**

1. On the morning of 19 Jan 96 the Generator Unit was tasked to remove a 100 KVA generator from the Diocese at GITERAMA; the exact location known as "The Economat of KABGAYI". Generator Unit personnel arrived with a Crane Truck at approximately 0915 hrs local time. Accompanying them was an armed guard from INDBATT to act as an escort for the return journey.

**Aim.**

2. To present known facts as of 23 Jan 96.

**Background.**

3. The 100 KVA generator was put in place on the 14 Apr 94 to supply electricity to the whole church complex which includes a hospital, printing press and numerous other facilities covering a large area. The diocese does own it's own generator but it is 27 years old and can apparently only run for a couple of hours under load until it stops functioning. It is claimed that when UNAMIR II first occupied the premises that the diocese generator was used to provide power to the military personnel on a 24 hrs basis; this is a statement contradictory to the previous statement that it can only run for a couple of hrs and then stops, however, it would appear that the diocese provided the generator free of charge for a short period of time with fuel being supplied by UNAMIR.

4. Sometime, after the installation of the 100 KVA generator, it would appear that the then Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier General A from Ghana, intimated that the generator and other equipment would be left on site at the completion of the Mandate as compensation for non-payment of rent by UNAMIR. This, then, is the situation that the Generator Unit personnel found when they were to retrieve the generator.

**Current Situation.**

5. Due to the fact that it was intimated that equipment would be left in lieu of rent the Diocese has found it prudent to impound UNAMIR equipment until the sum of USD 116.974 is paid in full. This has been necessary due to the fact that the Diocese is of the opinion that UNAMIR is lax with payment of debts. The "Facture for same is attached as Annex A. The administrator, as of 20 Jan 96, is adamant that when the "Facture" is paid then the equipment will be released and no other solution is possible.

6. The 100 KVA generator is faulty and requires repair. See Annex B. It was intended to replace this generator with a 36 KVA equipment (see para 7. c.) if repairs to the diocese owned generator proved impossible. According to the generator mechanic, Mr. J. Ferguson, the diocese equipment had been repaired and was running satisfactorily under load (providing power). Of course, the Administrators claim that the generator will only run for a couple of hours before stopping, may be true.

**Equipment Impounded.**

7. The following equipments have been impounded:

a. UNAMIR 5025, Crane Truck, IVECO, approximate value USD 150.000,

b. BM-3080/379, Generator 100 KVA, Cummins, approximate value USD 15.000, and,

c. BM-3080/(check), Generator 36 KVA, Cummins approximate value (dep) USD 600..

**Personnel Involved.**

8. The following personnel were involved with the incident:

a. LTCOL. R.V. Blanchette, Sector Commander, Sector 2,

b. Father Vjeko, Administrator Diocese GITERAMA, Tele 62219,

c. Mr. J. Ferguson, Mechanic/Truck Operator, Generator Unit, Tele 17116,

d. Mr. P. Kerr, Electrician, Electrical Unit, Tele 17119,

e. Mr. B. Serunkuma, Mechanic, Generator Unit 17116, and

f. Mr. B. Palmer, Field Service Administration, BUTARE, Tele 30720.

9. The RPA Brigade Commander, the Prefect and the Bishop of GITERAMA were also involved at some stage or another but did not take part with direct negotiations for the release of UNAMIR equipment. They had certainly indicated to the Administrator their support for impounding the said equipment.

**Negotiations.**

10. Negotiations be between the Administrator of the Diocese and the UNAMIR administrative representative, Mr. B. Palmer, commenced at approximately 1430 hrs on 19 Jan 96. For a not *verbatim* account of these discussions See Annex C.

**Security.**

11. INDBATT have provided a security detail to guard the impounded equipment.

12. The RPA also have two personnel on site performing guard duties.

13. There is no animosity due to this situation and everyone is calm.

**Press.**

14. It is not known whom brought the Press into the situation but it was not long before they were privy to "going's on". Although, at this early stage, there has been nothing in writing about the incident the "rumor mill" in GITERAMA has it that UNAMIR tried to use force against the local population and was trying to "get away" without paying it's bills.

**Letter of Intent.**

15. A Letter of Intent was delivered to Father Vjeko on 20 Jan 96 by the Sector Commander of Sector 2 after the former failed to arrive for a meeting at 1530 hrs set up by the FSA for the sector. This letter is signed by the Chief Administrative Officer UNAMIR and intimates that further negotiations shall be entered into to resolve issues of back rent and apologizes for any misunderstandings that may have occurred due to this incident. See Annex D.

**Minor Works.**

16. It can be ascertained that some minor works have been carried out but nothing like what has apparently been promised. See Annex E.

**Further Negotiations.**

17. As the administrator is busy on Sunday (unusual) a time for further negotiation is not mutually available. The intention is to seek further consultations on 22 Jan 96 at a convenient time.

18. Further negotiations were possible on the afternoon of the 22 Jan 96. For a summary See Annex F.

**Conclusion.**

19. It should be stated from the outset that the working relationship between the MILOBS and the Diocese is very sound. This incident has boiled down to the fact that the diocese was under the impression that certain improvements would be made to occupied buildings and that equipments would be left as compensation for non-payment of rent by UNAMIR. As far as this office in concerned no verbal and certainly no written authority for this to happen has occurred. It is believed, however, that the military may have indicated that this would be the case as most equipment would probably stay in country anyway.

20. Further, it would appear that the diocese had no knowledge of the intention to remove the generator. This office had contacted the LOG Officer for the sector that morning but obviously there was not enough time to warn out the diocese; it is felt that even if they had known nothing would have changed except that maybe the press would have been waiting instead of turning up later.

21. The diocese administration seems to be holding fast with, no payment, no release of equipment; they have the support of the local authorities and the Bishop.

22. Negotiations on the 22 Jan 96 seemed to open a crack in the armour and we await corresspondence from Father Vjeko from Europe where he is vacating for 2 weeks.

**Recommendations.**

23. At this stage of the proceedings it is prudent to hold recommendations in abeyance until the matter is resolved and all facts are known.

Annexes: A. Facture from Diocese.

B. Memo 100 KVA Generator GITERAMA (from Gen Unit).

C. Summary of Negotiations (19 Jan 96).

D. Letter of Intent.

E. BMS Scope of Work (faxed to Father Vjeko P.M. 23 Jan 96).

F. Summary of Negotiations 23 Jan 96.

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

ANNEX B TO:
INCIDENT REPORT
DATED 24 JAN 96.

To: B. Palmer
FSA

From: Ray Rakena
OIC Generator Unit RRakena
UNAMIR

Date: 19 January 1996

Subject: **100 KVA GENERATOR GITARAMA**

As per your telephone conversation to this office in reference to the above subject I hope this will help you further your summary.

| | |
|---|---|
| Decal No: | BM 3080/379. |
| Crane Truck: | UNAMIR 5025 |
| Driver C/T: | Jim Ferguson. Bosco (Gen Mech) |
| Pax: | Phil Kerr. William (Elect) |

As per memos 5000.1(HAC)/A/1 dated 16 August 1995
4000.1/log-34 dated 15 August 1995
MH/CA0078 dated 07 August 1995
Joe Lombardo dated 15 January 1996

Generator technicians had arrived on location approx 09.30 hours and proceeded to repair the V12 Deutz stationed at Diocese of Kabgayi, within three hours was operational and taking load of 130 amps per phase. The UNAMIR Generator was disconnected and placed on the crane truck to facilitate its return to Kigali.
The Priest of the Diocese of Kabgayi upon seeing the Generator being loaded on to the truck then proceeded to lock the gate and parked two vehicles in front. An RPA officer had instructed the Technicians to replace the Generator on the ground, which was politely refused due to instructions given from Kigali. Shortly after , the Prefect of Gitarama stated to the technicians to place the Generator on the ground and this matter would be resolved, and again was politely refused.After discussions between the FSA and the Priest the Technicians were instructed to leave the equipment and truck. The Technicians returned to Kigali 18.00 hours and leaving Indi Batt to secure the vehicle.
The purpose of returning this Generator to Kigali as it was identified for shipment and for technical reasons.

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

ANNEX F TO
INCIDENT REPORT
DATED 24 JAN 96.

# Inter Office Memorandum

**FSA Unit**
**Loiret Centre**
**MILOB HQ**
**BUTARE**

**23 Jan 96**

To: Joe Lombardo
FSA COORD, UNAMIR HQ, KIGALI.

From: Brian Palmer
FSA Sectors 2, 3A, 3B, 4, 5C.
(Rwandatel 30720).

Subject: **FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH FATHER VJEKO, GITERAMA.**

**Introduction.**

1. See Annex C.

**Summary.**

2. Further negotiations were conducted on 22 Jan 96 at approximately 1430 hrs as follows (not *verbatim*):

a. I made it clear that I had waited for over one hour to honor our last meeting and he did not show (1530 hrs 20 Jan 96),

b. that would he consider once again the release of the truck and retain the generators?, and

c. that it is reiterated that this matter is heading for government level for resolution.

3. The administrator replied as follows:

a. apologized for not being able to attend our last meeting (para A. above),

b. that as far as the equipment was concerned the situation had not changed,

c. that the government, both local and federal, supported the action taken, and

d. that he was going on a 2 week vacation and was leaving that night at 1700 hrs.

4. I made the following remarks:

a. that the "Facture" for over USD 116.000 was "way over the top" and would he change his equation from USD 3.00 per meter to USD 1.00 a meter to at least start negotiations (a gleam in his eye made me hopeful),

b. that our Engineering Section had done a scope of work and it should not be too difficult to have them inspect the building again and make restorations in lieu of rent.

5. Further cordial muttering's were made and I departed at approximately 1515 hrs.

**Note:**

1. On arrival at KIGALI I rang Joe Lombardo and discussed what had transpired. The idea was struck upon to provide details of the restoration intended by BMS to Father Vjeko, prior to his departure, via facsimile.

2. Father Vjeko undertook to study the option and if he agreed would ring Joe Lombardo on 23 Jan 96 from Europe with Yes/No. To my knowledge he has not contacted Joe.

3. As there have been no changes to the situation, as yet, it will be necessary to keep in place security arrangements with INDBATT.

# CCOMODATION UNITS DEPLO D
# GIKONGORO AREA.

**As of 24 January 1996**

| Sl No | OWNER/LOCATION/STRUCTURE | TYPE OF ACCOM | CONTRACT YES/NO | RENT YES/NO | ADDITIONAL INFORMATION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Private, Gikongoro, SOS Orphanage/School | Zambatt Tac Hq | Yes | Yes | Contract BMACC950011 USD4000 Pm/Mali Coy vacated 8 Jan 96. UNAMIR stop rent 26 Jan 96. Refurbish fball field. BMS in negotiations. |
| 2 | Govt, Murambi, School | Bn Hq/Log Base | No | No | Handed back to Prefect/Letter received good results |
| 3 | Govt, Runyombyi, School | Coy Hq/Pl Hq | No | No | Group de Scholaire. Agreement reached 24 Jan 96. |
| 4 | Govt, Karama, Commune/Bank | Coy Hq/Pl | No | No | |
| 5 | Govt, Muko, Commune Building | Pl Hq | No | No | Released 13 Dec 95. Cheque awaiting collection (Ali). |
| 6 | Govt, Musebeya, Commune Building | Pl Hq | No | No | Released 19 Jan 96. Cheque to be processed (Ali). |
| 7 | Govt, Rukondo, Commune Building | Pl Hq | No | No | Released Jan 96. Cheque to be collected (Ali). |
| 8 | Govt, Musange, Commune Building | Pl Hq | No | No | Released 13 Dec 95. Cheque to be collected (Ali). |
| 9 | Govt, Kaduha, Nursing School | Pl Hq | No | No | Released 13 Dec 95. Cheque collected (Ali). |
| 10 | Private, Kitabi, Tea Factory Houses x 5 | Pl Hq | No | No | Permission Granted (NFA RPA moved in when vacated) |
| 11 | Govt, Ruramba, School | Coy Hq/Pl | No | No | Private, Permission Granted (RPA moved in) |
| 12 | Church, Kibeho, Buildings | Coy Hq/Pl | No | No | Private; Security Provided. |
| 13 | Private, Munini, German NGO Building | Pl Hq | No | No | NGO name "Dunk" Private Security Provided. |
| 15 | Church, Kigeme, School | Coy Hq | No | No | Private. Security Provided. |
| 16 | Govt, Rwamiko, Commune Buildings | Coy/Pl Hq | No | No | Agreement reached 24 Jan 96 (Ali). |

# ACCOMODATION UNITS DEPLOYED GIKONGORO AREA.

**As of 24 January 1996**

| Sl No | OWNER/LOCATION/STRUCTURE | TYPE OF ACCOM | CONTRACT YES/NO | RENT YES/NO | ADDITIONAL INFORMATION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17 | Govt, Ndago, Building (shed) | Pl Hq | No | No | Shed No Repairs Necessary 24 Jan 96. |
| 18 | Govt, Munini, Guest House. | Pl Hq | No | No | Agreement Reached 24 Jan 96 (All). |
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**UNITED NATIONS**
**ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA**

UNAMIR-MINUAR

**NATIONS UNIES**
**MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA**

***OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER***

P.O. Box 749
Kigali, Rwanda
20 January, 1996

Father Vjeko
Adminstrative Officer
Diocese Giterama

Dear Father Vjeko,

This letter is written to express UNAMIR's intent to enter into discussions with the Diocese of Giterama to resolve the issue of back rent and/or repairs due as a result of UNAMIR's occupation of the sites managed by the Diocese of Giterama. UNAMIR resolves to settle the matter in the most timely fashion possible.

I would like to take this opportunity to apologize for any misunderstanding that has been caused by UNAMIR's actions yesterday and ask that you consider favorably our request for the releasing of the crane truck.

Yours Sincerely,

S. Matthew
Chief Administrative Officer

**UNITED NATIONS**
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***INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM***

DATE: January 20, 1996

TO: J. Lombardo
CFSA

FROM: B. Palmer
FSA Sector 3, 4, 5C

SUBJECT: **SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH FATHER VJEKO, GITERAMA**

**Introduction.**

1. On 19 Jan 96 the Generator Unit was tasked to retrieve a 100 KVA Generator from the diocese at GITERAMA. This property is occupied by UNAMIR and is used to house the MILOB SECTOR HQ. The Generator Unit was despatched with an escort and arrived at the location at approximately 0915. These personnel then proceeded to de-commission the Generator and load it on the accompanying truck. The Priest, who is in charge of administration, then informed the crew that he was going to impound the truck and the generator until an agreement was reached in reference to back rent of occupied premises. I became aware of this situation at approximately 1100 hours. I then proceeded to GITERAMA and entered into negotiations with the administrator. The following is a summary of the negotiations, which are not *verbatim*:

**Summary.**

2. I proceeded, through an interpreter, to explain UNAMIR's position:

a. the generator had been earmarked by UNNY to be transferred to another mission,

b. the generator was faulty and inoperable and would need to be overhauled and needed to be retrieved to KIGALI for same,

c. that the diocese had their own generator, albeit an old one, which the mechanics had worked on and brought on line (the generator in fact showed an output from the alternator and was in the judgement of the mechanic, functional),

d. that an alternative generator was to be provided if their own generator was not functional (a 36 KVA which is also impounded)

e. that to my knowledge no formal agreement had been negotiated for the diocese to retain this generator under any circumstances, and

f. that the escort was a standard procedure by the UN to safeguard property toward the end of a mission and apologized on behalf of UNAMIR if any offense was taken by the diocese.

3. The administrator replied with the following points:

a. that the previous Deputy Force Commander (DFC) had intimated that this equipment would be given to the diocese in lieu of rent,

b. that if the DFC's intimation would not be considered, then he would claim back rent. He proceeded to present me with a bill for rent and other services rendered. (See Attached).

c. that the Bishop, Prefect and Brigade Commander were all adamant that the generators and truck be impounded until the back rent was paid, he would then arrange for the release of UNAMIR property

4. I then made the following remarks:

a. that the DFC had no authority to categorically pledge equipment, owned by the International Community,

b. that I could not comment favorably on his proposition for back rent and that this would naturally be referred to higher authority. I delivered the bill for back rent to UNAMIR 1800 hrs 19 Jan 96 and,

c. would the diocese consider an obligation letter from UNAMIR for back rent for the release of equipment.

5. The administrator made the following reply:

a. that he considered the DFC to be part of UNAMIR.

b. that he had heard that UNAMIR does not pay it's bills in a timely fashion and could not accept a letter of obligation. I believe there is still room to negotiate in this area.

c. that he had discussed this matter with the Bishop and appropriate authorities who were all adamant that the equipment would stay impounded, and

d. that UNAMIR had promised to conduct minor works on the occupied property but had never done so.

6. I replied as follows:

a. that I understood his position but that an appropriate settlement could be continued even after the release of the equipment,

b. that if the equipment had to stay I need the release of personnel and their personal equipment,

c. that if the equipment had to stay that UNAMIR be allowed to place it's own guard at the location (along with the RPA), and

d. if he agreed so far I would report to KIGALI and take advice.

7. The administrator agreed.

**Conclusion.**

8. Although the administrator was amiable through our talks there seems to be an underlying animosity toward UNAMIR although the Sector Commander and his team have excellent relations with the diocese. I know that promises were made to refurbish the occupied premises in lieu of rent and even a "scope of work" of work was conducted by BMS. Work was to commence when a contract was let but to my knowledge never eventuated. This does not create an ideal working relationship (this will not be the first instance). I did not believe any further negotiations were going to produce a breakthrough and proceeded with the generator Unit personnel to KIGALI.

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***OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF FIELD SECTOR ADMINISTRATORS***

P.O. Box 749
Kigali, Rwanda
22 January, 1996

Pere Vjecko
Officier d'Administration
Numero de Fax: 62101
Quatre pages en tous

Cher Pere Vjecko,

Merci d'avoir pris le temps de parler avec moi cette apres-midi. Je suis certain qu'on veut tous les deux ce qui est dans les meilleurs interets de la MINUAR et du Diocese. Inclus dans ce fax la description des travaux que la MINUAR va faire pour vous.

Je compte recevoir votre reponse d'Europe demain.

Bon Voyage!

Sincerement,

J. Lombardo
FSA Coordinator

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

# WORK ORDER REQUEST

CMC# _____

DATE OF REQUEST: 16 03 95 WORK LOCATION: GITARAMA SECTOR 3

Description of work (attach sheet if necessary):

REPAIRS AT THE MILITARY CLINIC

1) Repair of existing wash hand basin
2) Installation of stainless steel sink
3) Fixing of ceiling approximately 14 m²
4) Painting walls with emulsion paint
5) Construction of shelves
6) Fixing glass panes in the door
7) Install 80 lt water heater

Point of Contact: EDDY C OLER Phone/Call sign: EXT 15120

Priority of Work: [ ] Flash; [✓] Immediate; [ ] Urgent; [ ] Routine

Requested Completion Date: ASAP

CCCS 16/5-95

**SUBTASK ORDER MANAGER** (only) SubTask WO number: _____

**Priority of Work:** [ ] 2 days; [ ] 7 days; [ ] 14 days; [ ] 21 days; [ ] more than 21 days;

**Detailed cost reporting required:** [ ] Yes; [ ] No.

**Comments:**

SubTask Order Manager: _____ Date: _____

**CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CELL** (only) **Work Order Number:** __ . _ . __ - __

**Cost estimate:**

[ ] Need Detailed cost estimate. Provide estimate in __ day(s)

[ ] Need Rough order cost estimate. Provide estimate in __ day(s)

[ ] No cost estimate required

**Action:**

[ ] Do Not begin work until directed by the Contract Administrator.

[ ] Begin work immediately

**Comments:**

**AUTHORIZED BY:** _____ Date: _____

G. Brière, CMCO

**CERTIFIED AUTHORITY:** _____ Date: _____

P. Hornsby, CSS

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

**SUBJECT : SCOPE OF WORK FOR UNAMIR CONSTRUCTION AND ISSUES REGARDING - SECTOR 3 HQ GITARAMA .**

## GENERAL:

The scope of engineering and construction work defined by this document is intended for use in military sectors of Rwanda. Questions regarding work schedules, construction materials, material substitutions, site access, site security, construction design or design modifications should be directed to the Chief of Engineering Operations, HQ UNAMIR UNICEF BUILDING, Kigali, Rwanda.

## WORK TO BE PERFORMED

UNAMIR requires repairs to military barracks sector 3 HQ GITARAMA. The facility is occupied by the contingent.

## SCOPE OF WORK:

The following general repairs are required to upgrade the facilities to minimum safe and sanitary facility standards for occupancy:

SEE AS ATTACHED OVERLEAF;

## WORK GENERAL:

- All installation and fittings shall be fitted and installed in a workmanship like manner in accordance with original manufacturer specifications to ensure proper fit and closure tolerance.

- Insure all electric works are completed in accordance with original manufacturers specifications and standards and meet or exceed EC or US safety standards.

- Insure all plumbing works are complete in accordance with original manufacturers specifications and standards to meet or exceed EC or US safety standards. Inspect and test all electric outlets and junction boxes for proper operation, safety and security. Repair as necessarily to prevent overload or fire or safety hazards.

- Insure all painting works are completed in accordance with original manufacturers specifications and standards and meet or exceed EC or US safety standards. Repair as necessarily to insure proper surface for paint. Inspect and test all painted surfaces for proper attachment.

## MATERIALS GENERAL:

If nothing else is indicated.

- All partitions' material shall be done in Plywood or Block board, thickness no less than 9,5 mm.

- All structure elements shall be done in wood.

- All wooden materials exposed to rain or water shall be coated with two coats of Marine paint, white.
- All provided glass shall be thick, min. 3 mm., clear glass.

- All Provided and installed fluorescent light fixtures shall be 36 Watt, 220-240 V, and include tubes and starters ( one flourescent light with one tube cover maximum 20 $m^2$ )

- All roof sheet materials shall be corrugated sheet metal.

- All painting of:
    a. Floors with special floor paint, grey, two coats.
    b. Walls with Latex, white, two coats.
    c. Interior wood with Latex paint, white, two coats (see also wood exposed to water).
    d. Window frames with Marine paint white, two coats.
    e. Ceilings with Latex paint, white, two coats, or equivalent!

- All electrical work and fixtures in wet rooms shall be done.

## PRICES:

- All prices shall include: Delivery on site and work required.

## COMPLETION DATE REQUIREMENTS:

Work is required to be complete by 31st March 1995. Point of contact is Mr. Eddy, C. OLER Chief Engineering Operation Section [CEOS ], to be found at UNICEF BLDG.

NOTE FOR FSA FILE

# BRIEF FOR SECTOR COMMANDER SECTOR 4
# PREPARED BY BRIAN PALMER
# FSA SECTOR 4

**Introduction.**

1. As you are well aware UNAMIR II is in the process of a complete close down of Mission. Elements have already been repatriated to home countries. Your Sector is due to close down by 14 MAR 96; this date, of course, being flexible. It is therefor necessary to prepare for this eventuality so that your Sector can close with a minimum of fuss.

**Aim.**

2. To present relevant recommendations to ensure smooth closure of Sector.

**United Nations Owned Equipment (UNOE).**

3. I have perused your list of UNOE. It is apparent, that now that you have centralized your resources, that there is a surplus of equipment of all varieties. It would be a good opportunity, during the next 6 weeks, to return to the various departments unwanted equipment. Your LOG OFFR can then collate the return vouchers for eventual check out. This return of equipment will make it easier for you and also allows the various UNAMIR departments to consolidate equipments and pack for eventual transfer etc.

4. There may be a necessity to Write Off certain furniture etc. These items should be identified and put to one side. PCIU unit will then send a representative when you are due to close and complete the paperwork. Advice on Write Off can be obtained from Mr. Marc Molatte, Chief PCIU Unit on telephone 11718.

**Accommodation General.**

5. As you are aware there are a couple of situations that exist with regard to contracts for buildings and whom is responsible for what. These situations are clearly defined thus:

a. office space that has been officially rented by UNAMIR, and

b. office space that has been set up in rented MILOB accommodation that is paid for from MSA at the choice of the MILOBS.

6. Your current office space falls under PARA A. I will be in CYANGUGU for the handover of the building to the landlord on your final day. Before final rental payment is made he will be asked to sign a Release Form certifying that he has no claim on UNAMIR after that date. The house and grounds are in good condition so I'm sure there will be no

problems.

7. PARA B. is not as clear cut. Your other accommodations have been used as office space and normal accommodation with agreements entered into between MILOBS and the owner/responsible representative. Although there are no rental contracts between UNAMIR and these people UNAMIR Troops are known to have resided in these premises for a given period of time. This may leave UNAMIR open to claims after you have departed country. It is therefor necessary to obtain a Release Forms for these premises to ensure that these claims are not forthcoming. A good example is BUGERAMA where we resided for quite some time with an agreement between MILOBS and the responsible person. It is therefor requested that you obtain the Release Forms mentioned from the person responsible for all accommodation that you have occupied since the beginning of the Mandate.

**Electrogaz.**

8. It is requested that the local Electrogaz station be notified of your final day so that final readings can be registered. Please arrange a time. If Electrogaz do not turn up then we will make our own readings and record same.

**Vehicle Servicing.**

9. Currently your vehicle servicing is conducted at the FS WKSP BUTARE. This facility will close by 2 MAR 96. As this is before your closure date it is necessary that all your vehicles are serviced before the end of FEB 96. A criteria for this is; if the vehicle has less than 500 KM at 25 FEB until it's next service book it in for a service at BUTARE. If the vehicle has more than 500 KM until next service that should be enough to see you through until the vehicle is handed back to transport at KIGALI. This should alleviate the necessity to drive all the way to KIGALI in the closing stages just for a service.

**Potable Water Container 10,000 LTR.**

10. NICOY SHAGASHA should be moving at the same time as you. That means there will be a heavy lifting capability in the area during the extraction period. Recommend you empty this container a few days before departure and live out of jerry cans. The container can then be removed in a timely fashion to SHAGASHA, centralized and then moved out to KIGALI.

**Minor Repairs.**

11. It may be necessary to carry out Minor Repairs to your office accommodation e.g. fixing of electrical switches etc. This may be carried out utilizing local tradesmen as long as the cost is appropriate and the damage was in fact caused by yourselves. This will enhance the look of the place and make it easier to handback. Would appreciate if this is going to happen that I am informed so I can make sure monies for reimbursement of expenses can be put aside out of Imprest.

G b

*Embassy of the United States of America*

U.S. Defense Attache Office
Kigali, Rwanda

16 Feb 1996

Ms. Susan Matthew
Chief Administrative Officer
UNAMIR

SUBJECT: Behavior of UNAMIR Staff Officer, Mr. Joe Lombardo

Dear Ms. Matthew,

As you are probably aware, there was an incident between Mr. Joe Lombardo, two members of the club association, and me on 2 February. The cause of that incident and resulting ejection of Mr. Lombardo was his belligerent behavior. I have attached copies of my own statement and those of the other staff members regarding the details of the affair.

I was fully prepared to let this matter drop unit UNAMIR military police arrived at the embassy to investigate a claim by Mr. Lombardo that he had been assaulted. Before discussing the matter with the UNAMIR military police, I told them that the incident had occurred on US diplomatic facilities and was therefore outside UNAMIR's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, I was willing to provide them the relevant statements as well as the names of several witnesses, all club members and all UNAMIR or UN agency affiliated.

There are several salient points in those statements that I will summarize:

a. The American Embassy Club is a US diplomatic facility operating as private club for members and their guests.

b. Mr. Lombardo, a non-member, arrived unescorted and loudly disparaged the club's food services before other members.

c. Mr. Lombardo then refused to join the club even though he has used the facility many times.

d. Mr. Lombardo then implied that he would use his UNAMIR staff position to delay a request from the Administrative Officer of the US Embassy for support from your office.

e. I with the assistance of two other club members/employees ejected Mr. Lombardo from the facilities. During that process he continued to be abusive and threatening.

As I told the UNAMIR military police earlier in the week, any and all UNAMIR personnel are welcome to join the American Embassy club. We have in certain cases gone out of our way to accommodate larger UNAMIR groups--like the Canadian contingent's sergeants mess--when they were not allowed to visit other local establishments.

On the other hand, no one regardless of position or rank is welcome in the club if they exhibit behavior like that of Mr. Lombardo. You should know that since we reopened the club in October 1994, Mr. Lombardo is only the second person to be ejected from the club for poor behavior. We like to have fun at the club and welcome all other like-minded people to join us. Unfortunately Mr. Lombardo did not fit into that category.

Thomas P. Odom

Thomas P. Odom
LTC, US Army
US Defense Attache

CC. SRSG
Force Commander
Chief of Staff

6 FEB 96

TO: Ms. Jerris Riordan
Post Security Officer

FROM: LTC Tom Odom TPO

SUBJECT: Expulsion of Mr. Joe Lombardo, UNAMIR, From The American Embassy Club 2 Feb 96

1. At around 2300 on 2 February Mr Joe Lombardo entered the American Embassy Club unescorted by any club members. He came to the bar and when another patron asked if he was going to eat, Lombardo loudly announced, "the food in the American Club is shit."

2. At that stage, I motioned my assistant, Robin Hunt, over and told him to present Mr. Lombardo with a club application. Robin did that and Lombardo tossed the application on the bar. Again in a loud voice, Lombardo remarked, "I don't need to join. I'm leaving soon." He then turned away, postured a bit, and announced, "I guess I can still drink here even though I'm not a member." Robin looked at me and I nodded and said get him a beer.

3. By this stage, I had moved behind the bar where Lombardo could see me. Lombardo then said--again in a loud voice--"I got a letter from Jerris about flying the plastic in for this roof. Maybe I'll get to it about late April."

4. It was at this stage that I reached across the bar and pulled the beer from Lombardo's hands and told him to leave the premises. After a verbal exchange, Robin and Will Powell escorted Mr Lombardo up the stairs and off the club grounds.

5. This is not the first incident with Mr. Lombardo at the club. He started an exchange last year with Bob Kile that nearly ended in a fist fight. Neither is it the first time that he has crudely disparaged the Club's food services or become belligerent with the staff. He has in any case never joined the club even though he has continued to use it.

7/2/96.

**TO:** Ms. Jerris Riordan

**From:** Will Powell , Manager AEC

Concerning the expulsion of a Mr. Joe Lombardo from the American Embassey Club premises on the night of 3rd February 1996.

On the evening of 3rd February I was working behind the bar at the American Embassey club. At approximately 23:15hrs I noticed that at the other end of the bar from where I was working there were raised voices and a scene developing that appeared to gravitate around Mr Joe Lambardo. I approached the end of the bar where I witnessed LTC Tom Odum remove a beer from infront of Mr.Lombardo and telling the same to leave the premises. Feeling that the situation might escalate I turned to Robin Hunt ,who was helping behind the bar, and asked if he would help me escort Mr.Lombardo off the premises.

As Robin Hunt and I were walking Mr. Lombardo to his Vehicle he made a number of disparaging remarks largely directed towards Robin Hunt. Once in his vehicle, Mr Lombardo, as he was driving towards the gate continued in same vein and challenged Robin Hunt to a fight before eventually driving away.

AEC OFFICE COPY

A qui de droit

Je dépose ici en tant que témoin de l'altércation entre T. Odon et J. Lombardi au lieu dit "American Club". Je me trouvais au comptoir au moment des faits. Après que T. Odon eut servi une bière à J. Lombardi, j'écoutais distraitement la conversation de ce dernier sans y prêter une attention particulière. J Lombardi a exprimé un certain nombre de remarques en défaveur de la place et du personnel en charge, entre autres mentionnant ses pouvoirs vis à vis de ceux-ci. J'ai remarqué, à ce moment là, que T. Odon se retenait de lui répliquer.

Je n'ai pas distinctement entendu la remarque de J. Lombardi qui à déclenché l'incident proprement dit. T. Odon a retiré la bouteille que J. Lombardi tenait dans sa main, et l'a brisé sur le sol derrière lui, derrière le comptoir. Il lui a ensuite demandé de quitter les lieux. J. Lombardi a refusé et a proféré des menaces. A ce moment, les autres membres du personnel de l'American Club sont intervenus, ont demandé à leur tour à J. Lombardi de quitter les lieux et l'ont escorté jusqu'au parking.

Toujours de ma position au comptoir, il était possible d'entendre J. Lombardi proférer des commentaires sur la filiation des personnels de l'American Club et des promesses-menaces pour leur futur, alors qu'il quittait le parking dans sa voiture.

Fait à Kigali le 12.02.96

Jérôme DOMERGUE
Security/Backstopping Officer
Id No: UNA 358
HRFOR, Kigali

UNITED NATIONS

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UNAMIR-MINUAR

TO : COL LD TIKOCA
POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICER

FROM : SO TO COS

DATE : 15 JAN 96

SUBJECT : COMPLAINTS BY CONGOLESE OBSERVERS - UNAMIR 1

1. We are in receipt of a complaint from LT COL PAUL VICTOR MOIGNY who was the Commander of the Congolese Military Observers to Rwanda from 1 Nov 93 to 23 July 1994 during UNAMIR I.

2. It is alleged that the Congolese Observers were given a very short notice to repatriate from Rwanda via NAIROBI, to the extent that they did not travel with their personal weapons to Nairobi and that MSA was not paid to them by the UNAMIR Finance Office (then in Nairobi) for Seven (7) days.

3. It is further stated that they were repatriated to NAIROBI on 16 July 1993, and that they were given only a day's notice to move. Consequently, their personal weapons (24 Makarov Pistols and 48 Magazines) which were then secured at HQ UNAMIR in Kigali, were left behind. However, on 19 July 1994, while they awaited repatriation, they received only 24 pistols and 43 magazines. Besides, other allegations are that the Congolese Observers were not paid MSA for Seven (7) days (USD$700.00) yet they stayed on in Nairobi from 16 until 23 July when they were finally repatriated to Congo.

4. The present CMO does not have details of the allegedly missing pistol, 05 magazines and non-payment of USD$700.00 to each of the Congolese Observers.

5. Would greatly appreciate if you could kindly furnish COS with background information that would assist resolve the matter.

HM

HM MUZYAMBA
Capt
SO To COS
Ext 1111

To: Ms Susan Mathews
Chief Admin Officer

From: Isoa D Tikoca
PAO, OSRSG

Date: 13 February 96

Subj: UNAMIR 1, CONGOLESE MILOBS QUERY ON WEAPONS(COE) AND MSA

STATEMENT BY COLONEL I.D.TIKOCA (rtd) EX-CMO, UNAMIR 1

Somewhere around the 13 July 1994, the then Force Commander, Maj Gen Dallaire received a communique from the Rwandese Patriotic Army that all Francophone Countries serving with UNAMIR must leave Rwanda at once.

After the discussion I had with the FC, I started to move the Military Observers from the Francophone Countries, which included the Congolese into Nairobi to await further orders. The move have to be done fast to avoid any further complications with the RPA and to protect the safety of the Francophone Officers.

On the 16 July 94, I received fax number 1160 from my SMPO based in Nairobi requesting the Congolese Pistols to be returned as soon as possible as they would be returning to Congo on the same day. Efforts to send them the pistols on the same day was impossible as the only mode of travel authorised by the RPA then was by road through Uganda.

On the afternoon of the 16 Jul 94, I contacted Mr Golo and also some Finance staffs in Nairobi by phone requesting them the possibility of delaying their return as we are still trying to locate the pistols which was secured by the logistic officer in a safe/magazine, at the former Milob Group Headquarters, some 10 minutes drive from the FHQ. The road that lead to the Milob Grp HQ was heavily used during the war and was covered with UXBs. Mr Golo and the Finance staff insisted that the Congolese must depart on that same day and UNAMIR Administration will be incharge of the delivery of these pistols to the Congo Defence Force. I informed Mr Golo that this arrangement is NOT in conformity with the Congolese Military Rules and Regulation and breaching of such rule is purnishable by Military Law, especially when these pistols were individually issued to the Officers, Mr Golo stated that he will not be responsible for paying MSA to the Congolese from 17th Jul onwards. With great reluctance, I transmitted Mr Golo's message to LtCol Moigny.

LtCol Moigny replied that it would have been alright if there's daily direct flight for Brazaville but this was not the case as 4there was only one direct flight to Brazaville from Nairobi on every Saturday. (Sats, 16 & 23). He then requested to communicate directly with the Force Commander.

On the evening of the 18 July, I reported to the Force Commander that we were able to locate the pistols but one was still missing with three magazines. I then asked the Force Commander on what transpired out of their discusssion with LtCol Moigny, He replied that the earlier we can move the pistols across to Nairobi the better.

Early morning of the 19 Jul I sent a Milob to deliver the pistols and my note to LtCol Moigny in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Congolese Milobs did not leave Nairobi till the 23 Jul 94 as that was the next available direct flight after the 16 Jul flight.

These are all the facts that I can recollect reference the subject above.

SEEN SLIP

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | |
| SO TO COS | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| CC | | |

CAO

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Victor MOIGNY
Ancien Chef du Contingent militaire Congolais
à la MINUAR I
4, Rue Charles Gounod
45000 Orléans - France.

Au DJ
pour plaintes
examiner
Kofi Annan
11/1

Orléans, le 1er Décembre 199

A Monsieur le Chief Personnel Management and Support Service FALD/DPKO
UN Secretariat New York 10017

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser la présente correspondance pour vous soumettre les doléances de l'ancien groupe d'Observateurs militaires congolais que j'ai eu l'honneur de diriger au sein de la MINUAR I du 1er Novembre 1993 au 23 Juillet 1994.

J'aimerais ainsi commencer par vous rappeler que ce contingent avait été rapatrié en cette date du 23 Juillet 1994 à partir de Nairobi (Kenya) où il avait été replié provisoirement par le Général Commandant la MINUAR un mois auparavant pour raisons de sécurité disait-on.

Il sied de signifier aussi que les conditions de son rapatriement avaient été des plus insolites, frisant la volonté d'humiliation, l'absence de courtoisie et surtout le [illegible] de reconnaissance vis à vis d'un ensemble qui

au plus fort de la guerre du Rwanda, avait fait preuve de courage et de dévouement exceptionnels, en acceptant en majeure partie de rester à travailler sous le feu à Kigali, tandis que la majorité des contingents avaient plié armes et bagages pour se réfugier à Nairobi jusqu'à la fin des hostilités.

En effet, alors que nos homologues togolais, sénégalais et égyptiens, soumis au même contexte que nous, avaient été avisés de leur rapatriement à temps et avaient eu jusqu'au délà d'une semaine pour préparer leur retour au pays, le groupe congolais avait été, quant à lui, informé de la décision de son rapatriement le vendredi 15 juillet à 16h00 suite à un appel téléphonique du bureau de la MINUAR de Nairobi au chef du contingent, lui sommant de passer retirer ce jour les billets de voyage pour un vol programmé pour samedi 16 juillet à 12h00.

Pourtant, en date du 12 juillet, soit trois jours plus tôt, j'avais eu un entretien téléphonique avec le Général Dallaire, commandant la Force, au cours duquel celui-ci m'assurait qu'il me tiendrait informé le plus vite possible dès qu'une décision nous concernant était prise, afin que lui et moi ayions la possibilité de régler certains détails administratifs au cas où nous devions être rapatriés.

Les faits ayant été ainsi posés, cette décision de nous recondurire à domicile à tout prix en date du 16 juillet n'allait pas manquer de poser quelques problèmes au plan administratif :

1°) Le bureau des finances de la MINUAR à Nairobi n'ayant pas non plus été mis au courant de ce rapatrim s'était trouvé, à la date du 16 Juillet à 11h00, dans l'incapacité de nous payer nos droits, faute de disponibilités financières, les banques Kenyanes étant fermées le samedi.

2°) Les armes du groupe congolais (25 pistolets Makarov et 48 chargeurs) demeuraient jusqu'à cette date du 16 Juillet 1994 à 11h00 au Quartier Général de la MINUAR à Kigali où elles avaient été gardées sous scellé depuis notre passage du Groupe d'Observateurs Militaires Neutres (GOMN) de l'OUA à la MINUAR.

A ce propos, le Commandant de la Force et le Chef des Observateurs Militaires m'avaient assuré — au cours du dernier entretien que nous avons eu à trois dans le bureau du Général à la veille de notre départ pour Nairobi (21/06) — qu'ils prendraient toute initiative nécessaire pour nous faire parvenir ces armes à Nairobi avant notre rapatriement, au cas où cette hypothèse venait à être confirmée.

C'est donc à cause de ces deux raisons fondamentales ainsi évoquées que le groupe congolais n'avait pas pu quitter le Kenya le 16 Juillet 1994 comme recommandé, mais par le vol immédiatement suivant, c'est-à-dire celui du 23 Juillet 1994.

Les divers contacts que j'ai eus dès lors avec le Général Commandant la Force et le Chef des Observateurs militaires m'ont fait savoir que les deux autorités s'engageaient à résoudre

Les armes (24 pistolets et 43 chargeurs seulement) nous sont parvenues le 19 Juillet 1994 ; cependant les droits des Observateurs, d'un montant de 800 Dollars, n'ont pris en compte que la période allant du 1er au 15 Juillet, en dépit des assurances données par le Commandant de la Force sur la prise en compte de la dernière semaine.

Il découle alors de ce qui vient d'être exposé la situation suivante :

AEC a) Un (1) pistolet Makarov, ainsi que cinq (5) chargeurs restent jusqu'à ce jour à la MINURR.

b) Le reste de nos droits, pour la période allant du 16 au 23 Juillet 1994 ne nous est pas encore versé

CAO 100 D x 7 jours = 700 Dollars US

c) L'Administration de la MINURR n'avait certainement pas cru utile de nous délivrer les pièces administratives

ORD attestant que nous avons participé à cette mission alors que ces pièces sont toutes aussi importantes et utiles dans la gestion de la carrière de chaque militaire.

Toutes les démarches que nous avons entreprises jusqu'ici étant demeurées sans suite, à savoir à travers le Représentant Résident du PNUD à Brazzaville, à travers l'on le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU à la réunion de la 6e Session du Comité Consultatif Permanent des Nations Unies sur les questions

de sécurité en Afrique Centrale (Son Excellence M. de SOUZ

Je voudrais vous prier de prendre toute action utile, en vue de pallier à ces manquements, imputab sans aucun doute à l'erreur humaine.

Je vous adresse en copie les différentes pièces en notre possession, susceptibles d'apporter davantage de crédi à ces propos.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de ma haute considération.

P. K. MOBUY

Copies à :

- Son Excellence Mr le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies
- Son Excellence Mr le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU à la MINUAR - KIGALI

Translated Text

I have the honour of submitting to you the following correspondance which will explain certain problems which were experienced by the former group of Congolese Observers which I had the honour of commanding as part of UNAMIR 1 from 01 November 1993 to 23 July 1994.

I would like to begin by first reminding you that this contingent was repatriated on 23 July 1994 from Nairobi(Kenya) where it had been withdrawn to by the Force Commander of UNAMIR one month earlier for reasons of, shall we say, security.

I would like also to signify that the conditions of the repatriation were of the most insolent, bordering on humiliation, with a lack of respect and courtesy, and above all with a lack of recognition vis a vis a contingent who, on the whole, during the worst of the war in Rwanda, showed the utmost courage and an exceptional dedication, in, for the most part, accepting to work, under fire in Kigali, while the majority of contingents had thrown down their weapons, packed their bags, and took refuge in Nairobi until the end of the hostilities.

In effect, while our Togolese, Senegalese, and Egyptian peers, faced with the same situation as us, were advised of their repatriation in time and had up to a week to prepare their return to their countries, the Congolese group was informed of the decision to repatriate Friday, 15 July at 1600h after a phone call from the UNAMIR office in Nairobi to the head of the contingent which informed him to pick up the tickets on the same day for a flight scheduled the next day, Saturday, 16 July at 1200h.

However, on 12 July, 3 days earlier, I had a phone conversation with General Dallaire, The Force Commander, in which he assured me that he would keep me informed as soon as possible as soon as a decision concerning us was reached, in order that he and I could sort out certain administrative details in the case of a repatriation.

Therefore, it is not unusual that the decision to repatriate us at all costs on 16 July caused certain administrative problems:

A. The UNAMIR finance office in Nairobi which had not been made aware of the repatriation, was in the position, on 16 July, not to pay us what we were owed, due to a lack of money, and the fact that Kenyan banks are closed on Saturdays.

B. The weapons of the Congolese contingent( 25 Makarov pistols and 48 magazines) stayed until 16 July 1994 at 1100h at the Head Quarters of UNAMIR in Kigali where that had been guarded, sealed, since our transfer from the Groupe d'Observateurs Militaires Neutres(GOMN) to UNAMIR. On this subject, the FC and CMO had assured us in a three way meeting, in an office during our last meeting on the eve of our departure(21 06 94), that they would take all the necessary actions to get the weapons to Nairobi before our repatriation, in case repatriation became a reality.

| | |
|---|---|
| A/FC | |
| MA | |
| ADC | |
| ADM ASS'T | |

It is for these two fundamental reasons that the Congolese group could not leave Kenya on 16 July 94 has planned but on the next available flight which is to say, the one on 23 July 94

The many contacts that I have had with the FC and the CMO let me know that the FC and CMO would solve the questions left pending immediately.

The weapons(24 pistols and 43 magazines only) were sent to us 19 July 1994, however the rights(monies?), in the amount of 800 USD, of the Observers only took into consideration the period from 1 to 15 July, in spite of assurances given by the FC during the last week.

The following points come to light in the above mentionned situation:

check

A. One Makarov pistol as well as five magazines are, to this day, with UNAMIR;

B. The rest of our rights, for the period covering 16 to 23 July 1994 still have not been paid to us. 100d x 7 days = 700USD

C. UNAMIR's administration certainly did not think it useful to send us the required administrative documents which attest to our participation in the mission, while these documents are very important in the career planning of each member.

All the actions which we have undertaken until this point have not been followed up, wether it be thru the UNDP rep in Brazzaville, or the SRSG during the 6th session of the Permanent Consultation Committee of the UN on the questions of Central Africa ( His Excellency Mr. de Souza).

I am asking you to take all the necessary actions, in vue of the mentionned shortcomings, caused, no doubt, by human error.

I am sending you copies of various documents in our files in order to give further credit to these remarks.

G6

UNAMIR
DRIVER'S ~~ACCIDENT~~/INCIDENT REPORT

Date of Accident/INCIDENT: 9/2/96 Time: 2000 ~~Hours~~ Vehicle UN/~~Private~~: 1197
Location: U N H Q, KIGALI Open Road/
Driver: Tommy BRUCE ID NO: 186 Pessenger(s)
On or off duty: N/A Purpose of trip: N/A
Weather Condition: N/A Road Condition: N/A
Other Vehicle (NO): N/A Make: N/A Model: N/A
Driver: N/A Address: N/A
Insurance Company: N/A
Property (other than Vehicle): N/A
Injured person(s): Name, Age Address: N/A

Investigation
Name of Security Officer: S/Sgt Samuel Dolan
Police Officer: [signature] WP Cpl Kigali

DETAILS DESCRIPTION (State also Speed: Visibility: extent of Damage, Injury: Name of Doctor, Hospital, Witness, Passenger, all Actions taken)

(All the driver's responsibility to report the accident/incident to the nearest UN Office/MP)

AT ABOUT 2000 HOURS ON ~~THE~~ 9/2/96 WHILE LOCKING UP MY ASSIGNED VEHICLE, UNAMIR 1197, I REALISED THE CROOK-LOCK KEY WHICH WAS ON THE SAME KEY HOLDER AS THE KAR KEY HAD FALLEN OFF. I HAVE TRIED TO TRACE MY STEPS FOR THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS TO TRACE THE KEY BUT TO NO AVAIL.

ROUTING SLIP — FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO: CO MP Coy
A:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| FOR ACTION | ☑ | POUR SUITE A DONNER | |
| FOR APPROVAL | ☐ | POUR APPROBATION | |
| FOR SIGNATURE | ☐ | POUR SIGNATURE | |
| FOR COMMENTS | ☐ | POUR OBSERVATIONS | |
| YOUR ATTENTION | ☐ | VOTRE ATTENTION | |
| AS DISCUSSED | ☐ | COMME CONVENU | |
| AS REQUESTED | ☐ | SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE | |
| NOTE AND RETURN | ☐ | NOTER ET RETOURNER | |
| FOR INFORMATION | ☐ | POUR INFORMATION | |

Please clarify at prayer 14 Feb.
The key was lost. No theft or otherwise
Thank you

Date: 12 Feb
FROM: DE:

UNAMIR
~~DENT~~/INCIDENT REPORT

00 ~~Hours~~ Vehicle UN/~~Private:~~ 1197
Open Road/
O: 186 Pessenger(s)
se of trip: N/A
Road Condition: N/A
N/A Model: N/A
dress: N/A
A
N/A

Samuel Dallaire
P Coy Kigali

d: Visibility: extent of Damage, Injury: Name of
tions taken)

(All the driver's responsibility to report the accident/incident to the nearest UN Office/MP)

AT ABOUT 2000 HOURS ON ~~THE~~ 9/2/96 WHILE LOCKING UP MY ASSIGNED VEHICLE, UNAMIR 1197, I REALISED THE CROOK-LOCK KEY WHICH WAS ON THE SAME KEY HOLDER AS THE CAR KEY HAD FALLEN OFF. I HAVE TRIED TO TRACE MY STEPS FOR THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS TO TRACE THE KEY BUT TO NO AVAIL.

G6

UNAMIR
MILITARY POLICE MILITAIRE
KIGALI RWANDA

UNAMIR
MILITARY POLICE COMPANY
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Ag/DCOS SP

FROM: FPM/CO MP COY

INFO: COS

DATE: 05 FEB 96

SUBJECT: OCCURENCE REPORT

References:

A. FPM memo dated 24 Jan 96.

B. Your letter 2000.1/A DCOS SP/MISC dated 30 Jan 96.

C. Your letter 2000.3/WEL/Misc dated 03 Feb 96.

1. All the above quoted references refers.

2. More than anyone else, I feel grately disturbed by this incident and a series of others, as it affects my personnel. Hence my sending reference A.

3. I understand your anxiety to get this matter done with. My non-compliance with reference B is not a defiance, but a result of my ill-health. I am expected to resume normal duties tomorrow. However, machinery is already in motion to get the report ready ASAP.

4. Inconveniences regretted.

**SEEN SLIP**

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | 5/2/96 |
| SO TO COS | | 5.2.96 |
| | | |
| | | |
| CC | | |

S.A. DARE
Maj
FPM/CO MP Coy

503

G-126

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATION UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU R

UNAMIR-MINUAR

2000.3/WEL/MISC

To: FPM/CO MP COY

Info: COS

From: Ag/DCOS SP

Date: 03 February 1996

Subject: **OCCURRENCE REPORT**

Reference:

A. Your memo dated 24 January 1996.

B. Our letter 2000.1/ADCOS SP/MISC/dated 30 January 1996.

1. I am directed to inform you that you are to submit a military police report for the incident reported in reference 'A' above by Monday 05 February 1996. Reference 'B' requested you to submit a report by 02 February 1996,but the dead line has not been met and no reasons have been given.

2. For your prompt action.

4. Best regards

J SICHILIMA
Maj
for Ag/DCOS SP

***SEEN SLIP***

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | 3 Feb 96 |
| SO TO COS | | 3.2.96 |
| | | |
| | | |
| CC | | |

G-12

**UNAMIR**

2000.1/ADCOS SP/MISC

To: FPM/CO MP COY

From: Lt Col I. ABUBAKAR
ADCOS SP
EXT: 11120

Info: COS

Date: 30 January 1996

Subject: **OCCURRENCE REPORT**

Reference:

A. Your memo dated 24 january 1996.
B. My letter 2000.3/WEL/MISC dated 25 January 1996.

1. The incident reported in ref "A" above is of a serous nature. You indicated that investigations were instituted and I requested for a report as quickly as possible.

2. You are to submit either initial or final Military Police report by 2 February 1996 so that we could know what happened.

3. Best regard.

***SEEN SLIP***

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | 30/01/96 |
| SO TO COS | | 3-2-96 |
| | | |
| | | |
| CC | | |

G+PB

Noted
PA.
25/Jan/96

TO : FPM/CO MP COY FILE: 2000.3/WEL/MISC

INFO : COS DATE: 25 JANUARY 1996

FROM : A/DCOS SP

SUBJECT : **DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL ON OCCURRENCE REPORT**

Reference:

A. Your Memo dated 24 January, 1996.

1. This serves to acknowledge receipt of reference 'A' above with thanks. However, I wish to point out that I would have appreciated your routing of such material to your action addressee only who was myself. In reporting certain incidents like the one under review, it should always be borne in mind that, the action addressee becomes almost irrelevant if there are several info addressees, especially when the case in question has not been investigated. Besides, it becomes almost pre-emptive to the action addressee when as it were, several info addressees of senior status to the action addressee have equally been informed.

2. In other words, wholesome distribution of material, in certain instances defeats the concept of "Chain of Command" which I believe is a pre-requisite for the successful execution of any military operation.

3. I am aware, however, that your memo was informative oriented than requiring action of myself, but still my contribution to the ultimate solution of the problem is greatly inhibited by simple knowledge that several info addressees have been equally informed of the alleged case at hand.

4. It is my sincere hope that in future matters of that nature will receive a more ethical approach to facilitate action from the person whose action is expected so that he in turn can look into the case and see if his superiors could be intimated or not.

5. Investigate the allegation and forward your report as soon as possible.

I ABUBAKAR
Lt Col
A/DCOS SP

G6

Cleared by ADCOS SP & CMO

MCC INCIDENT REPORT 1 FEB 96

①

DATE OF INCIDENT: 1 FEB 96 TIME: 0920 HOURS

AT 0920 HOURS CAPT ABDULLAHI (M8816) NIGERIAN CAME UP TO THE PROCESSING CHECK-IN COUNTER TO PROCESS FOR THE UNAMIR FLIGHT UN072/B-200 TO NAIROBI. CAPT ABDULLAHI WAS MANIFESTED FOR THE 2ND UNAMIR FLIGHT UN071/L-382. ON 31 JANUARY 96 FLIGHT BOOKING OFFICE CALLED ME TO LET ME KNOW THAT CAPT ABDULLAHI WHO WAS ON THE FIRST FLIGHT WAS CHANGED TO THE SECOND FLIGHT BECAUSE HE AGREED TO SWITCH WITH MAJOR RANA GAJRAJ SINGH (M11749) INDIAN, WHO NEEDED TO BE IN NAIROBI EARLIER. WHEN CAPT ABDULLAHI ARRIVED AT THE COUNTER HE WAS INFORMED THAT HE WAS ON THE SECOND FLIGHT SINCE HE AGREED TO SWITCH. HE STATED HE WAS CALLED BY A LADY TO COME OUT TO THE AIRPORT THAT THERE WAS AND OPEN SEAT ON THE AIRCRAFT. I TOLD I WOULD CHECK WITH FLIGHT BOOKING, BUT THE FLIGHT WAS FULL ALREADY WITH 10 PASSENGERS. AFTER CALLING MR. MCCOY AT FLIGHT BOOKING I ASKED IF MS.RUKIAH HAD CALLED AND TOLD CAPT. ABDULLAHI TO COME TO THE AIRPORT SO HE COME TRAVEL ON THE FIRST FLIGHT AND SHE STATED NO AND THAT HE WAS STILL BOOKED ON THE SECOND FLIGHT SINCE HE AGREED TO SWITCH WITH MAJOR RANA. I THEN TOLD CAPT ABDULLAHI THAT FLIGHT BOOKING HAD NOT CALLED HIM AND HE THEN STARTED YELLING ABOUT WHAT KIND OF SHIT IS THIS, YA'LL CALL ME TO COME OUT HERE AND NOW YOU WON'T PUT ME ON THE FIRST FLIGHT. I INFORMED HIM NOT TO SPEAK TO ME THAT WAY. I THEN ASKED HIM WHEN DID HIS FLIGHT LEAVE NAIROBI AND HE WOULD NOT ANSWER ME. I LOOKED AT HIS AIRLINE TICKET WHICH STATED 10 FEB 96. HE KEEP YELLING AT ME ABOUT THE WAY HE WAS TREATED AND THIS IS NO FUCKING WAY TO TREAT PEOPLE. I THEN TOLD HIM TO LEAVE MY OFFICE. AT THAT POINT ANOTHER OFFICER WHO WAS IN MY OFFICE WITH HIM (I DON'T KNOW HIS RANK), BUT HIS NAME WAS YOUSHIE I THINK. I DID NOT GET A GOOD LOOK AT HIS NAME SINCE HE WAS YELLING AT ME ,THAT I WAS HERE TO SERVICE THEM AND HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WOULD PULL ME OUT FROM BEHIND BY DESK AND BEAT ME. I THEN TOLD THEM BOTH I WOULD CALL THE MPS IF THEY DID NOT LEAVE MY OFFICE. THE SAME OFFICER THREATENED ME AGAIN AND I TOLD THEM TO LEAVE AND THEN CALLED UNAMIR SECURITY SO3 FOR ASSISTANCE. THEY LEFT THE OFFICE AND WHILE I WAS CALLING SECURITY, CAPT ABDULLAHI CAME BACK IN MY OFFICE AND YELLED THAT HE KNOWS I HAVE A OPEN SEAT AND I COULD PUT ON IF I WANTED TOO. I THEN AGAIN TOLD HIM THE FLIGHT WAS ALREADY FULL WITH 10 PASSENGERS. HE THEN LEFT MY OFFICE AT 0935 HOURS. AT 0937 HOURS UNAMIR SECURITY SO3 ARRIVED AND I BRIEFED HIM ON THE ASSAULT AND WHAT HAD HAPPENED.

LARRY E. JAUER
UNAMIR AIRFIELD OPERATIONS MANAGER/ EXT.11164

CC: CMO
Nigerian National Senior

② A/DCOS SP

1. Do Nigerian Contingent Commander would you please investigate with CMO and provide a response to me.
2. I leave any disciplinary action to you as this is a national matter.

COS
1 Feb 96

G4

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATION UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU R

UNAMIR-MINUAR

2000.3/WEL/MISC

To: FPM/CO MP COY

Info: COS

From: Military Personnel Branch

Date: 30 January 1996

Subject: **INCIDENT REPORT**

Reference:

A. Your today's FC's Morning brief.

B. Telcom between DCMPO and Kigali Detachment Commander.

1. This morning during the FC's daily morning briefing you reported an incident where members of the International tribunal alleged to have been assaulted by locals. You are requested to investigate the allegations as soon as possible and submit a military police report.

4. Best regards

J SICHILIMA
Maj
for Ag DCOS SP

G-6

# UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

## INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: DCOS SP

FROM: HQ FORCE MP

INF: MA/FC
COS
DCOS OPS
NICOY CONTIGENT COMMANDER
ZAMBIAN CONTIGENT COMMANDER

DATE: 24 JANUARY 96.

REF: OCCURRENCE REPORT

(1)

(2) DCMPO
You may wish to speak to WO2 Okhakunen. I would not wish to have him or Zambia embarrassed but any allegations which are not pursued
COS
25 Ja 96

---

1. On the 22 January 1996, I received information about an incidence which occurred at the MP Section of the Brown and Roots Transit Camp, Kigali-Rwanda. According to my informant, the incident involved a Zambian MP and a Nigerian Contingent soldier.

2. I commissioned Capt G MWANZA, the Detachment Commander to carry out an investigation into this case, and then brief me accordingly. Today, 24 January 1996, Capt MWANZA informed me that WO2 James OKHAKUNEN, who was purported to be at the centre of the whole quagmire has refused to co-operate by making his statement. I directed him to go and make a statement, or put it on paper that he is not prepared to do so.

(3) DCMPO has action
25 Jan 96

COMMENTS

3. Recent reports about the conduct of MP personnel at the Brown and Roots Transit Camp, to say the least, is very appalling. This has prompted my directing the Detachment Commander to issue a final warning to those concerned. The incident which occurred in the evening of 21 January 1996, in my opinion, is a very serious one. It could have resulted into a murder case if not for the timely intervention of Sgt Amadu KASIM, a Ghanian MP.

4. This report is intended to keep you abreast of the incident pending the outcome of our investigations.
I remain available.

SA DARE
Major
EPM/ CO MP

GP

COS

# UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

## INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

③ A/FC

1 This is a "shotgun" approach to informing addressees of an incident to which no one seems to have the complete story. There are conflicting reports which would indicate that "nothing out of the ordinary" took place.

2. A/DCOS SP has requested comp Coy to advise on the incident, investigate the facts and report thru him to me.

3. I will brief you in detail on the outcome.

COS
25 Jan 96

TO: DCOS SP

FROM: HQ FORCE MP

INF: MA/FC
COS
DCOS OPS
NICOY CONTIGENT COMMANDER
ZAMBIAN CONTIGENT COMMANDER

DATE: 24 JANUARY 96.

REF: OCCURRENCE REPORT

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② COS

What was the incidence. This has not been elaborated.

| | |
|---|---|
| A/Pe | |
| MMA | 25 Jan |
| ADC | |
| ADM SSTI | |

COMMENTS

3. Recent reports about the conduct of MP personnel at the Brown and Roots Transit Camp, to say the least, is very appalling. This has prompted my directing the Detachment Commander to issue a final warning to those concerned. The incident which occurred in the evening of 21 January 1996, in my opinion, is a very serious one. It could have resulted into a murder case if not for the timely intervention of Sgt Amadu KASIM, a Ghanian MP.

4. This report is intended to keep you abreast of the incident pending the outcome of our investigations.
I remain available.

SA DARE
Major
FPM/ CO MP

UNITED NATIONS
*INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM*

*UNAMIR-MINUAR*

NATIONS UNIES
*MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR*

**Inter-Office memorandum**

TO: **All UNAMIR Staff**

FROM: **William Clive**
**OIC, Administration**

DATE: **04 January 1996**

SUBJECT: **Fire prevention**

1. Please be informed that a UNAMIR fire department has been established and located at the Brown & Root Camp.

2. In case of any fire accident please contact the dispatcher Bravo Romeo 31 or Mr. Bill Griffeth, Bravo Romeo 16A on channel 6. Mr. Griffeth can also be reached at the Meridien Hotel telephone No. 82176/77/ or 78 Room No. 302.

3. Regards.

SEEN STAMP

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | 6/01/96 |
| SO TO COS | | |
| CC | | |

**UNITED NATIONS**
ASSISTANCE MISSION TO RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

**NATIONS UNIES**
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

INFORMATION CIRCULAR NO. 001/96

DATE: 4 January 1996

TO: All Military and Civilian International Staff
UNAMIR

FROM: William Clive, Officer-In-Charge
Administration

SUBJECT: VISAS

Please be advised that with effect from 4 January 1996, all visa applications and information relating thereto, will be handled by the Protocol Section, UNAMIR.

This Section can be reached on extension 11071/2, Room 4072, Amahoro Headquarters.

SEEN STAMP

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | 6/01/96 |
| SO TO COS | | |
| CC | | |

COS

To : List A, B, C, E and F

From : Force Sig Coy

File : 101/Ind Sigs/Comm

Date : 05 Jan 96

Subject : **ADDITIONAL TELE EXTENSION : UNAMIR TELE DIRECTORY**

1. The following UNAMIR tele extension has been provided :-

   a. 11034 FSO Clk

2. You are requested to include this number in the directory.

3. Best regards.

Bagai.

(Deepak Bagai)
Capt
Ops Offr
For Force Sig Offr

SEEN STAMP

| APPOINTMENT | SIGNATURE | DATE |
|---|---|---|
| COS | | 16 Jan 96 |
| SO TO COS | | |
| CC | | |

Bagai

47/6

MA TO DFC/COS

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: Lists A, B. C & D

From: Brig KS Sivakumar
DFC & COS

Date: 18 Nov 95

Subject: CARRIAGE OF CUSTOMS PAYABLE ITEMS INTO RWANDA

1. It has been noticed that pers from some Contingents while returning from Nairobi had been bringing in electronic items far in excess of their personal requirement, thus leading to avoidable embarrassment at Kigali International Airport. Although I have no doubt in my mind that such items are being brought exclusively for the personal use of troops, there is a need to follow the existing rules and procedures.

2. In future, all contingent members will intimate MOVCON and the concerned authorities of the Government before bringing in any customs payable item into Rwanda.

3. For strict compliance.

cc: CAO
MOVCON

UNITED  NATIONS

# HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Field Operation
in Rwanda
**(HRFOR)**

*Info*-Bulletin May 22, 1995

**Post Kibeho: HRFOR In the Communes**

Following the closing down of the Kibeho camp, Human Rights Field Officers (HRFOs) have been working long hours in the communes where people are returning. The situation in the Butare Prefecture, where the majority of displaced persons are returning, has been described as "calm but not a 100% stable" as 1000s of people settle into their home villages.

HRFOs are constantly surveying the movement of people and are working closely with civil authorities to see to it that the fundamental needs of the people already living in these areas, and those just arriving, are being met. The Ministries of the Interior and Justice have been working closely with the HRFOR in finding solutions to immediate problems in the communes. The Ministry of Justice has instructed Judicial Investigators to be present in the most problematic communes and the Ministry of the Interior has supported the establishment of communal committees, directed by Burgomasters, to address immediate problems.

Problems encountered include lack of housing, food and medical facilities. In some communes there have been security problems as local civilians take justice into their own hands. In some cases civilian authorities or military authorities or both have also been involved. The gendarmes in the Butare Prefecture is cooperating closely with HRFOs to stop these abuses.

The most recent group of 12 European Union HRFOs sent to Rwanda were temporarily deployed in the Butare Prefecture to work with the massive influx of IDPs.

"People are fearful," reports a member from the HRFOR Butare team, "but overall things are going along relatively smoothly considering the massive number of people." The Chief of the Operation and the Head of the Field Coordination Unit will be visiting Butare in the coming week.

In a press release dated April 27, the New York based Human Rights Watch/ Africa and the Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme stated that the increased presence of HRFOs and UNAMIR personnel "reduced tensions" and "increased security for those at risk".



Kibeho
24/05/95

**Independent International Commission Concludes it Inquiry**

On Thursday May 18, 1995 the President of Rwanda invited members of Parliament, Rwandese Ministers, Heads of UN agencies and the press to the National Assembly to hear the conclusions of the two week inquiry by the Independent International Commission into the events at Kibeho. The Chief and Deputy Chief of the HRFOR participated.

The six conclusions of the Commission and four recommendations were read out to the guests. The President of the Republic thanked the Commission and said that his Government would act upon these Conclusions and Recommendations. The first Recommendation welcomed the initiative by the Rwandese Government to carry out an investigation at the national level. The HRFOR will follow closely this national investigation. "I think that it is positive that the President made a commitment to carry on the investigation as it will once again emphasise the fact that there will no longer be impunity in Rwanda. The HRFOR will certainly assist in any way possible," said Mr Abderrazak Essaied, Deputy Chief of HRFOR, at the end of the meeting.

**Special Meeting of Friends of Rwanda Operational Support Group Held in Kigali on Friday May 19, 1995**

The Chief of the HRFOR attended an extraordinary day-long session of the Operational Support Group which was called by the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal Mr Goldstone and the Minister of Development from the Netherlands. The extraordinary meeting was called in order to help facilitate the work of the International Tribunal.

The Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, the Deputy Prosecutor, the Minster of Development from the Netherlands and the US Undersecretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, Ambassador Kahn and representatives of over a dozen countries attended the meeting which was opened by the President of Rwanda.

The day-long discussion concentrated on the state of affairs of the International Tribunal. The Chief of the HRFOR, William Clarance, gave an overview of work that had been done by the HRFOR to support the International Tribunal.

"An important part of the mandate of the HRFOR has been to carry out investigations into violations of human rights and humanitarian law, particularly the genocide. The Special Investigative Unit (SIU), which was established in mid-September 1994, has carried out numerous investigations and gathered basic information on the genocide. In order to carry out investigations in the most professional manner possible, the High Commissioner requested Governments to make available specialised personnel (prosecutors, criminal investigators, police and forensic experts). Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States responded positively to this request thereby enabling the HRFOR to investigate the genocide and to collate pertinent evidentiary materials.

"Human Rights Field Officers, under the guidance of the SIU's expert investigators, assist genocide investigations.

"The HRFOR has carried out in depth investigations into the April-July 1994 massacres in a number of locations including: Butare Prefecture - Karama, M'Bazi, Nyumba, Nyakibanda; Cyangugu Prefecture: Shangi; Gitarama Prefecture: Ruhango: Kibungo Prefecture: Zaza, Nyarabuye; Kibuye Prefecture: Rwamatamu, Mubuga; Kigali Rurale Prefecture: Ntarama.

"An important aspect of the work of the Special Investigative Unit consists in the coordination of information gathering by the Human Rights Field Officers. The Field Officers deployed throughout Rwanda were requested to gather information in a systematic manner to be transferred to the Special Rapporteur and the Office of the Prosecutor. In this way evidence could be gathered in a standardised manner on a prefecture-by-prefecture basis. The HRFOR will continue to assist in these investigations for the Special Rapporteur and, if requested, for the International Tribunal."

The Chief of the HRFOR also emphasised the work that had been done and still needs to be done for the national system of justice.

At the end of the meeting it was announced that six million USD had been pledged to the International Tribunal and 33 investigators were seconded from national Governments for use by Prosecutor Goldstone. Goldstone announced that he was very pleased with these generous donations and said that he felt certain the first indictment could come in the second half of this year.

**HRFOR Distributes Typewriters and Office Supplies to Judicial Authorities Throughout Rwanda**

The Technical Cooperation Unit (TCU) of the HRFOR in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice, has begun distributing typewriters, stationary, envelopes and folders to prosecutors, judges, investigators, prison administrators and gendarmes. Human Rights Field Officers coming to Kigali for meetings regularly load their vehicles with these supplies and take them to the communes. The materials were donated to the Ministry of Justice by the Governments of Belgium and the United Kingdom. The supplies are distributed in coordination with the NGO Citizens Network.

**State of the Operation**

The HRFOR presently has 124 HRFOs working from 13 offices throughout Rwanda. Of the 124, 33 Field Officers have been sent to the Operation by the European Union, 33 are UNVs, one was seconded by the Swiss Government and the others were recruited by the Centre for Human Rights. The Chief of the HRFOR has announced that the monthly costs of the Operation must be cut back and is presently working closely with the Head of Administration to find ways to do this.

In April the Government of the United Kingdom made a generous donation of 2.1 million pounds sterling to the Operation.

Ends

*HRFOR/Info-doc/May95*

*When Bizimungu and his guard sought "protection" (or was asylum?) with ZAMBATT, was it known that they were fugitives being sought by the RPA and hence "alleged criminals"?*

On 14 May 95 at 0600 hrs two Rwandese reported to a ZAMBATT location in the Rwamiko area and requested protection. The individuals claimed to be Second Lieutenant Faustin Nduwimana (of the Former Government Forces) and Ngabo Yves Bizimungu (the son of the former Rwandan Government Minister of Health) and had been part of the mass flight of IDPs that broke the RPA cordon of Kibeho camp on 22 Apr 95. UNAMIR was unaware that these individuals were being sought by the RPA at that stage.

*If so, why was not the normal procedure followed ie. a) report to ICRC, b) interview with Human Rights Monitors, c) handover to civilian prosecutor?*

Not applicable.

Done with
02/6
DFC/mw

*Who initiated the idea of the two fugitives being brought before the Inquiry Commission (the Commission only wanted witnesses who volunteered). Did the two fugitives demand to go before the commission or was it suggested to them?*

The individuals agreed to be interviewed by UNAMIR regarding the incident at Kibeho camp and to give information about FRGF/Interhamwe activity in the camps. UNAMIR asked the individuals if they wished to give evidence before the International Commission investigating the Kibeho incident. They volunteered to give evidence before the commission.

*Once they had volunteered, did the Commission ask that they be bought to Kigali? Or was this initiative taken by UNAMIR?*

The individuals were brought to Kigali for interview rather than possibly wasting limited time and resources in sending an interview team from UNAMIR and the International Commission to Gikongoro. It was also the intention to pass these individuals over to Rwandan government authorities if they were found to have been involved in the genocide or insurgent activities.

*Were the fugitives brought in UNAMIR uniforms? How were they brought? Where did they stay?*

When the individuals reported to ZAMBATT they were dressed in dirty civilian attire which they remained in when appearing before the commission and at the time of their release from the TUNBATT location in Matura. At no time were the two individuals given UNAMIR uniforms. A UNAMIR helicopter was used to transport the two from Gikongoro to Kigali and Kigali to Matura. They remained at ZAMBATT Tac HQ Gikongoro on the night 14 May 95 and INDBATT location (SOALTEE) on night 15 May 95.

*Was information regarding their presence with UNAMIR conveyed to the government at any stage?*

The government was not advised of their presence.

*After their evidence to the commission, why were they taken to Matura? Why were they transported in a helicopter? By now, it must have been evident that they were "criminals" on the run, was it not realised that taking them to Matura (instead of Gikongoro where they reported of even Kigali) and setting them free was tantamount to helping them escape?*

Once it was established that the individuals had not participated in the genocide and did not need to be handed to the civil authority, they were informed that UNAMIR could not offer indefinite protection. They were therefore offered the choice of being taken to the Rwandan civil authority or being allowed to go free. They initially requested to be taken to Zaire, via Burundi, however, this request was refused outright by UNAMIR. They then requested to be taken to the Ruhengeri area. It was assumed that this was the area of their home commune. .

As per the Mandate, who role was to be played by UNAMIR with regards to protection, safety and security of IDPs? Was this fulfilled? If not reasons? If yes state degree of security/protection provided.

## Independent Commission - Relevant Questions

A. On What basis was camp-closure planned?

UNAMIR's legal basis for camp presence?

Did we advise against forcible closure?

Operation Retour - why had it stalled? What were plans for revival?

What evidence of militia/interahamwe activity in IDP camps?

Collaboration with cross border military activity from Zaire, was is it on the increase?

Had RPF given notice of early closure?

B. Prior Consultation

To what extent was there consultation between UN and GOR? Which issues were discussed and agreed? Was there agreement on all issues? Which issues remained to be discussed? Was the timing of the launch discussed?

At what level was there agreement on a combined approach? Had there been consultation on camp closure between RPA and UNAMIR's military contingent?

Was there any ops/plans discussed ever to undertake an op in Kibeho camp to weed out criminals? (on the lines of op Hope)

In what way did the lack of consultation affect the Kibeho tragedy?

C. Ethnic base

What was the population ratio of Hutus/Tutsi's in the IDP?

Was there an ethnic basis for the closure of camps? Were IDP's expected to return exclusively to Tutsi or Hutu communes?

D. The Kibeho tragedy

What were the conditions from 18-22 April in Kibeho? How many people were there in the Kibeho IDP camps? How many moved to the Central Hill? How much food and water permitted? Sanitation and medical assistance? Space? Shelter from rain?

Kibeho

1. DFC's thoughts on E.
2. To SRSG/Mr Conde/Ms Scott prior to Sun

Was there any incident prior to the incident of 22 Apr 95?

How was the move of IDPs carried out from 18 to 21st Apr 95?

What was IDP condition after 5 days on Kibeho hill? How close or deep was the RPA cordon? Were Humanitarian Organizations allowed access?

When and how did the first break-out occur? When and how did the second break-out occur? What was the state of intimidation inside the camps? Were there machete attacks and by whom? Did Zambatt arrest some attackers? How did these machete attacks affect the atmosphere inside the camps? Were arms found in the camp?

Was there provocation/aggression from within camps against RPA? Was there an attack on RPA before break-out? How many RPA soldiers were treated for wounds?

If the reason for closing camps was the presence of organized militia/interahamwe within the camps, was not an element of provocation anticipated by RPA? If so what measures had been taken to meet such provocation?

Approximately what was the percentage of deaths through (a) firing by RPA, (b) crush and stampede within camp, (c) machete attacks?

Was the RPA firing in response to attacks by armed IDP's? Or was there indiscriminate killing as a result of panic and the situation going out of control? Was there cold-blooded revenge killing of defenceless people?

How did UNAMIR arrive at its initial estimate (on Saturday) of deaths? How was a "more accurate" count taken the following day? What was the method used for calculating deaths?

Amendment was issued the same day. The only official press release gave figs as 2000 killed, rest were tele/press interviews

Who were the eye witnesses to the events?

Zambatt, Ausmed and UNAMIR visitors

Human Rights Monitors

Humanitarian Representatives (ICRC, MSF, etc.)

Journalists

Any others

- Med evac
- Int'l city

Would all the dead bodies be buried around Kibeho? Could they be removed or hidden? If so how? Would the re-opening of graves give an accurate count of the deaths? Did RPA bar UNAMIR and agencies from certain areas? Have films been confiscated? Are there any video films of the tragedy.

Those IDP's who were allowed to walk - how were they treated on their way back? In their communes?

E. <u>UNAMIR's role</u>

What was the advice given by UNAMIR on the closure of IDP camps before 18 April?

What did UNAMIR contingent do on the morning of 18th when action started? Why was Zambatt allowed to stay in compound? What role did they and Ausmed play from within camp?

What was the advice being given by UNAMIR to RPA and government to resolve the crisis?

Did UNAMIR contingent in Kibeho fire any shots at any time? Why did not UNAMIR take action against interahamwe/militia? Why did not UNAMIR take action against RPA?

~~What was Zambatt/UNAMIR's role during heat of crisis?~~

Did UNAMIR bury dead bodies? - by themselves or jointly with RPA? How many children, women are assisted by UNAMIR? How did UNAMIR protect "civilians at risk"?

How did UNAMIR helped in restoring situation and reducing cas?

What is the fate of IDP's still in MSF Compound and refusing to return?

What actions were taken by UNAMIR to help save sit?

What support did UNAMIR give the government when they are informed of the operation? How did UNAMIR influence the Agencies to provide assistance in addressing the humanitarian problem?

F. General

Was the Kibeho tragedy due to pre-meditated action?

Or was the firing the result of panic, chaos and loss of control by troops?

Was there deliberate, cold blooded revenge killing? Stopped - med evac. fm Camp. - fm Butare - Airfd use.

Was the dead-count exaggerated?

Was there recognition by RPA that appalling humanitarian suffering would result in breach of human endurance?

**To:** SRSG

**From:** D COS OPS

**Info:** DFC
COS

13 May 95

**SUBJECT: POST-KIBEHO REFUGEES TO BURUNDI**

**References:** A. COS Comments, morning of 13 May 95
B. D COS OPS requirement, 131100B May 95
C. UNNY Coded Cable

COS
I consider this assessment is order. You may wish to contact Mr Smy BNO if a reply has not been sent to New York.

1. I contacted UNCHR at 131105B May and was passed their most current information.

2. There are approximately 10,000 refugees from Rwanda in Burundi as a result of the recent IDP camp-closures. 7,000 of which are currently congregated in the MABAYI region, and an estimated 2,000 gathered in the RUTABU region of Cibetoke Province. UNHCR further reports that small groups of new arrivals are trickling into KIVURNDO and MUYINGA provinces. UNHCR is still in discussions on the disposition of these refugees. Currently the Burundian government is not allowing the UNHCR to regroup these people and resettle them into existing or to be created UNHCR refugee camps. However, reports of forcible patriation of these refugees to Zaire appear unfounded, as well there is some doubt as to the actual circumstances which saw approximately 300 of the 10,000 refugees returned to Rwanda.

3. UNHCR has not heard of the report at Ref A about an additional 20,000 refugees exfiltrating through the Nyungwe Forest. Furthermore, UNHCR states that the situation is quite stable and calm amongst these 10,000 who, although not yet in any type of formal refugee camp, are being fed and assisted by UNHCR. There are no signs of panic or mass agitation amongst this population.

4. This branch was aware of the 10,000 refugees. The report at Ref C of 70,000 to 80,000 moving through the forest was surprising for, unless UNAMIR was completely incompetent in its observation and reporting of refugee flow during the Kibeho incident, we cannot support the assessment of so large a number moving undetected to the forest. We had assessed as probable that some small groups and individuals would attempt to go into hiding there until they could be certain of their safety. We also assessed the probability of increased banditry as these people attempted to "live off the land". The hypothesis of FRGF presence within the forest is viable, however no indicators to support this have been reported.

it cannot be

1/2

Kibeho – GG
12/5/95

5. In conclusion, this branch and UNHCR assess that approximately 10,000 refugees fled from Rwanda in the aftermath of the Kibeho incident. They are currently calm and stable in the two main areas of MABAYI and RUTABU. There are no indications of large (100,000) refugee populations agitating or migrating, neither from the old refugee population or those post-18 Apr 95.

Reference: A. CDS comments, morning of 13 May 95
B. O COS OPS requirement, 131100B May 95
C. UNHCR Coded Cable

1. I contacted UNCHR at 131105B May and was pumped their new current information.

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3. UNHCR has not heard of the report at Ref A about an additional 20,000 refugees exfiltrating through the Nyungwe Forest. Furthermore, UNHCR states that the situation is quite stable and calm amongst these 10,000 who, although not yet in any type of formal refugee camp, are being fed and assisted by UNHCR. There are no signs of [illegible]

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2/2 /3

NL BURUM LES 493139099=FOPF X 8-MAY-1995 08:37:52 215614

P081100 B MA 95.

FROM: UNAMIR HQ BUTARE

TO :UNAMIR FORCE HQ KIGALI

INFO: DFC
G-2

UNCLAS OPS 079.

SUBJECT : INTERNATIONAL INQUIRY KIBEHO INCIDENT.

1. PLEASE CONFIRM WHETHER ONLY WRITTEN STATEMENT WILL BE ENOUGH DURING THE SITTINGS OF ABOVE NAMED SUBJECT.

2. AN EYE WITNESS IS DUE TO DEPART MISION AREA SOONEST ON ROTATION.

3. REGARDS//

BT

PAC HQ BUTARE
The Witness should come over now and report to DCOS OPS or in his absence to the G2 OPS
11/5
DFC/amo

G6
11/05/95

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LES MIGRATIONS (OIM)
ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNACIONAL PARA LAS MIGRACIONES (OIM)

Phone: 717 91 11
Cable Address: Promigrant Geneva
Telex: 415 722
Telefax: 798 61 50

17, route des Morillons
P.O. Box 71
CH - 1211 GENEVA 19
SWITZERLAND

*MEMORANDUM*

TO: UNAMIR, HEADQUARTERS, KIGALI

YOUR REF.: FILE NO. 2000 (G2) MISC 1577

FROM: JOOST VAN DER AALST, CHIEF OF MISSION, IOM KIGALI

**SUBJECT: WITNESSES TO KIBEHO INCIDENT 22 APRIL 1995**

DATE: 5 MAY 1995, 1500 (LOCAL TIME)

---

1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE (REFERENCE MENTIONED ABOVE).

2. WE HAPPY TO FORWARD THE FOLLOWING LIST OF IOM LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF WHOSE WORK AND INVOLVEMENT BROUGHT THEM RELATIVELY CLOSE TO THE EVENTS.

INTERNATIONAL STAFF
*BA IDRISSA (HEAD OF OFFICE, IOM BUTARE);
*JEAN PIERRE LAFORGUE (IOM GISENYI, THEN ON ASSIGNMENT, KIBEHO);
*ROLAND BEUTLER (IOM KIBUNGO, THEN ON ASSIGNMENT IN THE AREA);
*FREDERIC CAILLETTE (IOM GOMA, ZAIRE, THEN ON ASSIGNMENT, BUTARE & KIBEHO);

NATIONAL STAFF (IOM BUTARE)
*JEAN BAPTISTE GIRUKWAYO;
*ALEXIS KARANGWA;
*ELOI NGENDAHIMANA;
*PATRICK NSHIMIYIMANA;
*ALICE RUTASIRE.

3. SHOULD YOU NEED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THEM OR SHOULD YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER QUERY, QE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONTACT US ANY TIME. MANY THANKS AND BEST REGARDS.

G6
9/5/95

13

| Cover Sheet Classification | Enclosure Classification |
|---|---|
| | UNCL |

# Department of Defence

008/05

## FACSIMILE COVER SHEET



2869

| | |
|---|---|
| File Number: 506-1-10 | Senders Name: MAJ M.R. RICKETTS |
| Precedence: ROUTINE | DTG Sent: 05 0156MAY95 Z |
| **Facsimile Destination** | **Facsimile Originator** |
| UNAMIR HQ<br>ATTN: G2 INFORMATION | AUSMED |
| Unclas Fax No: 11278 | Unclas Fax No: 75216 |
| Discon Fax No: | Discon Fax No: |
| Telephone No: 11254 | Telephone No: 75216 |
| Subject Title: WITNESSES TO KIBEHO INCIDENT 22 APR 95 | |

Instructions/Comments

Reference:

A. UNAMIR HQ/G2 2000 (G2) dated 4 May 95

1. IAW Ref A below is a list of witnesses to the subject incident on 22 Apr:

a. CAPT Vaughan-Evans

b. LT Tilbrook

c. LT Lucas

d. WO2 Scott

e. SGT Stanton

f. SGT Pickard

2. Six (6) other Offr/SNCO arrived in Kibeho A.M. 23 Apr and are available if required. They are:

a. CAPT McMahon

b. FLT LT Pyne

c. FLT LT Donalek

d. SSGT Burgess

e. SSGT Johns

f. SGT Dick

| Releasing Officer's Name | Signature | Rank / Appointment | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| RICKETTS | | MAJ/OPSO | 05/05/1995 |

THIS FAX COVER SHEET AND CLOSURE ARE TO BE TRANSMITTED IAW THE REQUIREMENTS OF

G6
9/6/95

(15)

502

GIKONGORO RWANDA

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL ONLY/CRYPTO

FAX OUT NO: PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES

| | |
|---|---|
| TO: G2 INFORMATION<br>UMANIR HQ<br>KIGALI | FROM: LT O CHAPULA<br>LIAISON OFFICER<br>SECTOR 4A/ZAMBATT HQ |
| PREFIX NO | DATE 05 MAY 1995 |
| ATTN: | FAX NO. |
| INFO: | DRAFTER:LT O CHAPULA<br>LIAISON/INFO OFFR |
| SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY | |
| REFERENCE: YOUR FAX MESSAGE DTD MAY 4, 1995 | |

1. Find attached hereto names of officers who witnessed the incident which occured at kibeho IDP camp on Saturday and Sanday 22/23 April 1995.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01. | M5789 | LT COL | D N LUYI |
| 02. | M5212 | CAPT | F SIKAONGA |
| 03. | M5038 | MAJ | W MAYABA |
| 04. | M5386 | CPL | NYIRENDA M |
| 05. | M5689 | LCPL | SAMPA N |
| 06. | M5384 | CPL | CHIRWA D |
| 07. | M5555 | LCPL | MWACHIYEYA L |
| 08. | M5446 | LCPL | MASANGU A |
| 09. | M1798 | LCPL | NYIMBIRI C |
| 10. | M5607 | LCPL | CHISHIMBA S |
| 11. | M5550 | LCPL | BANDA J B |
| 12. | M5617 | LCPL | SIAMAKANDA A |
| 13. | M5651 | LCPL | MUKANU A |
| 14. | M5566 | LCPL | ZONKIE P |
| 15. | M5548 | LCPL | MUKUKA F M |
| 16. | M5443 | LCPL | MUTINTA A |
| 17. | M5593 | LCPL | LUPIYA G |
| 18. | M5549 | LCPL | MWACHAMBO K |
| 19. | M5644 | LCPL | SHANDA K |
| 20. | M5574 | LCPL | INAMBAO C |
| 21. | M5414 | LCPL | MULENGA C |
| 22. | M5419 | LCPL | MUNALULA M |
| 23. | M5580 | LCPL | SWANA C C |
| 24. | M5560 | PTE | CHILEMENA C |

enter into file

UNAMIR REGISTRY
G2 Information
05 MAY 1995

G6-Kibeho

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 25. | M5618 | PTE | MUTALE W |
| 26. | M5490 | PTE | MULAUZI B |
| 27. | M5487 | PTE | MUKONKO M |
| 28. | M5592 | PTE | MUNDALILA J |
| 29. | M5342 | SSGT | CHINTU M S |
| 30. | M5352 | SGT | SHIMUSHI M |
| 31. | M5530 | SGT | NYIRENDA J B |
| 32. | M5588 | CPL | MAKAYI M |
| 33. | M5533 | CPL | NG'OMBE T |
| 34. | M5536 | CPL | ZULU B |
| 35. | M1792 | CPL | MUYUNDA C |
| 36. | M5552 | LCPL | JERE |
| 37. | M5440 | LCPL | LUBINDA C M |
| 38. | M5628 | LCPL | LIBULELO P |
| 39. | M5578 | LCPL | CHANDA C |
| 40. | M5545 | LCPL | KUNDA C |
| 41. | M5541 | LCPL | KALUNGA A |
| 42. | M5559 | PTE | SIFUNISO F |
| 43. | M5489 | PTE | SIMPAMBA T |
| 44. | M5649 | PTE | SAMUTUTA V S |
| 45. | M5587 | PTE | KAYUALA M |
| 46. | M5624 | PTE | MUMBA R |
| 47. | M5642 | PTE | LUWAWA I |
| 48. | M5671 | PTE | MULATU C |

Forwarded for your information and action.



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TO : UNAMIR HQ//G2

ATTN : G-2 INFORMATION, UNAMIR HQ
: MILOB GP HQ

FROM : SECTOR 4-A

DATE : 05 MAY 95

SUB : WITNESSES TO KIBEHO INCIDENT, 22 APR 95

1. REF YOUR FILE NO. 2000 (G2) DATED 04 MAY 95.

2. THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS FROM THIS SECTOR WITNESSED THE INCIDENT AT KIBEHO ON 22/23 APR 95:

22 APR

MAJ C MITHI, M8811
CAPT M AGORDEKPE, M7740
MAJ A E AIRENDE, M8823
SQN LDR R SHAFIQ, M7864

23 APR

LT CDR O OKUNBOR, M8823
CAPT G SOSA, M2137
MAJ E SCHUSTER, M7781
CAPT K DARKWAH, M7739

(S C MESTON)
MAJ
OPS OFFICER

Kwtrval info
compiler list
6 May 95

G6 - Kibeho
6/5/95

(14)

# OUTGOING CODE CABLE NO: CRN 145
## UNAMIR HQ

MIR NO:- 1533
MISC NO:- nil

03 MAY , 1995

| | |
|---|---|
| TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK<br><br>INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, NEW YORK | FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN<br>SRSG<br>UNAMIR, KIGALI,<br>RWANDA. |
| FAX: 001 (212) 963 9069<br>FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053 | FAX: (250) 86877 |

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
SRSG
FC
UNAMIR HQ MAIN FILE

SUBJECT: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING "KIBEHO INCIDENT"

NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS ONE: TWENTY SIX

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING THE "KIBEHO INCIDENT" AS REQUESTED.

2. PLEASE NOTE THAT ALSO AFFIXED IS A COLLECTION OF EXCERPTS FROM OUR INFOSUMS (ANNEX A) AND A SYNOPSIS OF UNAMIR'S ROLE (ANNEX B).

SRSG

G6
6/5/95

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SURROUNDING THE "KIBEHO INCIDENT" 22 APR

1. This report is an unprocessed compilation of various source reports and is intended as a general chronology of events, not a final analytical product. A detailed investigation into the event is expected to commence today.

2. **7-14 Apr:** Anniversary week of the genocide:

   a. national week of mourning declared;

   b. rumours fuel fears of revenge/retaliation attacks, populations of IDP camps increase;

   c. anti-UN demonstrations and media;

   d. rhetoric identifies IDP camps as source of insecurity/ instability within the country

   e. RPA increase internal security presence throughout country; and

   f. week passes relatively peacefully.

3. **13 Apr:**

   a. RPA close Kivugiza IDP camp, IDPs move to Kibeho;

   b. that evening, Rwandan Vice President MGen Paul Kagame makes a surprise visit to Rwandan/Burundian border, then overnights in Butare, leaving early the next day. Reason for visit unknown but (in retrospect) discussions regarding border and camp closure suspected.

4. **13-17 Apr**: RPA increases presence around IDP camps:

   a. residents of smaller camps intimidated/coerced to leave;

   b. IDP reaction against RPA increasingly hostile, incidents include:

      (1) mobbings;
      (2) grenade attacks;
      (3) stonings; and
      (4) attempts to snatch RPA weapons.

   c. RPA patrols sometimes react to IDP actions with fire, but result more often in effective withdrawal of RPA than IDP injuries.

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5. **18 Apr:** RPA establish cordon around Kibeho IDPC.

a. **0300:**

(1) two battalions of RPA surround Kibeho, Munini and Ndago IDPCs; and

(2) RPA arrival panics IDPs who flee to UNAMIR positions in centre of camp. RPA fire some rounds and in the process, 11 IDPs die in the stampede.

b. **~0500:**

(1) RPA move cordon inwards to capitalize on contracted IDP perimeter; and

(2) RPA appear to conduct localized sweeps, searches and arrests.

c. **0900:**

(1) HQ UNAMIR officially informed of RPA plan to close Kibeho and other camps when RPA COS requests interview with UNAMIR DFC.

(2) UNAMIR DFC and RPA COS joint visit to Kibeho where the public is informed of RPA plans;

d. Under instructions of the RPA Brigade Commander a leader of the IDPs addresses the IDPs, many volunteer to return to home communes;

e. **1630:** RPA fire warning shots, reason unknown. Nine IDPs killed in resulting stampede;

f. RPA plan appears to have good prospects for success in repatriating IDPs not involved in genocide or anti-government activities. Result of cordon and screening should result in a de-facto prison camp for those remaining. (In retrospect, amount of forces used in cordon appears to have been inadequate for the area covered.)

6. **19 Apr:** Kamana camp closure.

a. RPA troops deploy to and cordon Kamana IDPC;

b. UNAMIR DFC and D COS Ops:

(1) **1000:** visit Kibeho camp to assess and defuse situation on the ground; and

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(2) **1200:** meet with UN agencies/NGOs in vain attempt to convince them to assist in the rapid evacuation of the four cordonned camps

c. Minister of Rehabilitation visits camp and explains to IDP the need to vacate the camp immediately;

d. Approximately 700 persons screened and cleared from camp in first day;

e. UNAMIR is the only UN agency to be involved in providing transportation assistance and aid in response to the camp closure problem:

(1) continues to provide transport support for the:

(a) movement of IDPs (screened by RPA) to home communes;

(b) evacuation of casualties; and

(c) distribution of humanitarian aid.

(2) provides all available engineer support to repair and improve impassable road between Butare and Kibeho, thereby facilitating the movement and repatriation of IDPs.

7. **20 Apr:** Kibeho camp conditions deteriorating.

a. UNAMIR Force Commander visits Kibeho, holds discussions with UNAMIR forces and other agencies.

b. IDPs are tightly concentrated around UNAMIR positions;

c. sanitation is very poor and deteriorating;

d. shortage of food at all camps, complete absence of food supplies at Kibeho and Kamana since IDP panic and subsequent flight to UNAMIR positions caused them to abandon their belongings which included susbstantial amounts of food;

e. About 3,976 people are successfully screened by RPA and transported to their home communes by UNAMIR;

f. **1250:** IDPs stone RPA who return fire. No casualties;

g. **1730:** IDP reportedly attempts to snatch RPA weapon. RPA open fire killing 20, wounding 60; and

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h. reports of IDPs fighting amongst themselves, incidents of machete attacks.

8. **21 Apr:** Ndago cordonned. UNAMIR provides medical assistance.

a. **0700:** RPA surround Ndago. Some small arms fire into the air. IDPs panic, hundreds rush to UNAMIR position. Many injuries from running into protective concertina (barbed) wire.

b. large numbers of IDPs leave camps by foot after RPA screening;

c. UNAMIR (AUSMED assisted by Zambatt) establishes casualty clearing post at Kibeho providing medical treatment and evacuation for hundreds of IDPs;

d. SRSG and D COS Ops visit Butare requesting civil and military authorities to allow UN agencies/NGOs to distribute food and water. Attempt to coordinate the distribution of aid and develop a command, control and communication plan. Subsequently visit Kibeho and coord UNAMIR and MSF activities. Brief local RPA Comd present in Kibeho on outcome of Butare meeting and the agreements/concessions made by the Govt and RPA reps at that meeting.

9. **22 Apr:** The "Kibeho Incident".

a. **0830:** IDPs are densely concentrated around Zambatt platoon position in poor conditions. Several are wounded from machete attacks inflicted by fellow IDPs, stray gunfire and crowd related injuries (such as trampling, suffocation and crush), most are without sleep. Hygiene and sanitation conditions are deteriorating rapidly. Attempts to convince crowd to spread out more are met with only limited success due to IDP reluctance to move closer to RPA cordon and refusal by RPA to extend the cordon over a greater area. Distribution of food and water continues to be disallowed by the RPA to the IDPs- now for the fifth straight day.

b. **1030:**

(1) Zambatt platoon position is fired upon by unknown assailants;

(2) all assistance to injured is stopped;

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(3) UNAMIR and NGO medical teams are denied access to camp by RPA;

c. **1155:**

(1) people running to find shelter from an approaching rainstorm create panic amongst other IDPs who also run.

(2) sudden stampede interpreted by RPA as attempt to break cordon. RPA fires into crowd and continues firing until ~1250 when rate of fire dies to sporadic.

(3) Large numbers of casualties are reported from gunshot wounds, machete and crowd related injuries

d. **1300:** reports of IDPs being attacked with machetes by other IDPs;

e. **1400-1405:** UNAMIR overflight of Kibeho camp. Much of camp deserted, thousands IDPs passing through two RPA checkpoints, IDPs leaving camp on road to Butare.

f. **1450:** UNAMIR members carrying essential medical resupplies denied access to Kibeho camp by RPA.

g. **1500:** reports of RPA beating people to maintain order at screening points. IDPs attempting to escape cordon by running down hill were either shot at or pursued and captured;

h. **1600:** helicopters finally granted permission to land in Kibeho. Medical resupply brought in, wounded air-lifted out.

f. **1710:** IDP crowd near RPA screening/clearing post approximated at 5,000. Crowd surges and ran against cordon for undetermined reasons. RPA response is to open fire. Heavy fire for an extended period ensues, including reports of heavy machine-gun, rocket propelled grenade and mortar fire. Exchange of fire reported between IDPs and RPA.

g. **1800:** RPA fire begins to die down. Reports of probable Interahamwe and FRGF in MSF compound.

h. **1830:** Several shots, fired intermittently from MSF compound;

j. **1945:** Some IDPs attempt again to enter Zambatt compound, RPA attempts to stop them;

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k. **1955:** Several bursts of heavy machine-gun fire is heard from many directions of the cordon around the camp;

m. **2155:** hysterical screaming heard from MSF compound, probably IDP machete attack. Constant wailing continues throughout the night;

n. several acts of excessive and deadly force observed throughout the night.

o. RPA soldiers were observed burying bodies in shallow and mass graves throughout the night and at dawn.

10. **23 Apr:**

a. **until 0500:** Occasional single shots, short bursts and grenade explosions continue.

b. **0700:**

(1) RPA seen burying bodies in pit latrines and shallow graves;

(2) Perimeter of Zambatt platoon position is piled high with bodies, approximated as high as 40-45 bodies **per square meter** over an area of 15 square meters

(3) Access to Kibeho camp denied to all outsiders (including UN troops, UN agencies, NGOs, etc), until **1000.**

(4) AUSMED personnel conducted count of injured and dead in the area situated from the ZAMBATT Coy locs to MSF Compound and to ZAMBATT pl loc starting first light. Using "clicker counting" devices, Med pl comd and Med Warrant Officer counted 4050 dead and 650 wounded.

(5) RPA continues to push bodies down the hillside for burial. ZAMBATT soldiers bury bodies in mass graves on top of the hill to minimize the growing health risk.

(6) RPA severly restricts ZAMBATT's access and restricts all movement to various sections of the camp; suspected to be due to RPA wishing to bury bodies unobserved.

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(7) Force Provost Marshall conducts estimates at various sites throughout the camp and counts dead bodies at mass graves, treatment areas and collection points and records them in his ledger. After only seeing limited areas of the camp and having personally counted 800 dead, he estimates the death toll between 1200 and 1500.

(8) Zambian pl comd conducts counts of bodies around the camp and reports 3000 dead.

c. open air orphanage established in Zambatt platoon position (approximately 250 children gathered);

d. **1100:** UNAMIR Provost Marshal photographing scenes has film confiscated by RPA.

e. **1140:** Only UNAMIR personnel being allowed to pass into camp. Convoy of MSF and other medical NGO vehicles turned away.

f. Huye (Butare) Stadium, approximately 12,000 IDPs are concentrated awaiting further repatriation. Malicoy deploys a platoon to protect IDPs from hostile locals.

g. **1220:** UNAMIR Force Commander arrives Kibeho, conducts detailed survey of situation;

h. throughout afternoon: various Rwandan Government officials, including Rwandan President and the Ministers of Justice and Interior, visit site.

11. UNAMIR casualty figure is derived by compromise taking into account the Force Provost Marshall's figures ( 800 counted; total of 12-1500 estimated ), Zambatt's count of 3000 and the AUSMED count of 4050. As many of the dead had been moved and buried in various locations, a final tally was never conducted nor possible.

Attachments:

ANNEX A: EXCERPTS FROM UNAMIR INFOSUMS, "KIBEHO INCIDENT" 22 APR
ANNEX B: SYOPSIS OF UNAMIR'S ROLE.

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ANNEX A to
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
"KIBEHO INCIDENT" 22 APR

## EXCERPTS FROM UNAMIR DAILY INFORMATION SUMMARIES

1. UNAMIR daily information summaries have been reviewed. Relevant excerpts are included in this annex and reflect reports and analyses of information available at the time of reporting.

UNAMIR INFOSUM
171800B-190600B APR 95

3. SECTOR 4A: YESTERDAY, RPA BEGAN PROCEDURES TO CLOSE THE KIBEHO, NDAGO AND MUNINI DPCS. AT 0300, APROXIMATELY 2 BATTALIONS OF THE 301 RPA BDE (BUTARE) CARRIED OUT A CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATION, DEPLOYING FROM RUNYINYA JUNCTION (6112) TO KIBEHO (5007) AND NDAGO (5101) WITH THE INTENTION OF FORCIBLY CLOSING THE IDP CAMPS, MAKING PEOPLE RETURN TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES. THIS ACTION PLUS SOME FIRING APPROXIMATELY 0530 SERVED TO MOTIVATE IDPS TO ABANDON THEIR SHELTERS AND CONCENTRATE ON THE LOCAL UNAMIR POSITION FOR PROTECTION. A REPORTED 9 TO 11 IDPS DIED FROM BEING TRAMPLED. IDPS WERE PREVENTED FROM RETURNING TO THEIR SHELTERS BY RPA, WHO WERE REPORTED LOOTING ABANDONED STRUCTURES AND AT MUNINI, BEGAN PULLING SOME SHELTERS DOWN. 301 RPA BDE COMD (LCOL FRED IBIRINGA) AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF ADDRESSED THE IDPS, AFTER WHICH MANY VOLUNTEERED TO BE TRANSPORTED TO THEIR COMMUNES. BY DAY'S END, THE RPA HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE CAMPS INTERIOR BUT MAINTAINED ITS CORDON. *COMMENT: THE RPA HAVE TAKEN DECISIVE ACTION AND, ALTHOUGH IT MAY TAKE LONGER THAN THEY MAY HAVE HOPED, IT IS UNLIKELY THEY WILL STOP THEIR ACTIONS TO CLOSE ALL THE CAMPS. THE CAMP AREAS CONTAINED AN ESTIMATED 135,000 IDPS OR MORE. THE BOTTLENECK IN THE TIMETABLE WILL COME FROM FINDING PLACES FOR THESE PEOPLE TO GO AND GETTING THEM THERE. THE SITUATION IN KAMANA DPC (5196) IS CURRENTLY CALM, ALTHOUGH IDPS THERE HAVE RECEIVED THE NEWS OF THE KIBEHO CLOSURE AND MAY PROMPT SOME TO LEAVE BEFORE THE RPA MOVE TO CLOSE IT.*

UNAMIR INFOSUM
181800B-200600B APR 95

RPA

3. SECTOR 4A:

A. KIBEHO IDPC: NO CHANGE. 19 APR: A LOCALLY EMPLOYED WATCHMAN FOR THE UNICEF WATERWORKS WAS FOUND DEAD AND THROWN INTO A PIT LATRINE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF RPA INVOLVEMENT IN THE KILLING (NFI).

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B. KAMANA IDPC (5196). YESTERDAY THE RPA BATTALION FROM GIKONGORO BEGAN PROCEDURES SIMILAR TO THE KIBEHO OPERATION TO CLOSE THE IDPC AND RETURN IDPS TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES.

UNAMIR INFOSUM
191800B-210600B APR 95

RPA

3. SECTOR 4A: KIBEHO DPC

A. 201250B IDPS STONED RPA. RPA REACTED BY FIRING WARNING SHOTS. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

B. 201800B: AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF RPA SOLDIERS FIRED ON IDPS, KILLING 13, WOUNDING 24. RPA CLAIM THAT AN IDP HAD ATTEMPTED TO WRESTLE THE FIREARM FROM A SOLDIER. THE INJURED WERE BEING ATTENDED TO BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL.

UNAMIR INFOSUM
201800B-220600B APR 95

REFUGEES/IDPS

7. SECTOR 4A: RPA CAMP CLOSURE CONTINUES. INCIDENTS OF SHOOTING HAVE OCCURED, ONE AT KIBEHO: WHERE FIVE WERE INJURED, MOTIVE UNNOWN AND ONE AT KAMANA: WHERE TWO PEOPLE WERE KILLED, TWO ARRESTED AFTER ATTEMPTING TO BYPASS A ROADBLOCK. THE DEATH TOLL FROM YESTERDAY'S REPORT OF A SHOOTING IS UP FROM 13 TO 18, WHICH INCLUDES TWO WHO WERE TRAMPLED TO DEATH. LOOTING HAS OCCURRED, WITH SOLDIERS ALREADY ATTEMPTING TO SELL STOLEN ITEMS. DUE TO POOR ROAD CONDITIONS, UNAMIR, UN AGENCIES AND NGOS COULD NOT REACH KIBEHO CAMP. RPA CONTINUED WITH DOCUMENTATION OF IDPS AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF MOTOR TRANSPORT, MADE SCREENED IDPS WALK. AN ESTIMATED TOTAL OF 6,200 IDPS WERE ESCORTED BY RPA TO RUNYINYA ON FOOT. AFTER 1500, 6 IOM TRUCKS WERE ABLE TO GET TO THE CAMP AND TRANSPORTED APPORXIMATELY 600 IDPS TO BUTARE. COMMENT: RPA HAVE SIEZED AND MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE CLOSURE OF THE CAMPS. THEY CAN EXPECT SOME SUCCESS IN ADDRESSING THIS SECURITY ISSUE AND ARE UNLIKELY TO ALLOW ANY DELAYS IN CLEARING THE CAMPS. THEY WILL LIKELY END UP WITH A DEFACTO PRISON CAMP FOR THOSE NOT REPATRIATED, WHICH THEY WILL DEAL WITH AT A LATER STAGE.

INTREP 010

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 221710B APRIL, FIRING BROKE OUT AT THE KIBEHO IDP CAMP WHEN THE RPA ENGAGED AND PURSUED A GROUP OF AN

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ESTIMATED 5,000 IDPS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK THE CORDON EN MASSE. FIRING IS REPORTED FROM BOTH SIDES. THE LOCATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IN THE AREA OF THE CLEARING STATION. INITIAL CASUALTY ESTIMATES COULD REACH THE 2,000 MARK. NO UNAMIR SOURCES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO REPORT UNTIL DAYLIGHT HOURS 23 APRIL.

2. *COMMENT:*

*A. THE RPA OPERATION TO CLOSE THE CAMP APPEARED TO HAVE HAD GOOD PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN REPATRIATING MANY PEOPLE NOT INVOLVED IN THE GENOCIDE OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. THE RESULT WOULD BE A DE-FACTO PRISON CAMP FOR THOSE REMAINING; RPA INTENTIONS AFTER THAT IS UNKNOWN, BUT LIKELY DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THOSE REMAINING. AN ATTEMPTED BREAK-OUT BY THESE ELEMENTS WAS EXPECTED, IT IS TO BE SEEN IF THE RPA CORDON CAN BE EFFECTIVELY RE-ESTABLISHED. SHOULD ARMED IDPS ESCAPE THE CORDON, IT WOULD HAVE A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE REGION, WITH RPA PROBABLY INCREASING ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA AND INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF INNOCENT LOCALS BEING CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE OR ENGAGED BY MISTAKE.*

*B. THIS WAS THE SECOND SIGNIFICANT BREAK-OUT ATTEMPTTODAY. THE FIRST OCCURRING BETWEEN 1100B TO 1440B, RESULTING IN APPROXIMATELY 130 IDP DEAD. A SUSPECTED 100 IDPS BROKE THROUGH THE CORDON BUT WERE STILL BEING ENGAGED BY RPA.*

*C. THERE IS A VERY REAL FEAR AMONGST THE IDPS THAT THEY WILL BE KILLED BY THE RPA. THERE IS A REPORT THAT THE FIRST EXODUS MAY HAVE BEEN A SPONTANEOUS STAMPEDE, TRIGGERED BY A SUDDEN RAINSTORM AND EXACERBATED BY FEARS, RUMOURS AND THE SIGHT OF RUNNING PEOPLE.*

*D. THE SECOND (1710B) INCIDENT IS PROBABLY SIMILAR AS PEOPLE ATTEMPTED TO GET CLEAR OF THE CAMP THROUGH THE SCREENING STATION. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE INDICATORS THAT FIREARMS WERE PRESENT AMONGST THESE IDPS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BANDITS/FRGF/MILITIA INSTIGATED THE STAMPEDE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE CORDON.*

*E. INCREASED PRESENCE OF RPA ON THE BORDERS SHOULD HELP DEFEND AGAINST REINFORCEMENT OR RELIEF FROM ARMED GROUPS OUTSIDE RWANDA TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH.*

3. HUMAN RIGHTS CONFIRMS THAT AT AROUND 221830B, 1,500 IDPS MOVING ON FOOT TO RUNYINYA WERE BEING ATTACKED BY CIVILIANS ALONG THE ROUTE.

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4. *COMMENT: THESE ARE PROBABLY SCREENED IDPS ENROUTE TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES. THE ATTACKS BY LOCALS IS PROBABLY RELATED TO NEWS OF THE PROBLEMS AT KIBEHO CAMP. USUALLY THESE MOVEMENTS ARE ESCORTED BY RPA WHO MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF DETERRING ESCALATION OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST THESE RETURNING IDPS.*

5. 22216B: AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT STATES THAT APPROXIMATELY 1,000 IDPS REMAIN IN THE KIBEHO CAMP.

6. *COMMENT: IF TRUE, THEN THE RPA CORDON HAS FAILED. THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM OF TENS OF THOUSANDS UNSCREENED IDPS IN THE REGION WILL LIKELY BECOME BLOODY AS RPA ATTEMPT TO ORGANZE THEMSELVES AND REGAIN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MINIMUM FORCE WILL BE USED AND INSTANCE OF INDISCRIMINANT FIRE IS EXPECTED.*

UNAMIR INFOSUM
211800B-220600B APR 95

REFUGEES/IDPS

A. KIBEHO: AT APPROXIMATELY 221710B APRIL, FIRING BROKE OUT AT THE KIBEHO IDP CAMP WHEN THE RPA ENGAGED AND PURSUED A GROUP OF AN ESTIMATED 5,000 IDPS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK THE CORDON EN MASSE. FIRING IS REPORTED FROM BOTH SIDES. THE LOCATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IN THE WESTERN AREA OF THE CLEARING STATION. INITIAL CASUALTY ESTIMATES COULD REACH THE 2,000 MARK. NO UNAMIR SOURCES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO REPORT UNTIL DAYLIGHT HOURS 23 APRIL.

*COMMENT:*

*(1) THE RPA OPERATION TO CLOSE THE CAMP APPEARED TO HAVE HAD GOOD PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN REPATRIATING MANY PEOPLE NOT INVOLVED IN THE GENOCIDE OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. THE RESULT WOULD BE A DE-FACTO PRISON CAMP FOR THOSE REMAINING; RPA INTENTIONS AFTER THAT IS UNKNOWN, BUT LIKELY DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THOSE REMAINING. AN ATTEMPTED BREAK-OUT BY THESE ELEMENTS WAS EXPECTED, IT IS TO BE SEEN IF THE RPA CORDON CAN BE EFFECTIVELY RE-ESTABLISHED. SHOULD ARMED IDPS ESCAPE THE CORDON, IT WOULD HAVE A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE REGION, WITH RPA PROBABLY INCREASING ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA AND INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF INNOCENT LOCALS BEING CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE OR ENGAGED BY MISTAKE.*

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(2) THIS WAS THE SECOND SIGNIFICANT BREAK-OUT ATTEMPT THAT DAY, THE FIRST OCCURRING BETWEEN 1100B TO 1440B, RESULTING IN APPROXIMATELY 130 IDP DEAD. A SUSPECTED 100 IDPS BROKE THROUGH THE CORDON BUT WERE STILL BEING ENGAGED BY RPA.

*(3) THERE IS A VERY REAL FEAR AMONGST THE IDPS THAT THEY WILL BE KILLED BY THE RPA. THERE IS A REPORT THAT THE FIRST EXODUS MAY HAVE BEEN A SPONTANEOUS STAMPEDE, TRIGGERED BY A SUDDEN RAINSTORM AND EXACERBATED BY FEARS, RUMOURS AND THE SIGHT OF RUNNING PEOPLE.*

*(4) THE SECOND (1710B) INCIDENT IS PROBABLY SIMILAR AS PEOPLE ATTEMPTED TO GET CLEAR OF THE CAMP THROUGH THE SCREENING STATION. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE INDICATORS THAT FIREARMS WERE PRESENT AMONGST THESE IDPS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BANDITS/FRGF/MILITIA INSTIGATED THE STAMPEDE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE CORDON.*

*(5) INCREASED PRESENCE OF RPA ON THE BORDERS SHOULD HELP DEFEND AGAINST REINFORCEMENT OR RELIEF FROM ARMED GROUPS OUTSIDE RWANDA TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH.*

B. KIBEHO AREA: HUMAN RIGHTS CONFIRMS THAT AT AROUND 221830B, 1,500 IDPS MOVING ON FOOT TO RUNYINYA WERE BEING ATTACKED BY CIVILIANS ALONG THE ROUTE. *COMMENT: THESE ARE PROBABLY SCREENED IDPS ENROUTE TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES. THE ATTACKS BY LOCALS IS PROBABLY RELATED TO NEWS OF THE PROBLEMS AT KIBEHO CAMP. USUALLY THESE MOVEMENTS ARE ESCORTED BY RPA WHO MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF DETERRING ESCALATION OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST THESE RETURNING IDPS.*

C. KIBEHO: 230730B: REPORTS THAT KIBEHO CAMP POPULATION IS WOUNDED PLUS APPROXIMATELY 7,000 IDP AT A BUILDING IN THE VICINITY OF MSF HOSPITAL, CORDONNED BY RPA. *COMMENT: THE CAMP IS NOW EFFECTIVELY CLOSED AS AN IDPC. THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM CREATED BY THE ESCAPE OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF IDP DOES NOT SEEM TO CONCERN RPA REPS AT THIS HQ, WHO CLAIM THAT IDPS WILL EVENTUALLY BE ARRESTED AND THAT THOSE ATTEMPTING TO REACH THE BORDER "WILL BE STOPPED" (AMBUSH POSITIONS ARE PROBABLY ESTABLISHED ALONG ROUTES LEADING TO BURUNDI).*

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221600B-240600B APR 95

REFUGEES/IDPS

4. *SECTOR 4A: THE POSSIBLE SECURITY THREAT WHICH COULD HAVE DEVLOPED WITH IDPS AT LARGE FROM KIBEHO (INFOREP 010) DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE MATERIALIZED. RPA DO NOT APPEAR OVERLY CONCERNED AND STATE THAT THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE EXISTING INTERNAL SECURITY MEASURES ARE SUFFICIENT TO IDENTIFY AND ARREST THOSE GUILTY OF CRIMES. (THERE ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE DENUNCIATIONS THAN ACTUAL GUILTY PARTIES.) THOSE SEEKING TO EVADE CAPTURE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO PENETRATE THE SOUTHERN BORDER AS IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE RPA HAS ESTABLSIHED AMBUSH POSITIONS ALONG ALL ROUTES INTO BURUNDI. THE EFFECT OF IDPS IN HIDING WILL LIKELY INCREASE THE INCIDENTS OF BANDITRY AS THOSE EVADING CAPTURE WOULD ATTEMPT TO LIVE OFF THE LAND. IDPS HAVE NOT BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY LOCALS, WHO HAVE STONED AND WHIPPED RETURNEES AND EVEN TURNED THEM AWAY FROM AT LEAST ONE COMMUNE. THERE ARE EVEN REPORTS TO SUGGEST THAT IDPS RETURNING TO BUTARE AREA ARE BEING DENOUNCED BY RESIDENTS AND SUMMARILY KILLED, VICE ARRESTED (THIS IS BEING INVESTIGATED).* AS OF 0600B THIS MORNING, THE SITUATIONS IN THE CAMPS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. KIBEHO IDPC: REVISED ESTIMATE OF DEAD FROM SATURDAY'S BREAKOUT ATTEMPT MORE CLOSELY APPROXIMATES 2,000., WITH 650 WOUNDED AND 300 ORPHANS. RPA REMAIN IN BATTALION STRENGTH. ONLY AN ESTIMATED THREE HUNDRED IDPS APPEAR UNWILLING TO LEAVE THE CAMP. MANY OF THESE APPEAR TO BE HARDLINE MILITANT ELEMENTS POSSIBLY ARMED. THESE IDPS HAVE TAKEN POSITION IN THE BUILDING COMPLEX HOUSING THE KIBEHO CAMP CHIEF & OTHER NGO OFFICES NEAR THE ZAMBATT POSITION. IT IS KNOWN THAT THERE IS AT LEAST ONE FIREARM WITHIN THE BUILDING. RPA INTENTIONS APPEAR TO ALLOW THOSE WHO WISH THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE THE BUILDING AND UNDERGO SCREENING. THOSE REMAINING WILL PROBABLY BE SWEPT OUT OF THE BUILDING BY RPA SOLDIERS. THERE ARE REPORTS OF FIGHTING AMONGST THE IDPS IN THIS COMPLEX. ZAMBAT COMPANY COMMANDER IN LOCATION REPORTS SUSTAINED AUTOMATIC FIRING ON THE KIBEHO-BUTARE ROAD LAST NIGHT AT 2300. THIS WILL BE INVESTIGATED TODAY.

B. KAMANA (ORIGINAL POPULATION ESTIMATE: 40,000): CURRENT SITUATION CALM, BUT TENSE. NO ONE HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE, NO SCREENING BY RPA HAS OCCURRED. ICRC DISTRIBUTED 24 HOURS' FOOD YESTERDAY. RPA HAVE DUG APPROX 20 FIRE TRENCHES NEAR ZAMBAT POSITION, CLAIMING TO PREVENT IDPS FROM RUNNING AWAY. RPA REPORTED STEALING 50 CATTLE FROM LOCALS.

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C. NDAGO IDPC: CLOSED, COY OF RPA STILL IN LOCATION;

D. MUNINI IDPC: CLOSED, NO RPA. 9,000 SEEN LEAVING BY FOOT. FURTHER 1500 SEEN MOVIN ON FOOT TO NYAMKEZU. CAMP HAD HELD 16,0000. REMAINDER HAD PROBABLY EXFILTRATED EARLIER.

E. NYAMIGINA IDPC: SOME 900 IDPS OBSERVED DEPARTED FROM THIS CAMP. NO RPA IN OR AROUND THE CAMP. IDPS ARE LEAVING VOLUNTARILY.

5. SECTOR 4B:

A. BUTARE: AN ESTIMATED 17,000 IDPS FROM KIBEHO CAMP ARE CURRENTLY HOUSED IN HUYE STADIUM, BUTARE, AWAITING TRANSPORT TO HOME COMMUNES. RPA ARE WARY THAT THIS FACILITY NOT BECOME ANOTHER TRANSIT CAMP. RPA HAVE BEEN IDENTIFYING AND PICKING PEOPLE OUT OF THIS CROWD AND TAKING THEM TO THEIR BARRACKS. HUMAN RIGHTS WILL INVESTIGATE.

B. BUTARE COMMUNE: THERE ARE REPORTS THAT A CLEARING POST IN BUTARE TOWN HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, WHILST IN THE BUTARE COMMUNE SUBURBS, THERE IS INDICATION THAT RETURNING IDPS WHO ARE DENOUNCED AS INVOLVED IN THE GENOCIDE ARE BEING KILLED VICE ARRESTED.

B. NGOMA COMMUNE (9637): PEOPLE OF THIS COMMUNE ARE REPORTED TO BE REFUSING TO ACCEPT DPS BEING TAKEN THERE AND TRUCKS HAVE REPORTED BACK TO BUTARE.

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REFUGEES/IDPS

5. BUTARE: THE (MALI) GUARD COMMANDER OF THE PLATOON GUARDING THE STADIUM IDENTIFIED A PATTERN IN RPA SCREENING AND ARRESTS YESTERDAY; RPA WOULD REMOVE ANYONE WHO LOOKED HEALTHY OR IN ANY WAY DIFFERENT FROM THE AVERAGE IDP. RPA IS ALSO ALLOWING SOME LOCALS INTO THE STADIUM TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTS IN THE GENOCIDE. REPORTS OF SPORADIC SHOTS BEING FIRED INSIDE THE STADIUM THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT ARE REPORTED BY CIVPOL AS BEING WARNING SHOTS. AS OF LAST NIGHT, THE HUYE STADIUM POPULATION WAS DOWN TO 1,500 IDPS WHILE THE BUTARE RECEPTION CENTRE HAD A CONCENTRATION OF ABOUT 3,000.

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6. KIBEHO IDPC: FOLLOWING RPA DEMANDS AND ASSURANCES, APPROXIMATELY 250-300 DPS LEFT THE BUILDING COMPLEX YESTERDAY, LEAVING BETWEEN 100-200 DPS (FEEL 100 IS CLOSER TO MARK) WHO STILL REFUSE TO LEAVE. *COMMENT: THOSE REMAINING ARE BELIEVED HARDLINERS POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN THE GENOCIDE, PROBABLY INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. MILOBS ON THE GROUND DO NOT BELIEVE THE RPA IS PREPARED TO ATTACK THESE LAST HOLD-OUTS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, HOWEVER IT IS UNLIKELY THEY WILL ALLOW THE STANDOFF TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. (NOTE TO SELF: NO EVIDENCE OF MORTARS BEING USED, BDA INDICATES AS ASSESSED [HARDLINE DPS CAUSED THE STAMPEDE & CORDON BREACH, DID A LOT OF THE DEATHS {RPA DID NOT HAVE MACHETES} THE HARDLINE DPS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS, THE RPA ACTED LIKE SOLDIERS {MORE OR LESS, THEY ARE A YOUNG BUSH ARMY. BUT DISCIPLINE (WHILE OFFICERS ARE THERE) IS STRONG. INTERNATIONAL MEDIA CONDEMNATION IS UNFAIR. RPA ARE ACTING REASONABLY EVERYWHERE ELSE.]*

7. KAMANA IDPC: KAMANA CAMP IS NOW CLOSED. A REPORTED ESTIMATED 35,000 IDPS MOVED ON FOOT (WITHOUT RPA ESCORT) TO NYAKIZU, NSHILI, KIVU AND MUBUGA COMMUNES. SOME FRFG SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED DURING SCREENING AND IN RPA CUSTODY. NO REPORTED BEATINGS OF THE RETURNING IDPS, EXCEPT AS THEY PASSED THROUGH NYAKIZU (NO RPA ESCORT). COMMENT: KAMANA CAMP, WHICH HAD HAD A POPULATION OF APPROXIMATELY 40,000, WAS AN INTERMEDIARY CAMP BETWEEN KIBEHO AND BURUNDI. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE FRGF/MILITIA POPULATION WITHIN THIS CAMP WOULD HAVE BEEN LARGER, HOWEVER, MANY MAY HAVE EVACUATED WHEN IT WAS BELIEVED KAMANA WAS TO BE CLEARED AND CLOSED.

8. *COMMENT: RETURNEES TO HOME CELLULES MAY FACE HARDSHIP AS FOOD SUPPLIES DO NOT APPEAR TO BE PROVIDED TO THEM AND THAT PLANTING SEASON HAS BEEN MISSED.* _

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RPA

2. SECTOR 4A: KIBEHO: TWO ROADBLOCKS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED; ONE ON THE ROAD FROM THE HELIPAD, THE OTHER JUST ENTERING THE CAMP FROM RWAMIKO. (OUR GUYS ABLE TO PASS FREELY?). THE RPA ARE STILL SURROUNDING THE REMAINING IDPS, DENYING THEM FOOD AND WATER AND DEMANDING THAT THEY GIVE THEMSELVES UP PEACEFULLY. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RPA COMPANY COMMANDER IS UNDER STRICT ORDERS NOT TO TAKE ACTION UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY HIS HIGHER HQ. THE IDPS HAVE BEEN DEMANDING SAFE PASSAGE TO

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ZAIRE. THERE ARE REPORTS OF SOME WOMEN AND CHILDREN STILL IN THE COMPOUND. *COMMENT: IT IS PROBABLE THAT MANY OF THIS GROUP ARE FRGF/MILITIA AND/OR HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE, THEREFORE NO AMOUNTS OF ASSURANCES OF FAIR TREATMENT ARE LIKELY ENOUGH TO TEMPT THEM TO GIVE THEMSELVES UP TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. THE GROUP IS PROBABLY ARMED AND, IN THE EVENT THAT THEIR DEMANDS ARE NOT MET, LIKELY TO ATTEMPT EITHER A BREAKOUT OR EFFECT A HOSTAGE SCENARIO. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE RPA WOULD ENTER AND SWEEP THE COMPOUND. HOWEVER, IF GIVEN REASONABLE CAUSE, SUCH AS A SNIPING INCIDENT OR ESCAPE ATTEMPT, THE COMMANDER ON THE GROUND MAY BE AUTHORIZED TO FIRE. LIKE THE KILLINGS OF 22 APR, ONCE THE TROOPS ARE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO FIRE, EXTREME FORCE WOULD PROBABLY BE USED AT THE SOLDIER LEVEL.*

REFUGEES/IDPS

SECTOR 1: BOURGEMESTRES ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT RETURNEES, BUT ONLY AFTER ADDITIONAL SCREENING AT COMMUNE LEVEL.

APPEARS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN REPATRIATING IDPS IS A SHORTAGE OF TN. A SMALL NUMBER OF IDPS HAVE DIED IN TRANSIT REPORTEDLY DUE TO EXHAUSTION, SUFFOCATION, EXPOSURE

SECTOR 2: 25 APR: NGENDA (0644) 1073 IDPS ARRIVED IN 8 TRUCKS BUT RPA WOULD NOT ALLOW IDPS TO DISEMBARK UNTIL AUTH GIVEN BY BOURGEMESTRE. THESE IDPS HAD BEEN ON THE TRUCKS FOR 5 DAYS AND LACK OF WATER AND SANITATION IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD CAUSE HEALTH PROBLEMS. *COMMENT: WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF 2,400 IDPS AT NGENDA CAMP, THESE TRUCKLOADS OF PEOPLE REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN CAMP POPULATION. UNDERSTANDABLY, LOCAL AUTHORITIES WILL BE CONCERNED OVER THE ISSUE OF IDP CONTROL, AS WELL AS FEARS OF DE-FACTO ESTABLISHMENT OF IDP CAMPS AND THE LOCAL SECURITY PROBLEMS WHICH COULD ARISE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT SUCH MOVEMENTS BE THOROUGHLY COORDINATED AND AUTHORIZED WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES WELL BEFORE ARRIVAL.*

SECTOR 3: HUYE (BUTARE) STADIUM IS NOW CLEAR OF ALL IDPS. HOWEVER THE BUTARE WAY-STATION (3653) STILL HAD 4,000 IDPS YET TO BE TRANSORTED AS OF YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

SECTOR 4A:

A. NYAMIGINA IDPC: VACATED. STRUCTURES DEMOLISHED BY IDPS THEMSELVES.

B. KIGEME (475257) BURUNDI REFUGEE CAMP: HAS 2,400 PEOPLE AND STILL UNDERGOING NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPATRIATION TO BURUNDI.

C. MURAMBI IDPC (3538): TUTSI IDP CAMP HAS 1,385 PEOPLE. CAMP CHIEF IS WAITING FOR AN OFFICIAL ORDER TO CLOSE THE CAMP.

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D. NYAKIZU (5696: CLEAR OF ALL IDPS AS OF 1700 YESTERDAY;

E. KAMANA (5197): CLOSED;

F. MUNINI (4800): CLOSED;

G. RUNYINYA (6012): UNKNOWN NUMBER;

H. KIBEHO: (AS PER PARA )

J. GISHAMVY (6505): UNKNOWN NUMBER.

SECTOR 3 HAS SUBMITTED A DETAILED REPORT OF THE ATTACKS BY CIVILIANS AGAINST RETURNING IDPS. THEY ESTIMATE BETWEEN 10-15 PEOPLE, INCLUDING WOMEN AND BABIES WERE BEATEN TO DEATH AND THAT THE PRESENCE OF UN VEHICLES AND PERSONNEL NOT ONLY FIALED TO ACT AS A DETERRENT, BUT WERE MOBBED BY THE CROWD, AS WELL. *COMMENT: RHETORIC OF THE ANNIVERSARY PERIOD AND THE APPEARANCE OF UN INCAPACITY TO REACT TO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS APPEAR TO HAVE HAD THE EFFECT OF NEUTRALIZING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF UN PRESENCE. IT IS PROBABLE THAT SUCH INCIDENTS HELP TO EMBOLDEN RWANDESE TO COMMIT MORE SUCH ACTS IN THE FACE OF UNAMIR. IT IS, HOWEVER, LIKELY THAT OUR ARMED UNITS STILL COMMAND SOME FORM OF RESPECT WITH THE APPEARANCE OF STRENGTH AND (SUBCONSCIOUS) ANALOGY TO THE RPA (AND, BY EXTENTION, THEIR MORE DIRECT METHODS).*

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RPA

2. SECTOR 4A

A. KIBEHO: RPA MAINTAINED THEIR PRESENCE AND STILL REFUSED TO ALLOW FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES INTO THE BUILDING WHERE HARD CORE IDPS REFUSE TO COME OUT.

REFUGEES/IDPS

4. A. MOST OF THE IDPS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ARRIVED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE HOME COMMUNES.

B. IN KIBEHO: IDPS STILL IN THE BULDING REFUSING TO RETURN TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNES. 42 DEAD BODIES WERE REMOVED FROM THE BUILDING YESTERDAY AND WERE BURIED.

C. IN BUTARE: MOST OF THE IDPS REURNED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOMES APART FROM THOSE WHO ARE SO SICK TO MOVE ARE REMAINING AT THE RECEPTION CENTRE.

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REFUGEES/IDPS

6. THERE ARE REPORTS OF ARRESTS AND ATTACKS OF SOME RETURNEES, (4 KILLED, 10 WOUNDED BY LOCAL MOB, 10 RETURNEES ARRESTED IN RUSATIRA), HOWEVER MOST APPEAR TO BE RESETTLING WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN SECTOR 3: RUHANGO (): THER ARE REPORTS OF AN INTERESTING REPATRIATION PLAN AT COMMUNE LEVEL. ACCORDING TO THE BOURGEMESTRE, OF THE IDPS WHO HAVE RETURNED TO THE COMMUNE, ONLY THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE GONE BACK TO THEIR HOMES. THE MEN REMAIN AT THE COMMUNE PENDING A PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN AIMED AT PREVENTING ACTS OF VENGANCE.

7. SECTOR 4A: KIBEHO: 27 APR: AN ASSORTMENT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION WAS PRESENT AT KIBEHO CAMP, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SRSG, AMBASSADORS OF US, FRANCE, DENMARK AND OTHER DIPLOMATS. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THE APPOINTMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE SO CALLED KIBEHO MASSACRES. SRSG PROMISED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION. THE REMAINING IDPS STILL REFUSE TO COME OUT OF THE BUILDING COMPLEX PEACEFULLY, CLAIMING THAT THEIR SECURITY AND SAFETY WOULD NOT BE GUARANTEED. AS OF 1800 YESTERDAY, NINE OF THE IDPS WERE ABLE TO LEAVE AND WERE REPATRIATED TO RWAMIKO AND BUTARE. COMMENT: OUR ASSESSMENT STILL STANDS, RPA IS UNLIKELY TO MOVE AGAINST THE IDP GROUP, PREFERRING TO ALLOW THEIR SIEGE TO WORK AGAINST THEM. IDPS WILL CONTINUE THEIR ATTEMPTS TO KEEP THEM FROM RPA CUSTODY, HOWEVER THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION IS QUITE WEAK. THE EFFECTS OF FOOD AND WATER DEPRIVATION COULD FORCE THEM INTO EITHER A HOSTAGE SCENARIO OR AN ARMED BREAK-OUT ATTEMPT. A THIRD OPTION COULD BE TO EMPLOY INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN AN ATTEMPT TO GARNER WORLD SUPPPORT AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION. THE REPORTED NUMBERS OF HOLD-OUTS HAS RANGED FROM 2-300 TO 2,500. IT IS REQUESTED THAT REPORTING AGENCIES CONFIRM CURRENT FIGURES TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITIES.

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RPA

4. SECTOR 4A: KIBEHO: 27 APR: BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 1900-2300 RPA WERE SEEN UNEARTHING AND CARRYING AWAY DEAD BODIES ALONG THE KIBEHO-BUTARE ROAD. WITNESSES COUNTED SIXTEEN BODIES AT THIS INCIDENT. MILOBS CONFIRMED FRESHLY TURNED SOIL WHERE THESE BODIES MAY HAVE BEEN EXHUMED FROM. *COMMENT: THE MOVEMENT OF SIXTEEN BODIES WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE FINAL COUNTS WHICH WOULD BE DISCOVERED DURING THE COURSE OF INVESTIGATION. HOWEVER, PRIOR TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION BEGINNING FIVE DAYS FROM NOW, AN OPERATION TO REMOVE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF BODIES DURING THE*

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*HOURS OF DARKNESS IS POSSIBLE AND CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE USING A KIND OF AMBULANCE SHUTTLE SYSTEM, WHEREBY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS ARE TASKED TO REMOVE SO MANY BODIES TO A COLLECTION POINT WHERE A WORK PARTY LOADS A VEHICLE, THE VEHICLE TRAVELS TO A GIVEN DUMP SITE, AND RETURNS. TO BE MORE EFFICIENT, MORE THAN ONE VEHICLE ON THE ROUTE WOULD BE USED IN THIS TYPE OF OPERATION (ONE LOADING, ONE MOVING, ONE OFF-LOADING, ONE RETURNING EMPTY). IF THIS ACTIVITY IS GOING ON, IT COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN GOING ON SINCE SUNDAY. EVEN IF ONLY ONE COMPANY OF MEN WERE EMPLOYED AND GIVEN THE TASK OF COLLECTING MERELY FIVE BODIES PER NIGHT PER MAN, THIS COULD AMOUNT TO APPROXIMATELY 500 BODIES REMOVED PER NIGHT. INDICATORS TO WATCH FOR: INCREASED NUMBER OF RPA NOT INVOLVED IN THE CORDON ACTIVITY, EXHUMED BODIES COLLECTED AT ONE SITE, GONE THE NEXT DAY, FRESHLY TURNED SOIL OVERNIGHT, RPA DENIAL OF ACCESS TO CERTAIN AREAS, CONTINUOUS VEHICLE TRAFFIC DURING THE NIGHT, BODIES SHOWING UP IN MAJOR RIVERS, FRESH BODY DUMPS.* __

REFUGEES/IDPS

6. SECTOR 4A: KIBEHO: 28 1200B APR: 24 OF THE IDPS REMAINING IN THE COMPOUND AGREED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES, WERE SCREENED BY RPA AND RELEASED.

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RPA

4. SECTOR 4A: RPA CONTINUE TO EXHUME AND EVACUATE BODIES FROM KIBEHO. UNAMIR PERSONNEL ARE PROHIBITTED FROM AREAS WHERE THIS IS GOING ON. *COMMENT: UNLESS THERE IS VIDEO EVIDENCE, WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION BEGINS ITS INVESTIGATION, THE RPA WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN ITS PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IN THE EYES OF THE INTERNATIONAL (MEDIA) COMMUNITY THAT ONLY APPROXIMATELY 300 PEOPLE DIED. UNLESS UNAMIR CAN PROVIDE VIDEO FOOTAGE OR INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TO THE WORLD MEDIA, OUR CLAIMS OF HIGH MORTALITY DURING THE 22 APR INCIDENT WILL ONLY AMOUNT TO AN "OUR WORD AGAINST THEIRS" ARGUMENT AND WE ARE LIKELY TO COME UNDER INCREASED CRITICISM WITH THE RESULTANT DAMAGE TO OUR CREDIBILITY. UNITS SHOULD FOCUS THEIR EFFORT IN DETERMINING THE LOCATION THE BODIES ARE BEING DUMPED.*

REFUGEES/IDPS

6. MANY RETURNING IDPS ARE IN NEED OF FOOD, CLOTHING MEDICINE AND FARM EQUIPMENT. WITHOUT IMMEDIATE HELP, IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOME WILL TURN TO BANDITRY. DESPITE LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL CALLS FOR RESTRAINT, RETURNEES FACE ARBITRARY ARRESTS FOR SUSPECTED GENOCIDE INVOLVEMENT.

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RPA

2. SECTOR 3: RADIO RWANDA IS CALLING ON THE PEOPLE TO EXPRESS THEIR DISPLEASURE OVER UNAMIR'S REPORT OF FIGURES IN THE KIBEHO MASSACRE. IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE LANGUAGE WAS QUITE STRONG. *THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN OF PROBLEMS LOCALLY, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE USUAL COMBINATION OF INFLAMMATORY RHETORIC AND DISINCLINATION TOWARDS PROOF WILL HAVE ITS USUAL EFFECT ON THE POPULATION. THE RPA REMOVAL OF BODIES FROM THE MASSACRE SITE WILL EVENTUALLY GIVE THEM THE PLAUSABLE DENIABILITY REQUIRED TO PLAY THE INJURED PARTY AND DISCREDIT THE UN.*

3. SECTOR 4A: KIBEHO: INDICATIONS ARE THAT RPA ARE CONDUCTING AN EVACUATION OF BODIES FROM THE KIBEHO AREA BY VEHICLE. RPA CONTINUE TO DENY UNAMIR ACCESS TO AREAS WHERE BODIES ARE BEING EXHUMED AND REMOVED. THE SOUNDS OF CONTINUOUS VEHICLE TRAFFIC CAN BE HEARD ALONG THE KIBEHO-BUTARE ROAD. *COMMENT: WITHOUT VIDEO IMAGERY OF THESE ACTIVITES AND/OR POSSIBLY MEDIA PRESENCE, THESE ACTIVITES WILL LIKELY BE DENIED BY THE RPA AND GOVERNMENT. THE EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE WILL BE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF HUNDREDS (NOT THOUSANDS) OF DEAD AT KIBEHO CAMP, CLAIMS BY UNAMIR COUNTERED BY CLAIMS BY RPA WITH THE NET EFFECT OF DISCREDITTING UN/UNAMIR.*

REFUGEES/IDPS

7. SECTOR 4A: HUNDREDS OF IDPS CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT AT KIBEHO CAMP BUILDING COMPLEX. THEY ARE REPORTED TO HAVE RUN OUT OF FOOD AND WATER.

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ANNEX B TO
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
"KIBEHO INCIDENT" 22 APR

## SYNOPSIS OF ROLE OF UNAMIR

**TPS LOC WITHIN KIBEHO PRIOR TO AND ON 22 APR 95.**

1. **ZAMBATT**. Initially, a pl of ZAMBATT was deployed in KIBEHO camp. Early Apr 95, the force level was built up to a coy plus strength (220 pers). In addition, ZAMBATT also deployed medical pers to provide medical assistance to the IDPs. The various tasks performed by ZAMBATT were as follows :

a. Patrolling within the camp and establishment of a comd post so as to provide security to the IDPs and NGOs in the camp and also to coordinate all the activities therein.

b. Treatment and evac of casualties.

c. Transportation of IDPs to various home communes from the KIBEHO Camp.

d. Burial tasks after the massacre.

e. Information campaign to convince the IDPs to leave the camp voluntarily.

f. Assistance to the NGOs in distribution of food, water and other relief stores.

g. Established a comm link between the Coy HQ and UNAMIR HQ.

h. Assisted in negotiations with the RPA to diffuse the stand off situation at the MSF Building.

j. Providing a counter to RPA activities and being a deterrence by their physical presence thus minimizing casualties.

2. ZAMBATT troops did not fire back during the shooting by RPA at KIBEHO because the IDPs would have been caught in the fire fight and the casualties would have been higher. Secondly, instructions received from New York specifically stated that UN troops should not stand in the way of the RPA should they forcibly want to close the camps.

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3. **AUSMED**. On 21 April 95 RPA opened fire at 0700 hrs which resulted in heavy casualties from the ensuing panic and violence. AUSMED immediately despatched two CCPs for evacuating and treating possible UNAMIR as well as assisting IDPs casualties. The detachment, which remained in location until 29 April 95, in conjunction with ZAMBATT med pers, provided medical assistance to hundreds of IDPs. AUSMED also established a HF comm link with their elements in KIBEHO camp which gave accurate and timely info to all concerned.

4. **MILOBS**. In addition to the Sector Milobs in sector 4A, seven Milobs teams were despatched to KIBEHO camp on 21 Apr 95 from other sectors. These teams remained in the sector till 01 May 95.

5. **VISITS**.

A. On 18 April 95, RPA cordoned the whole of KIBEHO, NDAGO and MUNINI DPCs and fired warning shots to force the IDPs to concentrate in selected areas without prior intimation/info to UNAMIR. The DFC accompanied by the RPA COS visited KIBEHO camp to assess and diffuse the situation and coordinate details on the ground.

B. On 19 Apr 95, DFC and DCOS OPS visited KIBEHO camp to assess the sit and to coord UNAMIR efforts in BUTARE in a vain attempt to convince UN Agencies and NGOs to start evacuation and aid in KIBEHO IDPC.

C. On 20 Apr 95, the FC accompanied by the COS visited KIBEHO camp to see the situation on ground.

D. On 21 Apr 95, the SRSG with DCOS OPS visited BUTARE and requested the civil and military authorities to allow UN Agencies and NGOs to distribute food and water to the IDPs while the op was in progress. In several meetings in Butare with all civil and international agencies, tasks and responsibilities were assigned and a communications, command and control plan was discussed. At a subsequent visit to Kibeho camp, they discussed aspects of coordination between UNAMIR and MSF and discussed the outcome of the Butare meeting with the RPA Comd in the camp.

E. On 23 Apr 95, the FC accompanied by COS visited KIBEHO to assess the extent of damage and current sit. The Rwandese Ministers of Interior and Justice with the Chief UNHRFO visited KIBEHO to witness the situation after the massacre the previous night. The President of Rwanda also visited the IDPC later that afternoon.

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F. On 24 April 95, when there was a stand off between the RPA and IDPs inside the MSF building, the DFC and DCOS OPS visited KIBEHO to try and negotiate a peaceful settlement. Several hundreds were evac using UN vehicles. UNAMIR is still encouraging the IDPs still holed up in the MSF building to leave the camp and go to their respective home communes.

G. On 27 Apr 95, the Rwandese President, SRSG, members of the Rwandan Cabinet, members of the international diplomatic corps and international media representatives, visited KIBEHO DPC.

**TRANSPORTATION OF IDPs**

6. UNAMIR provided a total of 32 vehicles for the transportation of IDPs to various communes, casualty evacuation and distribution of humanitarian stores. These vehicles remained under comd the Tac HQ BUTARE from 19 Apr 95 till 29 Apr 95.

**SECURITY ARRANGMENTS - ENROUTE/HOME COMMUNES**

7. On 23 April 95, when RPA surrounded the BUTARE stadium in which approx 12,000 IDPs had concentrated, MALICOY rushed a platoon to the stadium to protect the IDPs from hostile locals, fighting amongst themselves and prevent clashes between the IDPs and the RPA. This platoon was subsequently relieved by a platoon from GHANBATT. The platoon was deployed until all the IDPs held at the stadium were evac to their respective communes.

8. UNAMIR formed troops provided security in the ORCs and home communes so as to ensure that the returnees could resettle in their home communes without undue harrasment by locals/RPA.

9. SENBATT and Milobs provided security at GISHAMVU, RUNYINYA, GISHALI and GISHITA which were the main concentration areas for the IDPs displaced from KIBEHO until evacuated by UNAMIR/UNHCR/IOM vehs to their respective home communes.

10. Escorted veh and foot convoys of IDPs evicted from KIBEHO camp to their home communes.

**ROLE OF ENGRS**

11. UNAMIR Force Engr Coy deployed dozers and all available dump trucks to improve the road BUTARE-KIBEHO which greatly assisted in the speedy movement of IDPs out of the camp. Also deployed recovery assets to keep the traffic moving.

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12. Provided a trench digger on 23 Apr 95 to assist in the burial of some of those killed in KIBEHO. However, due to the intensive efforts by the RPA to bury many during the night 22/23 Apr 95, there was little need for this excavator.

**ROLE OF SIGNALS**

13. The Force Sig Coy established VHF comm with HF back up from Coy HQ to UNAMIR HQ on 22 Apr 95 in KIBEHO camp which resulted in minute to minute accurate info being passed. In addition, the Force Signal Officer tried to install an INMARSAT terminal but were prohibited from doing so by the RPA until 24 Apr 95 when the terminal finally became operational.

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

14. UNAMIR troops in sectors 1, 2, 3 and 4B arranged with UN Agencies and NGOs for the provision of relief aid to returning IDPs to their home communes. The UNAMIR Chief Humanitarian Officer and the staff of Tac HQ (BUTARE) provided constant liasion with the forward deployed element of the Integrated Operations Centre and ensured that UNAMIR efforts were well coordinated and maximized.

**FOLLOW UP**

15. Approximately 1700 IDPs are reported to remain in the MSF building compound in KIBEHO camp. Despite best efforts on the part of the Rwandese govt and UNAMIR, the IDPs initially refused to vacate the premises which resulted in the RPA cordoning off the complex and positioning anti-tank weapons with the aim of demolishing the building. The DFC, DCOS OPS and CO ZAMBATT persuaded the RPA to do away with the dead line. Consequently, the holed up IDPs started leaving the building in a small trickle. Only about 200 IDPs have departed between 24 Apr 95 and 03 May 95.

16. Since ordering/institution of an International Investigation Commission on the KIBEHO incident, constant reports have been received both from ZAMBATT troops and Milobs in KIBEHO, that the RPA has started exhuming bodies in the camp and transporting them on road KIBEHO-BUTARE to unknown destinations with the possible aim of reducing the number of bodies to about 300 which was the official figure of the killed IDPs quoted by the Rwandese Govt. It is believed that this activity is conducted to project false info to the International Commission of Inquiry. UNAMIR troops and Milobs have been denied access to the sites where the exhuming is being carried out and to the sites where these bodies are suspected to be dumped/reburied.

P26/26
CRN 145

CURRENT CONDITIONS IN KIBEHO DRC

17. **Health/Medical** No medical aid is being provided to the IDPs and it is likely that unless medical aid is provided, there may be an outbreak of an epidemic soon.

18. **Sanitation** The hygiene and sanitation conditions are pathetic in the camp with human excrement and other garbege lying in the places where the IDPs are living and eating.

19. **Food/Water** The RPA is not permitting any supply of food and water to the holed up IDPs with the result, deaths due to starvation have started occuring.

20. **Security** RPA have cordoned off the complete MSF building complex. ZAMBATT troops are deployed in the camp to provide security to the IDPs and NGOs in the camp. Approximately 1700 IDPs remain, consisting of 300 males, the remainder being women and children.

REPORT ON ALLEGED EXHUMATION
OF GRAVES AT KIBEHO BY RPA

1. THE SUDDEN CLOSURE OF DPCS AT KIBEHO AND OTHERS BROUGHT IN A LOT OF TENSE ATHMOSPHERE UNTIL ALL IDPS HAVE BEEN EVACUATED TO HOME COMMUNES EXCEPT FEW HUNDREDS HARD-CORE STILL OCCUPING THE BUILDING COMPLEX.

2. SEVERAL INCIDENTS OCCURED DURING THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF THE CLOSURE AND EVENTUAL EVACUATION OF THE IDPS.

3. AMONG THE SEVERAL INCIDENTS WAS THE KILLING OF IDPS BY RPA AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONTROVERSES OF THE ACTUAL FIGURE OF IDPS KILLED.

4. IT IS IN LINE WITH THESE THAT SECTOR 4A STATIONED A TEAM AT KIBEHO TO PERMANENTLY OBSERVE, MONITOR AND REPORT ON ALL ACTIVITIES AROUND THE CLOCK.

5. OUR TEAM WAS STATIONED VERY CLOSE TO THE BUILDING COMPLEX TO BE ABLE TO OBSERVE AND MONITOR ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE HARD-CORE IDPS SINCE THE REST OF THE CAMP WAS EMPTY.

6. ON THURSDAY, 27 APR 95 AND BETWEEN THE HRS OF 1900 TO 2300, TEAM WAS DEPLOYED AT THE COMPANY HQ OF ZAMBATT, VERY CLOSE TO THE BUILDING COMPLEX SO AS TO SEE AT FIRST HAND ALL ACTIVITIES PERTAINING TO RPA AND IDPS.

7. TEAM HAD INFORMATION FROM ZAMBATT PL COMD 2NDLT MAWGOWELA WHOSE POSITION WAS ABOUT 700M FROM THE COY HQ THAT RPA HAD EXHUMED GRAVES NEAR HIS POSITION.

8. THE OFFICER AND A NUMBER OF SOLDIERS BETWEEN THE MENTIONED HRS OBSERVED RPA SOLDIERS CARRYING EXHUMED BODIES ON THE KIBEHO-BUTARE ROAD. IN ALL A TOTAL OF 16 BODIES WERE CONFIRMED COUNTED.

9. THE ZAMBATT PL COMD ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE BODIES WERE CARRIED IN BLANKETS AND LARGE POLYTHINE TAUPOLINES TOWARDS THE BUTARE ROAD.

10. THE WHOLE EXHUMATION EXERCICE BY RPA WAS CONFIRMED THE NEXT MORNING (FRIDAY, 28 APR 95) BY THE EXPOSURE OF FRESH TOP SOIL AT THE MASS GRAVES.
TEAM IDENTIFIED 3 GRAVES IN THE VALLEY AREA, WHICH HAD BEEN TEMPERED WITH. TEAM ALSO SAW IN THE SAME AREA ABOUT A PL OR MORE STRENGTH OF RPA CARFULLY CHECKING, MOST PROBABLY FOR OTHER GRAVES THEY (RPA) OVERLOOKED IN THE NIGHT.

11. SUBMITTED FOR YOUR ACTION, PLEASE.

G6-incidents
5/5/95

MEMORANDUM

Prepared For: Force Comd
MGen Tousignant

Prepared By: UNAMIR Force PAO
Lt(N) Kent Page

29/4

Info: J3PK, SRSG, DFC, COS

Subject: Report on Events of 22 Apr 95
Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons Camp

Date: 28 Apr 95

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1. The following is a chronological report of my observations of the events on 22 Apr at the Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons Camp:

a. I arrived at approx 0745 hrs, 22 Apr 95 at Kibeho Camp by UN helicopter with journalists from Reuters, Magnum and Die Zeit;

b. RPA at the first roadblock, located between the helipad and the ZamBatt Co HQ, denied the journalists access to not just the Camp, but also to the ZamBatt Co HQ;

c. As I was in uniform, we agreed that I would go into the Camp and find out what was going on and return and brief the journalists later that morning;

d. At this time, across the hill, we saw a man being chased by two armed RPA down the hill - he was shot at a few times, but not hit and a few minutes later, apprehended;

e. Throughout the rest of the morning, there were sporadic bursts of gunfire either into or above the crowd, or at specific persons trying to run through the cordon;

f. On entering the Camp, I first made my way to the Medicins Sans Frontieres building, located next to the ZamBatt Co HQ. On entering the compound, I faced approx 50 pers with severe, fresh machete wounds to the head, face, neck, back, arms and legs. There appeared to be only two local MSF staff on hand, with no medical supplies and there was not much they could do. I was told that the MSF staff usually arrived around 0900 hrs;

g. I then passed by the back of the ZamBatt Co HQ where the Zambians showed me an IDP who had tried to hide in one of their pit latrines and was buried up to the head in excrement and was either dead or unconscious;

h. By 0825 hrs, I had made my way along the road towards the ZamBatt Platoon HQ location, found in the centre of the camp. The crowd was very tense - likely from being packed together as they were, but also from four days of little sleep, food and water, horrendous sanitary conditions, nighttime machete attacks

Kibeho

and fear of their future, but specifically, I would say, as a result of the sporadic gunfire that was occurring. The RPA had an air of not so much hostility, but rather of insolence;

i. At 0830 hrs, I witnessed and caught on video, a man trying to run through the cordon past the RPA. He was shot in the back at very close range by an RPA soldier chasing him. I tried, along with two Zambian soldiers, to get over to see if he had survived, but we were prevented from doing so by the RPA;

j. For the next hour and a quarter I made my way to the back of the ZamBatt Platton HQ location, but due to the crowds was unable to gain access to the compound. The crowds were crushing up to the compound and there was general tenseness and misery about the situation amongst the IDPs;

k. At some point I saw another man being shot by the RPA as he tried to run down a hill. Again, we were denied access to his body, but within 15 minutes, he had been buried on the spot by RPA;

l. During this time, ZamBatt soldiers, led by Capt Francis Sikaonga with a loudhailer, began to move the very frightened crowd back from the ZamBatt Platoon location. This was a slow, but steady process which I have on video also. People were generally confused, fatigued and despondent. As they passed by us, some would indicate that if they left their throats would be cut, others made half-hearted attempts to walk towards the RPA who pushed them back into the crowd and others were dehydrated enough to drink muddy water from plastic sheets strewn about the ground. Many children had lost their parents and were wandering around aimlessly;

m. An UN truck had been overtaken by the crowd and men could be seen atop the cab and others trying to get in. It had to stop as it made its way towards the compound due to the density of the crowd. With the work done by Capt Sikaonga, it was eventually cleared;

n. After assisting in directing people back, I made my way through the crowd to the ZamBatt Platoon Compound. I had been in Kibeho on Wed and Thurs that week, but never had the crowd been packed together so tightly. It was essentially a question of forcing our way through the crowd and for the first time in my many visits to Kibeho over that past week and over the past three months, I distinctly felt that there was an air of danger, fear and tension amongst the IDP's;

o. As we pushed our way through the crowd towards the entrance of the compound, the crowd cleared, but only because the road was covered in bodies of dead, dying or injured people - to the point where it was impossible not to pass by without at some point, stepping on someone. I would estimate that there were about twenty people, men, women and children, laying in front of the compound. However, these were injured not by bullet wounds, but rather machete wounds or having been crushed, suffocated or dehydrated;

p. I finally gained access to the ZamBatt compound and over the next two and one quarter hours, we assisted with bringing in injured people - some with machete wounds to the face, having babies/children, both alive and dead, passed to us from the crowd and giving what water we had to the sick and dying. Some of the ZamBatt soldiers would go out into the crowd and help bring in bodies or injured people. They also were able to clear the pile of bodies at the front entrance, by bringing them into the compound. They also provided a sense of stability to an impossible situation and kept the crowd as calm and organized as they could. However, with the sporadic firing taking place at all points of the camp, as the morning went on, the situation appeared more and more grim. Some healthy men fought their way into the compound, but were apprehended by ZamBatt and pushed outside the barbed wire perimeter;

q. At approx 1035 hrs, the ZamBatt compound received fire to the degree that we all immediately dove behind sandbags for a few minutes. It is impossible to say whether the fire was directed at us, but is certain that it passed all around us - no one was injured in the compound, but could have been in the crowd;.

r. At 1045 hrs, I confirmed with an UNREO rep who had made his way illegally past the cordon and into the compound, that MSF, UNICEF, Save The Children, etc. were all being blocked by the RPA cordon and no medical assistance was getting in;

s. By this time, there were over 125 people inside the compound to whom we were providing safety, security and sanctuary as well as humanitarian and medical assistance as best we could. I counted 35 dead babies/children that were lined up in the compound. Of the other victims, I would say that the majority were still alive, however, about fifteen adults and youths were dead - again from trampling, suffocation, dehydration, etc. There were also about 75 children sitting in the compound. Throughout, the ZamBatt troops were providing water to them and those in the crowd and generally maintaining some semblance of control around the compound, in fact, doing a magnificent job given the conditions;

t. At approx 1100 hrs, the Prefect of Gikongoro drove through the crowd and through the compound, accompanied by RPA. He continued on towards the transportation/screening point at the opposite end of the camp;

u. Shortly thereafter, I watched another man shot who had been walking past the compound down the hill at the back of the ZamBatt location. Again, we were denied access to his body and he was buried by RPA within 5-10 minutes on the hillside in a shallow grave;

v. Throughout this time, there was sporadic gunfire throughout the camp. Also, I could see that people were walking through the screening point towards the tranportation points - as they were, they were being beaten severely by RPA with long, heavy sticks and rifle butts;

w. In the opposite direction, in a clearing on the hill, a women was beaten to the ground by three RPA with sticks, then chased and beaten back up into the crowd. If you are wondering why we couldn't do anything, these occurrences were taking place hundreds of yards and tens of thousands of people away and our hands were full taking care of the sick and dying around the compound and also providing security to the compound. At the same time, ZamBatt soldiers would venture into the crowd to assist those that they could;

x. At 1130 hrs, a cameraman from Rwanda TV passed through the compound accompanied by a photojournalist from the local newspaper IMVAHO;

y. More people with machete wounds stumbled into the compound area and we had them sit in the shade of some UN vehicles in the area. By this time, women and children were hiding under the vehicles inside the compound;

z. At 1150 hrs, more shots were heard around the camp, this time a more serious and intense volley - the crowd was bordering on panic;

aa. At 1155 hrs, a severe rainstorm approached the camp and by 1200 hrs, the rain started coming down hard on the crowd. The ZamBatt soldiers held their positions at the barbed wire perimeter of the compound shouting to the crowd to stay where they were and calm down - others helped move the 35-40 dead babies/children into a building for dignity from the rain;

bb. As I had video and camera equipment which I had been shooting with all morning, I got into a UN jeep parked inside the compound with a milob from Ghana and one milob from Mali, to protect my equipment from the rain;

cc. At that point, as the rain beat down and the crowd shifted for shelter, heavy gunfire erupted from all over the camp. Within one minute, despite the best efforts of ZamBatt soldiers to prevent it, the crowd poured over the barbed wire and overran the outside part of the compound, which included the jeep I was in. They did not make it into the walled part of the compound;

dd. Our vehicle instantly disappeared under the crowd. We couldn't see outside the windows or the windshield due to the people crushed against the car, on the hood, on the windshield, on the roof and under the vehicle. For the next one and a half hours we remained in the vehicle, not only physically unable to open a door for the crush of people, but when I started to roll down my window for air, people tried to force their way inside;

ee. The firing continued from 1200 hrs to about 1250 hrs, relatively continuously, then died down to sporadic fire. The people on the roof had broken our antennae so we could not send messages out about our situation, but as we were about 20 yards from an UN truck that had 3 ZamBatt soldiers on the cab keeping people from overtaking it, we remained inside the vehicle rather than risking the impossible of forcing our way out of the vehicle and through the crowd;

ff. At about 1300 hrs, someone told us through the window that people were being macheted in the crowd behind the vehicle - one minute later, a man's face appeared in one of our windows, split in half with a machete;

gg. Throughout, people were passing babies and children above their heads towards the ZamBatt compound, which may explain for the 250 abandoned children found there later;

hh. At about 1330 hrs, the crowd was still crushed together, but two ZamBatt soldiers forced their way to the vehicle and using sticks, were able to clear a path for us towards the end of the camp. As they did so, they had to pick up and remove bodies from before us, and as we passed by, the crowd swallowed up any space that had been provided;

ii. By 1345 hrs we were at the transportation point outside the perimeter of the camp. Sporadic firing could still be heard. After waiting for instructions, for about one hour, then we were told to go to Butare;

jj. On the road to Butare, we measured a 13 km steady stream of IDP's making their way along the road. They were being beaten by RPA with sticks, were being stopped and having what little possessions they had with them taken (eg. radios), and were being forced to run down the road by RPA chasing them. On more than one occassion I witnessed local civilians along the sides of the road beating the IDPs as they passed by.

2. At this point, I stopped being a witness to the events, but am told that at approx 1730 hrs, heavy firing into the crowd took place for an extended period, including machine gun firing, grenades and, I am told, mortar rounds.

3. The following morning, 23 Apr 95, the RPA were burying bodies by 0500 hrs in pit latrines and shallow graves.

4. I arrived in the afternoon with another media team and filmed the burying of bodies by ZamBatt and also the beginnings of the standoff in the compound. Another escaping IDP was shot dead by two RPA and his body left in the valley at the base of one of the hills the same day.

5. What video and film footage I have from the period of 18 - 28 Apr of Kibeho Camp is available for use as evidence as required.

Lt(N) Kent Page
UNAMIR Force PAO
11124

MEMORANDUM

Prepared For: Force Comd
MGen Tousignant

Prepared By: UNAMIR Force PAO
Lt(N) Kent Page

Info: J3PK, LCdr Gregory

Subject: Kibeho IDP Camp Body Count

Date: 28 Apr 95

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1. For what it's worth, I can only say that I personally saw a little more than fifty dead, men, women and mostly children, prior to the 1200 hrs shooting. I saw many more as we drove out of the compound, but I was in the middle of the crowd, so could not give an estimate of the number shot around the perimeter of the crowd.

2. I think that it is impossible to accurately tell how many people were killed for the following reasons:

a. the hills of Kibeho are absolutely covered in the debris and belongings of the IDPs. There are hundreds of yards where you cannot see the ground for the belongings. I am certain that many children are likely buried beneath the garbage and even today (28 Apr) saw three bodies that have not yet been recovered from the hills without looking too hard. Unfortunately, they are so well camoflaged with belongings, that I stepped on one;

b. many people were buried very quickly by RPA as they were shot throughout the morning of 22 Apr, as were the ones that I witnessed;

c. some belongings could easily be mistaken for bodies unless you went right up to them and vice versa;

d. on Sunday, with the media, we filmed one man who was very obviously dead on his back, surrounded by other bodies - until the ZamBatt soldiers came up to place him on a stretcher to be put in a mass grave. When they grabbed him by the shoulders, he jumped to his feet and ran into the compound, obviously faking death and waiting for a chance to run;

e. many people who were injured were forced to march towards Butare and likely died along the way; and,

f. although I am not a medical doctor, I suspect that many of those that I saw in the MSF building the morning of 22 Apr, could not have survived the day given that they were receiving no medical care and some were missing half their heads and faces.

3. Simply put, too many people died unnecessarily.

Lt(N) Kent Page

MEMORANDUM

Prepared For: Force Comd
MGen Tousignant

Prepared By: UNAMIR Force PAO
Lt(N) Kent Page

Info: J3PK
LCdr Gregory

Subject: Kibeho IDP Camp Conclusion

Date: 28 Apr 95

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1. This tragedy could have been prevented, even once the cordon operation began:

a. had the RPA not forced everyone together at such inhumanely close quarters with no sanitation and little food, water and sleep for five days;

b. had the RPA allowed for UNAMIR reinforcements to help out with security and stability of the situation;

c. had the RPA not lost their patience and discipline with the crowd control situation, as was the case on 22 Apr;

d. had the RPA merely apprehended those that tried to escape throughout the morning of 22 Apr, instead of shooting them down at point blank range;

e. had the RPA not begun beating IDP's throughout the day and as they left the camp on 22 Apr; and,

f. it is clear that those who ran, probably had a good reason to do this, so it must be noted that a contributing factor to this tragedy were the armed elements in the camp population.

Lt(N) Kent Page
UNAMIR Force PAO
111124

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

# REPORT ON THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE INCIDENT AT KIBEHO ON 22 APR

## Introduction

1. The incident at the Kibeho internally displaced persons camp is the biggest event after the genocide of Apr 94. It is important that a detailed review of the incidents leading to the tragedy,the tragic incident itself and the events afterwards be carried out so that some important lessons for the future can be drawn and tragedies of such nature be prevented.

## Aim

2. The aim of this report is to analyze the sequence of events leading to the death of internally displaced persons at the Kibeho camp and tabulate the actions of all the parties concerned.

## Events before the incident

3. First anniversary of the genocide. The government of Rwanda declared that a period of national mourning would be observed throughout the country from 7 Apr to 14 Apr 95. It also announced that the displaced persons camps in South Western Rwanda was a problem and an immediate solution to this was to be found because these camps were harboring criminals and these were considered a threat to the security of the country. As a prelude to the national mourning it was observed that a large number of persons were returning to Kibeho and the strength of Kibeho was reported to be increasing everyday. Small displaced persons camps like Rwamiko were abandoned by the displaced persons and these persons shifted to Kibeho. The large influx into Kibeho continued from 4 to 14 Apr 95. The period of observance of the anniversary of the genocide generally passed away peacefully despite apprehensions that there may be some incidents of revenge.

G-6 (incidents)

4. Events leading to the Tragedy. The following activities of importance occurred before the event at Kibeho :

(a) On 13 Apr 95 it was reported that the RPA entered Kivugiza IDP camp and forced the people to leave. Many ran to the Kibeho and some to Rwamiko leaving their possessions behind. The vice president of Rwanda Mr Paul Kagame paid an unscheduled visit to the Burundi border and had a night halt at Butare.

(b) From 13 Apr 95 to 17 Apr 95 there was move of RPA in and around the camps and actions by the RPA to coerce people of small camps to leave. The hostile reaction of the locals toward RPA appeared to be on the Increase. There were reports of stone throwing on RPA patrols and stray incidents of weapon snatching/ grenade throwing.

(c) On 18 Apr at 0300 it was reported that RPA soldiers surrounded the Kibeho, Munini and Ndago camps. RPA arrival panicked IDPs who ran to UNAMIR positions. At approximately 0500, some firing occurred for an unknown reason, resulting in a stampede of IDPs; 11 persons were killed from trampling. A complete cordon and partial search operation was underway. It was later learned that approximately two battalions of 301 RPA Brigade was deployed from Runyinya (6112) up to Kibeho, Ndago. The brigade commander Lt Col Fred Ibiringa addressed the displaced persons and after that some volunteered to go back. At 1630, for unknown reasons RPA fired numerous warning shots, nine persons were killed in the resulting stampede. UNAMIR DFC and D COS OPS visitted Kibeho camp to assess and defuse the situation on the ground.

(d) On 19 Apr 95 RPA troops went to Kamana camp and the second in command addressed the persons to get ready to move out of the camp. The RPA also started to screen the persons and then clear them to leave the camps. The speed of screening was slow and only 700 persons were cleared on 19 Apr 95. Minister of Rehabilitation addressed the camps and told them the of need to leave the camps immediately.

This HQ was info only at 0900h 18 Apr 95.
DFC was called to RPA HQ and briefed by COS RPA.
Jt visit to Kibeho DFC/COS
Modalities explained to IDPs.

(e) All UN agencies shunned the exercise and only UNAMIR continued to send their vehicles to transport people cleared by RPA. UN agencies and associated NGOs only started participation on late 20 Apr 95 after consultation with their heads of Agency/HQs. UNAMIR provided a total of 32 vehicles for transportation of IDPs to various communes, casualty evacuation and distribution of humanitarian stores. The impassable road conditions on the Butare-Kibeho road were repaired and improved using all available UNAMIR Force Engineer assets.

Nsit DFE

(f) 20 Apr 95 There was a problem of space as the persons were tightly concentrated at one place and there was a substantial breakdown of sanitation, an acute shortage of food generally and a complete absence of food at Kibeho and Kamana. 3976 persons were transported to their home communes after screening by the RPA at Kibeho. At 1250hrs some persons threw stones at RPA and fire was returned but no casualties occurred. At 1730 RPA opened fire, killing 20 persons and injuring 60. This happened when one person allegedly tried to snatch a weapon from an RPA soldier.

Nsit FC

(g) 21 Apr 95. At about 0700 RPA surrounded Ndago camp and fired in the air which sent the inhabitants into panic and hundreds ran towards the Zambatt location and in the process ran through the concertina wire resulting in injuries to a large number of persons. The situation at the camps remained tense due to the imminent closure by force by the RPA.A large number of persons left by foot after screening by RPA . UNAMIR AUSMED dispatched a casualty clearing post, which operated in conjunction with Zambatt medical personnel, providing medical assistance and evacuation to thousands of IDPs. The SRSG visitted Butare requesting the civil and military authorities to allow UN agencies and NGOs to distribute food and water to the IDPs while the cordon operation was in progress. UNAMIR provided 32 vehicles for the transportation of IDPs to various communes, casualty evacuation and distribution of humanitarian resources.

5. 22 Apr 95. The day began at Kibeho with sporadic firing being done by RPA at irregular intervals throughout last night. The details of activities are summarized as follows :-

(a) 0830 There was a large concentration of persons at the center of the camp around the Zambatt platoon location. The persons were packed together very tightly with little sleep or food over the last few days. A large number had wounds due to the sporadic gunfire and machete attacks by persons inside the camp. Zambatt platoon

(x) Needs to be covered in more details/sequence. See FPM's report/Page's report.

tried to restore order by creating an opening and letting the crowd to spread a bit. This continued for the next two hours and the effort was a partial success.

(b) 1030. The Zambatt platoon locality was fired upon by persons unknown and it was impossible to continue the operation of restoring order. All assistance to the injured was stopped and medical teams were denied permission by the RPA to enter the camp.

(c) 1155. A severe rainstorm approached the camp and by 1200 heavy rainfall started. As the IDP crowd ran for shelter a heavy volley of gunfire was fired by the RPA. The firing continued till 1250 and then died down to sporadic fire. A large number of persons were casualties due to gunfire, machete wounds and other causes.

(d) 1300. It was reported that people were being attacked by machetes and the crowd was still crushed together.

(e) 1500. It was reported that the RPA was beating even those who had presented themselves at the screening points. Anybody trying to escape by running down the hill was either shot at or chased and captured.

1705 - 2155

(f) 1710. The crowd near the clearing post, approximated at 5,000 people, surged and ran against the cordon for undetermined reasons. Heavy firing on the crowd started for extended period including machine gun fire and grenades. Fire is reported to have been exchanged between both RPA and IDP.

fpm report

2200 - 0510h 23 Apr 95

6. 23 Apr 95. The RPA started burying bodies in the pit latrines and in shallow graves. The access to outsiders was given later around 1000hrs. At Huye (Butare) Stadium, where approximately 12,000 IDPs were concentrated, Malicoy deployed a platoon to protect IDPs from hostile locals. This platoon was subsequently relieved by a platoon from Ghanbatt.

Fe risk'E

7. UNAMIR activities and actions also included:

a. provision of security by formed troops in the ORCs and home communes so as to ensure that the returnees could resettle in their home communes without undue harrassment by locals.

b. provision of security by Sennbatt and MILOBs at Gishamvu, Runyinya, Gishili and

NOT clearly covered
Cover under:-

(a) Role of Zambatt in Kibeho
(b) Assistance since 18th to 21st & on 22nd and thereafter.
(c) Role of Milobs
(d) Role of Ausmed
(e) Role of Engrs / Sigs & others.
(f) Role of formed tps. Security environment in communes & follow up.

Gishita which were the main concentration areas for the IDPs from Kibeho until evacuated by UNAMIR/UNHCR/IOM vehicles to their respective home communes;

c. UNAMIR troops in Sectors 1, 2, 3 and 4B arranged with UN agencies and NGOs for the provision of relief aid to returning IDPs to their home communes;

d. escort of vehicle and foot convoys of IDPs evicted from Kibeho camp to their home communes;

e. provision of engineer resources to assist in burial of some of those killed in Kibeho;

f. negotiations by UNAMIR DFC and D COS Ops for the peaceful settlement of an RPA/IDP stand-off at the MSF building compound. Hundreds of these last hold-outs were subsequently evacuated using UN vehicles. UNAMIR continues to negotiate the repatriation of the remaining IDPs.

Conclusion.

8. This report is an unprocessed compilation of various source reports and is intended as a general chronology of events, not a final analytical product. A detailed enquiry into the episode will bring to light some more facts which will further amplify the report.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
ET DE LA COOPERATION
B.P. 179 KIGALI

N°0531/03.00.1/CAB

File: Indepent Investigation Commissio

DFC

cc: Mr. Conde, Mr. Gbe
COS, KS
LA

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération de la République Rwandaise présente ses compliments à la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda et a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance que le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise a créé une Commission d'Enquête sur les événements de KIBEHO dont la MINUAR fait partie.

Le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise prie le Secrétariat Général de l'OUA de bien vouloir apporter une aide financière et logistique à cette Commission et d'en nommer un représentant.
La Commission d'Enquête doit commencer ses travaux le 03 Mai 1995 et dispose d'un délai de deux semaines pour déposer son rapport.
La Commission d'Enquête qui comprend un représentant de chacun des pays suivants: les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, la Hollande, la France, la Belgique et le Canada, des représentants de l'OUA ainsi que ceux du Gouvernement rwandais, se choisira son bureau (Président, Vice-Président, Rapporteur) lors de sa première séance de travail.

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération de la République Rwandaise remercie la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda de l'urgence qu'il voudra bien accorder à la présente et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa haute considération.

Kigali, le 29 APR 1995

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES ET DE LA COOPERATION

MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES
POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
KIGALI

Gb
15/5/95

RWANDESE REPUBLIC
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND COOPERATION
B.P. 179 KIGALI

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Rwandese Republic presents its compliments to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda and has the honour to inform that the Rwandese Government has created an Inquiry Commission on the events of KIBEHO in which UNAMIR takes part.

The Government of Rwanda would like the OAU Secretary General to provide a financial and logistic assistance to this Commission and to designate a representative.

The Inquiry Commission must start working on 3 May 1995 and will submit its report after two weeks.

This Commission comprises a representative of each of the following countries : United States of America, England, Germany, Holland, France, Belgium and Canada, the representatives OAU and Rwandese Government. The Commission will choose its bureau ( Chairman, Vice-chairman, Reporter) during its first working session.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Rwandese Republic is grateful to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda and would like to present its best regards.

Kigali, 29 April 1995

United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda.
KIGALI