

L'état des opérations civiles dans les provinces

115. La période considérée dans le présent rapport est importante du fait de la liaison qui a été établie entre le Chef des opérations civiles à Léopoldville et les fonctionnaires civils de l'ONUC dans les provinces. Les rapports de ces fonctionnaires et d'autres membres de la mission des opérations civiles, qui ont commencé à se déplacer plus fréquemment dans le pays, ont donné à l'ONU une image beaucoup plus précise que celle dont elle disposait il y a un mois de la situation économique et sociale hors de Léopoldville.

116. La présence d'un ou même de deux fonctionnaires de l'ONUC dans chaque province ne peut pas compenser l'arrêt de la transmission de renseignements et de statistiques économiques d'une importance essentielle, arrêt qui a en fait isolé Léopoldville du reste du pays, et ne peut pas non plus compenser tout à fait la désorganisation des liaisons entre les ministères centraux et provinciaux. Néanmoins, les renseignements reçus jusqu'à présent permettent d'évaluer la nature et l'ampleur de l'assistance technique à fournir dans diverses régions et de suggérer un système de priorités. Malheureusement, ces renseignements tendent aussi à confirmer les impressions que l'on avait sur l'état de désorganisation administrative, économique et sociale du pays. On peut dire que les difficultés d'ordre général qui ont été énumérées dans la section précédente existent dans les provinces aussi bien que dans la capitale, mais il faut ajouter les considérations suivantes :

a) Le fonctionnaire civil de l'ONUC - dans la mesure où il est chargé de l'assistance technique - se trouve accablé de renseignements divers provenant de toutes les sources, c'est-à-dire non seulement d'agents gouvernementaux mais aussi de commerçants et de particuliers. Son temps est à ce point absorbé qu'il a dû renoncer en partie à la tâche dont il devait s'acquitter, c'est-à-dire à beaucoup se déplacer dans la province à laquelle il est affecté. Comme la plupart des intéressés l'ont déjà signalé, leurs impressions sont limitées à la zone de la capitale parce que leur temps est tellement pris qu'ils ne peuvent guère s'en éloigner.

b) Sauf peut-être dans une province, les gouvernements provinciaux sont fort peu solides et le fait que l'on ne sache pas si un président ou si un ministre sera toujours au pouvoir le lendemain empêche presque totalement d'entreprendre les travaux relatifs à des plans économiques ou sociaux sérieux. La situation qui, semble-t-il, prévaut dans tout le pays a récemment été résumée par un des fonctionnaires civils dans les termes suivants : "Il faut se rendre compte qu'ils (les ministres) sont assez enclins à demander mon assistance toutes les fois qu'ils doivent affronter un problème urgent, mais il est très rare qu'ils saisissent l'occasion de me consulter au sujet des problèmes à long terme".

c) Bien que la portée des opérations civiles dans les diverses provinces se soit accrue au cours du mois dernier, il ne faut pas se dissimuler que l'assistance technique fournie par l'ONUC en dehors de Léopoldville demeure modeste. Dans la plupart des provinces, les seules opérations civiles sont effectuées par la Croix-Rouge et les équipes de télécommunications qui continuent à faire un travail excellent sur le plan pratique. Du point de vue des activités consultatives, il convient de mentionner, en plus des fonctionnaires civils de l'ONUC, les spécialistes détachés par l'OMS auprès des ministres de la santé des cinq provinces. Etant donné le succès remporté par les spécialistes de l'OMS et étant donné aussi que les autres ministres eux-mêmes ont exprimé le désir de bénéficier d'une assistance analogue, il serait, semble-t-il, judicieux de détacher des conseillers auprès des principaux ministères de chaque province. Des consultants belges se trouvent à présent dans la plupart des ministères provinciaux.

d) Les rapports reçus des provinces indiquent clairement qu'une aide financière est essentielle si l'on veut conserver intacte la structure économique. Si, comme le mentionnait le dernier rapport, la vitesse acquise précédemment a permis à la plupart des activités industrielles, agricoles et minières de se poursuivre pendant les premiers mois, nombre d'entre elles devront être abandonnées si l'on ne dispose pas des fonds nécessaires pour les salaires et le matériel. En fait, le fonctionnaire civil en poste à Bukavu a averti que les petites industries et les petites entreprises agricoles "risquent de disparaître si l'on ne trouve pas un moyen de continuer à les financer". Il a également souligné

que les mines qui fonctionnent actuellement dans la province de Kivu pourraient fort bien être paralysées si tous les employés qui ont déjà donné le préavis requis, démissionnaient effectivement.

Conclusion

117. Dans la conclusion de la section consacrée aux opérations civiles dans le dernier rapport d'activité, on exprimait l'espoir que l'ONUC pourrait contribuer à résoudre, dans un laps de temps raisonnable, les multiples problèmes économiques auxquels doit faire face le Congo, si du moins les conditions de base étaient remplies. Malheureusement, cet espoir n'a guère été réalisé, pour les raisons multiples qui sont exposées dans ce chapitre et dans d'autres chapitres du présent rapport. Toutefois, comme on l'a souligné au début du présent chapitre, il a été possible d'empêcher l'écroulement de l'économie et des services publics essentiels, grâce surtout aux efforts des techniciens de l'ONU. Dès que les conditions voulues existent, les consultants en matière d'assistance technique sont toujours prêts à faire progresser rapidement le pays vers la stabilité économique; ils seront aidés par les nouvelles équipes d'experts dont on pourra avoir besoin, dès qu'elles pourront travailler utilement et judicieusement dans des parties différentes du pays.

IX. CONCLUSION

118. La période sur laquelle porte le présent rapport a été une période de grande incertitude et de grande agitation. On a annoncé divers "gouvernements" rivaux, dont la composition a été remaniée, mais qui n'existaient que sur le papier. Le "coup" du chef d'état-major de l'ANC a introduit un nouveau facteur qui a ajouté à la complexité de la situation. Le but de cette entreprise était ostensiblement de neutraliser les deux principales figures politiques et le Parlement, afin que pendant l'arrêt momentané d'activité qui en résulterait, l'on puisse découvrir des solutions politiques. La marche quotidienne de l'administration devait être assurée par un collège de commissaires recrutés essentiellement parmi les étudiants. En fait, cependant, comme il est indiqué plus haut dans le présent rapport, l'irruption de l'armée sur la scène politique a constitué une nouvelle menace contre la paix et la sécurité, et a, en réalité, empêché une activité politique pacifique. Loin d'assurer quelque degré de sécurité et de stabilité, l'ANC est devenue le principal fauteur de troubles. Cette force, éparpillée dans différents centres à travers le pays, manquant de toute direction et de tout contrôle cohérents, indisciplinée, ne recevant pas de solde, complètement armée, a commencé à vouloir faire la loi. Arrestations et emprisonnements arbitraires sans l'ombre d'une justification légale sont devenus chose quotidienne. A Léopoldville, foyer de la vie du pays et centre principal de l'activité politique, il en est résulté un état de terreur qui a menacé de paralyser la vie de la collectivité.

119. Il a fallu faire face à cette situation avec fermeté, car la persistance d'un état d'anarchie et de désordre devenait de plus en plus dangereuse. A la suite d'efforts tenaces, le chef d'état-major de l'ANC a été persuadé de retirer ses troupes de la ville, où elles erraient dans les rues à leur gré. En même temps, les troupes des Nations Unies ont assumé de nouvelles responsabilités concernant le maintien de l'ordre public. Cela a eu immédiatement un effet apaisant sur la ville, effet qui s'est trouvé reflété à quelque degré dans les capitales provinciales. Mais le grave problème que pose l'ANC persiste. Sa solution véritable, si le pays ne doit pas être constamment menacé par le chaos et l'anarchie, incombe aux dirigeants congolais eux-mêmes.

120. Un autre élément de complications a été l'apparition violente de bandes de jeunes dévoyés qui, apparemment, se ralliaient à tel ou tel élément politique mais qui, parfois, n'avaient que des attaches tribales. Ces bandes, quelquefois armées, profitant du désordre qui régnait, sont devenues de plus en plus hardies et actives. Ayant commencé par se livrer à des voies de fait inspirées en général par des mobiles d'ordre politique douteux, elles en sont venues à être impliquées dans des assassinats, des enlèvements, et il s'est produit quelques cas de ce genre à Léopoldville même. C'est là une forme d'activité extrêmement dangereuse pour l'avenir du pays et que doivent juguler les dirigeants au nom desquels ces jeunes gens prétendent agir.

121. Le collège des commissaires, composé de jeunes étudiants sans expérience et dont l'objectif déclaré était d'assurer le fonctionnement des rouages de l'administration, a créé des problèmes particuliers pour ce qui est des efforts des Nations Unies. Ces jeunes gens étaient invariablement accompagnés de nombreux conseillers belges qui, parfois, avaient été leurs propres professeurs. L'inévitable conséquence en était que les commissaires se montraient plus enclins à écouter leurs propres mentors qu'à coopérer avec les consultants des Nations Unies qui, dans de nombreux ministères, se sont bientôt heurtés à un mur d'opposition. En vérité, au lieu de coopérer avec la mission d'assistance technique des Nations Unies, ce qui, selon leurs déclarations, était leur objectif, les commissaires ont en réalité fait de l'opposition. Leur inexpérience, leur manque de méthode et d'ordre, leur vulnérabilité aux influences extérieures, combinés avec une propension à publier des déclarations contradictoires, ont introduit de nouveaux éléments de retard, de confusion et de désorganisation. Par le jeu de ces facteurs combinés, la situation économique et administrative qui était chaotique en est arrivée au bord de la désagrégation.

122. A la suite des initiatives de l'ONUC et des offres de coopération du président du collège des commissaires, on s'efforce de faire disparaître quelques-uns des obstacles et des difficultés qui entravent les relations de travail entre les commissaires et les consultants des Nations Unies.

123. Les rapports avec le Collège se sont situés sur le plan purement technique et ils ont eu pour but de poursuivre l'exécution des programmes d'assistance technique existants; à aucun moment il n'a été question de reconnaître le Collège comme gouvernement légitime, son existence ne trouvant aucune justification dans la Loi fondamentale. Le Collège a été nommé par le Chef d'état-major de l'ANC puis installé officiellement dans ses fonctions par le Chef de l'Etat, acte que le Chef d'état-major a immédiatement qualifié d'abus de pouvoir du fait qu'il avait "neutralisé" le Chef de l'Etat. Au mieux, l'autorité des Commissaires n'est qu'une autorité dérivée; s'agissant d'un organe nommé par le Chef d'état-major, leur autorité repose en dernière analyse sur sa volonté et sur l'autorité qu'il peut être en mesure d'exercer de temps à autre sur ses troupes. Il y a eu des conflits fréquents entre le Collège ou certains de ses membres et le Chef d'état-major, la volonté de ce dernier l'emportant généralement.

124. Néanmoins, malgré l'absence d'un gouvernement unique et efficace ou même d'une administration cohérente, les programmes d'assistance technique se sont poursuivis et l'on a pu, grâce à beaucoup de dévouement, fournir du personnel aux hôpitaux, empêcher la propagation des maladies, maintenir ouvertes les grandes voies de communication du pays, nourrir les plus affamés, entreprendre des programmes de secours aux chômeurs, de plus en plus nombreux, et empêcher la banqueroute financière totale. On peut donc dire sans exagération que, grâce au labeur incessant de l'équipe de consultants des Nations Unies qui, en dépit des difficultés et des obstacles, ont continué malgré un handicap presque insurmontable à s'acquitter de leur mission, on a pu, pour l'instant, sauver la situation du désastre qui la menaçait.

125. Dans le domaine de l'ordre public, les troupes des Nations Unies ont dû partout faire face à des rigueurs exceptionnelles, travaillant nuit et jour sans répit ni relâche afin d'assurer un minimum de sécurité aux habitants paisibles. La situation dans le nord du Katanga, dont on a parlé plus haut, a imposé une charge supplémentaire à la Force, qui a assumé la responsabilité de ramener le calme dans la région. Au Kasai, où des luttes tribales et politiques sans merci se sont déroulées, la Force s'est interposée, évitant ainsi bien des effusions de sang; la situation reste troublée dans cette région. Dans d'autres régions, la Force a évité que la situation ne tourne à l'anarchie et au désordre complets. A

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Léopoldville même, l'ordre et la sécurité relatifs qui règnent sont dus en grande partie à la présence et à l'activité des troupes des Nations Unies.

126. Quant aux perspectives d'avenir, si l'on peut arriver à contrôler l'ANC dans une certaine mesure et à soumettre d'autres éléments indisciplinés, peut-être parviendra-t-on à rétablir une vie politique normale. Il faudrait pour cela assurer la liberté de la presse et de la radio ainsi que la liberté d'expression et d'association politique.

127. Dans la situation politique confuse qui règne actuellement, les deux seules institutions dont les fondements demeurent sont l'office du Chef de l'Etat et le Parlement. Si les conditions minimum de non-ingérence et de sécurité mentionnées plus haut pouvaient être créées, les dirigeants du pays pourraient alors rechercher des solutions politiques pacifiques par l'entremise de ces deux institutions.

128. La situation actuelle, avec les chefs politiques du pays pratiquement réduits à l'impuissance et la menace de l'imposition d'un régime extra-constitutionnel, indique clairement les dangers d'une continuation des luttes des partis et des factions. On commence à entrevoir la possibilité de recommencer à travailler à la réalisation de l'unité et de l'intégrité du pays de telle sorte que les six provinces puissent assumer, selon des conceptions démocratiques, la part qui leur revient dans les tâches à accomplir. Si les intérêts des individus, des partis et des factions sont subordonnés au bien général, il existe une chance de voir apparaître un gouvernement unique de conciliation, représentant tous les principaux intérêts. L'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, pour sa part, n'a épargné aucun effort pour préparer le terrain et créer les conditions requises pour qu'une activité politique fructueuse soit possible, on peut donc conclure le présent rapport en exprimant l'espoir qu'avertis par les expériences du passé et conscients des périls plus grands encore qui menacent, les dirigeants sauront assumer la pleine mesure de leurs graves responsabilités dans l'intérêt de la nation congolaise tout entière, de telle sorte que les 14 millions d'habitants du pays aient l'assurance qu'il leur sera possible de vivre dans la paix, la liberté et la sécurité.

ANNEXE

DEPLOIEMENT ACTUEL DES CONTINGENTS DE LA FORCE DES NATIONS UNIES

No d'ordre	Pays d'origine	Unités	Lieu de stationnement	Observations
1		ETAT-MAJOR DE L'ONUC	Léopoldville	
2	Canada	Compagnie de transmissions	"	
3	Inde	Section d'approvisionnement	"	
4	Inde	Section de régulation aérienne	"	
5	Inde	Service postal	"	
6	Inde	Hôpital de l'ONUC	"	
7	Pakistan	Compagnie de transport moins une section	"	
8	Pakistan	Compagnie de matériel	"	
9		Base de transports aériens des Nations Unies	" (Ndjili)	
10	Ghana	Brigade ghanéenne moins un bataillon, plus 2 compagnies de police	"	
11	Soudan	EM Bataillon soudanais et 2 compagnies	"	
12	Tunisie	9ème bataillon tunisien moins une compagnie	"	
13	Maroc	EM Brigade marocaine	"	
14	Maroc	Compagnie marocaine de parachutistes	"	
15	Maroc	Premier bataillon marocain moins 3 compagnies	Thysville	
16	Maroc	Compagnie moins 3 sections	Matadi	
17	Maroc	Section	Boma	
18	Maroc	Section	Tshela	
19	Maroc	Section	Lukula	
20	Maroc	Compagnie	Kitona	

No d'ordre	Pays d'origine	Unités	Lieu de stationnement	Observations
21	Maroc	Compagnie moins 3 sections	Songololo	
22	Maroc	Section	Lukala	
23	Maroc	Section	Moerbeke	
24	Maroc	Section	Inkisi	
25	Maroc	Section	Kolo	
26	Maroc	2ème bataillon marocain moins 4 compagnies	Kitwit	Deux compagnies au Katanga
27	Maroc	Compagnie moins une section	Leverville	
28	Maroc	Section	Tango	
29	Guinée	Bataillon guinéen moins 4 compagnies	Banningville	
30	Guinée	Compagnie	Dima	
31	Guinée	Compagnie	Mushie	
32	Guinée	Compagnie	Inongo	
33	Guinée	Compagnie	Kutu	
34	Inde	Hôpital de l'ONUC	Coquilhatville	
35	Indonésie	Bataillon indonésien moins 2 compagnies et 1 section	"	Une compagnie à Kamina
36	Indonésie	Compagnie moins 2 sections	Boende	
37	Indonésie	Deux sections	Bokungu	
38	Indonésie	Section	Ikela	
39	RAU	Bataillon RAU moins 3 compagnies	Gemena	
40	RAU	Compagnie	Lebenge	
41	RAU	Compagnie	Lisala	
42	RAU	Compagnie	Bumba	
43	Ethiopie	EM Brigade éthiopienne	Stanleyville	

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No d'ordre	Pays d'origine	Unités	Lieu de stationnement	Observations
44	Ethiopie	2ème bataillon éthiopien	Stanleyville	
45	Ethiopie	3ème bataillon éthiopien moins une compagnie	Stanleyville	
46	Ethiopie	Compagnie	Buta	
47	Ethiopie	1er bataillon éthiopien moins une compagnie	Bunia	
48	Ethiopie	Compagnie	Paulis	
49	Inde	Hôpital de l'ONUC	Luluabourg	
50	Tunisie	EM Brigade tunisienne	Luluabourg	
51	Tunisie	10ème bataillon tunisien moins 4 compagnies	Luluabourg	
52	Tunisie	Deux compagnies	Bakwanga	
53	Tunisie	Compagnie moins 3 sections	Lac Mukamba	
54	Tunisie	Section	Dimbelenge	
55	Tunisie	Section	Kaulu	
56	Tunisie	Section	Tshimbulu	
57	Tunisie	Compagnie	Port Francqui	
58	Tunisie	Compagnie, 9ème bataillon tunisien	Naiika Mwoeka	
59	Ghana	3ème bataillon	Tshikapa	
60	Libéria	Bataillon libérien moins une compagnie et une section	Mwene Ditu	
61	Libéria	Compagnie moins une section	Luputa	
62	Libéria	Section	Kaenda Kalenda	
63	Libéria	Section	Kele	
64	Libéria	Scomep	Elisabethville	
65	Inde	Compagnie de transmissions	"	
66	Suède	Bataillon suédois moins 2 compagnies	"	Une compagnie à la base de Kamina
67	Suède	Section	Kasenga	
68	Suède	Section	Pweto	
69	Suède	Section	Sakania (Déta- chement à Dubie)	/...

No d'ordre	Pays d'origine	Unités	Lieu de stationnement	Observations
70	Maroc	Compagnie ^{du 2ème} d'un bataillon marocain	Jadctville	
71	Maroc	Détachement	Kambove	
72	Maroc	Section	Mwadingusha	
73	Maroc	Compagnie du 2ème bataillon marocain moins une section	Lubudi	
74	Maroc	Section	Tenke	
75	Maroc	Section	Mitwaba	
76	Maroc	Détachement	Musabira	
77	Maroc	Compagnie (spéciale)	Manono	
78	Maroc	3ème bataillon marocain moins 3 compagnies	Kolwezi	Un groupe de commandos à Eville
79	Maroc	Deux sections	Nzilo	Une section à chacune des deux centrales de Nzilo I et Nzilo III
80	Maroc	Compagnie moins 2 sections	Dilolo	
81	Maroc	Section	Mutshatsha	
82	Maroc	Section	Kasaji	
83	Maroc	Section	Sandoa	
84	Maroc	Section	Kapanga	
85	Maroc	Compagnie moins 1 section	Luena	
86	Maroc	Section	Bukama	
87	Irlande	Une compagnie du 32ème bataillon irlandais	Kamina	
88	Irlande	Une compagnie du 32ème bataillon irlandais	Base de Kamina	
89	Indonésie	Compagnie	Maminaville	
90	Suède	Une compagnie	Base de Kamina (actuellement retirée et acheminée sur Eville)	

No d'ordre	Pays d'origine	Unités	Lieu de stationnement	Observations
91	Suède	Détachement de transmissions	Base de Kamina	
92	Inde	Section mixte	Base de Kamina	
93	Pakistan	Section transports	Base de Kamina	
94		Groupe de transports aériens des Nations Unies	Base de Kamina	
95	Ethiopie	4ème bataillon éthiopien moins 3 compagnies	Kabolo	
96	Ethiopie	Compagnie	Kongolo	
97	Ethiopie	Compagnie	Kabongo	
98	Ethiopie	Compagnie	Nyunzu	
99	Irlande	33ème bataillon irlandais moins 3 compagnies	Albertville	
100	<i>Irlande</i>	<i>Section</i>	<i>Kabianda</i>	
100	Irlande	Section moins détachement	Bendera	
102	Irlande	Section	Baudoinville	
103	Irlande	Section	Niemba	
104	Irlande	Compagnie moins section	Manono	
105	Irlande	Section	Piana	
106	Irlande	32ème bataillon irlandais moins 3 compagnies	Goma	Deux compagnies à Kamina
107	Irlande	Compagnie	Bukavu	
108	Mali	Bataillon mali moins 2 compagnies	Kindu	
109	Mali	Compagnie	Kasongo	
110	Mali	Compagnie	Simba	

PARTIE B

ECHANGE DE MESSAGES ENTRE LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL ET LE REPRESENTANT
PERMANENT DE LA BELGIQUE ET ENTRE LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL ET M. TSHOMBE,
PRESIDENT DU GOUVERNEMENT PROVINCIAL DU KATANGA

1. Note verbale en date du 8 octobre 1960 adressée
au représentant permanent de la Belgique par le
Secrétaire général

Le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies présente ses compliments au représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies et a l'honneur de déclarer que, eu égard à la résolution adoptée par l'Assemblée générale le 20 septembre 1960 et après examen attentif des conditions qui existent à l'heure actuelle au Congo, il est plus que jamais convaincu qu'il est absolument indispensable qu'aucune aide technique ou financière ne soit fournie à aucune des autorités dans le Congo si ce n'est par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies. Il conclut en conséquence que l'aide unilatérale que le Gouvernement belge continue de fournir aux autorités tant dans le Katanga que dans le Kasai méridional n'est pas conforme à ce que demande l'Assemblée générale, notamment au paragraphe 5 a) de la résolution, et qu'en fait elle entrave le rétablissement d'une situation politique et économique normale dans la République du Congo.

Procédant de cette conclusion, le Secrétaire général tient à prier le Gouvernement belge de retirer tout le personnel militaire, paramilitaire ou civil qu'il a mis à la disposition des autorités au Congo et de suivre dorénavant l'exemple de nombreux autres Etats en faisant parvenir toute aide au Congo, ou à toutes autorités dans le Congo, par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies.

Le Secrétaire général est convaincu que seule l'acceptation de ces requêtes permettra d'éviter que ne se produisent, au Congo, des événements qui risqueraient de faire du pays le théâtre d'un conflit de portée mondiale et qui serait des plus dangereux pour le pays lui-même.

Le Secrétaire général tient à informer le Gouvernement belge qu'il a adressé à M. Tshombé un message personnel dont copie est jointe à la présente pour information.

2. Note verbale en date du 19 octobre 1960 adressée
au représentant permanent de la Belgique par le
Secrétaire général

Se référant à la note verbale qu'il a eu l'honneur d'adresser au représentant permanent de la Belgique le 14 octobre 1960^{1/}, le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies désire informer le représentant permanent que, selon des rapports récents émanant de son Représentant spécial à Léopoldville, 114 officiers et 117 autres militaires belges servent encore dans la gendarmerie des autorités katangaises et 58 officiers belges sont actuellement au service de la police du Katanga. Il ressort en outre de ces rapports que tous les postes clés du Katanga, tant dans le domaine civil que dans celui de la sécurité, sont soit directement entre les mains de fonctionnaires belges, soit sous le contrôle de conseillers belges détachés auprès de fonctionnaires congolais. Telle est la situation qui règne actuellement, bien que la mission belge d'assistance technique ait apparemment été retirée le 13 octobre 1960.

En ce qui concerne le prétendu Etat autonome du Sud-Kasaï, les rapports continuent à affirmer que le colonel Crèvecoeur porte l'uniforme belge dans l'exercice de ses fonctions et est assisté par un officier belge, le colonel Levaureg, et que tous deux s'occupent à entraîner de nouvelles unités militaires au service des autorités du Sud-Katanga. A ce propos, il est déclaré que le médecin-chef de Forminière, de nationalité belge, sert d'inspecteur médical pour ces unités militaires.

Il est signalé d'autre part que de l'équipement militaire léger est transporté du Katanga au Kabinda par le territoire de Mwene-Ditu et qu'un homme d'affaires belge donne son appui à ce trafic d'armes.

^{1/} Cette date est celle de la transmission de la note verbale portant la date du 8 octobre. Ce retard a été causé par la nécessité d'assurer la communication simultanée de cette note verbale à la fois au représentant permanent de la Belgique et à M. Tshombé, Président du Gouvernement provincial du Katanga.

Le Secrétaire général désire attirer également l'attention du représentant permanent sur de récentes informations selon lesquelles une agence de recrutement pour le Congo a été créée à Bruxelles sous la direction du professeur Lacroix et avec le soutien du professeur Verhagen, tous deux de l'Université de Lovanium. Il semble que le but de l'agence soit d'envoyer au Congo un nombre sans cesse croissant de fonctionnaires belges, dont plusieurs ont déjà assumé leurs fonctions auprès de ce que l'on nomme le Collège des Commissaires. Les autorités des Nations Unies au Congo ont déjà été saisies de plusieurs cas où ces experts belges ont sérieusement empêché la mise en oeuvre du programme d'assistance technique des Nations Unies. Certains de ces experts ont même retardé sciemment la présentation de demandes d'assistance technique des Nations Unies par les autorités congolaises.

Il est évident que l'emploi d'experts belges par les autorités congolaises et les activités de ces experts, souvent dirigées contre l'Organisation des Nations Unies, ne peuvent qu'être la source de graves conflits, notamment en raison de la situation politique instable qui règne actuellement au Congo. A ce propos, le Secrétaire général se doit de noter que les accords entrent des techniciens belges et les diverses autorités congolaises ne sont approuvés par aucun gouvernement ni aucune autorité qui puissent prétendre à juste titre être le Gouvernement central légitime du Congo.

3. Note verbale en date du 28 octobre 1960 adressée au
Secrétaire général par le représentant permanent de
la Belgique

Le représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies a l'honneur d'accuser au Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies la réception de ses notes en date des 8 et 20 octobre, relatives à l'assistance donnée par la Belgique au Congo.

Il estime devoir formuler à propos de leur contenu les remarques ci-après. Il lui semble qu'une série de malentendus se sont glissés dernièrement dans les rapports existant entre la Belgique et l'ONU au sujet de l'aide donnée au Congo. En effet :

1) Aucune disposition explicite ou implicite des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité ou des recommandations de l'Assemblée générale ne donne au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies le droit d'exiger que toute l'aide technique destinée au Congo passe obligatoirement par le canal de l'Organisation.

En particulier, le paragraphe 5 a) de la recommandation du 20 septembre de l'Assemblée générale extraordinaire ne justifie nullement une demande de retrait de tous les fonctionnaires de nationalité belge travaillant sous les ordres du Gouvernement congolais.

Le paragraphe 2 du même texte, qui prie le Secrétaire général de continuer à mener une action vigoureuse conformément aux résolutions antérieures ne saurait impliquer des obligations imposées aux Etats Membres.

La demande d'éviction des techniciens belges présents au Congo ne repose dès lors sur aucun fondement juridique.

2) La demande formulée par le Secrétaire général se base en réalité sur la conviction, qu'il semble avoir acquise, de la nocivité de la présence au Congo de techniciens belges.

C'est là une prise de position non juridique, mais politique, essentiellement subjective, et qui constitue au surplus une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures du Congo.

3) Le paragraphe 6 de la recommandation du 20 septembre, qui débute par les mots "sans préjudice des droits souverains de la République du Congo", reconnaît en effet le droit aux autorités de ce pays de solliciter et de recevoir telle aide civile qui leur paraît nécessaire.

Une mise en question de ce droit incontestable poserait un grave problème de principe, puisqu'elle équivaudrait à contester l'exercice, par un état indépendant, de certains de ses droits souverains.

La plupart des Etats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies reçoivent une aide bilatérale en provenance d'autres pays indépendants. L'interdiction qu'en cette matière le Secrétaire général voudrait imposer au Congo établirait un précédent extrêmement dangereux pour tous les Membres de l'ONU, puisqu'elle constituerait en fait une tentative de mise sous tutelle d'un Etat souverain. Le retrait des techniciens belges aurait pour effet de priver le Congo de fonctionnaires qui sont sous l'autorité directe du Gouvernement congolais, pour les remplacer par des experts internationaux indépendants de ce gouvernement.

4) Or, c'est à la demande des autorités congolaises que les quelque 2.000 Belges qui se trouvent aujourd'hui au Congo, y sont demeurés ou y ont été envoyés.

Leur présence, loin d'"empêcher le rétablissement de l'ordre public et l'exercice de son autorité par le Gouvernement de la République", comme l'insinue la note du 8 octobre, contribue au fonctionnement des rouages principaux de l'Etat congolais et de son économie.

Le retrait que demande le Secrétaire général compromettrait irrémédiablement dans ce pays, sans que les 200 techniciens civils des Nations Unies puissent y porter remède, l'oeuvre de rétablissement de l'ordre et de restauration de la prospérité à laquelle les Nations Unies et la Belgique sont également attachées.

5) Les remarques qui précèdent prouvent la nécessité de clarifier les vues exprimées par le Secrétaire général dans les deux documents précités. Le Gouvernement belge est prêt à envoyer dans ce but un représentant à New York aussitôt qu'il paraîtra possible au Secrétaire général de le recevoir.

4. Note verbale en date du 29 octobre 1960 adressée au représentant permanent de la Belgique par le Secrétaire général

Le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies présente ses compliments au représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies et a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance que le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général au Congo vient de lui faire savoir officiellement que 37 membres de l'Armée nationale congolaise ont, comme suite à un accord entre les autorités belges et le colonel Mobutu, été envoyés en Belgique pour recevoir une formation militaire dans des écoles militaires belges. Le Secrétaire général tient également à attirer l'attention du représentant permanent de la Belgique sur l'information, confirmée aujourd'hui par le représentant local des Nations Unies à Elisabethville, selon laquelle 47 cadets de la prétendue armée katangaise ont, à des fins identiques, été envoyés du Katanga dans des écoles militaires belges.

Etant chargé de mener l'action appropriée en vue de la mise en application de la résolution, le Secrétaire général a le devoir d'attirer d'urgence l'attention du Gouvernement belge sur le fait que ces arrangements à des fins de formation militaire contreviennent à la lettre et à l'esprit du paragraphe 6 de la résolution de l'Assemblée générale en date du 21 septembre, par lequel l'Assemblée générale a invité tous les Etats à s'abstenir de fournir, directement ou indirectement, des armes ou autres matériels de guerre, du personnel militaire ou "autre assistance à des fins militaires au Congo" pendant la durée de l'assistance militaire accordée à titre temporaire par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies, sauf si les Nations Unies le demandent, par l'entremise du Secrétaire général, pour atteindre les objectifs de cette résolution et des résolutions adoptées par le Conseil de sécurité les 14 et 22 juillet et le 9 août 1960.

A ce sujet, il y a lieu de noter que lesdits arrangements n'ont été convenus avec aucune autorité légale de la République du Congo, reconnue comme telle par l'Assemblée générale ou le Conseil de sécurité.

Le Secrétaire général tient à prier le Gouvernement belge de bien vouloir examiner d'urgence la question et lui faire savoir quelles mesures il entend prendre en vue d'assurer l'observation des dispositions de la résolution ci-dessus mentionnée.

5. Lettre en date du 8 octobre 1960 adressée à Monsieur Tshombé, Président du Gouvernement provincial du Katanga, République du Congo, par le Secrétaire général

Comme vous vous en êtes certainement rendu compte, la situation au Congo, étant donné l'influence réciproque des réactions internes et internationales, évolue dans le sens d'un danger croissant. Le retrait des troupes belges de la totalité du territoire, y compris le Katanga, a pendant un temps réduit dans une certaine mesure les risques, mais nous assistons maintenant à une recrudescence des tensions. Eu égard au débat de l'Assemblée générale, vous ne pouvez avoir manqué de voir que l'ombre d'un conflit armé pèse à nouveau sur le pays.

Les risques, tels qu'ils se présentent à l'heure actuelle, semblent, à mon avis, tenir à trois facteurs : la situation confuse et inquiétante qui continue d'exister à Léopoldville, la présence continue d'un nombre considérable de ressortissants belges - militaires, personnel paramilitaire et civils - et, enfin, le conflit constitutionnel non résolu, menaçant l'intégrité du Congo, que symbolise le nom du Katanga. Parmi ces facteurs je considère en fait les deux derniers comme d'importance cruciale même du point de vue du premier : c'est-à-dire que si nous pouvions pleinement circonscrire le facteur belge et l'éliminer, et si nous pouvions amorcer une réconciliation entre le Katanga et le reste du territoire de la République du Congo, la situation pourrait fort bien être redressée à Léopoldville. La voie d'une pacification du pays se trouverait ainsi ouverte.

Compte tenu de ce qui précède, je saisis les Belges de certaines requêtes dont je tiens à vous informer sans retard. Ces requêtes se fondent sur la résolution de l'Assemblée générale du 20 septembre 1960, dont vous avez bien entendu pris pleinement connaissance. Mes requêtes au Gouvernement belge sont de deux ordres. D'une part, les Belges retireraient tout le personnel militaire, paramilitaire ou civil qu'ils ont mis à la disposition d'autorités au Congo et, d'autre part, ils suivraient dorénavant l'exemple donné par les grandes puissances occidentales, et en premier lieu par les Etats-Unis, en faisant parvenir toute aide au Congo, ou à toutes autorités dans le Congo, par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies. Je suis convaincu que seule l'acceptation de ces deux requêtes permettra d'éviter que ne se produisent au Congo des événements qui risqueraient de faire du pays le théâtre d'un conflit de portée mondiale et qui serait des plus dangereux pour le pays lui-même.

Vous saisirez pleinement que si les Belges retiraient aussi tous leurs techniciens, à quelque titre qu'ils servent actuellement au Congo, et si, en outre, ils faisaient parvenir toute leur assistance par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies, il en résulterait une situation dans laquelle toutes les parties, au Congo, auraient à reconsidérer d'urgence leurs politiques touchant l'avenir du pays. Je suis certain que dans cette perspective, vous désireriez vous-même revoir votre politique étant donné que le Katanga pourrait se trouver coupé de toute assistance de l'extérieur, exception faite de ce que vous pourriez recevoir dans le cadre de l'aide fournie par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies à la République du Congo. Il devrait également être clair que les possibilités que les Nations Unies ont de prévenir des initiatives inconsidérées de la part de ceux qui à l'heure actuelle sont responsables de l'emploi de la majeure partie de la population d'Eville disparaîtraient si une entente touchant la politique future ne se faisait pas dans le sens que je viens d'indiquer.

Bien entendu, votre réaction devant la situation qui découlera de l'attitude adoptée par les Nations Unies sera influencée par ce qui se passera à Léopoldville. Je vous laisse le soin d'apprécier la situation dans cette ville et son incidence sur votre politique. Ce qui est essentiel, c'est que, dans la conjoncture actuelle, votre coopération peut être décisive pour l'avenir du pays. Je connais votre patriotisme et, par conséquent, je ne doute pas que vous suivrez l'évolution de la situation en vous laissant guider en dernier ressort par le souci de la force et de l'intégrité de la République du Congo.

Au-delà des perspectives nationales et locales qui s'imposent de façon impérative lorsque l'on examine les politiques actuelles eu égard aux attitudes des Nations Unies et à l'évolution de la situation au Congo, interviennent les considérations internationales. Nous avons échappé de justesse à certains risques majeurs de guerre, qui, s'ils s'étaient réalisés, auraient déchiré le Congo, ce qui aurait eu des conséquences désastreuses pour le Katanga aussi. La nature de ces risques a changé dans une certaine mesure, mais leur gravité n'a pas diminué. Je manquerais de franchise à votre égard en ne vous disant pas que, si le problème du Katanga - qui fait partie du problème plus vaste du Congo - n'est pas résolu d'ici peu dans un esprit de conciliation et d'unité, la résistance que les Nations Unies

pourront opposer à une coupure radicale à l'échelle mondiale qui trancherait toute l'Afrique et le Congo, risque d'être irrémédiablement affaiblie. Vous savez certainement que je ne vous adresserais pas d'avertissement de ce genre si je ne pensais sincèrement que les risques sont réels et immédiats.

Au cas où vous estimeriez que ces considérations ne donnent pas une image fidèle de la situation actuelle et que vous ne pouvez donc pas prendre vous-même d'initiative dans le sens de la réconciliation et en faveur de l'unité maintenant indiquée, j'aimerais que vous vous entreteniez avec l'un de mes représentants personnels à Léopoldville, soit l'ambassadeur Dayal, soit le général Rikhye, ce qui vous permettrait d'examiner ensemble la situation et de jeter ainsi des bases solides sur lesquelles vous pourriez étudier plus avant le problème dans le sens que j'ai indiqué.

6. Télégramme en date du 27 octobre 1960 adressé au Secrétaire général par M. Tshombé, Président du Gouvernement provincial du Katanga

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre message personnel du 10 octobre ainsi que de la copie de la note adressée par vous en date du 8 octobre 1960 au représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies. Vous avez bien voulu me faire part de vos préoccupations en ce qui concerne l'évolution de la situation dans la République du Congo et des remèdes que vous préconisez en vue de mettre fin à ce que vous appelez une recrudescence des tensions dans ce pays. A votre avis, les risques tiennent actuellement à trois facteurs : 1) la situation confuse et inquiétante qui continue d'exister à Léopoldville; 2) la présence continue d'un nombre considérable de ressortissants belges : militaires, personnel paramilitaire et civils; 3) le conflit constitutionnel non résolu, menaçant l'intégrité du Congo, que symbolise le nom Katanga. Vous estimez que seuls le retrait de l'aide belge (remplacée par une aide fournie exclusivement par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies) et l'unité de la République du Congo, seraient susceptibles de redresser la situation à Léopoldville et d'écarter le danger d'un conflit armé mondial. L'examen de votre message me conduit à vous soumettre les considérations suivantes :

1) Je partage entièrement votre avis sur le danger que comporte la permanence d'une situation confuse à Léopoldville - danger que je n'ai d'ailleurs pas manqué de souligner à diverses reprises. Les espoirs nés lors de la chute du Gouvernement Lumumba ont malheureusement été déçus et, malgré les efforts déployés par certains leaders congolais, par ailleurs mes amis, le Gouvernement central continue à faire preuve d'un manque complet de décision et d'autorité. Cet état de choses empêche que soit abordée, entre interlocuteurs valables, l'étude des nouvelles structures de la communauté congolaise, étude à laquelle l'Etat du Katanga s'intéresse au premier chef et à laquelle il souhaite ardemment participer, encore qu'à certaines conditions.

2) Eu égard à ce qui précède, je me vois contraint d'écarter comme nullement fondée votre allégation suivant laquelle le Katanga menacerait l'intégrité de l'ex-Congo belge. La désintégration s'est déjà manifestée en juillet 1960 au moment de la mutinerie de la force publique. C'est elle d'ailleurs qui m'a décidé à proclamer au plus tôt l'indépendance du Katanga, afin de mettre mon peuple à

l'abri du chaos qui s'installait partout dans l'ex-Congo belge sous l'action destructrice de Lumumba et de sa clique. La xénophobie à outrance et le recours à l'aide de pays communistes ont précipité davantage les désordres et donné lieu à des luttes fratricides. C'est aux excès du Gouvernement central dirigé par Lumumba, et non au Katanga, qu'il faut imputer la responsabilité de l'éclatement de la République du Congo et des tensions qui s'en sont suivies.

3) Loin de se rendre coupable de séparatisme, le Katanga a depuis longtemps manifesté ouvertement son adhésion de principe à une association avec d'autres territoires de l'ex-Congo belge et son désir de fonder avec eux, en temps opportun, une communauté basée sur l'égalité des partenaires. Le Gouvernement du Katanga a fait sienne cette politique parce qu'il est intimement convaincu que, contrairement à ce que vous semblez considérer, la formule unitaire ne répond pas aux aspirations fondamentales et légitimes de la plupart des populations. L'expérience de ces derniers mois a clairement prouvé qu'un pouvoir unitaire est incapable d'apporter aux problèmes des solutions suffisamment adaptées aux contingences locales dans un pays si vaste et si diversifié. C'est en tenant compte de cette réalité, que le Katanga a opté en juillet dernier pour l'indépendance tout en se déclarant disposé à coopérer à une oeuvre commune de confédération.

4) Votre requête à la Belgique, en vue de retirer son personnel militaire et civil actuellement encore présent dans l'ex-Congo belge, est basée sur le fait que vous considérez la présence de ces Belges comme contribuant, au premier chef, à entretenir la tension. Cette constatation ne se vérifie nullement, du moins en ce qui concerne le Katanga. A plusieurs reprises, mon gouvernement a publiquement et sévèrement dénoncé les entraves mises depuis toujours par la Belgique aux désirs d'autonomie et d'indépendance des populations katangaises. Si, dans quelques cas, heureusement fort rares, des Belges se sont refusés à accepter entièrement les conséquences de l'accession à l'indépendance, dans l'ensemble, cependant, ceux qui ont mis leurs capacités au service de mon pays paraissent l'avoir fait dans un esprit certain de dévouement loyal et sans arrière pensée. Je vois difficilement dans ces conditions comment leur présence pourrait être une source de friction et provoquer l'hostilité. Au contraire, par leur collaboration, ils ont permis que les rouages essentiels de l'administration et des forces de l'ordre continuent à fonctionner normalement au Katanga.

Leur présence a donc été plutôt un facteur de paix que de désordre. Il ne faut surtout pas perdre de vue d'ailleurs, que c'est à la demande expresse des autorités katangaises et à leurs conditions que des Belges se trouvent ici. En faisant appel à leur coopération, mon gouvernement n'a fait qu'exercer les attributs de sa souveraineté qui l'autorise à recruter en toute liberté les personnes dont le concours lui paraît indispensable. Le recours aux techniciens européens n'exclut d'ailleurs pas l'africanisation progressive des cadres. Cette africanisation, mon gouvernement la prépare activement dans les domaines militaires et civils, dans certains secteurs, les premières mesures d'application sont déjà prises. D'ores et déjà, des Katangais suivent en Europe et en Amérique des cours de perfectionnement et effectuent des stages tant dans les secteurs publics (emplois civils et militaires) que privés. Mais en attendant de pouvoir se suffire à lui-même, le Katanga, pays indépendant, entend recruter ses techniciens où bon lui semble, sans en avoir à en référer à qui que ce soit.

5) Dans votre lettre prérappelée, vous proposez que l'aide reçue jusqu'à présent de la Belgique disparaisse et fasse place à une assistance fournie par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies. Pour autant que cette nouvelle formule implique le maintien, dans le secteur public katangais, de la plupart des conseillers et techniciens dont je dispose actuellement, je ne m'y oppose pas en principe. Si cependant elle devait, comme je le crains, entraîner le départ des cadres européens actuels et leur remplacement par des personnes entièrement au service des Nations Unies, je me verrais obligé de faire valoir de sérieuses objections à cet égard. Je pourrais difficilement accepter en effet que s'installent au Katanga des techniciens soustraits à mon autorité et peu au courant des problèmes, de la langue et des us et coutumes de mon pays. Si je m'engageais dans cette voie, je soumettrais le Katanga aux mêmes périls que ceux qui ont frappé le restant du Congo après le 30 juin, à la suite du départ massif des techniciens. Je ne veux qu'à aucun prix se reproduise ici une situation dans laquelle, étant donné la disparition des cadres essentiels, toute la vie d'un pays est paralysée dans ses parties vives : médecine, justice, agriculture, finances, communications, etc. La population en pâtirait gravement et les Nations Unies en seraient les premières responsables. Les mesures que vous préconisez constituent d'ailleurs une immixtion flagrante dans les affaires intérieures du Katanga, comme aussi des autres régions de

l'ex-Congo belge, si elles étaient appliquées, elles imposeraient au pays une nouvelle forme de tutelle, incompatible avec son statut d'Etat indépendant. J'en trouve d'ailleurs la confirmation dans les considérations que vous développez au sujet des répercussions qu'entraînerait pour le Katanga le refus de retirer les cadres belges. Vous menacez en effet le Katanga d'une privation totale d'assistance au cas où il ne reverrait pas sa politique et refuserait de recevoir de l'aide; comme partie intégrante de la République du Congo, mon honneur et celui de mon peuple m'interdisent de céder à une telle pression, qui ne cadre d'ailleurs pas avec la mission de pacification et de non-ingérence, qui est dévolue aux Nations Unies et que vous-même, Monsieur le Secrétaire général, avez prônée lors de nos entretiens.

6) Vous avez bien voulu me faire part de vos appréhensions quant au danger d'un conflit armé mondial. Je désirerais affirmer qu'afin de prévenir un tel conflit, le Katanga est aussi soucieux que tout autre pays de contribuer au rapprochement des peuples et à la compréhension mutuelle. La politique modérée, et la volonté de coopération dont mon gouvernement a toujours fait preuve, témoignent d'ailleurs de mon souci de participer à l'apaisement et à la diminution de la tension internationale. Je suis convaincu que vous reconnaîtrez le bien-fondé de ces considérations, qui sont inspirées par un désir ardent de paix et le souci de sauvegarder le bien-être des peuples du Katanga, et du restant de l'ex-Congo belge. Si toutefois vous éprouviez le désir d'obtenir de plus amples renseignements, je suis tout disposé à les donner ici à Elisabethville au représentant que vous voudrez bien désigner à cet effet.

M. Martin ✓

M. Lin ✓

20 October

0

Mr. John MaDiarmid, Executive Assistant to the Special
Representative

Philippe Poullain

Re: Preparation of Second Progress Report

1. In my conversation of yesterday's date with the Ambassador, he expressed his concern that the Assembly should, at the time of the debate on the Congo, be in receipt of the latest reports from his Mission.
2. In view of the apparent urgency of the matter, I am suggesting below a possible arrangement for all or parts of the political sections in the next Progress Report.
3. It seems to me that, at least, some of the operative paragraphs in the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/1474/Rev.1 (ES-IV), together with paragraphs of Security Council resolutions ("fully supported by the Assembly") could provide convenient headings under which material would be gathered for the report.
4. For the purposes of substantiating this view, I have attempted the following tentative outline.
 - A. THE "RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY"
ONUC's ancillary or subsidiary role
a chapter based largely on military sources and taking note perhaps of the following admission in an otherwise violently hostile article: "Les forces des Nations Unies, si elles ont collaboré par leur présence à assurer l'ordre et une sécurité relatives au Congo ..." (Courrier d'Afrique, 12 Octobre 1960)
 - B. "... TO SAFEGUARD ITS UNITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ..."
together with the following, a crucial chapter from the point of view of the political ~~action~~ work.

.../...

(a) The impact of ethnic differences on national unity

- charges and counter-charges of tribalisme (bias and discrimination in allocating arms, money, positions in the Ministries etc..):

- the re-grouping of districts and territories as a means to forestall or minimize tribal differences;

[as of to-day inter-Provincial issues are heavily affected by, but do not coincide with, ethnic data: leading on to ...]

(b) The question of the State's structure

- the debate in public opinion: statements favouring Federation (Bolikango) or Confederation (Thysville); positions taken in Katanga (demanding previous recognition of Katangese sovereignty);

- a rather widespread view that decision of such issues must await the Table Ronde;

- unity of the Congo is among the basic General Assembly principles; at the same time, constitutional devices not calling into question the country's unity and territorial integrity, but consonant with ethnic realities will inevitably remain attractive here.

C. "POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE"

The issues arising from military assistance, proffered or requested; the question of interference with central or provincial governments by foreign powers, groups or individuals.

D. "THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO WILL NOT BE A PARTY TO OR IN ANY WAY INTERVENE IN OR BE USED TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF ANY INTERNAL CONFLICT, CONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHERWISE"

(S/4426, operative paragraph 4)

In the first Progress Report (S/4531) the Special Representative had sub-divided his duty as follows:

(a) Impartiality

- the latest governmental developments: significance of the setting up of the new Lumumba Government: some of the members listed apparently follow Lumumba, others not;

- in this framework, attitude of ONUC (policy with regard to contacts; equal protection).

(b) The principle of confining oneself to the fulfilment of the mandate

(policy in business contacts; Press conference of 29 September: traher avec ceux qui occupent effectivement les fauteuils ministériels)

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/4531
21 September 1960

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FIRST PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CONGO,
AMBASSADOR RAJESHWAR DAYAL

21 SEPTEMBER 1960

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ANNEXES

1. ONUC LOCATION AND STRENGTH STATEMENT
2. ONUC COMMUNICATIONS
3. ONUC AIR TRANSPORT FORCE

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO

20 September 1960

INTRODUCTION

1. This progress report covers all important aspects of the operations of the United Nations in the Congo (ONUC), and seeks to set forth the nature and magnitude of the problems and the manner in which the Organization has attempted to discharge its responsibilities.
2. In its task in the Congo, the United Nations has broken entirely new ground; both the mandate given to it by the Security Council and the development of the situation itself have made this operation unique in the history of international organization. New situations and problems have thus often had to be met by decisions taken in the general spirit of the mandate, but without the benefit of experience from the past. While the role of ONUC and the general principles under which it is operating in the Congo are clear, the detailed method of application of these principles to a kaleidoscopic and often chaotic situation has sometimes been less easy to determine. Legal, political, humanitarian and practical considerations have had to be carefully weighed in determining the most desirable course of action. It is hoped that this appraisal may make the progress and the conduct of the operation more easily understandable and bring into focus the nature of the problems facing ONUC in its unprecedented task.
3. The Congo is a vast territory of 2,343,930 square kilometres - more than four times the size of France - but with a population of only 13,700,000, scarcely six persons per square kilometre. Occupying the greater part of the basin of the Congo in the very heart of Africa, it has a strategic position of great importance. It has great natural resources, in particular rich mineral deposits, extensive forests and ample cultivatable land. The country is largely self-sufficient in food supplies. The main centres of population and activity in the Congo are linked by an intricate system of rail, water and air transport. In view of the enormous distances to be covered, the importance of an efficient system of communications is paramount, and it has been a constant preoccupation of ONUC to prevent any interruption and to ensure the proper functioning of this system. Under colonial rule,

an elaborate economic structure and a Western society of a high material standard were superimposed on the African inhabitants of the Congo. The superstructure remains now, abandoned in large measure, and with almost no social or economic connexion with the life of the average Congolese.

4. On attaining its independence on 30 June 1960, the country would have been faced, even had the circumstances been more normal, with many serious problems - economic, social, political, military and administrative. On the economic plans, the paradoxical situation exists that despite the country's great natural wealth and its considerable development under Belgian rule, conditions of acute economic distress prevail which cannot be alleviated without outside assistance on a massive scale. The almost complete lack of trained civil servants, executives and professional people of Congolese origin in virtually all walks of life, and the striking absence of administrative and political experience would inevitably have created a serious situation for the Government of the young Republic. But the situation was made still worse by a complete failure to arrange for any organized hand-over to the Congolese of the administrative machinery of government or of essential public services.

5. The already difficult situation was still further complicated by the confusion, fear and disorder which gripped the country shortly after independence, as a result of a vicious circle of events. Mutinies of the Force Publique and subsequent outbursts of violence against Europeans were followed, on the one hand, by the sending of Belgian forces, especially parachutists, into action in many places, which in turn gave rise to bitterness and panic among the African population, and, on the other, to a new, fearful flight of many Europeans and the consequent breakdown of many public services and important economic enterprises. Some facilities, for example navigation aids at airports, police communications and some telecommunications, were damaged or destroyed. Funds for the payment of workers in certain public utilities were taken out of the country, creating further work stoppages and unemployment through inability to meet payrolls. General economic distress added to the widespread feeling of insecurity and unrest. Powerless to restore order and to maintain normal life in the country, the Government appealed to the United Nations for military and technical assistance.

6. The United Nations was thus faced from the beginning with serious problems of an economic, social, administrative and technical nature - problems which, with the active support of the world community and the co-operation of the Government of the Congo, it might reasonably have expected to solve by strenuous efforts over a certain period of time. It was also faced with a volatile and explosive situation with which the Government itself was unable to cope, a state of utter lack of public confidence, the disruption of the normal life of the community amidst a general atmosphere of fear and anxiety.

7. In the first phase of its operations under the Security Council mandate, the primary objectives of ONUC were to ensure the speedy evacuation of all remaining Belgian forces from the territory of the Congo, and by the deployment of United Nations forces in various parts of the country, to assist in the maintenance of law and order and the protection of life and property. At the same time, all possible efforts were made to help maintain essential services and to encourage the resumption of normal activity. Another urgent task was to assist the Congolese authorities to restore discipline in the Force Publique, now the Congolese National Army, and to regroup this army in camps where its training and reorganization could start as soon as possible.

8. With the evacuation of Belgian troops, one very potent source of suspicion, fear and panic was removed. It may also be noted with satisfaction that with the assistance of the Deputy Commander of the United Nations Force, acting as its adviser at the formal request of the Prime Minister, the Congolese National Army has begun to re-form in new units and to engage in the training of its officers and men.

9. But while these problems were being attended to, new differences and manifestations of violence began to appear. Tribal warfare, especially in the Province of Kasai, and to a lesser extent in the Province of Equateur, began to take a large toll of human life and to produce a drifting population of many thousands of refugees. In addition, in order to put down secessionist movements in the Katanga and Kasai Provinces by force, a part of the National Army was moved by the Central Government into the Bakwanga area and near the northern border of Katanga. A civil war was thus begun, which was to make many victims, not only among troops, but also among civilians, including women and children.

10. The United Nations Force, thinly deployed in the area, and circumscribed by its mandate, used its best efforts to safeguard lives, to prevent massacre and genocide, and to mitigate other consequences of these disasters, in particular famine and disease. By the use of United Nations good offices and by the employment of an observer organization, the hostilities on the Kasai-Katanga border have virtually been halted recently by a cease-fire agreement. The violence of the tribal conflicts has also abated, at least for the moment. Nevertheless, the necessary work of reconciliation of tribal differences has still to be undertaken, for these differences can have a direct bearing on the political situation.

11. The people of the Congo comprise many tribes speaking different dialects. The tribal conflicts, which plagued the country long before it attained independence, have since taken on a more serious character and spread into the political field. Many of the political parties have strong tribal affiliations and the provincial governments constituted after the May elections are often dominated by particular tribal elements. There is also a tendency for members of these provincial governments to use their newly acquired authority to promote the domination of their own tribes over others. This has led to a resurgence of tribal conflict with dire political, economic and social consequences, constituting a grave danger to the integrity of the country.

12. A typical example is the Baluba-Lulua conflict in the Kasai Province where, without effective intervention of the provincial authorities, the Lulua have mercilessly attacked the Baluba elements of the Luluabourg region. This has led to a mass exodus of the Baluba to their tribal lands in the Bakwanga region where a rebel government has been set up, and to a civil war between Central Government troops and the local forces, in which sporadic fighting and massacre has taken many lives. It is estimated that the refugees in the Bakwanga area from former and recent Lulua-Baluba conflicts now number about 250,000. Their feeding and maintenance is an urgent concern of the Red Cross, and of the ONUC food relief organization; strenuous efforts are also being made to cope with the medical problems involved. The mass exodus from Luluabourg of the Baluba, who constituted almost the entire clerical and skilled labour force of the town, has contributed largely to the disruption of the economic life of the entire province.

13. Latterly, new forms of division and strife have appeared. Violent political rivalry in the Central Government itself has led, in the past weeks, to a confused

and prolonged constitutional crisis, and to much discord and attempted violence. This situation is described in the next section of this report in relation to the problems of non-intervention.

II. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE PROBLEMS OF NON-INTERVENTION

14. A brief outline of the political developments is given in the following paragraphs, together with an indication of the nature of the problems confronting ONUC in the performance of its function in relation to the changing political situation. This is followed by an analysis of the application of the principle of non-intervention, as laid down by the Security Council, in the face of a succession of constitutional crises.

15. It is evident that in their size and scope the civil and military programmes described in this report are already, when measured in absolute terms, the largest which the United Nations has ever been called upon to organize. This extensive programme, viewed against the background of a comparative absence of governmental organization, bulks even larger. This situation imposes on the United Nations operation an increasingly grave responsibility to weigh its every action, and to impose on itself the most careful restraint in order to ensure that its presence promotes, and does not retard, the political development and independence of the new State. The Charter itself has established the guiding principle that the United Nations must not - reserving the special authority of the Security Council - intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State; and the Security Council, in paragraph 4 of its resolution of 9 August 1960, has reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise. On the other hand, it is manifest that the decision of the Security Council, in acceding to a governmental request for military assistance to the national security forces in the restoration of law and order, has itself automatically juxtaposed the international and the domestic spheres of action. In addition, in the civilian field alone, there is always the danger that the very extent of the aid offered may give the appearance of constituting in some manner a degree of intervention in the work of the government institutions into whose programmes the aid must be integrated.

16. It was already a difficult and delicate task for ONUC, in the period from the date of its first entry in mid-July up to the end of August 1960, to exercise its responsibility for maintaining peace and security without infringing on any internal function of government. By mid-September, however, the constitutional crises had resulted in the breakdown of the formal structure of government into partially overlapping but largely competitive power groups headed by the Chief of State, the Prime Minister, the Parliament and, more recently, the Army. In such circumstances, actions undertaken by the United Nations tended to become a bone of contention with one internal group or another. Indeed, even in matters on which ONUC's responsibilities were not attracted, it frequently transpired that opposing factions - always prompt to accuse it of "intervening" in favour of a rival - were nevertheless proclaiming for themselves some special monopoly of United Nations support.

17. The developments in relation to the entry of the United Nations Force into the Province of Katanga have previously been reported to the Security Council by the Secretary-General (S/4417/Add.6, 7 and 9) and the differences of viewpoint in the interpretation of ONUC responsibilities with regard to Katanga, relating to the Organization's mandate, have been fully explained in that report.

18. The difficulties encountered by ONUC in its relations with the Congolese Central Government as a result of the latter's mistaken notion of the United Nations functions in the Congo, are illustrated by the following instance. The Prime Minister demanded, and used military threats to seek to enforce, the control of the airports entirely by the Congolese National Army, a step which would have deprived the United Nations Force of its ability to guarantee the security of the centres of communication which are indispensable to the performance of its functions. Only the most skilful military liaison succeeded in avoiding a clash from this attempted use of force against ONUC, and in working out a demarcation of ONUC and Congolese military functions at the airports.

19. During this period, an attempt was made by ONUC to enter into negotiations with the Government, through the Foreign Minister. A draft agreement was submitted on the status of the United Nations in the Congo, modelled on the agreement on the status of the United Nations Emergency Force adopted in 1957 by the United Nations and the Government of Egypt. On particular

points, proposals were also offered for increasing liaison between ONUC and the Government, including the assurance of the Government's civil control at airports over non-ONUC flights.

20. These negotiations had no more than commenced, however, when the capital found itself in the midst of a grave constitutional crisis. On the evening of 5 September 1960, the Chief of State in a declaration broadcast on the national radio proclaimed in effect that the Prime Minister had betrayed his office by provoking discord within the Government, depriving citizens of their fundamental liberties and plunging the country into a fratricidal civil war. He therefore revoked the Government with immediate effect and named the President of the Senate, Mr. Joseph Ileo, to form a new government. He requested the United Nations to assure peace and order. During the same evening, the Prime Minister spoke three times to the population, indicating that the President was no longer Chief of State and calling upon the people, the workers and the Army to rise. In the face of an imminent breakdown of law and order, with a civil war already under way in parts of the country, and with a clear threat to the United Nations Force from the prospective movements of mutually hostile elements of the army, ONUC, in the interests of the maintenance of peace and security, that night closed all major airports to any traffic other than that of the United Nations. The following day, recognizing that the risk of major clashes between political and ethnic groups could present the Force with a peace and security problem far exceeding its powers, the United Nations took a directly related emergency measure and temporarily closed the Leopoldville radio station. The first demonstrations, with some casualties, had in fact taken place that day. After these two measures, the city of Leopoldville remained quiet, however, and in particular the closing of the airports soon brought the civil war in the provinces to a halt and checked the influx of arms into Katanga.

21. Also during the night of 5 September the Council of Ministers published a communiqué declaring the Chief of State deprived of his functions for having violated the fundamental law, nullifying the latter's revocation of the Government and accusing him of high treason. Parliament met continuously on 7 September. After an address by the Prime Minister, the Chamber of Representatives, by a vote of 60 to 19, undertook to cancel both the decisions of the Chief of State and of the Prime Minister dismissing one another. The

Foreign Minister and one other Cabinet member who had countersigned the presidential revocation of the Government both announced their resignations. The following day the Senate voted 41 to 2, with 6 abstentions and 29 absent, against the presidential proclamations. On the same day the Prime Minister stated at a press conference that he would consider demanding the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations Force if the airports and radio stations were not immediately turned over to the exclusive control of the Government. Mr. Kasa-Vubu also protested that his spokesman had not been permitted to broadcast from the station.

22. On 9 September, Mr. Lumumba stated in a speech in Camp Leopold, while referring to the voting in the Senate and the Chamber, that he was now Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the National Army. On the same day, President Kasa-Vubu issued a declaration rejecting the votes of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, on the ground that the decisions of the Chief of State were not subject to the approval of the Senate or Chamber of Representatives.

23. On 10 September 1960, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who had assumed his functions on 8 September, called on the Prime Minister and then on the President. The Prime Minister handed him a memorandum accusing the United Nations of flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Congo with reference to the action taken at the airports and radio station, and attributing to Parliament alone the power to revoke either the Government or the Chief of State. The Chief of State addressed a letter to the Special Representative declaring the non-existence of the Lumumba Government and requesting the United Nations not to treat with it. On the same day the bureau of the Chamber of Representatives communicated to the Secretary-General through his Special Representative its position that the interpretation of the fundamental law rested solely with Parliament and that the Secretary-General's comments to the Security Council on the constitutional situation therefore represented interference in the internal affairs of the country. On 11 September, the President of the Chamber of Representatives and the Acting President of the Senate informed the United Nations that the votes of their separate bodies constituted a sovereign determination of renewal of confidence in the Government of Mr. Lumumba and an annulment of the ordinance of the Chief of State. That night the Prime Minister designate, Mr. Ileo, announced the formation of his new government.

24. It is to be noted that these declarations and counter-declarations, although they divided the Executive, Ministerial and Legislative Branches of Government on the interpretation of their several powers under the Loi fondamentale (Fundamental Law), were made against a relatively non-violent background. In addition, the Presidents of the two chambers, on 12 September, addressed statements to the Special Representative that the Parliament would undertake the surveillance of the normal and peaceful utilization of the radio station and airports. Thus, on 12 September the United Nations, on its own initiative, reopened the radio station, appealing to all to exercise restraint in its use. The Minister of Information designated by Mr. Ileo broadcast a speech during the day, in the course of which he stated that Mr. Lumumba would be arrested and given a fair trial; two days later, a speech of Mr. Lumumba was broadcast. A serious show of force by both governments, however, did take place at the radio station both before and after its reopening. On 12 and 13 September, the airports were opened to all peaceful, civilian and humanitarian traffic and remain open.

25. On 12 September, an ordinance of the Chief of State proclaimed the composition of the new government and revoked the functions of another eleven members of the "former" government. That same day Mr. Lumumba was arrested by the Gendarmerie on the order of the Army Chief of Staff but was released by the Army Command in circumstances which are unclear. A parliamentary committee seeking a reconciliation between the Chief of State and the Prime Minister protested against this action and called attention to the fact that the Ileo government had not yet had a vote of confidence from Parliament and therefore could not substitute itself for the legal government. At the same time, Mr. Lumumba transmitted through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General an appeal to the Security Council that it furnish his government with direct aid in the form of twenty aircraft with crews, a "large quantity" of arms and munitions, and a powerful radio transmitter, or it would seek this aid elsewhere.

26. On 13 September a joint session of Parliament conferred full powers on Prime Minister Lumumba in a vote which was somewhat uncertain both as to substance and count. On 14 September the Chief of State suspended Parliament; the Presidents of the two chambers replied to him in writing that his ordinance was countersigned by Mr. Ileo as Prime Minister though the latter has received no parliamentary investiture. On the same day, a letter from Mr. Lumumba

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formally requested the detachment of a specified national contingent of the United Nations force to aid his government in the pacification of the country. That evening the Chief of Staff of the Army broadcast a statement that, two opposing governments having for some time fought for power in the country, the Army was taking power, by means of a peaceful revolution, until 31 December 1960. Dignitaries in all groups began a series of appeals to the United Nations for special protection of their persons and residences. At a press conference the Chief of Staff announced his reliance on the United Nations for assistance, and his intention to set up a "Collège des universitaires" for the governance of the country.

27. The following morning, 15 September, Mr. Lumumba took refuge in the Ghana Officers Mess in the Army's principal camp in Leopoldville. Throughout the day his life was seriously threatened while hard-pressed Ghana troops held off riotous soldiers of the hostile Baluba tribe who charged that their families had been victims of the civil war in Kasai. After personal intervention on the spot by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, it proved possible by nightfall for the national Gendarmerie and the Ghana troops to escort him out. During the same afternoon the Chief of State and his Prime Minister designate requested the United Nations to effect the arrest of Mr. Lumumba, which the Special Representative firmly declined, explaining that this was entirely outside the functions of ONUC. On 16 September, Mr. Lumumba demanded that the United Nations enable his government to fly in troops from Stanleyville to assure the security of Leopoldville.

28. To complete this chronicle of political events as at the time of the preparation of this report, an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Chief of Staff was made on 18 September in Camp Leopold. Two successive announcements were made by Mr. Lumumba, and categorically denied by Mr. Kasa-Vubu, that the Prime Minister and the President had signed an agreement of reconciliation. On 20 September, Mr. Lumumba protested in writing to ONUC that the Chief of Staff with elements of the Army had occupied the administrative buildings of the Central Government, and requested ONUC intervention to reverse this action. On the same day, the Chief of Staff announced the formation of his government, consisting of a College of Commissioners designated by ordinance of the Chief of State, thus apparently raising the number of rival governments to three.

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29. In this confused situation, with three rival governments jockeying for position, and each demanding as of right the enlistment of ONUC's support to enforce its own particular political solution, any action taken by ONUC in the performance of its disinterested mission has been liable to be seized upon by one or more groups, for reason of political advantage, as a basis for the unfounded charge of intervention in the domestic affairs of the country. In such a situation ONUC has maintained with scrupulous care an attitude of strict neutrality, avoiding any action which could be interpreted, even remotely, as influencing the political balance. The fragmentation of the branches of government into separate claims of supremacy by rival prime ministers, by the Parliament and by the Army has greatly increased the degree of circumspection required to avoid even the appearance of influencing the outcome of the conflict. Although it is a relatively easy matter to refrain from any open pronouncement, or to balance an interview with one leader with discussions with others, the real difficulty lies in the fact that the United Nations is not in the Congo as a mere observer; it has a military and a civil assistance programme regarding each of which it has certain specific responsibilities. The very size of these programmes has induced charges that they amount to a "take-over" of the government by the organization. It has therefore been unavoidable that operations should have been slowed down in many ways: formal agreements cannot be negotiated in the confusion at the governmental level; even the more routine contacts at lower levels are to an extent disrupted by the crisis; and some actions of unquestioned propriety in ordinary circumstances have perforce to be deferred lest they appear to favour one political faction against another.

30. In the field of law and order the effect of these inhibitions is particularly complex. While it is axiomatic that ONUC is in the Congo to assist the government in the maintenance of law and order, it is also true that its force cannot be placed at the disposal of one faction against another. In the exercise of the functions assigned to it by the Security Council, ONUC actions will inevitably have some impact on domestic matters. It must nevertheless ensure, and has striven to do so, that every such act is both impartial and strictly confined to the necessary fulfilment of its international mandate.

31. It is obvious that in so complex and variable a situation, the imperative of non-intervention requires continuous analysis and careful weighing by ONUC in the context of rapidly unfolding events. During the protracted political crises, while ONUC has maintained an attitude of strict detachment, it has not been one of indifference to the point of denying the possibility of the exercise of the function of good offices, should it be sought by all concerned.

III. MILITARY OPERATIONS

32. The United Nations Force now consists of some 16,400 officers and men coming from 28 nations. This total will soon reach nearly 19,000. The main contingents are supplied by 13 countries, the remainder supplying administrative and ancillary units, air force personnel and staff officers. The first units arrived within forty-eight hours of the Security Council decision, and were immediately deployed. Such exceptional speed was warranted by the seriousness of the situation, but it also entailed considerable risks and disadvantages. The troops had to be deployed before the Headquarters, logistic organization and signal communications were even formed. Operations in local areas were further hampered by lack of vehicles, a situation which is still in process of being rectified. The Force at present consists of a Force Headquarters the equivalent of 20 battalions, signals, engineers, supply and transport units, and ordnance depot, a field hospital, postal units, and an air transport force. For present location and strength of the Force, see annex 1.

33. The Force had to be air-lifted into unknown situations in distant places without, in many cases, any communications other than through liaison officers with Force Headquarters in Leopoldville. Time allowed very little briefing on the United Nations mission, and lack of information permitted even less instruction on the situation in a given area. An immense responsibility, therefore, devolved upon local commanders and their men, and it is the best evidence of their devotion, discipline and judgement that no serious situations arose in any of the varied and delicate situations in which they found themselves at such short notice. A high degree of improvisation has thus been required at all levels throughout the first stages of the operation.

34. The contingents of the Force have been called upon to deal with matters beyond the range of normal military experience in their assistance to local authorities. They have had to deal with civil disturbance, maintenance of essential services, protection of refugees, and with situations very often complicated by irrational fear and a host of alarmist rumours. They have constantly been asked for help in protecting minorities and in facilitating the resumption of work in a variety of enterprises. They have used their good offices in situations ranging from tribal war to arbitrary arrest of individuals and the molestation of minority groups. A further source of difficulty in many areas has been to discover who really constitutes the effective authority.

35. Communications of all kinds have hitherto been at a minimum. When a brigade of three battalions is responsible for an area the size of France, which is beset by problems ranging from famine to tribal war, the lack of communications aggravates the already exhausting task of the troops. At present, radio communications have been established by the Force signals between ONUC Headquarters and the majority of the territorial commands. There are, however, still some territorial commands which depend for their link with Headquarters on borrowed or public facilities. The situation within the territorial commands is also not completely satisfactory, many of the units being without radio communication between their headquarters and sub-units. This is due to the fact that the normal radio equipment with which a unit is equipped is not designed to cover the distances over which they are presently deployed. The Force signal communications are being progressively improved. For further information on communications, see annex 2.

36. The fact that the United Nations Force is a peace force provides another problem unfamiliar to the highly trained soldier. He is allowed the right to use force only in the last resort of legitimate self-defence. The troops are also compelled by the demands of non-intervention not to resort to military initiative in situations which would normally call for a strong reaction from courageous and responsible troops. This imposes on them a heavy strain, and only high morale, discipline and a belief in their mission have made it possible for contingents to meet this challenge with honour, and without the use of force.

37. Much attention has been given to the restraint which the United Nations imposes on its troops. This restraint is the only possible course for a peace force of this kind. It has been proved by the performance of the soldiers themselves, beyond any doubt, that well-trained and devoted troops can achieve their objective, even under these very difficult conditions, and can inspire a respect for their authority, which is more effective than any momentary physical advantage that could be gained by the use of force.

38. An emergency operation, extended over an area as large as the Congo, is in its initial phases almost entirely dependent upon aircraft for communications, transport and supply. The ONUC air component has had to be put together from a bewildering variety of sources. Such a situation is not conducive to maximum efficiency or performance and has created a large-scale and costly training programme.

39. In spite of this, and by the unrelenting efforts of air staff, air crews and ground crews, the ONUC air transport force is now in existence in the Congo and has been functioning with increasing efficiency for many weeks. Its tasks have included transporting of troops, supplies, relief food and necessary civilian personnel all over the Congo. With the development of this air component, the United Nations Force is gradually becoming independent of other less reliable agencies of air transport. A chart of the organization of the ONUC air transport force is attached as annex 3. Recommendations for the expansion and reorganization of this air transport force are now under consideration.

40. In the period of the build-up of the Force many services have necessarily been improvised. Medical services have been gradually organized, and, fortunately, there has been no major epidemic or significant number of casualties before this organization was completed. Local procurement of food on a large scale has so far been possible in most areas and has relieved the burden of long-range supply by air until a regular organization of supply by surface transport could be achieved. Nevertheless, in many areas it has not been possible to obtain adequate supplies of local food, and inroads have been made into the Force's stock of reserve rations. The development of postal services for the Force has, for various reasons - including the lack of necessary governmental agreements - been very slow, and this has been a hardship to which the men of the Force have submitted with patience. Similarly, owing to other more pressing demands, recreational facilities

have thus far been poor. As yet, there has been little time or opportunity for normal leave periods or recreation, since the strength available and the magnitude of the task to be performed have resulted in units having to operate at full pressure without the normal reserves necessary for regular reliefs. The excellent spirit of the Force, however, has remained unimpaired by these shortcomings.

IV. CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

41. For the first time in the history of international organization, the United Nations and the specialized agencies have collaborated in the Congo as a single team, under the mandate of the Security Council, to meet the economic emergency following the country's independence. They have put together, in a little over a month, the largest civilian team they have ever had in one country at one time. The vast responsibilities which the individual members of the mission have assumed are in themselves indicative of the void which exists in almost every sector of Congolese life today: the responsibilities which they have not been able to undertake, and the recommendations they have not been able to put through are indicative of the political and organization vacuum in which the United Nations has had to work, a situation which has regrettably been worsened in recent days.

42. To give a fair and accurate picture of the meaning of United Nations civilian operations in the Congo, one would have to begin by describing the extent to which the country's normal facilities were disrupted and by listing the services which would not be functioning save for the presence of the United Nations. There was an immediate and country-wide breakdown in the regular commercial arrangements for distributing food, to the point where people in some parts of the Congo must now rely for their main sustenance on food supplies distributed from Leopoldville by the United Nations. There was, at the same time, the threat of a major breakdown in the maintenance of water supply and sanitation facilities. Without the services of WHO personnel, who arrived within two days of the plea for help, these facilities might have failed. There is a more recent ominous threat of a smallpox and plague epidemic, and disquieting reports are being received of an increased number of malaria and filariasis cases.

43. With the voluntary departure of European personnel incident to independence, there was virtually no trained staff to supervise the operation of telephone, telegraph, telex and radio transmission installations, and these facilities are in operation today only because of the presence of a large UN-ITU team. Likewise, air traffic control services were deteriorating with the departure of technicians from a very large number of airports. Today, adequate servicing of flights can only be assured at the three airports where United Nations advisers, controllers and radio technicians are based. If there were not any meteorologists assigned by the United Nations to the country (there are five), there would be absolutely no meteorological protection for planes. Machinery for the radio transmission of weather trends within the country and from other parts of the world to the Congo has been almost completely disrupted, to the point that the chief of the meteorological mission has made an arrangement to send a helicopter once a day to Brazzaville to pick up necessary weather maps.

44. At the beginning of the crisis, in July, almost all surface transportation had become paralysed for lack of security and supervisory arrangements. This traffic has now been put into motion again, but at a lower level of efficiency and on an uncertain basis. The vital port of Matadi, for example, is running now because ONUC opened it to traffic and assured the continuation of dredging and pilot operations. The United Nations has taken measures to ensure the passage of rail freight through Kasai Province into Katanga, and from Matadi to Leopoldville.

45. In the all-important sector of finance and trade, ONUC stepped in to sound the alarm and suggest control measures at a time when there was a possibility of foreign exchange being completely exhausted. The flight of capital from the country, which had begun several years previously, is being brought under control by hastily improvised economic and financial measures. In the area of labour administration, the entire social security system has been, and to an extent still is, threatened by collapse. For the time being, the system of labour inspection has been suspended. For this service, and for the completely depleted statistical offices of the Government, substantial United Nations assistance has been requested. The collapse of the judiciary and court system has given rise to very serious problems affecting the administration of justice; a legal consultant has recently arrived and is faced with the very difficult task of helping to set up judicial machinery in the absence of trained Congolese judges and magistrates.

46. This is an abbreviated and incomplete picture of the stark background against which the United Nations established its programme of technical assistance in the Congo. Because of the nature of the emergency, this assistance has begun by being largely operational. It will undoubtedly continue to be operational for some time, but this has not prevented the advisory mission from turning its attention to the enormous planning, training and organizational problems which lie immediately beyond the first emergency. They have found reason to warn that the bigger crisis is yet to be surmounted; that there are many sectors of the country's economy, in agriculture, food distribution and some areas of health, for example, where a reasonably normal level of activity is being carried out on the basis of the momentum of earlier days. When this momentum wears down, however, the old ways of doing things and the old machinery will no longer be serviceable or feasible.

47. In almost every one of the major fields of current United Nations activity, new and simpler structures must be built to replace the old ones which will become useless later on. This vast undertaking must be carried out within the circumstances and the limitations which are described in the paragraphs that follow.

Deficiencies in the organization structure

48. A development plan begins with a Minister, with his central staff and with an administrative organization which reaches into the different sections of a country. The United Nations Mission in the Congo has begun its collaboration at the Central Government level, has worked with Ministers and their staffs where they existed, and has tried to help in their formation when no organization did exist. Nonetheless, the situation in this critical sphere has, if anything, deteriorated in the past two weeks.

49. Most of the senior United Nations consultants, whose work depends on day-to-day co-operation with Ministers and other host officials, have found (with a few notable exceptions) that they had no experienced Minister with whom to work, that there was overlapping of functions and that the staff who formed the Ministry were caught up in the confusion of the political situation. In the paragraphs that follow, there will be references to high priority actions recommended, and even drawn up, by United Nations advisers which still await signature, ratification or follow-through by a government department which is not functioning.

50. At the base of this situation is the fact that substantial numbers of European civil servants abruptly left the country soon after independence. No real arrangements had been made to set up a new structural basis - a civil service - for the Congolese Government. Ministries which had, suddenly, to be staffed from the ground up are now little more than names, with no well-defined functions and no experienced personnel. In this atmosphere, lower level staff began to promote themselves into higher jobs without any system or basis for doing so.

51. The member of the consultative group responsible for public administration, after nearly a month of not being able to find a proper ministerial base for his work, has now been operating more effectively within the Ministère de la fonction publique, which has only just been established. Slowly, civil servants are responding to the measures he has recommended, but there is always the threat of political considerations putting an end to the progress that has been made. A promotion system has been worked out, and the consultant has helped to draw up a salary scale, but the chances of reaching an agreement on the latter as between the various Ministries are very slight for the immediate future.

52. On the all-important point of developing co-ordination between Ministries, it might be mentioned that the first meeting of the Secretaries-General of all Ministries was held last week. Out of twenty-seven such officials, ten did not attend.

53. The structure and effectiveness of provincial governments and their co-ordination with the Central Government are undefined and obscure, a fact which seriously hampers the activities of ONUC.

54. In brief, ONUC is in the process of helping to build a civil service, working with an untried and inexperienced skeleton group which is diffused and lacking in esprit de corps. It may take twelve months, with the co-operation of the staff that exists, to survey the status, organization and efficiency of the current machinery, with a view to building from that point. In the meantime, the presence of United Nations advisers has made it possible for some organizational arrangement to function.

The financial and economic situation

55. Economic conditions in the Congo at the present time are characterized by an abnormally low level of production and high unemployment in the

major urban centres, by a substantial decline in the volume of foreign trade and in public revenue and expenditure. There are also signs of price increases for certain imported and domestically produced goods and services, and of a pronounced depreciation in the value of the Congolese currency in the foreign exchange markets.

56. Since the independence of the country, there has been a very substantial decline in the level of aggregate demand. The basic economic reasons for the tendency of prices to rise and for the present lack of confidence in the currency are therefore to be found on the supply side. The normal processes of production and distribution within the economy have been disrupted and there has been a steep decline in imports of certain raw materials and essential consumer goods. These developments reflect the absence of economic relations with Katanga, the lack of security and order, the breakdown of the administrative machinery and the inability of the Government to take appropriate measures in the fields of foreign exchange control, import regulations and monetary and financial policies. The revival of business activity is hampered by an acute shortage of credit, which is partly caused by the inability of the Government to meet its obligations.

57. On the positive side, the physical machinery of production and distribution remains largely intact and, as soon as the serious problems in the fields of security, public administration and economic policies have been eased and a certain amount of foreign aid has been made available, the volume of production should begin to rise at relatively rapid pace. In these circumstances, the United Nations economic and financial advisers have concentrated their efforts on problems of money and credit, foreign exchange and import regulations and budgetary planning and execution. The status of these activities is as follows.

The Central Bank

58. An Agreement for the liquidation of the old Central Bank of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi was entered into between Congolese and Belgian officials a month ago under United Nations auspices. Moreover, United Nations advisers assisted in the preparation of proposals for the creation of an interim organization to operate after the liquidation and before the establishment of a new Central Bank. As a result of the recent political crisis, no action has been taken, and the Government is still not in a position to create money and credit.

Foreign exchange and import regulations

59. As a result of extreme deterioration of foreign exchange balances of the Central Bank, the Government, on the advice of ONUC, has decided on strict rationing of foreign exchange and on import licensing limited to goods essential to the functioning of the economy. A list of such goods was prepared and ONUC advisers helped in drafting new foreign exchange control regulations. Although these regulations were approved in principle, they have not yet been put into operation. Owing to lack of a firm decision the granting of import licenses does not follow procedures recommended by ONUC. The help given is now on a day-to-day basis, by suggesting emergency measures for control, by filling some administrative jobs and by operating as liaison between local businessmen and the Government when urgent import-export and foreign exchange problems arise.

Budget

60. Both the revenues and expenditures of the Government have dropped very considerably. Whilst the revenue from taxation has declined in August to approximately one-third of the monthly average of the first half of 1960, the expenditure decreased by 50 per cent. The cash deficit, which was characteristic also in the first half of 1960, continued on a much reduced level of expenditure. The only means used for covering it since independence were advances from the Central Bank.

61. Recommendations were made by ONUC as to type and number of technicians needed to improve the tax administration; it suggested short-term steps necessary for raising revenue in the existing situation. So far no action has been taken on recruitment and the short-term measures suggested were not put into operation in the very uncertain political situation.

62. As the 1960 budget became quite unrealistic in relation to the completely changed situation, ONUC suggested that necessary adjustments should be made for the remaining four months of the year. It was suggested that each ministry and provincial government should enumerate its needs on a simplified form for consideration of the Ministry of Finance. As the answers were delayed, it was decided to call in the representatives of the Ministries to the Ministry of Finance, for quick consultation, and, in the case of the Provinces, to allocate funds on a proportional basis. It is hoped that the resulting adjustments will lead to a more rational allocation of funds to government services.

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Lack of adequate information on which to base planning

63. From the summaries which have already been given, it should be clear that the lack of sufficient background information underlines the present ineffectiveness in most fields. The breakdown of the Government statistical services has been noted. To go further, there is an almost complete breakdown in the transmission of statistical and factual information from the provinces into Leopoldville and even from points within Leopoldville. To give only an example of the effect which this situation has on civilian operation: the shipment of emergency food supplies from ONUC to points of demand is based on the most haphazard notice of such demand, depending on word received informally from United Nations military observers, some provincial authorities, Red Cross teams and anyone else who might be travelling in an area where food is scarce; there is no systematized way of knowing where these supplies should be sent.

64. In regard to the extremely vital programme of public works which is being organized to help alleviate the unemployment problem, ONUC engineers found that provincial authorities did not have adequate information about work stoppages and local needs on which to base a sound selection of projects. There is, for example, no reliable information on the number and kinds of agricultural plantations which have been abandoned, and - for that matter - the basic information on the extent of unemployment is in itself only an estimate.

Training of Congolese staff and recruitment of foreign technicians

65. There is perhaps no more serious long-range economic and social problem facing the Congo than that of finding a corps of officials and technicians, in the long run from among its own people or, more immediately, from other countries. The United Nations mission has turned its attention to questions of training and recruitment, regarding which the following preliminary observations are presented.

Training

66. At the time of independence there were only seventeen Congolese university graduates, not one doctor, no engineers, professors, architects, etc., and few, if any, qualified lawyers. If there is to be a large-scale programme of fellowship awards, and parallel programmes of in-service training, one must find people with sufficient educational prerequisites to qualify for this training. In the field of health, the ONUC Senior Consultant has

estimated that it will take some twenty-two years before the Congo can produce enough of its own doctors to staff even a reduced schedule of health services. Recently, a Government offered to train a substantial number of Congolese technicians in the much-needed skills of weather forecasting. So far, only six Congolese have been found who qualify for these awards, and they have not yet been sent abroad because it has been impossible in the present political hiatus, over a period of exactly one month, to get the necessary Government agreement.

Recruitment from abroad

67. It is apparent that for a long while to come, the Congo will have to depend on large numbers of technicians from abroad, and in fact ONUC has already been approached to use its machinery to recruit teachers, doctors, labour inspectors, administrators and other specialists who would become employees of the Government. UNESCO has been asked to undertake the task of finding over 1,000 teachers to staff, for the most part, the secondary schools. Effective recruitment is found difficult, however, because of the prevailing political conditions in the country.

68. Less than 50 of the 400 hospitals operating throughout the country have doctors, most of them provided by the Red Cross and bilateral aid teams. Many of these teams will have to return home within the next few months, and it will be difficult to find replacements.

Reorganization and simplification of basic services

69. In the introduction to this section of the report it was pointed out that a greater crisis is yet to come when the momentum of the old system wears out and when the old institutions - which still exist - can no longer be used. The elaborate health services which were built up throughout the Congo can no longer be maintained for lack of staff and financing. A smaller, simplified establishment will have to be substituted, and ONUC is already working on the structure of such a system. In the agricultural field, activity has not been seriously affected so far, but the very basis of the agricultural programme and the methods of work of the smaller plantations and farms will have to be reformed to conform to the new economic conditions and facilities of the country.

Likewise, the social security system, which was built on an elaborate base, will be reorganized to fit the needs of Congolese administration. The same can be said for the management of airports, the educational system and almost every phase of the country's structure. It will be a slow and painful process, which will take most of the attention of the United Nations civilian operations team for a long time to come.

70. The foregoing paragraphs have attempted to set out in relief the major problems in the social, economic and administrative fields, which are facing the country and having a direct impact on the day-to-day life of the people. A preliminary study of the problems has been made and measures devised to meet the immediate situation, which, however, have been prevented by the confused situation prevailing at the Government level, both Central and provincial, for taking full effect. The magnitude of the problems are enormous, but with the resources of the country in relation to its population, there is every hope for their ultimate solution in a measurable period of time, given the basic conditions to which attention has been drawn repeatedly in this report.

V. CONCLUSION

71. The magnitude and intricacy of the problems facing ONUC will be evident from the foregoing pages. The vast organization required before the implementation of the Security Council's mandate became at all possible was set up with great speed. The response from the Member States to the Secretary-General's invitation for assistance was prompt and encouraging. Contingents of specialist services and of troops, asked for or offered, are still arriving. The civil operations branch received excellent support and co-operation from the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

72. As soon as the basic organization, both civil and military was set up, no time was lost in attending to the manifold responsibilities cast upon ONUC. The presence of the United Nations contingents widely scattered throughout the country has had a calming and reassuring effect, and few occasions have arisen where they have had to resort to the regrettable necessity of using force, as in the protection of refugees, or to prevent looting or in self-defence. Even in such situations the degree of force used has been kept

to the minimum. Although the troops have suffered a few casualties, it is indeed fortunate that despite the fact of their deployment in distant areas and in difficult circumstances, the number of these casualties has been remarkably small. They have been involved in situations of grave provocation and humiliation, but have comported themselves with tact and dignity. In Leopoldville, for example, the tasks of the Force include constant patrolling in a populous community, and the protection offered to public personalities at their request has so far helped to prevent any violence or bloodshed. It is a tribute to the men of the Force that despite their possession of the means of retaliation, they have used the utmost restraint and forbearance.

73. The civilian operations have been designed in consultation with the Government, to provide bone and sinew to the Administration in its different branches, denuded as it was of technical and administrative personnel. Thanks to such assistance, the essential public services have been prevented from collapsing in Leopoldville and elsewhere. The urgent problems facing the country, such as serious unemployment, shortage of essential articles in various parts of the country, the closure of educational institutions, the absence of a judiciary or magistracy, the ineffectiveness of the civilian administrative machinery, the breakdown of the tax collecting and customs agencies, the disruption of the security organs including the army and the police, the partial paralysis of the public health and social security services and, above all, the depletion of the treasury, to mention some of the most pressing problems, are matters engaging the constant attention of the civil operations branch of ONUC. It is of the utmost importance to activate the different branches of the Administration so that these pressing problems which are daily mounting up, adding to the volume of insecurity and distress of the population, are tackled on a determined basis. The responsibility for dealing with these pressing problems is of course that of the Congolese Government, the United Nations being willing and ready to help the Government in meeting its responsibilities.

74. The United Nations operations in the Congo have been conducted on the basis of consultation with the Central Government of an unprecedented intensity and extensiveness and under unusually difficult conditions. There have been continuous consultations with the Prime Minister, with the full Council of

Ministers and with Committees of that body, with individual Ministers and Ministries, with parliamentary members and delegations and with high officers of the Congolese Army. All important actions of the United Nations in the Congo have been based upon such consultations, which had begun, in fact, even before the Government presented its formal appeal to the United Nations for assistance. In and out of Council meetings, the Prime Minister and individual Ministers have pressed the United Nations representatives with urgent demands for the deployment of United Nations troops in specific localities, for United Nations intervention in troubled areas, for food relief, for emergency health service, for United Nations protection, for quelling disturbances, for aid in financial crises and in unemployment, and on numerous other matters. The Special Representatives and all other senior officials of ONUC, civilian and military, have always been available for such consultations and have given full co-operation. There has been, in addition to the oral consultations, a voluminous correspondence with the Prime Minister and the Ministries of the Government. In spite of this, the difficulties amply exposed in other parts of this report, have developed.

75. While a great deal has been done in the face of almost insuperable odds to assist the civil administration in its different functions, from the Central and Provincial Ministries down to the district level, more could have been done, and more can be done, if the basic conditions can be established. Those conditions are some measure of stability in the Central Government, an integrated policy and the assurance throughout the country of a sense of security and freedom from disorder. Unfortunately, the experience of the last two months shows that these conditions have not been achieved either at the Central Governmental level or elsewhere. Indeed, during recent weeks the trend has been in the reverse direction.

76. Nevertheless, in spite of the serious difficulties and impediments which have daily, and even hourly, confronted this mission, there is no doubt whatsoever that the United Nations presence has had a steadying effect on the situation. The impact of the moral force of the Organization has not been inconsiderable since the very presence of the United Nations troops, conscientiously discharging their peaceful functions, the band of technical advisers and administrators devotedly assisting the Government in its different

branches in conditions of extreme difficulty, the Headquarters organization maintaining always an attitude of co-operation and conciliation, scrupulously refraining from taking sides in the political conflict, have all helped in maintaining some measure of calm and reassurance and prevented the situation from degenerating into chaos and disorder.

77. There is yet time for the Congolese leaders and people to take stock of the situation, to put an end to factional and party strife, to reconcile political and sectional interests and to embark on the path of national unity. That path would lead the country to the realization of its integrity, to the achievement of conditions of stability, and to order, progress and prosperity. The path of division would lead only to fratricidal strife, disorder and disintegration, dangerous not only to the Congolese people but to the continent of Africa and, indeed, to the world. This mission is in the Congo to help but not to intervene, to advise but not to order, to conciliate but not to take sides. While it is not part of its functions to get involved in any way in the political crises which have been constantly erupting, it is hoped that before it is too late, the political leadership will make its choice, both wisely and well. In that event, the United Nations assistance programmes, in consultation with the Government, could be applied - and applied with all possible speed - in the interests of the Congolese people, so that the sovereign independent Republic of the Congo could be enabled to take its rightful place in the world community as a stable, self-reliant and prosperous State.

ANNEX 1

ONUC LOCATION AND STRENGTH STATEMENT

A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT

Srl. No.	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Unit	Location	Remarks
1		ONUC Headquarters	LEOPOLDVILLE	
2	CANADA	Signal squadron	"	
3	INDIA	Supply platoon	"	
4	PAKISTAN	Ordinance company	"	
5	GHANA	Brigade of three battalions and two police companies	"	
6	SUDAN	Battalion HQ and two companies	"	
7	TUNISIA	One company	"	
8	UAR	"	"	
9	MOROCCO	Brigade HQ	"	
10		HQ 1st battalion	THYSVILLE	One platoon in BOENDE
11		Company HQ and one platoon	BOMA	
12		Platoon	TSHELA	
13		Platoon	LUKULA	
14		Platoon	KITONA	
15		Company	MATADI	
16		Company HQ and one platoon	SANGOLOLO	
17		Section	LUFU	
18		Platoon	LUKALA	
19		Platoon	MOERBEKE	
20		HQ 2nd battalion	KIKWIT	Two companies in KATANGA
21		Company	LEVERVILLE	

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A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl. No.	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Unit	Location	Remarks
22	GUINEA	Platoon	BANGA	
23		Platoon	KIZIA	
24		Company HQ and two platoons	POPOKABAKA	
25		Battalion HQ	BANNINGVILLE	
26		Company	DIMA	
27		Company HQ and one platoon	MUSHIE	
28		Platoon	KWAMOUTH	
29		Platoon	BOLOBO	
30		Company HQ and two platoons	INONGO	
31		Platoon	KIRI	
32		Company HQ and one platoon	KUTU	
33		Platoon	OSHWE	
34		Platoon	NIOKI	
35		Platoon	MABENGA	
36	MOROCCO	Parachute company	COQUILHATVILLE	One company in LEOPOLDVILLE
37		Platoon	BOENDE	
38	UAR	Battalion less three companies	GEMENA	
39	ETHIOPIA	Company less one platoon	LISALA	
40		Company	BUMBA	
41		Company	LEBENGE	
42		Brigade HQ	STANLEYVILLE	
43		HQ 1st Battalion and two companies	BUNIA	
44		Platoon	ABA	
45		Platoon	MAMBASA	

A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl No	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Unit	Location	Remarks
46	TUNISIA	Company HQ	PAULIS	Moving to PAULIS
47		Platoon	POKO	
48		Platoon	WATASA	
49		HQ 2nd Battalion and two companies	YANGAMBI	
50		Company HQ and one Platoon	ISANGI	
51		Platoon	ELISABETHA	
52		Company HQ and two Platoons	PONTHIERVILLE	
53		Platoon	BANALIA	
54		HQ 3rd Battalion and two Companies	STANLEYVILLE	
55		Company HQ and two Platoons	BUTA	
56		Platoon	AKETI	One Company in LEOPOLDVILLE
57		Company	BAMBESA	
58		Brigade HQ	LULUABOURG	
59		HQ 10th Battalion	"	
60		Company HQ	BAKWANGA	
61		Platoon	KABINDA	
62		Platoon	DIBAYA	
63		Section	KAULU	
64		Section	KALALA	
65		Platoon	LUSAMBO	
66		Company HQ and one Platoon	MWENE DITU	
67		Platoon	KANDAJIKA	
68		Platoon	LUPUTA	
69		Company HQ and one Platoon	KADIMA-DIBA	
70		Platoon	DIMBELENGA	

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A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl. No.	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Units	Location	Remarks
71	TUNISIA	HQ 9th Battalion and one Company	TSHIKAPA	On railway protection duties
72		Company	PORT FRANCOU	
73		Company	MWEKA	
74		Platoon	LUBAMI	
75		Platoon	KATUMBA	
76	LIBERIA	Battalion HQ and one Company	LULUABOURG	
77		Platoon	TSHIMBULU	
78		Platoon	KALU	
79		Platoon	KELE	
80		Platoon	MUSENGA BANZA	
81		Platoon	LUPUTA	
82	HQ UNOC	Sub Command	ELISABETHVILLE	
For Eastern Provinces (KATANGA-KIVU)				
83	SWEDEN	Battalion HQ and one Company	ELISABETHVILLE	One Company in KAMINA
84		Platoon	KASENGA	
85		Platoon	SAKANIA	
86		Platoon	MANONO	On temporary assignment
87	MOROCCO	Company HQ and one Platoon	JADOTVILLE	From 2nd Moroccan Battalion
88		Platoon	KAMBOVE	
89		Platoon	MITWABA	
90		Company HQ and one Platoon	LUBUDI	
91		Platoon	TENKE	
92		HQ 3rd Battalion	KOLWEZI	
93		Platoon	NZILO	

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A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl. No.	Nationality	Unit/Sub Units	Location	Remarks
94	SWEDEN	Company HQ and one Platoon	DILOLO	One Company each from 32nd and 33rd Battalions
95		Platoon	MUTSHATSHA	
96		Platoon	KASAJI	
97		Platoon	SANDOA	
98		Platoon	KAPANGA	
99		One Company	KAMINA	
100	IRELAND	Two Companies	KAMINA	
101	ETHIOPIA	HQ 4th Battalion	KAMINA	
102		Platoon	KANIAMA	
103		Platoon	MALEMBA	
104		Platoon	BUKAMA	
105		Platoon	LUENA	
106	IRELAND	HQ 33rd Battalion	ALBERTVILLE	
107		Platoon	KABINDA	
108		Platoon	BENDERA	
109		Platoon	BAUDOUINVILLE	
110		Company HQ and one Platoon	MANONO	
111	MALI	Platoon	PIANA	
112		HQ 32nd Battalion	GOMA	
113		Company	KINDU	
114		Company	BUKAVU	
115		Battalion HQ and one Company	KABALO	
116		Company	NYUNZU	
117		Company	KANGOLO	
118		Company	KABONGO	

B. STRENGTH OF CONTINGENTS

Sr.No.:	COUNTRIES	H.Q. ONUC	DEPLOYED	TOTAL STRENGTH	EXPECTED	TOTAL
1.	ARGENTINA	-	10	10	-	10
2.	AUSTRALIA	-	-	-	-	-
3.	BRAZIL	-	9	9	-	9
4.	BURMA	8	1	9	-	9
5.	CANADA	26	234	260	-	260
6.	CEYLON	9	-	9	-	9
7.	DENMARK	4	26	30	-	30
8.	ETHIOPIA	6	2,566	2,572	-	2,572
9.	GHANA	3	2,288	2,291	-	2,291
10.	GUINEA	1	748	749	600	1,349
11.	INDIA	23	350	373	217	590
12.	INDONESIA	8	-	8	1,144	1,152
13.	IRELAND	6	1,377	1,383	-	1,383
14.	ITALY	1	89	90	-	90
15.	LIBERIA	11	223	234	-	234
16.	MALAYA	8	-	8	444	452
17.	MALI	1	576	577	-	577
18.	MOROCCO	10	3,247	3,257	-	3,257
19.	NETHERLANDS	1	5	6	-	6
20.	NEW ZEALAND	-	1	1	-	1
21.	NORWAY	4	46	50	-	50
22.	PAKISTAN	4	244	248	-	248

B. STRENGTH OF CONTINGENTS (continued)

Sr.No.	COUNTRIES	H.Q. ONUC	DEPLOYED	TOTAL STRENGTH	EXPECTED	TOTAL
23.	SUDAN	4	394	398	-	398
24.	SWEDEN	22	594	616	32	648
25.	SWITZERLAND	-	22	22	-	22
26.	TUNISIA	1	2,632	2,633	-	2,633
27.	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	1	518	519	-	519
28.	YUGOSLAVIA	-	20	20	-	20
	TOTAL	162	16,220	16,382	2,437	18,819

Chief of Personnel (Mil)

ANNEX 2

ONUC Communications

Outline plan

The main command communications are being provided by a Canadian signal squadron using ANGRC 26 (Radio teletype).

Each territorial command HQ is to be served by a Canadian signals detachment working back to HQ ONUC at Leopoldville.

Within territorial commands, communications are provided by the national contingents. As their normal wireless sets in many cases cannot work over the great distances involved, additional equipment (ANGRC 9, ANGRC 19, and BC610) are to be issued where necessary.

Owing to the distances involved and the fact that it is an area of mixed national contingents, SCOMEF command communications will be provided by the Indian Signals using BC610 provided by the United Nations. These sets arrived in the Congo on 16 September. The Indian signal company is expected towards the end of September.

Present communications

At present the command net is working to Gemena, Coquilhatville, Stanleyville, Luluabourg, Elisabethville and on borrowed equipment at Kamina. It is expected to have the detachment at Matadi working in a few days.

The situation within units is not as agreeable, as most of the sets ordered to supplement unit communications have not yet arrived.


Future requirements

Additional Canadian signal detachments are required to provide communications to Goma, Kamina and Banningville.

The equipments already demanded for units is also now required urgently.

Annex 3

ONUC Air Transport Force



- (a) Italian C119 Squadron - 10 aircraft.
- (b) Indian C119 Squadron - 5 aircraft.
- (c) Brazilian/Argentinian DC3 Squadron - 17 aircraft (some aircraft detached for operations).
- (d) Swedish/Norwegian Helicopter Squadron - 6 H13, 2 H19, 6 "Alouettes" helicopters (majority detached for operations).
- (e) Swedish/Norwegian light Aircraft Squadron - 4 "Beavers", 4 "Otters" (majority detached for operations).
- (f) UN Air Transport Maintenance Base Kamina - All second line repairs and overhaul UN aircraft (First line maintenance to be done at parent base or detached base).