

UNARMED

CORRESPONDENCE

[27 MAR] - 16 APR 1994

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

CONFIDENTIAL
BH/WG APR 2001

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FC

UN SECRET

Copy No. 11 of 12

UNAMIR Force HQ
Hotel Amahoro
KIGALI

1000.7(DFC)/G/1

16 April, 1994

See Distribution:

Subject: ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION TO OPS ORDER NO 5

References:


- A. Operation Order No 5 dated 15 Apr 94.
- B. Additional Instr to Ops Order No 5 dated 16 Apr 94.

1. Further to reference 'B' above, the following supplementary instructions are issued:

a. It must be emphasized that BYUBAT must be sure it is conversant with the weapon systems being handed-over to the battalion and can fully operate them before a final take-over.

b. A complete assessment of the capability to fully defend the airport would have also been done by the time the final take-over takes place.

2. All to note for compliance.


HK ANYIDOH
Brig Gen
for Force Commander

Distribution:

Action:

External:	Copy No
Kigali Sector HQ	1
DMZ Sector HQ	2
MILOB Gp HQ	3
Force Engr Coy	4
Force Log Coy	5
Tun Coy	6
Force Med Pl	7
Mov Con Pl	8
MP Sec	9
File	10
Spare	11-12

1 of 1
UN SECRET

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

3000.9 (IO)
15 April 94

TO : FC
THROUGH : COO
: DFC
FROM : MIO

SUBJECT : COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. RPA : It is taking advantage on the ground. They are slowly, calmly and cooley gaining terrain. At this moment, they are manning to cut off the main routes. Many important targets are surrounded: Camp Kacyuru- Urugwiro village - Meridien Hotel. They are ready to engage RGF of Presidential Guard Camp in Kimihurura.

RPA is also installing TUTSIS in areas already under its control; its also helping them for vital supply.

RPA is conducting massive but very concealed infiltrations in KIGALI. It has assumed that about 10 battalions are already in the city. In fact, I witnessed hundreds of them getting in CND building the 14 April 94 around 2130; a very long column carrying mostly machine guns, anti tank weapons (RPG 7) etc.

Also this morning an important column has left MULINDI.

Routes for supply have been found by RPF and are under their control.

First aid medicines are critically needed.

RPA main HQ is still in MULINDI but the exact location of the tactical mobile HQ is unknown.

It also seem that RPA had begun infiltrations before the current hostilities since special rescue operations are still conducted in RGF/INTERAHAMWES controlled zone such as NIAMIRAMBO area. ~

RPA troops are not conducting looting unless necessary in order to feed their supporters or themselves.
They are not intended to spoil public goods or edifices.

The general intention seems that they are conducting a deep penetration to control the main RGF supply routes , to

surround the main targets and to make assaults only once they are ready.

Taking control of the airport is not their interest and they are avoiding to cross UNAMIR.

2. RGF It seems that the flow of tactical information is not working well to reach their own troops who are on contacts lines. Most of the time they don't know that RPA is close to them.

Some of them are leaving the fighting areas but no surrounding to RPF reported.

Most of the troops are supplying themselves by looting. The general feeling is that they are fed up of the ongoing situation and would be happy about a cease fire. They are confident in UNAMIR and specially confident in some Nationalities but not in BELGIANS.

The lack of coordination is noticed among RGF; number of hard liners is decreasing. The acting OPS leaders are favorable to peace process.

There is a divorce between the acting governmental military command and the INTERAHAMWES. In Niamirambo area, the Presidential Militia has the entire control. The Interahamwe political wing is very active. Even governmental Forces have to show ID and can proceed only after having been given clearance. The milicians are very excited and the road sides are full of dead bodies at the road blocks. They are armed with grenades and traditional weapons. I was obliged to turn back after four road blocks because they were getting very excited and seemed to be under influence.

3. It seemed that ITALIANS conducted special tasks against RPA (In fact it's a special force detachment). The whole detachment has left after FC's request.

UNAMIR

10 APR 16 10 11

CRN-122

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

P1/1

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: *[Signature]* UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 15 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-774

SUBJECT: CONTINGENT COMMANDERS ACCESS TO REAR LINK

1. AFTER INITIAL DIFFICULTY, ON 13 APRIL FC AUTHORIZED CONTINGENT COMMANDERS OR THEIR DESIGNATES TO MAKE ONE 5 MINUTE PHONE CALL ON A DAILY BASIS TO THEIR HOME GOVERNMENTS WITH A SITREP ON RWANDA. ALL CONTINGENT COMMANDERS HAVE AVOIDED THEMSELVES OF THIS SYSTEM.
2. IF NATIONS COMPLAIN TO YOU THE PROBLEM RESTS WITH THE HOME GOVERNMENT NOT PASSING THE INFORMATION TO NEW YORK OR WITH THE QUALITY OF THE CONTINGENT COMMANDERS NATIONAL SITREP.
3. FC HAS AUTHORIZED A SYSTEM TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM. REMAINDER OF SOLUTION RESTS WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND CONTINGENT COMMANDERS.
4. REGARDS.

UNAMIR
10 APR 16 10 15

UNITED NATIONS
COMM CENTRE
HEADQUARTERS

91 AP 15 22 30Z

YKF 664

01/14

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

16605

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 15 April 1994
NUMBER: MSF 2338-04

15 APR 16 UNAMIR 01 21

Attached press clippings arrived from Brussels and
Bulletin Number 2.

(1)

(2)

FC

~~Rel. Gen.~~
~~Booth~~

news
clips
BWB
ny
A/IMA

SRS4

FC

MSF 2338-04 02

15 April 1994, Bulletin #2

- 3 -

Amman - A senior Jordanian government official on Friday rejected Israeli accusations that Jordan helped the Islamic militant movement Hamas whose suicide bombers have killed 12 Israelis this month. "Accusing Jordan of helping Hamas is only rash, baseless and not conducive to the peace process," the official said. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin accused Jordan on Thursday of helping Hamas. (REUTERS)

Tel Aviv - Former heads of the security forces and dozens of reserve generals staged a peace rally here Friday calling on Israel to sign an accord with the PLO. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres arrived at the rally to loud cheers from the officers, who included 32 reserve generals. (AFP, REUTERS)

Tyres - Guerrillas in south Lebanon fired Katyusha rockets into Israel's occupation zone in south Lebanon on Friday, hours after rockets fired from Lebanon slammed into the Galilee, security and UN sources said. UN sources said one rocket slammed near the town village of Marwahine, near the border with Israel. It was not immediately known where in the zone the two other rockets hit. There was no report of casualties.

Meanwhile, the US Friday urged the Lebanese government to take steps to restore calm along its border with Israel as guerrillas launched fresh rocket attacks, officials said here. US Ambassador Marc Hambley handed Lebanese Foreign Minister Fares Bweiz a message describing the latest upsurge of violence in south Lebanon as "very painful and tragic." (REUTERS)

RWANDA

Brussels - Belgium said on Friday the UN should suspend its peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. The UN mission in Rwanda, which has been mired in violence since the assassination of the president last week, had lost its point because of the "brutal rupture" in the peace and democracy process, the government said in a statement after the weekly cabinet meeting. "That is why the government is in favour of the suspension of the UN mandate and the withdrawal of troops," the statement said. (REUTERS)

GENEVA - Over 20,000 people, many of them refugees from Burundi, have fled the current unrest in Rwanda, the UNHCR said on Friday. UNHCR spokeswoman Sylvana Fox told reporters that 12,000 people had fled to Burundi, around 9,100 to Zaire, several hundred to Tanzania and around 100 to Uganda. (REUTERS)

(MORE)

MSF 2338-04 03

A l'attention de Monsieur Jean-Claude Aimé, Chef de Cabinet de
S.E. M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secrétaire général des Nations Unies

Aux bons soins de Monsieur Juan Carlos Brandt, News Distribution
Service/DSSG/DPI (Room S-378)

Copie à: Mme Thérèse Gastaut, Porte-Parole du Secrétaire général pour l'Europe

Rapport PDPL 30/1994
15 avril 1994

La situation au Rwanda, l'annonce du départ des casques bleus belges et l'hommage rendu par la Belgique aux casques bleus tués à Kigali: principal élément d'information de ce 15 avril 1994.

Le retour des corps des casques bleus belges tués à Kigali a donné lieu à une cérémonie d'hommage en présence du Chef de l'Etat belge ainsi que des plus hautes autorités du pays. Le Directeur faisant fonction, Mme Ria Heremans, assistait à cette commémoration.

Dans l'ensemble ce retour a donné lieu à toute une série de commentaires exprimant horreur et indignation. Dans les journaux des lettres de différents lecteurs ont également été publiées qui très souvent ont souligné l'inadaptation de l'ONU dans la gestion des dossiers de maintien de la paix.

Les autres commentaires sont certes beaucoup plus nuancés mais, ainsi que vous le constaterez à la lecture des annexes, la plupart relèvent le déséquilibre entre le mandat des forces de maintien de la paix et la réalité sur le terrain. Tous concluent généralement à une nécessaire révision de l'ensemble du concept de maintien de la paix. A relever également que des commentaires de spécialistes de droit international ne manquent pas de se poser la question sur la responsabilité des Etats dans ces matières.

L'annonce du retrait des casques bleus belges - annonce faite par le Ministre des affaires étrangères - donne lieu également à certaines analyses. Dans l'ensemble les réactions à cette décision que d'aucuns considèrent comme "unilatérale", sont positives. L'opinion publique attendait cette déclaration... comme en témoigne un bref sondage diffusé par la RTBF: 90% des personnes interrogées souhaitaient une telle décision, tandis que 50% estimaient qu'une action des paracommandos était nécessaire pour sauver la vie des ressortissants belges.

Cependant, dans ce concert unanime, il faut relever le commentaire publié à la "une" par le journal "La Libre Belgique". Selon ce journal, la décision du Gouvernement belge crée un "précédent dangereux" non seulement parce qu'il appartient au Conseil de sécurité de décider d'un tel retrait, mais également parce que l'exemple pourrait être suivi par d'autres pays sur d'autres théâtres d'opération. "Qui ne sera pas tenté de s'en prendre aux soldats de l'ONU s'il a la certitude que ceux-ci se retireront sous la pression de leur opinion publique?"

MSF 2338-04 04

D'autres analyses se demandent qu'elle était in fine la faisabilité des accords d'Arusha? Accords que la Belgique n'a cessé de défendre dans le concert des nations. La Belgique se demande également le journal belge "De Standaard" n'a-t-elle pas été trop loyale vis-à-vis de l'ONU? Quand au journal néerlandais "NRC Handelsblad", il pense que l'on a tout lieu de craindre une extension des combats au territoire burundais. Enfin, remarquons l'analyse du journal belge "Het Laatste Nieuws" qui remarque que la question du commerce des armes n'apparaît dans aucun commentaire officiel ou non officiel: qu'en est-il du commerce des armes - celles là mêmes qui ont peut être tués les casques bleus belges... } X

Salutations très distinguées.

Jean-Luc Onckelinx, pour Ria Heremans, OIC,
CINU, Bruxelles

A BOUT PORTANT

LE SOIR - 15/4/94

MSF 2338-04 05

Sur l'enfer rwandais auquel elle a échappé. « Adieu, vous ne pouvez plus rien faire pour moi... » C'étaient, jeudi dernier, ses derniers mots à un ami belge auquel elle téléphonait quand la soldatesque a fait irruption chez elle. Il y eut un coup de feu. Elle est arrivée hier, saine et sauve.

■ C'est pas vrai ! Pas vrai !

□ Un miracle ! C'est un miracle !

■ Depuis ce coup de téléphone interrompu, jeudi dernier...

■ J'étais à la maison quand ils sont entrés vers 13 heures, en demandant où je me trouvais. J'avais dit à mes domestiques de laisser toutes les portes ouvertes. La détonation émanant du téléphone, c'était le début d'une attaque du Front patriotique dans mon quartier. Moi, je croyais qu'on venait m'abattre. Je m'étais cachée sous un besson. Le militaire qui me cherchait a failli me marcher dessus. J'ai compris un peu plus tard qu'il s'agissait de deux hommes du FPR. Alors, je suis revenue et je me suis cachée dans un placard. J'y suis restée pratiquement trente-six heures.


■ Vous étiez particulièrement visée. Vous avez fondé au Rwanda l'Association pour la défense des droits de l'homme. Vous êtes aujourd'hui secrétaire exécutive de la Ligue pour le respect des droits de la personne humaine et pour la démocratie dans la région des Grands Lacs. Jeudi, on a tous cru que vous aviez été abattue. La nouvelle s'est répandue immédiatement. Notre journal l'a publiée dès le vendredi 8 avril...

■ En bien non. J'étais dans le placard. J'en suis descendue un instant le vendredi, quand un domestique m'a avéré que des amis m'appelaient des Etats-Unis. Je leur ai donné des nouvelles, puis je me suis réfugiée dans le placard, avec des oreillers. Le samedi matin, j'ai entendu des villageois qui revenaient et cherchaient de l'eau. Je mourais de peur chaque fois que mes domestiques me prévenaient qu'on s'approchait de la maison. Des voisins, des gens du quartier venaient me provoquer. D'autres sont revenus. Je croyais toujours que c'était pour moi, mais cette fois, ils se sont contentés de couper le bois sec qui soulève la haie du jardin. Dans le placard, je me demandais : comment de terribles vents ont-ils pu continuer à me chercher ?

■ Quand vous êtes-vous décidée à descendre de votre cachette ?

■ Dimanche. Des militaires revenaient. J'étais à l'extérieur, je me suis jetée au milieu d'un groupe. Je me disais que je ne pouvais plus continuer à vivre cette peur. Je leur ai

Monique Mujawamariya



Fondatrice de l'Association rwandaise pour la défense des droits de l'homme

dit que j'avais été moi-même militaire. Ce n'était pas tout à fait faux, puisque j'ai été mariée pendant quatre ans avec un militaire. Je leur ai montré les photos, dans l'album de famille. Alors ceux qui arrivaient chez moi, et qui ne me connaissaient pas, ont dit qu'ils allaient essayer de me faire évacuer. Lundi, d'autres sont revenus. Je leur ai promis cent mille francs rwandais pour me conduire jusqu'à l'hôtel des Mille Collines. Mardi à 7 heures, ils étaient là. Ils m'ont fouillée, m'ont pris mes bijoux, tout ce que j'avais. Puis ils m'ont emmenée jusqu'à l'hôtel des Collines. Devant l'entrée, ils m'ont dit que si je ne leur donnais pas les cent mille francs promis, ils m'abattent. Là, j'avais mis l'argent dans des sachets plastiques glissés dans ma brousse de toilette. Je le leur ai donné.

■ Votre cauchemar prenait fin...

■ Non ! Beaucoup de Rwandais s'étaient réfugiés dans l'hôtel. Les militaires venaient en chercher pour les évacuer vers le sud, où la situation était plus calme, disaient-ils. Moi, je pensais qu'il ne fallait pas attendre que l'hôtel se vide, que je devais trouver une solution avant. J'ai pu parler à votre ambassadeur, Johan Swinnen.

■ L'ambassadeur a eu le ministre des Affaires étrangères Vitor Claes au téléphone. Le ministre lui a demandé de tout faire pour vous tenter de vous mettre en sécurité, de vous faire évacuer vers la Belgique.

■ Je ne savais pas. Moi, j'ai vu arriver le vieux frère Isaac, un Canadien respecté de tous ici, et qui a travaillé sur « le collier du Président ». Il m'a demandé : As-tu fait tes prières ? Si tu les as faites, alors on prend la route de traverser la ville. On y va. Puis, j'estime rendu compte qu'il n'y avait pas d'urgence dans son véhicule. Un Rwandais que

je connaissais en avait. On est partis. En route, un militaire rwandais nous a arrêtés. Il était ivre et menaçait de tuer. Un soldat qui avait avec lui, a reçu un coup de fusil. Le militaire nous a laissés passer. On est alors arrivés à l'aéroport, chez les Belges...

■ Vous vous attendiez à une telle explosion de violence après l'attentat du mercredi 6 contre le Président ?

■ Non. Je me disais qu'il y aurait sans doute encore des assassinats politiques par ci, par là. Pas des massacres de familles entières. Depuis qu'ils ont tué mes amis, mes voisins, mon seul recours était d'appeler des amis pour tenter de nous sauver. On m'avait préparée psychologiquement. J'étais menacée par téléphone, par petits messages écrits, des gens m'interpellaient dans la rue, m'avertissaient que je n'y échapperais pas. C'est la première fois que je me sentais obligée de fuir. Les menaces se focalisaient sur moi.

■ Avez-vous été aussi la cible des attaques de « Monsieur Georges », ce speaker d'origine belge qui se déchaînait à l'antenne contre les opposants au Président Habyarimana et contre les Belges ?

■ Depuis trois mois, à Radio Mille Collines, il n'arrêtait pas de dire que les Belges voulaient couper les vivres au Rwanda, et le samedi dernier, après l'attentat contre l'union du Président, il disait que c'étaient les Belges qui avaient tiré. Depuis le 25 février, les attaques d'ont pas cessé contre moi. Ce speaker belge a été de ceux qui ont semé la graine de la barbarie, et qui l'ont entretenue régulièrement.

■ Selon qui a organisé l'attentat ? Certains attaquent le FPR. D'autres disent le nom d'un colonel de la FAR. D'autres encore disent que ce seraient des mercenaires, payés par des extrémistes hutus du clan du l'incident.

■ Je ne suis pas propagandiste du FPR. Mais comment le front aurait-il pu savoir quand et où il fallait intervenir ? Et le FPR savait qu'un tel attentat déclencherait des massacres contre les Tutsis. Pour moi, ce sont les barons du régime qui, voyant que le Président lâchait du lest, ont décidé de le sacrifier pour pouvoir nettoyer tout après lui. Dans la population, les militaires ont plutôt visé les Tutsis. Mais pas uniquement des Tutsis. Avec eux, tous ceux de l'opposition qui ne s'étaient pas ralliés les derniers temps à la mouvance présidentielle. A commencer par les militants des Droits de l'homme et tous ceux qui voulaient le changement. La preuve : ils ont même massacré des députés de Giseryi, dans la région natale du Président.

■ Monique, on vous demande au téléphone, de Kigali je pense...

■ Bonne ou mauvaise nouvelle ?

■ ... Je ne sais trop. J'ai peur. Je viens de rappeler un numéro à Kigali où je pensais pouvoir joindre cet ami dont on me dit qu'il vient d'arriver. Mais je n'ai pas eu de réponse. Je sais que quelques amis ont pu trouver refuge dans des maisons vides, évacuées, d'où ils parviennent parfois encore à téléphoner pour annoncer qu'ils sont en vie. Comme moi.

Propos recueillis par
Nadia Haguen

UNITED NATIONS

Information Centre for Belgium, Luxembourg
d the Netherlands and Liaison Office with
European Communities

MSE 2338-04

06

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JME

LE SOLR

Belgium

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Netherlands

NGO Bulletin

Regional

Date: 15/4/94

ÉDITORIAL

La Belgique vient à nouveau de saluer la dépouille de dix de ses meilleurs soldats, tombés sous les couleurs bleues des Nations Unies, au champ d'honneur de la paix. Ces hommes remplissent un devoir particulier. Ils ont fait plus que leur devoir, ils ont rempli jusqu'au bout une mission devenue impossible, respectant un mandat qui leur était d'urgence leur droit de se défendre. Leur nom doit être inscrit au panthéon de cette guerre universelle contre la dégradation de l'homme, avec ceux de leurs frères d'armes tombés en Somalie et en ex-Yugoslavie.

Aujourd'hui, la Belgique est belle-vaillante et ardente. Non seulement elle a payé le prix du sang, mais elle doit se relever, s'honorer, raffermir et créer de nouvelles, de ce pays d'Europe dont le sort doit jamais être compromis. Elle veut y parvenir la paix et contribuer à son développement. En quelques heures, elle a percuté le charisme aride qui conduisait l'impitoyable bureaucratie à la non assistance à personne en à peuple en danger.

Les soldats en armée ont dû sacrifier impitoyablement au sacrifice d'aujourd'hui. Il a fallu abandonner des enfants, des femmes, des hommes à une mort quasi certaine. Il a fallu trahir silence et fièvre, pour ne savoir que les premiers. Il a fallu refuser celle et protéger à des hommes condamnés à mort en raison de leur appartenance ethnique

ou de leurs convictions idéologiques.

Les para-commandos ont accompli leur devoir avec bravoure et efficacité, mais il ne reste au cœur que rage et honte, un profond sentiment d'échec, et des questions violentes. Pourquoi les dix para belges sont-ils morts ? Pourquoi ce massacre à l'échelle de tout un pays ? Pourquoi les 2.000 hommes de la mission n'ont-ils pu prévenir ni empêcher ce qui a déjà rang de crime contre l'humanité ?

Ce nouvel échec de la communauté internationale d'ajoute à ceux qu'elle a subis en Serbie, en Angola, en Bosnie, en Libye, en Libéria, en Sierra Leone et en Haiti. Il vient renforcer encore un sentiment d'impotence déjà très répandu.

Il nous reste pourtant un devoir

DES HÉROS
LIGOTÉS

PIERRE LEFÈVRE

devoir. D'abord celui de lutter contre les sentiments et les réactions racistes, simplistes et qu'inspirent trop souvent de tels échecs. La mission de la Belgique est le fait d'une frange d'interventions criminelles, non celle d'un peuple, et il n'est pas davantage l'ouvrage des gens de paix belge. Le devoir aussi de lutter contre l'écueil de se replier sur soi, de cesser de l'inspiration, et de laisser ces peuples s'ordonner dans l'horreur. L'humanité qui prétend bannir ces citations ne peut être l'œuvre d'une de ces barrières qui ont été une fois-ci le Rwanda à son et à sang. Il y a une grande majorité d'hommes et de femmes qui vivent, souffrent, se battent et qui, peut-être, espèrent encore. Ils ne méritent pas qu'on les abandonne aux forces destructrices et totali-

naires qui cherchent à les asservir ou à les exterminer.

Après le choc qu'elle vient de subir, assurée par l'histoire et dégoûtée de l'écueil du droit à la victoire par les vrais criminels, la Belgique n'est sans doute pas en mesure de maintenir aujourd'hui une présence efficace dans un dispositif international au Rwanda. Elle ne peut cependant renoncer à ce devoir particulier de solidarité que lui impose son passé colonial. Si les heures reprennent, elle le sera revenue, une œuvre de coopération de route plus pertinente.

La communauté internationale garde elle aussi, et plus que jamais, un devoir de médiation de la paix et de prévention de génocide dans ce pays déchiré. Mais elle devra se défaire d'avantage les risques et donner à son agent un mandat et des moyens bien plus solides.

Quel que soit leur traitement actuel, les responsables locaux, les diplomates, les militaires et les coopérants n'auront d'ailleurs d'autre choix que de reprendre place à pleins la construction de ce pays, repartir des ruines d'aujourd'hui, reconstruire les écoles et les hôpitaux, relancer la machine économique. De nouveaux mécanismes juridiques ne pourront en effet être écartés qu'au prix d'un développement économique, social et politique réel.

[illegible]

**Olivier
Paye**

**Überwachen Sie die Drucker-
Druckeinstellungen:**

Abstract The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of a 12-week training program on the heart rate (HR) and heart rate reserve (HRR) of sedentary middle-aged men. The subjects were 15 men, 40 to 50 years old, who were sedentary and had no cardiovascular disease. They were randomly assigned to a 12-week training program or a control group. The training program consisted of 3 sessions per week of aerobic exercise at 60% to 70% of the maximum HR. The control group did not exercise. The HR and HRR were measured at rest and during a submaximal exercise test at the beginning and at the end of the 12-week period. The results showed that the training program significantly increased the HR and HRR at rest and during the submaximal exercise test. The control group showed no significant changes. The results suggest that a 12-week training program can improve the cardiovascular fitness of sedentary middle-aged men.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

**Pyriminase Inhibitors for
Tubercular Malaria**

UNITED NATIONS

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Luxembourg and the Netherlands
and Union Office with the
Embassy in Brussels



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Netherlands	WCO Bulletin		Regional	
				Date: 15/4/94

Actions judiciaires en Belgique ?

A près la tragédie vandalisée, des actions judiciaires pourraient-elles être menées, y compris en Belgique ? Il faut savoir que les trois statuts militaires belges, joints pour l'Afrique, les deux les quelques fois, l'autre avec les part-courants, est très bien à Nieuwpoort, l'agence de mi-litairisme internationale ont non-bonement pour mission de re-cueillir un maximum d'informa-tions sur ces tragédies. Notre Service de l'Etat s'ins-titue aussi à ces heures.

LES AGENCES

Pour ce qui est de la ques-tion de l'action judiciaire, l'enquête, en principe, doit être ouverte par les autorités bel-ges, avec l'appui d'agents de police. Il ne faut pas à Nieuwpoort pour les militaires de Belgique, militaires en civil, et notre Service est évidemment prêt à lui communiquer ses données.

Pour ce qui est des pro-priétés liées aux actions de la radio des « Mille Collines » accusant la Belgique de tous les maux et notamment de l'attentat contre le président, notre pays, à défaut d'une ju-stice internationale, pourrait-elle être amenée à poursuivre ces individus pour crimes de la violence, pour sa contribution pour contribuer au massacre de la mort d'une dizaine de Belges, sans parler des milliers de Rwandais ? A première vue se présente l'article 114 du code pénal stipulant que « quel-conque acte profané des me-morielles ou différents des in-telligibles avec une personne

étrangère ou toute personne prouvée engagée dans l'ac-tion à l'égard de la guerre, contre la Belgique ou pour lui en prouver les moyens sans puis de la défection per-pétrée. Si des poursuites sont au-torisées, il sera prouvé de la peine de mort ».

Evidemment, l'état de guerre, juridiquement, n'a pas cessé entre la Belgique et la Rwanda. Il n'en demeure pas moins, si on observe dans certains milieux judiciaires, que les poursuites, presen-tées ou non, sont de tout repos non interdites par le pou-voir exécutif à Nieuwpoort, pour quelques uns de ces com-plices les mêmes sans-querres meurtriers qu'une guerre.

LE CODE DE PROCEDURE

penale

Par ailleurs, l'article 6 du code de procédure pénale per-tient de poursuivre en Belgique « tout Belge qui, hors du ter-ritoire belge, aura commis un crime, soit d'un crime pa-did, soit d'un fait qualifié crime ou délit si la loi est pénale pour la législation de pays où il a été commis ». Or, évidemment, il y a une incitation à la violence, voire au meurtre. Enfin, après les 30 jours, une poursuite de poursuites « qu'on ne peut pas la démissionner, à la Belgique et à la violence à l'égard d'une personne ou même de sa race, de sa couleur, de son qua-dre ou de son origine auto-rité ou étrangère... »

Roger BOURGAT.

UNITED NATIONS

Information Centre for Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands
and Liaison Office with the
European Communities



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Subject matter:

Date: 15/4/94

Commentaire

Par Christophe LAMFALUSSY

Un précédent dangereux

Comment ne pas être touché et remué par les larmes des familles qui ont vu revenir du Rwanda leurs fils orphelins - ceux de nos congénères bleus lâchement assassinés à Kigali ?

L'émotion est grande. Elle est légitime. Les hommes politiques ont senti tourner le vent, ont réclamé le départ de tous les congénères bleus belges du Rwanda. Il n'est pas facile, dans ces conditions, de faire valoir un point de vue contraire. Or, la décision du gouvernement belge, confirmée jeudi par le ministre des Affaires étrangères Willy Claes, appelle deux réflexions.

La première est qu'il est peu diplomatique de forcer une décision qui appartient au Conseil de sécurité. Les 400 soldats belges sont sous la bannière de l'Onu, dans le cadre d'une force internationale.

La deuxième est qu'un retrait pour cause de mort d'hommes crée un précédent dangereux. Qui ne sera pas tenté de s'en prendre aux soldats de l'Onu s'il a la certitude que ceux-ci se retireront sous la pression de leur opinion publique ? Nous avons plus de mille soldats en ex-Yugoslavie où la tension est grande.

L'assassinat de nos soldats au Rwanda pour satisfaire une question beaucoup plus large qui est la nature des mandats de l'Onu. Le fameux devoir d'ingérence, produit de l'humanisme des années 80, ne tient plus la route.

Les pays occidentaux ont consenti à maintenir la paix et à encadrer l'aide humanitaire, mais pas à forcer la paix.

Pour la première fois, la Belgique reconnaît cette impuissance, qui l'amène à se laver les mains du drame rwandais. Et c'est un message très lourd de conséquences que reçoivent ainsi les peuples africains.

UNITED NATIONS



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Belges Conscience

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Les paras s'en vont, reste le chaos

Les paramilitaires espagnols dans l'opération « Silver Beach » ont commencé jeudi après-midi leur retrait de Belpaïs. Uniquement restés en attente par les tire de deux avions de reconnaissance sur l'aéroport, qui sont maintenant au-
cun d'eux.

L'opération des étrangers de la capitale et de l'interne du Belpaïs a pris fin avec l'ar-
rivée à l'aéroport d'un ultime convoi de journalistes inter-
nationaux bloqués à l'Hotel des
Mille Collines.

dans les rues d'une ville sou-
mise à la dictature, les
réfugiés de courage et des
pilotes depuis plus d'une se-
maine. Selon certains
sources, des milliers de Belpaïs
patriotiques rivaux ont
reçu à l'arrivée en nombre
dans les quartiers populaires
du sud. Des troupes, avec de
l'armement lourd, ont défilé
sur des routes au nord et à
l'est.

La prise en main des
membres de la famille
leur des militaires des Belpaïs
armées révolutionnaires et de la
garde présidentielle.

Si le retrait de nos paras est
ou cru, celui des quelques
Belpaïs, présents depuis
novembre 1983 dans la Belpaïs
des Nations unies pour l'inspec-
tion de Belpaïs, devant être
quasi éliminés. Dès jeudi, le
ministre des Affaires étran-
gères, Willy Claes, a précisé
qu'il quitterait la ville des
Mille Collines. La décision
d'attendre de leur retrait était
déjà prise dans le milieu du
Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

Nous représentons à New
York à par ailleurs l'ensemble
suffisant de la position belge
sur la situation des Belpaïs.

« donner aux élites
dans le cadre de son mandat
actuel ».

Dans ce contexte, la tâche du
Secrétaire général, M. Bou-
tron Ghali, en tant que médiateur
d'urgence le mandat de la M-
cuser parait pour le moins élimi-
né.

Le Front patriotique rwan-
dais, qui semblait jusqu'ici en
position de force dans la Bep-
taïs pour Kigali, a cependant
toujours montré son médis-
ance.

C.P.

MSF 2338-04

11

de voir : Courrier des Lecteurs (suite)

A. MUELENBERG (Bruxelles)

C'est que bien : ne savez décrire

En tant qu'officier retraité, je vous fais part, à chaud, de ma réaction devant le drame au Rwanda. Le véritable statut de Casque bleu qui est celui de nos forces armées en l'occurrence devait, dans ces régions, déboucher tôt ou tard sur une issue de ce genre. S'interposer entre des factions est la chose la plus difficile et la plus périlleuse qui soit. Surtout lorsque les protagonistes ne respectent rien : ni la parole donnée, ni le droit des gens, ni la dignité humaine, ni la vie; ni, bien entendu, la neutralité des Nations unies.

Qu'on envoie nos troupes au moment opportun pour y défendre nos ressortissants et nos intérêts vitaux avec la claire mission de faire pièce nette les armes à la main, comme ce fut fait en son temps à Stanleyville par exemple.

Ce type d'intervention au moins justifie les pertes éventuelles et l'argent qu'elle coûte. Alors que, pour l'heure, les dix braves qui ont été odieusement massacrés à Kigali sont malheureusement morts pour rien.

GEORGES H.

Un Belge marié depuis 20 ans à une Rwandaise

Ce 9 avril 1994, nous sommes plusieurs dizaines de familles rwandaises et belgo-rwandaises à avoir pris le deuil. Comme les familles belges des 10 para-commandos. Suite aux massacres systématiques, survenus à Kigali, de nos pères, mères, frères, sœurs, cousins, cousines, oncles, tantes, neveux et nièces. Ils sont des milliers à

W. DE CLERCQ (Louvain)

Quelle mission ?

J'avais toujours la croyance que les soldats belges étaient là pour renforcer l'OTAN et défendre l'Europe. Et pas pour protéger des gouvernements temporaires en Afrique qui sont souvent très douteux. En plus, ils sont morts sans même oser se défendre ! D'où viennent de tels ordres ?

Pour résumer : dans des circonstances parallèles, il est mieux de rester en Belgique et laisser les Africains mener leurs propres batailles.

JEAN-LOUIS CORNELIE
12040 Belg

Quels sont vos intérêts ?

Les récents et pénibles événements survenus au Rwanda-Burundi et le fin sans doute tragique de dix de nos Casques bleus, la terreur à Kigali, les massacres inter-ethniques me portent à vous écrire ceci :

Qu'allons-nous donc faire en de telles galères ? Quels intérêts cruciaux défendons-nous là-bas ? Pourquoi notre pays, engagé jusqu'aux nerfines, intervient-il, sous la bannière de l'ONU, un peu partout dans le monde et surtout en Afrique ?

Pourquoi — à chaque fois — à grands frais, envoyons-nous le fleur de notre armée (les blindés, les para-commandos) se faire « tuer pour rien » ? Quelle stupide décision !

Sans doute sommes-nous un pays très riche, très puissant qui peut se permettre d'expédier, régulièrement, des bataillons armés jusqu'aux dents pour

J.-L. STAPPERS (Paris)

Des moyens insuffisants

Comme tous nos compatriotes j'ai été profondément ému en apprenant le massacre des paras belges au Rwanda, mais profondément indigné aussi, révolté et écœuré par l'imprévoyance, l'incurie, la coupable incompetence de ceux qui envoient dans des missions impossibles des soldats se faire bêtement massacrer parce que l'on ne leur a pas donné les moyens d'assurer leur supériorité militaire.

Ne jouez pas les affligés en présentant aux familles éprouvées des condoléances hypocrites et en décorant les défunts de médailles posthumes.

Vous êtes responsables, et vous seuls, de la mort de nos paras condamnés par ordre à mourir comme des moutons, parce qu'ils n'avaient pas le droit d'être en soldats, désorientés par des ordres de missions des plus flous, et traumatisés parce que dans d'autres circonstances vous aviez traduit leurs camarades en cour martiale pour s'être fait respecter en Somalie.

(...) Il est logique qu'en s'interposant entre deux camps, on risque de ramasser des coups des deux côtés.

Il faut donc être suffisamment fort pour être craint et dissuader les antagonistes de s'attaquer à vous. Cela ne semble pas avoir été le cas de Kigali au Rwanda.

La question est de savoir s'il

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	Subject matter											
	Date: 15/14/94											

Israël-OLP : briser les tabous

et dont les radiocollations de-
viennent de plus en plus
un complément aux tradi-
tionnelles études de régime d'irradi-
ation. Il n'empêche, le mot est
faux.

[illegible]

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the polymer solution on the surface free energy of the polymer film. The surface free energy of the polymer film decreased with increasing the concentration of the polymer solution.

IT'S SORRY

4.3. *History*

et les paracombattants, dont la moitié des officiers et sous-officiers du 2^e bataillon de parachutistes a été affectée à ces unités. Quelque quatre-vingt-cinq dix-huites.

[illegible]

Les hommes du 1^{er} sergent Van Niek Larray, d'abord désemparés dans le hall des secours par leurs chefs, ont été sûrs par leurs frères à l'arrière, quand, pour le moins, des barrières que s'effondrèrent à 10 heures les Allemands. Les chars sortent ensuite des tranchées vers les deux perspectives de destruction où les hommes mûrissent leur serment sans dormir.

in Easternmost L. O.
at New York, place
in Easternmost, place
L.

La chambre de l'Université de la Colombie (le Sénat) a nommé le capitaine José Práxedes Ibañez, ses dévoués à la chaire de l'enseignement de Sévill, sans doute également, le capitaine Juan Dabady Kelly, sans incertitude sur le rôle de commandant de Gd. Les professeurs de la faculté de médecine ont nommé leur collègue, le docteur Manuel Ruiz, également à l'Université de France. Les professeurs, en même temps

Les collèges scolaires de Rochelle ont inscrit la double élection à un vote unique au scrutin de liste. Les candidats sont : M. de la Roche, pour la République, et M. de la Roche, pour la République.

As Governmental wisdom is observed in their success and in the results of their efforts, it is to be noted that the Government, through the National Bureau of Investigation, is endeavoring to protect the innocent victims.

TOTAL P.16

UNAMIR

194 APR 15 08 08

1/3

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

KYF662

19 APRIL 1994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 3-4849	FROM: J.-R. BOOH-BOOH, SRSG, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, DPKO, NEW YORK	
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: (250) 84265
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	
SUBJECT: UNAMIR INSTALLATIONS - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS COVER: THREE	

DIRECT

MIR 463

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM. - COMMENTS
2. REGARDS.

UNAMIR
194 APR 15 08 24

FC E/OIR

1 SRSG.

TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

FROM : FORCE HQ/OPS BRANCH

SUBJECT : UNAMIR INSTALLATIONS - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

Reference : Ops Directive No 2 / 19 Nov 93.

1. UNAMIR Installations are

a. Whether compounds surrounded by fences or walls, containing UN personnel or UN equipment.

b. Vital grounds defended by UN troops, i. e. grounds to which UN troops will not allow any access unless to persons presenting themselves at the normal access(es) and after identity controls.

2. UNAMIR troops will adhere to following specific guidelines whilst guarding or defending the installations:

a. Hostile Intent. It is an action which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against :

- (1) The UN - installation or
- (2) The UN personnel guarding/defending it or
- (3) Any person who has access to it or
- (4) Equipment contained in it.

b. Hostile Act. Any aggressive action against as under paragraph 2, a. above.

c. Authority. The commander of the guard/defence unit is authorized to use all available weapons or means needed to respond to the threat to which the installation, the own troops, the persons authorized to accede or the stored equipments are exposed. Still, the principles of Minimum Force and collateral damage to be avoided (ref 7. e. and f) will be adhered to.

d. Threats.

(1) Any installation of weapon directed to the installation has to be considered as a hostile intent and will lead to preparedness to respond fire by the guarding unit.

(2) Any firing at the defending/guarding troops, authorized persons or stored equipments has to be considered as a hostile act and will lead to immediate reaction by fire and even to offensive actions in order to dislodge the threat.

(3) Hostile attitude by persons will only be reacted at, if those persons proceed towards the installation, although warning by voice have been given. Warning shots will precede fire for effect. If the installation is surrounded by fence or wall, there will be no firing for effect unless the persons actually attempt to cross or to force the barrier.

3. Rules of Engagement:

<u>Rule No</u>	<u>State</u>
1	B
2	B
3	D
4	A
5	B
6	B

R. A. DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

Distribution :

Action :

Internal :

Kigali Sector
DMZ Sector

Info :

SRSG
MILOB HQ
DFC/COS

" Immediate "

H UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
UNAMIR
194 APR 14 05 32
(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)
(MINUAR)

1/3

KIGALI RWANDA

OUTGOING FAX NO. KYF 658

PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: ANNAN\UNATIONS\NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
PREFIX/NO: MIR/ 759	DATE: 14 APRIL 94
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	PHONE: 250-84271
FAX NO: 212-963-4879	FAX NO: 250-84265
INFO:	DRAFTED BY: MAJ BEARDSLEY
FAX NO:	FILE REF:
Internal Dist.:	
SUBJECT: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION	
REFERENCE:	

1. ATT IS OUR PERIODIC INFORMATION FROM THE MIO WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU AS THEY ARE ISSUED.

2. REGARDS.

UNAMIR
194 APR 14 05 41

EC

E/DIR

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

3000.9 (IO)
13 April 94

TO : FC

THROUGH : COO
: DFC

FROM : MIO

Sene

SUBJECT : COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. ONE BELGIC COY IS INSTALLED AT KIYUVU, IN THE FRENCH SCHOOL. IT'S AN ASSEMBLY AND TRANSIT POINT. THIS COY IS ALSO TASKED TO ORGANIZE CONVOYS TO KIGALI AIRPORT.
2. THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN EVACUATED TO NAIROBI TODAY:
 - 103 PERSONS FROM DIFFERENT AFRICAN COUNTRIES .
 - 12 POOLISH PRIESTS FROM GIKONDO PARISH.
 - 01 BELGIC PERSON AT GIKONDO.
 - 02 ZAIRAN AND A CHILD IN KIUVU - RUE DU PROGRES.
 - REFUGEES OF MILLE COLLINES HOTEL.
 - 07 BELGIC PERSONS FROM PSYCHIATRICAL CENTRE OF NDERA IN KANOMBE AREA.
 - NONCES IN KIBUYE CROSSED THE LAKE TO ZAIRE BY BOAT.
 - A SENEGALESE FAMILY IN KIGALI.
 - OTHER EVACUATIONS ARE STILL GOING ON.
3. FRENCH TROOPS PASSED THE CONTROL OF KIGALI AIRPORT TO BE BDE. THE FRENCH DETACHEMENT LEFT RWANDA TERRITORY AROUND 0530. ABOUT 50 FRENCH PARATROOPERS ~~ARE LEFT~~ ^{WERE LEFT} BEHIND.
4. THE BELGICS AGREED TO ~~S~~ SUPPORT THE ITALIAN DETACHEMENT.

5. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT RGF ELEMENTS TOOK SOME UN VEHICLES TO GET AWAY.IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NOT UNAMIR VEHICLES.
6. KILLINGS ARE STILL CONTINUING IN KIGALI. PEOPLE ARE COLLECTING DEAD BODIES.
7. IN THE CENTER OF THE TOWN, MILICIANS ARE MANNING CHECK POINTS VERIFYING IDENTITY WITH TRADITIONAL WEAPONS. MILICIANS AND RGF TROOPS ARE NOW SHOWING FRIENDLY SIGNS TO UNAMIR. KILLINGS ARE STILL CONTINUING. RGF TROOPS AND MILICIANS SERIOUSLY THINK THAT BELGIC TROOPS ARE PHYSICALLY HELPING RPF.
8. BYUMBA WAS UNDER HEAVY ARTILLERY SHELLING THIS AFTERNOON FROM MULINDI. THE CONTRE BATTERY WAS NOT ACCURATE.
9. 05 URUGAY MILOBS REACHED THE BORDER UGANDA-RWANDA THIS MORNING.
10. A 10 TRUCKS CONVOY OF RED CROSS WITH MEDICINES INSTEAD OF 106 PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED AND SUPPOSED TO CARRY FOOD FOR REFUGEES HAS REACHED BUTARE THIS AFTERNOON.
11. OUR MILOBS REPORTED THAT THE BORDER WITH TANZANIA IS CALM.(TEAMS 604 AND 602).
12. RPF ALSO TOOK UNICEF VEHICLES , BUT THEY TOOK THE PRECAUTION TO BANALISE THEM BEFORE USE.
13. RGF AND RPF TACTICAL POSITIONS IN KIGALI ARE REPORTED IN THE OPS ROOM.
14. REGARDS.

UN RESTRICTED
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ

Date : 14/11/02 Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : INFO - NOTE FROM MILOB LIAISON - AIRPORT -14 APR 94

1. One Belgian Magistrate who arrived today 14 April 1994 to investigate the assassination of the Belgian soldiers requests:

- a. Capt Apedo, MILOB, (TOGO to provide him with a copy of the report he wrote on this matter.
- b. Or to interview this UNMO on this matter.

~~②~~
~~CMO~~
~~from FC. Please Action.~~
~~BPM~~
~~mg~~
~~A/PA~~

COO Per fix asap.

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ

Date : 13 Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ *M. G. H.*

SUBJECT : SPECIAL SITREP FROM BUTARE - 130710B APR 94

1. Presidential Guards are probably in the University Compound.

2. Team 702 is not in contact with the Sector HQ. The Team is likely to be in BUKAVU-Zaire or BUJUMBURA. Members of the team are as follows:

- Maj Maurice	- CONGO
- Maj Kampila	- ZIMBABWE
- Capt Djatoh	- TOGO
- Capt Chaengeni	- ZIMBABWE
- Capt Sibanda	- ZIMBABWE
- Capt Albert	- CONGO

3. MILOBs assisted foreign nationals moving through BUATARE to BUJUMBURA.

4. There is mass movement of people from Kigali to Burundi. People of Tutsi side are scared that killing by RGF (Govt side people continue, they and SUD Hutus are running to BUJUMBURA).

5. UNMOS present are :

a. BUKAVU/BUJUMBURA	- 6
b. KIGALI	- 3
c. BUTARE	- 17

UN RESTRICTED

(Handwritten notes and signatures)
②
FC
R/p.
BMB
no
A/MH.

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

3000.9 (IO)
12 April 94

TO : FC
THROUGH : COO
DFC

FROM : MIO *SENS.*

SUBJECT : COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. ON 11 APRIL 94, ABOUT 300 RPF LIAISED WITH THEIR FRIENDLY TROOPS AT CND AROUND 1600B. 02 OTHER BATTALIONS (900) WERE FOLLOWING.
2. RPF INFILTRATED IN KICUKIRU, GIKONDO AND REBERO AND MADE CONTACT WITH GOVERNMENTAL TROOPS.
3. RPF AGREED WITH 48 HOURS TO EVACUATE THE EXPATRIATES FROM KIGALI FROM 12 APRIL 94 AT 0700B. THE FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY NOT LATER THAN 12 HOURS AFTER THE 48 HOURS FOR EVACUATION.
4. FRENCH PARATROOPERS HAVE STARTED WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES. ONE COY LEFT AROUND 1600B. THEIR NEXT DESTINATION SEEMS TO BE GABON.
5. FOREIGN RADIO STATIONS BROADCASTED THAT THE AUTO PROCLAIMED GOVERNEMENT IS GOING TOWARD THE SOUTH (GITARAMA) WITH A HEAVY ARMED ESCORT. IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THEY TRY TO FIND A WAY TO ZAIRE VIA THE AXIS GITARAMA-KIBUYE-CYANGUGU.
6. KIGALI AND TWO GOVERNMENTAL BATTALIONS SEEM TO BE SURROUNDED BY RPF.
7. ONE RGF BATTALION FROM BYUMBA TASKED TO CONTAIN RPF IS NO MORE OPERATIONAL.
8. RPF REPORTED THAT RGF IN A BLUE PICK-UP HAS PROFITED OF A UN

CONVOY FOR HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION OPENED FIRE IN RPF ZONE . 02
SERIOUS INJURIES ARE REPORTED.

9. NO CASUALTIES REPORTED AFTER THE HEAVY SHELLING OF CND
BUILDING.

10. THE RTLM RADIO STATION IS STILL BROADCASTING VIRULENT SUBJECTS
AGAINST BELGIANS. IT INVITES THE POPULATION TO FIGHT BY ALL MEANS
BELGIANS. IT EVEN INVITED RGF TO FIRE ON ONE CICR TRUCK CARRYING
INJURED PEOPLE TO GITARAMA. ACCORDING TO IT , THAT TRUCK WAS
CARRYING RPF COMBATTANTS INSTEAD OF PATIENTS.

11. REGARDS.

UNAMIR MILITARY DIVISION
INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

3000.9 (IO)
12 April 94

TO : FC

TROUGH: COO
DFC

FROM : MIO

Handwritten: J. Li 12/4
Handwritten: J. M.

SUBJECT: COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.

1. A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 650 EXPATRIATES OF 22 NATIONALITIES WERE EVACUATED ON 10 APRIL 94 WITH 10 AIRLIFTS.

2. IN THE UNAMIR SIDE, A TOTAL OF 211 PERSONS WERE EVACUATED WITH 03 AIRLIFTS : 101 UN PERSONNEL IN A CANADIAN C130 - 97 IN THE SECOND CANADIAN C130 AND 13 WITH THE REMAINING LUGGAGES IN A UN C130.

3. 02 FRENCH MILITARY AIRCRAFTS BROUGHT ABOUT 01 COY OF TROOPS. THEIR STRENGTH SHOULD BE ABOUT ONE BATTALION. IN ADDITION OF THE MARINE PARATROOPERS FROM CENTRAFRICA (BANGUI) , ARRIVED MARINE INFANTRY TROOPS.

4. 08 BELGIC MILITARY AIRCRAFTS BROUGHT IN A TOTAL OF 01 BATTALION OF PARA-COMMANDO, MOTOR BYKES AND 03 ARMoured VEHICLES.

5. FRENCH MILITARIES TRIED TO TAKE BY FORCE UN VEHICLES AND RADIOS AT THE AIRPORT. ALL THE UN VEHICLES KEYS WERE COLLECTED BY MIO (19) AND HANDED OVER TO CMO.

6. THE JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN BELGICS AND FRENCH IS STILL ONLY AT HQ LEVEL. THE ATMOSPHERE SEEMS NOT TO BE THE BEST.

7. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT A MESSAGE BETWEEN RGF WAS INTERCEPTED BY RPF THIS MORNING. THE CONTENT IS AN ORDER TO FIRE ANY BELGIC AIRCRAT LANDING OR TAKING OFF.

8. REGARDS.

CRN-110 1/3
UNAMIR
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
194 APR 12 18 40 UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Most IMMEDIATE

DATE: 12 April 1994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX NO: (1-212) 963-4879	FAX NO: (250)-84265
SUBJECT: CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEATH OF TRANSITIONAL PM AGATHA UWILINGIMANA AND TEN BELGIAN SOLDIERS	
MIR-747	ROOM NO: 2035 TEL NO: (250)-84271
NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 3	

REFERENCE YOUR CODE CABLE 1064 DATED 11 APRIL 1994. THE RESIDENCE OF THE LATE TRANSITIONAL PRIME MINISTER MRS. AGATHA UWILINGIMANA WAS BEING PROVIDED WITH HOUSE GUARD FOR QUITE SOME TIME. DURING THE NIGHT OF 06/07 APRIL 1994 THERE WAS SUCH A UNAMIR HOUSE GUARD COMPRISING 05 GHANIAN SOLDIERS AT HER RESIDENCE. THE INNER PERIMETER OF THIS HOUSE USED TO BE GUARDED BY UNAMIR GUARD AND OUTER PERIMETER (OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARY WALL/FENCE) BY THE GENDARMERIE. AT AROUND 0430 (LT) HOURS 07 APRIL 1994 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS UNDER COMMAND ONE LIEUTENANT CAME WITH 04 VEHICLES AND JOINED WITH THE HOUSE GUARD. AFTER ABOUT AN HOUR BETWEEN 0530-0600 HOURS THE PM WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF GENDARMERIE ESCAPED THROUGH THE REAR FENCE WITH HER FAMILY WHEN IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE RGF WERE GOING TO ATTACK HER. AROUND 0700 HOURS MANY RGF SOLDIERS SUDDENLY CAME IN THE HOUSE AND ORDERED THE GUARD TO SURRENDER. THE ASSAILANTS SNATCHED THEIR RIFLES, WIRELESS SETS AND OTHER EQUIPMENTS AND DROVE THEM IN A MINI BUS TO CAMP KIGALI.

NOT FINDING HER IN HER RESIDENCE THE RGF SOLDIERS SEARCHED THE SURROUNDING AREAS AND FOUND HER HIDING WITH HER FAMILY IN THE HOUSE OF ONE UNDP PERSONNEL LIVING IN THE UNDP RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND. THIS COMPOUND IS JUST ADJACENT TO THE PM'S RESIDENCE. THE ASSAILANTS FIRED INSIDE THE ROOM WHERE THE PM WAS HIDING. THE PM, HER HUSBAND AND TWO OF HER CHILDREN WERE TAKEN AWAY BY THE RGF FROM THIS HOUSE. AFTER RECEIVING CALL FOR ASSISTANCE TWO UNAMIR APCS WERE DISPATCHED BUT THE APCS COULD NOT REACH THE SPOT BECAUSE OF ROAD BLOCKS. AT THIS STAGE THE FORCE COMMANDER MANAGED HIS WAY TO THE SPOT BUT BY THIS TIME THE ASSAILANTS HAD LEFT THE SPOT. THE PM'S DEAD BODY WAS LATER REPORTED FOUND IN CAMP KANOMBE (THE ELITE PARA COMMANDO UNIT). HER HUSBAND HAS ALSO BEEN KILLED. UNMO TEAMS ASSISTED IN SNATCHING AWAY WITH THE HELP OF A FOREIGN GROUP, THE CHILDREN ARE ALIVE AND UNHURT.

AT ABOUT 0730 HOURS ON 07 APRIL 1994, AN RGF OFFICER BY THE NAME OF MAJ BERNARD NTUYAHAGA ALONG WITH SOME RGF SOLDIERS BROUGHT THESE 05 GHANIAN SOLDIERS AND 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS IN FRONT OF MT5 OFFICE OF CAMP KIGALI. FIVE MINUTES AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL, THE RGF OF CAMP KIGALI WHO WERE IN THE FORMATION (MORNING FALL IN) CAME TO THE MT5 OFFICE AND STARTED BEATING THEM WITH WEAPON BUTTS AND STONES AND SOME TRIED TO KILL THEM WITH THE BAYONET. THE MILOB ON DUTY (AN OFFICER FROM TOGO, NAME AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST) OPENED THE OFFICE AND SOME OF THE UNAMIR SOLDIERS GOT IN AND FOUR OF THE BELGIAN SOLDIERS COULDN'T GET INSIDE WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. THE MILOB ON DUTY AT CAMP KIGALI TRIED TO PREVENT THE RGF SOLDIERS GETTING INSIDE THAT ROOM BUT WAS THREATENED THAT IF THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED, THEY WOULD THROW GRENADES INSIDE THE ROOM. THEN THE MILOB WAS FORCED IN ANOTHER ROOM. FEW MINUTES LATER, SOME RGF SENIOR OFFICERS CAME THERE AND TRIED VAINLY TO DISPERSE THEM. AFTER ANOTHER FEW MINUTES THE COLONEL COMMANDING CAMP KIGALI HQ COY ARRIVED ON THE SPOT AND TRIED TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED TO THE HOSPITAL BUT THE SOLDIERS REFUSED AND WAS ABOUT TO BEAT HIM.

AT THIS POINT THE COLONEL COMMANDANT'S ESCORTS SENT HIM AND THE MILOB TO THE ESM (OFFICERS ACADEMY) WHICH IS NEAR BY. THE MILOB MANAGED TO PERSUADE THE COLONEL'S ESCORTS TO GO TO MT5 OFFICE AND BRING AT LEAST THE GHANA SOLDIERS IF NOT ALL. THIS HE DID BECAUSE HE FOUND THE RGF SOLDIERS WERE TOTALLY AGITATED AGAINST THE BELGIANS AND THE RGF BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THE BELGIAN SOLDIERS WHO SHOT DOWN THEIR PRESIDENT. ONE OF THE ESCORTS MANAGED TO BRING THE 05 GHANIAN SOLDIERS TO THE ESM. AFTER ANOTHER ABOUT 5 MINUTES RGF SOLDIERS SHOT FOR A LONG TIME AT CAMP KIGALI. SOLDIERS AT ESM SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN THE BELGIAN SOLDIERS WHO WERE KILLED. ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER THE FORCE COMMANDER ARRIVED AT ESM WHERE THE MILOB BRIEFED HIM ABOUT THE INCIDENT. THE FORCE COMMANDER WHO WAS IN THE AREA FOR A "COMITE DE CRISE" MEETING WITH THE MILITARY LEADERS SAW THESE BODIES IN THE INNER COMPOUND OF CAMP KIGALI FROM THE ROAD. THE FORCE COMMANDER AFTER INSISTING UPON THE RGF OFFICERS PRESENT TO GO TO THE SITE OF THE KILLINGS, HE WAS NOT PERMITTED FOR FEAR THAT THE EXITED RGF SOLDIERS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR AGGRESSION AND KILLINGS. HE THEN PROCEEDED FOR A MEETING AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. ON THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS THE FORCE COMMANDER TRIED TO GET INTO THE CAMP KIGALI BUT HE WAS REFUSED ACCESS EVEN BY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE "COMITE DE CRISE". ONLY AFTER INSISTING A FOURTH TIME, BY 2200 HOURS THAT NIGHT, IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT THE BODIES WERE AT THE HOSPITAL MORGUE. ALTHOUGH LOCKED, HE GAINED ACCESS WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE AND FOUND THE BODIES PILED UP IN A TERRIBLE HEAP OUTSIDE THE DOOR OF THE BUILDING.

THE DEAD BODIES OF THESE 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS WERE RECOVERED THE NEXT DAY AND FLOWN BACK HOME ON 10 APRIL 94. LIST OF THOSE KILLED HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT TO YOU VIDE OUR FAX NO KYF 642 DATED 11 APRIL 1994.

CRN-110
3/3

THERE IS NO OTHER UNAMIR PERSONNEL, CIVIL OR MILITARY, UNDER DETENTION OR MISSING. THE ONLY GHANA SOLDIER WHO WAS MISSING FOR SOMETIME IN ANOTHER INCIDENT HAS BEEN RECOVERED. ALL UNAMIR CIVILIAN STAFFS(LESS 11 ESSENTIAL STAFFS) HAVE LEFT KIGALI SAFELY. MOST(EXCEPT 5 BELGIANS) OF THE CIVPOL HAVE ALSO LEFT KIGALI SAFELY.

REGARDS.

YKF-633
UNAMIR
154 APR 12 00:23
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

PAGE 1 OF 1

ROUTINE PRIORITY IMMEDIATE MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL CRYPTO ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO: 11	DTG: 112347 NYT APR 94
TO: UNOSOM MOGADISHU	FROM: UN HQ - DPKO SITUATION CENTRE
FAX NO: 963-3082	FAX NO: (212)-963-9852 (CRYPTO) (212)-963-9053 (PLAIN)
SUBJECT: LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO UNAMIR	
ATT: MR MANSON DIR OF ADMIN	DRAFTER: LTCDR PIZZABIOCCA SIGN: <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO: UNAMIR KIGALI FAX 963-3090 REF NO: TELECON 112330NYT APR 1994 MR.SAVARD	
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 1(ONE)	

[Signature] MESSAGE

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED WITH TELECON REF. FROM MR. MARCEL SAVARD

- 1.REFERENCE MY FAX THIS DATE, WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM THE USA SECRETARY OF DEFENCE THE AUTHORITY TO MOVE US M-113 APC FROM UNOSOM TO UNAMIR.
- 2.BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME CRITICAL CONDITION IN RWANDA IT WILL BE MOST HELPFULL IF YOU COULD MOVE TWO (2) M-113 TO RWANDA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE 12 APRIL 1994. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THIS TASK WILL CREATE GREAT DIFFICULTIES BUT YOUR ASSISTANCE WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED.
- 3.WE APOLOGIZE FOR ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD ASSIGNED TO YOUR MISSION.
- 4.WARMEST REGARD SAVARD.

[Signature] E/DIR oic

TOTAL P.01

UNAMIR

184 APR 11 08 38

UNAMIR
OUT GOING FACSIMILE

HYF641

1/1

DATE: 11 APR 94

TO : SITUATION CENTRE/DPKO/UNNY	FROM: MGEN DALLAIRE UNAMIR/KIGALI
FAX NO: 212 963 9053 MR-757	FAX NO: 250 84265
SUBJ: CAS REPORT-UNAMIR PERS-PERIOD COVERING 101000 APR 94 TO 110800 APR 94	
TO : DUTY OFFR	ORIGINATOR - LT COL J.A.CHOUDHURY CMPO EXT 1056
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : ONE	

1. CAPT NZOUNGOU EMILE (MILOB) OF CONGO WAS INJURED ON 10 APR 94 BY SPILINTER NEAR HOTEL MERIDIEN, AT KIGALI.
2. SENT FOR YOUR INFO PLEASE.
3. REGARDS.

UNAMIR
184 APR 11 08 43

(FC) CMPO E/DIR

UN RESTRICTED
UNAMIR
OUT GOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 10 APR 94

TO : MA TO SECY GEN/DPKO/UNNY	FROM: MGEN BARIL UNAMIR KIGALI
FAX NO: 212 963 4879	FAX NO: 256 84283 11
SUBJ: CAS REPORT - UNAMIR PERS - PERIOD COVERING 062000 APR 94 TO 101000 APR 94	
TO : MGEN BARIL MIR-733	ORIGINATOR - LT COL J.A.CHOUDHURY CMPO EXT 1056
TOTAL NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGE INCL THIS ONE : ONE	

1. FOLLOWING UNAMIR PERS OF BELGIUM WERE KILLED :

<u>SL NO</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE OF KILLING</u>	<u>PRESENT LOC OF DEAD BODY</u>
A.	42610	LT	LOTIN	07 APR 94	KIGALI
B.	R67307	1ST SGT	LEVOY	"	"
C.	R55876	CPL	PLESCIA	"	"
D.	R71293	PVT	DEBATTE	"	"
E.	R68470	PVT	RENEWA	"	"
F.	R65006	CPL	UYTTEBROECK	"	"
G.	R64125	CPL	BASSINE	"	"
H.	R68214	CPL	LHOIR	"	"
I.	R70968	CPL	UPONT	"	"
J.	R66169	CPL	MEAUX	"	"

2. FOLLOWING UNAMIR PERS WERE INJURED :

<u>SL NO</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TYPE OF INJURY</u>	<u>PRESENT LOC</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
A.	MAJ	CIESLINSKAS	URUGUAY	SPLINTER	KING FAISAL HOSPITAL	OBSERVER
B.	CAPT	TARRASCO	"	"	"	"
C.	WO	HARUN	BANGLADESH	BULLET	"	CONTINGENT
D.	SGT	DAN QUAH	GHANA	"	"	"

3. REGARDS.

UN RESTRICTED

FL

CMPO

E/DIR

UNAMIR
04 APR 94
04 30

UN RESTRICTED
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ

Date : 08/ Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : MEDICAL PROGRESS REPORT ON INJURED MILOBS


Reference :

A. Communication, Medical Duty Officer/MILOB GP HQ at 081445B
Apr 94.

1. Reference A above, the two Uruguayan MILOBs, Maj CIESLINSKAS
and Capt TERRASCO have undergone successful surgery and reported
to be in stable condition.

2. For your information and necessary action for onward
submission to UNNY.

(i)
Fc
For your information. We
Should ~~the~~ closely monitor their progress



I D TIKOCA
Col
C M O

UN RESTRICTED

SRSG
FC

CNR 071 P 1/2

UNAMIR

APR -9 05 UNITED



NATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE : 8 APRIL 1994
NUMBER : 1045

Received
LW on
12 Apr

SUBJECT: Safety of human rights activist

1. Enclosed is a self-explanatory letter from the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch.
2. We are fully aware of the pressures under which you were unable to assist Mrs. Mujawamariya. We would request you to give this case special priority when conditions are more favourable. in particular to assist her to leave Rwanda when the airport is reopened.
3. We make this request as we have information that she indeed is in danger of her life, and the sooner she can leave Rwanda the better.
4. Please assign an officer (Kabia?) to keep track of this case and to keep us informed.

Best regards.

CNR 071 P 2/2

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

AFRICA · AMERICAS · ASIA · HELSINKI · MIDDLE EAST

485 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10017-6104 TEL (212) 972-8400 FAX (212) 972-0908 Email: hrwatchny@igc.apc.org
1322 K Street, NW, #910 Washington, DC 20005-1202 TEL (202) 371-6578 FAX (202) 371-0134 Email: hrwatchdc@igc.apc.org
90 Borough High Street London, UK SE1 1LL TEL (71) 378-8008 FAX (71) 378-8029 Email: hrwatchuk@igc.apc.org

April 8, 1994

The Honorable Kofi Annan
Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations

Dear Secretary General Annan:

As I discussed in depth with your assistants, I am writing to request your personal attention to a matter of utmost urgency concerning the safety of Monique Mujawamariya in Kigali, Rwanda. As you may know, Mrs. Mujawamariya is the leading human rights figure in Central Africa and has been targeted for many months because of her human rights activities. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of the two presidents on Wednesday April 6, Mrs. Mujawamariya contacted General Dallaire requesting protection, and was refused. That evening members of the presidential guard went house-to-house in her neighborhood killing as they went, and searching for Mrs. Mujawamariya.

We have received information that she escaped with her life and may be hiding in her home in Kigali. She is widely presumed to be dead, which may be providing a degree of security to her at this moment from the presidential guard. She is at great risk, however, and it is essential that the United Nations take advantage of this small window of opportunity that might be provided by the presumption of her death and make an attempt to bring her to a place of safety.

We know of the disastrous situation on the ground in Kigali and appreciate the vulnerability of the U.N. forces and the extraordinary demands being placed upon them. Nonetheless, we appeal to you to direct General Dallaire to attempt some effort to bring Mrs. Mujawamariya to safety.

I would be most grateful for your personal attention to this difficult matter. I can be reached at my office this afternoon at 212-972-8400 and at my home over the weekend at 212-678-7044. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of any assistance.

Respectfully,
Kenneth Roth
Kenneth Roth
Executive Director
Human Rights Watch

UNHCR
Radio Operator
at UNHCR Building

FC

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ

Date: 07 Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

ST CMO

SUBJECT : REPORT ON THE KILLING OF BELGIAN SOLDIERS
BY RGF TROOPS AT CAMP KIGALI ON 7 APR 94

1. At about 0700hrs (LT) on 7 Apr 94, an RGF officer by name Maj Bernard NTUYAHAGA brought 5 Ghanaian soldiers and 13 Belgian soldiers to the front of MT 5 office in Camp Kigali. These soldiers were on security duty at the Prime Minister's house and according to them since yesterday night, 6 Apr94, they were attacked by the RGF soldiers led by that Major and this morning they took their weapons and vehicles before bringing them to the Camp.

2. Five minutes after their arrival the RGF of Camp Kigali who were in the formation came to the office and started beating them with weapon butt and stones and some of the RGF soldiers tried to kill them with bayonet. I opened the office and some of the UNAMIR soldiers got in and four of the Belgian soldiers couldn't get inside were seriously wounded.

3. As the RGF soldiers told me they didn't want to kill me. I stayed against the door to prevent them from getting in but one of them said he'll throw grenade inside if I didn't let them get in. Two of them pulled me away from the door and took me to another room and told me they didn't have any problem with me. Few minutes later, some superior officers came there and tried vainly to disperse them.


UN RESTRICTED

At that time I tried to take the opportunity to take the wounded to the hospital but the soldiers refused. When the Colonel Commanding Camp Kigali HQ Company arrived and asked me to help him to take the wounded soldiers to the hospital but the soldiers refused and were about to beat him. His escorts sent him and me to the ESM (Officers Academy) and I took advantage of their saying that "we don't have problem with black people" to go and bring five Ghanaian soldiers who were there. One of them went and brought them to ESM. On the way, a RGF soldier was about to shoot at me but his friend opposed.

4. About five minutes later RGF soldier shot for a long time and according to the soldiers at ESM it might be at the Belgian soldiers. At that time a meeting was going on at ESM. After the meeting a sergeant in charge of us introduced us to the Colonel Commanding ESM (whom I asked introduction from). General Delaire(FC) arrived at that time and I briefed him on the situation. He wanted us to go to the Ministry Of Defence with him but the gendarmerie Major suggested to bring us to the Force HQ.

5. From a sergeant in charge of us, the RGF soldiers will attack the CND this night. And from a RGF Major they monitored RPF conversation which stated, " Target is hit".

Captain APEDO KODJO
656 - MT 5



UN RESTRICTED

Dfc

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ

Date: 07 Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

CMO

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
UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

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Captain APEDO KODJO
656 - MT 5

UN RESTRICTED


UNAMIR
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

File No: 1000.04 (A\MA)

To: Distribution List ①
From: FC
Info: A\MA
Date: 1 April 1994
Subject: REVIEW AND COMMENT ON GENDARMERIE CAPABILITY CODE
CABLE TO NEW YORK
Reference: Telecon Martin\Beardsley 23 March 1994

1. At the reference the Desk Officer for Rwanda requested a paper from UNAMIR Force HQ outlining and assessing the capabilities of the Gendarmerie. UNCIVPOL and Kigali Sector provided raw data from which the A\MA produced this draft code cable.

2. Please review and pass your comments to the A\MA at the Commanders Conference on Tuesday 5 April 1994 for preparation of the final code cable we will send to New York for their information and reference.


R. A. Dallaire
Major-General
Force Commander

Attachment: 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

~~Submitted~~
Maj Delporte

Information

A\MA

②
FC
1. I disagree with Col Mwach. comments.
2. Inclusion is correct, sufficient & politicized.
3. This has to be reflected in New York.
In your opinion.
BWB
Maj
A/MA

①

②
A/MN
Write this revised
ASAP by my departure and
col Marshall. See note.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
DATE: 30 MARCH 1994
NUMBER:
SUBJECT: GENDARMERIE CAPABILITIES
REFERENCE: TELECON MARTIN\BEARDSLEY 23 March 1994

1. During the reference your HQ requested an assessment of the National Gendarmerie of Rwanda commonly known as the Gendarmerie.

2. This analysis will cover the size, organization, locations and capabilities of the Gendarmerie and will conclude with an assessment of their effectiveness.

3. The Gendarmerie numbers approximately 6000 personnel and is organized as follows:

- A. 1 Headquarters (Kimihurura, Kigali).
- B. 1 Training School (Ruhengeri).
- C. 9 Territorial Groups (1 per Prefecture or Province).
- D. Specialist Units (Mostly in Kigali).
- E. Support Units (Mostly in Kigali).

4. Headquarters for the Gendarmerie is in Kigali at Kiminhurura. The Gendarmerie is commanded by the Chief-Of-Staff, a Major-General. While technically under the Ministry of the Interior, the Gendarmerie appear to take their orders from the Minister of Defence. The Headquarters consists of the normal staff branches of personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics. The Headquarters also contains the communications centre for the Gendarmerie. It should be noted that communications in the Gendarmerie is by radio and telephone only and only goes down to the company level.

5. The training school of the National Gendarmerie is in Ruhengeri at Egena. Basic, advanced and specialist training is

Any do
the order

conducted in this complex. Officer and NCO training is conducted at the Army Officers and NCO schools in Kigali and Butare respectively.

6. The territorial groups number in total approximately 3000 personnel as per the attached organization chart. Strength of territorial groups varies with the prefecture and the peculiar security needs of that prefecture (ie a second territorial company is added in areas with a large concentration of refugees or displaced persons). The territorial groups are located and headquartered in the prefecture capitals as per the attached chart. The organization of each group varies but generally consists of:

- a. One territorial company with one brigade for security duties (30 personnel), one traffic control platoon (30 personnel) and one Headquarters and Service platoon (20 personnel).
- b. One intervention company of 100 personnel.
- c. One Group Headquarters and Service Platoon of 30 personnel.

7. Some territorial groups have a second territorial company to deal with special security situations. The average territorial group has only three vehicles (one jeep, one small truck and one large truck). Other transport is provided by National Service Units, rented or expropriated for transport tasks.

8. The Kigali Territorial Group has four territorial companies due to the security tasks of the capital.

9. The specialist units of the Gendarmerie number approximately 1200 personnel are based primarily in Kigali. They consist of the following units:

- a. Traffic Control Company (111 personnel) is responsible for traffic control on the roads into the city and within the city. It is based in Camp Muhima near the national prison. This company has two motorcycles, two cars, two small trucks and one large truck.
- b. The VIP Security Company (266) is responsible for security of VIPs or bodyguard duties. This company is based in Camp Kacyiru. This company has one jeep and 2 small trucks. Bodyguards travel in the vehicle of the VIP they are protecting. They also protect residences. Their salary is augmented by the VIP they are protecting. Their weapons are superior to the normal Gendarmes (ie SA Assault Rifles or UZI SMGs vice FN FAL).
- c. The Airport Security Company (112 personnel) is responsible for security of the Kanombe Airport in Kigali and is based at that location. This company has one

minibus and two small trucks. This company is very well uniformed.

- d. The Criminal Research and Documentation Centre (81 personnel) is responsible for criminal investigations and documentation. This centre is based in the CRCD building near the Belgian School. This centre has two small trucks and one minibus. As most crime goes unsolved in Rwanda this group is not particularly effective.
- e. Mobile Group of Kigali (265 personnel) is anything but mobile. It is responsible for static vital point guards in Kigali. This group is based at Camp Muhima. This group has one jeep and one small truck.
- f. Mobile Intervention Group (283 personnel) is responsible for intervention to maintain law and order. It is in effect riot control police. It is based in Camp Jali. Transport resources vary depending on the situation.

10. The Support Units consist of approximately 900 personnel and are mostly based in Kigali. They consist of:

- a. Headquarters Company of 699 personnel is based at Camp Kacyiru. It provides administrative and defence support to Gendarmerie Headquarters. It can also provide 3 to 6 platoons for emergency operations.
- b. The Service Technical company of 61 personnel is based at Camp Kacyiru. It provides service support to the Gendarmerie.
- c. The Medical Company of 80 personnel is based at Camp Kacyiru and is responsible for medical support from its hospital for the Gendarmerie and their dependents.
- d. The Music Company of 70 personnel is based at Camp Muhima and is responsible for ceremonial support to the Gendarmerie.

ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

The effectiveness of the Gd is seriously limited due to some shortcomings.

11. The Gendarmerie is assessed to minimally if not ineffective. Their major shortcomings are:

- a. When the war commenced in 1990, the pre-war gendarmerie of 2000 personnel was rushed to the front and employed as untrained and lightly equipped infantry. This action decimated the pre-war gendarmerie which contained the trained and experienced personnel. The gendarmerie was later withdrawn but the damage had been done and was not corrected. In addition, the gendarmerie was rapidly expanded to 6000 personnel with ineffective instructors

and training time (4 weeks). As such most of their new personnel are not trained or experienced in police or other security duties. Even Gendarmerie Commanders openly lament the poor quality of gendarme and their poor standard of training.

- b. During the war, to avoid military front line service, questionable recruits opted for the Gendarmerie as a way of avoiding combat duty and living the so called "good life". Therefore the motivation of many gendarmes is questionable. The number that have been arrested for crimes since UNAMIR arrived in Rwanda bears evidence of this fact.

I really don't think that we can state this. Have we objective element?
c. The Gendarmerie, especially at the high levels, is thoroughly politicized. They owe their positions and future to certain political interest groups. They are therefore reluctant to respond to certain situations or investigate certain activities (ie responding to demonstrations, roadblocks or riots sponsored by one of the parties or investigating ethnic or political assassinations). They therefore only react or intervene if it is cleared with their political leaders and in their interest.

Is this really correct?
No!

- d. The Gendarmerie is desperately short of transport and thus is largely immobile and unable to respond to routine calls for assistance like traffic accidents, neighborhood complaints or even more serious violations of law and order. This is compounded by severe budget and fuel restrictions.

- e. The Gendarmerie is desperately short of communications and other specialist equipment due to budgetary constraints. They lack communication and basic equipment at the platoon and company level.

I'm not dealing this request for Patrol Base!

part of New
f. The Gendarmerie lacks the support and confidence of the local population who fear, distrust and in some cases are openly hostile to them. This situation is aggravated by the RPF and opposition parties who frequently and intensely condemn the Gendarmerie in their propaganda campaigns.
This is not true. Gd seems to have confidence of the population from e.g. Patrol bases have been requested by the population.

Not police have been

- g. The Gendarmerie lacks gas masks and tear gas for crowd control operations.

- h. Despite a year of relative peace the standard of training in the Gendarmerie has not improved.

- i. The standard of leadership, particularly in the junior level is poor lacking initiative, flexibility and good judgement. They tend to remain stiff to tasks and are easy to lose their temper and resort to violence.

Is this really correct?

It's a matter of fact that the basic formation is not at the normal standard due to the war time but the Gendarmerie is doing now a real effort to give a complementary formation to young off and New's

The judicial
system failure
also

j.

The Gendarmerie does not control crime. Crime is largely unpunished and openly conducted (ie theft markets, money changers etc). It is alleged the Gendarmerie profit from these activities and are therefore reluctant to stop them. The all system failed

k.

When the Gendarmerie does react to a situation in force it is respected. They appear rugged and are armed with assault rifles. When they appear the situation usually pacifies.


CONCLUSION


12. The Gendarmerie is largely ineffective in responding to criminal and politically motivated situations for the reasons outlined above. The only solution to the problem is to completely rebuild the Gendarmerie from the bottom up as is envisaged in the Arusha Peace Agreement.

What about
the rest control
coys?

This is the problem of Justice
in the all - some full
- no by for for

GA has been in several occasions a reliable partner. His will of cooperation exist, but the quality of his members is unequal. I don't think that we can condemn the GA in whole it should be unfair for those who have shown a true spirit of cooperation. We can probably state that GA is not very effective but this situation is largely due to serious shortcomings in logistic, equipment, radio communication, transport. --





UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ Date : Apr 94
FROM : MILOB HQ
SUBJECT : MILOBS WHO CROSSED THE BORDERS INTO
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES DURING THE RWANDAN CRISIS

1. The following MILOBs were ordered to crossed the borders into neighbouring countries during the Rwandan crisis.

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	MAJ MAURICE	CONGO	UNMO	IN BURUNDI AS AT DATE
2.	CAPT KAMPILA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
3.	CAPT DJATO	TOGO	UNMO	
4.	CAPT CHAENGONI	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
5.	CAPT SIBANDA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
6.	CAPT ALBERT	CONGO	UNMO	
7.	SON LDR SABIR	NIGERIA	UNMO	IN TANZANIA AS AT DATE
8.	MAJ SALAM	EGYPT	UNMO	
9.	MAJ DEKEYA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
10.	CAPT KADANGHA	TOGO	UNMO	
11.	MAJ AZOTI	TOGO	UNMO	
12.	MAJ DRAGE	AUSTRIA	UNMO	
13.	MAJ UNGAR	AUSTRIA	UNMO	BELIEVED TO TO BE IN ZAIRE
14.	MAJ NKODIA	CONGO	UNMO	
15.	MAJ TCHEMI	TOGO	UNMO	
16.	LTCDR AKPAN	NIGERIA	UNMO	
17.	CAPT SALAM	EGYPT	UNMO	
18.	MAJ RYHZKOVSKY	RUSSIA	UNMO	

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2. The under-listed officers crossed the border into neighbouring countries without prior authority from MILOB GP HQ:

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	SNQ LDR ANIS	BANGLADESH	UNMO	IN UGANDA DATE
2.	MAJ AGGREY USHE	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	IN TANZANIA
3.	CAPT GENERO	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT MUTAMBURE	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	

3. The officers listed below crossed the border into Uganda on the instructions of their home government:

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	LT COL SOSA	URUGUAY	UNMO	
2.	MAJ GRIECO	URUGUAY	UNMO	IN UGANDA
3.	CAPT FONTES	URUGUAY	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT MIKAK	URUGUAY	UNMO	
5.	CAPT MUNZ	URUGUAY	UNMO	

4. Submitted for your information please.

5. Best regards.

DRAFT

UN RESTRICTED

U N A M I R

1000 (FC)
Force HQ
Amahoro, Kigali

March 1994

To: Distribution List

From: FC

Info: Distribution List

Subject: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO 13

Reference: A. UN Peacekeepers Handbook dated 1984
B. Operational Directive No 9 dated 3 March 1994

GENERAL

1. Due to the uncertain security situation and due to the anticipated requirement to become more heavily committed to assisting the civil power in the maintenance of law and order, it will become necessary, especially after the installation of the BBTG, to conduct arms recovery operations throughout Rwanda. Rwanda is saturated with illegal arms due to the war, due to a thriving black market industry and due to illegal distribution to certain subversive groups. UNAMIR must be prepared to conduct arms recovery operations in coordination with and in support of the Civil Power. The threat of the illegal weapons is that any fringe or subversive group may derail the entire peace process if they are not recovered and placed under governmental control. While these operations appear to be offensive in nature, they are in fact a deterrent operation. If they are not conducted in a timely and accurate manner, the threat of illegal arms will haunt this mission and the peace process and will ultimately lead to UN casualties and a possible derailing of the peace process. Deterrent Operations will become the major orientation of UNAMIR military forces in Phase 2. These operations will allow us to seize and maintain the initiative by forcing those opposed to the peace process onto the defensive and thereby ultimately ensuring the success of our Mission in Rwanda.

AIM

2. The aim of this operational instruction is to define the concept and procedure for the conduct of arms recovery operations by UNAMIR.

THREAT

3. Arms in large quantities were distributed to elements of the population during the war. Large numbers of these weapons were not accounted for, and therefore could not be recovered at the end of the war. In addition, deserters from the war took weapons in large numbers as they abandoned their positions and went home or entered a life of banditry. These also have not been recovered as many deserters remain at large. Bandit organizations, while not large or dangerous at present, do exist and could increase in size as demobilization takes place. There have also been reports that off-duty gendarmes and soldiers have also taken their weapons to pursue other activities. It has been confirmed that there is a large illegal arms business in Rwanda. This makes the sale of arms especially from neighbouring Zaire and Burundi a growing activity.

4. The single most dangerous group, with illegal arms, are the militias of the various political parties, namely, the Interhamwe (MRND) and the Power (CDR) and the RPA (RPF). These groups are well led, organized, trained and equipped with large quantities of illegal arms. They pose the single greatest threat to the peace process in Rwanda by being able to launch terrorist attacks that could discredit UNAMIR, terrify the local population and political leaders and lead to general disruption of the political peace process. They also can be exploited by their political leaders to make excuses for political activity or inactivity, influence the situation and stir ethnic problems.

5. In the period of the disengagement and demobilization (Phase 3), the number of gendarmes will decrease from 6000 to approximately 1800. The communal police are largely ineffective. The army will be confined to assembly points. Therefore, the number of forces available to maintain law and order will be seriously reduced and the demand for support from UNAMIR will subsequently increase. Any major disturbance during this period could seriously discredit UNAMIR, the BBTG and the peace process. During the next three months, UNAMIR must, in support of the Gendarmerie, perfect and conduct its arms recovery operations to disarm all fringe groups and bandits. The more that can be done before Phase 3, the greater the chance of success of Phase 3 and the less involvement and threat for UNAMIR during that period.

6. Arms Recovery Operations have been impaired by confusion over the mandate, political stagnation and the reluctance of the Gendarmerie to participate in these operations before the establishment of the BBTG. With the political impasse has come a realistic reluctance to conduct these operations for fear of alienating one particular party or group before a political settlement can be reached. Thus, some of these operations could endanger the entire peace process. However, once the BBTG is established UNAMIR will in addition to its mandate be legally supported by the BBTG in conducting Arms Recovery Operations. These operations may become the major tactical operations during Phase Two.

ARMS RECOVERY OPERATIONS

6. In accordance with paragraph 3 of the UNAMIR mandate, UNAMIR is authorized to assist the civil authority in recovering illegal arms. Arms recovery operations may be conducted in four ways:

- a. Gendarmerie initiatives throughout Rwanda (except the RPF zone in Phases 1 and 2 and in the DMZ in phases 1,2,and 3);
- b. UNAMIR initiatives throughout Rwanda but differing from sector to sector according to procedure;
- c. An amnesty for all illegal weapons, sponsored by the BBTG and monitored by UNAMIR; and
- d. A purchase programme, sponsored by an international agency, which pays for the anonymous turn-in of illegal arms to UNAMIR which destroys them.

GENDARMERIE INITIATIVES

7. Of late, the Gendarmerie has shown an inclination to get seriously involved in the arms recovery action, specifically in the KWSA. UNAMIR will continue to encourage these operations and commanders at all levels, in discussion with Gendarmerie Commanders, are to emphasize the importance of these operations. If necessary the Gendarmerie is to be prodded into conducting these operations. UNAMIR will provide operational advice on techniques and encourage the Gendarmerie to spend more time training and conducting these operations. Whenever these operations are conducted, UNAMIR will monitor the operation with UNCIVPOL and UNAMIR military monitors. These operations will only take place in non-RPF and non-UNAMIR (DMZ) sectors. In the KWSA these operations will be conducted in accordance with the restrictions of the KWSA agreement.

8. In general terms the operations will be conducted in the following manner:

- a. Information is received by the Gendarmerie, UNCIVPOL, Force HQ or the applicable Sector HQ (ie Kigali, RGF or southern) of an arms cache.
- b. The Gendarmerie informs the applicable Headquarters of the cache. The joint decision should be taken to conduct a cordon and search operation. The Sector Headquarters will inform and keep the Force Headquarters updated on the progress of the planning and the operation. In addition, the UNCIVPOL is an integral part of the operation and will be fully involved in planning and the conduct of the operation.
- c. A discreet joint reconnaissance of the area should be

conducted by UNCIVPOL, UNAMIR Military Planning Personnel and the Gendarmerie to check the area, routes in and out, local situation and to complete the collection of information for the plan.

- d. The joint plan should be completed. Attached to this directive is a suggested tactical doctrine for cordon and search operations. The plan should be approved by the FC, Police Commissioner and the COS Gendarmerie.
- e. A RV and time should be established for the marrying up of UNCIVPOL and UNAMIR Military with the Gendarmerie force. The respective commanders should be collocated and each major element, especially search teams should be monitored by UNAMIR personnel.
- f. The operation will be conducted.
- g. A debriefing will be conducted by the joint planning team and a joint report forwarded to the Gendarmerie, UNCIVPOL and UNAMIR Force HQ primarily focused on results and lessons learned.

UNAMIR INITIATIVES

9. UNAMIR has many sources of information which periodically forward information on arms caches for our action. UNAMIR does not have the mandate (except in the DMZ) to conduct unilateral arms recovery operations. Therefore, in all areas except the DMZ, these operations must be joint operations with the Gendarmerie (in the KWSA, RGF and Southern Sectors) and with the RPF in the RPF Sector (in Phases 1 and 2 only).

10. The conduct of these operations will therefore differ between sectors due to the authorities and mandate within the sectors.

11. RGF, Southern and KWSA Sectors. Arms Recovery Operations in these sectors will be joint operations conducted by UNAMIR Military Forces, UNCIVPOL and the Gendarmerie.

12. In general terms the operations will be conducted in the following manner:

- a. Information is received by the Force HQ, applicable Sector Headquarters or UNCIVPOL of an arms cache.
- b. The information is discreetly shared between the headquarters.
- c. The information should be verified by discreet reconnaissance involving military personnel from the applicable Sector and the UNCIVPOL.
- d. A recommendation is forwarded to the FC and Police

Commissioner recommending an arms recovery operation.

- e. A joint plan is prepared by the Sector Operations Staff with the UNCIVPOL.
- f. The joint plan is approved by the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner and a joint approach is made to the COS of the Gendarmerie giving all details except location and time.
- g. The plan is briefed to the applicable Gendarmerie force with the approval and support of the COS and coordination is conducted.
- h. An RV and Time is established for the Gendarmerie force and UNAMIR Military and UNCIVPOL monitors.
- i. The operation is conducted. Commanders should be collocated and major elements and search teams should be monitored by Military Personnel and UNCIVPOL.
- j. A debriefing between the participating commanders is conducted and a joint report is prepared stressing results and lessons learned.
- k. The joint report is submitted by the applicable Sector Headquarters to the Force Commander, Police Commissioner and COS of the Gendarmerie for their review and action.

13. DMZ Sector. Arms Recovery Operations in the DMZ are the sole responsibility of UNAMIR and will be conducted by designated DMZ Military Forces monitored by the UNCIVPOL and ideally with observers from the RGF\Gendarmerie and RPF.

14. In general terms the operations will be conducted in the following manner:

- a. Information is received by the Force HQ, the Sector or one of its unit headquarters or the UNCIVPOL of an arms cache.
 - b. The information is discreetly passed between the headquarters.
 - c. The information should be verified by discreet reconnaissance involving military personnel from the Sector and the UNCIVPOL.
 - d. A recommendation is forwarded to the FC and Police Commissioner recommending an arms recovery operation.
 - e. A joint plan is prepared by the Sector or Unit operations staff with the UNCIVPOL.
-

- f. The joint plan is approved by the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner after permission is obtained from New York.
- g. At the latest possible moment the RPF and RGF\Gendarmerie LOs should be invited to monitor the operation. The plan is implemented with a cordon and search operation.
- h. A debriefing will be conducted and a joint report submitted through the chain of command to the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner emphasizing results and lessons learned.

14. RPF Sector. Arms recovery operations in the RPF zone are unlikely due to the nature of the sector and the RPF. If they are conducted they will be conducted as per the RGF, Southern and KWSA Sectors except the RPF will conduct the operations (obviously without the gendarmerie or RGF) with UNAMIR providing monitoring as per the procedure outlined in Para 12.

DEMOBILIZATION PERIOD ARMS RECOVERY OPERATIONS

15. During Phase 3, UNAMIR will conduct arms recovery operations throughout Rwanda as per the procedure outlined in paragraphs 7-10. This procedure will be confirmed by operational directive before the disengagement and demobilization phase.

TACTICAL DOCTRINE

16. The tactical doctrine for arms recovery operations will be the cordon and search operation. An example for tactical consideration and training purposes is attached to this operational directive. This method is a tried and proven method but is by no means universal in application. Sector and Unit Commanders and their Staffs must apply it to the situation, terrain, forces available, the standard of the gendarmerie etc.

AMNESTY PROGRAMME

17. Once the BBTG is established, the government will be approached to initiate a National Arms Recovery Amnesty Program. This will involve a major media and public information blitz to assure the local population that anyone turning in, or informing on the location, of arms caches will remain anonymous and free from any political or legal retribution. A period of time will be offered to turn in or inform on weapons which will be taken by the Gendarmerie and/or UNAMIR into BBTG custody. This period will be prior to the Disengagement and Demobilization Phase. It must also carry a legal liability for persons caught with illegal arms after the amnesty period (ie jail sentence, criminal record, etc). Information received by informers will initiate the procedure outlined in paragraphs 7-10. Plans Branch will prepare a detailed proposal for the BBTG which will be presented once it has been installed.

PURCHASE PROGRAMME

18. UNDP will be approached to organize an arms recovery conference for donor nations and organizations. UNAMIR will present the nature of the threat to the peace process, political, economic and humanitarian activity in Rwanda. UNAMIR will also present its proposal for arms recovery operations and the amnesty programme. In conclusion UNAMIR through UNDP will request donations to create a fund which will allow UNAMIR, after the Disengagement and Demobilization Phase commences (and after the Amnesty Programme has expired) to purchase illegal arms or confirmed information in regards to illegal arms. To prevent resale the arms purchased under this programme will be destroyed.

CONCLUSION

19. In conclusion, the procedures outlined above outline how UNAMIR will conduct its arms recovery mandate in Rwanda. By ensuring that as many illegal arms as possible are recovered during Phase 2, using a variety of operations and programmes, the safety of the BBTG, peace process, the civilian population and our troops will be ensured.

20. Commanders at all levels are to commence orientation of operations and training in this direction. Security tasks have been the focus of our operations and training to date and these tasks will continue into the foreseeable future. However, we cannot ignore the dangerous threat of illegal arms and we must orient ourselves towards the deterrent operations which will ensure the success of our mission and the safety of our troops.

R. A. Dallaire
Major-General
Force Commander

Attachment. 1

DISTRIBUTION LIST

UNAMIR Force HQ Standard Distribution List A

UN RESTRICTED

REPORT ON THE SITUATION AT THE AIRPORT

GENERAL

1. The general situation at the airport was calm during the whole day on 10 Apr 94.
2. The evacuation operation is going on smoothly as scheduled.
3. A total of approximately 650 expatriates of 22 nationalities have been evacuated with 10 air lifts as at 2230hrs (LT).

MILITARY SITUATION

4. The French Troops. The French troops continue to ensure security of the airport and to evacuate the expatriates. They are co-located with the RGF Arty Bty. Two French Mil aircrafts brought one company of troops, so French troops are now of a battalion plus strength.
5. Belgian Troops. Eight Belgian Mil aircrafts brought in a total of about one battalion of para-commandos and a number of motor bikes and armoured vehicles (3 x Tanks). The Belgian troops started the joint operation at the North-west sector of the airport. They also carried out motor bike patrols along the evacuation route.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

6. There were difficulties in coordinating the departures and liaison duties.
7. There were difficulties working with the French soldiers especially Colonel PONCET.

CONCLUSION

8. In our point of view, the Belgians have come to restore law and order.

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Done by CAP CREUZ

(Translated by Maj Baboon)