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ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO


BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

22 July 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : Air Operations

1. Further to my memorandum to you dated 21 July on the above subject, the signals referred to in para 7 of that memorandum will be forwarded to you during the forthcoming week.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



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BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

21 July 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : Air Operations

1. You will probably feel that the following paragraphs, which observe on present methods of operation and include recommendations for change, are somewhat premature. Particularly when they have been written by an officer who has been such a short time on his job. However, I would hasten to assure you that the recommendations which you are requested to support are in accordance with sound Air Transport techniques and that they are applicable anywhere such a force is used.

2. The primary objective of the Air Commander is to accomplish the airlift requirements as directed by the Force Commander. It is inherent in the responsibility of the Air Commander that this airlift be provided in the most efficient and economical method possible. To do this, he must first establish the role or missions to be accomplished. As a starting point, I will list below the various tasks as I see them :

- a) emergency commitment - to provide airlift capability for transportation of one battalion group and its weapons, on short notice;
- b) logistic support - to provide airlift on a scheduled basis in support of forces in the field;
- c) provision of airlift for planned troop redeployments and rotation purposes;
- d) provide aircraft for tactical purposes within brigade areas;
- e) provide VIP airlift for the Force Commander and those others designated by him.

3. With the obvious exception of the emergency requirement, the most economical method of conducting air transport operations is on a scheduled basis and this should be our goal. This of course entails rigid control of all air transport equipment and personnel (including those personnel from Movement Control who are directly associated with air operations), and the establishment of a realistic priority system by Military and Civil

/Logistics

Logistics. At the moment, everything is being moved on the basis that it is priority "A" Cargo — such is obviously not the case. Priority control will ensure that high priority goods move rapidly and those of a less urgent nature when space is available or if quantity (backlog) demands a special flight can be organized.

4. In order to accomplish the foregoing, it is obvious that very close liaison will be necessary between Air and Army. Long-range planning (minimum of 30 days) is essential. It is my opinion that such planning is possible and practicable for most non-perishable goods. If this be so, airlift can be provided on a regulated basis and efforts to make use of the individual aircraft for the return trip will have a reasonable chance of being successful.

Personnel

5. One of the most critical problems that exists at the moment is the lack of qualified personnel to supervise and control aircraft loading. To be done accurately and efficiently requires the use of highly trained personnel. Such individuals are not available in this theatre and as a result we are obliged to make use of Movement Control personnel. It is vital that this situation be improved as the safety of each flight can be seriously affected by improper loading and lashing of cargo. UNHQ should be requested to provide properly qualified personnel for this purpose. If it is not possible to obtain them direct from military sources, I would point out that airlines are adequately staffed with such personnel and it should be recommended that this source be surveyed.

6. To improve the situation at present, I propose to organize short training courses at N'Djili — making use of skilled USAF personnel who are located there. Such Movement Control personnel of course should be carefully selected and have a good command of the English language. They of course must also be under the direct control of the Air Commander's staff. It is incongruous to have personnel who are responsible for fulfilling such an important part of the airlift function responsible to some other formation.

7. The problems created by such shortages of aircrew and maintenance personnel in the C47 and helicopter squadrons were discussed verbally with you. Attached please find signals for your signature to UNHQ pointing out the consequences of such shortages.

Recommendations

8. Find below specific recommendations which I am sure will improve the control and effectiveness of the Air Transport Force.


- a) The Air Commander and the Chief Air Operations Officer must be included in all preliminary and follow-up planning meetings on operations which are likely to have an air implication.
- b) Long-range planning figures must be provided by Logistics branches of military and civilian organizations. This is paramount if the routine airlift of consumables is to be conducted on an efficient basis. Included in such information must be a realistic assignment of priorities.

- c) Large-scale movements of troops which are conducted by UN aircraft either internally or in support of troop rotation must be covered by an Operation Order. This will aid immeasurably in stopping last-minute changes to verbally agreed schedules. As an example, we have had to draw up three different schedules and shuffle our transport aircraft madly in order to meet changes that have occurred in the recent lift of Ghanaian troops.
- d) Movement Control personnel directly associated with air transport must be brought under the control of the Air Commander and he should be given the authority to set up and conduct training courses under the auspices of the USAF at N'Djili.
- e) The C47 aircraft presently on detachment to various Brigade headquarters must be integrated into the Air Transport schedule to provide effective feeder line service to outlying airstrips. Light aircraft and helicopters to operate as at present in the tactical role.

Conclusion

9. I have not attempted to cover the problems which exist within the ATF. In the main, they centre round personnel — either an extreme shortage or inadequate training. These subjects will be brought up separately in the very near future.

10. I solicit your support of the above recommendations and am prepared to get on with them upon receipt of your approval.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

C/ADM 420/3

5 May

1

Air Commodore G.G.W. Chapman, Air Commander
S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

1. You have received already copy of New York's cable 3156 advising us that the contracts for all chartered aircrafts will expire on 15th May and requesting whether we had any objection to the renewal of all present charters.
2. You will recall that we agreed to review in April the position of the chartered aircrafts and to submit recommendations to New York. However, you advised me that you had sent a cable to New York, not shown to me prior to issue, in which you had submitted your requirements of aircrafts. You also advised me of subsequent correspondence between you and New York in which a drastic reduction in the number of aircrafts at present available to us was foreshadowed.
3. I regard the cable referred to above, received from New York, as a reflection upon our administration of the aircrafts arrangements. The initiative in these matters should normally come to us and not to New York. May I therefore request you again to keep me fully informed of your considerations concerning the fleet of aircrafts required for ONUC.
4. I would also appreciate it if you would kindly make arrangements that in future no communication is sent to New York concerning the aircrafts without being shown to me in the first instance. This will enable me to keep the administration service in New York advised at all times concerning matters for which I am responsible at this end.

copy to Force Commander ✓

File

6005/12/Air Ops

28 March 1961

To : See Distribution
From : Air Commander
Subject; Progress Report No. 2 covering the period 16-28 Feb.

A. Summary

1. During the period under review no changes have been made in the UNATF mission nor in its organizations.
2. The Bakwanga food relief lift for refugees has been nearly completed and now a limited amount only remains.
3. The majority of the airlift has involved support and redeployments of UN troops. The major movements have been: (a) Indonesians Coquilhatville - Leo; (b) Malaysians Leo-Kindu; (c) Morrocans Kikwit-Leo.

Mrs. Lumumba and family have been flown from Leo to Stanleyville.

4. On 14 February the Ambassador sent a signal to the secretary-General about the UN aircraft requirements in the Congo. For the different missions (see progress report No. 1) the following number of aircraft was estimated to be required: .

20 DC 3

11 C 119

30-35 DC 4

12 C130

It should be noticed that the number of DC4 includes what was necessary for the Bakwanga food relief lift. Since that lift is completed the required number of DC4 could be reduced to about 20.

The C130 were to stand by for emergency military operations. No progress has until now been made in obtaining these aircraft. The requirements of light aircraft and helicopters are not mentioned above but concerns with the number now available.

5. On 21 February on order from New York, Seven Seas charter was revoked. This caused a serious but temporary disruption in the UN Air Transport capability. By the end of the month, however, aircraft contracts had been made with several other companies and aircraft were scheduled to arrive in the Congo early in March.

B. Air Operations and Air Engineering

1. Hours flown, Aircraft Status etc.

Type of A/C	Hours Flown January	Feb. 1-28		Engine Charges	Inspections
		Hours Flown	A/C Quantity		
C-119	535	480	9	2	2 (Pisa)
DC-3 ²⁾	435	470	14	1	3 (Brazv)
Otter Beaver ²⁾	170	242	8	2	2
Helicopters ²⁾	360	142 ¹⁾	16	6	1
	1490	1334	47		
Charter A/C ³⁾	1940	1350	Av. 15		
Grand Total	3430	2684	62		

REMARKS: 1) The situation concerning spare parts etc was considerably bad during this period. Now improved.

2) Still deficiency in establishments

3) During February the following civil aircraft operated under charter to the United Nations Congo and flew the hours indicated:

(a) Sabena - Six DC4) 540 Hours
One DC3)

(b) Seven Seas - Four DC4 - 386 hours (contract terminated 21 Feb 61)

(c) Trans Air Sweden - Two C46 - 336 hours

(d) Air Broussac - One Apache - 38 hours

(e) SAS - One Convair - 50 hours

2. Airlift Summary - The majority of airlift during the last half of February involved the movement of supplies for UN personnel. C119 aircraft of United Nations were used exclusively for the airlift of bulk loads such as vehicles that could not be carried on conventional aircraft.

3. Special Occurrences - On several occasions during the period of this report the political and military situation at various airfields resulted in UN chartered aircraft being impounded and in emergency diversions of aircraft to prevent complications.

- (a) 24 Feb 61 - Report received that Luluabourg airfield was under the control of Stanleyville ANC. Two enroute aircraft were diverted. The report later proved false.
- (b) 24 Feb 61 - Sabena DC4 CBR and DC4 CBI under charter to UN were impounded at Goma by Congolese authorities and crews placed under arrest. Aircraft and crews were released unharmed 48 hours later. The cause of this occurrence was attributed to unusual aircraft markings plus the fact that one of these aircraft was known to have participated in the invasion airlift of Leo troops to Usumbura prior to employment by the UN.
- (c) 25 Feb 61 - Lisala and Gemena airfields closed to all UN aircraft. This order continues in effect.
- (d) 28 Feb 61 - Libenge airfield closed to all UN aircraft. This order is still in effect.
- (e) 28 Feb 61 - Balair DC4 ILC under charter to UN was impounded at Gemena after special clearance for landing had been received. Aircraft and crew released 48 hours later.

C. Administration

Strength of Contingents effective 28 February 1961

Argentina	23
Brazil	29
Canada	12
Denmark	1
Ethiopia	6 (-1)
India	50 (-8)
Italy	75 (+3)
Norway	52 (-9)
Sweden	<u>70 (+3)</u>
T O T A L	318 (-12)

D. UN Air Transport Base - N'djili

1. Since the last report further progress has been made in reorganizing the base towards final establishment.
2. Base Operations Wing
 - (a) The personnel establishment is not yet complete. As the amount of UN aircraft and charter aircraft and the overall activities at N'Djili have increased, it is

important to complete the establishment. Requirements have been made to New York.

- b) During the period air crews have been assigned to work in the FIC to coordinate between this department and Base Operations. Additional personnel will be posted to the Base to work in the FIC.
- c) A statistician Officer is now working in Base Operations and statistics concerning Operations, Training and Technical matters are now beginning to be compiled.
- d) Indian air and ground crews have commenced training on C47

3. Administration

- (a) There are difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies from Ordnance depot. The Base Commander has taken up the matter with the Chief Ordnance Officer but until now no progress has been made.
- (b) For security reasons, the Base Commander would like all Air Base personnel to be accommodated in Limite. However, it has not yet been possible to arrange this for all concerned personnel. Also it is required to install telephones in at least the sub-commanders and Senior Officers residences. Necessary applications have been made but very little progress has been made until now.
- (c) Since the last report was presented, there is now considerable improvement in the Operations of Finance Section which is now operating satisfactorily.

4. Technical Wing

- (a) With the arrival of further DC3 and Charter aircraft, parking space presents a serious problem. At present, 5 DC3 planes are parked on the grass area adjoining the landing field.
- (b) Engineers are urgently needed by the C47 Squadron to accord with the proposed establishment for that unit.
- (c) In regard to Aircraft Log Documentation, difficulty is being experienced in obtaining the American forms. At present both America and Canadian forms are being used in the absence of sufficient supplies of the first mentioned for which a demand has been placed.

(d) The provision of Spare Parts still presents some difficulty. It is particularly difficult to secure the return of Spares sent away for repair or change. Movement Controll must be compelled to take prompt action whenever they are requested to arrange movement of spare parts components.

(E) Short summary for the period 1 March to 25 March (for details see progress report No. 3 being submitted appr. 1 April)

1. The airlift capacity has now considerably improved with the arrival of additional charter Aircraft. The number of charter aircraft on the 28 March was 17 DC4 and 6 C46.
2. Two serious incidents involving UN helicopters have occurred.

3rd March - helicopter crews detached Matadi were arrested and maltreated in Boma. They were released appr. 24 hours later.

14 March - three helicopter crews en route from Albertville to Kamina were arrested when making a forced landing in Nyunzu. They were later released by Ethiopian troops under firing. It has not yet been possible to salvage one helicopter still in Nyunzu. Other UN aircrafts have been shot especially during the Matadi incident but no casualties or damages have been suffered.

3. A FIC circuit is organized in cooperation with ICAO. This net is expected to be in operation at the beginning of April and will considerably improve air communications.

4. Postings of Personnel

Lt. Col. Aarak Chief Administrative Officer has repatriated and has been replaced by Lt. Colonel Lovstad of Norway. W/C Russell, has repatriated and has not yet been replaced. Major Appelquist personnel and Finance Officer Air H.Q. is being posted to Air Base N'Djili and is replaced by Capt. Carlsson from Sweden.

This report should be submitted through commanding officers to their subordinates (detachments)

(C.G.W. Chapman) A/C
Air Commander

t.

Distribution

Force Commander	1
DCOS	1
Deputy Air Commander	1
Chief of Air Operations	2
Chief Air Administrative Officer	2
Chief Air Engineering Officer	2
Base Commander N'Djili	25
Movement Control	1
Mr. Fournier ICAO	2
Charter Companies	8

To : See Distribution

From : Air Commander

Subject: PROGRESS REPORT No. 6 COVERING JUNE 1961

A. SUMMARY

1. During June 1961, UNATF operations continued with tonnages and passengers still increasing in comparison to previous months.
2. Flying hours increased slightly from 5539 in May to 5564 in June.
3. The total load airlifted within the Congo in June (May) was:

a) Freight	7,064,904 lbs	(6,444,000)
b) Passengers (troops)	9,575	(7,874)
c) Vehicles	153	(169)
4. On external airlift, the rotation has been carried out of eight Ethiopian battalions, comprising a total of 4584 troops and a further transit rotation of 320 men. Internal and external airlifts together total a number of 14,419 passengers (troops) in June.
5. On 29 June, a C47 crashlanded at Tshikapa 180 miles WSW of Luluabourg due to engine failure when taking off. There were no injuries to the crew. The aircraft must be written off. Salvage of equipment is going on.
6. On 30 June, there was a change of Deputy Air Commander, when Col. Rosenius left for Sweden and was succeeded by Col. Norstrom (Sweden).

B. AIR OPERATIONS

7. Hours Flown, Aircraft Status, etc.

Type of a/c	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	a/c numbers 30 June	Engine Changes	Major Inspections
C119	535	480	521	535	471	457	6	1	-
C47	435	470	940	958	795	817	20	2	-
OTTER/BEAVER	170	242	295	330	468	394	8	1	-
Helicopters	360	142	313	372	365	302	17	2	-
	1490	1334	2069	2195	2099	1970	51		
Charter a3c	1940	1350	2494	3664	3440	3594	25		
Grand total	3430	2684	4563	5859	5339	5564	76		

Remarks

- 1) During June, the following civil aircraft operated and flew the hours indicated:

Sabena	5 DC4s	672
Interocean	7 DC4s	1393
Panama	3 DC4s	415
	7 C46s	546
Transair	2 C46s	479
SAS	1 Convair	89

8. Flying analysis - Charter Aircraft

	March	April	May	June
Average aircraft strength	18	24	22	17.4
Average daily flying	11(61%)	15(62%)	13(59%)	13(52%)
Average daily maintenance	3 (17%)	6.5(62%)	7.6(34%)	7.6(30.4%)
Average serviceable but not flying	4 (22%)	2.5(12%)	1.4(7%)	4.4(17.6%)
Average monthly flying hrs per a/c	144 (May : 146)			

Remarks

- 1) High percentage of daily maintenance is due mainly to one of the charter companies.

C. AIR ADMINISTRATION

9. Total air personnel by nationality effective 30 June 1961 (compared with the figures for 31 May):

Argentina	24 (\pm) 0
Brazil	20 (-6)
Canada	15 (\pm 0)
Denmark	4 (-1))
Ethiopia	4 (\pm 0)
Greece	25 (+4)
India	45 (-3)
Italy	74 (\pm 0)
Norway	61 (+3)
Sweden	92 (+13)

10. The establishment of the UN Air Transport Force in the Congo as of 1 June consisted of 433 posts. In addition, there were 36 persons working for ONUC Air Transport Force who were not accounted for in the above establishment.
11. The systematic revision mentioned in Progress Report No. 5 is going on and will be completed early in July.
12. Personnel vacancies in the Helicopter Squadron will seriously influence its ability to operate if the requests for pilots and mechanics are not met during the next two months. No decision has as yet been taken on conversion courses for Scandinavian helicopter pilots in Germany.
13. Medical. Overall health conditions have been satisfactory.

D. AIR ENGINEERING

14. General. The a/c serviceability rate during the month of June has been very satisfactory regarding C119, Light a/c and Helicopters. The C47s serviceability rate could be improved if the supply of spares from Pisa was not so bad.

15. Supply Support

Logistics support of aircraft in the month of June has shown no improvement from the last month and have to be characterized as not fully satisfactory. The AOCP demand has been delivered at an approximate rate of 45%. Routine demands coming in gradually.

To maintain the stockage objective, especially on C47 spares in operating levels, priority/requisitions have been raised during the month of June. The work in the Supply Section has been greatly hampered, mainly because the Section is moving into a more permanent place in another hangar. Because of this, some processes are necessarily delayed but we hope that in the near future the Supply Section is catching up with these delays.

16. C119s

The serviceability rate is extremely good. As all periodic inspections are carried out in Italy the spare parts situation in this country would not affect so much the serviceability of the a/c. The spare part situation on C119 in Europe is grave as I know from my own country. The USAF is not anymore operating C119s in Europe and this will do that the production and stocking of spares for C119 will cease. The depot which maintains the C119s for USAF has moved back to the USA. In the future the C119 will be more and more difficult to operate.

17. C-47s

The C47 has had for some time about 50% serviceable a/c. This is low but the reason for this is the difficult positions the C47 is operating under in Congo.

- a) The personnel establishment is not filled more than about 50%.
- b) The spare part situation is not good.
- c) C47 on detachment operate without any technical or supply support. Small, and easy to correct faults will ground the a/c for days which would happen if the technical "know-how" was available on the spot.
- d) Unscheduled repairs after mishaps, etc. cause the a/c grounded for days.

A solution would be to build up small "Fly-away kits" for the C47. But here again nothing is possible before the general spare part situation improves.

18. Light a/c.

The serviceability has been during the month extremely good. The figure mentioned in the latest Progress Report about 1200 overhaul is a miscalculation. The Otters will have major inspection at 800 hrs and the Beaver at 1200 hrs. In 1961 2 Otters will probably have reached 800 hrs and these inspections will, if approved be carried out at Sabena while the Beavers will reach 1200 hrs some time in 1962. This is if the flying program is not to be changed, too much. The T.O.S for this a/c is obsolete and H.Q. is working on obtaining up-to-date T.O.s.

19. Helicopters

In Administrative Report No. 24 from Pisa, it is mentioned that spares for H19 Copters were becoming scarce as the US Army is passing out this type and the present stock of spares is only sufficient for one year. ONUC is at the moment supplied of spares for H19 through US Army in Europe. H19 engines replacement is getting very difficult. The US Army will not be able to do any help in supplying engines.

There is a big shortage of tools for the helicopters. Tools are on order. The future replacement of personnel technically is dark. The engineer officer and 10 very experienced mechanics are leaving and this H.Q. have no knowledge of replacement arriving.

E. UN AIR TRANSPORT BASE N'DJILI

20. As reported earlier, there is an urgent need of a Flying Safety Officer. It is therefore important that Flying Officer should be provided as soon as possible.

21. The previously requested Military Police detachment consisting of a senior NCO and 8 ORs is still lacking.

22. On 30 June 1961, aircraft were detached as follows:

Albertville	1 C47, 1 Otter, 1 Beaver, 4 Sikorsky H19s
Bukavu	1 C47
Elizabethville	2 C47s, 3 Sikorsky H19s
Luluabourg	1 C47, 2 Otters, 2 Beavers, 4 Sikorsky H19s
Stanleyville	1 C47
Kamina	1 C47

23. The Air Supply Section has completed its move from the Sabena hangar to the new locality by the American hangar. It is expected that the efficiency of the supply section will increase.

24. There is still a serious shortage of vehicles and of certain spare parts, radio units and tools. There is also a need for spare aircraft engines, particularly for the C47 Squadron. All serviceable and repairable parts of C47 UN203 which crash-landed at Tshikapa will be brought to N'Djili. There is still a shortage of parking space for C47 aircraft and 800 pressed steel plats for use as parking platforms are needed.

25. C47 Squadron: W/C G.B. Singh took over command of the Squadron from W/C KL Suri. During the month of June, C119 aircraft ceased to operate from the Squadron. The Indian crews concerned returned to India and replacements arrived from there to fly C47 aircraft. C47 UN203 lost an engine when it crash-landed on take-off at Tshikapa. This aircraft was damaged beyond repair, but the crew members were uninjured.

26. C119 Squadron: The main problem is the lack of spare parts. Although there is an agreement between the IAF and UN that the latter is to provide all spare parts for both major inspections in Italy and for first-line maintenance in the Congo, the Squadron is all too often obliged to obtain spare parts from the Air Brigade in Pisa in order to have a reasonable ~~serviceability~~ **serviceability** rate.

27. Light aircraft Squadron: A number of air and ground crew were changed during the month. This temporarily decreased the serviceability rate and the total flying time is less than during May. The Squadron had no accidents during June.

28. Helicopter Squadron: There has been less helicopter flying during the month than in previous months mainly due to a lessening of activity by ground forces. In South Kasai, helicopters still encounter small arms fire from the ground. Two rotor blades were damaged during an incident of this nature and had to be changed.

29. The number of motor transport vehicles is much below establishment. It is important that a sufficient number of vehicles be available to obtain maximum operational efficiency.

30. The Chief Accommodation Officer visited N'Djili during the month of May to examine the question of providing a much needed Pilots' Rest Room. Since then, nothing has been heard of the matter.

31. The UNATB has only one ambulance which has no oxygen installation for patients. The Base needs two ambulances complete with all first aid equipment.

(C.G.W. Chapman) A/C
Air Commander

Distribution:

Force Commander ✓	1	Chief Air Eng Officer	2
COS	1	Base Commander N'Djili	25
DCOS	1	Movement Control	1
Air Commander	1	ICAO Mission	2
Deputy Air Commander	2	Charter Companies	8
Chief Air Operations Officer	2	Chief Admin. Officer	6
Chief Air Administrative Officer	2		
U.N HQ., New York	6		

E. UN Air Transport Base, N'Djili

20. The Flying Safety Officer has not yet arrived. Flying conditions in the Congo differ from those in the home countries of most of the aircrews. Also, the aircrews are of many different nationalities and it is therefore important that a Flying Safety Officer should be assigned as soon as possible.

21. In order to enforce the airfield traffic regulations (speed limit, smoking, etc.) and to assist in keeping a check on incoming passengers and cargo, a request has been made to have a Military Police Detachment assigned to the Base.

22. On 31 May 1961, aircraft were detached as follows:

Albertville	1	C47	1	Otter	1	Beaver	2	Sikorsky H19s
Bukavu	1	C47						
Elizabethville	2	C47s						
Kamina	2	Sikorsky H19s						
Luluabourg	1	C47	1	Otter	2	Beavers	4	Sikorsky H19s
Manono	1	C47						
Stanleyville	1	C47						

23. The Air Supplies Section is in the process of moving from the Sabena Hangar to the "American" Hangar. The move is expected to be completed in one week's time.

24. The C47 Squadron is experiencing an acute shortage of technicians in specialist trades such as electricians and radio technicians. Serviceability rate cannot be improved owing to the lack of these tradesmen. The squadron also has a shortage of both ordinary and specialist tools. There is only one tool kit between two men, which is inadequate and cause a waste of time. The Squadron needs a crane for the lifting of engines. At present no spare engines are held in stock.


25. There is still a shortage of vehicles and the strength of vehicles is much below the agreed establishment. International civilian staff are without any guaranteed

/method

method of transport between Leopoldville and the Base, some have remained as such ~~for~~ as long as seven months. A service station has been established for minor repairs and this is working satisfactorily.

26. The Chief Accomodation and Travel Officer has visited N'Djili to examine the question of providing a Pilots rest-room and we realize that steps are being taken to institute this facility.

27. Troops continue to be housed in workshop areas thereby contributing to a serious shortage of workshops. This is an old chesnut. Very simply personnel accomodation should be provided elsewhere. In fairness to the troops it must be recognized that workshop hangars are for aircraft and furthermore make only poor personnel accomodation.


(C.G.W. Chapman) A/C
Air Commander

Distribution:

Force Commander	1		
COS	1	Chief Air Eng. Officer	2
DCOS	1	Base Commander, N'Djili	25
Air Commander	1	Movement Control	1
Deputy Air Commander	2	ICAO Mission	2
Chief Air Operations Officer	2	Charter Companies	8
Chief Air Administrative "	2	Chief Admin. Officer	1
U. N. Hq., New York	6		

To: (See distribution)
 From: Air Commander
 Subject: PROGRESS REPORT No. 5 COVERING MAY 1961

A. SUMMARY

1. During May 1961, UNATF operations continued close to maximum capacity, with tonnages and passengers the highest on record.
2. Notwithstanding the record loads carried, flying hours decreased slightly from 5859 in April to 5539 in May. There are two main reasons for this decrease. One is that the UNATF during May has not been engaged in external airlifts to the same extent as in April. Another is that the logistic support of the C47s was bad in April, which has affected serviceability during May. The light aircraft squadron has increased its flying hours during May by 42%.
3. The total load airlifted within the Congo in May (April) was:

a) Freight	6,444,000 lbs (2,658,915)
b) Passengers (troops)	7,874 (1,720)
c) Vehicles	169

The increase in freight and passengers can be seen to be remarkable. However, it should be noted that in May the main part of the airlift was carried out in connection with UN operations in North Katanga, with a lot of shuttles over relatively short distances.

4. On external airlift, there have only been occasional flights to and from Dar-Es-Salaam.
5. On 17 May an H19 helicopter made a forced landing 4 miles NW of Mwene Ditu, due to engine failure. The landing, which took place in the bush, was successful with no damage or injuries to crew or aircraft. The crew and passengers were able to reach the railway line and telephone for assistance. After five hours all were back in safety in the camp in Mwene Ditu

/It has not

It has not been possible to salvage this helicopter, which must be written off. However, all important parts have been secured and brought to N'Djili.

6. On 31 May the Deputy Force Commander presented the Congo Medal to UNAFT personnel at N'Djili. At the same time there was a change of command at the Base, when Lt-Col. Pappalardo left for Italy and Col. Nimis (Italy) took over as Base Commander.

(B) Air Operations

B. AIR OPERATIONS7. Hours Flown, Aircraft Status, etc.

Type of a/c	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	a/c number 31 May	Engine Changes	Major Inspections
C119	535	480	521	535	471	8	-	3 (Pisa)
C47	435	470	940	958	795	20	6	5
Otter/Beav.	170	242	295	330	468	8	-	4
Helicopters	360	142	313	372	365	17	1	2
	1490	1334	2069	2195	2099	53		
1) Charter a/c	1940	1350	2494	3664	3440	23		
GrandTotal	3430	2684	4563	5859	5539	76		

Remarks

1) During May, the following civil aircraft operated under charter and flew the hours indicated:

Sabena	6	DC4	553
Interocean	7	DC4	1257
Balair	3	DC4	323
Panama	3	DC4	460
	6	C46	440
Transair	2	C46	334
SAS	1	Convair	73

8. Flying Analysis - Charter Aircraft

	March	April	May
Average aircraft strength	18	24	22
Average daily flying	11 (61%)	75 (62%)	13 (59%)
Average daily maintenance	3 (17%)	6.5 (62%)	7.6 (34%)
Average serviceable but not flying	4 (22%)	2.5 (12%)	1.4 (7 %)
Average monthly flying hrs per a/c	146	151	139

/(C) Air Administration

C. AIR ADMINISTRATION

9. Total air personnel by nationalities effective May 31 1961 (compared with the figures of April 30):

Argentina	24	(-0)
Brazil	26	(-2)
Canada	15	(+0)
Denmark	5	(+0)
Ethiopia	4	(-2)
Greece	21	(+0)
India	48	(-1)
Italy	74	(+2)
Norway	58	(+1)
Sweden	79	(+5)
	<u>354</u>	<u>(+3)</u>

10. As mentioned in Progress Report No. 4, the establishment for Air Detachment-Kamina has been revised and the establishment of UN Air Transport Force in the Congo as of the 1st of May, consisted of 435 posts. In addition to that, there were 28 persons working for ONUC Air Transport Force who were not accounted for in the above establishment.

11. The systematic revision of UNATF establishments has now been started. The intention is to carry out this work on a regular basis to ensure up-to-date establishments at all times.

12. According to the previous report, paragraphs C-6, 7, and 8, so far, no improvements have been brought about, except the fact that arrangements are being made to organize conversion courses for Scandinavian H-13 pilots to H-19 Helicopters. These courses will probably take place in Germany.

13. Medical. The overall health conditions have been satisfactory.

/(D) Air Engineering

D. AIR ENGINEERING14. General

The aircraft serviceability during May has been good.

15. Supply Situation

(a) The month of May saw no change in the critical situation of incoming spares. The only improvement brought about was the receipt of the total number of spares from 6 out of the 38 requisitions raised in March for stock. Of the remaining 32 requisitions, 17 were partially processed by the shipping off of 46% of the items requested.

(b) Of the 29 requisitions raised in March for AOCP, 2 are still pending and 9 were received in May.

(c) Of the 22 requisitions generated in May for AOCPs, 4 were processed immediately. These refer to C119 aircraft.

(d) 71% of the April requisitions raised for AOCP were processed during the month of May.

(e) On 19 May, a cable was sent out to UNEF, Pisa, Italy, with information copy to Field Service, UN HQ, New York, stressing the urgent need to materialize the outstanding requisition for C47 spare parts. UNEF, in reply, drew attention to the time lag between the date of submission of the requisition and the date on which it was received in Pisa (8 to 10 days later). Considering these dates and the date of the assist number assignment by Field Service, New York, there has hardly been time to evaluate the ability of Chateauroux to supply the items in due time.

16. C119s

The C119 serviceability rate has been very good during May and flying hours slightly exceeded the planned inspection rate. As mentioned in the previous report, however, the supply of spare parts is very difficult and a further increase in flying hours will not be possible except through an increased maintenance program and increased logistic support. In fact, it may be difficult to maintain the 450 hours a month planned at present.

/C47s

6003/12/AIR OPS
18 May 1961

To: See Distribution

From: Air Commander

Subject: PROGRESS REPORT No. 4 COVERING APRIL 1961

A. SUMMARY

1. During April there has been a further increase in UNATF flying hours. Military flying has increased from 2069 hours in March to 2195 in April, charter hours from 2494 to 3664.

2. The UNATF has been involved during April in external airlift which is not normally included in our missions. This airlift has covered:

- a) the lifting of Indians from Dar-es-Salaam to Kamina:
2250 passengers and 900,000 lbs of cargo;
- b) the lifting of Sudanese from Leo to Khartoum: 400
passengers and slightly over 60,000 lbs of cargo.

The flying hours spent on this external airlift total approximately 800.

3. Within the Congo, the total load airlifted in April was

- a) equipment, ordnance, supplies,
ammunition and vehicles: 2,658,915 lbs
- b) passengers 1,720
- c) food relief Bakwanga and Luluabourg 294,551 lbs
37 passengers

4. Individual Flying Hours. During the last two months, there have been some cases of flying fatigue. In fact one light aircraft crew had to be grounded one week for that reason. This is a factor which could considerably affect flight safety. One of the causes of this flying fatigue is the too high monthly flying time rate of some crews.

The following brief synopsis illustrate the range of aircrew flying hours:

/(a) In

2

- a) In the C47 Squadron, two pilots flew 170 hours each during March. Two pilots flew 160 hours. It has also been found that the average flying hours for the different national contingents in this Squadron vary considerably. The contingents differ considerably in strength. Considering, therefore, the four pilots with the highest number of hours in the Argentinian, Brazilian and Norwegian contingents, it is found that the averages for March for these pilots are:

Argentina	102 hours
Brazil	50 hours
Norway	160 hours

- b) The corresponding figures (the four pilots with the highest number of flying hours) are, for the:

Italian C119 Squadron (April)	69 hours
Helicopter Squadron (March)	57 hours
Light Aircraft Squadron (March)	87 hours

- c) Taking the above-mentioned cases of flying fatigue and the individual flying hours of some crews into consideration, an order has now been issued limiting the monthly maximum of flying hours for:

C47 Crews to.....	100 hours
Light Aircraft Crews to	75 hours
Helicopter Crews to....	60 hours

5. In connection with the Port Franqui incident, aircrews detached in Luluabourg made frequent trips between these two places, sometimes under difficult and dangerous conditions.

6. On 28 April, W/O S.Feron (Sweden), pilot of a Beaver, landed in Port Franqui little over an hour after the shooting of the UN officers, at a time when the situation in Port Franqui was very tense, and in spite of the fact that the captain of an Air Brousse aircraft coming from Port Franqui had advised him not to land there. It is probable that the arrival of a UN aircraft in Port

/Franqui

Franqui at that time contributed considerably to getting the situation under control. This flight showed a devotion to duty worthy of high commendation.

7. On 4 May, CWO Glad (Sweden) and W/O B. Nilsson (Sweden) made a flight with an Otter from Luluabourg to Port Franqui and back to Luluabourg in the face of appalling weather conditions and the obvious possibility of finding a very dangerous situation in Port Franqui. Moreover, the flight was partly carried out in darkness. In his commendation for gallantry, the Ghana Brigade Commander in Luluabourg stated that this flight showed a devotion to duty worthy of the highest commendation.

8. The commendations for these three pilots have been forwarded to the Force Commander and the Royal Swedish Air Force.

B. AIR OPERATIONS

1. Hours Flown, Aircraft Status, etc.

Type of a/c	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	a/c Number 30 Apr.	engine changes	Major Inspects	Remarks
C 119	535	430	521	535	8	1	-	2 a/c sent to Pisa.
C 47	435	470	940	958	20	4	3	Brazzaville
Otter/Beaver	170	242	295	330	8		3	
Helicopters	360	142	313	372	15	4	-	3 a/c sent to Germany
	1490	1334	2069	2195	51			For write-off
Charter a/c	2) 1940	1350	2494	3664 ¹⁾	23			
GrandTotal	3430	2684	4563	5859	74			

/Remarks

REMARKS:

- 1) Of these, approximately 800 hours were spent on external airlift which normally does not come under the responsibility of the UNATF.
- 2) During April, the following civil aircraft operated under charter and flew the hours indicated:

Sabena	5 DC4	656
Interocean	7 DC4	896
TWA	2 DC4	460
Balair	3 DC4	517
Panama	3 DC4)	727
	4 C46)	
Transair	2 C46	338
SAS	1 Convair 70	

2. <u>Flying Analysis Charter Aircraft</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>March</u>
Average Aircraft Strength	24	18
Average Daily Flying	15 (62%)	11 (61%)
Average Daily Maintenance	6,5 (26%)	3 (17%)
Average Serviceable but not flying	2,5 (12%)	4 (22%)
Average monthly flying hours per a/c	151	146

3. An ICAO mobile technical group has visited i.a. Stanleyville and several places in Kasai for repairs and maintenance to radio aids. This mobile technical maintenance has proved very effective and the radio aids situation has improved considerably. It is planned that this team will continue their work also in other provinces. It is in the interest of the UNATF to assist the team whenever help is needed.

4. It is expected that a 24-hour forecasting and other meteorological services will shortly be provided at N'Djili. Forecasters will also be stationed at Luluabourg and Kamina.

5. On 17 April, a UN C47 on its way from Leopoldville to Luluabourg was lost due to a navigational error. After 4,5 hours of flying time the aircraft finally landed in the vicinity of Canzar in Angola. The crew and passengers - six persons in all - were taken to Luanda, but were later allowed to return to the aircraft and fly it back to Luluabourg on 21 April.

/C - Admin

C. ADMINISTRATION

1. Total air personnel by nationalities effective 30th April, 1961 (compared with the figures of 14th April, 1961):

Argentina	24	(+ 0)
Brazil	28	(- 1)
Canada	15	(+ 0)
Denmark	5	(+ 0)
Ethiopia	6	(+ 0)
Greece	21	(+ 0)
India	49	(+ 0)
Italy	72	(- 4)
Norway	57	(- 4)
Sweden	74	(+ 4)
	<u>351</u>	<u>(- 5)</u>

2. The establishment of UN Air Transport Force in the Congo as at 1st April, 1961 consisted of 431 posts. In addition to that there were 27 persons working for the ONUC Air Transport Force who were not accounted for in the above establishment.

3. In January, when the Air Transport Force was reorganized at N'Djili, a small detachment was left over at Kamina. This detachment was self-sufficient only to deal with small operations. On the other hand, since then the air traffic at Kamina has greatly increased and it was felt necessary to increase the strength of personnel at this base. Accordingly, the establishment for Kamina has been revised and some posts have been added.

4. Experience of air operations in the Congo has proved that for the satisfactory conduct of operations, it is essential to have air operation teams located at most important airfields. These teams were meant to be of a flexible nature and to be used on a rotation basis to suit the various demands. On 22 April, a request was sent to New York for 11 such teams, each team consisting of one officer and one NCO.

/5. To cover

5. To cover up for vacancies, another request was forwarded to New York for 50 personnel (9 for HQ duties and 41 for air and ground duties).

6. According to the establishment, our nominal roll on the 1st of April showed 97 vacancies. Out of these 97 vacancies only one post has been filled up during April. This is considered most unsatisfactory and serious attempts should now be made to have the important posts filled up as soon as possible.

7. The personnel situation of the Helicopter Squadron has become very serious. At the end of April there were only 14 pilots instead of 24, as provided for in the establishment. By the middle of May this Squadron will have no Engineering Officer in charge. Furthermore, we have not yet been assured of any replacements for either air or ground crews who are being gradually repatriated. If the situation goes on like this, it will be extremely grave later this summer and may seriously hamper the operations.

8. The C-119, the C-47 and the Light Aircraft Squadrons are for the time being only maintaining their strengths, which means that especially the C-47 Squadron is still very short of technicians.

9. In the future, some additional aircrews will be needed, as it has been found necessary to state maximum flying monthly hours for the pilots. Furthermore, the crew for light aircraft should consist of 2 pilots.

10. It is unsatisfactory that some of the air personnel arriving in the Congo are not sufficiently familiar with the English language. As the knowledge of this language is most essential for the efficiency of air operations and flying safety (R/T procedures), it is requested that only personnel with a good knowledge of English should be sent to the Congo in future.

11. It is felt necessary that qualified replacements arrive in the Congo before the personnel on duty are repatriated. Although the importance of this is fully understood by the Liaison Officers, this matter should also be emphasized by the UN on the representatives of the countries concerned.

12. Medical. The overall health conditions has been satisfactory.

/D. Air Engineering...

D. AIR ENGINEERING1. General

The availability of aircraft during the month of April must be characterized as good. The main reasons for this is the high rate of incoming spare parts with exception of engines during March. Another reason is the latest arrivals of Greek and Argentinian Technicians who are highly experienced and keen workers.

Pilferage from the hangar at N'Djili is becoming a problem. Toolboxes seem to be the most popular item but also the aircraft spare store has twice been broken into. Each case is reported.

2. C47

a) Maintaining the C47 is now and will become hard. During April the logistics support dropped fatally which will highly affect the serviceability in the months to come. The Squadron has needed engines with quick change kits badly. Presently, engines have to be built up after the defective one is taken out of the aircraft which delays the operation about 14 days. With quick change kits an engine change is completed in less than four days. To cut down delays the Squadron is removing engines from aircraft coming in for periodic inspection, to install it on an aircraft which needs an engine only. Such operations are doubling the workload but have to be carried out in order to get serviceable aircraft. During the month of April this was done on four occasions.

b) Early the month of March the C47 Squadron received 4 C47s which had no V.H.F. radio installation. The radiosets and related equipment were immediately requisitioned from USAF Depot, Chateauroux in France. About 6 weeks later four complete installations were received whereupon the installing work was started. One aircraft was completed by the end of April and two only partly. The reason for this slow process is that the A.T.B. have only one experienced Radiotechnician capable of supervising and doing this work. Unfortunately ^{he} fell sick early May and as a result the work has more or less been at a half since then. The aircraft are being worked on by the remaining Technicians but little progress is being made, due to inexperience. In order to get the installing work done quick and to prevent relying on only one Technician, Sabena and Air France were contacted and asked to do the installation on two aircraft. Due to low capacity and lack of technicians with experience on this particular work, their answer was no. However the last aircraft is expected serviceable by the end of May.

/(3) C119

3. C119

Since the Italian Air Force took over maintenance of C119s, its serviceability rate has been good. However, future predictions are rather black. The Italian Air Force, who have supplied most of the spare parts are now running short. Second list of parts needed over a 6 months period running from January to June 1960 has been submitted to Pisa, USAF, Chateauroux and New York but only 10-15% is received so far. The Italian Air Force have already given the warning that they will not be able to meet UN's required flying hrs. in the Congo unless immediate improvement occur. Back in the month of November 1960 USAF also came forward with a warning that C119 would in near future be impossible to support. Their advise to UN was to get rid of all C119s soon as possible.

4. Light Aircraft

The Light Aircraft Squadron are now well stabilized in sending teams out to detachment airfields performing periodic inspections. However the more complicated inspections such as 800 Hrs. must be done at N'Djili. Logistic support of Beaver and Otters is also a problem due to the scarcity of parts. It is in many instances very surprising to notice how well the Squadron manages such a difficult situation.

5. Helicopters

During the month of April the Helicopter Squadron performed 4 engine-changes out in the field. The engines had to be built up at N'Djili due to lack of quick change kits. The lack of these kits delays the operation to a great extent and is causing much unnecessary work. However, kits are expected to arrive in Leo before end of May. The Squadron received five H19 Helicopters during April and another four in the beginning of May. The total number of helicopters 23 May was 16 H-19, 2 H-13 and one Alouette.-

6. Logistics

a) Concerning the Logistics support of spare parts for UN aircraft in the month of April, the incoming of spares for AOCP fell down to a rate of 40% and the routine demands for replenishment of stock generated during the month, none was received; nevertheless, requisitions for 1230 line items were dispatched to Field Service, HQ, UN, New York, through Procurement Section, ONUC HQ.

b) As per List No. 2 furnished by the Italian Air Ministry (Pisa Administrative Report No. 12 dated 23 March 1961) Requisition

/No.-

No. LEO/1-9177/AL was raised by ONUC, cable No. 2221, QP-152, to cover an estimated usage of C119 spare parts for six months period, considering six Italian aircraft due in operational status as ONUC employed aircraft. Reference to this requisition is found in the following cables, addressed with information to Leopoldville:

- (1) Ital 229 from Ryder to Field Service;
- (2) Cable 298 from Field Service to Pisa;
- (3) Ital 251 from Ryder to Field Service.

Assist. Letter US/ONUC/86-307 was provided by Field Service to cover this transaction.

c) To maintain the stockage objective specifically of C47 spare parts in operating level, requisitions were raised during the month of April.

E. U.N. AIR TRANSPORT BASE - N'DJILI

1. The personnel situation at Base Operations Wing is still difficult especially as it has proved necessary to send out from time to time Operation Teams for especially arranged airlifts. It is not expected that the personnel situation will improve until mobile operation teams, requested through New York, are available.

2. Parking problems have slightly improved with the delivery of some steel-planking. Further supplies of steel-plates are expected. It has not yet been possible to get marshalling crews.

3. Hangar space is still not sufficient. It should be noted that certain hangar space now is used for Movement Control freight shed and that workshops are being used as sleeping quarters and other items.

It is planned to build a transit camp at the Base to accommodate troops as well as a freight shed for Movement Control. However these buildings are not yet started and until these facilities are available hangar space will remain as it is now. The Congolese

/Air Force ..

Air Force is moving from N'Djili to N'Dolo which will give some additional space i.a. for the supply section at N'Djili.

4. The Chief Accomodation and Travel Officer has been approached for arranging a crew restroom at the Base.

5. In comparison with the actual requirement, the Base is still short of 14 cars/jeeps and 6 light buses. Th consequence of this shortage is difficulty to get the aircrew and groundcrew to the Base in time, particularly for early morning flights.

6. On 30 April, aircraft were detached as follows:

Kitona	1	light a/c
Stanleyville	1	C-47
Bukavu	1	C-47
Kindu	1	light a/c
Albertville	2	C-47, 1 light a/c, 2 helicopters
Katalo	1	light a/c
Kamina	2	helicopters
Elizabethville	2	C-47
Luluabourg	1	C-47, 2 light a/c, 3 helicopters

This report should be submitted through Commanding Officers to their subordinates (detachment).

(C.G.W. Chapman) A/C
Air Commander

Distribution:

Force Commander	1	
COS	1	Chief Air Engineering Officer 2
DCOS	1	Base Commander, N'Djili 25
Air Commander	1	Movement Control 1
Deputy Air Commander	2	ICAO Mission 2
Chief Air Operations Officer	2	Charter Companies 8
Chief Air Administrative "	2	Chief Admin. Officer 1

Force Commander.

6005/12/Air Ops
18 April 1961

To : See Distribution
From : Air Commander
Subject: Progress Report No. 3 covering March 1961
(and in some respects the beginning of April)

A. Summary

1. During March, considerable progress has been made in the UNATF capacity. This is shown in the number of **military** flying hours which in February amounted to 1334, and in March increased to 2070, the highest figure reached since UN operations in the Congo started. The charter hours have increased from 1350 in February to 2495 in March. Totally there is an increase of 1879 hours.

2. The situation concerning demands and capacity for airlift has improved considerably during the month. With the 23 chartered aircraft now at the disposal of UN and the capacity of the UNATF, the requirements for airlift have been fulfilled. At the end of the month, therefore, there were no backlogs whatsoever in the Congo. During March 1633 passengers and **2,393,412** lbs cargo were airlifted by UN flights.

3. The main troop movements completed were:

- | | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| a) Indonesians | Leo - Kitona (614 passengers, 300.000 lbs cargo) |
| b) Malaysians | Leo - Kindu (208 " , 400.000 " ") |
| c) Indians | Leo - Kamina (beginning of April) |
| d) Ethiopians | Bunia - Kabalo (beginning of April) |
| e) Irish | Kamina - Elizabethville (beginning of April) |
| f) Indians | Dar-es-Salaam - Kamina (beginning of April) |

The main problem concerning the troop movements is still the limitations of carrying vehicles. At the moment this can only be accomplished by the C119s. However, by providing special ramps, it is expected to be able to move jeeps in the DC4 and C46 in the future.

4. With the exception of the helicopter squadron, the squadrons are now fairly well up to establishment as regards aircrew. With regard to ground crew, the situation is not so good. There is still a deficiency of technicians, especially in the DC3 squadron.
5. In the different detachments, some increase in personnel is required. This cannot, however, be accomplished within the present establishment. Necessary action will be taken to obtain the additional personnel.
6. All 20 DC3s have now been delivered. Four of these aircraft, however, have no VHF equipment and have therefore been out of commission. Radiosets are now available and will be installed.
7. A suggestion has been sent to UN New York to replace the Otters and Beavers by Caribous. The main reason for this is the need for STOL aircraft for local support capable of carrying small vehicles. The Caribou has also better performances concerning instrument and bad weather flying than the Otters and Beavers. Also from safety point of view it is desirable to replace single-engined aircraft with twinengined. No reply has as yet been received from New York.
8. With the FIC circuit now in operation, air communications have considerably improved, but still there is much left to be completed in air communications. Plans for point to point circuit and for movable teams for airfields without any communication facilities are now under consideration.
9. Special directives for the different alert measures for the UNATF have been distributed.

10. The Congolese Air Force is probably in the process of commencing flying training at N'Dolo. This is, however, not organized in co-operation with UN, but, as far as is known, on a private contract basis. Congolese authorities have requested UN assistance. It is understood the matter is under consideration JN-NY

11. UNATF depends to a great extent for maintenance on SABENA facilities at N'Djili and Air France at Brazzaville. Furthermore, the space available at N'Djili is now very limited. A situation could arise in which UN would have to carry out its own maintenance, but this could probably not be arranged at N'Djili. For these reasons, a special survey of Kitona base was carried out on 15 March. Upon the completion of some work on certain buildings, workshops, etc., this Base would probably be a suitable maintenance base for the UNATF. From other points of view, also, Kitona is a suitable base for the UNATF. This matter is now under consideration at UN Air HQ.

12. The fuel situation throughout the Congo has continued to deteriorate owing to the total lack of surface transportation and embargos in certain areas against the UN. Leopoldville is the only reliable source of fuel in the Congo although there are still small quantities available in Luluabourg, Stanleyville and Elizabethville. Large quantities of drummed fuel have been ordered for Bukavu, N'dola and Tabora which are located just outside the Congo in Rouanda-Uroundi, Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. These stocks will be airlifted into the closest Congo airfields if the situation does not improve.

Air Operations

1. Hours flown, Aircraft status etc.

Type of A/C	Hours flown			A/C Quantity 31 March	Engine Changes	Inspections
	Jan	Febr	March			
C119	535	480	521	12	1	6 (Pisa)
DC3	435	470	940	20	1	4 (Brazza-
Otter/Beaver	170	242	295	8	-	ville)
Helicopters	360	142	313	18	4	
	1490	1334	2069	58		
Charter A/C	1940	1350	2494	24		
Grand Total	3430	2684	4563	82		

Remarks: 1) During March the following civil aircraft operated under charter and flew the hours indicated:

Sabena	4	DC4	348 Hours
Inter-Ocean	7	"	900
Transair	2	C46	256
TMA	2	DC4	260
Panama	3	DC4	303
	4	C46	
Balair	2	Dc4	387
SAS	1	Convair	40

2. Special Occurences

- 3 March helicopter crews detached to Matadi were arrested and maltreated in Boma. They were released appr. 24 hours later.
- 14 March three helicopter crews en route from Albertville to Kamina were arrested when making a forced landing in Nyunzu. They were later released by Ethiopian troops under firing. It has not yet been able to salvage one helicopter still in Nyunzu.

During the Matadi incident UN aircraft were shot at but no casualties or damages were suffered.

There have also been other incidents when aircrews and to some extent passengers have run into trouble although landing on airfields supposed to be fully under **UN** - Control. Precautionary measures have been discussed with Military Operations. It is also expected that when communications improve incidents caused by unexpected arrivals can be avoided.

B. Air Engineering

1. As shown from chart above, aircraft utilization has improved in comparison to February. This is due to improved spare parts situation and increase in squadrons personnel strength. However the squadrons are hampered by language difficulties, workshop facilities and hangar space. Regarding workshops, the squadrons are relying completely on Sabena. This is an unsatisfactory arrangement as the workload imposed on Sabena's shop are by far exceeding their capacity.

2. In the month of March, Air Logistics generated a total of 89 Requisitions for spare parts, equipment, tools and engines for the various types of aircraft utilized by Air Transport Force, totalizing 532 line items.

From the total of Requisitions mentioned above 27 were raised for aircraft out of commission for parts (AOCP) and for aircraft not fully equipped (ANFE).

The receiving of spare parts requested for AOCP has improved on March to a rate of 70%.

The receiving of spares, equipment, etc. for stock replenishment was not very satisfactory, but it seems it is going to improve for the months ahead.

Our sources of supply, U.S.A.F. Depot, Chateauroux, France has forwarded instructions for the procedures of ONUC Repairable Spares generated during the month, as well as for unserviceable engines, which is adhered to.

C. Administration

1. Total air personnel by nationalities effective 14 April 1961
(compared with the figures of 28 February 1961):

Argentina	24	(+ 1)
Brazil	29	(⁺ 0)
Canada	15	(+ 3)
Denmark	5	(+ 4)
Ethiopia	6	(⁺ 0)
Greece	21	(+21)
India	49	(- 1)
Italy	76	(+ 1)
Norway	61	(+ 9)
Sweden	70	(+ 0)
							Total	356	(+38)

D. UN Air Transport Base - N'Djili

1. With the comparatively large number of aircraft now based at N'Djili there have been certain difficulties concerning parking of aircraft, refueling, loading etc. This refers specially to the charter aircraft. A special officer has been posted to the Base to coordinate these activities. To increase parking area special planning will be provided starting at the end of April.

2. Since the closing down of the Kamina Base to custodial maintenance the flying activities there however have been much wider than at any time before. It therefore has proved necessary to strengthen up the air detachment at the Base with personnel for Air Operations and for Maintenance. As a temporary action this personnel have been provided from the Base..

3. 31 March aircraft were detached as follows:


Kitona	2 helicopters
Stanleyville	1 DC3
Bukavu	1 ..
Kindu	1 light a/c
Albertville	1 DC3, 1 light a/c, 2 helicopters
Kamina	2 helicopters
Elizabethville	2 DC3, 1 light a/c
Luluabourg	1 DC3, 1 light a/c, 3 helicopters

4. The Personnel establishment for Base Operations is still not complete.

For FIC the Base now has received additional personnel.

5. Air Supply are working with the emergency jungle equipment. Some of the items required have been received.
6. A Medical Section is now established at the Base.

This report should be submitted through commanding officers to their subordinates (detachments)


(C.G.W. Chapman) A/C
Air Commander

Distribution

Force Commander	1
DCOS	1
Deputy Air Commander	1
Chief Air Operations Officer	2
Chief Air Administrative Officer	2
Chief Air Engineering Officer	2
Base Commander M'Djili	25
Movement Control	1
ICAO Mission	2
Charter Companies	8
Chief Administrative Officer	1

Ad

24 October

1

Dr. S. Linner, Officer-in-charge

Mr. W.W. Cox

H. Kanakarathne, Legal Adviser

Complaints by Government of Congo (Brazzaville) regarding alleged infractions by UN aircraft

1. By Note dated 9 September 1961 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Congo (Brazzaville) brought to our notice certain infractions of International Aviation Regulations by two of our aircraft the particulars of which, including the markings and the names of the pilots, were furnished. One of these infractions, according to the Note, could well have led to a collision between the UN DC-4 and another DC-8 of a regular airline. The main complaint appears to be that the pilots of the two UN aircraft (one chartered from Inter-ocean Airways and the other from Panama Airways) had not adhered to the International Regulations regarding overflying of the various regions in this part of the world. The Ministry has requested that steps be taken to compel our pilots to respect the regulations and that the offending pilots be punished.

2. Mr. Paganelli who had apparently discovered this among the papers of the late Mr. Fabry forwarded it to the Air Commander on 7 October for his comments on the alleged violations. By note dated 13 October, which in my view was most unhelpful and even indifferent, the Air Commander said that he could "add nothing to what has been said by Brazzaville authorities". Whether by this he implies that the allegations were found justified after investigation by him I do not know. No effort has been made by him to indicate to us whether or not in fact he had even questioned the pilots concerned whose names are given in the documents attached to the Ministry's Note.

3. I obtained from the ICAO representatives the relevant Rules of the Air contained in the Annex to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. They have also clarified for me after reading the documents forwarded by the Ministry the nature of the offences alleged to have been committed by the pilots in question. If the allegations are true the pilots have been guilty of serious omissions which may have led to collisions with other aircraft and to the consequent loss of life. The ICAO representatives also brought to my notice the fact that on several occasions they themselves had complained to the Air Operations of the UN here about several infringements and violations of International Civil Aviation Rules by UN aircraft but had not received any response or encouragement. Para 2 of the Air Commander's note addressed to Mr. Paganelli explains the laxity and carelessness shown by the crews of aircraft

chartered by the United Nations from the charter companies, for the Air Commander is of the view that "it is hardly within my field of responsibilities to advise duly licensed commercial operators on such basic requirements as proper R/T procedures." I must confess that I cannot concur with this limited and somewhat modest estimate by the Air Commander of his own responsibilities. Although the planes belong to private companies and are serviced by personnel employed by the companies, they are engaged in the service of the United Nations and are identified everywhere as United Nations aircraft. In my view it is most essential that such aircraft should be the last to contravene international air standards and rules of the air established by the Convention on International Civil Aviation. I am therefore taking steps to invite the attention of all the charter companies concerned to the terms of their contracts with the United Nations as well as to their obligations to observe the relevant rules of the air. ICAO representatives have been kind enough to cooperate with me in this matter and I am sure the Air Commander will be prepared to accept a somewhat broader interpretation of his responsibilities in this connection.

4. Pending verification of the facts alleged in the Note from the Foreign Ministry of the Congo (Brassaville) I suggest we address a Note in terms of the attached draft to the Ministry regretting the delay in attending to the matter (since they have sent a second reminder) and undertaking to inquire into it and communicate with them further.

cc. ~~Br. Liaison, Office in Charge~~
 General S. MacBain, Force Commander ✓
 Air Commodore Morrison, Air Commander

28 November 1

HQ Nigerian Bde
Force Commander

Authority granted for the transport in UN aircraft
of the following :

President of Kasai
Special Commissioner for Kasai
Commissioner of Police
Minister of Economic Affairs or Representative
Col. NDJOKU, ANC
ANC Liaison Officer
ANC Medical Officer

as required by Brigadier Goulson.

48.

(G.L. Yacob) Maj. General
A/FC

28 November 1961

Air

To : See Distribution

From : Air Commander

Subject : PROGRESS REPORT NO. 10 COVERING OCTOBER 1961

A. SUMMARY:

1. At the beginning of October 1961 fighter units requested by UN Headquarters, New York, from Ethiopia, India and Sweden to secure UN air transports against hostile air activity were all available in the Congo. As hitherto used denomination - the United Nations Air Transport Force (UNATF) - from now on did not correspond to the extended organization, UN Headquarters approved that this name had to be changed to United Nations Air Division (ONUC/AIR DIV) comprising the Air Transport Group and the Fighter Operations Group.
2. To exercise the control of the Fighter Operations Group including the Ethiopian F84 Squadron No. 1, the Indian Canberra Squadron No. 5 and the Swedish J.29 Squadron F22, UN Headquarters approved a Fighter Operation element to be organized at ONUC Headquarters, LEO. Nominated as Chief Fighter Operations Officer was Col S Lampell, Royal Swedish Air Force and as Senior Fighter Operations Officer Wing Commander A S Bhawnani, Indian Air Force.
3. During October the main base for the Ethiopian and Indian Squadrons was N'Djili Airport, Leopoldville and for the Swedish Squadron, Luluabourg.
4. Considering the extremely complicated problems to organize and control an operational fighter group under existing circumstances it can be recorded that this work has been carried out with reasonable success.
5. Organization charts of UN AIR DIVISION and FIGHTER OPERATIONS GROUP are attached (Appendix A and B.)
6. The Force Commander Lt Gen S Mac Eoin inspected in the presence of the Air Commander, Air Commodore H A Morrison, the Swedish jet fighters on 6 October and the Indian Canberra Squadron on 17 October at N'Djili.
7. Flying hours increased from 4,892 in September to 5,965 in October which is the highest figure ever recorded.
8. The total load airlifted within the Congo (September in brackets) was:

(a) Freight	6,412,959 lbs	(6,003,462)
(b) Passengers (troops)	10,578	(3,565)
(c) Vehicles	194	(67)

9. On 28 October UN helicopter No. 637 made a forced landing near Niemba. There were no injuries to the crew.

B. AIR OPERATIONS:

10. Hours flown, aircraft status, etc.

Type of a/c	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	A/C Numbers 31 Oct
C-119	243	462	343	816	9
C-47	806	968	943	645	17
C-54	-	-	-	74	1
Otter/Beaver	372	360	424	365	8
Helicopter	253	319	264	217	13
F-86	-	-	-	51	4
B(I)58	-	-	-	125	6
J-29	-	-	-	146	5
Total	1674	2109	1974	2439	63
Charter A/C	3061	3328	2918	3526	25
Grand Total	4735	5437	4892	5965	88

Remarks:

During October the following civil a/c operated and flew the hours indicated:

SABENA	4	DC-4	581
INTEROCEAN	8	DC-4	1226
PANAMA	1	DC-4	191
	5	C-46	780
TRANSAIR	1	DC-6	93
	4	C-46	466
LINJEFLYG	2	DC-3	189

.../3

11. FLYING ANALYSIS - Charter Aircraft'

	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Average a/c strength	19	21	16	21
" daily flying	12(52.2%)	12(50%)	11(55%)	14(56%)
" daily maintenance	4(17.4%)	3(12.5%)	4(20%)	4(16%)
" serviceable but not flying	7(30.4%)	9(37.5%)	5(25%)	7(28%)
" monthly flying hours per a/c	133	139	146	141

C. AIR ADMINISTRATION:

12. Total air personnel effective 31 October 1961 are shown below:

Argentina	26 (+0)	
Brazil	32 (+0)	
Canada	82 (+0)	
Denmark	9 (-22)	Decrease due to return of C-47 and helicopter crew
Ethiopia	48 (+1)	
Greece	25 (+0)	
India	203 (+159)	Increase due to arrival of No. 5 Canberra Squadron
Italy	76 (+1)	
Norway	70 (-2)	
Sweden	136 (+56)	Increase due to arrival of Swedish Jet Fighters Squadron F-22

13. The establishment of UN Air Division Organization in the Congo as of 1 October consisted of 514 posts. In addition there were 59 persons working for UN Air Division who were not accounted for in the above establishment.

14. Due to the request for fighters and additional transport aircraft the following units and aircraft arrived at the beginning of October:

	<u>No. of a/c</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
4 Swedish Jet Fighter Unit F-22	5 J-29 SAAB	40
12-17 Indian Canberra Unit No. 5	6 B(I)58	129
8-9 Linjeflyg SE-CFM, SE-CFT	2 C-47	-
10 Transair SE-CFF	1 C-46	-

15. One Norwegian C-119 returned home on 16 October and one Danish C-47 returned home on 30 October.

D. UN AIR TRANSPORT BASE, N'DJILI:

16. Aircraft Serviceability 31 October:

The serviceability of aircraft as per 1 November was as follows:

<u>Types of a/c</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	<u>Unserviceable</u>
C-47	10	7
C-119 (Italian)	5	1
C-119 (Norwegian)	1	0
C-119 (Canadian)	0	2
Otter	1	3
Beaver	4	0
H-19	8	4 + 1 @

@) Captured by Katangese Force

Detachments

On 31 October a/c were detached as follows:

	<u>C-47</u>	<u>C-119</u>	<u>Otter/Beaver</u>	<u>Helicopter</u>
Albertville	3	-	1	3
Bukavu	2	-	-	-
Elisabethville	-	-	-	3
Luluabourg	2	-	4	3
Stanleyville	1	-	-	-

17. Base Operations Wing

Reference is made to previous progress reports concerning:

- A. Officers for Base Ops
- B. Flying Safety Officer
- C. Marshalling Team
- D. Military Police Detachment
- E. Navigation Officer

Every effort is made to obtain some of these services from within our own resources.

18. C-47 Squadron

A reduction in flying hours is accountable by unserviceability of aircraft damaged in the Katanga operation.

Three Indian Air Force crew members arrived from India during the month and were integrated into the C-47 Squadron.

19. C-119 Squadron

No serious incidents or particular difficult problems are to report,

20. Light Aircraft Squadron

There are no incidents or problems of serious nature to report for this month.

21. Helicopter Squadron

Helicopter No. 637 made a forced landing near Niamba due to engine cut-out. A special report on the matter will be made by the helicopter representative.

During the period there has been insufficient missions for all helicopter pilots and the newly arrived Danish pilots have remained in Leopoldville unoccupied. They will be repatriated soonest. Lt Hovden and W/O Thers who were taken prisoner in Jadotville were released on 26 October.

22. Technical Wing

Fire fighting equipment still remains a problem. Requisitions have been placed to cover all requirements.

27. C-119 The serviceability of the nine C-119 in October was 61.5%. Two periodic inspections and eight post flight inspections and some repairs were carried out.
28. C-47 Serviceability 61.1%. Four periodic inspections, one engine change and many repairs were carried out during the month. UN aircraft No. 219 was sent to Air France to be repaired. The closing of the border between Leo and Brazzaville makes it impossible to supply parts necessary to get the aircraft in a serviceable condition again whereby 219 is still at Air France.
29. Light Aircraft Serviceability 50%. This low figure is partly due to the difficulties with the engines' oil consumption which increased to a high figure and partly due to lack of spare engines and lack of parts. Due to difficulties in obtaining parts an Otter aircraft has been a hangar queen for the last seven months but increased efforts are being made to obtain the ordered parts.
30. Helicopters: Serviceability rate during the month was 56%. One 800 hours, one 700 hours and two 100 hours inspections were carried out. One helicopter was badly damaged near Albertville. Salvage action is being carried out.
31. J-29 Swedish Jet Fighters: Serviceability rate extremely good. (100%) Squadron stationed at Luluabourg. Biggest problem is re-fuelling of aircraft.
32. F.86E Ethiopian Jet Fighters: Serviceability rate 72.3%. Squadron stationed at N'Djili.
33. Canberra Indian Light Bombers: Serviceability rate 98%. Five 25 hours inspections carried out. The introduction of Canberras into the Congo operation is creating many problems maintenance-wise and support-wise. Many problems regarding their supplies are still to be solved. The most difficult problem at the moment is the support of high pressure oxygen as this is not available in the Congo. The consumption of H.P. oxygen is great and as the nearest place, in this political situation, is Nairobi where it can be obtained but the supply will be difficult and expensive. Another problem is the maintenance of electronics, the ejection seats and parachutes.

For (H. A. MORRISON) A/C
AIR COMMANDER

Distribution:

Force Commander	1	UN HQ, New York	6
COS	1	Chief Air Eng Officer	2
DCOS	1	Base Commander, N'Djili	25
Air Commander	1	Movement Control	1
Deputy Air Commander	2	ICAO Mission	2
Chief Air Ops Officer	2	Charter Companies	8
Air Info and Stat Officer	2	Chief Admin. Officer	6
Chief Air Admin Officer	6		

AHQ/6005/12/ADMIN


12 February 1962

To: See Distribution

From: Air Commander

Subject: AMENDMENT TO PROGRESS REPORT NO. 12 COVERING DECEMBER 1961

1. The attached supersedes page No. 8 of the subject report.



(S.G.H. NORSTROM)
ACTING AIR COMMANDER

Distribution:

Force Commander
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
Air Commander
Deputy Air Commander
Chief Air Ops Officer
Chief Air Admin Officer
Chief Fighter Ops Officer
Air Info and Stat Officer

UN HQ, New York
Chief Air Eng. Officer
Base Commander, N'Djili
Movement Control
ICAO Mission
Charter Companies
Chief Admin Officer

26. Helicopter

The serviceability rate during December was 85.3%, with 11 aircraft in use. Three 100-hour inspections were carried out. Two engine changes have not yet been completed.

27. Light Aircraft

The serviceability rate was 47.1% with four Otters and two Beavers in use. Two Beaver aircraft are stored due to maximum flying time. There is still no decision on replacement aircraft for the Beaver.

28. No. 1 Squadron F-86F


The serviceability rate was 88.8%. The unit has four aircraft. One 50-hour inspection was carried out.

29. No. 5 Squadron

The serviceability rate was 82.7%. The unit has six aircraft and has done two 50-hour inspections during the month. A number of bullet holes has been repaired.

30. No. 22 Squadron J-29

The serviceability rate was 82.6%; unit establishment is five aircraft. Two inspections were carried out. The unit is now carrying out repair of bullet holes in the aircraft.



(S.G.H. NORSTROEM)
ACTING AIR COMMANDER

Distribution:

Force Commander	1	UN HQ, New York	6
Chief of Staff	1	Chief Air Eng. Officer	2
Deputy Chief of Staff	1	Base Commander, N'Djili	25
Air Commander	1	Movement Control	1
Deputy Air Commander	2	ICAO Mission	2
Chief Air Ops Officer	2	Charter Companies	8
Chief Air Admin Officer	6	Chief Admin Officer	6
Chief Fighter Ops Officer	3		
Air Info and Stat Officer	2		

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IN THE CONGO

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REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

Aril

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

30 December 1961


A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet :

1. Reference is made to attached signal from HQ Katanga. The following information has been obtained from Colonel Shapiro U.S.A.F. and Colonel Stagner U.S. Military Attaché who was an eye-witness. The crew unfortunately has returned to their present unit.

- Point one. No comment except to point out that 1546Z is approaching night fall and increased concern of crew.
- Point two. 45 minutes is about 30 minutes too long if unloading crew in position and trucks organized.
- Point three. Absolutely incorrect. Crew involved in off loading throughout. For first 20 minutes by themselves.
- Point four. Irrelevant.
- Point five. Personnel did not show up for first 20 minutes. Interest of troops was apparently generated when it was determined that a shipment of rum was on board for them.

Point six.

Colonel Stagner was involved in this and states emphatically that there was no fuss made by either he or U.S. Consulate. The Consulate advised him that 3 Mobiloil employees would be sent to airport for return to Léo. On arrival they were requested to produce travel orders from HQ Katanga. They were not in possession of such papers and were quite properly refused airlift. Stagner then advised them to return to U.S. Consulate.



(H. A. MORRISON) A/C
AIR COMMANDER

HM:hd

encl.

**SECRET
ROUTINE**

CANADIAN CIPHER

F 231830Z

FM HQ KAT COMD EL

TO ONUC LEO

BT

SECRET Q1021 FOR FORCE COMDR FROM RAJA

YOUR FC769 OF 22 DEC. COMPLAINT FROM USAF LIAISON OFFICER HAS
BEEN FURTHER INVESTIGATED AND FACTS ARE AS UNDER

FIRSTLY THE PLANE LANDED AT 1440Z AND LEFT EVILLE AT 1546Z
AS REPORTED BY CONTROL TOWER

SECONDLY UNLOADING TOOK EXACTLY 45 MINUTES

THIRDLY NO MEMBER OF THE CREW HELPED IN UNLOADING

FOURTHLY IT WAS RAINING HEAVILY AT THE TIME OF UNLOADING

FIFTHLY 20 BALUBA LABOURERS PLUS GURKHA DOGRA AND AIR OPS
PERSONNEL HELPED IN UNLOADING

SIXTHLY IN THIS COMPLAINT EYE GATHER THAT THERE IS SOMETHING
MORE THAT THAT MEETS THE EYE. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT EFFORTS
WERE MADE TO TAKE ON BOARD 2 BELGIAN AND 1 ITALIAN NATIONAL FOR
CARRIAGE TO LEO BUT THIS WAS PREVENTED BY OUR SECURITY STAFF AT
THE AIRFIELD AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THIS HQ

BT

37/23/BB/232241Z DEC 61

SECRET

To Air Commodore

*I would like
your comments on
this cable*

Sinc 26/12

*Dist. 2 copies to Eville
1 " Col. Lovestad
1 " Air Comdt.*

3rd January

2

To Headquarters, Katanga Command
From Force Commander
Subject SPECIAL MISSION - LT. COL. L. LOVESTAD

1. Lt. Col. Lovestad has been ordered to proceed to Elisabethville by me to act as Commanding Officer of the Airbase. He will be in control of all elements associated with Air Operations including Air Movement Control. He will be responsible for providing the necessary liaison with ICAO representatives. Further specific duties will be as follows:-

- To look into the administrative set-up at the airbase directly connected with Air Operations.
- To consider adequacy of accommodation for Air Operations personnel including ICAO.
- To consider the effectiveness of loading and unloading arrangements and general handling of aircraft.
- To check Air Ops and ICAO transport arrangements and to secure necessary transport for this purpose.

2. Furthermore, he is authorized to remedy any other deficiencies with a view to improving the efficiency of the Air Operations with regard to safety and security.

3. Your cooperation with Lt. Col. Lovestad in his mission and your assistance in fulfilling the remedial action he proposes is expected.

Gue

(S. Mac Rein) Lt. Gen.
FORCE COMMANDER

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

PRIORITY.

To : Gen. MacEoin.
From : Bunche
Date : 30 Dec. 61.
No. : 9217

SECRET

Please submit details of temporary detention of the RCAF
Yukon aircraft at Ndjili by the congolese authorities earlier this
month.

*Reply to you
on 12 Jan 1962
at Ndjili*

c.c. Dr. Linner.

12/1/62

Report

Interference with Operation of RCAF Yukon Aircraft by Congolese on 20 Nov 61

1. On 19 Nov an RCAF Yukon aircraft arrived in Leo from Pisa. It carried approx 30,000 lb general UN cargo including clothing, spare engines & miscellaneous cargo. The aircraft was a preliminary trial flight to determine the feasibility of using these large capacity aircraft on the Pisa-Leo route. Prior notification of its flight had been given many days ahead of its arrival. The aircraft remained overnight & was scheduled to depart 0800 Z on 20 Nov.
2. At approx 0730 Z the Air Commander and others of his staff arrived at NDW 11 to discuss the mission with the crew & to see its departure. In addition the previous Base commander was on repatriation to Italy and a number of his working associates were there to bid him well. Upon arrival at NDW 11 it was found the aircraft was under armed guard of Police & civilian security personnel of Congolese Gov't. The crew were in the terminal building trying to convince the airport manager & others that the aircraft was RCAF and that it was on an official mission. Flight logs of the previous days journey from Pisa were produced

but airport & Police officials refused to accept these as any proof the aircraft had come from Pisa.

The ONUC Air Commander intervened and attempted to convince the Congolese that the aircraft was RC-7 and authorized to be in Leo. He was in the airport terminal building doing this when a platoon of para-commandos on the double, raced through the building & out to the airport tarmac & lined up in front of the aircraft. Their automatic weapons were uncased & they surrounded the aeroplane and adopted a menacing attitude to those people in the area.

Much jabbering ensued and it seems that an anonymous telephone call had informed the Congolese that the aircraft was a Russian one falsely painted with Canadian identification, and that was carrying arms & ammunition to Katanga. The Air Commander meanwhile had telephoned Dr Ginnet & contact was made with Gen Mobutu & other senior Central Gov't personnel. The Air Commander went aboard the aircraft to take the Congolese airport officials to see the interior of the aircraft & its cargo. While boarding & in the aircraft he was several times jabbed in the ribs with a sten gun in the hands of para commandos. The same treatment was

accorded other senior ^{UN} officers who were standing about outside the aircraft. Shortly after all persons near the aircraft were ordered by the para commandos back to the terminal & the aircraft remained under heavy guard.

About two hours later an officer sent out by Gen Mobutu arrived and in a very few minutes the para commandos were dispersed, and the aircraft released to start its mission.

The unwillingness of airport officials and para commandos ^{officer} to accept any assurance from the UN Air Commander & others in authority, and the rude & irresponsible conduct of the para-commandos has resulted in a decision by Canada not to employ these high capacity & most useful aircraft on the UN support flights from Kisumu. The restriction on the use of these aircraft into Luo is likely to remain for as long as there is any possibility of interference & irresponsible acts by troops who were not even supposed to be on the airport.

At no time during this episode was there any evidence of UN troops who were supposed to be at N'DUKI for reasons of ensuring airport security and non-interference by outside sources.



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Np 1001/19/OPS

29 Dec 61

A: Chief of Air Ops

DE: Chief of Mil Ops


OBJET: POSITIONING OTTER AIRCRAFT AT KAMINA

1 The Force Commander desires that an OTTER aircraft be positioned at KAMINA with immediate effect. This aircraft will be used for recce purposes only.

2 Please confirm.

cc: Force Commander ✓

Chief of Staff


Lt Col
Chief of Military Operations

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
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UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE N° 1
LEOPOLDSVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDSVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

16 December, 1961

A: Mr. H.S. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

De: E.G. Lanser, Chief Procurement Officer

Objet: Equipment - Air Operations

1. Concerning equipment and supplies required by the Air Transport Force, I would inform you that never have any requisitions for such material been refused or action thereon unduly delayed.

2. Reference firefighting equipment, all requisitions received have been filled, with the exception of a requisition for chemical charges which was raised 5 July 1961. Ordnance requested that the requirement be revised September 1961, in view of the fact that the models of fire extinguishers for which the charges were requested were not held at Ndjili. Finally, on 20 November 1961, this requisition was cancelled by agreement with the Ordnance Depot, as they had been unable to get any information from Ndjili. The Senior Ordnance Officer reports that Ordnance do not have any outstanding requests for firefighting equipment for the air transport force.

3. When discussing fuel problems with the Air Commander possibly six or seven months ago, I recommended to him that a detailed requisition should be submitted for refueling tankers (Bowsers). However, it was not until 26 September 1961 that a firm request was made by Air Operations, and New York were cabled immediately to obtain three Bowsers to be flown into the Congo. New York raised Assist Letter on the United States Minister for the three units to be procured through U.S. Air Force, Westover Air, but on 20 October 1961 information was received from Pisa that USAF had directed that our requisition and the Assist Letter be returned for processing as operation or special request by United Nations. Subsequently, New York cabled 24 October advising that the cost of the Bowsers was \$25,000 each, plus \$25,000 for air shipment, and requested that we endeavour to make satisfactory alternative refueling arrangements. When in Pisa in early November, a Procurement Officer (Mr. Abelafio) discussed this matter with oil companies, who agreed to study whether or not they could make refueling units available to their associate

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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

16 December 1961

A : Mr. H.S. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer
De : N.G. Lanser, Chief Procurement Officer
Objet : Equipment - Air Operations

- 2 -

companies in the Congo. This matter has been continuously pursued but to date no Bowers have materialised. It is understood that such equipment that is available to us in the Congo is in very poor condition and in view of the present urgent situation I am endeavouring to ascertain if suitable equipment is available in East Africa which could be moved into the Congo with the minimum of delay.

R. ED

8.11

Act

00:17 00:59

YC7 NY 40 17 0002Z ;

LTF

ONUC

LEO V

8889 MACEOIN FROM RIKHYE STOP ENSURE THAT RCAF SHUTTLE CREW KANO IS
ADVISED OF CONGO BRAZZAVILLE CANCELLATION OF OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE
OF ALL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF ONUC STOP THIS APPLIES TO
RCAF SCHEDULED FLIGHTS AS WELL "

COL 8889 "

RE: ID
C

17 00:59

YC7 NY 48 17 88822 ;

LTV

ONUC

LID V

8889 NACGIN FROM RIKHYE STOP ENSURE THAT ACAF SHUTTLE CREW KANO IS
ADVISED OF CONGO BRAZZAVILLE CANCELLATION OF OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE
OF ALL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF ONUC STOP THIS APPLIES TO
RACF SCHEDULED FLIGHTS AS WELL "

COL 8889 "

FIGHTER OPS ORDER No 6Appendices:

- "A" Equipment held by the two ACT's
- "B" Signals instructions

Information

1. Two Air Control Teams of the Fighter Group ONUC Air Division are in the Congo for use in the close support role of the Fighter Aircraft, and are now equipped for operations. They are to be employed according to the following instructions issued by UN HQ New York.

"The UN jet Air Force will not be used in a supporting role without the authority of the Air Commodore under instructions from Dr Linner and the Force Commander STOP The Un Jet Force will be ready to take action if at any time by day our forces are in danger in accordance with OPS 1867 repeated hereunder STOP Planning will commence at once to provide for the latter contingency STOP The possible use of this Air Force will not be conveyed to the ANC in the form of a threat or otherwise except on authority from Dr Linner and the Force Commander STOP Repeat of OPS 1867 as follows: following is the policy laid down by New York in relation to use of Jet Aircraft STOP All requests for air strikes must be cleared by this HQ STOP Quote STOP Authorisation is given to employ UN Jet Aircraft in aerial action against any Congolese troops which are endangering the lives of UN troops by actually attacking them or by moving directly against them with hostile intent STOP Such action is to be taken only as a last resort and should be limited to those measures clearly necessary to the defence of ONUC troops and other personnel STOP No action of this kind is to be ordered, however, without prior warning in ample time, to the authorities concerned STOP Due care should be exercised to avoid casualties among non involved civilians." End of citation.

Intention

2. To deploy the two ACT's in the Congo in close support role of the Fighter Aircraft.

Execution3. Deployment

- No 1 ACT commanded by Capt M.M. Chopra will operate with the Fighter Group A/C of Nos 5 and 22 Squadrons. Until further orders it will remain in N'Djili.
4. No 2 ACT commanded by Capt G. Banerjee will operate with the Indian Indep. Brigade Group in Katanga. It will move to E'ville under orders of this HQ.

Command & Control

5. No 1 ACT will be under Command and Control of this HQ through No 5 Squadron.
6. No 2 ACT will be under the Operational Control of the Indian Indep. Brigade Group.
7. Relief and Change-over will be under instructions of this HQ.

Equipment

8. Both ACT's possess the equipment as per Appendix "A".

Signals

9. Signals instructions are at Appendix "B".

Operational Procedure

10. Planning of Targets. The Indian Brigade Commander will apprise the ACT Unit Commander of the likely targets as planned by him. He will also brief him of the type of operations that will be carried out on arrival of ACT. Fighter Ops of this HQ will also be given a plan well in advance by the Brigade Commander.

11. Preplanned Demands. During Operations, the Indian Indep. Brigade will place preplanned demands with Military Operations HQ ONUC by 1600 hrs GMT daily for the next days operations.
12. Immediate demands. The Immediate Demands will be placed direct to the Operations Room wherever the Fighter Aircraft are based. Fighter Operations in turn will obtain acceptance of these demands from the Senior Fighter Operations Officer who will be nominated and will be available at the Base of Operations. The Army authorities will ensure that these demands are kept to the minimum.
13. Close Support Control. One pilot of No 5/22 Squadron will be positioned with the ACT for directing Aircraft onto the target, as required by the Army. All pilots are to be fully trained in this role. Move of pilots for this task will be ordered by this HQ on commencement of Operations.
14. Briefing & Debriefing. OC No 1 ACT will brief pilots prior to each sortie and will also debrief them personally on completion of the sortie.
15. Opsums. Opsums are to be sent immediately after each sortie but not later than one hour delay, to Fighter Ops ONUC HQ.
At 1800 hrs daily, a consolidated Opsum will be sent to Fighter Ops ONUC HQ.
16. At 1800 hrs daily, the Fighter Units will also despatch Opsums to Fighter Ops ONUC HQ.
17. Sitreps. OC No 2 ACT will arrange to obtain sitreps and will ensure distribution to all Fighter Units and Fighter Ops ONUC HQ.
18. Codes & Ciphers. All messages in relation to Operations will be in code.
19. Administration. OC ACT's will be responsible to this HQ for their own administration.
20. Logistics. For Logistic cover including accomodation, allowances, rations, etc, the ACT's will be under the respective Air Detachment Commanders.
21. Maintenance. Maintenance of Radio Equipment will be carried by the Units with the help of the nearest signals unit.
22. Vehicles will be maintained under instructions of the Base Commanders.

A P P E N D I X "A"

EQUIPMENT HELD BY THE TWO ACT'S

1. Each Air Control Team holds the following equipment:
 - a) Transport
 - One 3/4 Ton truck
 - Two Jeeps
 - b) Signals Equipment
 - One ANGRC - 19 Set
 - One 19 H.P.
 - One 19 L.P.
 - One V.H.F. Set
 - One TAC - R Broadcast Set
 - One Generator
 - Batteries
2. The equipment is mounted on vehicles to facilitate mobility.

S E C R E T

A P P E N D I X "B"

SIGNALS INSTRUCTIONS

1. Both Air Control Teams will establish contact with each other on ANGRG - 19 set and report satisfactory Operation to Fighter Ops at this HQ.
2. Air Control Teams will liaise with the responsible army formations, and establish contact with them for operations. The channels of communication established will be reported to Fighter Ops at this HQ.
3. The Air Control Teams will ensure that their V.H.F. sets are fully crystallised and Operative with the Fighter aircraft, prior to deployment. They must ensure that a set R/T procedure is worked out with the Fighter Aircrew before-hand.
4. The Unit Commanders of the ACT are responsible to ensure that, in case of failure, they will make use of Army Communication Channels.
5. Opsums and Sitreps will be sent to all concerned by W/T in code.
6. A standard Opsums form will be supplied by this HQ.

S. Lampell
(S. Lampell) Colonel,
Chief Fighter Ops Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

Order to: All Fighter Group Units

Info to : All Base Commanders
All Air Detachment Commanders
Force Commander (2 copies)
Chief of Staff
Air Commander
Deputy Air Commander
Chief Air Transports Officer
Air Telecom. Officer

MOVEMENT ORDER - LIST

Lt. Gen. S. Mac Eoin

Lt. Col. KINNMAN

Capt. T.O'Neill

Sgt. L. Rodrigue

Comdr K. O'Brien.

Capt HAMERCRANTZ.

Air

for Enelle
1000Z 8/12/61

SECRET

Aut
No 4004/7/Q
HEADQUARTERS
LEOPOLDSVILLE COMMAND
6 DEC 61

To

MA to the Dy Force Commander
3 QONR
8 Eth Bn

Subject:- AIRCRAFT FOR GOING TO KITONA

Reference this HQ letter of even No dated 29 Nov 61,
addressed to Chief of Mil Ops and copy to you.

The Aircraft asked for vide this HQ letter under reference
will be available. The take off time from N'DJILI Airport will
be 0700 Z on 8 Dec 61.


Major
D.A. & JMG

SECRET

SECRET

No 4004/7/Q
HEADQUARTERS
LEOPOLDVILLE COMMAND
7 DEC 61

To

3 QONR
8 Eth Bn

Subject:- AIRCRAFT FOR GOING TO KITONA

Reference this HQ letter of even Nos dated 29 Nov 61 and
6 Dec 61.

The trip to KITONA on 8 Dec 61 has been cancelled.

Copy to:-

 Major
DAA & QMG

MA to ~~XXXXX~~ Dy Force Commander
Chief of Air Ops

SECRET

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 775 MOV
Dated : 6th December 61

To : Chief of Staff
From : Chief Movement Control Officer

Subject : Use of Helicopters

1. It is reported for your information and necessary action that one Helicopter flew from LEO to BRAZZAVILLE on 4 December 1961 without any authorisation from the Movement Control office.

2. If there is any change in the policy set forth on the orders of Force Commander, I may please be informed so that instructions issued vide our letter No 761 MOV of 27 October 1961, are cancelled.



Lt Col
Chief Movement Control Officer
(A.A.K. YUSUF ZAI)

cc: MA to Force Commander

AIR

" Luxlines ",
Luxembourg Inter-Continental Airlines S. A.
Luxembourg (C. D.)



Belgian Office :
Shell Building
Ravenstein
Brussels

Cables :
Luxlines - Brussels
Phone : 12.17.83
12.17.84

Dec. 1st. 1961.

Maj. K. O'Brien
Military Assistant to
Force Commander
U.N.O. Leopoldville.

Sir,

I take the liberty in requesting your permission to utilize your air transportation for a trip to Elizabethville.

An Aircraft belonging to my company has been held in Katanga for the past year under fabricated charges. The same has now been "liberated" but essential documents, logs and equipment are still in Elizabethville and must be salvaged before we can recommission the aircraft.

On my last visit to that place where I went to plead with the authorities I was imprisoned for seven days without being charged and eventually released.

I trust that your protection will spare me the renewal of such an unpleasant experience.


Yours faithfully

A. Orkin
Man. director.

FC does NOT
approve this request
HOB comml
MAFC
2 Dec 61.

Appendix "A"


ORGANISATION CHART HEADQUARTERS UN AIR DIVISION



ORGANISATION CHART FIGHTER OPERATIONS GROUP

Chief Fighter Operations Officer
(Col. S. Lampell)

Senior Fighter Operations Officer
(Wg. Cdr. A.S. Bhawani)



SECRET

NO 4004 / 7 / Q
HEADQUARTERS
LEOPOLDVILLE COMMAND
29 NOV 61

To

Chief of Mil Ops

Subject:- AIRCRAFT FOR GOING TO KITONA

1 It is requested that an aircraft may please be arranged for transporting the undermentioned officers from LEOPOLDVILLE to KITONA and back on Friday the 8th of Dec '61:-

Maj Gen G.L. YACOB	... Deputy Force Commander
Brig SARTAJ SINGH, CM	... Commander Leo Command
Lt Col AEM KAVANAGH with one officer	... CO 3 QONR
Lt Col TEZERA FORPE	... CO 8 Eth Bn

2 The plane will be required to take off from N'DJILI airfield at 0700 Z on 8 Dec '61 and return to LEOPOLDVILLE taking off from KITONA at about 1600 Z the same day.


MAJOR
BRIGADE MAJOR

Copy to:-

1. MA to The Deputy Force Commander. ✓
2. Chief of Air Ops.
3. 3 QONR
4. 8 Eth Bn.... You are requested to inform your
.... Coy at KITONA about the arrival of
.... above offrs so that relevant
.... reception arrangements can be made
.... by them.

SECRET



CABINET
DU PREMIER MINISTRE

N° 2809/61

(CAB/P.M.)

Liaison aérienne

Léo/Albertville.

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 Nov in which you informed me that it would not be possible for ONUC to continue transporting passengers on UN planes if they were not covered by insurances.

The date of departure of the Vice Prime Minister Mr. J. Sendwe is not yet fixed.

To ensure liaison between Aville and the capital I have just given instructions to the Company AIR-CONGO TO RESUME air traffic between these two cities in the shortest delay at the rate of 2 flights per week and if it can be done without any risks with stopovers at Lulu and Kabalo.

I will let you have the hours of the flights as Monsieur le Chargé de Mission, soon as they are established

Consideration
etc.

J'accuse réception de votre lettre du 19 novembre par laquelle vous m'informez qu'il n'est guère possible à votre Organisation de continuer à transporter des passagers à bord d'avions ONU non couverts par une assurance.

La date du voyage de Monsieur le Vice-Premier Ministre J. Sendwe n'est pas encore fixée.

Afin d'assurer une liaison entre Albertville et la capitale, je viens de donner instructions à la Compagnie AIR-CONGO de rétablir le trafic entre ces deux villes, le plus rapidement possible, à raison de deux vols par semaine et, si cela est réalisable sans risque, avec escales à Luluabourg et à Kabalo.

Je ne manquerai pas de vous faire connaître les horaires dès qu'ils seront établis.

Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Chargé de Mission, à l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE,

Cyrille ADOULA

Monsieur Sture Linnér
Chargé de la Mission de
l'ONU au Congo
Léopoldville

DE-41 = 300 sl/hours

C119 = 200 sl/hours

T29 = 2500 lbs/hours

Comb = 6000 " "

F86 = 2500 " "

Are

Cruising high.

Cable ONNS6936

deals with reply to NY.

15/8 - 30/9

All cables

Situation at Kaminia.

Fuel

$100/130 = 142.722 \text{ lbs}$ DC-4 - C-47 - DC-6
 $115/145 = 7.000 \text{ lbs}$ C 119
 $\overline{TP1} = 354.000 \text{ lbs}$ SW F-29 + Cambera
 $\overline{TP4} = 58.000 \text{ lbs}$ Ethiopian F-86 F.

II This amount of fuel should give the following possibilities:

a. The transport fleet should be able to operate in to Kaminia for 6 to 10 days pending load and flying distances.

b. The C 119 a/c could only use the airfield as a emergency fuel stop.

c. The F-29 and Cambera's could after adjustment to the fuel control, operate in the TP-1 for a 100% effort for 14 days.

d. The F86F's could out of 58,000 lbs get around 16 sorties, ~~mean~~ that is one week flying

Situation at Lulu

Fuel

$$100/130 = 49.26 \text{ drums} = 985.200 \text{ ltr.}$$

$$115/145 = 3160 \text{ ---} = 632.000 \text{ ltr}$$

$$JP-1 = 0$$

$$JP-4 = 38.000 \text{ ltr.}$$

The status on JP-4 is: ^a 1000 drums on the way on barges from Leo to Port Franequi.

3 rail tanker on route from Port Franequi to Lulu, amount = $38.000 \times 3 = 114.000 \text{ ltr.}$

This amount of fuel ^{available} should therefore give the following possibilities:

a. The transport fleet could operate from Lulu for 12-20 days supplying A. Will, Kamina and Euill, around 5 sorbiers a day from Lulu.

b. The C119, should be able to get around 100 sorbiers of a 6 hrs return trip. out of this amount of fuel.

c. The fighters could operate on a 20% basis for 2-5 days.

d. If the waterway and rail link could operate normally supplying Lulu with 100.000 ltr a week the fighter % could operate on 100% for a indefinite period.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM


.....3 August..... 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : Inspection of Dove Aircraft, N'Djili

1. As requested, a cursory examination of the two Congolese Dove aircraft located at N'Djili has been made.

... 2. From the attached lists, you will readily appreciate that a complete overhaul would be required to put either aircraft into a flyable state. I would point out also that this examination was confined almost entirely to the external configuration and did not look for such troubles as corrosion, etc., which is undoubtedly present on the flying control cables, etc.

3. I do not have the means at my disposal to provide a cost estimate for it, but it would be considerable.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

10. Oil filter and cap missing.
11. Oil tank cowling missing.
12. Oil pump missing.
13. Hyd pump missing.
14. Suggest complete engine overhaul.

Nose Landing Gear

1. Seems to be ok but cannot determine capability without retraction test.

Left Landing Gear

1. Emergency airlines cut.
2. Hyd line cut.
3. Trunion pinions damaged.
4. Trunion bolts and nuts missing.
5. Complete gear assy dismantled.
6. Electrical connections cut.
7. Junction box cover missing and box damaged.
8. Landing wheel doors missing.
9. Gear swivel joints assy missing.

Right Landing Gear

1. Complete gear assy dismantled.
2. Emergency air lines cut.
3. Hyd lines cut.
4. Electrical connections cut.
5. Trunion bolts missing.
6. Trunion pinions missing.
7. Junction box damaged.
8. Gear door missing (Wheel well).
9. Gear swivel joint assy damaged.
10. Junction box cover missing.

Number 2 Engine

1. Complete prop assy missing.
2. Ignition harness all cut up.
3. Spark plugs missing.
4. All cylinder's heads missing.
5. Lower half cowling missing.
6. Oil, line's missing to engine.
7. Fuel lines missing from tank to engine.
8. Oil filter and cap missing.
9. Oil pump missing.
10. Magneto's missing.
11. Hyd. pump missing.
12. Intake pipes missing.
13. Exhaust stacks missing.
14. Prop governor missing.
15. Oil tank cowling missing.
16. Suggest complete engine overhaul.

Number 1 Engine

1. Complete prop assy missing.
2. Two cylinder heads missing.
3. All spark plugs missing.
4. All intake pipes missing.
5. All exhaust stacks missing.
6. Oil lines missing from tank to engine and assy.
7. Fuel lines missing from tank to engine and assy.
8. Prop governor missing.
9. Lower engine cowling missing.

Left Wing

1. Hole in left wing leading edge.
2. Wing fillet missing.
3. Flap and elevator cables appear to be broken.

Fuselage

1. Aircraft skin on bottom of fuselage bent and torn in several places.
2. Inspection plates missing.
3. Rudder and vertical stabilizer cables broken and corroded.
4. Tail skin badly bent.
5. Battery missing and cables.
6. Cargo door handle broken right side.

Right Wing

1. Wing fillet missing.
2. Wing tip bottom side badly dented.
3. Bent leading edge.
4. Inspection plate missing bottom side.

Inner Fuselage

1. C/P side window broken.
2. All radio equipment missing.
3. All instruments missing.
4. C/P control pedals missing.
5. Four passenger's seats missing.
6. Two upper escape hatches missing.
7. Floor matting missing.
8. Seats remaining in aircraft torn upholstery.

Summary

Suggest complete IRAN on aircraft. Impossible to record all discrepancies because cannot determine what all equipment should be on aircraft.

AIRCRAFT D-16

Right Wing

1. Wing tip missing.
2. Aileron and tab missing.
3. Flap assy missing.
4. Fillet missing (Wing).
5. Complete landing gear assy missing.
6. Fuel tank access covers missing (Underside).
7. Inboard underside of landing edge missing.
8. Complete engine and prop assy missing.
9. Engine control cables disconnected.
10. Latch cover missing on access cover leading edge.
11. Emergency gear air lines and electrical leads cut.
12. Electrical leads to navigation light cut.
13. Landing gear fairing doors missing.
14. Electrical leads and canon plugs to engine damaged.
15. Engine intake blast tube missing (Leading edge).
16. Electrical leads to terminal strip damaged (Leading edge).
17. Engine oil tank missing.
18. Stress panels under fuel tanks missing.
19. Fuel intake vent damaged.
20. Fuel tank bonding line disconnected.

Left Wing

1. Flap assy missing.
2. Aileron and tab missing.
3. Wing tip missing.
4. Electrical lead to nav. light broken.

5. Landing light missing (Underside center).
6. Complete landing gear assy missing.
7. Landing gear fairing doors missing.
8. Electrical, air, and hyd lines to gear cut.
9. Fuel tank access plates missing (Underside).
10. Stress panels under fuel tanks missing.
11. Wing fillet missing.
12. Center flap hinge point inspection plate missing (Top).
13. Complete engine and prop assy missing.
14. Engine oil tank missing.
15. Engine control cables disconnected.
16. Engine lines and electrical canon plugs damaged.
17. Fuel tank bonding wire disconnected.
18. Engine intake blast tube missing. (Leading edge).
19. Inboard under side of leading edge missing.

Fuselage

1. Nose cone missing (Underside).
2. Forward nose gear fairing door missing.
3. Outside air temp bulb damaged (Underside forward).
4. Battary and cables missing.
5. Hor stab center hinge point inspection panel missing (Underside) both sides.
6. Hor stab has damaged skin.
7. Right elevator push-pull rod disconnected.
8. Complete tail cone missing.
9. Left elevator assy missing.
10. Left hor. stab. tip missing.
11. Bearing broken on left elevator tab mech.
12. Rudder trim tab missing.

13. Elevator control cables slack.
14. Access panel missing (Right underside fuselage).
15. Antennas missing.

Inside

1. Complete instrument panel missing.
2. All radio equipment missing.
3. Pilot and co-pilot seats missing.
4. Right control column missing.
5. Right vent missing (Window).
6. Escape hatch missing.
7. All passenger seats missing.
8. Cargo floor missing.
9. Complete interior is a mess.
10. Impossible to record all discrepancies.
11. Suggest complete overhaul and IRAN inspection.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
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BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE

AHQ/6201/1/OPS


31 July 1961.

Colonel Miller
Colonel Carroll

INSPECTION OF DOVE AIRCRAFT - N'DJILI

1 General MacEoin has requested me to determine the present status of the two Dove aircraft at N'Djili. As per my recent verbal request would you have your engineering personnel do a cursory examination of these aircraft on behalf of the Force Commander, ONUC.

2 This information will enable me to assess the feasibility of raising them to a serviceable state and the approximate cost of such action.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE

AH2/6201/1/OPS

le 31 juillet 1961

Au Colonels Miller et Carroll

INSPECTION DES AERONEFS "DOVE" à N'DJILI

1. Le Général Mac Eoin m'a prié de déterminer l'état actuel des deux avions "Dove" qui se trouvent à N'Djili. Selon la demande verbale que je vous ai faite dernièrement, auriez-vous l'obligeance de faire faire un examen rapide de ces avions de la part du Commandant des Forces de l'ONUC par votre personnel du génie.

2. Ces renseignements me permettront d'évaluer la possibilité de les rendre utilisables et le coût approximatif d'une telle opération.


(H.A. Morrison) Général
Commandant des Forces Aériennes de l'ONUC

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGOUNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGOBOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLECONFIDENTIAL

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

.....12 August..... 1961.....

A : Force Commander
 De : Air Commander
 Objet : Airlift costs - policy

1. May I refer you to the decision you handed down at a meeting in your office a.m. 5 Aug 61. At that time you directed your staff to obtain accurate tonnage estimates and proper identification of the military stores which were to be returned to Tunis. Upon completion of this action, you further directed that the utmost discrimination was to be used in the selection of stores for airlift.

2. To date I have not received this information. I was advised verbally by the A/COS on Monday past that there was a requirement to airlift 50 tons of ammunition. I pointed out to him that this would cost the UN approximately \$ 140,000 and that in my opinion this was sufficient reason to question the airlift of the whole amount - particularly when the airlift of the Tunisians will have cost the staggering total of \$ 850,000, exclusive of the ammo lift. In the face of this, an attempt to save in the neighbourhood of \$ 100,000 surely is worthwhile.

3. A.m. 10 August, the problem was again discussed with the A/COS and it was agreed that in view of the pressure being applied by the Tunisian Brigade Commander we should present the case to UN New York. We would advise them of the Tunisian request for airlift, the cost to the UN for the operation and ask them for a decision, because of possible political pressures. The actual signal, of course, put the problem to UNHQ in such a manner that they had little or no choice but to agree to airlift - in fact, there was little purpose in sending it, except to box the undersigned. A side issue to this of some considerable importance is the method employed by the A/COS - surely, if for no other reason than common courtesy, he should have advised me of his intention to go against a firm agreement made with me only an hour or so before.


4. The approach taken on this problem has filled me with doubt as to what actual policy you wish me to pursue. Rightly or wrongly, I have assumed that the manner in which I have been handling the Air Transport Force has been generally in accord with your thinking. As described to you in my letter of 19 July, I am sure there are several avenues of action available to us by which the heavy costs of air transport can be reduced without affecting your emergency capabilities.

/Attached

... Attached find copies of letters which I have sent to the Chief of Logistics and Movement Control, which clearly depict the kind of action which I believe will reduce airlift costs and at the same time provide better service to all field forces.

5. In summation, therefore, I request advice from you as to what policy I am to follow. I can assure you that, as up to the present, I am prepared and willing to give my utmost to provide you with an efficient Air Transport Force, but I must know in what direction I am to point. I might add at this time that I believe I have been acting in accord with the specific briefings I received from Dr. Bunche and Mr. Vaughan at UNHQ, both of whom expressed grave concern over the high costs of airlift. This concern was repeated to me as recently as 10 August by Brigadier Rikhye.

6. I would request also that you advise me specifically if you wish me to pursue the action as indicated in my letters to Logistics and Movement Control.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

To : Bunche
From : Mac Eoin
Date : 10 Aug 61
N° : ONUC 4620

The Tunisian Bde has 50 tons of ordnance stores, which consists of ammunition, weapon and radio spare parts, for move to Tunis. The Bde Commander has requested airlift for these stores as his Government is pressing for the items.

The airlift involved would mean eight to ten sorties by UN DC4 aircraft. Movement by sea, due to the time factor involved, is not acceptable, and in addition, the shipping of such stores through Matadi is doubtful at present.

I recommend that under the circumstances the stores be lifted by air.

We are moving vehilces and other non-warlike stores by sea through Matadi. This still has to be negotiated with the Government here.

Your decision is required urgently.

cc: A/COS

S E C R E T

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : General Mac Eoin
From : Bunche
Date : 10 August 61
N° : 5563

Ref our 5114 and ONUC 4214 and 4620

1. Agree that Tunisian ammunition, weapons and radio spare parts should be airlifted to Tunis and vehicles should go by sea. We therefore approve the necessary 8 to 10 sorties by Unations DC4 aircraft Léo-Tunis, for this purpose. Clearances obtained previously for Tunisian repatriation should cover these flights. We should, however, be informed of ETD for each aircraft, and progress of operation.
2. Incidentally, are ordnance stores original Tunisian stock or replacements supplied by ONUC ?

cc: Dr. Linnér

8 August

1

Acting Chief of Staff, Chief of Movement Control, Chief of Military Ops.
Air Commander


Airlift of military stores

1. During the past two to three weeks, several changes in location of units have taken place within the military force. Such changes, of course, have been dictated by tactical requirements within the Congo and/or as a result of rotation and repatriation. In all such moves, I am requested to provide a large-scale airlift to move military stores based on rather vague or generalized estimates of the tonnages involved. This is not satisfactory. Airlift is a most expensive commodity and from a professional, as well as an economic, point of view, I am obligated to guard against its abuse.

2. On future operations of this type, I must insist that you provide accurate figures in order to prevent excessive assignment of airlift. Additionally, these estimates should be supported by a detailed breakdown of the stores to be moved in order that you can assess the legitimacy of the units' requests. I strongly recommend that you apply the following measurements to all future airlifts of this nature:

- a) Is it legitimate air cargo?
- b) If so, what is the sense of urgency? Can it be phased in with other airlift requirements in order to make full use of assigned aircraft. UN pays whether the aircraft is full or empty.
- c) For the items not urgently required and/or of a low cost value, why can't these be consigned to surface transport?

3. In order to add some substance to the foregoing, I have attached a small chart (Appendix 'A') showing some cost figures for a few typical flights frequently undertaken by the ONUC aircraft. I am sure you will agree that they are sufficiently significant to warrant the acceptance of one goal by all of us, i.e. airlift must only be used for high value or vitally required stores.


(N.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

From	To	a/c type	Av. load tons	Cost per trip (\$)	Cost per ton a/c used both ways	Cost per ton a/c used one way	Remarks
LEO	A'VILLE	DC4	6.5	5,320.00	410.00	820.00	104 cents \$435.00 per hr.
LEO	A'VILLE	C48	3	3,000.00	300.00	760.00	C48 costs \$420.00 per hr.
LEO	GOMA	DC4	6.5	5,002.00	392.00	783.00	
LEO	GOMA	C48	3	3,520.00	352.00	704.00	
LPO	STAN	DC4	6.5	4,122.00	317.00	634.00	
LEO	STAN	C48	3	3,000.00	300.00	600.00	
LEO	LOLU	DC4	7	2,910.00	208.00	416.00	
LEO	LOLU	C48	6	2,000.00	166.00	332.00	
LEO	TUNIS	DC4	6.5	18,520.00		2,367.00	

N.B. 1. From this table, it should be obvious that :

- aircraft must be made use of both ways
- cost per ton decreases with short-stage lengths. Therefore surface transport should be used to reduce distance of airlift wherever possible.
- airlift of stores over long distances (L60-Tunis) must be restricted to items of high value.

26 July

Chief of Logistics

Air Commander

INTERNAL AIRLIFT - Logistic Support

1. Up to present time airlift has been provided on a non-scheduled basis in support of the logistic program throughout the Tonga. As I am sure you readily appreciate this is a most expensive and inefficient way to operate an Air Transport Force. It creates a situation in which it is virtually impossible to make proper use of the airlift capacity which is available. It is therefore my intention to provide airlift on a scheduled basis to meet your logistic requirements.

2. In order to plan an effective schedule I require realistic figures for your office on which I can calculate the frequency of trips and the types of aircraft per area. In your calculations you should not include those tonnages of non-perishable goods which can be easily surface transported. These tonnage estimates should be able to stand on the basis that will be valid for a minimum period of 90 days. For the first 3 or 4 months a joint survey should take place monthly between your office and CAir Ops in order to make whatever adjustments are necessary as indicated by experience. On the occasions when scheduled airlift will not meet the demand, a special flight can be organized to clear the backlog.


3. To make this system operate effectively in addition to provide this office with estimates of tonnages you will also have to establish an effective priority system. This will ensure that "A" priority items move in the shortest possible time. Stores of a less urgent priority will be moved on a space available basis. I would like to discuss this priority system in detail with you.

4. As you no doubt appreciate there will likely be periods when an overriding requirement to move military forces for operational reasons could well have an effect on a percentage of scheduled flights. To be prepared for such conditions I would recommend that your planning figures make allowance for a five-day stockpile of non-perishable stores. Airlift required for items of a perishable nature will obviously be the last to be affected. You should also not lose sight of transportation available to you through use of existing surface and water vehicles to meet periods of reduced airlift schedules.

- 2 -

5. It is my intention that the conduct of air transport on a scheduled basis should begin by 31 Aug. In order to provide us with the necessary time to plan and organize schedules I must have your estimates of tonnages to be moved from source to consumer by 9 Aug 51.

6. I would appreciate early advice from you that the requested estimates will be made available as per para 5 above.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

NOTE VERBALE

Le Chargé de mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République du Congo et a l'honneur de se référer à la note N°12/5969/OI/C.31 qui lui a été adressée en date du 6 novembre 1961.

L'hélicoptère "Alouette" est en effet à l'aéroport de N'Djili mais étant donné qu'il n'a pas été utilisé pendant plusieurs mois nos experts militaires ont décidé qu'il fallait tout d'abord le remettre en état de voler. Les pièces de rechange qui étaient nécessaires sont déjà arrivées et nos techniciens sont en train de mettre au point l'hélicoptère en question. Nous espérons être à même de pouvoir rendre l'appareil aux Autorités congolaises avant la fin de la semaine prochaine.

Le Chargé de mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires étrangères l'assurance de sa haute considération.

Léopoldville, le 27 novembre 1961

Ministère des Affaires étrangères
de la République du Congo
Léopoldville



cc: A/Force Commander ✓ (With a request that the 6th floor be informed of exact date when this helicopter can be given back to Central Authorities and name of UN official who should be contacted).

A. R.

3

24 November 1

Mr J. Poujoulat
MA to Force Commander
Helicopter

To inform you that the helicopter which
is the subject of the attached correspondence
is at the moment under repairs. It will be
fully serviceable and ready to hand back to the
responsible authorities by next week.

K. O.

(K. O'Brien) Maj

3


No. 1001/ 'S /OPS

25 November 1

Senior Movement Control Officer
Chief of Staff

Checking of UN aircraft manifests in N'Djili

Movement Control in N'Djili will be instructed at once to take more than the normal precautions that no unauthorised person is permitted to travel in UN aircraft. Extra special attention will be paid to aircraft bound for Kindu or Aville. There is a possibility that a certain pressman may attempt to get to Kindu by UN aircraft. You would be responsible for ensuring that this instruction is fully carried out.

 Colonel
(J.J. Quinn)
A/COS

cc: Dr. Linner
Force Commander ✓

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

AHQ 6096/1 (Air/Cmdr)


22 November 1961

A : ☒ Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet :

AIRFIELD SECURITY

1. Several incidents have occurred recently which clearly point up the need for an urgent reappraisal of existing airfield security measures. I can state categorically that unless action is taken immediately to provide airfield security on an effective basis the airlift capability of ONUC is in jeopardy. I would further point out that the UN accepted the 3 fighter units on the basis that they would always be operated from a secure airfield.

2. May I be advised soonest as to your proposed action.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

c.c: Dr. Linner
COS
CAirTOps
CFighter Ops

23 November 1

Air Commander
Force Commander
Airfield Security

Reference your letter of 22 November AHQ 6096/1 (Air/Cmdr). Security of the airfields has been given as the primary task to our units. It is agreed that certain incidents which took place as of late suggested that we were not in full control of such places as Leopoldville and Luluabourg, but on examination the situation was not as bad as first reported. However, specific orders have been issued to Luluabourg that the primary task of the battalion located there is the security of the airfield. It will be impossible to guarantee that no future incidents will take place particularly at, for example, Leopoldville, due to the volume of civilian traffic. It is not feasible to fully seal off the airfield for UN use, nor would it be politically acceptable.

YB.

(G.L. Yaacob) Maj. Gen.
A/FC

AHQ 6096/1 (Air/Cmdr)

22 November 1

Force Commander

Air Commander

AIRFIELD SECURITY

1. Several incidents have occurred recently which clearly point up the need for an urgent reappraisal of existing airfield security measures. I can state categorically that unless action is taken immediately to provide airfield security on an effective basis the airlift capability of ONUC is in jeopardy. I would further point out that the UN accepted the 3 fighter units on the basis that they would always be operated from a secure airfield.

2. May I be advised soonest as to your proposed action.

(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

HAM/gb

c.c: Dr. Linner

✓SOS

CAirOps

CFighter Ops

23 November 1

Air Commander
Force Commander
Airfield Security

Reference your letter of 22 November AHQ 6096/1 (Air/Cmdr). Security of the airfields has been given as the primary task to our units. It is agreed that certain incidents which took place as of late suggested that we were not in full control of such places as Leopoldville and Luluabourg, but on examination the situation was not as bad as first reported. However, specific orders have been issued to Luluabourg that the primary task of the battalion located there is the security of the airfield. It will be impossible to guarantee that no future incidents will take place particularly at, for example, Leopoldville, due to the volume of civilian traffic. It is not feasible to fully seal off the airfield for UN use, nor would it be politically acceptable.

G. L. Jacob

(G. L. Jacob) Maj. Gen.
A/FC

cc: Dr. Linner OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO : BUNCH
FROM: YACOB
DATE: 23 Nov 61
No : ONUC

Action has been taken on complaint of Niger Representative regarding violation of civil aviation regulations involving UN aircraft number HP 324. The company operating this aircraft on charter to UN has been instructed to investigate the incident fully and has been reminded that their contract with UN provides for immediate cancellation of their employment if the conduct of their flight crews gives rise to complaints of this nature. The Chief ICAO Officer here has also been instructed to report this violation to the Licensing country concerned who, in the final analysis, are the authority to take action on such breaches of regulations.

cc: Dr. Linner

Draft

~~UNITATIONS~~ New York.

BUNCHE

YACOB

ONUC.

— ~~BUNCHE~~. ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON COMPLAINT

OF NIGER REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING ^{VIOLATION of CIVIL AVIATION} ~~AIR TRAFFIC PROCEDURE~~ REGULATIONS.

~~INCIDENT~~ INVOLVING UN AIRCRAFT NUMBER HP 324.

THE COMPANY OPERATING THIS AIRCRAFT ON CHARTER TO

UN ^{HAS} ~~HAVE~~ BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT

FULLY AND ^{HAS} ~~HAVE~~ BEEN REMINDED THAT THEIR CONTRACT

WITH UN PROVIDES FOR IMMEDIATE CANCELLATION OF THEIR

EMPLOYMENT IF THE CONDUCT OF THEIR FLIGHT CREWS

GIVES RISE TO COMPLAINTS OF THIS NATURE. THE

CHIEF ICAO OFFICER HERE HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO

REPORT THIS VIOLATION TO THE LICENSING COUNTRY CONCERNED

WHO, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ARE THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE

ACTION ON SUCH BREACHES OF REGULATIONS

CC to Linnier

ROUTING SLIP

TO

AIR Commodore.

APPROVAL	NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE	YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE	YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE	FOR ACTION

Sir Force Commander
would like material
for a reply to Dr Buncho

14/11/61

MAFC

22 NOV 61

DATE

FROM

C
O
P
Y

19 November 1961

Mr. Pêche, Acting Chief ICAO TA Mission, Congo
Air Commander

INFRACTION PANAMA AIRWAYS

1. Please refer to letter dispatched to Manager, Panama Airways Leo as a result of your correspondence on the subject to me. I have, as yet, had no reply to my letter.
2. As discussed with you previously such violations should be processed back to the country "of license". I would suggest that you advise the authorities in Hamey to push such action with vigor.
3. I will advise you on response of Panama executive personnel to my letter as soon as it is received.

SIGNED BY: (H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

C

O

P

Y

14 November 1961

Mr. Mauaocitia,
Manager,
Panama Airways,
Leopoldville.

Violations - International Civil Aviation Regulations
Panama Airways - Aircraft DC4-299 and C46-HP324.

Dear Sir,

1. Attached find copies of two reports of airways violations, allegedly committed by above mentioned aircraft which belong to your Company. The report against DC4-299 was made by Brassaville authorities and the report against C46-HP324 by the aviation authorities in Miami.

2. I need not take time to explain to you the seriousness of such violations. In the case of DC4-299 the Brassaville authorities have been advised by this Headquarters that the aircraft does not in fact belong to the UN and that a formal violation should be filed with the country "of license". Correct ownership of the C46 was established by the authorities in Miami and the infraction has been properly reported to the Director of ICAO in Paris. In addition to the action that will be taken as a result of the foregoing I expect you to fully investigate the "charges made" and advise this office of your findings and what action you have taken against the crews concerned. If guilty, and in particular I want your written assurance that everything possible will be done to prevent such consurrence in the future.

3. The United Nations, as you are fully aware, is International in character and it is not acceptable that any person, unit or company under its employ be allowed to create embarrassment between the UN and its Member Nations. I would draw your attention to Amendment no. 1 dated 10 March 1961 to the contract between your Company and the United Nations which states:

"the Carrier and its flight crews and other employees shall exercise the utmost discretion in the conduct of their affairs during the period of this agreement. They shall refrain from any action, whether within or outside of the Republic of the Congo, which may embarrass or be inimical to the interests of the UN... Violation of this provision by the Carrier, its flight crews or other employees shall be deemed a breach of this agreement and as cause for its immediate cancellation by the UN without any period of notice or any cancellation indemnity."

Yours very truly,

SIGNED BY: (H.A. MORRISON) A/C
AIR COMMANDER

QUOTE: AIRCRAFT C.46 REGISTRATION HP 324 OF UNITED NATIONS, PILOT POMEROY, LEFT KANO FIRST OCT AT 1725, DID NOT CONTACT EITHER KANO OR NIAMEY DURING THE WHOLE TRIP AND ONLY AT 1537 KANO RECEIVED ITS ARRIVAL AT IDRIS ...

SUCH AS THE PRECEDING CASE, I WOULD ASK YOU TO KINDLY INTERVENE WITH THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN ORDER THAT THE NECESSARY REPRIMAND BE MADE TO THIS CREW AND THAT STRICT INSTRUCTIONS BE GIVEN BY THE RESPONSIBLE PERSON FOR THESE FLIGHTS TO ALL THEIR AIRCRAFT ".

I answered him 21 Nov as follows:

QUOTE: I HAVE NOTED YOUR COMPLAINT CONCERNING THE C.46 REG HO 324 OF UN. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL TAKE ALL THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO AVOID REOCCURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS.

ROUTING SLIP

A/Force Commander

APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

I assume the Air Commodore
will take urgent action as
requested by Dr. Bunche.

Please prepare draft reply
for N.Y. on action taken.

Thank you

DATE 22

X1 61

FROM



Room 66

YC3 S NY 193 21 23552 ;

ETAT PRIORITE

ONUC

LEOPOLDVILLE ;

8193 LINNER 1. NIGER PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS SUBMITTED TO ME A COMPLAINT CONCERNING FAILURE OF AYE ONUC PLANE TO CONTACT KANO OR NIAMEY WHEN FLYING OVER NIGER TERRITORY AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE LAPPAREIL C.46 IMMATRICULE HP 324 DES NATIONS UNIES VIRGULE PILOTE POMEROY VIRG PARTI DE KANO ;

P2 ;

LE 1ER OCTOBRE A 17H 25 VIRG NA CONTACTE NI KANO NI NIAMEY PENDANT TOUT SON VOYAGE STOP CEST SEULEMENT A 15H37 QUE KANO A RECU SON ARRIVEE A IDRISS ET NKR LA TRANSMISE. (DADA) COMME POUR LES CAS PRECEDENTS VIRG IS

VOUS PRIE DE BIEN VOULOIR INTERVENIR ;

P3 ;

AUPRES DES AUTORITES COMPETENTES POUR QUE LES OBSERVATIONS NECESSAIRES SOIENT FAITES A CET EQUIPAGE ET POUR QUE DES CONSIGNES SOIENT STRICTEMENT DONNEES PAR LE RESPONSABLE DE CES VOLS A TOUS SES AVIATEURS. UNQUOTE. 2. I ANSWERED HIM 21 NOVEMBER AS FOLLOWS COLON QUOTE JE PRENDS NOTE DE LA ;

P4/43 ;

RECLAMATION CONCERNANT LE EQUIPAGE DE LAPPAREIL C.46 IMMATRICULE HP 324 DES NATIONS UNIES STOP SOYEZ ASSURE QUE NOUS PRENDRONS TOUTES LES MESURES NECESSAIRES POUR QUE DE TELS INCIDENTS NE SE RENOUVELLENT PAS. UNQUOTE. 3. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR URGENT ACTION ON SUBJECT ;

BUNCHE "

COL 8193 1. C.46 324 17H 25 15H37 2. 21 C.46 324 3

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN!DJILI.....to ~~DAKARA~~ **KAKINA**.....

DATE **6 Sept 61**

ETD .N!DJILI..... **1000 LT**


RETURN DATE/TIME **6 Sep 61**

MEALS ABOARD **NIL**

... PASSENGER LIST ~~ATTACHED~~

Lt-Gen S Mac Eoin
Lt-Col AG Callen
Maj PA Pajuyi
Col Kjellgren
Maj Karwarkar
Rev Fr Pagan
Comdt O'Shea
Lt MacMahon
Capt Costello
Sgt Bernard
Lt-Col Paul
Maj Muntaz

SIGNED:

 Lt-Col.
K. O'BRIEN, Maj
(~~J. J. CASSELEY~~)
MA to Force Commander

DATE..... **5 Sep 61**

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN!DJILI.....to ~~DAKINA~~ **KARINA**

DATE **6 Sept 61**

ETD .N!DJILI..... **1000 LT**


RETURN DATE/TIME **6 Sept 61**

MEALS ABOARD **NIL**

... PASSENGER LIST ~~ATTACHED~~

Lt-Gen S Mac Eoin
Lt-Col AG Callen
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Col Kjellgren
Maj Karwarkar
Rev Fr Fagan
Comdt O'Shea
Lt MacMahon
Capt Costello
Sgt Bernard
Lt-Col Paul
Maj Muntaz

SIGNED:


Lt-Col.
K. O'BRIEN, Maj
(~~J. J. CASSELY~~)
MA to Force Commander

DATE..... **5 Sept 61**

Distribution:-

Movement Control
OIC Flight

23 August 1961

To: Air Commander
From: MA to Force Commander

1. This is to inform you that the Force Commander has agreed to allot the DC-6 aircraft to Mr Ahmed on Friday 25 Aug 61, to convey Mr Ahmed and party from LEO to EVILLE.

2. Dr Cruise O'Brien, Brig Raja and party will also travel in the aircraft to EVILLE on that date. The plane will be returning directly from EVILLE.

KOB.
(K. O'BRIEN) Maj

*Given to Air Commander
By hand on 24 Aug 61.*

Shir

7 August 1961

Chief of Flight Operations,
Sabena,
25, rue du Cardinal Mercier,
Brussels.

Dear Sir,


Charter Flights - Delayed Departures

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter sent to your Operations Manager Léopoldville, the contents of which are self-explanatory.

It is my impression that such a record, as outlined in the attached, is not in keeping with the standards set by Sabena, regardless of operational conditions. The United Nations is expending vast sums of money in the Congo and particularly in the aviation field. It is my intention, therefore, that every effort must be made towards a more economical operation and economy can only be achieved through efficiency.

Your office will be advised further should a satisfactory improvement not be forthcoming as a result of the attached correspondence.

Yours faithfully,



H.A. Morrison
Air Commodore
Air Commander, ONUC

cc: Force Commander
CAO



7 August

1

Operations Manager, Sabena, Léopoldville

Air Commander, ONUC HQ

Charter Flights - Delayed Departures

1. A review of charter flights completed by your Company during the period 1 July 61 through 5 August 61 reveals that, out of a total of 66 trips, there were the following delays in departure from N'Djili :

- 3 : technical reasons
- 11 : crew late
- 4 : loading
- 4 : other, including ATC clearances, blocked on ramp, etc.

2. The foregoing constitutes a 33 1/3 % failure to meet scheduled departure times. However, the most disturbing single factor is that half of these delays were the direct result of crews failing to report for duty in sufficient time. This is not an impressive record for any airline company, and when one considers the reputation held by Sabena throughout the world, it is a particularly poor record. Undoubtedly there are numerous reasons for the failure of crews to report in sufficient time to meet scheduled departures. These are, however, of no direct concern to the UN.

3. In view of the preceding facts, I would request written assurance that this matter will be given active consideration by you personally and that considerable improvement can be expected. I wish to advise you that a copy of this letter will be forwarded to your Head Office in Brussels.

4. I have been advised by my Chief Operations Officer that your local operations office is unable to accept either new flight missions or alterations to schedules of missions already accepted after 1800 hours each day. I would request immediate written clarification of this point, as the implications could result in a severe restriction to UN airlift capability.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

cc: Force Commander
CAO



INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

AHQ/6028/1/ADMIN

2nd August, 1961

TO : M.A. to Force Commander ✓
FROM : Air Commander
SUBJECT : IDENTITY CARDS TO CIVIL PILOTS

Reference is made to your letter No. nil dated 7th July 1961.

2. It has been checked from the Office of Civilian Personnel that Identity Cards were issued to the following six crew who failed to return the same on leaving the country on 26th May 1961.

Cne Souster	(British)
F/Off. Voneuw	(Swiss)
F/Off. Hafely	(Swiss)
N/Off. Kellard	(British)
F/Eng. Nemeier	(Swiss)
Asp/F/Eng. Ruegg	(Swiss)

This is contrary to the Administrative Instructions No. 1 dated 4th May 1961, issued by HQ UN Air Transport Force in the Congo. Detailed instructions regarding return of the Identity Card and other materials by personnel of Chartered Airlines are being issued to all concerned. A copy of the same is attached herewith.

3. Messers Swiss Balair is being approached for return of the Identity Cards issued to above mentioned personnel.

L. Lovestad

(L. Lovestad) LtCol
Chief Air Administrative Officer
FOR Air Commander

2nd August, 1961.

HEADQUARTERS U.N. AIR TRANSPORT FORCE IN THE CONGO

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 3

AMENDMENT TO ADMIN INSTRUCTION NO. 1

RETURN OF UN IDENTIFICATION CARDS AND MATERIALS ISSUED
TO CHARTERED AIRLINES PERSONNEL

Attention of all the addressees is drawn to our administrative instructions No. 1 dated 4th May, 1961 wherein it was stressed that all the Chartered Airlines will ensure that the following items issued by UN to their personnel serving in the Congo, will be returned to UN before those personnel leave the Congo or on termination of the contract, whichever is earlier.

- a) UN identification cards
- b) Caps
- c) Badges
- d) Arm Bands

2. It has been observed with great concerns that the above instructions have not been rigidly followed by some of the Chartered Airlines. To ensure proper enforcing of the above instructions the following procedure will henceforth be followed :-

- a) The Chartered Airlines will intimate the Deputy Base Ops Officer, N'Djili in writing the arrivals and departure of their personnel giving their names, ranks & trade.
- b) Deputy Base Ops Officer will then issue/requisition letter to the Chief of Personnel (civilians) for issue of the above mentioned items. In no case identity cards etc. will be issued without a written request from the airline concerned.
- c) The identity cards and other items will be personally collected by the individuals.
- d) The Chartered Airlines will depute a representative by name, who will keep a close liaison with the Deputy Base Ops Officer and shall be responsible for informing him the arrival and departures of the personnel of his airline. He will also be responsible for returning the Identity Card etc. to Deputy Base Ops Officer.

- e) Deputy Base Ops Officer will maintain a record of arrivals and departures of airlines personnel and also of issue and return of Identity Cards, etc.

3. Non compliance of the above instructions will be reported to the Head Office of the Airline concerned.

L. Lovestad
(L. Lovestad) Lt. Col.
Chief Air Admin. Officer.

DISTRIBUTION (EXTERNAL)

1. Chief Administrative Officer
2. Chief of Civilian Personnel ONUC HQ
3. UN Air Transport Base N'Djili (10 copies)
4. Sabena
5. Inter Ocean
6. Panama Airways
7. Tranair Airways
8. TMA C/O Sabena
9. Continental C/O Sabena

DISTRIBUTION (INTERNAL)

1. Air Commander
2. Deputy Air Commander
3. Chief Air Operations Officer
4. Chief Air Administrative Officer
5. Chief Air Engineering Officer
6. One copy in each of the following files:

6022/AIR OPS 6204/AIR OPS 6204/1/AIR OPS
6204/2/AIR OPS 6204/4/AIR OPS 6204/6/AIR OPS
6204/7/AIR OPS 6204/8/AIR OPS 6204/9/AIR OPS


No. 5430/PERS
Chief of Personnel (Mil)
HQ ONUC
LEOPOLDVILLE

2 Aug 61

To :- Lists A,B,C and D

Subject :- Travel by Commercial Aircraft

1. New York has queried an instance where a rear party of 15 Malayan Officers were booked by commercial air flight for return to their home country.
2. It must be appreciated that this is unnecessary expense to the U.N. and that this particular journey could at the very least be affected if not completely, partially by UN aircraft.
3. For further guidance, if a necessity should arise for a journey by commercial aircraft the authority of this HQ will be sought in the first instance before such booking are made.


Chief of Personnel (Mil)

Copy to:-

Chief, Accommodation & Travel Officer



10. 7030/7111
Chief of Personnel (MIL)
HQ ONLY
10. 7030/7111

10. 7030/7111

HQ ONLY

10. 7030/7111

Comdr UN Force

10. 7030/7111

10. 7030/7111

10. 7030/7111

10. 7030/7111

10. 7030/7111

TO
FORCE COMMANDER

28 July

1

Chief of Logistics

Air Commander

INTERNAL AIRLIFT - Logistic Support

1. Up to present time airlift has been provided on a non-scheduled basis in support of the logistic program throughout the Congo. As I am sure you readily appreciate this is a most expensive and inefficient way to operate an Air Transport Force. It creates a situation in which it is virtually impossible to make proper use of the airlift capacity which is available. It is therefore my intention to provide airlift on a scheduled basis to meet your logistic requirements.
2. In order to plan an effective schedule I require realistic figures from your office on which I can calculate the frequency of trips and the types of aircraft per area. In your calculations you should not include those tonnages of non-perishable goods which can be sent by surface transport. These tonnage estimates should be calculated on the basis that will be valid for a minimum period of 90 days. For the first 3 or 4 months a joint survey should take place monthly between your office and CAir Ops in order to make whatever adjustments are necessary as indicated by experience. On the occasions when scheduled airlift will not meet the demand, a special flight can be organized to clear the backlog.
3. To make this system operate effectively in addition to provide this office with estimates of tonnages you will also have to establish an effective priority system. This will ensure that "A" priority items move in the shortest possible time. Stores of a less urgent priority will be moved on a space available basis. I would like to discuss this priority system in detail with you.
4. As you no doubt appreciate there will likely be periods when an overriding requirement to move military forces for operational reasons could well have an effect on a percentage of scheduled flights. To be prepared for such conditions I would recommend that your planning figures make allowance for a five-day stockpile of non-perishable stores. Airlift required for items of a perishable nature will obviously be the last to be affected. You should also not lose sight of transportation available to you through use of existing surface and water vehicles to meet periods of reduced airlift schedules.

5. It is my intention that the conduct of air transport on a scheduled basis should begin by 21 Aug. In order to provide me with the necessary time to plan and organize schedules I must have your estimates of tonnages to be moved from source to consumer by 9 Aug 61.

6. I would appreciate early advise from you that the requested estimates will be made available as per para 5 above.

(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

Personnel and Finance Officer
Air Staff
ONUC Headquarters
Tel - 3921/200

6015/1
July 25, 1961

To : (See distribution list, para 22)
Subject: INFORMATION CONCERNING AIR PERSONNEL

42. Sweden has granted a prolongation of tour for the following air personnel:

WO/3	BLOMQUIST	Air Detach. Kamina
"	HJERTQUIST	" " " "
WO/2	MELIN	" " " "
WO/1	HOEGLUND	Helicopter Pilot

43. Cpl COUSINEAU R. arrived from Canada on July 20 as replacement for Cpl DAIGLE who was repatriated on the same day. Cpl COUSINEAU is posted in Ops Room at HQ.

44. The Norwegian Mission in NY advised that Lt. FJAERBU J. will replace Lt. R. NAESS who was repatriated on July 23. He is expected to leave Oslo for the Congo on Aug 3.

On that same day, will also departe from Oslo to Congo, Lt. O. HERSTAF, Helicopter pilot. (New York)

45. The Norwegian Government has agreed to extend tour of duty for Major HAEREID, senior Ops Officer. (Nor IO)

25 July 1961

Dear Sir,


Aircraft loading - security of cargo

It has been brought to my attention that on numerous occasions, aircraft under UN charter have flown without the cargo aboard's being properly lashed and secured. Some reports indicate that no lashing or tie-down of cargo has been done at all and on some of these particular flights, passengers have also been carried. Such practices not only go far beyond the unsafe category, but are truly suicidal. The United Nations will under no circumstances condone flying operations of this nature and any further reports, if validated, will result in the automatic suspension of the company concerned.

The Movement Control Organization of ONUC does not contain experienced and well-trained aircraft loading personnel, and therefore the responsibility for calculating the correct weight and balance, establishing an index within safe limits, supervising the loading to correspond with the weight and balance and finally the proper lashing and security of the load, must rest with the charter company concerned. All companies presently under charter to the UN have agreed in principle to having a responsible person in attendance during loading operations. However, to date this principle has not been met in practice. Effective immediately, therefore, this agreement must be met in every instance. Aircraft will not depart the ramp until cargo has been properly lashed and secured.

I would request written assurance that the contents of this letter are fully understood and will be met.

Yours truly,



H.A. Morrison, Air Commodore
Air Commander, ONUC

The Operations Manager,
Transair Sweden, SA,
Léopoldville.

cc: Force Commander
Base Commander, N'Djili
Chief of Movement Control

25 July 1961

Dear Sir,

Aircraft loading - security of cargo

It has been brought to my attention that on numerous occasions, aircraft under UN charter have flown without the cargo aboard's being properly lashed and secured. Some reports indicate that no lashing or tie-down of cargo has been done at all and on some of these particular flights, passengers have also been carried. Such practices not only go far beyond the unsafe category, but are truly suicidal. The United Nations will under no circumstances condone flying operations of this nature and any further reports, if validated, will result in the automatic suspension of the company concerned.

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I would request written assurance that the contents of this letter are fully understood and will be met.

Yours truly,

H.A. Morrison, Air Commodore
Air Commander, ONUC

The Operations Manager,
Panama Airways, Léopoldville.

25 July 1961

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I would request written assurance that the contents of this letter are fully understood and will be met.

Yours truly,


 H.A. Morrison, Air Commodore
 Air Commander, ONUC

The Operations Manager,
 Sabana,
 Léopoldville.

cc: Force Commander 
 Base Commander, Ndjili
 Chief Movement Control Officer
 Chief Operations Officer

25 July 1961

Dear Sir,


Aircraft loading - security of cargo

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
Yours truly,



H.A. Morrison, Air Commodore
Air Commander, ONUC

The Operations Manager,
Interocean Airways,
Léopoldville.

cc: Force Commander
Base Commander Kibuli



HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761 -MOV

22 July

1


Chief Administrative Officer
Chief Movement Control Officer
Improper use of ONUC Aircrafts

Info: MA to Force Commander
COS
Air Commander
CLO

- ... 1. Attached please find copy of a report as received from Capt. R. Hammer of this Section, for your information and necessary action.
- ... 2. Attached please also find Travel Authorizations of the following:
- (a) Donal CRUISE-O'BRIEN, son of Mr. C. Cruise O'Brien, ONUC Representative in Elisabethville.
 - (b) Mrs. V. TOMBELAINE, wife of Mr. Tombelaine, Information Officer in Elisabethville.
3. It will be seen from the attached report and Travel Authorizations that both passengers seem to be in the habit of looking for an excuse to go from one place to another, simply because the people who can authorize the Travel Authorizations happen to be their relations. As per present Travel Authorizations, both these passengers came to Leo from Elisabethville and then went to Stanleyville. The object of the travel as shown on their Travel Authorizations is "Business".
4. I understand that not long ago the same people, along with a third person, visited Albertville on 14 July in the hope that they would get space for a pleasure trip to Dar es Salaam. Infact the Administration at Elisabethville is understood to have given signals to HQ. North Katanga soliciting their assistance in the matter. However, when they could not succeed at Albertville, they made their way to Goma. But even there they were disappointed and consequently had to return to Elisabethville.
5. You will appreciate that Movement Control cannot stop such travellers so long as they produce a proper Travel

./.

Authorization form which in both these cases these people had. However, one feels obliged to bring to your notice instances like these, where abuse of official positions on the part of certain individuals is indicated. It is therefore requested that proper investigation in the matter be made and a stop put to such occurrences.



Major
Offg. Chief Movement Control Officer
(SHAH DAD)

HQ ONUC 1001/4 761-MOV

Dated: 14 June 1961

To : List A, B, C and D
ONUC Coquilhatville
ONUC Kamina
ONUC Port Francqui
Movement Control Detachment Albertville
Elisabethville
Goma
Luluabourg
Matadi (presently at N'Djili)
N'Djili
Stanleyville

From : Acting Chief of Staff

Subject: AIRLIFT - NON UN PERSONNEL

Ref : HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-MOV of 20 April 1961.

1. In partial modification of the above referred memorandum, the following revised instructions are being issued for your information and necessary action:

"The Force Commander has decided to allow the Brigade/Sector/
"Station Commanders in outposted stations to use their discretion
"in permitting non UN personnel on UN chartered aircrafts. It
"may be found necessary by the local Commander to carry members of
"the provincial Government, local ANC officers, local chiefs and
"other officials to meetings or on joint fact-finding or peace-
"making missions. Similarly at times it may be necessary to eva-
"cuate patients, refugees, etc. at short notice. In all the
"above cases, the authorities mentioned above are permitted to use
"their discretion to allow non UN passengers on aircrafts allotted
"to them within their own operational area. Permission to allow
"the non UN press representatives to use UN aircrafts will,
"however, continue to be cleared with this Hq. in advance.


2. Please acknowledge receipt.


Col
Acting Chief of Staff.
(J.J. Quinn)

21 July 1961

To: Air Commander
From: MA to Force Commander
Subject: Air Operations - Coordination between Staffs

1. In message FC 381 dated 19 July 61, the distribution was directed to Air Operations instead of to yourself. It is agreed that this was an error.
2. Unfortunately this Warning Order had to be issued at short notice and therefore it was not possible to have the Air Commander in from the start. The Mil Ops Officer and the Air Ops Officer did get down to a staff check and outline plan of the operation at the earliest opportunity, which was in fact the following morning. The operation is still in the planning stage and the Air Commander will be taken into the conference with the remainder of the Brigadiers which is to take place on Fri 21 July.


(JJ Caseley) Lt-Col

Disseminated by hand
2.4 22/7/61


ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLES : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

21 July 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Acting Chief of Staff
Objet : Air Operations: Coordination between Staffs

1. In message FC 381 dated 19 July 1961, the distribution was directed to Air Operations instead of Air Commander. It is agreed that this was in error.

2. It must be ^{unfortunately} understood that this warning Order had to be issued at short notice and, therefore, it was not possible to have the Air Commander in from the start. However, the Military Operations Officer and the Air Operations Officer did get down to a staff check and outline plan of the operation at the earliest opportunity which was in fact the following morning. The operation is still in the planning stage and the Air Commander will be taken into the conference with the remainder of the Brigadiers which is to take place on Friday, 21 July.

M.A.
James J. Quinn

(James J. Quinn) Colonel
A/COS

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLES : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

21 July 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Acting Chief of Staff *M A*
Objet : Air Operations: Coordination between Staffs

1. In message FC 381 dated 19 July 1961, the distribution was directed to Air Operations instead of Air Commander. It is agreed that this was in error.

2. It must be ^{unfortunately} ~~understood that~~ this warning Order had to be issued at short notice and, therefore, it was not possible to have the Air Commander in from the start. However, the Military Operations Officer and the Air Operations Officer did get down to a staff check and outline plan of the operation at the earliest opportunity which was in fact the following morning. The operation is still in the planning stage and the Air Commander will be taken into the conference with the remainder of the Brigadiers which is to take place on Friday, 21 July.

M A
James J. Quinn

(James J. Quinn) Colonel
A/COS

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

20 July 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : Air Operations - Co-ordination between Staffs

1. Reference is made to your FC 381 dated 19 July 1961, a copy of which was received by my staff (not sent direct to me) a.m. 20 July 1961.
2. This typifies the existing problems relative to the lack of co-ordination where airlift is involved. It is my opinion - and I believe it to be reasonable - that I should be exposed to the discussions and preliminary planning that obviously have to take place before such a signal is despatched. Otherwise we will continue to be advised at the last minute and be compelled to operate on a crash basis.
3. I make this overture to you with only one thought in mind - that of providing to you a better service.


(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

17-05
Y - Command 12
10/16 21/7
1/1

It is agreed that in the distribution list
the word 'Air Ops' should read 'Air Comd'.
The Air Commander will be informed of
the intended moves as well as the

P. Ops

17 July

1

Chief of Civilian Operations

Air Commander

Air Operations - Mistreatment of Flight Crews

1. Attached hereto is a report submitted by Captain Jonson of Transair Sweden regarding mistreatment of himself and his crew during a stopover at Bakwanga airport.

2. By way of a brief résumé, UN flt 20 was arranged and authorized by direct request from Mr. J. Poujoulat for the airlift of Mr. Albert Kalondji and party from Bakwanga to N'Djili. The flight was to be carried out on 14 July and assurances were given that the aircraft and crew would be secure during their brief stopover at Bakwanga, although no UN troops were on location.

3. As will be seen from the attached report, the aircraft and crew were, in fact, completely insecure. Further, the crew was subjected to what could be termed close arrest at gunpoint and the aircraft subjected to a thorough but unauthorized search resulting in the loss by the crew of valuable personal equipment and funds.

4. With regard to the personal losses suffered by the crew, I would request that full and vigorous action be taken to regain the articles and funds stolen or, failing this, that full retribution be made to compensate for the losses. May I be advised as to the action taken and progress made in the very near future.

5. In future and by way of a safeguard against incidents of this nature recurring, I will not commit aircraft of the Air Transport Force to missions where destination points are not under the jurisdiction of UN forces and assurance has been given beforehand by the local UN Commander that the airfield is secure.

H.A. Morrison

(H.A. Morrison) A/C
Air Commander

cc: Force Commander

Wingcommander A.J. Mackie

AIROPS, UNHQ

Leopoldville

Leopoldville, July 17, 1961

Sir,

Enclosed I am sending you a voyage report from our captain J. Jonson. On closer examination we have found no damages or losses on the aircraft. For this purpose the company will have no claims except the personnel losses of the crew.

Yours truly

Harald Noork
TRANS AIR SWEDEN AB

20/7/61

Voyage report Leopoldville-Bakwanga July 14.

On July 14, 1961 a/c SE-CPC on mission order 20 was dispatched from Leo to Bakwanga for transporting members of parliament to Leo for meetings. Upon arrival in Bakwanga myself and my crew were removed from the a/c at gunpoint by Congolese soldiers. My 1st officer was ordered to contact an aircraft just departing Bakwanga for informations concerning the passengers we were to pick up when a congolese soldier shoved a gun into the cockpit and ordered him to stop transmitting. We were taken in to the terminal building and on several occasions we were pushed in the direction the soldiers wanted us to go. After having held approximately one hour, a minister came out and apologized and asked if we were in any way mistreated. Our answer was no because we did not want to be any further detained. Also the same soldiers were still in attendance and he ordered them to disperse and they suddenly left all except three or four. We were advised that there were no passengers because Air Congo took them in the morning. He then changed his mind and assigned two passengers, their status and importance vague.

After taking off and getting to cruise altitude I then discovered that both myself and my first officer was missing various sums of money and several articles that had apparently been removed from our flightbags while we were detained in the building.

Capt John Jonson

1 moviecamera in case (Revere) value 10,510 katanga francs

1 pair Rayban sunshades value 15,00 US dollars

In money 5,000 congolese francs and 75 US dollars

First officer Don Lynch

1 camera (Retina Reflex) value US dollars 150.

1 hunting knife value US dollars 7,50

In money 11,000 congolese francs.

Leopoldville July 14, 1961

John Jonson

Captain

JH

10 July 1961

To: Maj Nielsen, Movement Control
From: MA to Force Commander
Subj: Request for UN Transport
Ref: Attached letter

Please inform Mr Rasmussen that the Force Commander has considered his request of 5 July to accommodate Mr Amadé Kabugubugu on a UN flight to Pisa.

Unfortunately, UN policy in this regard only authorises non-UN personnel to travel on UN aircraft outside Congo where the purpose for travel is sponsored by some UN organization. In the circumstances, therefore, he regrets being unable to give the necessary permit for this man to travel to Pisa.

Request of a similar nature has also been refused.

JJB
(JJ CASELEY) Lt-Col

*Given by hand
18/7/61
[Signature]*

Personnel and Finance Officer
Air Staff
ONUC Headquarters.
Tel- 3921/200

6015/1
July 13 1961

Guir
SPS

To : (See Distribution list, para 22)
Subject: INFORMATION CONCERNING AIR PERSONNEL

37. Sgt K.R. BERGET, Kamina, has, with effect from April 1 1961, been promoted to the rank of 2/Lt. (Nor LO)

38. WO S.E. GEMMING, Kamina, has, with effect from ~~April~~ 1 1961, been promoted to the rank of 1/Lt. (Swe LO)

39. The following Helicopter personnel are expected to arrive Leo by the North Star on Friday, July 14:

WO/3 HAGBERG A.G. Pilot
" LJUNG T.O. Mechanic
" NILSSON A.S. Pilot
Capt SJOELANDER T. "

40. Changes in Command, Air Contingents (See para 24) :

Canadian Contingent Commander	A/C MORRISON	Air HQ
Danish " " " "	Danish LO	HQ
Ethiopian " " " "	Ethiopian LO	"
Indian " " " "	W/C SINGH	C-47 SQD
Swedish " " " "	Col NORSTROEM	Air HQ

41. Estension of tour is approved for:

WO/3 JOHANSSON G. Light A/C SQD and
" VIKBERG L. Base HQ

Their estimated time of repatriation is now January 1 and March 22 1962, respectively. (Swe LO)

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN!DJILI.....to.....*E.VILLE*.....

DATE*8 JULY 61*.....

ETD .N!DJILI.....*1200 LT*.....

RETURN DATE/TIME*As per instructions at Eville*.....

MEALS ABOARD*Lunch 8 July 61.*.....

... PASSENGER LIST ATTACHED

*Col. Eggen
Mr. Kuehl
Capt. Fiddo
Plus 4 others*
[Signature]

SIGNED:

[Signature]

Lt-Col.

(J. J. CASELEY)

MA to Force Commander

DATE.....*8 JULY 61*.....


7 July 1961


To: Air Ops
From: MA to Force Commander

A/C HBILU, Swiss Balair, Greek charter, arrived STAN 1 July and departed 4 July at 1400 hrs. Some members of the crew are alleged to have UN identity cards.

Crew members are Cne Souster (British), F/Off Voneuw (Swiss), F/Off Hafely (Swiss), N/Off Kellard (British), F/Eng Nemeier (Swiss), Asp/F/Eng Ruegg (Swiss), Purser Huber (Swiss) and F/Eng (Swiss).

Please check if any member of the crew served with UN Air Unit here.


(JJ Caseley) Lt-Col


Passed to Cui
Ops By hand 7/7/61


AHQ/6002/1/ADMN

July 5, 1961.

To : See Distribution
From : Air Commander
Subject: Change of Command

With effect from July 6 1961, Air Commodore H.A. Morrison will take over the command of the UN Air Transport Force in the Congo from Air Commodore C.G.W. Chapman, who has completed his tour of duty with ONUC.


(Sean Mac Eoin) Lt. Gen.
Commander UN Forces in the Congo

Distribution: Lists A, B, C and D.

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN'DJILI.....to *Elizabethville*.....

DATE*7 July 61*.....

ETD .N'DJILI.....*0700 ~~0630~~ LT*.....

RETURN DATE/TIME*8 July 61*.....

MEALS ABOARD*Breakfast*.....

... PASSENGER LIST ~~ATTACHED~~

as follows:-

MR. KHIARI.

MR. MESTERI.

Miss Lefevre.

SIGNED:

J. J. Caseley Lt-Col.

(J. J. CASELEY)

MA to Force Commander

DATE.....*6 July 61*.....

L.

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN!DJILI.....to *Elizabethville*.....
DATE7 July 61.....
ETD .N!DJILI.....0700 ~~0630~~ LT.....
RETURN DATE/TIME8 July 61.....
MEALS ABOARDBreakfast.....

... PASSENGER LIST ATTACHED

as follows:-
MR. KHIARI.
MR. MESTERI.
Miss Lepierre.

SIGNED:

J. J. Caseley Lt-Col.
(J. J. CASELEY)
MA to Force Commander

DATE.....6 July 61.....

Distribution:-

Movement Control

OIC Flight

L. M. P. P. P.
Mr. P. P. P.

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN'DJILI.....to ~~ELISABETHVILLE~~.....

DATE 7 July 61

ETD .N'DJILI..... 0630 LT

RETURN DATE/TIME 8 Jul 61

MEALS ABOARD Breakfast

... PASSENGER LIST ATTACHED
as follows

Mr KHIARI M.
Mr MENDERI A.

SIGNED: _____ Lt-Col.
(J. J. CASELEY)
MA to Force Commander

DATE... 6.8. July. 1961

Distribution:-

Movement Control

OIC Flight

M. Penguat.

*Copies Dispatched
as under:-*

Per Ops = 16.30 6/7/61

Per C/T = 16.30 6/7/61.

[Signature]

Personnel and Finance Officer
Air Staff
ONUC Headquarters.

6015/1
July 4/1961.

TO : (See distribution list, para 22)
Subject: INFORMATION CONCERNING AIR PERSONNEL

30. The Norwegian Government has appointed:

Major HOLT P.
1/Lt KROGH M.
1/Lt SANDSBRATEN G.
Capt JOHANSEN A.
T/Sgt MYHRENE A.
" SIMENSEN A.
" SANDMO F.
1/Lt DAHL K.

as replacements for the following personnel: HAEREID, AUSTENAA,
PAULSEN, MO, KRAAKSTAD, LOVAAS, MIDTUN and STURAAS.

Lt DAHL will arrive in Leo on July 7 by North Star. Remaining
Personnel on July 5, also by North Star.

(UNATIONS New York)

31. The duty with ONUC is extended until the end of January 1962
for 1/Lt K. CELINDER. (Dan IO)

32. The duties with ONUC for the following Helicopter personnel
expire by the end of July 1961:

1/Lt P. RAVN-LARSEN
M/Sgt J.A.N. PIPER
" B. JENSEN
" H.G. MOELLER

They will be replaced by the u/m persons:

1/Lt V. DAHL
M/Sgt C.C.J. RASMUSSEN
" E.B. HANSEN
" F.V. JENSEN

(Dan IO)

33. Replacements for LAC MEUNIER and GADOURY will departe Trenton
September 30 and for Cpl RUEL on October 21. (Can Cont Cmdr)

Me

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN!DJILI.....to *Lulu*.....

DATE *1200 HT*

ETD .N!DJILI..... *6 Jul 61*

RETURN DATE/TIME *As soon as possible*

MEALS ABOARD *Lunch 6 July 61*

... PASSENGER LIST ATTACHED

*BRIG. ST4
Major Cantwright*

SIGNED: *[Signature]* Lt-Col.
(J. J. CASELEY)
MA to Force Commander

DATE..... *5 July 61*

Distribution:-

Movement Control
OIC Flight

*6 addresses by
Lund at 16.45 hrs
on 5/7/61*

1 July

See Distribution

Military Assistant to the Force Commander
Convoir to Albertville

1. The Force Commander will fly to Albertville on 3 July and will return via Luluabourg on 4 July.

ATC N'Djili - 1000Z ET: Albertville - 1430Z

Other times later.

2. The following are accompanying the Force Commander:-

Mil Ops Rep
Log/Mov Ctl Rep
Mil Pers Rep

Malayan SLO
ADC
Female Secretary

3. Also travelling:-

Brigadier S. Singh
Brigadier Raja
Mr. J. Kelly

4. Lunch will be served on 3 July.

2 SP1

2 and
Baptist

30
Baptist

(J. J. Caseley) Lt. Col.
MA to Force Comdr

Distribution

Mil Ops
Logs
Mov Ctl
Mil Pers
Air Ops
Base Ops N'Djili
Brig. S. Singh
Brig. Raja
Mr. Kelly

29 June

1

Chief Air Operations Officer
Acting Chief of Staff
Convair Schedule

(1)

1. The Force Commander directs that the Convair proceed to Elisabethville to pick up Mr. Nwokedi and party of three. Please confirm if Convair can be available at Elisabethville at 0800 LT on 30 June.

2. The Convair is also required on Monday, 3 July, to convey the Force Commander to Albertville. Details of Force Commander's party will be submitted later by the Military Assistant to the Force Commander. He is responsible for the passenger list and informing Albertville of ETA.

② MAB for Cmd
I would like my G to
accompany FC to A'ville as
Ops Rep - also, there should be
a rep from Logistics.
J. Quinn
29/6/61

(James J. Quinn) Colonel
A/COS

cc: Dr. Linner
MA to FC
DCOS
OPS ✓


NOTE: Reference Para 1. This has been confirmed with Air Ops and Convair will be available as requested. Signal being sent to Elisabethville to this effect.

29 June

1

Chief Air Operations Officer
Acting Chief of Staff
Convair Schedule

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(James J. Quinn) Colonel
A/COS

cc: Dr. Linner
MA to FC ✓
DCOS
OPS

NOTE: Reference Para 1. This has been confirmed with Air Ops and Convair will be available as requested. Signal being sent to Elisabethville to this effect.

Personnel and Finance Officer

6015/1

Air Staff

June 15/1961

ONUC Headquarters.

To : (See distribution list, para 22)

Subject: INFORMATION CONCERNING AIR PERSONNEL.

28. Colonel S.G.H. NORSTROEM will arrive Leo June 16 in order to replace Col. ROSENIUS, who will Leave Leo on June 30. (Swe LO)
29. Extention of tour has been approved for Major SOLLENBERG, Light Squadron. Major S. is expected to be repatriated around September 20. (Swe LO)

To : Air Operations
From : MA to Force Commander
Subject : Schedule for CONVAIR.

FLIGHTN'DJILI.....*10 EVILLE*.....
DATE*12 June 61*.....
ETD .N'DJILI.....*08.00 Z*.....
RETURN DATE/TIME*12 June 61*.....
MEALS ABOARD*Light Refreshments*.....

... PASSENGER LIST ~~ATTACHED~~

Gen Gyassu
Major Woodcock
Lt Breeze
Pte Rmanc
Comdt McQuill
Comdt Norman
School Secretary

SIGNED: _____ Lt-Col.
(J. J. CASELEY)
MA to Force Commander

DATE.....*10 June 61*.....

Distribution:-

Movement Control
OIC Flight

Personnel and Finance Officer

6015/1

Air Staff

June 8 1961

ONUC Headquarters

INFORMATION LIST CONCERNING AIR PERSONNEL (MIL)

- 18- The third helicopter pilot mentioned in para 11 (2/Lt GRANLI), is expected to arrive Leo on board the North Star June 13. (Nor LO)
- 19- A Swedish group of 10 Officers and NCO's, all for service in Light Squadron, are expected to arrive Leo June 16. (Swe LO)
- 20- Extention of tour in the Congo has been approved for the u/m Swedish personnel, all in Light Squadron, and their new estimated dates of departure from Leo are as follow:
- | | | |
|----------------|-------------|----------|
| Major LIND | Dec 20 1961 | |
| W/O SUNDEQUIST | Sep 27 " | |
| M/Sgt OLSSON | Dec 28 " | |
| " JOHANSSON | Sep 27 " | (Swe LO) |
- 21- It is mandatory that service personnel travel in uniform on all flights to PISA. This is for reasons of regulations, custom and passport clearance formalities. (LO Pisa)
- 22- These informations are distributed to:
- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| All Air HQ Personnel | Air Contingent Cmdrs |
| Air Unit Commanders | Liaison Officers |
| Base HQ | Charter Companies |
| C-119 Sqd | |
| C-47 Sqd | Force Commander |
| Hlpt Sqd | Chief of Personnel (Mil) |
| Light Sqd | Camp Commandant |
| Kamina | Chief Signal Officer |

Personnel and Finance Officer
Air Staff
ONUC Headquarters.

6015/1
June 6 1961

TO (See distribution List)
SUBJECT: INFORMATIONS CONCERNING AIR PERSONNEL

- 14- Wing Commander A.J. MACKIE arrived in Leo June 2 and will take over the post as Chief Air Operations Officer from W/C DOBBIN, who is going home to Canada (Can Cont Cmdr)
- 15- The present Indian Air Force Contingent, 49 officers and NCO's, will be repatriated with estimated departure from Leo June 15. A new contingent is arriving Leo June 18. (Indian Cont Cmdr)
- 16- Corporal T. BERG, now posted at Norwegian Liaison Office, will, with effect June 10, be posted at Base HQ, N'Djili as member of an Air Operation Team. Cpl B. is from the same date, promoted to the rank of Sergeant. (Nor LO)
- 17- Two of the Helicopter pilots, mentioned in para 11, (HOVDEN and GAARD) will arrive in Leo on Board the North Star On June 9. (Nor LO)

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Personnel (Mil)
C-47 sqd
Air detachment, Kamina
Helicopter Sqd
Light A/C Sqd
Norwegian Liaison Off.
Swedish Liaison Off.

Brazilian Air Contingent Cmdr
Norwegian Air Contingent Cmdr
Swedish Air Contingent Cmdr
Circulation
File
Base Commander, N'Djili


No. 1001/34/0/2

8 June 1961

Chief Air Operations

MOVE TO E'VILLE - Deputy Force Commander

1. General Iyassu, Deputy Force Commander will be proceeding to Elisabethville Monday, 12 June.
2. You are requested to make the CONVAIR available to leave N'Djili at 0700 Local Time. The plane will return to Leo same day after delivering General Iyassu at destination.


Lt Col
(J.G. POULIN)
Chief Operations Officer

INFO: Deputy Force Commander
Acting Chief of Staff
MA to Force Commander
Movement Control

no. 1001/3410/2


8 June 1961

Air Operations

FORCE COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE - KAMINA

1. The Force Commander will require the CONVAIR to proceed to a Formation Commander's Conference at Kamina 14-15 June.
2. The plane will be required to leave N'djili Airport at 0800 Local Time, Wednesday, 14 June, stop over at Luluabourg to pick up Commander Ghana Bde and thence proceed to Kamina for the Conference which is scheduled to start at 1400 hrs Local Time same day.
3. The Force Commander will be accompanied by his ADC, the Chief Logistics Officer, the Chief Operations Officer and a female secretary provided by Force Commander's Office.
4. The Party will remain in Kamina overnight, returning to Leopoldville Thursday 15 June.
5. Air Operations is requested to arrange CONVAIR flight and Movement Control is to advise Luluabourg and Kamina, as well as make other necessary arrangements.
6. Personnel forming Force Commander's Party will be responsible for their own transportation to N'Djili and back.
7. Major E. Azim will act as Chief Operations Officer during the absence of the undersigned.
8. Addressees having matters they wish to discuss with their representatives at Kamina should contact Chief Military Operations before 1000 hrs, Tuesday, 13 June.

INFO: Acting Chief of Staff
MA to Force Commander ✓
Chief Communications Offr
Chief Logistics Officer
Chief of Personnel
Movement Control
ADC to Force Commander


Lt Col
(J.G. POULIN)
Chief Operations Officer

Maj Azim
(Mil Ops)

XXX
XXXXX

cc:

Air Ops
Mov. Control
Miss Weiner

8 June

1

*Copies delivered
By Hand 15.30
Lec on 8/6/61.*

*6
JShw.*

De:

MA to Force Commander

CONVAIR required to fly to STANLEYVILLE ^{9 4/6.} 10 June 61
ETD LEC 0700 Hours LT.

Passengers:

Mr. Gardiner
Mr. Ciari
Mr. Poujoulat
Miss Wiener

/Lt-Col.

(J. J. Caseley)

MA to the Force
Commander.

File

6015/1/AIR OPS

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

31 May 1961

A : Dr. Bunche, Under-Secretary, United Nations, New York
De : Commander, UN Forces, Congo
Objet : Nominal Roll, United Nations Air Transport Force, Congo

1. Further to the Force Commander's memo of even file dated 12 April 1961, attached please find revised UNATF personnel status reports effective 23 May, as follows :

- (a) summary of requests to New York for filling up of vacancies in the UNATF Congo.
- (b) nominal roll, UNATF Congo - part I : Headquarters.
- (c) nominal roll, UNATF Congo - part II : UNATB N'Djili
 - a) Base Headquarters
 - b) C119 Squadron
 - c) C47 Squadron
 - d) Helicopter Squadron
 - e) Light Aircraft Squadron
- (d) nominal roll, ATF Detachment Kamina.
- (e) total air personnel by nationalities.

2. You will note from paragraph 1 (a) above quite large personnel shortages. As flying hours have increased, these deficiencies have become more serious. During the past six months, military flying hours have increased from about 1200 hours per month to 2195 hours per month. Personnel deficiencies over the past six months are summarized as follows :

	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May
Personnel deficiencies	61	63	84	97	96	92

3. From the charts referred to in paragraph 1 (c) above, you will observe that the most serious shortages of personnel exist in the Helicopter Squadron, where today we have only 14 pilots instead of the 24 shown in the establishment. Furthermore, we have not as yet received assurance of replacement pilots, so that the shortages in the Helicopter Squadron may become more serious as time goes on.

4. Personnel strengths in the C47 Squadron and the Light Aircraft Squadron are marginal to meet the present flying programme. In March and April, flying hours in the DC3 Squadron were doubled and it had been our intention to triple the rate in May and to quadruple the rate by the end of June. Unfortunately the personnel situation, together with spare parts and other factors, has not allowed us to achieve our planned increase for May.

5. May I take this opportunity to thank you for your assistance in the past and to assure you that we shall do everything within our power to obtain maximum benefit from whatever personnel and equipment you may be able to provide.

Sean Mac Eoin
(Sean Mac Eoin) Lieutenant-General
Commander, UN Forces in the Congo

DMZ
31 May 61

Full Air Op

VISIT BY FC TO KAMINA, E'VILLE, LULUABOURG.

The itinerary for the above visits will be as follows:

1.6.61. Dep	N'DJILI	12.30Z
Arr	KAMINA	16.00Z
3.6.61. Dep	KAMINA	08.30Z
Arr	E'VILLE	10.00Z
4.6.61. Dep	E'VILLE	06.30Z
Arr	LULUA	09.30Z
Dep	LULUA	14.30Z
Arr	LEO	16.45Z

Accompanying the Force Commander will be:

Lt.Col B. EGGE	MIL INFO
Major M.S. KATHAVATHE	LOGS
Captain M. COTE	MIL OPS
Private P. O'CONNOR	BATMAN
Mrs. C. HOPE	SECRETARY
Mr. P. JANKOWSKI	OPI
Mr. O. FAURA	OPI
Mr. F. BAYAT	OPI
Mr. H. HOLTZENDORFF	WELFARE
Captain FOGARTY	ADC

Catering on board CONVAIR will be required as follows:

1.6.61 and 4.6.61 : Afternoon tea.

Signed
Captain

T. O'NEILL, ADC to the
Force Commander

cc: Air Ops
Mil Info
Logs
OPI
Welfare
File
Swedish LO

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

24 May 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : C119 flying time

1. As you know, our C119 flying programme is based on a total of 450 hours per month. Over the past five months, we have exceeded this programme by better than 10 per cent.

2. Although we have not yet reached the end of May, we have already exceeded our flying programme. In fact, commitments to date total 497 hours. Any further C119 flying this month therefore eats into our potential for the month of June. In fact, if we were to fly three aircraft per day from now to the end of the month, all aircraft in the Congo would become time expired, so that we would have no C119s in the Congo as of 1 June. We must therefore control C119 flying carefully, in accordance with our overall programme capability.

3. For your information, C119 flights to Kabalo for the period 13 to 24 May were as follows :

13 May	-	2 flights to Kabalo
14 "	-	1 flight " "
15 "	-	1 " " "
16 - 19 May	-	1 a/c on shuttle Kamina - Kabalo
17 May	-	1 flight to Kabalo
18 "	-	2 flights to Kabalo
19 "	-	2 " " "
20 "	-	2 planned, but both u/s
21 "	-	Leo - Lulu to carry helicopter engine for rescue hel.963
22 "	-	Nil. A/c u/s
23/24-	-	Leo - Kabalo - 1 a/c - shuttle Kamina - Kabalo
24 -	-	1 flight Leo - Kabalo.

(C.G.P. Chapman) A/C
Air Commander

Arrangements are now being made to buy vehicles in TANZANIA which can be brought across to A'ville. They should be available within 14 days. This should relieve our requirements of C119 lift to KABALO

Li
Delivered By hand at
11.30 hr: 23/5/61. JHW

23 May

1

Air Ops
Movement Control

MA Force Commander ✓

CONVAIR - LEO-COQ 23 May 61.

The Convair will be at one hours notice from 1000 LT
to fly to Coquilhatville. *Take off N)JIL 14.00 LT.*

Passengers:

Mr. Linner

Another

General YASSU

Lt. Adise

Lunch will be made available during flight.

J.J. Casseley

Lt. Colonel

J.J. Casseley

MA to the Force Commander.

No. 5430/PERS
Chief of Personnel (Mil)
HQ ONUC,
LEOPOLDVILLE

22 May 61

To :- Lists A, B and C


From :- Chief of Personnel (Mil)

Subject:- Use of North Star Flights

1. All military personnel are hereby reminded that the use of North Star flights between LEOPOLDVILLE and PISA for travel on long leave to EUROPE is authorised purely on space available basis. While space may be available for passengers on the North bound flights from LEOPOLDVILLE to PISA, space is not available, especially at the present time, on the South bound flights from PISA to LEOPOLDVILLE.

2. Until further notice, all military personnel who might be authorised to travel on the North Star flights to PISA on long leave are hereby informed that they must make their own arrangements, by commercial aircraft if necessary, to return to duty station by due dates. The personnel who do not report on due dates are liable to disciplinary action.

3. The contents of this letter may please be brought to the notice of all concerned under your command.



Colonel,
Chief of Personnel (Military)

19 May

1

Movement Control

MA to Force Commander

CONVAIR to BUKAVU/ENTEBBE - 20 May

1. The following is the passenger list for the above flight:

Col JJ Quinn
Maj Shah Dad
Cpl Nazir
Miss Beaugard
Mr Carlos White

2. In addition, five passengers to be nominated by the Force Commander will travel. ETD N'Djili 0600LT. Breakfast and lunch to be served on board.

Signed 19/5.

(JJ Caseley) Lt-Col

cc: Air Ops

*Delivered by hand to you
R/H at 6.00 hrs on 19/5/81.*

[Signature]

19 May 61

Mr S Habib Ahmed
Col Hajeebhoy
Lt-Col Madan
Air Ops

*Delivered by hand
at 16.00 hrs on 19/5/61*

[Signature]

Arrival of General RIKHYE

A helicopter will leave
pad at Royal at 0800 hrs Sunday
21 May for Brazzaville, to
collect Gen Rikhye on arrival there.

Signed on 19 May 61.
(JJ Caseley) Lt-Col
MA to Force Commander

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

17 May 1961

A : Force Commander

De : Air Commander

Objet : C119s, DC3s, DC4s and C46s - Vehicle lift

1. To assist you in maintaining a sense of feel for the vehicle lift into Kabalo, the following figures on C119s may be of interest :

- a) hours flown 1 - 16 May : 250 ;
- b) flying hours available for remainder of month : 100.

2. In view of our many discussions on vehicle lift capabilities, I am certain there is no need for me to emphasize how important it is to ensure that C119s are employed only on heavy vehicle lift.

3. The carrying of jeeps and other small vehicles in DC3s, C46s and DC4s is a matter which has been under discussion for some time, and it is largely a question of loading and unloading facilities. For some days, if not weeks, it has been my understanding that the Indian Brigade would construct loading ramps for use at N'Djili, Kamina and Kabalo. Unfortunately, progress does not appear to have been very fast in this matter. I will be discussing the matter in more detail with Brigadier Raja today.

4. Operations at Kabalo are somewhat limited by the aerodrome. I am not certain what resources the Indian Brigade may have for extending runways, but it is obvious that, if several hundred yards could be added to the Kabalo runway, we might then use this aerodrome for DC4s. Whether or not this is necessary depends on the scale of activities planned for that aerodrome. Your views on this matter will be appreciated. Similarly, I would appreciate your views on the scale of operations expected at other aerodromes in North Katanga, such as Nyunzu and Nanono.

5. Attached as Appendix 'A' is a statement of C119 flying times over the past nine months.

6. Attached as Appendix 'B' is a copy of a signal concerning the availability of spare parts for C119s, which tends to indicate that C119 flying hours may decrease rather than increase in the future.

7. Finally, it would seem logical to me that, if conditions are becoming more stable in Katanga, railroads, waterways and highways should very soon begin to function normally, so that our requirements for heavy airlift should ease in the future. I would appreciate your views on this matter.

(C.G.W. Chapman)
Air Commander

Appendix 'A'

FLYING TIMES : C119 AIRCRAFT
AUGUST 1960 - APRIL 1961

<u>Month</u>	<u>Hours flown</u>
August	255
September	630
October	415
November	310
December	515
January	535
February	480
March	521
April	534

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

Spare

INDICATE
PRIORITY

SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	X	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

N R

Appendix 'B'

Address(es)

UNATIONS NEWYORK

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

ONUC 2735 16 MAY 61 STOP FOR FIELDSEV FROM CHAPMAN AND AHMED STOP
 SUBJECT CLAN SPARE PARTS FOR C119 AIRCRAFT STOP YOU WILL RECALL OVER THE PAST
 NINE MONTHS WE HAVE HAD A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SHORTAGE OF SPARE
 PARTS FOR C119S STOP IN DECEMBER WE ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ITALIAN
 AIR FORCE FOR ALL SECOND LINE MAINTENANCE TO BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE ITALIAN
 AIR FORCE AT PISA AND AT THE SAME TIME THE UNITED NATIONS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE
 NECESSARY SPARE PARTS TO SUPPORT 450 FLYING HOURS PER MONTH STOP DURING THE
 PERIOD JANUARY TO MAY CMA C119S HAVE FLO N APPROXIMATELY 2000 HOURS STOP
 PARA 2

TODAY WE HAVE HAD SOME DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE
 AND IT IS APPARENT THAT NOTWITHSTANDING OUR AGREEMENT CMA EXCEPT FOR A FEW
 PARTS WHICH HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO THE CONGO TO MEET FIRST LINE SERVICING PROBLEM
 AND AOCF CMA THE UNITED NATIONS HAS NOT PROVIDED ANY SPARES TO SUPPORT SECOND
 LINE SERVICING IN ITALY OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS SO THAT C119 FLYING HAS BEEN
 SUPPORTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BY DRAWING ON ITALIAN AIR FORCE RESERVES STOP THE
 ITALIAN AUTHORITIES TELL US THAT THEY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WITH RYDER CMA
 DI MARCO AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY AT ROME DURING APRIL
 STOP THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ALSO STATE THAT INSOFAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
 DETERMINE CMA CHATEAUXROUX ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE MORE THAN TEN TO FIFTEEN PER CENT
 OF THE DEMANDS TO SUPPORT THE AGREED FLYING PROGRAMME STOP

PARA 3

ALTHOUGH WE MAY NOT BE FULLY INFORMED ON THIS MATTER OF SPARE PARTS CMA IT DOES
 SEEM TO US THAT THE PROBLEM IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT AND CMA UNLESS
 SOME MAJOR IMPROVEMENT CAN BE MADE CMA WE MUST EXPECT FURTHER REDUCTION IN C119
 FLYING HOURS STOP IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE
 SUBMITTED TWO SEPARATE LISTS OF SPARE PARTS TO DATE CMA THE FIRST COVERING THE
 PERIOD UP TO DECEMBER AND THE SECOND COVERING THE PERIOD JANUARY TO JUNE STOP
 IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT VERY FEW OF THESE PARTS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED STOP

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : A/C Chapman
 Authorized : " "
 Date : Mr. Ahmed
 16 May 61

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

**INDICATE
PRIORITY**

SVC Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
-----------------------	-------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------------------------

Priorité Nations traffic
is strictly limited.

N R

PAGE 2

Address(es)

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

**THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES FURTHER STATE THAT A THIRD LIST OF SPARE PARTS WILL BE
SUBMITTED BY THE FIRST WEEK IN JUNE CMA COVERING THE PERIOD UP TO DECEMBER
1961 STOP**

PARA 4

**AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE CMA UNLESS THE SPARE PARTS CAN BE PROVIDED CMA IT WILL
NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT SCALE OF EFFORT STOP ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT
WISH TO BE PESSIMISTIC CMA IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE BEST EFFORTS OF WELL
MEANING PEOPLE IN THE PAST HAVE FAILED TO BRING ABOUT ANY IMPROVEMENT IN THE
C119 SPARE PARTS SITUATION STOP CANADA HAS BEEN APPROACHED AND HAS INDICATED
INABILITY TO ASSIST STOP SIMILARLY WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE
FROM NORWAY AND FURTHER WE BELIEVE THAT ALL NATO COUNTRIES HAVE INDICATED
INABILITY TO ASSIST STOP THE USA WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY REMAINING SOURCE
STOP WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT REALISTIC PLANS FOR THE FUTURE CMA WE WOULD
THEREFORE APPRECIATE YOUR IMMEDIATE ADVICE ON THIS MATTER**

**CC/ Air Commander
Mr. Ahmed**

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized : **A/C Chapman**

Date : **Mr. Ahmed**
16 May 61

Imp. Sarfat! 10035

Passed to Mr. Abbas

on 16/5/61.

16 May

1

Mr M. Abbas
Force Commander

[Signature]

Unloading of UN a/c at Stanleyville

Herewith comments of Air Commander:

" I have investigated the case in question and it is my belief that members of the crew of the aircraft approached the Sabena personnel at Stanleyville, demanding the use of Sabena unloading equipment, while at the same time pointing out that they were not prepared to pay for the use of the equipment. The Sabena representative recognized the aircraft in question as one belonging to Inter-Continental which, although on charter to the United Nations, has refused to enter into any agreement with Sabena for the use of servicing facilities in the Congo. Therefore, quite naturally, Sabena are reluctant to provide service to this Company, since the Company is not prepared to pay anything for service, but rather chooses to handle its own servicing.

" At the same time, however, it is not the aircraft captain's responsibility to arrange for the unloading of an aircraft at Stanleyville. This is a Movement Control responsibility, and it appears that, if this matter had been handled through the proper channels, no difficulties would have arisen.

" This incident is indicative of a difference of opinion between two commercial operators. Intercontinental have consciously chosen not to enter into any agreement for assistance from Sabena. Other charter companies such as Balair and Transair Sweden have agreements for credit and servicing with Sabena throughout the Congo. It is not reasonable, therefore, to cite this incident as an indication that 'we have had our first trouble with Belgians here'.

" I have discussed this matter with the Senior Movement Control Officer and, although we recognize how nice it would be to have a special Movement Control organization at Stanleyville, the fact remains that Movement Control experts are in very short supply and events over the past nine months do not appear to justify a separate organization at Stanleyville. "

Mr Tickner should discuss the problems with local Sabena and Military representatives and make or recommend any adjustments he considers necessary. It seems more economical to pay Sabena handling charges than to purchase specialized equipment which may be difficult to obtain and position in Stanleyville.

(Sean Mac Eoin) Lt-Gen

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
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UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

15 May 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : Unloading of UN aircraft in Stanleyville

Reference : Stanleyville CIV 456.

2. As you know, loading and unloading of aircraft is a Movement Control responsibility. At Stanleyville, over the past nine months, these duties have been performed by a detachment of the Ethiopian Battalion and, insofar as I can determine, there have been few real difficulties, although, quite understandably, the operation may at times be a little rough for lack of fully qualified Movement Control personnel.

3. In addition to personnel to handle loading and unloading, there are of course times when special equipment may be required. At the moment, the UN does not have any specialized handling equipment at Stanleyville. Therefore, ^{at Stanleyville} as at many other places in the Congo, we rely on whatever local facilities may be available and pay for the use of the equipment.

4. I have investigated the case in question and it is my belief that members of the crew of the aircraft approached the Sabena personnel at Stanleyville, demanding the use of Sabena ^{unloading} equipment, while at the same time pointing out that they were not prepared to pay for the use of the equipment. The Sabena representative recognized the aircraft in question as one belonging to Inter-Continental, which, although on charter to the United Nations, has refused to enter into any agreement with Sabena for the use of servicing facilities in the Congo. Therefore, quite naturally, Sabena are reluctant to provide service to this Company, since the Company is not prepared to pay anything for service, but rather chooses to handle its own servicing.


5. At the same time, however, it is not the aircraft captain's responsibility to arrange for the unloading of an aircraft at Stanleyville. As pointed out in the first paragraph, ~~This is a Movement Control responsibility~~, and it appears that, if this matter had been handled through the proper channels, no difficulties would have arisen.

/6. It

6. This incident is indicative of a difference of opinion between two commercial operators. Intercontinental have consciously chosen not to enter into any agreement for assistance from Sabena. Other charter companies such as Balair and Transair Sweden have agreements for credit and servicing with Sabena throughout the Congo. It is not reasonable, therefore, to cite this incident as an indication that "we have had our first trouble with Belgians here".

7. I have discussed this matter with the Senior Movement Control officer and, although we recognize how nice it would be to have a special Movement Control organization at Stanleyville, the fact remains that Movement Control experts are in very short supply and events over the past nine months do not appear to justify a separate organization at Stanleyville. //

8. If Mr. Tickner has any further doubts on this matter, he might be well advised to discuss the local situation with the local military and Sabena representatives, so that he may better understand the problem and make local adjustments as necessary. Clearly, we cannot get something for nothing and it appears far more economical to pay Sabena handling charges rather than to purchase and move in specialized equipment of our own. 2


(C.G.W. Chapman) A/C
Air Commander

16/6 *Sent. 16/6/61* *[Signature]*
16 May 1

Air Commander
Deputy Chief of Staff

The Force Commander wishes to again emphasise that it is essential that all available C-119s be made available for the build-up of the Indian Bde at KABALO.

He would also like if you would overcome as quickly as possible any difficulties that there might be in airlifting vehicles in DC-3s and C-46s.

[Signature] *Col.*
(83 QUINN) Col
DCOS

Curr

*Phaul's and original of
letter sent to Dr. Bunche on
12/5/61.*

6201/AIR CMDR

Ends

10 May 1961

Dear Dr. Bunche,

Ref.: Charter Aircraft Utilization

In view of our many discussions concerning flying hours and utilization rates, I felt you might be interested to see copies of charts showing details of charter flying for the months of March and April as follows:

- (a) Charter companies.
- (b) Number of aircraft available from each company.
- (c) Aircraft serviceable each day.
- (d) Aircraft unserviceable each day.
- (e) Aircraft flying each day.
- (f) Total flying hours per aircraft.
- (g) Some other detailed statistics.

From these charts you will observe a considerable spread in flying times by the various aircraft and companies. A good many factors have contributed to these differences, such as, experience, type of jobs, logistic support, technical support, etc. The important thing, however, is to note that although a few aircraft have achieved more than 200 hours in a single month, others have achieved closer to 100 hours and the average comes out to about 150 hours per aircraft per month.

It is our view, based on several months' experience, that these actual hours represent maximum rates and are therefore not satisfactory for calculating the number of aircraft required in our fleet, since flying hours are not the only criterion. Frequently, what is most needed is a large number of aircraft to meet unscheduled commitments and emergencies. If we were to plan our requirements on the highest utilization rates, then we would have too few aircraft and no reserve capability. In other words, it is necessary to plan our

Dr. Ralph Bunche
Under-Secretary
United Nations
New York 17, New York

- 2 -

fleet on an easily achievable normal flying rate so that in time of emergency we may have a reserve capability of not less than one-and-a-half to two times our normal rate. This is in fact what has happened in the past.

I hope these charts may be of some interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

(Séan Mac Eoin) Lt. Gen.

cc: Force Commander
Air Commander

17 CA2
16 May 1
Air Commander
ONUC Headquarters



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Handwritten initials: ZK

A: CHIEF MOVEMENT CONTROL.
DE: M.A. FORCE COMMANDER.
OBJET: A.C . TO COQ 7 MAY 61

TO INFORM YOU THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE
WITH AIR OPS FOR A D.C. 3 TO GO TO COQ
ON 7 MAY?

ETD N DJILI 0700Z
MAY REMAIN OVERNIGHT
PASSENGERS _ THREE

MR . RARASIMHAM .

MR. GARDINER

MR. MARTIN

ALL UN STAFF.

Handwritten signature: JJ

Lt Col

Handwritten: 061200

Handwritten: Passed to you OK
Handwritten: 1220 hrs 6/5/61
Handwritten signature


5 May

1

Movement Control N'Djili
Movement Control HQ ONUC
MA to Force Commander

The following are authorised to travel by UN
a/c, ETD N'Djili, 5 May, 1300LT, to COQUILHATVILLE:

K. HALLAM	Deputy Commissioner Edet (Nigerian Police)
J. JAMES	P. Willis - Nigerian Police
	Lt Newman - Cdn Sigs
	Comdt Ebeya - ANC


(JJ Caseley) Lt-Col

18=
7
126
6

with instructions

1 May


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To : DCOS
cc : Mil Ops
Mil Info
MA Force Commander

Following is an extract of a communication from
Sec Gen.

"UN Forces should take all measures within its
"capability to stop non-Congolese aircraft and their personnel
"from being used by local authorities in military operations
"related to civil war. Whenever possible aircraft and their
"crews should be seized on same base as German plane and
"mercenaries."

The Force Commander directs that instructions be
prepared for his approval in this connection. These
instructions would of course be in addition to what is contained
in Operation Directive No 11.


J. J. Caseley) Lt. Col
MA to the Force Commander.

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BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

28th April 1961

A : Force Commander
De : Air Commander
Objet : Reference AO-1049, New York 2923 concerning civil aircraft
operating in the Congo.

1. To answer the question raised in the reference correspondence requires careful consideration of the fundamental principles governing the operation of civil aircraft in the Congo. Consideration of the following factors may help to avoid misunderstandings and provide proper prospective for policy and actions in internal Congolese air transport matters.

- a) Sabena as a prime contractor have entered into preliminary negotiations with the various Congolese authorities for the provision of air transport within the Congo. Sabena by right of their interest prior to independence and as a result of post independence negotiations are in a position to supply aircraft, technical personnel, maintenance services and facilities for the operation of commercial aircraft in the Congo. Within the political structure of the Congo Sabena have found it necessary to enter into separate agreements to suit the wishes of the various local political authorities. For example, Air Congo exists under an arrangement with the Leopoldville authorities. Congo Air exists under an arrangement with the Stanleyville authorities and the agreement calls for the provision of 2 DC3s aircraft for operations in Oriental Province. The Air Katanga agreement exist under arrangements with Elizabethville authorities and calls for the provision of 2 or 3 DC4s and 3 DC3s. Air South Kasai exist under arrangements with Bakwanga authorities and calls for the provision of one DC-4 plus one or two DC3s.
- b) These various companies operating under directions of local authorities transport goods and personnel as requested by the local authorities. For example Air Congo has transported many Mobutu troops, Congo Air has transported the Stanleyville troops and Air Katanga has transported Katangese troops.

- c) At the present time there is no law or instruction which prohibits any one of these local authorities from utilizing aircraft under their control and within their individual areas of responsibility. It is a good question therefore as to what extent the contractor is to be held responsible or limited in carrying out the wishes of the local authorities.
- d) In the final analysis there is one obvious answer to this problem of what can be transported by air and that is for the United Nations to control traffic in and out of all airdromes. Of course if the United Nations is to control air traffic the question arises whether the same principle should be applied equally to rail, road and boat transport.

2. With particular reference to the aircraft GORIC it must be pointed out that contrary to statements in the referred correspondence this aircraft came to the Congo to support civil operations. It was not brought here initially to support UN operations.

3. Over the past 10 months Sabena have maintained approximately 6 DC4s and 13 DC3s to support Congolese civil commitments. In the early days of the UN occupation these aircraft were used as required to support both UN and Congolese operations. Starting in January however when the Bakwanga food relief, became a major commitment, Sabena began to charter additional aircraft to augment their normal fleet to meet UN operations. Even then however there was little clear distinction between aircraft for UN operations and aircraft for Congolese operations. In fact until the time of the Manono incident it was customary for chartered aircraft from all companies to fly under their own colours. During the early days of UN chartering, in the interest of economy, contracts required payment for 75 hours per month at a low hourly rate and it was the custom when an aircraft was not required by the UN, it could be used on other commitments. This procedure prevailed until about the end of January when due to the heavy demand for air transport and the necessity to distinguish clearly between UN and other aircraft for security reasons a new procedure was introduced whereby all aircraft on charter to the United Nations were required to be painted UN colours and aircraft on UN charter were forbidden to be employed on any operations other than the United Nations operations while on UN contract. The same rule was written to cover aircrew personnel. From the above you will see that through a process of evolution, regulations concerning the operation of aircraft on charter to the UN have become more restrictive and more specific.

4. To refer back to OORIC it can be seen therefore that it is neither technically nor morally correct to suggest that the aircraft OORIC had been brought into the Congo for UN operations and subsequently placed by Sabena at the disposal of local authorities. Also it is misleading to suggest that commercial aircraft of non-Congolese registration are being used for the support of military operations for Katangese authorities any more than to support other Congolese authorities.

5. Overall therefore it would appear that the question most deserving of consideration is whether or not Congolese authorities are to control civil aviation in the Congo and whatever principle is decided on here might very well be applied to other forms of transportation. It should be borne in mind however that fundamentally what we are talking about is the question of armed forces in the Congo and the rights of local authorities in respect to the employment of these forces. Just as Congolese authorities control United Nations operations at Matadi, equally United Nations could control Congolese military operations by control of air transport, waterways, highways and railways. There would appear to be three ways of achieving this control, (a) either by agreement with the local authorities or (b) by the application of force., (c) As a last resort, through economic sanctions and other means force out of business, commercial operators who have facilities which could be used for military purposes by local Congolese authorities contrary to United Nations wishers. This is not an attractive idea however since Sabena employs about 300 Europeans and more than 2000 Congolese to support air transport in the Congo. If these people were forced out of business then the Congolese and the economy as a whole suffer greatly, (particularly since surface transport is so unreliable these days.) At the same time, we could not expect a vacuum to exist for long and we might therefore soon find Russian aircraft or other aircraft operating at Stanleyville and other bases rather than DC-3s of Congo Air, Air Congo, Air Katanga etc.

6. Concerning the question of immediate cancellation of Sabena contracts with the UN, it is doubtful whether this would have any major effect in terms of the number of aircraft since Sabena now provide us with 6 aircraft, and it is our understanding that New York are in fact contemplating a very considerable reduction in our charter fleet in the near future. On the other hand, this would not affect Sabena operations in the Congo either, since Sabena would be left with approximately 7 DC4s and 13 DC3s to support Congolese commitments as in the past.

7. The effect of aircraft cancellation on maintenance and fuel services is more difficult to predict. Provided however that Sabena were not forced out of business, one might expect that maintenance

and servicing could continue more or less the same as today. It must be remembered however that the UN does not possess any maintenance facilities, workshop equipment, refueling equipment or personnel which could be substituted for facilities and services which are now provided by Sabena. If therefore we should wish to cancel all Sabena contracts and become entirely independent of Sabena, we would require a considerable investment in facilities and a considerable increase in technical personnel.

8. Concerning fuel, it should be noted that Sabena own all the refueling facilities at the following location, Coq., Gemena., Lisala, Stanleyville, Goma, Bukavu, Usumbura, A'ville, Luluabourg, E'ville.

9. Mobil Oil and other oil companies have facilities at Leopoldville only, so that it would be quite difficult to provide alternative fuel arrangements.

10. Overall therefore it is suggested that since the commercial companies carryout the wishes of the local authorities, the UN should initiate action with the Civil and Military authorities to properly control military activities within the Congo or alternatively the UN should control all military movements, through airports, railways, highways etc., rather than to attempt to impose control through restrictions of public carrier.

11. The suggestion that these internal air movements are similar to or deserve the same treatment as external arms movements would not appear to be valid.

12. The question of whether the air transport operations ^{from} Elizabethville to Manono were legal police operations or were operations contributing to civil war is a point deserving consideration. There is clearly some difference of opinion on this point between the UN and the Katanga authorities. Such a question is important in the interpretation of any regulations which may exist on which may come into effect.

Note

UN charter situation today:

Trans Mediterranean	- 2 DC4
Panama	3 DC4 + 4 C46
Inter Ocean	7 DC4
Balair	2 DC4
Trans Aer	2 C46
Sabena	4 DC4
Total	<u>24</u>

Breakdown Sabena

1	Sabena
1	Starways (UK)
1	Worldwide (UK)
1	Continental (Germany)
* 1	Riddle (USA)
5	* Note Riddle contract expires 5 May

[Signature]

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MEMORANDUM

MIL INFO 2/A/3

25 Apr 61

FORCE COMMANDER

Forced Landing of UN Chartered DC3 in ANGOLA on 17 Apr 61

1. Detailed report on the debriefing of the crew and passengers of the above aircraft is enumerated below.

FLIGHT DETAILS

2. a. UN chartered DC3 Flight No.111 from LEOPOLDVILLE (N'Djili) to LULUABOURG on 17 Apr 61. Time of departure 1004 hrs (local time).

b. Names of crew:

(1) Capt Enrique Domingo FERRARI	-	ARGENTINA
(2) Lt Emil WILLIAMS	-	"
(3) Sub Ayudante BUSTOS	-	"

c. Names of passengers - relief crew:

(1) Capt Lebessis STAMATIS	-	GREECE
(2) Capt Stamenos NIKOLAS	-	"
(3) M/S Linos APOSTOLOS	-	"

INCIDENT

3. On 17 Apr 61 at about 1335 hrs (GMT), the Captain of the DC3 decided to force land due to a navigational error. He made a successful forced landing in an open field in area 30 km NORTH NORTH EAST of CANZAR. This spot was about 1 km from the River KASAI. There were some mines near the farms, where several locals were working.

4. As soon as the crew and passengers came out of the aircraft, they met a European Portuguese who took them to his farm house. In his house, he had one HF transmitter

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of the type similar to those found in military tanks, on which he spoke to DUNDO and told the authorities about the forced landing. There seemed to be no other means of communication with DUNDO. The speech on radio telephony of the transmitter was clear and loud, and a police/army escort arrived soon afterwards.

5. The whole party was taken from CANZAR to DUNDO in two vehicles. Their luggage was searched and some of the valuables such as cameras were taken away. The two guns on the aircraft were also taken away by the police. The crew discovered later that some of the personal belongings were removed from their baggage in the vehicle and were never returned to them.

6. Until they reached DUNDO, everyone concerned was quite nice to them but as soon as they arrived in DUNDO they found that the whole of the Portuguese European population was very much excited over the UN personnel. A large crowd surrounded their car and shouted slogans like "Down with the UNO!", "Why are you here in our country?", "Go away!". They were quite threatening and one of the crowd hit an egg against the head of one of the crew members, and another tried to remove the UNO ensign from the arm of a crew member. The police and army personnel who were present did not intervene. Soon after, a Portuguese civilian officer addressed the excited crowd. He praised their great sense of patriotism as manifested by the demonstrations and requested them to go home. The crowd then dispersed.

7. An armed guard was placed on the place where the crew and passengers were lodged. The guard consisted of a Portuguese European officer and NCOs and local Africans. The arrangements in general at this place were poor.

8. At about 1400 hrs (local time) on 18 Apr, the guard went away. At 1700 hrs the whole party was taken by aircraft C119 to LUANDA where they arrived at 2000 hrs the same day. At LUANDA, several newspapermen and photographers were awaiting their arrival. The party was also met by an Inspector of International Police. He returned to them the cameras and some of the other articles removed at CANZAR.

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9. During their conversation with the Interpol Inspector they gathered that the Portuguese authorities were apprehensive of the arms assistance from across the CONGO border to the terrorists in ANGOLA. Some of the terrorists captured by the Portuguese were reported to be in possession of UN arms from UN dumps in MATADI.

10. The Portuguese were also afraid that some of the local Angolese from the areas bordering the CONGO were sympathetic to the TSHOMBE regime because of the ethnic affinities among the population of these areas on either side of the border. The TSHOMBE Government in turn might try and take over the adjoining ANGOLA territory. The Portuguese also suspected that some Angolese with anti-Portuguese views were being trained in the Congolese Army for terrorist activities in ANGOLA and might later form the Liberation Army in ANGOLA.

11. At LUANDA, the party was accommodated at a hotel and all arrangements were excellent. They had complete freedom to move around. They stayed at LUANDA 18 and 19 April. During this period, they were not interrogated by the local authorities other than for routine information regarding the air flight viz route, flight plan, alternative airfields.

12. On 20 Apr at 0900 hrs, the party left by civil aircraft BEEHCRAFT from LUANDA and arrived at PORTUGALIA at 1500 hrs after touchdown at MALANJE for refuelling. The two guns of the aircraft were handed back to the crew. One of the guns had been fired and left uncleaned, presumably by one of the Portuguese officers. Arrived DUNDO 20th night. Left DUNDO at 0930 hrs on 21 Apr by car and proceeded to the area of forced landing.

13. The area where the aircraft had force landed was cleared by the local authorities to help the take-off. The crew took off successfully and reached LEOPOLDVILLE in the same UN chartered DC3.

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COMMENTS

14. Our comments on the information given by the crew and passengers are given below. The points of interest are:

- a. Possession of the HF transmitter by a Portuguese farmer near the border between ANGOLA and the CONGO. Para 4 refers;
- b. Anti-UN attitude of the Portuguese Europeans in ANGOLA. Para 6 refers;
- c. Probable passing of UN arms from MATADI to the terrorists in ANGOLA. Para 9 refers;
- d. Training of the Angolese by the Congolese Army in KATANGA for action in ANGOLA. Para 10 refers.

15. The HF transmitter in possession of the Portuguese farmer may be explained on the following basis:

- a. Many loyal subjects, especially the Portuguese Europeans living on the border areas, may be equipped by the Government with these sets for the purpose of vigilance and quick means of communication. Information about any activities by the local terrorists or from across the CONGO border will then be quickly passed to the higher authorities; or
- b. The owners of the farms and mines in the outlying areas may be equipping themselves at their own cost. This will enable them to be in communication with bigger towns and cities on business and personal matters. There appears to be no other means of communication between outlying areas and cities.

16. Anti-UN feelings among the European Portuguese in ANGOLA may be due to the following reasons. The Portuguese might be afraid, though without any basis, that the UN may intervene either with armed forces, or otherwise, in the disturbances now taking place in ANGOLA. It is of significance to note in this connection that during these days the UN Assembly was discussing the subject of ANGOLA and

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had censured the Portuguese on this issue. The UN was also not very happy about the Portuguese relations with MOZAMBIQUE and GOA.


17. The possibility of UN arms from the MATADI area being sent across the border to ANGOLA cannot be ruled out. It is also possible that the UN stores in MATADI may be misused by unauthorized persons/agencies.

18. The training of Angolese by the TSHOMBE regime to carry out terrorist activities and to form the Liberation Army may be true or possibly it is not. The training of mercenaries in KATANGA and the training of the increased number of KATANGA Army personnel during the recent past may be mistaken by the Portuguese for the training of Angolese.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. It is recommended that the possibility of UN arms from the area of MATADI port being sent across the border or otherwise misused by unauthorized agencies/persons be thoroughly and immediately investigated.

mkk/jmr



f (BJORN EGGE)

Lt-Col

Chief of Military Information

Distribution:

Chief of Military Operations
Chief of Air Operations

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

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FILE NO.:

21 April 1961

To : Commander, ONUC

From: Ralph J. Bunche

Subject: Nominal roll of United Nations
Air Transport Personnel

Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum of 12 April, No. 6015/1/2 AIR PERS, with enclosures as listed.

RJB

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM


24 April 1961

A: Force Commander
DE: Deputy Chief of Staff
OBJET: UN Aircraft at N'Djili

1. I have examined the statement that 13 UN aircraft were lying idle on Sunday night, 23 April, at N'Djili. There would appear to be some misunderstanding in relation to this matter as every possible DC4 was utilized on Monday morning for lifts of various kinds, particularly food lifts. For example, 11 DC4s took off with loads before 9 o'clock on Monday morning.

2. I have checked with Air Commodore Chapman on this matter and he tells me that he did mention to you that he had 13 DC3s grounded for various reasons, such as unserviceability, lack of radios, etc. This is purely an Air matter, but from the Army side every available aircraft is made use of. Three aircraft which were earmarked for a possible lift of Indonesians were in fact utilized on Monday.

3. Again I would like to emphasize that the lack of aircraft of the C119 type is the greatest restricting factor in the execution of military operations in the Congo.



(James J. Quinn) Colonel
DCOS



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

24 April 1961

Ans of

A: Distribution
DE: Deputy Chief of Staff
OBJET: Priority of Aircraft: North Katanga

The Force Commander directs that until further notice priority of aircraft will be given to requests from North Katanga, with particular reference to Kabalo.

James J. Quinn

(James J. Quinn) Colonel
DCOS

cc: Force Commander ✓
Deputy Force Commander
Air Commander
Operations
Logistics
Movement Control
Malayan LO
Nigerian LO

Jub


Pic 7ps

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-Mov
Dated:- 21 Apr'61.

To:- Air Operations
From:- Chief Movement Control Officer.
Info:- M A to Force Commander. ✓
D C O S
Chief Logistics Officer.
Movement Control N'DJILI.

Subject:- Passenger Manifests.

1. A copy of Movement Control N'DJILI letter of 18 Apr'61 is forwarded herewith for information and necessary action please.
2. From our point of view the suggestion contained in the letter is recording the names of the air crews on the flight manifest, will have many advantages. Will you therefore please examine the case and convey to us your arrangement or otherwise.
agreement
3. Should you approve of the above suggestion, in that case a copy of your action may please be endorsed to this office and Movement Control Detachment N'DJILI.


Major
Offg Chief Movement Control Officer
(SHAH DAD)

ZIA/

COPY

N'Djili Airport 18 April 1961

To: Chief Movement Control Officer HQ ONUC
From: OC Movement Control N'Djili
Subject: PASSANGER MANIFESTS

It has been the normal practice to put the names on the Passanger-Manifests of only those passangers who are travelling by air on a particular flight. The names of the aircrew is never mentioned on the Passanger-Manifests. Keeping in mind the security aspect and preventing any unauthorised passangers getting on board it is essential to have the names of the aircrew included in the manifests.

If this suggestion is agreed to then the captain of each aircraft, UN or UN chartered aircraft be told to give the names of the crew at each MC detachment so that these names can be put down on the manifest before the captain signs the manifest.

Major
OC MOVEMENT CONTROL N'DJILI AIRPORT
(Y D SAHASRABUDDHE)

Feb

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-MOV
Dated: 20th April 1961

To: List A, B, C and D
ONUC Coquilhatville
Kamina
Movement Control detachment Albertville
Elisabethville
Goma
Luluabourgh
Matadi (Presently at N'Djili)
N'Djili
Port Francqui
Stanleyville

From: Deputy Chief of Staff

Subject: AIRLIFT - NON UN PERSONNEL

Ref: MOV 1136 of 31 December -60

1. In view of the importance that this HQ attaches to the instructions contained in our above quoted reference, it is considered necessary to draw your attention to these once again.
2. It may please be noted that under no circumstances will non UN personnel repeat NON UN PERSONNEL be allowed air-lift on UN or UN chartered aircraft. This is particularly so in the case of Press Representatives, except ofcourse those who belong to ONUC ie are in uniform and forming part of an ONUC contingent.
3. Non UN personnel may however, under very special circumstances, be permitted by the Force Commander to travel on an UN or UN chartered aircraft. This is an exception rather than the rule.
4. The Force Commander has delegated the Administration of this power of making exceptions to the above general rule to his Military Asstt, who does so in the name of and under the authority of the Force Commander.
5. When ever the Military Asstt approves of a particular journey by a non UN person in an UN aircraft, he must sign and stamp the Movement Order/Travel Authorisation. Failing this signature and stamp, non UN personnel will not repeat not be allowed to board an aircraft.
6. In case of journeys commencing from a station other than Leopoldville, and time permitting, the Movement Order/Travel Authorisation duly signed and stamped as above will be transmitted to the post/station concerned. When time does not permit this, the Military Asstt to the Force Commander will convey to the Chief Movement Control Officer his assent to the journey in writing, who will then cable his Movement Control Detachment or, where none exists, the person discharging those duties. In such cases the Movement Order/Travel Authorisation will then be signed locally and the cable retained as confirmation of the authority.

Continued on page 2

7. All requests from outstations will therefore be communicated to Chief Movement Control for obtaining the necessary sanction of the Military Asstt to the Force Commander. Requests so made will show full itinerary of the person for whom airlift is requested and will be supported with full reasons necessitating/initiating such an action.
8. Officer incharge Movement Control Detachment or where none exists, the person discharging those duties, will be **personally** held responsible for any contravention of the above instructions.
9. The Force Commander directs that the above instructions be reproduced every month in local station orders to ensure that these are not lost sight of. Contravention of these orders will be viewed seriously.
10. Please acknowledge receipt and confirm that the above instructions are understood.

J. J. Quinn — Col
Deputy Chief of Staff
(J. J. QUINN)

HQ ONUC 5802-3 (LOGS)

MC - MATADI	MC - KAMINA
MC - LULUABOURG	MC - ELISABETHVILLE
MC - COQUILHATVILLE	MC - GOMA - KINDU
MC - STANLEYVILLE	MC - ALBERTVILLE

MOV 1136 dated 31 December 1960.

AIR LIFT FOR NON UN PERSONAL STOP REPEAT SIG 0681 OF 14 NOV AS FOLLOWS
STOP IT IS STRICTLY FORBIDDEN TO PUT NON UN PERSONNEL ON UN AIRCRAFT STOP
THIS INCLUDED PRESS REPRESENTATIVES UNLESS THEY BELONG TO UNOC OR ARE IN
UNIFORM WITH CONTINGENTS STOP ANY DOUBTFUL CASES MUST BE REFERRED TO CHIEF
MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER FOR CLEARANCE STOP ENSURE STRICT COMPLIANCE STOP
ONE STOP WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT NO PERSON WILL BE ALLOW TO BOARD ONUC PLANE
OR ONUC CHARTERED PLANE WITHOUT PROPER MOVEMENT ORDER OR TRAVEL AUTHORIZA-
TION STOP TWO STOP PERSON NOT CONNECTED WITH ONUC WILL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES
BE PERMITTED IN UN OR UN CHARTERED AIR CRAFT WITHOUT PREVIOUS REFERENCE
TO THIS HQ STOP SUCH REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO MILITARY ASSISTANT TO
COMMANDER WITH COPY TO CHIEF MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER FOR INFORMATION STOP
ALL REQUEST MUST SHOW FULL INITIARY OF THE PERSON FOR WHOM AIR LIFT IS
REQUESTED ACCOMPANIED WITH FULL REASONS STOP THREE STOP MC DETACHMENT
INCHARGE WILL BE HELD PERSONNALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY CONTRAVENTION OF ABOVE
INSTRUCTIONS STOP FOUR STOP ACK AND CONFIRM MESSAGE UNDERSTOOD STOP AND
END.

cc.: List A,B,C and D.

Rah Dad Major

Offg Chief Movement Control Officer
(SHAH DAD)

MC- MATADI	MC- KAMINA
MC- LULUABOURG	MC- ELISABETHVILLE
MC- COQUILHATVILLE	MC- GOMA-KINDU
MC- STANLEYVILLE	MC- ALBERTVILLE

QG ONUC 5802-3 (LOGS)

MOV 1136 en date du 31 décembre 1960.

TRANSPORT PAR AVION DE PERSONNES NON MEMBRES DE L'ONU STOP REPETONS TELEGRAMME 0681
DU 14 NOVEMBRE REDIGE COMME SUIT STOP IL EST STRICTEMENT INTERDIT D'ACCEPTER A BORD
APPAREILS ONU PERSONNES NON MEMBRES DE L'ONU STOP CETTE INTERDICTION S'APPLIQUE AUX
REPRESENTANTS DE LA PRESSE SAUF S'ILS FONT PARTIE DE L'ONUC OU S'ILS SONT EN UNIFORME
ET ACCOMPAGNENT LES CONTINGENTS STOP TOUS LES CAS LITIGIEUX DOIVENT ETRE SOUMIS AU CHEF
DU CONTROLE DES MOUVEMENTS POUR DECISION STOP VEUILLEZ APPLIQUER STRICTEMENT CES
INSTRUCTIONS STOP UN STOP A COMPTE DE LA DATE D'AUJOURD'HUI NUL NE SERA AUTORISE
A VOYAGER A BORD APPAREILS DE L'ONUC OU D'APPAREILS AFFRETES PAR L'ONUC SANS AUTORISATION
DE VOYAGE OU ORDRE DE MISSION EN BONNE ET DUE FORME STOP DEUX STOP TOUTE PERSONNE
ETRANGERE A L'ONUC NE SERA EN AUCUN CAS ADMISE A BORD D'UN APPAREIL DE L'ONUC OU D'UN
APPAREIL AFFRETE PAR L'ONUC SANS L'ACCORD PREALABLE DU SIEGE DE L'ONUC STOP LES DEMANDES
DEVONT ETRE ADRESSEES AU BUREAU DU COMMANDANT EN CHEF ET COPIE REMISE AU CHEF DU
CONTROLE DES MOUVEMENTS POUR INFORMATION STOP LES DEMANDES DEVONT INDiquer EN TOUTES
LETTRES LE NOM ET LA QUALITE DE LA PERSONNE POUR LAQUELLE L'AUTORISATION EST DEMANDEE
ET PRECISER LES RAISONS EN DONNANT TOUTES JUSTIFICATIONS STOP TROIS STOP LE DETACHEMENT
DU CONTROLE DES MOUVEMENTS DU LIEU INTERESSE SERA PERSONNELLEMENT RESPONSABLE DE TOUT
MANQUEMENT AUX INSTRUCTIONS CI-DESSUS STOP QUATRE STOP VEUILLEZ ACCUSER RECEPTION ET
CONFIRMER QUE LA TENUEUR DU TELEGRAMME A ETE BIEN COMPRISE STOP ET FIN

Copie aux listes A,B,C et D.

Rah Dad
Major SHAH DAD

Chef du Service du Contrôle des
Mouvements par intérim

1012 Operations

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19/4*

HQ ONUC (LOGS) 761-110V
Dated: 17 Apr -61

To: Air Commander G. G. Chapman
Chief Security Officer

From: Chief Movement Control Officer

Info: Col. J. J. Cassaley ✓ — 451
Commander, Air Transport Base N, Djili
Mil. Ops
CLO

Subject: DUTIES OF MOVEMENT CONTROL AND AIR CREW AS
REGARDS PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT.

1. Attached please find a copy of a letter dated 15th April, received from Officer in Charge MC N, Djili for your information and necessary action please.
2. Will appreciate if a copy of your action taken is endorsed to us and to MC N, Djili.
3. Please acknowledge.

Rahmad
Major
Offg. Chief Movement Control Officer
(Shahdad)

N, Djilli Airport 15 April 1961

To: Chief Movement Control Oficer HQ ONUC LEO
From: OC Movement Control N, Djilli
Subj: DUTIES OF MOVEMENT CONTROL AND AIR CREW AS REGARDS PASSANGERS
AND FREIGHT.

1. New cases have come to light where unauthorised non-UN personnel have emplaned the UN or the chartered UN aircrafts and flown to various destinations. Such incidences reflect badly on the efficiency of the MC detachment and the air crew who are responsible for the handling and conveyance of passengers from one station to another.
In order to avoid such mishaps in future clearcut difference in duties between MC detachment and aircrew which already exists at present be brought to the notice of all the air crew of both UN and UN charted aircrafts.
2. It is pointed out that the responsibility of the MC detachment is over as regards passengers and freight once the pilot signs the manifests and the passengers and the freight are put on the aircraft by the MC detachment. After that it is the responsibility of the air crew and not of MC detachment to see that nobody else gets on the aircraft.
3. It is requested that in order to enforce strict security measures it is highly essential to post some security personnel at the airfield whose sole job should be to avoid the recurrence of such cases.

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OC MOVEMENT CONTROL N'DJILI AIRP
(Y D SAHASRABUDHE)

Handwritten notes:
contops
12 April 1964
12 April 1964

12 April 1

Supreme Commander, ONUC Forces
Maj Hereid, Chief Base Ops, N'Djili

Flight by Continentale Aircraft to Katanga

Several times during the last two months, Continentale has had DC4s through Brazzaville Airport. These have not been chartered by ONUC. During the same period the above mentioned company has had one DC4 chartered by ONUC through Sabena.

Whenever the non UN chartered aircraft landed in Brazzaville one of the Commanders on the same company's UN chartered DC4 went over to Brazzaville. In one case the crew member told me that he was to collect aircraft parts, in another case he said that he should meet the Brazzaville crew because they were not too familiar with the conditions down here and later on he told me a different story. One he went over in the afternoon to be there when the aircraft landed at 0400 in the morning. When I asked what they were doing down there, I never got a straight answer.

Yesterday, 11 Apr around 1200, Continentales DC4 BEF landed at N'Djili from Kamina. BEF was chartered by UN up to the 25 of Mar, then BEB of the same company. I asked a crew member on BEB what BEF was doing down here. He then told me with a smile, "Same thing like Seven Seas". "Are they flying for Tshombe" I said. "Well in some way" was the answer. Then I asked why they landed in Kamina and he said they tried to be refuelled there, but they had no fuel there so they came to N'Djili. Why I said didn't they refuel in Elisabethville because it is not normal for non UN aircraft to go to Kamina for refuelling. Then he gave me the story. He said they were flying arms and ammo to Katanga. The cases used to be marched Police Equipment. On each trip they were bringing from either Brussels or Italy between 7 and 8 hours down to Kolwezi in Katanga (no UN troops there). The place in Italy was near a well known weapon factory, something like Lambrella he said (most probably Beretta). He had been on the first trip and he was convinced that this last one was at least the fourth if not the fifth. On the first trip they landed in Malta for refuelling. The customs people were about to check if, but didn't since the load was addressed to Congo, Brazzaville, (but they thought it was a lot of weapon for the police). After that he believed they never have landed in Malta on the way down to Congo. After Malta they landed somewhere in French Equatorial Africa, where the runway was blocked before and

after the landing! Next landing was in Brazzaville and then finally Kolwezi.

He said he and the rest of the crew now flying for ONUC had realized that this weapon flying for Tshombe was a disgusting business. Consequently the crew had decided when rotated back to Europe they would refuse to fly any more of these trips. Because, as he said, the Company wouldn't dare to order us".


Finally he asked me not to give his name as he had his future to think of too. That, I promised. To the best of my memory those are the complete details of my conversation with the Continentale crew.

I found out that BEF was supposed to leave about 1700 hrs and drove to the Headquarters where I reported the main items of the story to Wing Commander Dobbin in Air Ops. Then we both reported to the Air Commander.

A Canadian Security-Major and a Canadian MP/Captain were called in and it was decided that these two and I were to go immediately to the airport and try to examine the crew. Furthermore I instructed my assistants in Base Ops at the airport to report immediately to the Air Ops. if BEF was about to take off. That happened when we were on our way out to the airport, and Wing Comm. Dobbin passed through the message to the Tower Controller at the airport to return to the parking space and that the crew had to report to Base Ops.

When we arrived at the airport the crew was waiting in my office.

What happened from then on is a matter for the UNOC security.


(H. Haereid) Major
Chief Base Ops.

PS: The acting Base C/o. was not present on the Base when all reported in this letter happened and could not be contacted on the phone. Due to the importance of the matter I then had to report as I did.-