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FUTURE OF UNAMIR IN RWANDA

INTRODUCTION.

1. UNAMIR will complete two years in Rwanda on 17 Aug 95. A lot has been done by the UN in trying to bring a semblance of normalcy to this war-torn country and it is now felt that it was time to assess the future of the mission based on the current situation prevailing.

2. The trouble in Rwanda has been going on between the Tutsis and the Hutus for a good number of years. However the circumstances which forced the International Community to intervene need to be known to carry out a realistic assessment of the future of UNAMIR in Rwanda.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to analyze the options available to UNAMIR in Rwanda keeping in view the latest developments in the country.

SCOPE

4. The scope of the paper will cover the following aspects:

- A. Brief history of the formation of UNAMIR.
- B. Mandate of UNAMIR and its concept of operations.
- C. Prevailing situation in the neighbouring countries and its effects on Rwanda and UNAMIR.
- D. Intentions and Objectives of the Rwandese Govt.
- E. Areas of conflict between UNAMIR and the Rwandese Govt.
- F. Analysis of the factors discussed and important deductions.
- G. UNAMIR's options for the future and recommended option.
- H. Conclusion.

FORMATION OF UNAMIR.

5. In Oct 1990, the exiled force of Tutsis crossed into NE Rwanda from Uganda but the initial assault was repulsed. This force known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) resorted to guerrilla warfare which only ended in Aug 93 when the warring

factions decided to sign the Arusha Peace Agreement. This peace agreement called upon the UN to place a International peace force known as United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in a 22 month peace process starting from 05 Oct 93. At Arusha, the warring factions agreed to the following:

- A. Install a Broad Based Transitional Govt.
- B. Set up transitional institutions.
- C. Deploy a neutral international force.
- D. Withdraw foreign troops from Rwanda.
- E. Deploy a RPF bn in Kigali to protect RPF dignitaries involved in the transition process.
- F. Integrate RGF and RPF into the National Defence Force.
- G. Integrate OAU observers into UN observers.
- H. Protect expatriates and ensure security of humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda.
- I. Repatriate refugees and resettle displaced persons.
- J. Ensure a secure atmosphere for a general elections.

6. Based on the Arusha Agreement, the Security Council adopted Resolution 872 which gave UNAMIR a mandate for 6 months. However, in April 94, after the death of the Rwandese President under suspicious circumstances, the Presidential Guard alongwith the Interhamwe went on a rampage killing thousands of Tutsis and their sympathizers. The RPF, appalled at the carnage taking place, broke the cease fire and went on the counter-offensive and stopped only when they reached the French Protected Zone. During the war, the deteriorating situation led to a drastic scaling down of UNAMIR forces who performed the following tasks:

- A. Provision of security to DPs in camps under UNAMIR's care.
- B. Escort duties.
- C. Humanitarian Assistance to Displaced Persons.
- D. Monitoring activities of NGOs.
- E. Security of personnel involved in distribution of humanitarian aid.
- F. Transfer of Rwandese from territory held by either the RGF or the RPF.

7. UNAMIR's mission now is to assist and coordinate the humanitarian support of participating countries and NGOs with the view to bringing to an end the Rwandese crises. As per Security Council Resolution 965 of 30 Nov 94, UNAMIR's mandate is :

A. Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas.

B. Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

C. Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

D. Contribute to the security in Rwanda of personnel of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and Human Rights officers, including full-time protection for the Prosecutor's Office, as well as security details for missions outside Kigali.

E. Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force.

8. With that extended mandate, the new concept of ops of UNAMIR aims at:

A. Stabilising refugees and displaced persons in their present locations.

B. Preparing the home communes for their return by helping to improve essential life supporting services in the communes with the assistance of NGOs.

C. Encouraging the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes.

D. Providing transportation, food, water, medical assistance on their way to their homes.

E. Assisting the people to return to their normal life and,

F. Hand over in due course, all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese Govt.

9. Based on the new concept of ops, some of the tasks that formed tps have performed are:

A. Conduct of protective ops such as road blocks, check points, vital points protection, observation posts, cordon and search and patrolling.

B. Provision of security in large towns, villages and in refugee/ DP camps.

C. Denial of insurgent activities in the sectors.

D. Guard UN installations within UNAMIR AOR.

E. Assist local authorities in maintaining law and order

in the camps.

F. Motivate the displaced persons to return to their homes.

G. Assist the NGOs in the distribution of food, water and medical support.

H. Assist in the coordination of all NGOs activities.

I. Hand over all activities to the Govt and NGOs progressively as the situation becomes normal.

10. UNAMIR since 06 April 94, has undergone some very important changes. The force is now over 6000 strong and is pursuing its mandate vigorously to return the country to normalcy. The situation is still far from normal and UNAMIR has a major role to play to try and achieve its goal in the shortest possible time frame.

PREVAILING SITUATION IN THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND ITS EFFECT ON UNAMIR AND RWANDA.

ZAIRE.

11. The situation in Zaire is extremely volatile politically as well as militarily. The army has not been paid for the last one year and the civil administration is in shambles. The existing govt is virtually defunct with the result the country's economy has collapsed. Thus, in all probabilities it is safe to assume that the chances of a civil war erupting in the country, are very great. If this eventuality should occur, it possibly would result in a mass exodus of refugees from Zaire into Rwanda, which would further escalate the Rwandese crisis.

12. As of date, there are over 1.2 million Rwandese refugees in Zaire in camps located at Goma and Bukavu. This mass influx of refugees has added a tremendous burden on the already fragile economy of Zaire. The living conditions in the camps are appalling and the time is not far off when these camps would become the bedrock of insurgency in the region. Added to this, is the ever present threat of the volcanos erupting in the Goma region which pose a serious threat to the refugee camps in the region and may result in anything upto 400,000 refugees coming into Rwanda in one go for which contingency planning is already on.

BURUNDI

13. Burundi is also in turmoil. After the April 94 genocide, about 190,000 refugees from Rwanda went into Burundi and are presently located in refugee camps in Magara, Ruvumu, Kibezi, Ntamba, Mugano, Majuri and Rukuramijab.

14. Like Zaire, there is wide spread political unrest in Burundi and if this unrest manifests itself into a civil war, it would result in catastrophic consequences for Rwanda. In fact, as the

genesis of the problem is the same in both the countries, disturbances in one would likely trigger off a spontaneous reaction in the other country.

TANZANIA

15. Tanzania is relatively a more stable country as compared to the others in the region. In Tanzania too, there are about 140,000 Rwandese refugees located in camps in Ngara and Karagwe regions. Although the political atmosphere is much more stable in Tanzania, the mass influx of refugees has imposed a considerable strain on the country's economy and ecological balance, due to which, Tanzania is keen to see the Rwandese refugees leave their soil as early as possible.

EFFECTS ON UNAMIR AND RWANDA

16. From the above facts it is clear that the sub-region is a ticking time bomb that is likely to explode any moment. Any disturbance in the surrounding countries will have a direct bearing on the security of Rwanda and consequently on the task of UNAMIR.

17. Some of the important effects on Rwanda would be as under:

- A. Start of another genocide in Rwanda.
- B. Mass influx / exodus of refugees into and out of Rwanda.
- C. Colossal collateral damage to UNAMIR and Rwandese life and property.
- D. Collapse of the existing govt and resultant anarchy.

INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF RWANDESE GOVT

18. Having won the war against the FRGF at a very heavy cost, the Rwandese Govt has certain aims and objectives laid out for the normalisation of the country and national reconciliation. Some of these are as given in the succeeding paras:

- A. Bring normalcy into the country at the earliest.
- B. Instill a sense of confidence in the minds of the local population towards the new govt.
- C. Establish a viable judicial system in the country at the earliest so as to bring to justice all those persons accused of genocide and other related war crimes.
- D. Empty the IDP camps within the country and resettle the DPs in their Home Communes at the earliest.
- E. Create favourable security conditions within the country so as to encourage the Rwandese refugees in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania to return home in peace and dignity.

- F. Set up the civil administration at the earliest.
- G. Improve the country's economy so as to raise the standard of the Rwandese currency in the world market.
- H. Repair the collateral damage caused by the war.
- I. Gain world financial and technical support in rebuilding the country's economy.
- K. Protect the territorial integrity of Rwanda against attacks by the FRGF and Interhamwe based in Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania.

AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN UNAMIR AND RWANDESE GOVT

19. Having seen the intentions and the objectives of the Rwandese govt, it is important to know the objectives of UNAMIR in Rwanda so as to be derive the areas of difference between the two. The major aims of UNAMIR in Rwanda are given in the following paras:

- A. Stabilising the refugees and DPs in the present locations.
- B. Cooperating with the Rwandese govt in creating ideal conditions for the return of the refugees to their home communes.
- C. Assist/augment NGO's in providing tpt, food, water, medicines etc to the DPs and the returning refugees.
- D. In conjunction with the RPA, create secure conditions in various communes so as to act as deterrent to the bandits and Interhamwe from carrying out looting, killings, kidnapping and other such activities.
- E. Protect UN life and property in Rwanda.
- F. Assist all NGO activities in Rwanda.
- G. Assist the civil administration in the maintenance of law and order in various parts of the country.
- H. Hand over all humanitarian activities to the Rwandese govt and the NGOs as the situation keeps on improving.

20. Although at a glance it looks as if both UNAMIR and the Rwandese govt have the same aims and objectives, there are some major points of differences between the two which are as follows:

- A. The Rwandese govt has started regarding UNAMIR as more of a " occupation army" than a peace keeping one. This is due to the fact that they regard the strength of the formed tps to be far in excess of that required to fulfil the given mandate.
- B. The govt firmly believes it has the sole sovereign

right to safe guard the sanctity of the Rwandese borders. They thus have strong objections to the patrolling activities conducted by the formed tps and the MILOBS as they see it as an infringement on their duties. Similarly, objections are raised to UNAMIR providing security to the NGO's as they feel it is their duty to ensure security of all foreign nationals.

C. The biggest complaint that the Rwandese Govt have against the UN in general as an International Body, is that it failed to react to the country's needs to stop the massacres in April 1994. They strongly feel that the UN withdrew in the time of crisis leaving the country at the mercy of the genocide perpetrators. This is one allegation that the UN has not yet responded satisfactorily.

D. UNAMIR's actions of providing sanctuary to the locals who are sought by the RPA for various offenses is seen by them as standing in the way of their system of justice. Similarly, the provision of medical aid to the locals is seen by the Rwandese govt as trying to take over the civil administration of the country as also an attempt to take away the jobs of the Rwandese doctors, pharmacists etc.

E. The Rwandese govt also feels that the presence of UNAMIR is seriously undermining all their efforts to try and bring stability into the country. They feel that with all that UNAMIR has done for the betterment of Rwanda, it has made the locals totally dependent on UN and that the locals no longer regard the govt as an effective one.

F. It is a fact that the presence of UNAMIR formed tps is believed to be vital for the smooth functioning of the various UN agencies and the NGOs as also the Milobs. This is due to the fact that the presence of formed tps gives a sense or aura of security to all the other agencies, but the Rwandese govt still has the objection that providing security is not part of the UNAMIR mandate. Also the question in front of us still remains wether security is really being provided to the locals by the formed tps? This question arises as there is no way that UNAMIR can protect the locals from arrests and detention by the RPA as this would amount to gross interference in the judicial system of Rwanda.

G. UNAMIR has given the reasoning for the presence of the formed tps as to ensure in conjunction with Human Rights, that no violation of Human Rights takes place. The Rwandese govt feels that if it is just a matter of monitoring incidents of human rights violations, then this can be done by increasing the number of Milobs and the involvement of NGOs and concurrently, reduce the numbers of UN formed tps in Rwanda.

21. These differences between the Rwandese govt and the UNAMIR, though working towards a common goal of bringing back normalcy into Rwanda, has created serious doubts in the minds of people, as to wether UN needs to retain a 6000 strong force of formed tps

or can the task be still achieved by a lesser force.

ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AND DEDUCTIONS.

22. Having seen the various factors, certain important deductions can be drawn based on which the options for UNAMIR can be drawn. These deductions are as under:

A. In view of the prevailing internal situation in Zaire and Burundi, there is a definite need for UNAMIR formed tps in Rwanda to cater for any potential fallout from the political turmoil in the region.

B. In case the volcanoes in Zaire erupt, it will result in catastrophic consequences for Rwanda as the mass influx of refugees from the Goma region, will place an impossible burden on the already fragile economy of the country as also the fact that, the security situation would definitely deteriorate. In this eventuality, the presence of UN formed tps as also NGOs in Rwanda will most definitely increase as the present strength would be grossly inadequate.

C. The future working of the NGOs as also the Milobs, depends directly on the prevalent security situation in Rwanda and this safe working environment can only be achieved by the physical presence of formed tps at this time.

D. A much more deeper understanding between UNAMIR and the Rwandese govt is essential to remove the misinterpretations regarding the role of UN tps in Rwanda. It must be made clear to the govt that the UNAMIR tps are not shielding fugitives from justice; rather it is a case of giving refuge to locals who are trying to escape the arbitrary arrests of the RPA as the locals have no faith in the judicial system of the country.

E. As regards the two issues of monitoring of Human Rights violations and whether UNAMIR formed tps are providing any security to the locals against arbitrary arrests by the RPA are concerned, both give an important deduction that the strength of formed tps can be decreased.

FUTURE OPTIONS FOR UNAMIR

23. Based on the above quoted facts and analysis, there are basically three main options for UNAMIR in its peace keeping role in Rwanda. These are as under:

A. **Option 1.** Maintain status quo as regards the strength of formed tps in Rwanda.

B. **Option 2.** Reduce strength of formed tps and correspondingly increase the number of Milobs and NGOs in Rwanda.

C. **Option 3.** Increase the strength of formed UNAMIR tps

in Rwanda.

24. It can be appreciated that option 2 is not a practical one to be implemented in Rwanda at present, primarily because of the following critical factors:

- A. The present ethnic and political turmoil in the region.
- B. The need to provide a secure environment for the effective working of the Milobs and the various NGOs.
- C. The ever present threat of the volcanoes erupting in Zaire and its consequences for Rwanda.
- D. Given the present security situation in Rwanda where even UN formed tps are being targeted by FRGF/Bandits as also the spate of arbitrary arrests by the RPA, reduction in strength of formed tps would result in consequences like they existed from April to July 1994.

25. Keeping in view the above facts, it is clear that either option 1 or option 3 needs to be exercised. Option 3 has the disadvantage that it would involve extra expenditure for the UN which, given the present precarious position of the availability of funds, may not be a viable option.

Recommended Option.

26. In view of the above, the recommended option is Option 1 because of the following advantages:

- A. No additional expenditure is involved.
- B. The present strength of formed tps in Rwanda is sufficient to cater for the contingency of the volcanoes in Zaire erupting as also to cater for any fallout of an ethnic or political turmoil in the neighbouring countries.
- C. The current deployment of the formed tps, provides adequate security to ensure the safe working of the Milobs and NGOs.
- D. In case of the situation deteriorating to an extent that evacuation of UNAMIR from Rwanda is warranted, the present strength of approx 6100 can easily be evacuated in an acceptable time frame.

27. Although option 2 has the maximum advantages, the issues of UNAMIR's interference with the Rwandese system of justice and other factors which are the bone of contention between the two, have to be addressed at the earliest and sorted out amicably.

CONCLUSION

28. There is no doubt in anybody's mind that UNAMIR has done yeoman service in Rwanda in trying to bring peace to this war

torn country. Repair to roads and bridges, medical assistance, providing security to the local population and assisting in other humanitarian activities, have gone a long way in improving the situation in Rwanda and this proves the necessity of maintaining the presence of formed UN tps till such time that the situation comes to normal.

29. Efforts now need to be made at the highest level of political and military hierarchy, to ensure that the minor misunderstandings between the Rwandese govt and UNAMIR are sorted out, so that the common aim of bringing peace to the country is achieved at the earliest, thus making the UNAMIR one of the most successful UN missions in the world.

Brainstorming Points

1. What is the number/configuration of the military that would be required to fulfil on existing mandate which could be summarized as follows:

(a) Contribute to security and protection of IDP's, refugees and civilians at risk including the establishment of secure humanitarian areas.

Note: This requirement was logical in a two front situation where, in a civil war situation, the innocent population sought security and shelter from violence and persecution. It was expected that UN would and in fact did provide this security. We are now operating with a sovereign, one dimensional Government which feels that our 'protection' is an intrusion on their sovereignty. Rwanda does not recognize IDP's. They want them going home, working in the fields. They feel UN is protecting and spoon-feeding the criminal and the indolent.

(b) However, our protection and security support for transit camps and safe corridors would be welcome.

(c) The fact that our presence across the country gives an aura of confidence and security need to be recognized particularly in the context of returning refugees, IDP's and eventually the reconciliation process. Until the refugees return, this confidence-building role needs to be played by UNAMIR. But do we need the existing proportion of formal troops to Milobs?

(d) Security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief. This requirement is likely to continue but what proportion of formal troops/Milobs/logistic call etc. do we need?

(e) National Reconciliation. This exercise no longer requires a large presence of troops or of civilians. This process can be taken in hand by a handful of experienced intermediaries.

(f) Protection and security for International Tribunal and Human Rights Monitors.

(g) Assist police force.

2. Against this background the overall question arises:


(a) do we need the present configuration and strength to perform our mandate?

(b) If we are to reduce numbers, by how much?

(c) Now that a sovereign Government is established and has control, is not our peace-keeping role at an end? Would not prolonging our stay risk ending up in confrontation.

(d) Is not the accent now on re-structuring, rehabilitation and development and less on military presence?

(e) If we are to phase out - when do we start? Should not UNREO close down by March/April? (i.e. after main effort with IDP's) as a signal.



Shaharyar Khan
Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Rwanda

RE
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AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL SUPPORT FORCE

MINUTE

521 - 1 - 1

18/3/95

FMO

FL
Sir, I have requested a brief
be written for you.
In interest, this may assist

UNAMIR II MANDATE AND OP RETOUR

FMO 24/3 1/3

References:

- A. Conversation FMO/Legal Officer 1 Mar 94;
- B. United Nations Security Council Resolution 965 dated 30 Nov 94.

1. During reference A the FMO raised with the Legal Officer his concern about the culpability of UNAMIR II in relation to the repatriation of IDP's during OP RETOUR. His concern was fixed around the position of UNAMIR II where personnel from the mission had a reasonable belief that an IDP upon repatriation to his or her commune may face unlawful arrest, imprisonment or other human rights abuse.

2. Reference B reaffirms inter alia, that UNAMIR II will:


"Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas."

The word 'risk' is not defined in the Resolution, but it can be argued, that given its usual every day meaning it can include those displaced persons who are reasonably likely to suffer unlawful arrest and imprisonment, positive discrimination, or physical abuse.

3. As it is duty of UNAMIR II to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, which includes those IDP's presently in camps and the subject of OP RETOUR, then returning, or encouraging IDP's to return to their homes in circumstances where it is reasonably likely that they will be at 'risk', may amount to a breach by UNAMIR II of its mandate.

4. It should also be said that it is far from clear at the moment as to whether any of the 20,000 plus persons presently being detained in Rwandan prisons for genocide related crimes are being so held lawfully. It is recommended that liaison with HRFOR occur to determine the extent to which the rule of law in the arrest and detention process has, and is, being applied.

5. Further I recommend that the Force Commander seek advice from New York on this issue given the obvious significant consequences for the mission.


C. K. McCONAGHY
MAJ
SO2 Legal

/ MAR 95

F. TASKS UNDER THE NEW MANDATE.

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT RWANDA AND ITS POPULATION

4. GEOGRAPHY. Rwanda is a small country with a rugged terrain with steep hills and widges. The reletation varies from tropical rain forest in the West and savanna grassland in the East.

5. POPULATION. The population of Rwanda used to be 8.2 million I do not think that population new is upto 5 million. The original inhabitent of RWANDA were TWA people, then came the HUTUs hundreds of years from the North followed by the Tutsis in the eighteenth century. The Hutus form 85% of the population, followed by the Tutsis 14% and the Twa 1%.

6. RWANDA like ZAIRE and BURUNDI were under BELGIAN domination. The Tutsi while under belgian domination took advantage of Western education and thus enable them to occupy very important positions both politically and economically. For example in BURUNDI, the military, the economy were in the hands of the Tutsis. The situation was no different in RWANDA. While the status quo prevailed in BURUNDI, in 1959 the Hutus in RWANDA revolted to overthrow the Tutsi domination. The rebellion led to the massacres of 20,000 Tutsis, with 160,000 fleeing into neighbouring countries. A UN supervised refreodum in 1961 brought victory to the a Hutu led party known as the party of Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMA HUTU).

7. The political environment though tense was stable until in 1990 when 10,000 troops made up mainly of exiled Tutsis attacked Rwanda from the North. The attack was repulsed by the Rwandese Government Forces with the assistance of French and Zairian troops, thus forcing the invading Rwandese Patriotic Force to turn guerrilla. For three years the RPF continued to gain ground through its military activities against the government forces until in Mar 1993 a cease fire was agreed by the rebel forces and the Government troops. Under the Truce the RGF agreed to give up half of the territory it controlled to give way to the creation of a 19 KM wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

8. On 04 August 1993 the RPF and the RGF under the aegis of the OAU signed the Arusha Peace Agreement which called upon the UN to put in place a Neutral Force Known as UNAMIR to assist in a 22 month peace process, starting from 05 Oct 93. *

9. Based on the Arusha agreement the relevant Security Council Resolutions were passed to give birth to UNAMIR.

10. Prior to the arrival of UNAMIR troops in Rwanda. The OAU had an observes team in RWANDA to monitor the cease fire. These officers were absorbed into UNAMIR in Nov 93.

ARUSHA AGREEMENT

11. At ARUSHA the following were agreed to:

- a. That a Broad Base Transitional Government be installed.
- b. That transitional institutions be established.
- c. That foreign troops withdraw from RWANDA.
- d. That a Bn of RPF troops be deployed in Kigali to protect RPF dignitaries during the transition period.
- e. That expatriates be protected and security provided to humanitarian agencies operating in RWANDA.
- f. That OAU observers be integrated into the UN Observer force.
- g. That refugees be repatriated and displaced persons resettled.
- i. And finally creating a secure atmosphere for a general election.

FORMATION OF UNAMIR

OP RETOUR - HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

~~1. You will be aware no~~

1. As the immediate benefits of OP RETOUR
are now be

1. Now that the first flush of success during
of RETOUR has been realised, and the the



UNAMIR - MINUAR

AGENDA FOR COS WEEKLY ADMINISTRATIVE MEETING
28 FEBRUARY 1995


1. Matters arising out of the previous meeting :
 - a. Progress on containers / pre- fabricated accommodation for formed troops.
 - b. Usage of sustainment rations.
 - c. Requirement of maintaining staff lists of contingents at the HQ.
 - d. Opening of PX.
 - e. Requirement of establishing an EDP committee to control issue of computers.
2. Points by the participants.
3. Miscellaneous.

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TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF ETHIOPIA
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Ref. No. MOD/TGE/UNAMIR II/013/94
Addis Ababa 18 August 94
Date 19

P. O. Box 1373

Tel. 51 17 77

TO: UNAMIR FORCE HQs,
KIGALI, RWANDA

AX NO 001(212) 963 - 3090

FROM: MOND - TGE, ADDIS ABABA

AX NO 51 14 17 17

AX NO 51 55 07

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ATTN: ANNAN, USG, DPKO - UNHQ
NEW YORK

PAX NO (212) 963 - 4879

TOTAL NO OF PAGES : 1

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Ethiopian Airlines, Type boeing 737, call sign 8245, is sch-
eduled to land Kigali at 1200ZT on 19 August 1994.

We request a 2 hour window, plus of minus, to accomodate
either or any other problems.

COL CRISSY
GENEVA

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WITH REGARD

For ASAMINEW BEDANE
Department Head for Foreign
Military Relations

E/DIR FC CAO (COO) AIRLARS

FORM P. 1700 2669

Sectin Composite Engineering Company.

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KATONA. To pick up ~~and~~ recruit
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A DIPLOMAT AND TURNER TECHNICAL
ASSISTANTS, -

EVACUATION PLAN FOR RWANDA

Introduction

1. The security situation in Rwanda was gradually returning to normalcy up to the beginning of 1995, but has changed rapidly since with an increase in banditry, hijacking of United Nations vehicles, attack on UNAMIR military bases, personal attacks on international civilian staff and arrest/detention of locally recruited staff of UN family of organizations.
2. Incidents of killings, cross border raids, and other malpractices such as human rights abuses, have been constantly reported in different parts of the country, This may be unconnected to ethnic animosities, and a determination for vengeance, emanating from events of the past.
3. The defeat of the Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) in the recently concluded civil war, and their taking refuge in the neighbouring countries like Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi has given rise to a high sense of insecurity. The Goma camp in Zaire is said to have between 16,000-18,000 former RGF and Bukavu 12,000-15,000. Tanzania is also no exception to the presence of FRGF estimated at 15,000 troops.
4. Reports of organized training, command, and control structures of the FRGF in the neighbouring countries preparing to launch a counter war against the Tutsi (RPA) have been constantly received. Further reports of serious ethnic violence in neighbouring Burundi on the same ethnic lines as Rwanda has given rise to further threats.
5. The attack by the FRGF if any, may take the form of infiltrating the country so as to establish bases for insurgency activities. The most likely areas of hostility may come from the Zairian border with Rwanda i.e. Goma and Bukavu sectors, and Tanzania as well. According to military appreciation of the situation, Kigali the seat of Government may be destabilized by small teams infiltrating to carry out insurgency operations. Initially, the attack may be on those lines, and with time, it may develop into full scale conventional operations.
6. Outlining the current situations in Rwanda, it is time to dwell on the present level of alertness as prescribed in our security evacuation plan.
7. Since after the war in Rwanda in July 1994, the level of security alertness in our evacuation plan has been at Phase III - Relocation, although we have been operating at Phase I level - Precautionary. Therefore the Rwandan Phase III is a modified Phase. However, any attempt to introduce Phase II - Restricted Movements, would demand non essential staff members to stay at home; not to mention Phase III - Relocation. Since the operational level of alertness calls for Phase I - Precautionary, it is planned to maintain it at that level until security situation commands a change.

8. In view of the foregoing, the following precautionary measures have been implemented;

- (a) Imposed movement restrictions on all personnel advising indoors not later than 2100 hrs;
- (b) Sent out security guidelines to all personnel advising them about the whole security situation in the country;
- (c) Advised them to check the validity of their passports, Laissez-Passer, exit visas and health certificates, etc;
- (d) To pack personal belongings up to 15 kg per person for emergency case;
- (e) Check on food, water, candles, matches and first aid kit;
- (f) Keep some money in cash up to \$600.00 or even more;
- (g) Keep all UNAMIR vehicles refuelled;
- (h) Staff members to submit list of personal effects to Personnel and Security departments;
- (i) Names and house addresses of staff members to be sent to Security;
- (j) Staff members advised of regrouping and concentration points, and procedures in the different sectors, and zones in the city, and the different zone wardens etc.

9. During this phase no official travel by staff members of the organizations should be undertaken without explicit approval of the Designated Official through the United Nations Security Coordinator. The Office of the UN Security Coordinator at Headquarters, New York advises that no travel between cities is authorized from 18:00 to 05:30 hours.

Purpose

1. The purpose of the United Nations Evacuation Plan as set out in this document is to select the actions to be taken, to ensure the security of Military Observers, Civpol, Military Force, International Civilian Staff of UNAMIR, the International Tribunal's staff and the staff of United Nations Agencies and their recognized dependents in Rwanda. Assistance may be provided to locally recruited staff, subject to political considerations. It should be kept in mind that there are an infinite number of different security situations which may arise and the evacuation plan provides for a series of options to be drawn upon, reviewed and revised as circumstances dictate.

2. The primary responsibility for the protection of UN personnel, their dependents (for agencies only) and property rests with the host government. Ensuring the safety and security of UNAMIR personnel and agency staff is a matter of paramount importance and if it relies on contingent the cooperation and assistance of all UN personnel in Rwanda, to ensure its full implementation. Revisions to this plan will be promulgated as the need arises. All officials are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the contents of the Evacuation Plan.

3. One of the main goals of this plan is the continued fulfillment of UNAMIR and UN agencies' mandate for as long as security conditions allow. This may mean that operations could be curtailed or ceased in some regions/provinces, while continuing in others.

Applicability of the Security Arrangements

4. The security arrangements provided in this Evacuation Plan are intended to cover all military personnel, agency staff and their recognized dependents, Civpol and international civilian staff. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is responsible for the security of UN personnel in Rwanda. It should be noted that since UNAMIR is a non-family mission, family members of UNAMIR staff who may be in the mission area are not included in the arrangements because they have no official UN status in the country. The UNDP Resident Representative will act as Deputy Designated Official and coordinates the security of agency staff and their dependents.

Management of the Security Plan

5. Ambassador Shaharyar Khan is the UNAMIR official in charge of management of the Security Plan in Rwanda. The UNDP Resident Representative is the official in charge of the coordination of all agency staff in Rwanda. The SRSG and the UNDP Resident Representative will be responsible to the Secretary-General, through the United Nations Security Coordinator, for ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel. They will maintain liaison with the government of the host country on matters concerning the security and protection of UN personnel and, through the United Nations Security Coordinator, will be responsible to the Secretary-General:

- (a) for establishing a Security Plan for Rwanda, including a number of feasible options for the movement of personnel within the host country, or to a safe haven outside the mission, should relocation or evacuation become necessary;
- (b) for keeping the Secretary-General informed, through the United Nations Security Coordinator, of all developments within the host country which may have a bearing on the security, safety and protection of UN personnel. In this regard, where operational matters touch on security or the lack thereof, these should also be communicated to the United Nations Security Coordinator;
- (c) for the implementation of any arrangements adopted by the Secretary-General in support of the host government measures for the security and protection of UN personnel and property;

- (d) for forming the appropriate security management team, a crisis management team and a joint security operation team identifying the personnel who will have special responsibilities in this regard;
- (e) for ensuring that those with special responsibilities for security receive adequate and appropriate training, inter alia, with respect to communications, available transport facilities and a thorough knowledge of the areas for which they are responsible as wardens including the addresses of all staff members residing therein;
- (f) for establishing a briefing system that would ensure that all personnel are advised of specific precautionary measures which must be taken in relation to the security plan;
- (g) for taking action short of relocation in an emergency when it has not been possible to communicate with the Secretary-General. Where there is a breakdown of communications within the emergency area, the SRSG and the UNDP Resident Representative will exercise their best judgement in carrying out the relocation/evacuation to a safe haven area and reporting to the Secretary-General immediately thereafter; and
- (h) for ensuring that adequate and appropriate arrangements are in place for locally-recruited staff.

PART ONE

1. Responsibility

6. This section of the Evacuation Plan describes the responsibilities of officials concerned with the plan for Rwanda.

1.1 Security Coordinator

By delegation of authority from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, **Mr. Benon Sevan**, ASG - Tel. No. Office 1-212-963-5767, Fax.No. 1-212-963-4140, is the Security Coordinator at Headquarters, New York, for the UN system of organizations. **Mr. Sevan** is assisted by:

Mr. Eduardo Gutierrez	Deputy Security Coordinator Tel: (Office) 1-212-906-5500 Fax: 1-212-963-3609 E-Mail: UDP-095
Ms. Diana Russler	Sr. Security Coordination Officer Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-7584 Fax: 1-212-362-2544 (Beeper) 1-212-314-8676
Mr. Julio Grieco	Security Coordination Officer Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-1914 Fax: 1-212-838-1867
Mr. Richard Manlove	Security Coordination Officer Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-1867
Mr. Terry Burke	Security Coordination Officer Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-5184 Fax: 1-212-833-0868

1.2 Designated Official

The SRSB, Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, is the Designated Official (DO) for security matters for all UN personnel in Rwanda. The UNDP Resident Representative is the Deputy Designated Official, entrusted with the responsibility to coordinate all agency staff and their recognized dependents in Rwanda for security matters.

1.3 Security Management Team/Crisis Management Team

To assist the DO in his task, a UNAMIR Security Management Team/Crisis Management Team, consisting of the Force Commander, the Deputy Force Commander, the

2
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Chief of Staff, the Civpol Commissioner, the CAO, the UNDP Resident Representative, the UNHCR Representative, the UNICEF Representative and UNAMIR and UNDP Field Security Officers has been established.

1.4 Joint Security Operations Team

The Security Operations Team consisting of the Deputy Force Commander, the DCOS Sup, the CAO, the COS, the CISS, the CCO, the CTO, the CCPO, AirOps, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNREO, WFP, WHO, a legal adviser and the UNAMIR and the UNDP Field Security Officers, has also been established and should meet on a regular basis.

Amb. Shaharyar Khan

SRSG, Designated Official

Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-309

Fax: 1-212-963-3090

Mr. R. R. Sukehiro Hasegawa

UNDP Resident Representative,

Deputy Designated Official

Tel: (Office)

Fax:

Mr. Paul Ishlika

Chief of Security, Field Security Officer
[delegated by CAO]

Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-9906

Fax: 1-212-963-3090

MGen. G. Toussignant

Force Commander, Member

Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-3092

Fax: 1-212-963-3090

BGen. Ahyidoho

DFC/COS, Member

Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-9906

Col C.O. Diarra

Civpol Commissioner, Member

Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-9906

Mr. Ally H. Golo

CAO, Member

Tel: (Office) 1-212-963-3091

Fax: 1-212-963-3090

Mr.

UNICEF Representative, Member

Tel: (Office)

Mr.

UNHCR Representative, Member

Tel: (Office)

Mr.

UNDP Field Security Officer

The Operations Team is responsible for ensuring that the necessary logistical and administrative arrangements are capable of coping with an emergency. The Team makes recommendations for consideration by the Security Management Team/Crisis Management Team.

1.5 UNAMIR Field Security Officer/Chief Warden/Wardens/Deputy Wardens

The field Security Officer is responsible for ensuring that day-to-day security matters are on hand, and that the Security Plan is up-to-date. Duties of Field Security Officer is attached as Annex A.

1.6 Wardens

The Chief Warden and a Deputy, Wardens and Deputy Wardens are officials appointed by the Designated Official and are responsible for the implementation of the Evacuation Plan within their respective sectors.

1.6.1 The warden will:

- (a) functions as a channel of communications between the DO and UN personnel in his/her zone;
- (b) ensure that UN personnel in his/her zone are informed with regard to security arrangements and emergency phases in effect;
- (c) verify to see that instructions or precautionary measures are being followed;
- (d) carry out other duties as assigned by the DO.

1.6.2 The duties of the Wardens is attached as Annex B. List of Warden is attached as Annex C. Letters of appointment for Wardens is attached as Annex D.

1.6.3. Deputy Wardens are expected to be familiar with all aspects of the plan and be prepared to replace the Wardens whenever necessary.

7. UNAMIR Operational Sectors are in line with the division of Rwanda into six sectors. For the purpose of the Evacuation Plan, the sixth sector will be the HQ of UNAMIR at Amahoro Hotel. Each Operational sector Commander is Warden of his own sector and each subsector Commander is deputy warden in his subsector. The DFC will be the Chief Warden of UNAMIR HQ. Direction and selection of Deputy Wardens in Rwanda come under the control of the Chief Warden, assisted by the Field Security Officers. All are members of the Security Management Team. Monthly wardens' meetings should be held and chaired by the Chief Warden. Given that the UN deployed a force in Rwanda, the implementation of the Security Plan has been entrusted to that Force. It follows that all

But how
where is
the one
GP of the
force?

wardens should be from the military to the extent possible. However, deputy wardens should be from international staff of UN family of organizations.

8. In order to minimize confusion during an emergency situation, the Joint Security Operations Team must take stock of the UNDP warden system and integrate it into the overall system for the Evacuation Plan for Rwanda.

PART TWO

2. Phases

9. This section deals with the phases. The Evacuation Plan for Rwanda consists of five phases, as follows:

- (a) Phase One: Precautionary
- (b) Phase Two: Restricted Movement
- (c) Phase Three: Concentration/Relocation (staging)
- (d) Phase Four: Suspension of Operations
- (e) Phase Five: Evacuation

(a) Phase One - Precautionary

Following **notification** to the Secretary-General, of the **declaration** of **Phase One**, the SRSG Designated Official may take **any or all** of following actions:

- (i) Notify the designated Official(s) in the safe haven country and in nearby country(ies) of the implementation of Phase One;
- (ii) Convene the Security Management Team; establish a coordination center which should be UNAMIR HQ;
- (iii) Convene a meeting of wardens and their deputies each of who will ensure the proper implementation of the security plan in a particular predetermined sector/zone;
- (iv) Review and update the security plan. Identify personnel for specific security-related tasks;
- (v) Notify **all** UN personnel of the implementation of Phase One, reminding them to:
 - a. avoid unnecessary movement;
 - b. check validity of travel documents: laissez-passer and national passports;
 - c. not to overreact or discuss the initiation of the alert with anyone other than UN personnel;
 - d. observe that children are not removed from school (for agency staff);

*Indicators to
order this phase.*

- (vi) Advise of any case of hospitalization or other medical problem that could need special attention;
- (vii) Check the needs of other persons who are eligible for United Nations assistance, particularly staff and dependents of UN agency personnel;
- (viii) Check that there are adequate supplies of rations/stores.

(b) **Phase Two - Restricted Movement**

10. The DO may declare **Phase Two - Restricted Movement** to signify a much higher level of alert than the precautionary phase and to impose major restrictions on the movement of all personnel. During this phase, all personnel will remain at home, at base or on post unless otherwise instructed. In addition, no official travel either incoming or within the country, should occur unless specifically authorized by the DO and the Deputy Designated Official as essential. In this phase the CMO, the COS, the UNDP Res. Rep., the Civpol Commissioner and the CAO will be responsible for informing the Military Force, Civpol, Milobs, and staff of other UN agencies who are on leave (home leave/CTO) of the declaration of Phase Two.

11. Following the **notification** to the Secretary-General through the United Nations Security Coordinator, of the declaration of Phase Two, the DO may take **any or all** of the following actions:

- (i) Notify the Designated Official(s) in the safe haven and nearby country(ies) that Phase Two has been implemented;
- (ii) Instruct all personnel to remain at home, at base or on post, except those who are required to maintain operations or implement security measures;
- (iii) Determine which personnel would be considered as non-essential in the event that Phase Three is implemented;
- (iv) Maintain close liaison with government authorities, as appropriate;
- (v) Obtain from the host government details of any road restrictions and the current situation of ports and airports, as applicable;
- (vi) Instruct removal of children from school (for agency staff).

- Actions to
counter the threat.
- Levels of threat.
- What's the threat.

(c) **Phase Three - Concentration/Relocation (staging)**

12. **Phase Three** is to enable the DO to recommend to the Secretary-General, through the United Nations Security Coordinator, the implementation of any or all of the mandatory actions.

13. Depending on the security situation, directives will be issued for the temporary concentration/relocation (staging) of all UN personnel to a selected safe area(s). The determination of essential personnel for security purposes will be made by the DO and in conjunction with the UNDP Res. Rep. for Agency staff. However, any person unable to effectively carry out his/her assigned tasks due to the deteriorating security situation should be considered non-essential. Operations of the military Force will continue, unless otherwise instructed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

14. With the declaration of **Phase Three**, the DO will take the following actions:

- (i) Notify the Designated Official in the safe haven country as well as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Three;
- (ii) Notify the host government and request assistance if necessary;
- (iii) Brief Wardens, as necessary, on further steps that may be required including:
 - a. transportation arrangements;
 - b. securing of housing and personal property;
 - c. arrangements for luggage, documents and food.
- (iv) Notify the United Nations Security Coordinator that no official travel by personnel of the United Nations should be undertaken to Kigali without the explicit approval of the DO, through the United Nations Security Coordinator;
- (v) At this stage, the DO may recommend to the Secretary-General through the United Nations Security Coordinator, the relocation outside the country of all remaining internationally recruited staff members, except those directly concerned with security matters and directives regarding the Military Force and/or the MILOBS and the CIVPOL.

(d) **Phase Four - Suspension of Operations**

The decision to initiate **Phase Four - Suspension of Operations** is to enable the Designated Official to recommend to the Secretary-General through the United Nations

- what does it involve
- what are the various actions involved?
- mechanics?

Security Coordinator the Relocation outside Rwanda of all remaining internationally recruited staff members, Civpol and Milobs, except those directly concerned with Emergency, or Humanitarian Operations or Security matters. All other internationally recruited staff members who heretofore were considered essential to maintain mission activities be evacuated at this time.

With the declaration of Phase Four, the Designated Official will take **all** of the following actions:

- says nothing about the phase.*
- (i) Notify the Designated Official in the safe have country, as well as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Four;
 - (ii) Notify the Local authorities and request assistance as necessary; and
 - (iii) Notify Wardens or otherwise instruct UN personnel on actions to be taken.

(e) **Phase Five-Evacuation**

15. The decision to initiate **Phase Five-Evacuation** signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that all remaining internationally-recruited staff members, Milobs, Civpols and if required the Military Force are required to leave. With the declaration of Phase Five, normally by the Secretary-General, the DO will take the following actions:

- Doesn't cover the entire process of pers, stores, etc.
- Doesn't specify responsibilities & what all to evacuate.
- Mechanism?*
- (i) Notify the Designated Official in the safe haven countries as well as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Five,
 - (ii) Notify the host government and request assistance if necessary;
 - (iii) Designate a senior locally-recruited staff member as Officer-in-charge and issue instructions for, **inter alia**:
 - a. the safety and welfare of locally-recruited staff members and their eligible family members;
 - b. the security and safe keeping of UN premises, property and equipment;
 - c. the means of communicating with the DO and the UNDP Res Rep following their departure.

In the event that Forces are to remain, arrangements under para 15 (iii) should be turned over to the Force Commander.

- (iv) The relocation/evacuation of UN personnel will, in the first instance, normally be to a designated safe haven area(s), either inside the country or in another country. This area will be designated by the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the DO and taking into account all factors such as the availability of air flights, hotel accommodations, communication facilities, staff resources at the office of the Designated Official in the safe haven area(s) outside the country, for instance to evacuees.

Evacuation of military personnel may be done on the basis of factors to be determined by the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the DO. For protection purposes, for instance, the Force may be required to leave only when all UN civilian personnel, Civpol and Milobs have been evacuated.

16. The Designated Official in the safe haven country will be alerted at the earliest possible moment to a possible evacuation to permit local arrangements to be made for the reception and accommodation of UNAMIR evacuees. At this stage, UNDP may make similar arrangements for Agency staff or avail itself of the same arrangements as for UNAMIR evacuees.

17. It is emphasized that during the above phase all UN operations in Rwanda may recommence if the situation changes. In this regard, the UN Security Coordinator may take into account the specific mandate of UN presence in Rwanda. Until orders from United Nations, New York or the DO states otherwise, UN organizations will retain their capability to resume operations to the maximum extent possible.

PART THREE

3. Operational Aspects

18. This section deals with practical operational aspects of the Evacuation Plan.

3.1. Sectors

19. United Nations Operation in Rwanda is divided into six sectors for the purpose of implementing the security plan, these are :

Sector 1 Nicoy	-	Byumba
Sector 2 Ghanbatt	-	Kibungo
Sector 3A Malawicoy	-	Butare
Sector 3B Malicoy	-	Gitarama
Sector 4A Zambatt	-	Gikongoro
Sector 4B Senbatt	-	Kibuye
Sector 4C Ethiobatt	-	Cyangugu
Sector 5 Tunbatt	-	Ruhengeri - ?
Sector 6 Indbatt	-	Kigali

Instructions will be issued as the situation warrants.

3.2 Coordination centre/Concentration points

Having considered the availability of/and, supplies of food and water and adequacy of sanitation facilities, accessibility and proximity to potential evacuation points, Amahoro Hotel, Trafipro, the Meridien and Chez Lando, etc have been designated as United Nations staging areas. The coordination between concentration points will be from Amahoro Hotel.

3.3 Designation of Safe Haven

Nairobi (Kenya), Kabale/Kampala (Uganda) and Goma (Zaire) will be designated as UNAMIR (and UN Agencies) safe haven depending to a large extent on the determination of critical points.

3.4 Essential measures/supplies

The CISS and the DCOS Sup are responsible for indicating estimates of requirements for logistical support in an emergency situation such as drinking water, food reserves, medical supplies, transport facilities, fuel reserves, communications equipment. These reserves should support UN personnel for a reasonable period of time. Plans should be drawn up regarding where these reserves would be kept. Present arrangements for UNDP and UN agencies in Rwanda should be made part of UNAMIR logistical support.

*Stadium - ?
- Accy Pts - ?
- Ask us
whether defensible?*

3.5 Other Administrative Arrangements

The CAO will be responsible for implementing all administrative arrangements required during Phase Five such as travel, accommodation, payment of allowances etc. UNDP and UN agencies should make similar arrangements.

4. Conclusion

20. The primary management tool for security preparedness in Rwanda is the Security Plan. The aim of the plan is to detail the responsibilities of individuals, the actions to be carried out, the sequence to be followed to ensure the security of UN personnel and the practical operational aspects to be observed. This plan will be updated annually or as required depending on how the situation develops in the area of operation.

21. In order for UNAMIR and UN agencies to fulfill their assigned mission and responsibilities, it is essential that all personnel react promptly to all situations and that preparations are made to meet all unforeseen operational requirements.

22. All UN personnel should understand that the security situation in the mission area could change suddenly. With this awareness, each person must maintain a degree of caution and preparedness.

ANNEX A

DUTIES OF THE UNAMIR FIELD SECURITY OFFICER

The duties of the Field Security Officer under the overall supervision of the Designated Official are the following:

- (a) Assisting the Designated Official in the execution of the responsibilities with regard to the security of personnel and property;
- (b) Preparing and maintaining the Security Plan and submitting it to the UN Co-ordinator or the Emergency Co-ordination Unit as appropriate for approval by the Secretary-General;
- (c) Maintaining contact with national law enforcement agencies to obtain the best possible protection for personnel and property;
- (d) Maintaining records of all organizations' personnel and their dependents and submitting and updating personnel listings to UN Co-ordinator or the Emergency Co-ordination Unit as appropriate;
- (e) Collecting and maintaining inventories of household effects for all personnel;
- (f) Conducting weekly communications checks and submitting reports for all personnel;
- (g) Keeping personnel and dependents informed with regard to security arrangements and emergency measures; and
- (h) serving as a member of the Security Management Team.

ANNEX B

DUTIES OF WARDENS

- (a) The warden is responsible for ensuring that the staff records in his/her region are up-to-date and that the designated security personnel is informed of any changes;
- (b) The Warden must ensure that all staff members in the sector/zone are aware of the Security Plan and that all precautionary measures have been taken;
- (c) The Warden must visit all the staff members in the region so that he/she knows exactly who they are and where they live and that their dependents know who their Warden is;
- (d) The Warden should provide the staff in the region with a simple map of the sector/zone indicating where each family lives. Obviously this should be updated as required;
- (e) The Warden should select a "safe house" in the area and ensure that all the staff members or military personnel in the area know its location; and
- (f) Wardens must be available during any phase of the Security Plan to convey instructions to all concerned in the region from the designated Official.

During the implementation of Phases, the duties of the wardens are as follows:

Phase One - Precautionary

A. Although Phase One procedures should have been observed as normal routine precautions, wardens will visit their zone and check to see that the procedures have been observed. For their guidance, the initial instructions given to all personnel are as follows:

1. For all UN personnel

- (a) Prepare an inventory in triplicate of furniture, valuable, household effects and automobiles; two copies are to be forwarded to the representative of your organization. Entries are to be updated every January and July. (Proforma inventory blanks are available from the office of the Field Security Officer).
- (b) Check to see that passports, laissez-passer and health certificates are in order.
- (c) Check that private and United Nations vehicles (if any) are constantly refuelled and that spare wheels and toolkits are in order.

This plan seems more pertaining to the civ staff at UNAMIA than to all components of UNAMIA.

- (d) Maintain reserve finances of approximately US \$600 or a higher amount.
- (e) Given consideration to selection of clothes, depending on season, to be packed should an evacuation be ordered, the limit in weight to be 15 Kg. per persons.

2. For locally-recruited staff members

Check to see that identity cards are in order.

B. They will also ensure that eligible staff in their zone that:

- (a) Any friends or relative visiting them from other countries may be advised to leave the country;
- (b) Servants of eligible staff may be advised to leave the country.

Phase Two - Restricted Movement

A. Wardens will visit UN personnel in their zone and give them the following instructions:

- (a) All non-essential staff members will remain at home. If they want to leave their home for urgent reasons, e.g., medical treatment, etc., they will contact their warden and make the necessary arrangements.
- (b) For UN personnel, check that one suitcase of clothing is packed. The limit of 15kg per person. Each suitcase to be clearly labelled showing the person's name and nationality. Check that identity cards, passports, health certificates and reserve finances are at hand.
- (c) Prepare food and water to take to the concentration area in case Phase Three is declared.

B. Wardens will also advise individuals in their zone of the procedures to be observed during subsequent phases.

Phases Three and Four - Relocation/Evacuation (Staging)

A. The DO will inform wardens of the time and place where eligible staff are to be concentrated.

B. Wardens will inform all eligible staff of these Phases and give them the following instructions:

- (a) Leave home at _____.
- (b) If they do not have a vehicle, they are to wait at their home until they are picked up by United Nations Transport.
- (c) They are to leave their home with their personnel documents, food and prepared luggage.
- (d) Turn off electricity, gas, water and heater connections.
- (e) Make sure their room is locked.
- (f) Arrange for vehicle (private or otherwise) to move to pre-arranged concentration area.
- (g) Wardens will record the details of each vehicle leaving the zone.
- (h) Wardens will accompany the last vehicle from their zone to the concentration area.
- (i) In the concentration area, wardens will be responsible for the checking of all personnel from their zone and arrange for the parking of their transport.
- (j) Wardens will receive further instructions from the DO.
- (k) Wardens will carry out all duties assigned to them by the DO and will accompany UN personnel from their zone to the designated area.

ANNEX C

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF WARDENS/DEPUTY WARDENS

Name	Res. tel.	Off.Tel.	Room	Call Sign
------	-----------	----------	------	-----------

ANNEX D

DATE: _____

TO: _____

FROM: _____

SUBJECT: **Letter of Appointment - Warden**


 This is to confirm your appointment as Warden of Sector No. _____ covering the following areas: _____

 As Warden you are responsible to the Designated Official for the implementation of the Security Plan in the above region.


 Attached is a listing of all personnel in your region and their dependents together with the residential addresses. It will be your responsibility to verify the listing and to ensure that it is kept up-to-date.

1st FLOOR LAYOUT

AS OF: 10 JAN 95



2nd FLOOR LAYOUT








3rd FLOOR LAYOUT


11084	11085	11086	11087	11088	11089	11005	11006	11090	11091	11092	11093
CBES	BMS	R & I	CTO	CIVILIAN PERS	CCPO	CAO	CAO'S SEC	CSS	CCO	C MIS O EDP	EDP
3085	3076	3069	3060	3053	3044		3035	3028	3021	3012	3005

3084	3077	3068	3061	3052	3045			3029	3020	3013	3004
GENERAL SERVICES	AIR OPS	CLAIMS	MOV CON	PERSONNEL SERVICES	LEGAL ADVISOR		3034	C SUP O	CC LOG O	SEC TO CSS & ADMIN ASST	UNAMIR FINANCE O
11096	11134	11103	11097	11098	11099		11221	11101	11102	11094	11104









4th FLOOR LAYOUT

11066	11067	11068	11069	11002			11004	11075	11076	11077	11078
TRANSLATOR	POLITICAL ADVISOR	HAO	PROTOCOL O	 E D SECRETARY	EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	SRSG	 SRSG SEC	 POLITICAL SECRETARY	 LEGAL O	 RADIO BROADCAST	POLITICAL AFFAIRS O
4085	4076	4069	4060	4053	4044		4035	4028	4021	4012	4005

BODY GUARD
TO
SRSG



11161

4084	4077	4068	4061	4052	4045			4029	4020	4013	4004
RADIO ROOM	PROTOCOL ASST & SECRETARY	H A O SECRETARY	C S O & SECRETARY	RADIO BROADCAST	CONFERENCE ROOM		4034	SENIOR POLITICAL O	POLITICAL AND LEGAL SECRETARY	LEGAL ADVISOR	POLITICAL AFFAIRS O
 11070	 11071	 11072	 11073	 11065	11074		 11079	11080	 11081	 11082	11083

DRAFT

GENERAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE VISIT OF THE RWANDAN MINISTER
OF INTERIOR TO THE HPZ ON SUNDAY 14 AUG 1994

GENERAL

1. As a measure to win the confidence of the people in the HPZ prior to the take over of the area by UNAMIR from the French, and as a measure of reassuring the local population of their security after the withdrawal of the French, the Rwandese Interim Minister of Interior will visit the HPZ on Sunday 14 Aug 1994.

AIM

2. The aim of this instruction is to assign responsibilities for a smooth and successful movement of the minister in and out of the HPZ.

PLACES TO BE VISITED

3. a. MBABANZA. A team of nuns have been protecting both Tutsi and Hutu refugees since the beginning of the war.
- b. GISHYITA. To serve as a confidence boosting exercise for the Interim Govt.
- c. RWAMATAMU. The Bourgemestre is a brother of the minister of Interior and this visit will go a long way to boost the image of the Bourgemestre.
- d. GISOVU. This is one town in which no massacres have been recorded so far and it is expected that a pat on the shoulder of the people of this town will go a long way to recognise their good work.

4. MODE OF TRAVEL

a. Options

- (1) By Helicopter.
- (2) By Road.
- (3) Combination of (1) and (2).

5. This will be determined after consultations with the Govt.

TASKS

6. HAC.

- a. Provide two 10 trucks load of food items for distribution to the population to coincide with the visit of the minister.

- b. Trucks will leave KIGALI on Sat 13 Aug 94 for KIBUYE.
- c. Food to be distributed in MBABANZA.
- d. Coordinate with French LO Team with UNAMIR for exact location.

SECURITY

7. It is requested that the French Coalition Forces provide site security during the visit of the minister. Lt Col F Giraud FCF LO (UNAMIR) is to liaise with the FCF on this.

8. In addition to the RPA providing close security to the minister with 3-4 RPA soldiers, the following will be provided by UNAMIR:

a. CHANBATT (REAR)

- (1) Provide one x section for medium security to the minister's team during the visit.
- (2) Section will be airlifted in 1 x helicopter from KIGALI on Sunday 14 94 at 1000 hrs should the minister travel by helicopter.
- (3) Detail an officer to command the section.
- (4) Offr detailed should report to the DCOO for briefing at 1000 hrs on Sat 13 Aug 94.
- (5) Detail armed escorts in 2 x pickups to escort the food convoy to Kibuye on Sat 13 Aug 94. Escort commander to report to HAC for briefing before departure.
- (6) Detail armed escorts in 2 x pickups to standby to provide security should the journey by the minister be undertaken by road. Escorts to be commanded by an officer.

9. MILOB GP HQ

- a. Provide 2 x MILOB Teams to escort Food Convoy to MBABANZA on Sat 13 Aug 94.
- b. Team leader to report to HAC for briefing before departure on Sat 14 Aug 94.
- c. Task MILOB Team in KIBUYE to join the minister's team on arrival at KIBUYE on Sun 14 Aug 94.

10. CANSIGs

- a. Provide 2 x 10 ton trucks with drivers to convey the food to MBABANZA on Sat 13 Aug 94.
- b. Drivers and trucks to report to HAC for briefing in

the morning of Sat 13 Aug 94.

11. AIR OPS

a. Detail 2 x Helicopters to lift the ministers team and the Ghanbatt Section from KIGALI for the visit.

b. Helis to be ready for take off by 140900 Aug 94.

12. Force Military Spokeman. Select a team of journalists to cover the visit. Team to leave KIGALI latest PM Sat 13 Aug 94.

13. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

a. Timings

(1) Food convoy leaves KIGALI not later than 131400 Aug 94.

(2) Food Convoy Escorts Report to HAC for briefing _ 131000B 94.

(3) Ministers Team departs KIGALI - 141000 Aug 94.

14. CONCLUSION. The Interim Govt minister of Interior intends to visit the HPZ on Sun 14 Aug 94, in order to reassure the population in the HPZ. As a confidence boosting exercise UNAMIR will distribute some food to the local population to coincide with the minister's visit. All concerned are to play an active role to make this visit a success.

R.A. DALLAIRE
Major General
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

French coalition Forces
HAC
MILOB GP HQ
GHANBATT

Information:

Internal:

Action:

CANSIGs

Airops
Mil Spokesman

Information:

SRSG's Office
DFC

INSTRUCTIONS FOR UNAMIR OPS ROOM DUTY PERSONNEL

1. To ensure that UNAMIR HQ Ops Room is run efficiently the following instructions will strictly be adhered to:

a. There will always be a Radio Operator, a Duty Officer and a Senior Duty Officer detailed for duty in the Ops Room.

b. On all occasions there will be at least two personnel manning the Ops Room.

c. All duty personnel will be properly relieved before they vacate their posts.

d. In addition to the instructions contained in the Duty Officer's Standing Orders, all Duty officers will ensure that the following are always logged in the Duty Officer's Log Book:

- (1) All official phone calls,
- (2) Traffic accidents involving UNAMIR personnel,
- (3) Complaints,
- (4) Inquiries,
- (5) Escort requests,
- (6) Casevac requests,
- (7) Timings for receipt of SITREPS,
- (8) And any other significant incident not mentioned above.

e. Senior Duty Officers will ensure that SITREPS for the previous day are filed before they hand over to the next Senior Duty Officer.

2. Only in extreme emergencies will the Force Commander be called on telephone except when transferring his calls. When the SDO requires assistance or guidance, he will call the following officers in descending order:

	<u>C/S</u>	<u>BBC Tel No.</u>
a. G3 Ops	93A	NA
b. G3 Plans	93B	82907
c. DCOS Ops	9B	82917
d. DFC/COS	9A	NA

APPROVED ACTIONS FOR DUTY OFFICERS

1. MURDER OF RWANDAN CITIZEN

- a. INFORM CIV POL (TELE: 11132...).
- b. INFORM MP.
- c. INFORM GENDAMARIE.
- d. INFORM RPA LO.
- e. LOG IN DUTY OFFR'S LOG BOOK.
- f. INCLUDE INCIDENT IN DUTY OFFICER'S REPORT.

2. ACCIDENT

- a. REPORT ACCIDENT TO MP/CIV POL. (CIV POL TO CONTACT GENDAMARIE OR DO IF NO AVAL) REPORT TO RPA LO IF RPA INVOLVED.
- b. IF CASEVAC NEC:
 - (1) OBTAIN DETAIL AS PER MEDICAL EVACUATION FORMAT.
 - (2) INFO FMO.
 - (3) GIVE WNG O TO 93H.
- c. INFO BROWN AND ROOT IF RECOVERY OF UN VEH NECESSARY.

3. THEFT OR ROBBERY. ACTIVATE RRF AS PER INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ACTIVATION OF RRF, (IF ACT STILL IN PROGRESS.

4. RPA INCIDENT

- a. GIVE WNG O TO RRF.
- b. FIND LOC OF INCIDENT.
- c. OBTAIN DETAILS OF INCIDENT.
- d. ACTIVATE RRF IF NECESSARY.
- e. INFO RPA LO (TELE 74434).