

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

cc: yyc

DPA
54/62nd

TO: Mr. Kim Won-soo
A: Deputy Chef de Cabinet

DATE: 15 August 2007

REFERENCE

THROUGH:

S/C DE:

FROM: B. Lynn Pascoe
DE: Department of Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Re: Departmental Recommendations for the Secretary-General's
OBJET: September Programme – 62nd session of the General Assembly


With reference to your memorandum of 9 August 2007 addressed to Mr. Pascoe on the above subject, I would like to convey the following recommendations:

a) Meeting on the Iraq Crisis

DPA does not see the need for the Secretary-General to be involved in the consultations during September. The intention is to first have a working-level discussions between the relevant department and then at the USG level. The focus would be on the modalities for implementation of SCR 1770 (2007). The recommendations will then go to the Secretary-General and the Policy Committee, as per the latest Policy Committee decision on Iraq which states that "... DPA will lead an inter-departmental consultation process to identify strategic options for the UN in Iraq, to be referred to the Policy Committee by the end of September", to be discussed in the Policy Committee when appropriate (but after September).

b) Bilateral meeting with Zimbabwe

In the absence of progress on the political front, economic conditions continue to deteriorate exacerbating a dire humanitarian situation. The purpose of the meeting is to urge President Mugabe to continue to cooperate with the SADC-mandated mediation efforts of South Africa in order to put an end to the crisis. The SG could offer help, and ask in what way he could help.



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c) Meeting between NATO and DPA


DPA wishes to confirm that a separate meeting with NATO is being planned, in the margins of the General Debate, with a team from NATO and DPA, DPKO and OCHA, on UN-NATO relations. This is by way of follow-up to Mr. Pascoe's meeting with Mr. Martin Erdmann, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy (please see attached note to Mr. Nambiar of 27 July). The date of the meeting has not yet been fixed. This would be in addition to the Secretary-General's meeting with the NATO Secretary General, tentatively scheduled during their meeting of 3 July in Rome.

cc: Mr. Guéhenno
Mr. Holmes
Mr. Menkerios
Ms. Kane

Note to Mr. Nambiar

NATO

Please find attached a note of my meeting with Mr. Martin Erdmann, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy which took place on 17 July 2007, for your information.



B. Lynn Pascoe
27 July 2007

cc: Mr. Guéhenno
Mr. Holmes

Note to the File

Meeting between Mr. Pascoe and Mr. Martin Erdmann, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, 18 July 2007, 10:30 a.m. -12:00 pm

Summary

1. On 18 July 2007, Mr. Pascoe met with Mr. Martin Erdmann, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, and Ms. Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Political Affairs Officer. Ms. Angela Kane and Ms. Susan Hulton were also present. The discussion explored the potential for enhancing NATO cooperation with the UN, focussing on what it could contribute to the UN's work. It was agreed that a follow-up meeting should be held in September, on the margins of the General Debate, between the NATO Secretariat, and DPA, DPKO, OCHA and other interested actors on the UN side, to discuss these issues further. Consideration could then be given to whether something formal on UN-NATO cooperation might be useful.

NATO wish for a "more structured relationship"

2. Mr. Pascoe underlined the importance of Mr. Erdmann speaking to DPKO, too, on enhancing operational areas of cooperation. He then asked Mr. Erdmann what NATO had in mind in terms of broader cooperation with the UN. Mr. Erdmann replied that NATO was looking for a "more structured relationship" with the UN, prompted by the Secretary-General's 2005 report "In larger freedom", which had highlighted the need for increased cooperation with regional organizations in facing challenges to international peace and security. With its peacekeeping role in Africa and Kosovo, and involvement in non-proliferation issues and counter-terrorism, NATO had considered that it was one of the regional organizations the Secretary-General had had in mind. Hence its 2005 initiative. Puzzled as to why it had not been treated like the EU or AU – with each of which the UN had entered into agreements/declarations – NATO had concluded that it was a question of perception: that the Organization was seen as a Cold War entity. He added that its approach had perhaps come at an unfavourable moment.

3. Mr. Pascoe confirmed that there had been unease among some Member States about closer ties with a military alliance, particularly on the part of a permanent member of the Security Council which was concerned about NATO expansion. As to the areas of WMD and counter-terrorism, these had been and remained very sensitive. Beyond this, there was a broader question which he wished to explore: namely, what did NATO bring on the global side to the UN's work. The imperatives underlying the UN relationship with the AU (peacekeeping and early warning in Africa) and the EU (conflict prevention and elections worldwide) were much clearer.

Expanded cooperation to be driven by UN needs

4. As he saw it, it would be most useful to look at what the areas were where the two Organizations could work together. The key question was how NATO fit into UN needs. In that connection, Mr. Pascoe enquired about NATO's "out of area" operations apart from peacekeeping. He noted in this regard that the problems DPA faced were not, for the most part, in Europe (the Balkans and the Caucasus aside), but concerned the failed States in Sub-Saharan Africa. The needs in that quarter were huge. While the AU had the ambition, it lacked the

capacity for peacekeeping. And DPKO was wary of engaging in situations where it did not have command and control. If NATO was looking for a middle project, that might be it. Noting that NATO had transported some 50,000 AU troops in Sudan, and was considering the transport of Somali troops, he asked how NATO saw its role in Africa beyond that. Acknowledging NATO's strong contribution in the area of disaster relief, Mr. Pascoe asked whether NATO had institutionalized its humanitarian response capabilities. He questioned generally how NATO activities dovetailed with what the UN was trying to do.

NATO as a political/security organization

5. Mr. Erdmann stressed that NATO did not consider itself to be a military organization, but rather as a political/security organization. He described the expanding partnership arrangements that NATO had developed with some 64 nations. In addition to the 26 members of NATO (the North Atlantic Council), there were the following partners: (i) the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (49 nations); (ii) the Mediterranean Dialogue (7 nations), which focused, in particular, on the issue of defence sector reform; (iii) the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which sought to engage countries in the Gulf region; and (iv) a new group of so-called "contact countries", which included Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, and most recently China. These arrangements were institutionalized, with regular meetings held at Ambassadorial level. NATO also had relations with the Russian Federation; they met in the context of the NATO-Russia Council, to discuss disarmament and other issues.

6. These partnerships both addressed operational issues, and provided a forum for political discussion on wider security issues. NATO's role in Afghanistan provided a concrete example of the important role played by partner countries. In that instance, NATO member states were joined by troops from 37 partner countries. Australia, for example, contributed 10,000 troops; New Zealand had contributed \$120 million to the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). And, of course, ISAF was more than troops.

7. On the political side, NATO activities included the following:

- Disarmament (including small arms/light weapons (e.g. Trust Fund for the Ukraine);
- Disaster response (including close cooperation with OCHA);
- Security sector reform;
- Cooperation with scientists (through a Science for Peace and Security Programme);
- Participation in High Level working meetings with the UN Secretariat;
- NATO-led crisis response operations under UN mandates;
- Cooperation with international NGOs, e.g. the ICRC;
- Cooperation with other intergovernmental/regional organizations (e.g. World Bank, OSCE, and the EU).

8. Mr. Erdmann insisted that, though founded as a military defence alliance, NATO had not been a military organization since 1990. Paradoxically, prior to that, it had never fired a shot. Srebrenica had been a wake-up call. Since then, it had taken part in crisis response operations, always under UN-mandate, with the exception of Kosovo. It was for the foregoing reasons, that there was a feeling at NATO that the Organization should have a more structured relationship with the UN, as opposed to a separate agreement with DPKO. However, NATO did not wish to

put itself in the position of *demandeur*. It was for the UN to consider whether there was scope to cooperate more closely.

NATO "out of area" operations

9. Mr. Pascoe noted that the pressing problems on DPA's agenda concerned primarily the larger Middle East and the failed States of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Somalia. In addition to peacekeeping, there were issues of peacebuilding and early warning. He asked whether there was any appetite within NATO for involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the wake of the experience in Afghanistan. Many troop contributors had expressed concern to him.

10. Mr. Erdmann responded that the Afghanistan experience had indeed made NATO member states somewhat cautious. Their involvement had been very costly in terms of casualties and financially. Canada alone had suffered 70 casualties. The Iraq debacle and the Afghanistan difficulties had led European Parliaments to question their international engagement. He noted that the EU engagement in Congo for the elections had produced considerable concern among national Parliaments, and that some governments, including the German Government, had almost fallen.

11. He added that, NATO was very aware of the sensitivities of African countries and the African Union about NATO involvement on the continent. They equated NATO with the United States and Iraq, and wanted no part of it. Confidence would have to be built slowly, through, for example, its transport of AMIS troops in the case of Darfur. In short, NATO involvement in Sub Saharan Africa was a question of building confidence.

12. Mr. Pascoe suggested that, if there were an opening, the key would be to support AU capacity in peacekeeping. While transportation was important, so, too, was training and equipment. If we can get enough forces available to come into Somalia, for example, and replace the Ethiopians, it would be possible to move ahead on the political front. But the AU lacks capacity. There were lots of areas like that. Another was the situation in Chad and the Central African Republic, where the international community seemed to be turning to the EU. Security sector reform was another vital area in which NATO could contribute if it reached the point where it had the confidence of those on the ground. This would be very important for peacebuilding.

13. Ms. Kane added that, in Nepal, too, there was a clear need for security sector reform, but it was not included in the UN mandate. Once again, however, there was an image problem. In that case, the authorities did not even wish the Security Council to be involved.

Future approach

14. Mr. Pascoe suggested that, based on this exploratory discussion, the fundamentals were there. More thinking would need to be done, to determine how NATO and UN needs could fit together. As he saw it, the focus should be on identifying the tools for solving the issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Security was of huge importance: both on the peacekeeping side; and also in restructuring the armed forces, which were so often part of the problem. One possibility, which he would like to discuss with the USG for Peacekeeping, Mr. Guéhenno, and his own ASG for Africa, Mr. Menkerios, was to hold a three-way conversation with the AU regarding how to help

it. Mr. Erdmann recalled that NATO had offered its assistance to the AU, but that the latter had been cautious. Mr. Pascoe thought the UN might be able to help in this regard.

15. Ms. Kane suggested that Haiti was another relevant case for cooperation. There was also a clear need to cooperate in Afghanistan, added Mr. Pascoe. It was noted, on the other hand, that there had been no mention today in NATO's list of activities of counter-terrorism and WMD, which had featured in the original NATO declaration. This was not pressed.

16. Mr. Pascoe invited Mr. Erdmann to come back in September with his team and sit down with DPA, DPKO, OCHA, and other relevant departments/agencies to discuss these issues. Consideration could then be given to whether something formal on UN-NATO cooperation would be useful. He said he was agnostic on that. Mr. Erdmann accepted the invitation for further discussions on the margins of the ministerial meetings, but stressed that the 26 member states of NATO wished to see that there was evenhandedness with the EU in terms of a more structured relationship. Mr. Pascoe suggested that, given the history, it was important to have all the interested players on board to discuss the issue and to see what transpired.

17. Ms. Kane added that she would be in Brussels at the end of August for another meeting, and could perhaps meet with Mr. Erdmann again then. Mr. Erdmann welcomed that possibility. He also invited Mr. Pascoe to Brussels to address the North Atlantic Council.

Susan Hulton
AED/DPA
23 July 2007