Expanded Number S-0885-0003-30-00001

Title Items-in-Harvard Alumni Association, 12 June 1963

Date Created 12/06/1963

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0885-0003: Operational Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: Speeches, Messages, Statements, and Addresses - not issued as press releases

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United Nations Stand-by Peace Force.

I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to address the annual meeting of the Harvard Alumni Association on this Commencement Day. I have chosen as my theme a subject to which Governments, as well as individuals, have been giving considerable thought, namely, the peace-keeping role of the United Nations, and the means to strengthen it under present conditions.

The development of an international order, enshrined in an accepted code of world law and guaranteed by an effective world police force, has long been a human aspiration. This dream is based upon the very reasonable idea of projecting the stability and orderliness of a well-governed state on to the relations between nations. In the history of most nation states, there came a time when the feuding of a few powerful interests or personages, in disregard of the welfare of the majority, and the
ensuing chaos and disaster, became intolerable. From this situation, there was the evolution in due course of a strong central authority, based on popular representation, a sound system of law and a reliable police force. In our world, we reached a similarly intolerable situation many years ago and have twice in this century paid a terrible price for having failed to draw the necessary conclusions.

Most sensible people now agree that some reliable system of ensuring world peace is essential. But, as in most situations involving great and conflicting interests and very large numbers of people, there is all the difference in the world between the need and the practical fulfilment of the need. That fulfilment will be a long and complicated process, requiring a degree of confidence and understanding which we have not yet established in our world.

Few would deny that, if we are to look forward with confidence to the future, we have to take a great step forward in regulating
the relations of nations and produce workable institutions for that purpose. One should not, however, underestimate the difficulties of such a step or the inevitable risks which attend it. Nations and governments, taking a great step forward, face imponderables and unknown dangers which no research or scientific test can resolve, for these unforeseeable events will be the result of the actions, reactions and interactions of hundreds of millions of human beings, and the human mind and human behaviour are still perhaps the most mysterious and awe-inspiring force in our world. Statesmen are wise, therefore, to view the future with caution and to examine proposals for fundamental change with more than usual care.

While we are making this step forward towards a new world order, we need guarantees, we need moderating influences and we need some commonly operated and accepted agency to share the risks and make the necessary tests and experiments, and even mistakes. Certainly we need an agency through which the necessary confidence and contact among nations can be built up and maintained. The United Nations is
the nearest thing we have to such an agency, and I believe that it is beginning to play an important role of the kind I have just described.

It is no doubt true that there are certain great problems, such as the struggle between the greatest powers and the related problem of disarmament, which may be with us for a long time and which, perhaps, cannot be tackled head-on by the United Nations. We must, of course, do everything that we can to avoid adding fuel to the great power struggle. There are, however, a large number of important problems and situations which can usefully be tackled and, if this is done, the greatest problems themselves can be isolated, if not resolved. We should, in this process, begin to develop the necessary institutions and practices by which, at a later stage, a more stable world order can be ensured.

I am going to talk today about one particular aspect of our problems, namely, peace-keeping and the use of international peace forces by the United Nations. Due partly to the lack of unanimity
among the great powers ever since 1946, and partly to the radical
change in the nature of war resulting from the development of atomic
and hydrogen weapons, there has been a gradual change in thinking on
questions of international security in the United Nations. There has
been a tacit transition from the concept of collective security, as
set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to a more
realistic idea of peace-keeping. The idea that conventional military
methods -- or, to put it bluntly, war -- can be used by or on behalf
of the United Nations to counter aggression and secure the peace,
seems now to be rather impractical. There has also been a change in
emphasis from the use of the military forces of the great powers, as
contemplated in the Charter, to the use, in practice, of the military
resources of the smaller powers, which has the advantage of not
entangling United Nations actions in the antagonisms of the cold war.
Although there has been one collective action under the aegis of the
United Nations -- Korea -- and although in 1951 the Collective
Measures Committee, set up by the General Assembly under the Uniting
for Peace Resolution, actually published in its report a list of units earmarked by member states for service with the United Nations in actions to counter aggression, actual developments have in practice been in a rather different direction.

The nature of these developments is sometimes confused, wittingly or unwittingly, by an attempt to relate them to the use of force to counter aggression by the Security Council provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. In fact the peace-keeping forces I am about to describe are of a very different kind and have little in common with the forces foreseen in Chapter VII, but their existence is not in conflict with Chapter VII. They are essentially peace and not fighting forces and they operate only with the consent of the parties directly concerned. In this context it is worth noting that all of the permanent members of the Security Council have, at one time or another in the past fifteen years, voted in support of the creation of one or other of these forces, and that none of them has in any case gone further than to abstain from voting on them.
Since 1950 the United Nations has been called on to deal with a number of critical situations of varying urgency. The most urgent of these have been what are sometimes called "brush fire wars"; meaning, I take it, small conflagrations which, unless controlled, may all too easily ignite very much larger ones.

If we briefly look through the United Nations experience with this kind of operation, we can see that from small and informal beginnings a useful body of precedent and practice has grown up over the years of using military personnel of member states on peace-keeping operations. In Greece in 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans found that professional military officers were invaluable as an observer group in assessing the highly complicated and fluctuating situation. The Security Council itself set up an observer group of military officers in India and Pakistan to watch over the Kashmir question. This observer group, which was set up in 1948, is still operating.
A much larger use of military observers by the United Nations was made when, in July 1948, the first truce agreements in the Palestine war were supervised on the ground by some 700 United Nations military observers working under the United Nations Mediator and the Chief of Staff. This team developed into the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization after the armistice agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbours were concluded in the period from February to July 1949. This organization of officers from many countries still plays a vital role in keeping the peace in the Middle East and in reporting on and dealing with incidents which, though small in themselves, might all too easily become the cause of far larger disturbances if not dealt with. Its indefatigable members in their white jeeps are now a familiar and welcome part of the Middle Eastern landscape.

A peace-keeping organization of a different nature made its appearance as a result of the Suez crisis of October 1956. Confronted with a situation of the utmost urgency in which two of the permanent members of the Security Council were directly involved, the General
Assembly voted for the urgent creation of a United Nations force. This was essentially not a force designed actively to fight against aggression. It went to Egypt with the express consent of the Egyptian Government and after the other parties concerned had agreed to a cease-fire. It was designed not to fight but rather to allow those involved to disengage without further disturbance. It allowed for the peaceful resolution of one of the most dangerous crises which had faced the world since the second world war. It also, incidentally, allowed for the clearance, by the United Nations, of the Suez Canal, which had been blocked during the previous military action.

The United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East has for six years watched over the borders of Israel with the United Arab Republic in the Gaza Strip and through the Sinai Desert. It also watches over the access to the Gulf of Aqaba and to the Israeli port of Elath. What was once a most troubled and terrorized frontier has become peaceful and prosperous on both sides, and the very presence of the United Nations Force is both an insurance against a resumption
of trouble and a good excuse not to engage in it. It presents us with one serious problem. To maintain an army of over 5,000 men costs money, but at present the parties concerned have no wish to see it removed.

In 1958 another very tense situation, with quite different origins, occurred in Lebanon. After the success of UNEF there were suggestions in many quarters that another United Nations force should be collected and dispatched to that country. Here, however, the problem, though aggravated by external factors, was essentially a domestic one. The Security Council therefore set up a three-man observer group and left the Secretary-General considerable latitude as to the methods to be employed to make this group effective in watching over the possibilities of infiltration from outside. A highly mobile group of 600 officers was quickly organized to keep watch from ground and air, while the crisis itself was resolved by negotiation and discussion. By the end of 1958 it was possible to withdraw the United Nations Observer Group from the Lebanon altogether.
The greatest and most complex challenge to the United Nations in the peace-keeping field arose a few days after the Congo gained its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. The general proportions of this problem are sometimes obscured by a wealth of dramatic detail and are worth restating. Harassed by mutiny, lawlessness and the collapse of public order and services from within, and afflicted by foreign military intervention as well as by ominous threats of other forms of interference from without, the new Government of the Congo appealed to the United Nations for help. The Security Council committed the United Nations to respond to this appeal and thus made the organization not only the guarantor of law and order and the protector of the Congo against external interference from any source, but also the adviser and helper of a newly independent state which had had virtually no preparation for its independence.

By filling, in the space of a few hours, the very dangerous vacuum which existed in the Congo in July 1960, the urgent danger of a confrontation of the great powers in the heart of Africa was avoided.
and the territorial integrity of the Congo preserved. The new leaders of the Congo have been given at least a short breathing spell in which to find their feet. Despite its shortcomings, which must be judged in the light of the fearsome complexity of the problem, the United Nations Operation in the Congo is, in my opinion, a most promising and encouraging experiment in international responsibility and action.
The blue helmets of the United Nations Force are known throughout the Congo as the symbol of security. Its soldiers have given protection at one time or another in the last three years to almost every Congolese public figure and almost every group both African and non-African, when danger and violence threatened them. It is worth noting that, now that the withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the Congo is in sight, the deepest regret, and even alarm, is expressed by the very groups who used to be its most hostile critics and detractors. In the Force soldiers from other African countries work side by side in this vast tropical country with those from farther away. Their loyalty to the United Nations, their team-spirit and comradeship have been an inspiration to all those who value the peace-keeping role of the United Nations.

I will end my catalogue with two more operations, one of which has already been successfully concluded, and which also
involved an unprecedented role for the United Nations. I would like to refer first to the transfer of West Irian from Dutch rule, through a temporary period of United Nations executive authority, backed by a United Nations Security Force, to the administration of Indonesia. This entire operation has taken place with the agreement of the parties concerned, and in consultation with them.

The second is the despatch to Yemen of an observer team as a basis for the disengagement of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia from the affairs of Yemen. This operation will be paid for by the two parties concerned, and has been undertaken at their request and that of the Government of Yemen.

Although these are peace forces, service in them is hard and can be dangerous. In the Middle East the United Nations has registered casualties not only from accidents and disease, but from mines. Both there and in West Irian, as also in Yemen, the terrain and the climate are inhospitable. In the Congo we have
had, unfortunately, serious casualties from unwanted fighting as well as from other causes, and I very much hope that we shall have no more.

I have only mentioned here the peace-keeping activities which have involved the use, in one way or another, of military personnel. If I were to mention the many other tense situations in which the United Nations, and my office in particular, have been used as a meeting ground and as an instrument for mediation and peaceful settlement, the list would be much longer.

To sum up, we have now had experience of three major peace-keeping forces and a variety of military observer and truce supervisory operations. Each of the three forces has been different in composition, nature and task, but they have shared certain common characteristics. All three were improvised and called into the field at very short notice; all three were severely limited in their right to use force; all three were designed solely for the maintenance of peace and not for fighting
in the military sense; all three were recruited from the
smaller powers and with special reference to their acceptability
in the area in which they were to serve; all three operated
with the express consent and co-operation of the states or
territories where they were stationed, as well as of any other
parties directly concerned in the situation; and all three
were under the direction and control of the Secretary-General
acting on behalf of the organs of the United Nations. These
facts may now seem common-place; it is a measure of the progress
that has been made that even ten years ago they would have
seemed very unusual.

By the standards of an efficient national military establishment,
these forces have considerable disadvantages. Obviously, a force
put together only after the emergency with which it is to deal is
in full swing, will inevitably have some shortcomings. There is
difficulty in recruiting at very short notice exactly the right
kind of units for the work in hand, and in operating a force
whose units and officers meet each other for the first time
in the midst of a delicate operation. There are differences
not only of language and tradition but of training, equipment
and staff procedures. There are differences in pay and
emoluments which, if not handled carefully, can cause
considerable problems of discipline and morale. Staffwork
and command are especially difficult where every decision has
important political implications. Although these contingents
from Member States are under the operational control of the United
Nations, disciplinary powers are still vested in the national
authorities and this could be, although in fact it never has been,
the cause of very serious difficulties for the United Nations Force
Commander and for the Secretary-General. The fact that the
military establishments of the permanent members of the Security
Council cannot be used cuts us off from the most obvious sources
of equipment and personnel. The improvised nature of these
operations also gives rise to various problems of logistics.
In our experience these difficulties, which are inherent in the pioneering nature of these operations, have been off-set by the enthusiastic co-operation of Member States and by the spirit and comprehension of the officers and men of the contingents which have made up the United Nations forces. It is an encouraging thought that in the military establishments of some 30 or more countries in the world there are now large numbers of officers and men who have served the United Nations with distinction in one or other of these operations and have added thereby a new dimension to their military experience. The improvised approach also makes it possible on each occasion to make up the United Nations force from the countries which are, politically and in other ways, most suitable for the operation in hand, and at least the United Nations is not afflicted with the age-old problem of having on its hands a standing army with nothing to do.

In my opinion, a permanent United Nations force is not a
practical proposition at the present time. I know that
many serious people in many countries are enthusiastic about
the idea, and I welcome their enthusiasm and the thought they
are putting into the evolution of the institution which will
eventually and surely emerge. Many difficulties still stand in
the way of its evolution. Personally I have no doubt that the
world should eventually have an international police force which
will be accepted as an integral and essential part of life in
the same way as national police forces are accepted. Meanwhile
we must be sure that developments are in the right direction and
that we can also meet critical situations as and when they occur.

There are a number of reasons why it seems to me that the
establishment of a permanent United Nations force would be
premature at the present time. I doubt whether many governments
in the world would yet be prepared to accept the political
implications of such an institution and, in the light of our
current experience with financial problems, I am sure that they would have very serious difficulties in accepting the financial implications. I believe that we need a number of parallel developments before we can evolve such an institution. We have to go further along the road of codification and acceptance of a workable body of international law. We have to develop a more sophisticated public opinion in the world, which can accept the transition from predominately national thinking to international thinking. We shall have to develop a deeper faith in international institutions as such, and a greater confidence in the possibility of a United Nations civil service whose international loyalty and objectivity are generally accepted and above suspicion. We shall have to improve the method of financing international organization. Until these conditions are met, a permanent United Nations force may not be a practical proposition.

But we have already shown that, when the situation demands
it, it is possible to use the soldiers of many countries for objectives which are not national ones and that the soldiers respond magnificently to this new challenge. We have also seen that, when the situation is serious enough, governments are prepared to waive certain of the attributes of national sovereignty in the interest of keeping the peace through the United Nations. We have demonstrated that a loyalty to international service can exist side by side with legitimate national pride. And, perhaps most important of all, we have shown that there can be a practical alternative to the deadly ultimate struggle and that it is an alternative which brings out the good and generous qualities in men rather than their destructive and selfish qualities.

Although it is perhaps too early, for the reasons I have already given, to consider the establishment of a permanent United Nations force, I believe there are a number of measures which could
be taken even now to improve on our present capacity for meeting dangerous situations. It would be extremely desirable, for example, if countries would, in their national military planning, make provision for suitable units which could be made available at short notice for United Nations service and thereby decrease the degree of improvisation necessary in an emergency. I take this opportunity publicly to welcome and express my appreciation for the efforts of the Scandinavian countries in this direction. Denmark, Norway and Sweden have for some time now engaged in joint planning of a stand-by force comprising various essential components to be put at the disposal of the United Nations when necessary. It would be a very welcome development if other countries would consider following the lead of the Scandinavian countries in this matter.

At present the activities of the United Nations are over-shadowed by a very serious financial crisis, a crisis which stems
directly from the costs of the special peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo and from the failure of some members to pay their assessments for those operations. Although the sums of money involved are small in comparison to the sums spent by many countries on military budgets, they do, nonetheless, present a very serious financial and political challenge to the stability of the United Nations. The United Nations is the sum of all its members and, to develop in the right direction, it must maintain this global character. On the other hand, I am convinced that the organization must maintain and develop its active role in keeping the peace. I, therefore, view with the gravest concern the prolongation of the financial crisis of the United Nations with its very serious political overtones, and I trust that we may see a solution of the problem before too long.

I am concerned at this financial crisis more particularly because I see, in the long run, no acceptable alternative method of keeping peace in the world to the steady and sound development
of the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations. It is no longer possible to think rationally in terms of counteracting aggression or keeping the peace by the use of the ultimate weapons. However improvised and fumbling the United Nations approach may be, we have to develop it to deal with the sudden antagonisms and dangers of our world, until we can evolve more permanent institutions. There has been already a great advance in the world towards co-operation, mutual responsibility and common interest. I have described some of the pioneering co-operative efforts made by the United Nations to keep the peace. I believe that these efforts constitute vital steps towards a more mature, more acceptable, and more balanced world order. We must have the confidence and the means to sustain them and the determination to develop out of them a reliable and workable system for the future.

I am a firm believer in the organic development of institutions.
I also firmly believe that, if the United Nations is to justify the hopes of its founders and of the peoples of the world, it must develop into an active and effective agency for peace and international conciliation by responding to the challenges which face it. May we have the courage, the faith, and the wisdom to make it so!
Secretary General

Here is a first draft of your speech. Ralph says it should be about 25 or 30 minutes. This is about 25 I think.

Brian O'Hara
UN Peace Force?

1. Any concept of the U.N. (Organic) should develop into a really effective instrument for peace & international conciliation.

2. Past record in extinguishing bush-fire wars: Gene, Kashmir, Middle East, Lebanon, Congo.

3. Difficulty in militating military personnel; differences in training & difficulty of coordination; difficulty in enforcing a scheme of uniformity in pay, conditions, etc.

4. A permanent UN force not a practical proposition at present.

5. Stand by UN peace force. Desirable arrangement.

6. Place to other member states. (Small states)

7. Link with the financial stability question before the Special Session.

8. Win alternative.

24 May 1963

The development of an international order, enshrined in an accepted code of world law and guaranteed by an effective world police force, has long been a human aspiration. This dream is based upon the very reasonable idea of projecting the stability and orderliness of a well-governed state on to the relations between nations. In the history of most nation states, there has come a time when the feuding of a few powerful interests or personages, in disregard of the welfare of the majority, and the ensuing chaos and disaster, became intolerable. Such situations have usually evoked in time a strong central authority, based on popular representation, a sound system of law and a reliable peace force. In our world, we reached a similarly intolerable situation many years ago and have twice in this century paid a terrible price for having failed to draw the necessary conclusions.

Most sensible people now agree that some reliable system of ensuring world peace is essential. But, as in most situations involving great and conflicting interests and very large numbers of people, there is all the difference in the world between the ideal aim and the practical achievement of that aim. The ideal can generally be accepted, but the long and complicated process of making it a reality is much harder and requires a degree of confidence and understanding which we have not yet established in our world.

Few would deny that, if we are to look forward with confidence to the future, we have to take a great step forward in regulating the relations of nations and produce workable institutions for that purpose. One should not,
however, underestimate the difficulties of such a step or the inevitable risks which attend it. Before the astronaut explores the unknown realm of space, an immense organization and an intensive programme of tests have first weighed the mysteries and the unknown quantities and have done everything possible to resolve them or to foresee their effects. Even with this preparation the astronaut's ascent into space is an act of courage. Nations and governments, taking a great step forward, face imponderables and unknown dangers which no research or scientific test can resolve, for these unforeseeable events will be the result of the actions, reactions and interactions of hundreds of millions of human beings, and the human mind and human behaviour are still perhaps the most mysterious and awe-inspiring force in our world. Statesmen are wise, therefore, to view the future with caution and to examine proposals for fundamental change with more than usual care.

While we are making this step forward towards a new world order, we need guarantees, we need moderating influences and we need some commonly operated and accepted agency to share the risks and make the necessary tests and experiments, and even mistakes. Certainly we need an agency through which the necessary confidence and contact among nations can be built up. The United Nations is the nearest thing we have to such an agency, and I believe that it is beginning to play an important role of the kind I have just described.

I am a firm believer in the organic development of institutions. I also firmly believe that the United Nations, if it is to justify the hopes of its founders and of the peoples of the world, must develop into an active
and effective agency for peace and international conciliation by responding to the challenges which face it. It will grow as an institution by responding to them, and such growth will be attuned to the realities of our world.

There are certain great problems, such as the struggle between the greatest powers and the related problem of disarmament, which may be with us for a long time and which cannot be tackled head-on by the United Nations. I am convinced, however, that there are a large number of important problems and situations which can usefully be tackled and that if this is done, the greatest problems themselves can be isolated, if not resolved. We must do everything that we can to avoid adding fuel to the great power struggle. We must also attack the great common problems — want, disease, backwardness, fear and hatred — which are at the root of political, economic and social instability. I believe that if we courageously and steadfastly keep our eyes on these objectives, we shall, in the process, begin to develop the necessary institutions and practices by which, at a later stage, a more stable world order can be ensured.

I am going to talk today about one particular aspect of our problems and the development of methods of dealing with it, namely peace-keeping and the use of international peace forces by the United Nations. There is, in many parts of the world, a growing enthusiasm for the idea of an international peace force, and this in itself is encouraging in showing a growing public awareness of the problem and of the necessity for a solution. But in striving to realize this aim, we must make sure that we proceed in the right direction. We must examine with the greatest care our experience to date, our resources, the kind of situations we are likely to encounter and the
obstacles we are likely to meet. Personally, I have no doubt that the world will eventually have a police force and that it will be accepted as an integral and essential part of life in the same way as national police forces are now accepted. What concerns me is that such an institution should develop on the right lines and not be misused or side-tracked and also that, until it comes into existence, we should be able to meet critical situations as and when they occur.

Due partly to the lack of unanimity among the great powers ever since 1946, and partly to the radical change in the nature and feasibility of war resulting from the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, there has been a gradual change in thinking on questions of international security in the United Nations. There has been a tacit transition from the concept of collective security, as set out in Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, to a less grandiose but perhaps more realistic idea of peace-keeping. The idea that conventional military methods — or, to put it bluntly, war — can be used by or on behalf of the United Nations to counter aggression and secure the peace, seems now to be entirely unrealistic. There has also been a change in emphasis from the use of the military forces of the great powers, as contemplated in the Charter, to the use, in practice, of the military resources of the smaller powers. Although there has been one collective action under the aegis of the United Nations — Korea — and although in 1951 the Collective Measures Committee, set up by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, actually published in its report a list of units earmarked by member states for service with the United Nations in action to counter aggression, actual developments have in practice been in a rather different direction.
Since 1950 the United Nations has been called on the deal with a number of critical situations of varying urgency. The most urgent of these have been what are sometimes called "brush fire wars", meaning, I take it, small conflagrations which, unless controlled, may all too easily ignite very much larger ones.

If we briefly look through the United Nations experience with this kind of operation, we can see that from small and informal beginnings a useful body of precedent and practice has grown up over the years of using military personnel of member states on peace-keeping operations. These operations already represent a body of cooperation and experience which is a most valuable investment for the future. In Greece, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, charged with investigating the situation on the northern borders of Greece, found that professional military officers attached to the members were invaluable as an observer group in assessing the highly complicated and fluctuating situation. The Security Council itself set up an observer group of military officers in India and Pakistan to watch over the Kashmir question. This observer group, which was set up in 1948, is still operating.

A much larger use of military observers by the United Nations was made when, in July 1948, the first truce agreements in the Palestine war were supervised on the ground by some 700 United Nations military observers working under the United Nations Mediator and the Chief of Staff. This team developed into the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization after the armistice agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbours were concluded in the period from February to July 1949. This organization of
officers from many countries still plays a vital role in keeping the peace in the Middle East and in reporting on and dealing with incidents which, though small in themselves, might all too easily become the cause of far larger disturbances if not dealt with.

A peace-keeping organization of a different nature made its appearance as a result of the Suez crisis of October 1956. Confronted with a situation of the utmost urgency in which two of the permanent members of the Security Council were heavily involved, the territory of a member state violated and a battle in progress over one of the world's most important waterways, the General Assembly voted for the urgent creation of a United Nations force to be sent at once to the area of operations to secure a peaceful withdrawal of the armies of three foreign powers from Egyptian soil and to restore peace and order in the area. This was essentially not a force designed actively to fight against aggression. It went to Egypt with the express consent of the Egyptian Government and after the other parties concerned had agreed to a cease-fire. It was designed not to fight but rather to allow those involved to retire with honour and to disengage without further disturbance. It suffered no casualties in action, and its creation, movements and tasks were all subject to the most detailed and careful diplomatic preparation and negotiation. It allowed for the peaceful resolution of one of the most dangerous crises which had faced the world since the second world war. It also, incidentally, allowed for the clearance, by the United Nations, of the Suez Canal, which had been blocked during the previous military action.

The United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East has for six years
watched over the borders of Israel with the United Arab Republic in the Gaza Strip and through the Sinai Desert. It also watches over the access to the Gulf of Aqaba and to the vital Israeli port of Elath. What was once a most troubled and terrorized frontier has become peaceful and prosperous on both sides, and the very presence of the United Nations Force is an insurance against a resumption of trouble and a good excuse not to engage in it. It presents us with one serious problem. To maintain an army of over 5,000 men costs money, but at present the parties concerned have no wish to see the United Nations Emergency Force removed.

In 1958 another very tense situation, with quite different origins, occurred in Lebanon. After the success of UNEF there were suggestions in many quarters that another United Nations force should be collected and dispatched to that country. Here, however, the problem, though aggravated by external factors, was essentially a domestic one. The Security Council therefore set up a three-man observer group and left the Secretary-General considerable latitude as to the methods to be employed to make this group effective in watching over the possibilities of infiltration from outside. A highly mobile group of 600 officers was quickly organized to keep watch from ground and air against the possibility of infiltration into Lebanon, while the crisis itself was resolved by negotiation and discussion. By the end of 1958 it was possible to withdraw the United Nations Observer Group from the Lebanon altogether.

The greatest and most complex challenge to the United Nations in the peace-keeping field arose a few days after the Congo gained its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. A great deal has already been written and
said about the Congo and the involvement of the United Nations there, and I
do not propose to deal with this fascinating subject at length today. The
general proportions of the problem, however, are sometimes obscured by a
wealth of dramatic detail and are worth restating. Harassed by mutiny,
lawlessness and the collapse of public order and services from within, and
afflicted by foreign military intervention as well as by ominous threats of
other forms of intervention from without, the new Government of the Congo
appealed to the United Nations for help. The Security Council, meeting in
urgent all-night session, committed the United Nations to respond to this
appeal and thus made the organization not only the guarantor of law and
order and the protector of the Congo against external interference from
any source, but also the adviser and helper of a newly independent state
which had had virtually no preparation for independence. The United Nations
Force in the Congo, which at its largest numbered some 23,000 men, was called
upon to play a role in that vast and complex country which can seldom, if
ever, have been demanded of soldiers before.

After nearly three years, admittedly very much remains to be done in
the Congo, above all by the Congolese themselves and also by the United
Nations. What is now often forgotten is that by filling, in the space of
a few hours, the very dangerous vacuum which existed in the Congo in July
1960, the urgent danger of a confrontation of the great powers in the heart
of Africa and the spreading of disorder to other parts of the continent,
was avoided and the territorial integrity of the Congo preserved. The new
leaders of the Congo have been given at least a short breathing spell in
which to find their feet. In this process the United Nations has acted,
among other things, as a lightning rod and has attracted to itself many shocks and attacks and much criticism which would otherwise have been directed upon others, probably with disastrous results. In this operation the United Nations has received the loyal support of the vast majority of its members in going to the assistance of one of them. A very large body of experience of the problems and the possibilities of international cooperation in peace-keeping and in the use of military personnel for this purpose has also been gathered. Despite its shortcomings, which must be judged in the light of the fearsome complexity of the problem, the United Nations Operation in the Congo is, in my opinion, a most promising and encouraging experiment in international responsibility and action.

I will end my catalogue with one more operation, which has already been successfully concluded, and which also involved an unprecedented role for the United Nations. I refer to the transfer of West Irian from Dutch administration, through an interim period of United Nations administration, safeguarded by a United Nations force, to the administration of Indonesia. This entire operation has taken place with the agreement and in consultation with the parties concerned.

I have only mentioned here the peace-keeping activities which have involved the use, in one way or another, of military personnel. If I were to mention the many other tense situations in which the United Nations, and my office in particular, have been used as a meeting ground and as an instrument for mediation and peaceful settlement, the list would be much longer. To sum up, we have now had experience of three major peace-keeping forces and a variety of military observer and truce supervisory operations.

/...
Each of the three forces has been different in composition, nature and task, but they have shared certain common characteristics. All three were improvised and called into the field at very short notice; all three were severely limited in their right to use force; all three were designed solely for the maintenance of peace and not for fighting in the military sense; all three were recruited from the smaller powers and with special reference to their acceptability in the area in which they were to serve; all three operated with the express consent and cooperation of the states or territories where they were stationed, as well as of any other parties directly concerned in the situation; and, perhaps most important of all, all three were under the direct control of the Secretary-General acting in behalf of the organs of the United Nations. These facts may now seem common-place; it is a measure of the progress that has been made that even ten years ago they would have seemed very unusual.

By the standards of an efficient national military establishment, these forces have considerable disadvantages. Obviously, a force put together only after the emergency with which it is to deal is in full swing, will inevitably have some shortcomings. There is the difficulty of recruiting at very short notice exactly the right kind of units for the work in hand. There are obvious difficulties in operating a force whose units and officers meet each other for the first time as they go into a delicate operation. There are differences not only of language and tradition but of training, equipment and staff procedures, all of which have to be overcome in the course of carrying out difficult tasks. There are differences in pay/emoluments which, if not handled carefully, can
cause considerable problems of discipline and morale. We have found that it is particularly difficult to assemble at short notice an efficient head-quarters staff to deal with a force of this kind in a situation which is anything but strictly military, and where every decision has important political implications. Although these contingents from member states are under the operational control of the United Nations, disciplinary powers are still vested in the national authorities and this could be, although in fact it never has been, the cause of very serious difficulties for the United Nations Force Commander and for the Secretary-General. We have also experienced difficulty in finding at short notice the kind of specialist troops and personnel, engineers, military police, helicopter pilots and, above all, signals personnel which are required. In the Congo, in particular, a large air component is necessary to maintain communications and mobility in a country roughly the same size as the subcontinent of India. The fact that the military establishments of the permanent members of the Security Council cannot be used cuts us off from the most obvious sources of equipment and personnel. On the logistical side, the improvised nature of these operations has also given rise to severe problems, such as the urgent procurement of the necessary supplies and equipment and the establishing of supply lines to the area of operation.

In our experience these difficulties, which are inherent in the pioneering nature of these operations, have been off-set by the enthusiastic cooperation of member states and by the spirit and comprehension of the officers and men of the contingents which have made up the United Nations forces. It is an encouraging thought that in the military establishments of some 30 countries
in the world there are large numbers of officers and men who have served the United Nations with distinction in one or other of these operations and have added thereby a new dimension to their military experience. There are other compensating advantages in this necessarily improvised approach. It is possible on each occasion to make up the United Nations force from the countries which are politically, and in other ways, most suitable for the operation in hand, and at least the United Nations is not afflicted with the age-old problem of having on its hands a standing army with nothing to do. In my opinion, a permanent United Nations force is not a practical proposition at the present time. Dag Hammarskjold reported to the General Assembly on this problem in 1958 in the light of the experience gained with the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, and concluded that for the time being the Assembly should go no further than to endorse certain basic principles and rules which might form a useful framework for later operations of the same kind. These principles did in fact, two years later, form the basic guidelines for the Congo operation. There are a number of reasons why it seems to me that the establishment of a permanent United Nations force would be premature at the present time. I doubt whether many governments in the world would yet be prepared to accept the political implications of such an institution, and, in the light of our current experience with financial problems, I am sure that they would have very serious difficulties in accepting the financial implications. I believe that we need a number of parallel developments before we can evolve such an institution. We have to go further along the road of codification and acceptance of a workable body of international law. We have to develop a
more sophisticated public opinion in the world, which can accept the transition from predominately national thinking to international thinking, for to support a permanent United Nations force we shall require the understanding and support of governments and peoples all over the world. We shall have to develop a greater confidence in international institutions as such and a greater confidence in the possibility of United Nations civil service whose international loyalty and objectivity are generally accepted and above suspicion. Until these conditions are met, a permanent United Nations force, even supposing the governments were prepared to vote for its establishment, might well become a political and financial liability rather than an asset.

At present we have the seeds of all these requirements and we can, on occasions of exceptional stress, act upon them. What we have at the moment is a stop-gap method of dealing with emergencies and sudden antagonisms. I do not wish to underestimate the progress which has been made. Fifteen, or even 10, years ago the United Nations Force in the Congo, composed of soldiers from the smaller powers and supported loyally by great powers, who have abstained from direct intervention in the situation, would have been almost unimaginable. We have shown that when the situation demands it, it is possible to use the soldiers of many countries for objectives which are not national ones and that the soldiers respond magnificently to this new challenge. We have found that, when the situation is serious enough, governments are prepared to waive certain of the attributes of national sovereignty in the interest of keeping the peace and entrust to the United Nations the necessary degree of authority to do an effective job. We have shown that a loyalty to international service can exist side by side with national loyalties. And,
perhaps most important of all, we have shown that there can be a practical alternative to the deadly ultimate struggle and that it is an alternative which brings out the good and generous qualities in men rather than their destructive and selfish qualities.

Although it is too early to consider the establishment of a permanent United Nations force, there are a number of measures which could be taken to improve on our present capacity for meeting dangerous situations. It would be extremely desirable, for example, if countries would, in their national military plans, make provision/suitable units which could be made available at short notice for United Nations service. I take this opportunity publicly to welcome and express my appreciation for the efforts of the Scandinavian countries in this matter. Denmark, Norway and Sweden have for some time now engaged in joint planning of a stand-by force to be put at the disposal of the United Nations when necessary. This arrangement has a number of great advantages. It decreases the degree of improvisation necessary in an emergency and also makes it possible to plan in advance for the provision of specialist units and personnel which are so vital to intricate peace-keeping operations. It would be a very welcome development if other countries would consider following the lead of the Scandinavian countries in this matter.

By the very existence of these United Nations operations, we already have a large body of officers in countries throughout the world who have vital experience of this new application of the military art, and they are an extremely important investment for peace in the future. I hope that their experience with the United Nations will be used in the training programme of their national armies so that the knowledge of United Nations
requirements will become more widespread in the armies of the world. I have also established in my office a small military advisory staff which is available at all times to advise me on military questions and to think ahead to the problems of the future. Such steps, small in themselves, will, I believe, both improve our capacity to meet emergencies and bring us more surely and more steadily towards the ultimate establishment of a permanent international force, when that becomes desirable and necessary.

At present the activities of the United Nations are over-shadowed by a very serious financial crisis, a crisis which stems directly from the costs of the special peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo and from the failure of some members to pay their assessments for those operations. Although the sums of money involved are small in comparison to the sums spent by many countries on military budgets, they do, nonetheless, present a very serious financial and political challenge to the stability of the United Nations. The United Nations is the sum of all its members and, to develop in the right direction, it must maintain this global character.

On the other hand, I am convinced that the organization must maintain and develop its ability to keep peace. I, therefore, view with the gravest concern the prolongation of the financial crisis of the United Nations with its very serious political overtones, and I trust that we may see a solution of the problem before too long.

I am concerned at this financial crisis more particularly because I see, in the long run, no acceptable alternative method of keeping peace in the world to the steady and sound development of the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations. It is impossible any more to think rationally in terms of countering aggression or keeping the peace by the use of the ultimate weapons. However improvised and fumbling the United Nations approach may be,
we have to develop it to deal with the sudden antagonisms and dangers of our world until we can evolve more permanent institutions. In spite of some of the things that are said about the United Nations in various parts of the world — usually, I suspect, for motives which have little to do with the main objective of keeping the peace — I cannot believe that mankind will again fail to draw the sensible conclusions about its present state. There has been already a great advance in the world towards cooperation, mutual responsibility and interest. I have described some of the pioneering cooperative efforts made by the United Nations to keep the peace. I believe that these efforts, faltering as they may still be on occasion, are steps toward a more mature, more acceptable, and more balanced world order. We must have the confidence and the means to sustain them and the determination to develop out of them a reliable and workable system for the future.
Secretary General

These additions are a result of Ralph's comments. I'm afraid the text is getting too long.

Brian Upton
Additions to draft speech

Page 1, line 10 for "peace" read "police".

Page 4 add after last paragraph

"The nature of these developments is sometimes confused, wittingly or unwittingly, by an attempt to relate them to the use of force to counter aggression by the Security Council provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. In fact the peace-keeping forces I am about to describe are of a very different kind and have little or nothing in common with the forces foreseen in Chapter VII, and their existence is therefore not in conflict with Chapter VII. They are essentially peace and not fighting forces, and they operate only with the consent of the parties directly concerned. As such, therefore, they are well within the competence of the General Assembly. In this context it is worth noting that all of the permanent members of the Security Council have, at one time or another in the past fifteen years, voted in support of the creation of one or other of these forces."
"Its indefatigable members in their white jeeps are now a familiar and welcome part of the Middle Eastern landscape."
The blue helmets of the United Nations Force are known throughout the Congo as the symbol of security. Its soldiers have given protection at one time or another in the last three years to almost every Congolese public figure and almost every group both African and non-African, when danger and violence threatened them. It is worth noting that, now that the withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the Congo is in sight, the deepest regret, and even alarm, is expressed by the very groups who used to be its most hostile critics and detractors. In the Force soldiers from other African countries work side by side in this vast tropical country with those from further away, Indians and Swedes, Irish and Indonesians, Malayans and Brazilians, Austrians and Pakistanis. Their loyalty is to the United Nations, their efforts are for the Congo, and their own nationalities, while preserved with pride in their dress and ceremonial, are one part of their membership in a wider fraternity. Their spirit and comradeship are an inspiration to see.

Although these are peace forces, service in them is hard and can be dangerous. In the Middle East the United Nations Force has registered casualties not only from accidents and disease, but from mines. Both there and in West Irian the terrian and the climate are inhospitable. In the Congo we have had, unfortunately, serious casualties from unwanted fighting as well as from other causes, and I hope very much that we shall have no more.
Additions to draft speech

Page 12

add after first sentence of second paragraph:

("... at the present time."): "I know that many serious people in many countries are enthusiastic about the idea, and I welcome their enthusiasm and the thought they are putting into the evolution of the institution which will eventually and surely emerge. I feel bound to say, however, that as a practical proposition at our present stage of political evolution the excellence of the idea may blind us to the hard realities of its execution."