

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

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EL/WG JUNE 2009

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-1062
BOX 137
FILE 2
ACC. 1998/0283

U N S E C R E T

Copy No. 1 of 15UNAMIR GHANBATT 3
KIBUNGO

Rwanda

GH/060/G(OPS)

13 Sep 95

①

See Distribution

G3 Plan

Please review
and speakGHANBATT SECURITY AND
EVACUATION PLAN

Reference:

A. UNAMIR SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN 5000.46(Plans)
dated 14 Aug 95.

15/9

B. MAP OF RWANDA SCALE 1: 250,000.

② G3 Plan
CopiedGENERAL

1. On 6 Apr 94 after the death of the President of Rwanda and Burundi there was a genocide in Rwanda which resulted in the death of about 500,000 Rwandese who were mainly Tutsis. This genocide resulted in a Civil War which ended in the defeat of the government forces and the displacement of about 1.5 Hutus.

2. The present government of Rwanda is a government of National Unity supported by an Army and Gendermeries who are mainly Tutsis. There are also about 1.8 million displaced people who are scattered in the neighbouring countries of Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. These displaced people wish to come back to the country and in addition to that their host countries also wish to repatriate them for economic and security reasons..

THREAT

3. The threat to UNAMIR could be External or Internal. Since the presence of UNAMIR is of assistance to Rwanda, it is considered that the most likely threat could come from outside and may be from the Ex-Forces of Army of Rwanda (Ex-FAR).

4. In this regard it is likely that the Ex-FAR may start insurgence activities from their bases in the neighbouring countries with the view of achieving the following:

a. To establish bases in the Hutu dominated areas.

b. Gradual infiltration into urban areas especially with the aim of stretching government resources and the security forces to facilitate the conduct of small scale conventional

1 of 8

U N S E C R E T

U N S E C R E T

operations by the Ex-FAR.

c. The large scale decisive conventional operations to reach the desired political objective.

5. With the above in mind it is assumed that the threat could manifest itself through three states as follows:

a. Low Level Threat. The threat at this level may take three forms as follows:

(1) Insurgent Activities. This is the preliminary phase and may take the form of strikes and civil disobedience acts. In general it will be the disturbance of law and order.

(2) Insecurity. The government and people of Rwanda, the RPA or Ex-FAR may decide to be hostile to UNAMIR thereby creating a state of insecurity. This may necessitate the move of UNAMIR personnel and curfew may be imposed.

(3) Threat to UNAMIR Personnel and Property. The inflicting of damage to property and injury of UNAMIR personnel may take place. This could be a planned or mistaken action. It could however become persistent and therefore develop into a serious threat.

(4) Intentions. At this level it will be difficult to determine the intentions towards UNAMIR.

b. Medium Level. The following may occur at this level:

(1) Insurgency Activities. A pattern of insurgency activities may be found at this level. The occurrence of hostile activities increases resulting in a confrontation between the RPA and the insurgents.

(2) Insecurity. The government and people may become uncooperative resulting in obstructive and hostile behaviour. Movement may be impeded, humanitarian activities obstructed resulting in increased security commitment of UNAMIR formed troops.

(3) Threat to UNAMIR. Threat to UNAMIR personnel increases confirming the threat to UNAMIR.

(4) Intention. Hostile intention towards UNAMIR is now confirmed.

c. High Level Threat. The following may characterize this level of threat:

U N S E C R E T

(1) Insurgency Activities. Hostile activities may be well co-ordinated, widespread and intensified. There may be small scale conventional activities between the opposing forces.

(2) Insecurity. The government may become ineffective resulting in restricted movement and humanitarian activities may be halted. The security commitment of UNAMIR may increase significantly.

(3) Threat to UNAMIR. The threat becomes critical and frequency of incidents against UNAMIR increases. This deteriorated situation may halt UNAMIR operations.

(4) Intentions. The hostile intention to destabilize UNAMIR is confirmed.

SECURITY STAGES

6. This stage is broken down into 5 stages and the activity of GHANBATT will be as follows:

a. Normal Stage. Movement between 2300 hrs and 0500 hrs may be restricted. Movement between these moments will be authorised by GHANBATT Ops only.

7. Alert Stage (General). On declaration of this Stage the following will take place.

a. All civilian personnel in the Sector will fall back to Kibungo and will be evacuated to Kigali on order.

b. OC GHANCOY 1 will standby to receive reinforcement when nec.

c. All Ranks are to remain alert and be prepared to be disengaged.

d. All movement to and from Kibungo must be cleared with the Ops Cell.

e. All Ranks will remain alert and wpns will be carried at all times.

f. As the situation deteriorates action will be taken as follows:

(1) Alert Stage 1 (Low Level Threat). Under this condition the following will be undertaken:

(a) All civil staff in Sector to be on Unit net.

(b) Movement is restricted between 1800 and 0600

U N S E C R E T

hrs and VIP visit postponed.

(2) Alert Stage 2 (Medium Level Threat). The following will be undertaken:

- (a) Withdrawal of all civilians to Sector HQ.
- (b) OC GHANCOY 1 to standby to provide reinforcement to other Sectors on order.
- (3) Movement is restricted between 1900 to 0600 hrs and VIP visit postponed.

(3) Alert Stage 3 (High Level Threat). The following will be undertaken under this stage:

- (a) All operations in Sector may be halted except emergency operations.
- (b) GHANCOY 1 to standby to provide reinforcement on order.
- (c) All civilians and NGOs available to be evacuated to Kigali under maximum security.
- (d) GHANCOY 1 to prepare to undertake other tasks on order.
- (e) Movement is restricted to essential services only and VIP visits cancelled.

8. Disengagement Stage. At this stage GHANCOY Ops Cell may order withdrawal from Sector to Kigali on orders from UNAMIR HQ. Destruction of non-essential stores may be ordered at this stage.

9. Consolidation Stage. At this stage GHANCOY 1 & 2 will link up and come under the command of CO GHANBATT. All activities of GHANBATT will now be controlled from Ops Cell GHANBATT HQ.

10. Evacuation Stage. Details of this will be issued based on the situation. All Ranks will be ready to move within one hour.

11. Protection. GHANBATT will provide the following with protection until withdrawal from Sector 2.

- a. UNHRFO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agencies.
- b. Contractors including BRSC.
- c. Any other person under UN protection.
- d. NGOs if possible (NGOs to take note of this during the

U N S E C R E T

briefing). List of personnel as at 31 Aug 95 is at annex A.

12. Caution. It is to be noted that the escalation of hostile activities may be so rapid as to be impossible to be classified into stages. All Ranks, MILOBS and civilian personnel of various organisations are to respond promptly to all instructions from GHANBATT.

13. Change in Security Stage. Any changes in the security stage will be communicated to all by the fastest means possible.

CO-ORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

14. Evacuation destinations (Outside Rwanda) are as follows:

a. Planned - Kabale and Kampala in Uganda. Nairobi in Kenya.

b. Alternative - Areas of Nyamahale and Kanazi in Tanzania.

c. Contingency destinations are as follows:

(1) Goma in Zaire.

(2) Bukavu in Zaire.

(3) Cibitoke or Bujumbura in Burundi.

15. Reporting. Normal SITREPS to be submitted as per existing timings. Any unusual activity to be reported without delay to the Ops Cell.

16. Frequent rehearsal of Alarm Schemes.

17. Training of All Ranks in MT ambush and contact ambush drills by OCs GHANCOY 1 & 2 immediately on receipt of these instructions.

18. All Ranks are to be revised on Operation Plans NIKE, HECTOR and JASON attached as annexes B, C and D respectively.

19. Withdrawal Routes. Kibungo - Kigali. MIO to recce all withdrawal routes and submit report to Ops Cell by 20 Sep 95. Routes to be recce indicated below:

a. Kigali - Byumba - Kabale.

b. Kigali - Kibungo - Rusumo - Nyamahale.

20. Reception point for GHANCOY 1 - Road Bend GR 154843.

21. Reception point for MILOBS from Byumba - Cross Road junction

U N S E C R E T

GR 048856.

22. Assy Pts. The following are the assy pts for civilian personnel.

- a. UNHCR.
- b. UNDP HQ.
- c. BMS Building.
- d. Hotel Meridian.
- c. Trafipro.
- e. Amahoro Complex.
- g. Regional Stadium for the local staff.

23. Safe Areas in Kigali are as follows:

- a. Amahoro Hotel.
- b. UNAMIR Transit Camp.
- c. UNICEF building.
- d. Chez Lando Hotel.
- e. Kigali International Airport.
- f. TRAFIPRO.

24. All emergency assistance required by civilian personnel may be sent to GHANCOY 1 and should contain the following:

- a. What type of emergency, that is activity taking place.
- b. Assistance required.

SERVICE SUPPORT

25. LOGO is to maintain the present level of compo and water reserves as authorised by UNAMIR HQ.

26. LOGO to submit admin instructions to support this plan to Ops Cell by 25 Sep 95 to include plan to receive and sp re-enforcement.

MEDICAL

27. Present medical facilities will be maintained until otherwise directed. All Ranks are however to continue to carry

U N S E C R E T

field dressing at all times.

COMD AND SIGNAL


28. Present comm facilities will be maintained until the interference of comm escalates or supported.

29. BSO is to issue anticipated comm instrs by 25 Sep 95 to cater for all stages of this plan.

30. Present Chain of Comd will be maintained until GHANCOY 1 withdraw to Kigali. On arrival in Kigali GHANCOY 1 & 2 will come under the Comd of CO GHANBATT.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

31. Ack.


SK ADETI
Maj
for Commanding Officer

Annexures:

- A. List of UN and NGO Personnel.
- B. Ops Plan NIKE.
- C. Ops Plan HECTOR.
- D. Ops Plan JASON.
- E. Status of MILOBS

Distribution:

External:

Information:

	<u>Copy No</u>
UNAMIR HQ (OPS)	1
ARMY HQ	2
MILOBS Sector 2	3
UN Agencies	4 - 6

Internal:

Action:

Ops Cell	7
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U N S E C R E T

LOGO
BSO
GHANCOY 1
GHANCOY 2
File
Spare

8
9
10
11
12
13 - 15

U N S E C R E T

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ANNEX A TO
GH3/060/G(OPS)
DATED 13 SEP 95

LIST OF UN AND NGO PERSONNEL

Srl	Name	Nationality	Residence	Remarks
1.	<u>INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS</u>			
a.	Lea Svedeen	American	Kibungo	
b.	Loma Masingila	Kenyan		
c.	Dr Martin Ngokion	Congolese		
d.	Christa Lonneville	Belgian		
2.	<u>INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS</u>			
a.	Jarvis, Dabyelle Marie	-	Kibungo	
b.	Jeanneret, Martine	-	Kibungo	
c.	Emery, Jean-Charles	-	Kibungo	
d.	Sandoz, Jean-Christophe	-	Kibungo	
e.	Giambonini, Monica	-	Kibungo	
f.	Bodaghi, Bardia	-	Kibungo	
3.	<u>INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE</u>			
a.	Ganesh Ratbasamy	-	Kibungo	
b.	Amina Issa Mohamed	-	Kibungo	
c.	Tim Schmaiz	-	Kibungo	
d.	Linnet Onyango	-	Kibungo	
e.	Getachew Teklu	-	Kibungo	
f.	Ben Mwongera	-	kibungo	

A - 1 of 2

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4. LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION

- | | | |
|--------------------|---|---------|
| a. Mr Ulrik | - | Kibungo |
| b. Mr Abdur Rashid | - | Kibungo |

5. RED BARNET

- | | | |
|-------------------|---|---------|
| a. Eva Jordung | - | Kibungo |
| b. Kjeld Norgaard | - | Kibungo |

6. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---------|
| a. Lonneville Christa | - | Kibungo |
| b. Mesureur Bruno | - | Kibungo |
| c. Bakari Diarra | - | Kibungo |

U N S E C R E T

ANNEX B TO
GH3/003/G(OPS)
DATED 13 SEP 95

OPS PLAN NIKE

1. PLAN NIKE GREEN

- a. Normal Activities. Continue with normal activity.
- b. Recce. Confirmatory recce to be carried out on routes including alternatives to all locations identified for use under NIKE YELLOW and RED.
- c. Protected Pers. All protected pers incl MILOBs are to be briefed on procedures to be followed under NIKE YELLOW and RED.

2. PLAN NIKE YELLOW. Withdrawal to Safe Areas as follows:

- a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Mov of pers on escort duties to be restricted.
- b. Protected Personnel. May be withdrawn to Safe Areas on a voluntary basis only.
- c. Fixed Installations. Fixed Installations will be listed and the level of security to be accorded each will be indicated.
- d. MILOB Withdrawal. As per Annex E.
- e. Movement.
 - (1) Min number of vehs in a convoy is four.
 - (2) Min protection for a convoy or a packet is one section.
 - (3) Movement off main Supply Route (MSR) only when absolutely nec.
 - (4) All convoys will have guaranteed comm.
 - (5) Night movement may be undertaken only when absolutely necessary.
- f. Administration.
 - (1) Combat Supplies. 7 x days supplies as first line will be maint.

B - 1 of 2

U N S E C R E T

U N S E C R E T

(2) Stockpiling. Further 7 x days combat ration at Coy level.

(3) Destr. In accordance with ops Plans HECTOR and JASON.

(4) Leave. Restricted to compassionate cases only.

(5) Alcohol. No alcohol will be consumed when on NIKE YELLOW or RED.

3. PLAN NIKE RED. When the Unit is NIKE RED the following will prevail:

a. Recce. Further recce of locations/routes for use under plans HECTOR and JASON will be carried out.

b. Protected Personnel. The Unit will plan to escort protected personnel to Kigali or neighbouring country as may be ordered by HQ UNAMIR.

c. Movement.

(1) Min convoy - 8 x vehicles.

(2) Min protection - 2 Sections per convoy or packet.

(3) No movement off MSR.

(4) All convoys or packets have guaranteed comm.

(5) No movement at night.

d. Administration.

(1) No leave to be granted.

(2) All personnel will wear ballistic protective equipment and headgear when issued.

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ANNEX C TO
GH3/003/G(OPS)
DATED 13 SEP 95

OPS PLAN HECTOR

1. PLANS HECTOR GREEN

a. Recce. Confirmatory recce of loc and routes for use under HECTOR YELLOW and RED.

b. Admin of Rft Troops. Be prep to administer one platoon consisting of:

- (1) Recce Party - 5
- (2) Advance party - 5
- (3) Main Body - 20
- (4) 5 Vehicles.

c. Prep of Own Troops. Be prep to rft another Sector as fols:

- (1) NTM
 - (a) Recce Party - 6 Hrs NTM
 - (b) Advance Party - 12 Hrs NTM
 - (c) Main Body - 18 Hrs NTM
- (2) Eqpt. Fully eqpt and sealed for 7days Ops.
- (3) Combat Supplies. Self contained for 3 days.

2. PLAN HECTOR YELLOW

a. Recce. Further recce if nec.

b. Prep for Rft. If ordered to rft another Sector/Sub-Sector, reduce NTM to:

- (1) HECTOR YELLOW ALFA
 - (a) Recce Party - Move immediately.
 - (b) Advance Party - 6 hrs.
 - (c) Main Body - 24 hrs.

C - 1 of 2

U N S E C R E T

U N S E C R E T

(2) HECTOR YELLOW BRAVO

(a) Advance party - Move immediately.

(b) Main Body - 12 hrs.

(3) HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE

c. Reception Arrangements

(1) Issue verbal orders on arrival of Recce Party.

(2) Appoint LO.

(3) Provide guides.

(4) Coord incl electronic eqpts.

(5) Prep accn.

(6) Coord admin sp.

3. PLAN HECTOR RED

a. GHANCOY 1 or 2 will deploy Main Body immediately if ordered to reinforce another sector.

b. Reception Arrangements if receiving rfts:

(1) Issue confirmatory orders.

(2) Coord arrangements.

(3) Arrange admin sp as reqd.

C - 2

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ANNEX D TO
GH3/003/G(OPS)
DATED 13 SEP 95

OPS PLAN JASON

1. PLAN JASON GREEN. Normal ops may continue as feasible.
 - a. CO GHANBATT will:
 - (1) Prepare GHANCOY for Ops Plan JASON activation.
 - (2) Brief all pers to incl:
 - (a) Threat.
 - (b) Safe Areas.
 - (c) Destruction Plan.
 - (d) Comm Plan.
 - (e) Log Plan.
 - (f) Mov Plan.
 - (3) Provide UNAMIR HQ with updated list on Protected Personnel if/when deployed to Safe Areas.
 - (a) Names and parent organisation.
 - (b) Locations.
 - (c) Medical Condition.
 - (d) Aval tpt.
 - (e) Store and Eqpt.
 - (f) Capability for self sufficiency.
 - (g) Intentions.
 - (4) Prepare to escort protected pers to Kigali.
2. PLAN JASON YELLOW. It is staged as follows:
 - a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Wdr to Kigali. On receipt of Code "JASON YELLOW ALFA".
 - (1) GHANCOY 2 Protected Persons will marshall into Safe Areas. Contact will be made with Zone Warden, Maj
D - 1 of 3

U N S E C R E T

U N S E C R E T

MM Singh, to facilitate movement.

(2) Briefing and prep for move to Kigali using rehearsed wdr plan/routes.

(3) Await detailed Instrs from UNAMIR HQ.

(4) Non essentials will be prep for destruction.

(5) Route clearance and Security carried out.

(6) Destr non-essentials before departure.

(7) Move to Kigali.

(8) Arrival procedures (Kigali).

(a) Estb perimeter defence.

(b) Coord return of protected pers to parent org with Zone Warden.

(c) RRF to take over local def from Sector 1 Commander.

(d) Ops Offr and Logo to list non-essential stores and manifest for evac under YELLOW BRAVO.

(e) Ops Offr and Logo to identify important stores for evac.

(f) Ops Offr and Logo to identify non-essential stores for destr.

b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Prelim Evac.

c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Force level will be reduced to min consistent with the maint of UN presence. When ordered:

(1) All remaining non-essential eqpt will be destroyed.

(2) All eqpt which cannot be evac within remaining air/veh lift aval will be destr.

(3) GHANCOY will evac as ordered by UNAMIR HQ.

3. PLAN JASON RED. Executive Order to evac Rwanda will be conducted in 2 Phases:

a. Phase 1. Evac of remaining presence via KIA to consist of fol:

D - 2

U N S E C R E T

U N S E C R E T

- (1) Reduction of KP resp by Security Force to min.
- (2) Centralisation of UN personnel in one loc.
- (3) Provision of transitional security at KIA for final evac flights.
- (4) Route recce for land evacuation route.
- (5) Escort of remaining UN personnel to KIA by Security Forces.
- (6) Evacuation of UN presence less Security Forces.

b Phase 2. Evac by road of Security Forces to consist of the fol:

- (1) Centralisation of Security Force.
- (2) Desp of recce elms incl Engr Liaison Det.
- (3) Clearing of Route, if reqd.
- (4) Route Security.
- (5) Rd mov to neighbouring country.

U N S E C R E T

ANNEX E TO
GH3/003/G(OPS)
DATED 7 SEP 95

STATUS OF MILOBs

General

1. MILOBs have Special Status under UN Convention herein they are defined as "experts". Because they are unarmed their security will be safeguarded by the CO GHANBATT.

MILOB Withdrawal.

2. MILOBs will adhere to Op NIKE SAMs.

3. Reception and administration for them will be considered by CO GHANBATT.

4. They may be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE and YELLOW provided:

a. They are not sent to the site of known or suspected threat.

b. They travel as a minimum party of six in two vehicles.

c. They must have guaranteed communications.

5. They may not be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE RED without the specific authority of the Force Commander.

E - 1

U N S E C R E T

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.46 (Plans)

To: Distribution List

From: A/DCOS OPS

Date: 21 Aug 95

Subject: SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

1. The Security and Evacuation Plan has been approved by the Force Commander and is enclosed for your action.
2. All Sector Commanders (not Milob Sub Sector Commanders) are to prepare their plans to support the Security and Evacuation Plan and forward them to the Force Commander by 8 Sep 95 for his perusal. These plans should address the following issues:
 - a. Identification of all Milobs and UN Agencies and NGOs personnel in your sector.
 - b. The method of concentrating these personnel when and if required.
 - c. A communications plan (this may require the assistance of the Force Signals company).
3. An updated list of UN Agencies and NGOs personnel will be forwarded once it has been received from the UNAMIR Chief Security Officer. However, this should not stop you from immediately gathering all UN Agencies and NGO personnel in your sectors for a security conference to address the above issues.
4. If you have any questions relating to the Security and Evacuation plan please direct them to MAJ P.K. Malik, G3 Plans 3, on Ext 11162.
5. Acknowledge receipt.

Enclosure:

1. Security and Evacuation Plan dated 14 Aug 95

Distribution:

Action:

List B (less RPA LO)
List C

Information:

List A

Office of SRSG

CAO

UNAMIR CSO

UNDP (Attn: John Cleeland)

HNHCR

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5000.46 (Plans)

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
KIGALI

14 Aug 95

SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

- References :**
- A. Appreciation on Recovery of UNAMIR Troops.
 - B. Map Rwanda, 1:250,000.

Appendices :

- A. Sector Concentration Areas.
- B. Administration Policy.
- C. Communication Policy.
- D. Instructions on Reinforcement.
- E. Routes (Withdrawal/Evacuation) and Possible Contingencies.
- F. Timings.
- G. Evacuation Procedure in Kigali.
- H. Aide Memoire - Summary of actions to be taken.

GENERAL

1. The history of Rwanda is one of long established inter-ethnic bloodshed which dates back to the 15th century when the Tutsis first came from the region of 'The Horn of Africa'. A peasant revolt in 1959 overthrew Tutsi leadership internally while Rwanda remained under Belgium administration. In 1962 the two territories of Rwanda and Burundi gained independence from Belgium and separated. An invasion from Burundi by Tutsi rebels in 1963 failed, but set the pattern for the future. Tensions in Rwanda produced a military coup in 1972 which resulted in the death of many Tutsis. In 1990, Tutsi exiles of the RPF invaded Rwanda seeking to topple the government. Although the first attack failed, the RPF launched further attacks from 1991 onwards. Following repeated attempts at a diplomatic solution, UNAMIR and UNOMUR were established to monitor the Arusha Accord. On the 6th of April 1994, after the deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda, a plan to commit genocide on the Tutsi population and kill moderate Hutus opposing the hardline regime was executed. This caused the death of about 500,000 Rwandans, mainly Tutsis. The ensuing civil war resulted in the defeat of the government and RGF, and the displacement of up to 1.5 million Hutus.

2. Currently there is a government of National Unity with a Tutsi dominated army and Gendarmerie. There are 1.8 million displaced refugees throughout the neighbouring countries of Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. The FRGF has bases in GOMA camps (16-18,000 personnel), BUKAVU camps (12-15,000) and 15,000 troops in Tanzania near Akagera Park.

3. Therefore, contingency plans must be prepared for the possible resumption of hostilities, which may include the targeting of UN personnel and property and cause the withdrawal/evacuation of the mission from Rwanda.

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THREAT

4. A threat to UNAMIR could develop from internal or external forces. However, as our mandate is one of assistance, it is considered unlikely that a threat would originate from the existing government. This does not rule out disagreements which may develop from time to time between UNAMIR and the government. As such it is considered likely that any threat to UNAMIR would primarily develop from the FRGF.

5. It is likely that the FRGF would commence its operations with insurgency activities to establish bases in the rural areas dominated by the Hutus while maintaining external bases in Zaire and/or Tanzania. This could be followed by a gradual infiltration into the urban centres, in particular Kigali, which would stretch the government resources and keep the security forces off balance. It would also allow the FRGF time to mount small scale conventional operations. The FRGF would look for small victories to bolster the morale and confidence of its cadre and the Hutu population. The final stage would likely to be a large scale decisive conventional operation to reach the desired political decision. Therefore the threat could develop in different sectors simultaneously.

6. It is appreciated that the threat would likely be manifested in three levels (low, medium and high level threat).

a. Low Level Threat.

(1) Insurgent Activities. It is a preliminary phase which may be misinterpreted as a law and order problem. The effects of insurgency activities would be mainly felt in the rural areas. There may be some incidents of attack and ambush, however, a clear pattern of insurgency activities can not be established.

(2) Insecurity. The government and local population may become uncooperative and hostile due to the influence of either the Government/RPA or FRGF, and movements may be impeded and curfews imposed.

(3) Threat to UNAMIR Personnel and Property. Attempts may be made to inflict damage/injury to personnel and property of UNAMIR. Targeting of UNAMIR may be as a result of mistaken identity or a planned activity. It may be difficult to determine the real threat at this stage and therefore it may be interpreted as an isolated incident. It has the potential to develop into a serious threat.

(4) Intentions. As a result of these activities it is difficult to determine the hostile intentions towards UNAMIR.

b. Medium Level Threat.

(1) Insurgency Activities. A pattern of insurgency activities is confirmed. The frequency of incidents of attacks and ambushes increase and activities

UN RESTRICTED

spread to the urban areas. Confrontations between the RPA and insurgents increase in frequency and intensity.

(2) **Insecurity.** The government and local population become uncooperative, obstructive and hostile, and movements are impeded. Humanitarian operations may be disrupted, resulting in increased security commitments.

(3) **Threat to UNAMIR Personnel and Property.** Threats to UNAMIR personnel and property increases. The pattern of attacks confirms that UNAMIR personnel and property are being targeted.

(4) **Intentions.** Hostile intentions towards UNAMIR are established.

c. **High Level Threat.**

(1) **Insurgency Activities.** Activities are well coordinated and wide spread. The intensity and the degree of violence increases. There may be instances of small scale conventional operations by the FRGF against the RPA.

(2) **Insecurity.** The administration machinery of the Government becomes ineffective. Movements are restricted and humanitarian operations may be halted. Security commitments of UNAMIR will increase significantly due to the escalating threat.

(3) **Threat to UNAMIR Personnel and Property.** The threat to UNAMIR personnel and property becomes critical and the frequency of incidents increases. UN facilities and personnel may be specifically targeted. The security situation has deteriorated to such an extent that operations are halted.

(4) **Intentions.** Hostile intentions are identified as attempting to destabilise UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda.

SECURITY STAGES

7. **Normal Stage.** The Integrated Core Group (Crisis Management Team) is identified. Normal operations will continue. During this stage movements are restricted between 2300 hours and 0500 hours to essential duty or when specifically authorized by Contingent/Unit Commanders/Branch Heads.

8. **Alert Stage.** Civilian personnel will fall back to the company locations according to the level of threat. Reinforcements may be required to control the situation. The UN civilian and NGOs personnel will be evacuated to Kigali. Full security measures will be adopted and operations may have to be halted towards the end of this stage. The final part of this stage will see preparations for disengagement of UNAMIR personnel from the threatened sectors. It will encompass all the measures to deal with low, medium and high level threats and has been divided into the following stages:

a. **ALERT STAGE ONE (LOW LEVEL THREAT).** Operations are to be carried out with enhanced security. The situation is to be constantly monitored.

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Communications are to be established with all UN civilian personnel deployed in sectors and they are to be briefed accordingly. During this stage movements are restricted between 1800 hours and 0600 hours to essential duty and VIP visits are postponed.

- b. **ALERT STAGE TWO (MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT).** All UN civilian personnel deployed in the sectors are to be withdrawn to the company locations. Reinforcements may be ordered if required. Operations may be restricted and are to be carried out with enhanced security measures. During this stage movements are restricted between 1800 hours and 0600 hours to essential duty and VIP visits are postponed.
 - c. **ALERT STAGE THREE (HIGH LEVEL THREAT).** All operations may have to be halted except emergency operations, which are to be carried out with maximum security. Reinforcements may be ordered if required. UN civilian personnel and NGOs (if possible) will be evacuated to Kigali. Preparations are to be made for withdrawal to the staging area. From this stage onwards all movements are restricted to essential duty only and VIP visits are cancelled.
9. **Disengagement Stage.** This stage will entail the withdrawal of troops from threatened sectors to Kigali, or evacuation to the evacuation destination outside of Rwanda (Only Sectors 4 and 5). Those sectors not threatened are to continue to occupy their sectors. Therefore, if the security situation warrants a withdrawal of these sectors, they will withdraw to Kigali/evacuation destination on order of UNAMIR HQ. If the security situation improves, troops are to redeploy in to the same sectors. However, if the security situation continues to deteriorate, threatened sectors will continue their withdrawal to Kigali. These actions will allow a graduated withdrawal and thus present a resolute front. If the evacuation of the mission from Rwanda is probable, preparations for the relocation of personnel and property in Kigali are to commence. Destruction of non-essential stores will be on order of UNAMIR HQ.
10. **Consolidation Stage (Kigali).** In view of the deteriorating security situation and the probable evacuation of the Mission from Rwanda, Kigali will have to be consolidated. Only those troops required to support the evacuation process will remain in Kigali. Other troops not already evacuated to the evacuation destination will do so on order. All personnel in Kigali are to be relocated to Safe Areas and all UN civilian personnel prepared for evacuation in the next stage. All NGO personnel will be advised to evacuate. UN property in Kigali is to be relocated and security forces are to occupy final positions to support the evacuation.
11. **Evacuation Stage.** There will be a progressive evacuation of UN civilian, military and the remaining core group in three stages:
- a. **EVACUATION STAGE ONE.** All civilian personnel are evacuated leaving behind a core group, as required. Non-essential military personnel are to prepare for evacuation in the next stage.
 - b. **EVACUATION STAGE TWO.** Military nonessential personnel and civilian core group will then be evacuated leaving behind an Integrated Core Group comprising military and UN civilian representatives.

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- c. **EVACUATION STAGE THREE**. Evacuation of the integrated Core group and the security force using the land and the air routes.

Parallel Security States

12. The following identifies the correlation between the military security stages and the phases defined in the United Nations Field Security Handbook:

<u>Defined by UN Field Security Handbook</u>	<u>Military Security Stages</u>
a. Phase 1-Precautionary (Movements restricted to essential activities).	ALERT STAGE ONE & TWO
b. Phase Two-Restricted Movements (All movements restricted)	ALERT STAGE THREE
c. Phase 3-Relocation (Persons and property relocated in concentration centres in anticipation of evacuation).	DISENGAGEMENT & CONSOLIDATION STAGES
d. Phase 4-Programme suspension (Regular ops can not continue, all non essential persons evacuated).	EVACUATION STAGE ONE
e. Phase 5-Evacuation (All the ops halted and all personnel evacuated).	EVACUATION STAGES TWO & THREE

Protection

13. In a deteriorated security situation UNAMIR has a duty to protect the following personnel:

- a. UNHRFO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. Contractors including BRSC.
- c. Any other person under UN protection.
- d. NGOs (if possible).

14. As UNAMIR resources are limited, the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited when there is an increased threat. Therefore, in these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be have to be restricted.

Command Responsibility

15. Sector Commanders are responsible for all aspects of the security plans in their sectors.

Activation of Security Stages

16. **Activation.** The activation of security stages will be ordered by FORCE HQ, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. Subject.
- b. Brief description of the situation.
- c. Time from which these security states will be applicable.
- d. The applicable security state to the sectors.
- e. Other instructions if any.

17. **Example.** An example of the activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

4C THIS IS ZERO.

- A. SECURITY STATES.**
- B. INSURGENT ACTIVITIES INTENSIFIED IN AREAS GISAKURA SECTOR 4, BUTARE SECTOR 3, MUTURA SECTOR 5.**
- C. WITH EFFECT FROM 120600 APRIL 95.**
- D. SECTOR 1- ALERT ONE, SECTOR 2-ALERT ONE, SECTOR 3-ALERT ONE, SECTOR 4, SECTOR 5-ALERT THREE.**
- E. SEND REGULAR INFORMATION, ROE APPLICABLE AS PER THE SOP.**

18. **Action on Receipt.** On receipt the unit is to:

- a. Send acknowledgement by telephone and FAX.
- b. Follow the action indicated in the relevant security stage.
- c. Keep UNAMIR HQ informed through regular reports.
- d. Inform UNAMIR HQ immediately by telephone and FAX of any serious development or incident, without waiting for the periodic SITREP.

19. **Authority to Change Security Stages.** The authority to change security stages resides with the Force Commander, however this authority may be delegated further. If a Sector Commander believes the security stage should be changed in his AOR, he must provide justification to UNAMIR HQ. Therefore, Sector Commanders are to constantly update UNAMIR HQ regarding the situation in their sector to allow for a timely decision.

Evacuation Destinations (Outside of Rwanda)

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20. **Planned.**
- a. Kabale and Kampala in Uganda.
 - b. Nairobi in Kenya.
21. **Alternative.** Areas of Nyamahale and Kanazi in Tanzania.
22. **Contingency Destinations (Refer to Appx E).**
- a. Goma in Zaire.
 - b. Bukavu in Zaire.
 - c. Cibitoke or Bujumbura in Burundi.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN

23. Specific and detailed actions as indicated below are to be taken once UNAMIR HQ has ordered the adoption of each of the following stages:

Normal Stage

24. This stage denotes normal operations. The following actions are to be taken by all concerned:

- a. Monitor the security situation constantly and report any security incidents to the UNAMIR HQ.
- b. Liaise with the neighbouring sectors for the locations of sub units near the inter sector boundary.
- c. List all UN civilian and NGO personnel deployed in the sector (with their telephone numbers, addressees and Motorola call signs). Decide on the method of passing any message to them and establish the venue and the timings for security conferences.
- d. Brief all the Military Observers, UNCIVPOL, UN Agencies and NGO personnel on the security plans. Ensure that they know what actions they are to take in the different security stages.
- e. Make arrangements for accommodation in the company locations for all troops and civilian personnel requiring protection. The list of company locations is attached as Appx A.
- f. Maintain a RRF of one section at 30 mins notice to move.
- g. Update information on all the planned routes for movement of personnel in

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different security stages.

- h. Carry out liaison for the accommodation in Kigali.
- i. Carry out rehearsals of the plan as required.
- j. Identification of the Integrated Core Group (Crises Management Team) which will be comprised of the following personnel:

- (1) SRSG.
- (2) Force Commander.
- (3) Chief Administration Officer.
- (4) Deputy Force Commander.
- (5) Chief of Staff.
- (6) Deputy Chief of Staff Operations.
- (7) Civilian Police Commissioner.
- (8) Deputy Chief of Staff Support.
- (9) Chief Integrated Support Services.
- (10) Force Medical Officer
- (11) Chief Movement Control Cell.
- (12) Air Operations Officer Kigali.
- (13) Force Engineering Officer.
- (14) Force Signal Officer.
- (15) UNDP Field Security Officer.
- (16) BRSC Operations Manager.

k. Prepare list of essential (high priority) and non-essential(low priority) stores. All essential stores are to be evacuated, however, if suitable transport and/or time is not available, can be planned to be destroyed in the Disengagement stage.

- 25. **Administration.** Administration policy is attached as Appx B.
- 26. **Communication Policy.** Refer Appx C.

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Alert Stage One

27. The following actions are to be taken by the affected sectors:
- a. Ensure that the security stage message is disseminated to all concerned.
 - b. Operations will continue with enhanced security.
 - c. Establish contact with all UN civilian and NGO personnel. Civilian personnel may be withdrawn to the company locations on request.
 - d. Brief all the Military Observers, UNCIVPOL, UN civilian and NGO personnel on the security stage.
 - e. Maintain a RRF of one section 30 mins notice to move.
 - f. Test communications with troops and other civilian personnel.
 - g. Movements may be impeded and is to be in groups of at least two vehicles.
 - h. Necessary security precautions are to be taken.
 - i. Conduct reconnaissance of the routes to be used in the next stage.
 - j. Be prepared to provide reinforcement to other sectors. For instructions on reinforcement refer to Appx D.
 - k. Be prepared to provide specified transport on orders of HQ UNAMIR. Each vehicle will have the driver, co-driver and one armed escort.
28. **Reporting.** All sectors are to send SITREPS as per existing timings. It should highlight all activities of the security stage.
29. **Administration.** Refer to Appx B.
30. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.

Alert Stage Two

31. The following actions are to be taken by the affected sectors:
- a. Ensure the change in the security stage is disseminated to all concerned.
 - b. The company locations to be capable of being defended from a direct attack.
 - c. Restricted operations will continue with enhanced security measures.
 - d. UN Civilian personnel in sectors are to be withdrawn to the company locations if not done in the earlier stage. They may be evacuated to Kigali on request. Sector

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Commanders are to provide transport and escort for the movement of the civilian personnel.

- e. UN civilian personnel may be temporarily located in the company location during transit. Therefore, arrangements for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of these personnel are to be made.
- f. Provide appropriate protection to UNAMIR assets as required.
- g. Update information on the routes to be followed in the next stage.
- h. Military Observers are to be given security, where possible, for the performance of their operations. Military Observers may be given military tasks only if,
 - (1) they are not sent to the site of a known or suspected threat,
 - (2) given an appropriate escort,
 - (3) they travel as a minimum party of two vehicles, and
 - (4) they have guaranteed communication.

However, if the security condition demands, they are to be withdrawn to the Concentration Areas.

- i. All movement is impeded. Convoy movements are permitted under the following conditions:
 - (1) Minimum convoy of two vehicles.
 - (2) Minimum protection of one section per convoy/packet.
 - (3) Movements on other than main routes is to be minimised.
 - (4) All convoy/packet have guaranteed communication.
 - (5) Movement at night minimised.
- j. Maintain RRF of two sections on 20 mins notice to move.
- k. **UNCIVPOL**. Sector Commanders should consider requesting UNCIVPOL support to enhance their security arrangements, in particular:
 - (1) Crowd control.

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- (4) Guarding of Key Points.
 - (5) Liaison with Gendarmerie.
 - l. Be prepared to provide reinforcement to any sector as ordered. Refer to Appx D for instructions on reinforcements.
 - m. Be prepared to receive reinforcements as ordered. Refer to Appx D for instructions on reinforcements.
 - n. Back loading of essential stores not required for sustainment in the subsequent stages.
 - o. Be prepared to provide specified transport on orders of HQ UNAMIR. Each vehicle will have the driver, co-driver and one armed escort.
32. **Reporting.** All sectors are to send SITREPS as per existing timings. It should highlight all security stage activities.
33. **Administration.** Refer to Appx B.
34. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.

Alert Stage Three

35. Alert stage three indicates a high level threat which may cause the evacuation of UNAMIR from Rwanda. This stage entails high level security measures and preparations for the withdrawal to Kigali or to evacuation destination (only Sectors 4 and 5) on order from UNAMIR HQ. The following actions are to be taken by all concerned:

- a. Ensure the change in the security stage is disseminated to all concerned.
- b. Operations may have to be halted due to the increased threat. Emergency operations are only to be conducted with full security measures. Sector Commanders are to keep UNAMIR HQ fully informed.
- c. UN Civilian personnel are withdrawn to Kigali. Sector Commanders are to provide transport.
- d. Military Observers are to be withdrawn to company locations if not done so in an earlier stage. In sectors where formed troops are not deployed, specific orders will be issued to the mil obs.
- e. Key civilian personnel may continue to carry out their tasks if the security situation permits and agreed to by the Sector Commanders. Sector Commanders may refuse these requests if the security situation demands restrictions. UN Civilian personnel will then be evacuated to Kigali. Sector Commanders are to provide escort and transportation for the move.

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- f. Maintain RRF of one platoon at 20 mins notice to move.
 - g. Be prepared to provide reinforcements to other sector as ordered. Refer to Appx D for instructions.
 - h. Be prepared to receive reinforcements as ordered.
 - i. Military Observers are not be given military tasks with out permission of UNAMIR HQ.
 - j. All movements are restricted. No movements permitted at night. Convoy movement is permitted only under the following conditions:
 - (1) Minimum convoy of four vehicles.
 - (2) Minimum protection of two sections per convoy or packet.
 - (3) Movements only on main routes.
 - (4) Communications must be guaranteed.
 - k. Preparations will be made for withdrawal to Kigali in the next stage.
 - l. Seek permission from HQ UNAMIR to destroy the essential (high priority) stores, which can not be evacuated due to the lack of transport and/or time.
 - m. prepared to provide specified transport on orders of HQ UNAMIR. Each vehicle will have the driver, co-driver and one armed escort.
36. **Reporting.** All sectors are to send SITREPS as per existing timings. It should highlight all security stage activities.
37. **Administration.** Refer to Appx B.
38. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.
39. **Withdrawal/Evacuation Routes.** The withdrawal/evacuation routes and possible contingencies are attached as Appx E.
40. **Movement Timings.** Movement timings for various routes are shown in Appx F.

Disengagement Stage

- 41. The exact destination for withdrawal will be notified in the activation message. It entails withdrawal to Kigali and/or evacuation destination in case of Sectors 4 and 5.
- 42. The following actions are to be taken by all concerned:

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- a. Ensure the change in the security stage is disseminated to all concerned.
- b. Conduct liaison with the neighbouring sectors to gather/pass information on the current security situation and dispositions of troops near the intersector boundary.
- c. Secure/clear the major choke points on the withdrawal/evacuation route within the Sector boundaries, to prevent possible ambush. It may be difficult to secure all the likely ambush sites, therefore convoys are to have front, centre and rear escorts. Detailed instructions are to be given to the escorts, including action to be taken in case of ambush. Counter ambush drills are to be practised during the earlier stages.
- d. Units are to carry all accommodation tentage, if held.
- e. Essential stores are to be destroyed on order from UNAMIR HQ.
- f. Provide protection, where possible, to the Military Observers and attached UNAMIR personnel.
- g. Military Observers will form part of the sector withdrawing to Kigali. However, Military Observers with the sector ordered to evacuate to the alternate destination may be required to withdraw instead to Kigali. Definite instructions will be given in the activation message.
- h. Troops withdrawing to Kigali are to report to the Sector 1 Reception Point. A list is given in Appx G.
- i. The LO will receive troops at the reception point, brief and guide them to the sub sector allotted to them.
- j. The incoming troops will be self sufficient for the first three days with rations, water and POL. Subsequently resupply will be direct from CSMG as required.

43. **Administration.** Refer to Appx B.

44. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.

Consolidation Stage (Kigali)

45. This stage covers the Kigali consolidation process in view of the probable evacuation of the mission out of Rwanda. Only the troops required to protect UN installations and support the evacuation process are to be kept in Kigali. All others will be ordered to withdraw to the evacuation destination (if not done so in Disengagement Stage), unless air evacuation from KIA is deemed the only viable method.

46. The following actions are to be taken by all concerned:

- a. Ensure change in the security level is disseminated to all concerned.

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- b. Conduct liaison with the neighbouring sectors to gather/pass information on the current security situation.
- c. Secure/clear major choke points on the withdrawal/evacuation route within the Sector boundaries. Convoys are to have escorts.
- d. Units are to carry all accommodation tentage, if held.
- e. An advance party is to be despatched 6-8 hrs ahead of the main body, by HQ UNAMIR, to make arrangements to receive the troops ordered to evacuate to evacuation destination in this stage.
- f. Troops ordered to evacuate to evacuation destination are to be self contained for three days with rations, water and POL.
- g. Sector 1 is to maintain Two platoon RRFs, at 20 mins notice, at ALEXANDRA and UNDP HQ.
- h. It is recommended that all NGOs are evacuated in this stage because they may not be guaranteed security after this stage.
- i. Kigali Zones and Zone Wardens are shown in Appx G.
- j. All UN civilian personnel are to gather at the Assembly Points. A list of the Kigali Assembly Points is at Appx H. Sector 1 is to provide protection to the Kigali Assembly Points.
- k. Sector 1 is to provide escort and transport for the move of all UN civilian personnel from Assembly Points to Safe Areas. A list of Safe Areas in Kigali is shown in Appx G.
- l. Sector 1 is to provide security to the Safe Areas.
- m. All UN property in Kigali is to be relocated into TRAFIPRO.
- n. All UN civilian personnel requiring emergency assistance are to contact UNDP, UNHCR or UNICEF. The duty personnel at these locations are to immediately contact the UNAMIR duty officer and Sector 1 HQ Operations Room. The information to be provided is attached as Appx G.
- o. All UN civilian personnel are to prepare for evacuation in the next stage. Manifests are to be prepared by MOVCON. The baggage limit for air evacuation is 15 kgs. Instructions on evacuation by air will be issued subsequently.
- p. Security forces are to occupy their final positions to support the evacuation process. This is to include security of routes to the airport.

47. **Administration in the Safe Areas.** The planned number of personnel to be catered for

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is given in the Appx G. The various Safe Areas are to be stocked with 10 days rations and water. The required accommodation is to be catered for with the necessary sanitation facilities for the number of personnel mentioned in Appx G.

48. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.

Evacuation Stage One

49. This stage involves the evacuation of UN civilian personnel less "NORMED" personnel. The following actions are to be taken by all concerned:

- a. UNAMIR Operations Branch is to ensure that the change in the security stage is disseminated to all concerned.
- b. MOVCON is to manifest all civilian personnel. All manifested personnel are to be escorted to the airport and evacuated.
- c. It is likely that in this stage other civilian international personnel of embassies may also be evacuating, therefore, MOVCON will have to coordinate all necessary aspects.
- d. Some UN Agencies may leave a small core group behind, if required.
- e. Security of Safe Areas is to be adjusted as a result of the partial evacuation in this stage.
- f. Preparation for evacuation of military nonessential personnel in the next stage, including manifests, is to commence.
- g. Stores and vehicles not required in Kigali in the next stages are to be evacuated. Refer to Appx B (Administration Policy) for instructions.

50. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.

51. **Administration in Safe Areas.** Refer to Appx G.

Evacuation Stage Two

52. This stage involves evacuation of nonessential military personnel. The following actions are to be taken by all concerned:

- a. Nonessential military personnel and Civilian Core Group are to be escorted to the airport and evacuated.
- b. All stores and vehicles, not required in Kigali in the next stage, are to be evacuated. For instructions refer to Appx B.

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- c. Nonessential stores that can not be evacuated are to be destroyed. For instructions refer to the Destruction Plan in Appx B.

53. **Administration in Safe Areas.** Refer to Appx B.

54. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.

Evacuation Stage Three

55. Stage three is the final evacuation of the mission presence from Rwanda. The following actions are to be taken:


- a. Essential stores which can not be evacuated are to be destroyed on order from the Integrated Core Group. Refer to Appx B for instructions.
- b. The Integrated Core Group is to be escorted to the airport and evacuated.
- c. Some elements of the security force are to be evacuated by air and the remainder by road. The routes and destinations for evacuation of the security force by road will be determined by the Integrated Core Group prior to its evacuation.

56. **Administration in Safe Areas.** Refer to Appx B.

57. **Communication Policy.** Refer to Appx C.

58. **Summary of Actions.** A summary of action to be taken during the various stages is attached as Appx H.

59. Sector plans are to be developed in line with the guidance provided above, and forwarded to UNAMIR HQ (Plans Section). Plans are to be reviewed and updated on an as required basis.



G.C. Toussignant
MGEN
FC
UNAMIR HQ

COMPANY LOCATIONS

- 1. **Sector 1.** Kigali.
- 2. **Sector 2.** Kibungo.
- 3. **Sector 3.** Gikongoro.
- 4. **Sector 4.** Shagasha.
- 8. **Sector 5.** Nyundo.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY

General

1. To ensure sufficient operating stocks are held in all sectors for contingencies, 2nd line support agencies will ensure that 10 days stock of combat supplies (rations, water and fuel) are maintained in all contingents at all times during Normal and Alert stages.

Resupply

2. Normal weekly resupply may be affected as the security situation changes. Indicative procedures are:

a. **Normal Stage.**

(1) Normal resupply continues.

(2) Safe Areas at Amohoro Hotel, Trafipro and Transit Camp stocked with 10 days rations and water.

b. **Alert Stage One.**

(1) Normal resupply continues with armed escorts.

c. **Alert Stage Two.**

(1) Resupply continues with section strength armed escorts to Sector Concentration Areas only.

(2) Backloading of essential stores to Kigali, which are not required in subsequent stages.

d. **Alert Stage Three.**

(1) Essential resupply only conducted with armed escort of two sections.

(2) Consumption of reserve stocks of combat rations and bottled water may be ordered.

(3) Permission sought from HQ UNAMIR for the destruction of essential stores

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which can not be evacuated/backloaded due to the lack of transport and/or time.

e. **Disengagement Stage.**

- (1) Resupply likely to be suspended to sectors.
- (2) 2nd line transport likely to be dedicated to movement of personnel and stores.
- (3) Emergency issues of combat rations and water made to all international staff.
- (4) Destruction of essential stores of the sectors other than Kigali.

f. **Consolidation Stage.**

- (1) Resupply confined to Kigali.

g. **Evacuation Stage One.**

- (1) Resupply confined to Kigali.
- (2) 1st line vehicles may be brigaded to evacuate personnel and stores.

h. **Evacuation Stage Two.**

- (1) Reduced resupply of essential combat supplies to Security Force and Integrated Core Group.
- (2) All personnel, vehicles and essential stores not required in next phase evacuated.
- (3) Reduced manning of 2nd line support agencies implemented. Manning will be restricted to those elements essential for immediate support of Integrated Core Group (Command element, Repair and Recovery Team, fuel vehicles, Ammo tech).

i. **Evacuation Stage Three.**

- (1) Essential stores which cannot be evacuated destroyed.
- (2) Evacuation of Integrated Core Group by air.
- (3) Security Force evacuated by air and road.

Health Support

3. Medical treatment and evacuation is to continue as the various stages of the evacuation plan are implemented.

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a. **Normal Stage.**

(1) Level one medical support is to be provided at independent company locations, INDBATT and 95 CMSG.

(2) Level two/three support is to be provided by NORMED at TRAFIPRO.

(3) Evacuation for Pri1/Pri2 casualties is to be by air to NORMED as per SOP. Pri3 to be evacuated by road.

b. **Alert Stage One**

(1) As for Normal Stage with enhanced security for evacuation tasks.

c. **Alert Stage Two**

(1) Level one medical support is to be provided at independent company locations, INDBATT and 95 CMSG. Treatment to be extended to UN civilians and NGO in company locations.

(2) Level two/three support is to be provided by NORMED at TRAFIPRO.

(3) Evacuation for Pri1/Pri2 casualties is to be by air to NORMED as per SOP. Pri3 to be evacuated by road. Security to be provided at LZ and armed escorts to accompany all road evacuation.

d. **Alert Stage Three**

(1) Level one medical support is to be provided at independent company locations, INDBATT and 95 CMSG. Treatment to be extended to UN civilians and NGO in company locations.

(2) Level two/three support is to be provided by NORMED at TRAFIPRO.

(3) Evacuation for Pri1/Pri2 casualties is to be by air to NORMED as per SOP. Pri3 to be evacuated by road. Security to be provided at LZ and armed escorts to accompany all road evacuation.

(4) Dedicated medical liaison officers are to be established at destination medical facilities out of Rwanda.

e. **Disengagement Stage**

(1) Level one support remains a national responsibility. Units are to ensure this support is available to road convoys, within staging areas and at evacuation destinations.

(2) Level two/three support is to be provided by NORMED at TRAFIPRO.

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(3) Evacuation for Pri1/Pri2 casualties is to be by air to NORMED as per SOP Pri3 to be evacuated by road. Security to be provided at LZ and armed escorts to accompany all road evacuation.

f. **Consolidation Stage**

(1) Level one support is the responsibility of the contingent tasked with providing support to the evacuation process in Kigali.

(2) Level two/three support is to be provided by NORMED at TRAFIPRO. Arrangements are to be put in place for the transfer of inpatients to destination medical facilities out of Rwanda as determined by the FMO.

(3) Evacuation of all casualties to NORMED by road. Armed escorts to accompany all tasks.

g. **Evacuation Stage One**

(1) Level one support is the responsibility of the contingent tasked with providing support to the evacuation process in Kigali.

(2) All inpatients from NORMED are to be transferred to destination medical facilities out of Rwanda as determined by the FMO.

h. **Evacuation Stage Two**

(1) Integrated Core Group to ensure Level one and road evacuation capability is maintained.

(2) NORMED facility to close.

(3) All casualties to be evacuated to destination medical facilities out of Rwanda as coordinated by FMO.

g. **Evacuation Stage Three**

(1) Integrated Core Group to ensure Level one and road evacuation capability is maintained.

(2) Security forces moving by road are to ensure level one capability is included in convoy.

(3) FMO to coordinate reception and further evacuation of casualties arriving at designated evacuation destinations.

Backloading/Destruction Policy

4. Backloading will be commenced in Alert Stage Two and will be implemented to ensure

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the withdrawal of maximum amount of equipment. Allocation of 2nd line transport, and possible brigaded 1st line transport, to effect this task may be expected from Alert Stage Two.

5. Destruction will be commenced on order from UNAMIR HQ and will be implemented to prevent UN equipment, which cannot be backloaded and evacuated, from being used to contribute to actions against UN personnel or the authority of the Rwandan Government. Destruction by contingents of non-essential stores may be authorised as a general policy by UNAMIR HQ. Destruction of essential stores is only to occur on approval of UNAMIR HQ on a specific item by item basis. Essential stores are defined as:

- a. Weapons.
- b. Ammunition.
- c. Vehicles.
- d. Communications equipment.
- e. Fuel.
- f. Combat rations.
- g. Packaged and bulk water.
- h. EDP (Computer) equipment.

COMMUNICATION POLICY

General

1. In order to ensure a smooth withdrawal/evacuation it is imperative to provide infallible communication during all stages of evacuation. it is necessary to cater for all contingencies by using a judicial mix of satellite, VHF and HF communications.

Communication Planning

2. Communication planning and its implementation will be dovetailed in the evacuation plan.

- a. **Normal Stage.** The following will be the means of communication;
 - i. **Satellite.**
 - (1) VSATs.
 - (2) INMARSAT-C & M.
 - ii. **VHF.**
 - (1) Rural shoots.
 - (2) Base Stations/mobile/hand held radio sets.
 - iii. **HF.**
 - (1) From INDSIGS (as back up).
 - (2) By contingents using their own equipments.
- b. **Alert Stage 1.** The communications remain unchanged as in normal stage, with the following exceptions;
 - i. Communication to RRFs will be planned by the contingents on existing VHF channels as also with contingent owned equipment.
 - ii. Additional HF/VHF links to safe areas under contingent arrangements.
- c. **Alert Stage Two.** Same as 2 (b).

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- d. **Alert Stage Three.**
 - i. Field cables going out of the sector HQs to be reeled back.
 - ii. VHF communication at Kigali to be strengthened by the Force Sig Coy by installing extra repeaters to cater for reinforced troops.
- e. **Disengagement Stage.**
 - i. VSAT and VHF communication will be primary means.
 - ii. HF and INMARSAT will be stand by means.
 - iii. Activation of VHF repeaters for communication of reinforced troops.
 - iv. Detachments for close down of VSATs, VHF repeaters and VHF rural shoots to be kept at six hours notice.
- f. **Consolidation Stage.**
 - i. **Sector HQ.**
 - (1) All communication to Sector HQ will be closed down.
 - (2) HF will be the primary means.
 - ii. **Reinforced Troops.**
 - (1) Reinforced troops to come on activated VHF repeaters in Kigali.
 - (2) VHF rural shoots to be established in a phased manner between Force HQ and the reinforced troops.
 - iii. **Kigali/Evacuation Destination.**
 - (1) Contingent owned HF will be the primary means.
 - (2) INMARSAT- C will be used for data communication.
- g. **Evacuation Stage One.**
 - i. **Kigali.**
 - (1) VHF will be the primary means.
 - (2) Close down all civilian communication.

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- (3) For troops evacuating by road, HF will be the means of communication.

- ii. **Evacuation Destination.**

- (1) Contingent owned HF will be the primary means.
- (2) Contingents to hand over all UN communication equipment.

- h. **Evacuation Stage Two.**

- i. Close down of VHF rural shoots in a phased manner.
- ii. VHF communication will be the primary means.
- iii. HF to be the stand by means.

- i. **Evacuation Stage Three.**

- i. HF will be the primary means.
- ii. Close down of all VHF communications.
- iii. Use of HF communications till final evacuation.

INSTRUCTIONS ON REINFORCEMENT

OPERATION PLAN HECTOR

General Aspects

1. **Scenario.** Reinforcements may be used to meet the additional requirement of troops in certain sectors due to a deteriorating security situation. Therefore, reinforcements may be provided to a threatened sector from sectors facing no or relatively little threat. Consequently, all sectors need to be prepared to provide and receive reinforcements to/from any sector.
2. **Requirement and Scale of Reinforcement.** Under this plan, reinforcements of platoons and even the companies may be ordered. Sectors are to be prepared to provide platoon size reinforcements. The requirement to reinforce a sector will be determined by the following:
 - a. At the request of the Sector Commander.
 - b. On evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the sector.
 - c. To preempt a possible threat.
 - d. In response to a changing political situation.
3. **Command and Control.** The gaining Sector Commander will assume command of reinforcing troops, unless otherwise directed by UNAMIR HQ.
4. **Composition of the Platoon Reinforcement.**
 - a. **Personnel.** 30
 - (1) Advance Party - 5.
 - (2) Main Body - 25.
 - b. **Vehicles.** Two Four Runner/pick ups and three trucks.
 - c. **Other Stores.** Tents and generator.
5. **Notice to Move.** Reinforcements are to be maintained at the following notice to move (NTM) after receipt of activation message:

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a. **ALERT STAGE ONE.**

- (1) **Advance Party.** 6 hrs NTM (move 6 hrs after receipt of message).
- (2) **Main Body.** 12 hrs NTM (move 12 hrs after receipt of message).

b. **ALERT STAGE TWO.**

- (1) **Advance Party.** 4 hrs NTM (move 4 hrs after receipt of message).
- (2) **Main Body.** 8 hrs NTM (move 8 hrs after receipt of message).

c. **ALERT STAGE THREE.**

- (1) **Advance Party.** 2 hrs NTM (move 2 hrs after receipt of message).
- (2) **Main Body.** 6hrs NTM (move 6 hrs after receipt of message).

6. **Activation.** An activation message will be sent by UNAMIR HQ using the fastest means, followed by a hard copy. The activation message will include the following:

- a. The code word HECTOR and the applicable security stage.
- b. Security situation.
- c. Reinforcing and gaining sectors.
- d. Level of reinforcement.
- e. Notice to move and time to reach RV.
- f. Location of RV in the gaining sector (met by guides from gaining sector).
- g. Other instructions.

7. **Example.**

1 AND 2 THIS IS ZERO

- A. **HECTOR, ALERT THREE.**
- B. **INCREASED INSURGENCY ACTIVITIES IN SECTOR 5. REQUIRED TO AUGMENT SECURITY IN RUHENGARI.**
- C. **SECTOR 2 WILL REINFORCE 5.**
- D. **ONE PLATOON.**
- E. **4 HRS NOTICE, REACH RV NLT 121800 APRIL.**
- F. **RV-RUHENGARI, GR 123456.**
- G. **SELF CONTAINED FOR THREE DAYS FOR SUPPLIES, WATER**

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AND POL.

8. **Deployment.** The reinforcement of company size and are to be given a subsector to ease command and control problems.

Predeployment Preparations

9. The following preparations are to be carried in ALERT STAGE ONE for the provision of reinforcements:

- a. Identify reinforcement troops.
- b. Concentrate three days stock of combat supplies, water and POL.
- c. Identify tentage requirements.
- d. Identify suitable vehicles.
- e. Brief reinforcement commander and troops.
- f. Identify other stores requirements.

10. The following preparations are to be carried in ALERT STAGE ONE for receiving reinforcements:

- a. Identify subsector/location for the reinforcement.
- b. Nominate a Liaison Officer and provide guides for RV.
- c. Identify possible accommodation/camping area for the reinforcement.
- d. Prepare for the provision of administrative support to the incoming troops, after the initial three days period.

Actions on Receipt of Activation Message.

11. **When Ordered to Provide Reinforcements.** The following actions are to be completed on receipt of an activation message:

- a. Contact the gaining Sector Commander.
- b. Issue a warning order.
- c. Ensure sections weapons are issued.
- d. Ensure issue of first line ammunition, three days combat supplies, helmets and

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ballistic protective jackets. Subsequent issue of combat supplies is to be done by the gaining unit.

- e. Conduct checks of communications equipment.
- f. Move to RV.
- g. Receive brief on current security situation in sector at RV from Liaison Officer and move with guides to the deployment area.
- h. Reinforcement troops are under command gaining Sector Commander upon reaching the RV.

12. **When Ordered to Receive Reinforcement.** The following actions are to be completed on receipt of an activation message:

- a. Contact the sector providing reinforcements to confirm RV.
- b. Advance party is received and briefed at RV by Liaison Officer and guided to deployment area. The briefing is to include the security situation, deployment area, accommodation arrangements, key points requiring protection in the sub sector/location allotted to the reinforcement, communication instructions and any other relevant information.
- c. Main body is to be received and guided to deployment area.
- d. Provide defence stores to the reinforcing troops, if required.

13. The communication policy is attached as Appx C.

ROUTES FOR WITHDRAWAL/EVACUATION,

AND

POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES

Routes

1. **Withdrawal Routes to Kigali.**
 - a. **Sector 2.** Kibungo - Kigali.
 - c. **Sector 3.** Gikongoro - Butare - Gitarama - Kigali.
 - c. **Sector 4.** Shagasha - Gikongoro - Butare - Gitarama - Kigali as the main and the alternate will be Shagasha - Kibuye - Gitarama - Kigali.
 - d. **Sector 5.** Nyundo - Ruhengeri - Kigali.
2. **Evacuation Routes.** Units are responsible for security of the evacuation routes within their sector boundaries.
 - a. **Sector 1.** Kigali - Byumba - Kabale (Uganda) as the main route and Kigali - Murambi - Gabiro - Kabale as an alternate. Road Kigali - Kibungo - Rusumo - Nyamahale (Tanzania) will be the route to the evacuation destination.
 - b. **Sector 2.** Kibungo - Kigali - Byumba - Kabale (Uganda) as the main and Kibungo - Murambi - Gabiro - Kabale as the alternate route. Road Kibungo - Nyamahale (Tanzania) will be the route to the evacuation destination.
 - c. **Sector 3.** Gikongoro - Butare - Gitarama - Kigali - Byumba - Kabale (Uganda) as the main and Gikongoro - Butare - Gitarama - Kigali - Murambi - Gabiro - Kabale as the alternate route. Road Gikongoro - Butare - Gitarama - Kigali - Kibungo - Rusumo - Nyamahale (Tanzania) will be the route to the evacuation destination.
 - d. **Sector 4.** Shagasha - Gikongoro - Butare - Gitarama - Kigali - Byumba - Kabale (Uganda) as the main route and Shagasha - Gikongoro - Butare - Kigali - Murambi - Gabiro - Kabale as the Alternate route. Shagasha - Butare - Kigali - Kibungo - Rusumo - Nyamahale (Tanzania) will be the route to the evacuation destination.

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- e. **Sector 5.** Nyundo - Ruhengeri - Kigali/Gitarama - Byumba -Kabale (Uganda) as the main route and Nyundo - Ruhengeri - Kigali/Gitarama - Murambi - Gabiro - Kabale as an alternate route and Nyundo -Ruhengeri - Kigali/Gitarama - Kibungo - Rusumo - Nyamahale (Tanzania) as the route to the evacuation destination.

Contingencies

3. Various contingencies may arise as a result of hostile action against UNAMIR. The withdrawal/evacuation may have to be conducted in a hostile environment. The following contingencies may occur:

- a. Interference with the withdrawal of the protected personnel to the company locations.
- b. Interference with the withdrawal to Kigali.
- c. Interference with the evacuation to evacuation destination (outside of Rwanda).

4. Hostile action may be encountered while withdrawing to company location/Kigali. Therefore, RRFs are to be employed to control the situation and extricate personnel. The RRF is to be reinforced as required. Some helicopter assets may be available to assist in extricating personnel, finding disengagement difficult, to Safe Areas. Therefore, some equipments, which can't be evacuated, are to be destroyed on order from UNAMIR HQ. Communication is to be established and maintained with UNAMIR HQ. Likely choke points along the planned route of withdrawal/evacuation are to be secured before the movement of troops/personnel commences.

5. **Contingency Peculiar to Sector 4.** Due to the location of this sector and its natural features, there are many opportunities for a hostile force to disrupt the withdrawal of troops/personnel. For example the withdrawal routes to Gikongoro and Kibuye may be severed. In such a circumstance the following actions may have to be taken:

- a. **Evacuation by Air.** If the security situation allows, all personnel are to concentrate at Kamembe airfield for evacuation by air.
- b. **Withdrawal to Zaire/Burundi.** In case of open conflict between the RPA and FRGF, UNAMIR troops are to disengage and withdraw from the area. If all planned withdrawal routes(air/land) are blocked all troops/personnel may have to withdraw to Zaire or Burundi. It is unlikely that any force will intentionally fire at UNAMIR troops, this is not to rule out the possibility of stray fire. Troops/personnel are to proceed to Bukavu airport in Zaire or to Nyakagunda, Rugumbo or Bujumbura airports in Burundi for evacuation to Kampala.

MOVEMENT TIMINGS

1. These timings cater for movement timings, halts, TPP and possible contingencies.

a. Sector 1.

- | | | | |
|-----|---|-----|---------|
| (1) | Kigali - Kabale | --- | 6 hrs. |
| (2) | Kigali - Kabale via
Murambi and Gabiro | --- | 11 hrs. |
| (3) | Kigali - Kibungo -
Nyamahale. | --- | 8 hrs. |

a. Sector 2.

- | | | | |
|-----|--|-----|--------|
| (1) | Kibungo - Kigali | --- | 4 hrs. |
| (2) | Kibungo - Nyamahale | --- | 4 hrs |
| (3) | Kibungo - Kabale
via Kigali and Byumba | --- | 10 hrs |
| (4) | Kibungo - Kabale
via Murambi and Gabiro | --- | 12 hrs |

b. Sector 3.

- | | | | |
|-----|--|-----|---------|
| (1) | Gikongoro - Kigali | --- | 5 hrs. |
| (2) | Gikongoro - Kabale
via Byumba | --- | 11 hrs. |
| (3) | Gikongoro - Kabale

via Murambi and Gabiro | --- | 16 hrs. |
| (4) | Gikongoro - Nyamahale | --- | 13 hrs. |

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g. **Sector 4.**

- | | | | |
|-----|---|-----|---------|
| (1) | Shagasha - Kigali | --- | 11 hrs. |
| (2) | Shagasha - Kabale
via Byumba. | --- | 16 hrs. |
| (3) | Shagasha - Kabale
via Murambi and Gabiro | --- | 21 hrs. |
| (4) | Shagasha - Nyamahale | --- | 19 hrs. |

h. **Sector 5.**

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------|---------|
| (1) | Shagasha -
Kigali | ---- | 6 hrs. |
| (2) | Shgasha -
Kabale via Ruhengeri | --- | 6 hrs. |
| (3) | Shagasha -
Kabale via Byumba | --- | 12 hrs. |
| (4) | Shagasha -
Kabale via Gabiro | --- | 13 hrs. |
| (5) | Shagasha -
Nyamahale | --- | 14 hrs. |

EVACUATION PROCEDURE IN KIGALI

RECEPTION POINTS

1. The reception points in Kigali are:
 - a. For personnel withdrawing from Kibungo - road bend at GR 154843.
 - b. For personnel withdrawing from Gitarama, Ruhengeri and Byumba - cross road junction at GR 048856.

ZONES IN KIGALI

2. Kigali is divided in seven zones controlled by Zone Wardens. These zones are marked on the attached map. Zone wardens are to coordinate all requirements with the Military Coordinators listed below:

- a. **Zone 1, 2 and 3.** Major M M Singh.
- b. **Zone 4.** Major T P S Rana.
- c. **Zone 5 and 6.** Major M S Hooda.
- d. **Zone 7** Major G S Bora.

ASSEMBLY POINTS

3. The assembly points in Kigali for civilian personnel are:
 - a. UNHCR HQ.
 - b. UNDP HQ.
 - c. BNR Building.
 - d. Hotel Meridien.
 - e. TRAFIPRO.
 - f. Amahoro Complex.

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- g. Regional Stadium for the local staff.

SAFE AREAS

- 4. The Safe Areas in Kigali are:
 - a. Amahoro Hotel.
 - b. Transit Camp.
 - c. UNICEF Building.
 - d. Chez Lando hotel.
 - e. Airport.
 - f. TRAFIPRO.

CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS OF SAFE AREAS

- 5. The following are the numbers of personnel to be planned for in the Kigali Safe Areas:
 - a. Formed Troops. It is anticipated that about 800 to 1000 troops will be required in Kigali to support the evacuation process. However, most of the troops will be conducting security duties. Therefore, accommodation in the safe areas is only required for approximately 500.
 - b. UNAMIR Civilian staff. It is anticipated that accommodation for approximately 205 civilian staff will be required.
 - c. UN Agencies. It is anticipated that approximately 180 personnel from UN agencies will require accommodation.
 - d. Local Staff. It is anticipated that approximately 300 locally employed UN staff (including families) will require accommodation.
 - e. NGOs. Accommodation may be required for up to 100 NGO personnel.
 - f. UNAMIR Military Staff. Accommodation for 35 staff officers will be required.
 - g. Mil Obs. Accommodation for 300 mil obs will be required.
 - h. Contractors including BRSC. Accommodation of up to 115 persons will be required.

Therefore the total number of personnel requiring accommodation in the Kigali Safe Areas is

approximately 2000.

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

5. If emergency assistance is required by civilian personnel, an emergency assistance message is to be sent to UNAMIR. The message is to contain the following information:

a. **Situation.** What type of emergency, for example, house is being surrounded and there are approximately four armed men. Unable to come out. Vehicle damaged.

b. **Assistance Required.**

(1) Troops (RRF/escort).

(2) Transport.

(3) Medical.

c. **Example.**

(1) HOUSE SURROUNDED BY APPROXIMATELY FIVE ARMED MEN. SOME FIRING ALSO HEARD. THERE WAS A BANG ON THE DOOR TWICE. NOT ABLE TO COME OUT. ONE MEMBER HURT ON HAND. CAR DAMAGED.

(2) SEND SECURITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(3) TRANSPORT REQUIRED FOR FIVE PERSONS.

(4) MEDICAL AID REQUIRED.

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AIDE-MEMOIRE

APPENDIX H TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED 14 AUG 95

ACTION TO BE TAKEN DURING SECURITY STAGES

H/1/7

SECURITY STATE	ACTION REQUIRED		
	UNAMIR HQ	SECTORS	UN CIVILIAN/NGO PERS
NORMAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Identify Integrated Core GroupMovement restricted between 2300-0500 hrsNormal ops continue	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Monitor & report security situationLiaise with neighbouring sectorsList all UN civilian & NGO pers (tel # & C/S) and decide method of passing infoEstbl timing/place for security conferencesBrief all on security plansArrange accn in the company location for all personnel to be protected in case required due to the security situationRRF of 1 section on 30 min NTMupdate route info for each security stageConduct liaison for accn in KigaliConduct rehearsals for the planMovement restricted between 2300-0500 hrsNormal ops continuePrepare list of Essential and Non essential stores	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Pass accn/work details to Sector Commanders

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APPENDIX H

SECURITY STAGE	ACTION REQUIRED		
	UNAMIR HQ	SECTORS	UN CIVILIAN/NGO PERS
ALERT STAGE ONE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">. All briefed on security stage. Security measures enhanced. Movement restricted between 1800-0600 hrs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">. Min strength when moving out on task to be one section. Enhanced security measures. Comms to UN civilians and NGOs estbl.. Disseminate change in security stage to all. All briefed on security stage. RRF of 1 sec on 30 min NTM. Test comms between troops. Movement in groups of 2 veh minimum. Conduct route recce of withdrawal routes. Be prepared to provide reinforcements to other sectors. SITREPs as per normal timings. Movement restricted between 1800-0600 hrs. Be prepared to provide specified transport on orders of HQ UNAMIR	<ul style="list-style-type: none">. Establ comms with Sector HQ. May be withdrawn to company location on request

SECURITY STAGE	ACTION REQUIRED		
	UNAMIR HQ	SECTORS	UN CIVILIAN/NGO PERS
ALERT STAGE TWO	Disseminate change in security stage to all Order withdrawal of civilian pers from sectors if required Movement restricted between 1800-0600 hrs VIP visits postpone	Disseminate change in security stage to all Min 2 vehicles when moving out on any task Company location capable of being defended from direct attack Civilian personnel withdrawn to company location, may be to Kigali on request Provide tpt/accn/feeding for withdrawal of civilians Update info on routes to be used in next stage Provide security to MILOB Ops RRF of 2 sections on 20 min NTM use CIVPOL sp to enhance security arrangements Be prepared to provide/receive reinforcements Ops conducted with enhanced security measures SITREPS as per normal timings Movement restricted between 1800-0600 hrs Backloading of Essential stores to Kigali Be prepared to provide specified transport on orders of HQ UNAMIR	Concentrate as per own security plan Withdraw to company location on orders

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H/4/7

APPENDIX H

SECURITY STAGE	ACTION REQUIRED		
	UNAMIR HQ	SECTORS	UN CIVILIAN/NGO PERS
ALERT STAGE THREE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disseminate change in security stage to all All movements restricted to essential duty only VIP visits are cancelled 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disseminate change in security stage to all Be prepared to provide/receive reinforcements Minimum strength for any task to be one platoon Ops (less emergencies) may be halted and carried out with maximum security Preparations made for withdrawal to Kigali/evac destination as ordered MILOBs withdrawn to company location Civilian pers withdrawn to Kigali Provide tpt & escort for movement of civilian pers RRF of 1 platoon on 20 min NTM MILOBs tasked only on permission of UNAMIR HQ Prepare contingency plan and seek permission for destruction of Essential stores All movements restricted to essential duty only No movements permitted at night SITREPs as per normal timings Be prepared to provide specified transport on orders of HQ UNAMIR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Withdraw to Kigali under command of Sector HQ

SECURITY STAGE	ACTION REQUIRED		
	UNAMIR HQ	SECTORS	CIVILIAN/NGO PERS
DISENGAGEMENT STAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">. Disseminate change in security stage to all. Notify destinations for withdrawing troops. Order withdraw of troops from threatened sectors. All movements restricted to essential duty only	<ul style="list-style-type: none">. Disseminate change in security stage to all. Conduct liaison with neighbouring sectors. Withdraw troops on order from UNAMIR HQ to Kigali or the evacuate to evac destination (only Sectors 4 & 5). Secure/clear choke pts on withdrawal/evac route within your sector boundaries. Destruction of Essential stores on order UNAMIR HQ. Carry all accn tentage. Troops withdrawing to Kigali to report to Sector 1 reception pt. incoming troops to be self sufficient for 3 days combat supplies. Sector 1 LO to receive incoming troops and guide them to the deployment areas. Redeployment to sectors if security situation improves. All movements restricted to essential duty only	

SECURITY STAGE	ACTION REQUIRED		
	UNAMIR HQ	SECTORS	UN CIVILIAN/NGO PERS
CONSOLIDATION STAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relocation of troops in Kigali to Safe Areas NGOs advised to evac UN property in Kigali to be relocated to Safe Areas Order destruction of nonessential stores despatch advance party to the evac destination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disseminate change in security stage to all Secure/clear major choke pts on evac route Carry all accn tentage Destroy Essential stores on order UNAMIR HQ, in Kigali Evac of remaining troops to evac destination Evacuating troops to be self sufficient for 3 days in combat supplies, water and POL. <p>SECTOR 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide tpt & escort the civilian pers to Safe Areas Provide security to Safe Areas Relocate UN equipment to Safe Areas Sector 1 to maintain 2 pl RRFs on 20 min NTM Security forces in Kigali occupy final positions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civilian pers prepared for evac Civilian pers requiring emergency assistance from UNAMIR to contact UNDP, UNHCR or UNICEF

SECURITY STAGE	ACTION REQUIRED		
	UNAMIR HQ	SECTORS	OTHERS
EVACUATION STAGE ONE	. Disseminate change in security stage to all . MOVCON to manifest all civilian pers . Manifested civilian pers to be evac . MOVCON to coord evac of other . international civilian pers	. disseminate change in security stage to all . Non-essential military pers prepare for evac . Adjust security of Safe Areas . All stores & vehs not required in next stage . evacuated . Nonessential stores that cannot be evacuated to . be destroyed	. All civilian pers (less Core Group if . required) evacuated
EVACUATION STAGE TWO	. Disseminate change in security stage to all . Order evac of civilian pers and nonessential . mil pers	. Disseminate change in security stage to all . Military non-essential pers evacuated . Nonessential stores that cannot be evacuated to . be destroyed	. Civilian Core Group evacuated
EVACUATION STAGE THREE	. Disseminate change in security stage to all . Provide evac routes and destinations to . Security Force . Order evac of Integrated Core Group and . Security Force	. Disseminate change in security stage to all . Essential stores not evacuated to be destroyed . on orders of Integrated Core Group . Escort Integrated Core Group to airport for . evac . Security force evac	

KIGALI ZONES

LEGENDE

- Route au sens unique (unilateral road)
- Voie d'accès (access road)
- Sentier (path)
- Chemise (shirt)
- Cour, place, parking (court, square, parking)
- Unité de service de la ville (city service unit)
- Éclairage (lighting)
- Arbre (tree)

BT : Bureau Technique
 AS : Service des Affaires
 COTRACOM : Office National de Transport et Commerce
 PTT : Poste, Télégraphe, Téléphone
 TVE : Télévision de la ville
 MR : Musée Royal
 DITPA : Office National de Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux
 ONAPO : Office National de la Population
 CCI : Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de la Région

PLAN TOURISTIQUE

DE


KIGALI

ECHELLE 1/12500

REALISE ET PUBLIE PAR
 MAPPING AGENCY

TH. 7 4540

OCTOBRE 1993



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Australian Medical Support Force



MINUTE

611/1/4

AS MED SPT FORCE 2768/95

G3 PLANS UNAMIR FORCE HQ

SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

Reference: A. UNAMIR FORCE HQ 5000.46 (PLANS) dated 18 Apr 95

1. IAW Ref A the following comments are provided by AUSMED on the subject plan:
 - a. The plan is clear and easy to understand.
 - b. The analysis of "Threat" and the explanation of each of the three levels of classification suggest that at all levels (progressively getting worse) the government and local population are likely to be un-cooperative. Accepting this premise then the allocation and reliance on some of the safe areas in Kigali (vis-a-vis Amahoro Stadium) may be difficult to justify. This is particularly in regard to security. As the threat level escalates so to will the demand on "bayonet" resources. A structure as large as the stadium would heavily drain resources, and is an easy indirect fire target.
 - c. The plan does not include reference to a Medical Support Plan. On the assumption that this has been considered, once finalised, this unit would like to provide specific comment.

M.R. RICKETTS
MAJ
OPSO

28 APR 95

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File No 5000.46 (PLANS)

To: Distribution List

From: DCOS Ops

Date: 18 Apr 95

Subject: SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

All action addressees are requested to review and comment on the attached Security and Evacuation Plan. All comments are to be sent to the attention of G3 Plans no later than 25 April 1995.

Attachment: (1) UNAMIR HQ Security and Evacuation Plan

Distribution List:

Action:

SECTOR 1 Commander (CO NIBATT)
SECTOR 2 Commander (CO GHANBATT)
SECTOR 3 Commander (Sector 3 MILOB Commander)
SECTOR 4A Commander (CO ZAMBATT)
SECTOR 4B Commander (CO SENBATT)
SECTOR 4C Commander (CO ETHIOBATT)
SECTOR 5 Commander (CO TUNBATT)
SECTOR 6 Commander (CO INDBATT)
CO AUSMED
CO 95 FLSG
OC MALAWICOY
OC MALICOY
MILOB GP HQ
CIVPOL
Force Engr Coy
Force Signal Coy
CSO
Brown & Root
UNDP (for all UN Agencies)
UNREO (for all NGOs)

Info:

OIC Administration

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Australian Medical Support Force



MINUTE

611/1/4


AS MED SPT FORCE 2768/95

G3 PLANS UNAMIR FORCE HQ

SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

Reference: A. UNAMIR FORCE HQ 5000.46 (PLANS) dated 18 Apr 95

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 - a. The plan is clear and easy to understand.
 - b. The analysis of "Threat" and the explanation of each of the three levels of classification suggest that at all levels (progressively getting worse) the government and local population are likely to be un-cooperative. Accepting this premise then the allocation and reliance on some of the safe areas in Kigali (vis-a-vis Amahoro Stadium) may be difficult to justify. This is particularly in regard to security. As the threat level escalates so to will the demand on "bayonet" resources. A structure as large as the stadium would heavily drain resources, and is an easy indirect fire target.
 - c. The plan does not include reference to a Medical Support Plan. On the assumption that this has been considered, once finalised, this unit would like to provide specific comment.



M.R. RICKETTS
MAJ
OPSO

28 APR 95

RESTRICTED



File No 5000.46 (PLANS)

To: Distribution List

From: DCOS Ops

Date: 18 Apr 95

Subject: SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN

All action addressees are requested to review and comment on the attached Security and Evacuation Plan. All comments are to be sent to the attention of G3 Plans no later than 25 April 1995.

Attachment: (1) UNAMIR HQ Security and Evacuation Plan

Distribution List:

Action:

SECTOR 1 Commander (CO NIBATT)
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