

Before the voting, Mr. Zorin declared that Mauritania's status was more complex than that of other newly-independent states. The Soviet Union's veto on Mauritania came after a 5 to 4 vote not to consider Outer Mongolia. Argentina and Ecuador abstained in the vote on Outer Mongolia, while Ceylon and Tunisia joined the Soviet Union and Poland in favour of Outer Mongolia.

It is perhaps worth recalling that at our Delegation meeting of December 2, it was decided to support the admission of Mauritania to the United Nations if the Security Council passed its application.

Election of Members of the Security Council and Economic and Social Council

The Assembly was scheduled, on November 11, to choose successors to three retiring members of the Security Council - Argentina, Tunisia and Italy. Earlier in the month the Asian-African group met several times to consider the allocation of seats, and it was generally felt that the enlarged Asian-African group of 46 members, almost half the total of U.N. membership of 99, had been greatly under-represented in the principal organs of the United Nations. Originally the Asian Africans pressed for a U.N. Charter amendment to expand the Council to 13 members so that their area could have a stronger voice. The Western Powers supported the Asian-African proposal but Russia threatened to veto it unless the Peoples' Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations and given the Chinese seat in the Council.

Blocked on expansion, the Asian-African group, at its meetings, proposed to increase their representation by redistributing Security Council seats and negotiated with the representatives of the Latin-American group and the European group for concessions. As things stand two seats are allocated by tradition to Latin America and one each to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the "British Commonwealth and others." The Latin Americans feared the redistribution proposal would cut down their representation and the Western powers joined them in opposing it.

When the question of election came up on November 11 the Nigerian delegate tabled a motion for postponement. The move, to the surprise of Latin Americans and Europeans, was adopted by 51 votes in favour and 38 against, with 9 abstentions. The Communist group voted solidly in favour. Generally, the Western European states, the Latin American delegates and the United States were opposed. Among the abstainers were Nationalist China, Japan, Turkey, Israel and Cyprus. Western speakers opposed the Nigerian proposal for postponement. Mr. Wadsworth of the United States told the Assembly that the troubles over the elections were being caused largely by the Soviet Union. Mr. David Ormsby-Gore of Britain argued that postponement of the elections, if continued, might "paralyse" the work of the United Nations.

Chile, United Arab Republic and Portugal were the respected candidates for the three seats to be filled, but the Asian-African group was set to bar Portugal from election, because of her well-known colonial policies and her refusal to report on her colonies in Africa, India and Asia. The Portuguese representatives insist these territories are overseas parts of Portugal proper.

When the matter came up again on December 9, the General Assembly elected Chile and the United Arab Republic as non-permanent members of the Security Council. It failed to make a choice between Liberia (Asian-African candidate) and Portugal for a third seat.

After seven rounds of secret ballots Liberia had 55 votes and Portugal 38.

A similar situation prevailed when it came to electing six new members to the Economic and Social Council. Five - Uruguay, El Salvador, France, Jordan and Ethiopia - were named without difficulty. (Burma voted for Ghana instead of Jordan). But the selection of the sixth was deadlocked between Belgium and India, the Asian-African candidate.

Turkey obtained without opposition the split one-year term on the Council that she was promised after a deadlock last year with Poland. It will be recalled that when neither nation obtained the necessary backing in 1959, it was agreed that Poland should take the seat for one year and then retire in favour of Turkey.

The election of Chile and the United Arab Republic came on the second ballot. Each received 74 votes. They will replace Argentina and Tunisia whose terms expired on December 31, 1960. The non-permanent seat contested between Liberia and Portugal is the Council place that is to be vacated by Italy.

Sir Patrick Deane of the United Kingdom discussed with me on December 16 and 19, and he asked me to convey to the Asian-African group that Ireland, and not Portugal, would be the European candidate. Britain is the Chairman of the European group. I conveyed the information to the Asian-African group which met on December 19, and it was again decided to vote for Liberia. When the election took place on December 20, under a deal worked out in secret negotiations, Liberia was elected to hold the seat for one year and then resign in favour of Ireland. Liberia thus became the first nation from Negro Africa to win a seat on the Security Council.

The Assembly failed, however, to resolve a stalemate in filling a vacancy in the Economic and Social Council. After three ballots, India, the Asian-African candidate, was leading with 48 votes against 43 for Belgium for a seat assigned by tradition to a West European power. Finally, the Assembly decided to put off further voting until after it resumes its session on March 7. The elimination of China from the Economic and Social Council is very significant. It will be noticed that two Asian-African countries - Ethiopia and Jordan - were elected earlier in place of Sudan and China.

General Reflections

The extent of Asian-African initiative and strength was one distinctive feature of the 15th session. Previously the group has held a kind of negative balance of power. This year, for the first time, the Asian-Africans themselves set out to try to direct events. Our strength grows and is growing, but we are still far from a monolithic bloc as is evident from our voting on the Congo, Algeria and Mauritania.

With the Soviet bloc support, the group for the first time succeeded in winning a non-permanent seat on the Security Council a seat formerly held by a Western European country. Western Europe has now been forced to share it with an African state. In the case of the Economic and Social Council, an African state displaced Nationalist China, and India is holding a lead over the West European candidate, Belgium, for another seat in the contest, which will be resumed in March.

The Soviet Union joined the great majority - 89 - in voting for immediate steps to end colonialism. The United States and the Colonial powers formed a conspicuous and uncomfortable minority of nine who abstained.

On the issue of Algeria, the Soviet Union again was with a majority of sixty-three, supporting the Algerian independence movement, and the United States was with a minority of twenty-seven who supported France by abstaining.

On the issue of debating the admission of the Peoples' Republic of China as a member of the United Nations, the Soviet bloc and uncommitted countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America mobilized thirty-four votes. Some believe it may succeed in the 16th session in securing the simple majority required to win a debate on this issue.

On the question of the Congo the Soviet Union, allying itself with most of the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa, won increased prestige while the United States was often thrown on the defensive. The vote on December 20 is an evidence of this development with which the Soviet bloc nations are delighted and the Western nations are greatly disturbed. The Soviet bloc, together with many Asian-African countries including India, Ceylon and Indonesia, was unable to carry a resolution to unseat the government of President Kasabubu and restore deposed Premier Patrice Lumumba to power. However, the United States failed by one vote to mobilize the necessary two-thirds majority on behalf of a resolution intended to strengthen the position of both Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and President Kasabubu. The fact that the Soviet bloc failed to get a majority is not news. The fact that the United States failed to do so is generally regarded here as perhaps one of the outstanding events of the 15th session. This was the first time the United States had failed to mobilize the required majority for an issue of major international importance.

The Assembly set out to grapple with many pressing problems but in retrospect it got very little done. The Assembly started in an atmosphere of great expectations. The Special Emergency session of the Assembly, which concluded on the night of September 19, adopted a resolution by 70 votes to nil endorsing the Secretary-General's policy in the Congo. After repeated Soviet attacks on the Secretary-General in the 15th session and the continued deterioration of the Congo situation, his prestige was weakened. However, the United Nations can congratulate itself on Mr. Hammarskjold's refusal to resign under Soviet attack. In my humble opinion, he still is the man for the post.

Another disappointment of the session was the fact that no resolution was adopted on either the substance or the procedure of future disarmament negotiations; this was left over for the resumed session, which will start on March 7. In this connection it will be pertinent to recall that Mr. James J. Wadsworth, United States representative, at his farewell news conference here on January 17, surprised most Americans with the statement that he thought the Soviet Union intended to keep any agreement it would make for a suspension of nuclear tests or on broader disarmament issues. Mr. Wadsworth is generally regarded here as the top United States expert on disarmament as the man who has negotiated with Russian representatives in 240 meetings in Geneva on the question of a treaty for a ban on nuclear weapon testing. To a question put to him at the news conference, Mr. Wadsworth replied, "I think generally, by and large, that the Russian Government has every intention of living up to any agreement they may make from the standpoint of

nuclear tests or the larger areas of disarmament."

Before I conclude this report I feel that a brief observation on the change of atmosphere in the United Nations, resulting from the change of administration in Washington, is called for. There are unmistakable indications that a conscious effort is being made by the Kennedy administration to improve United States-Soviet relations. All the public utterances from the President down to Ambassador Adlai Stevenson reflect a new policy of trying to defrost the cold war. All references to Moscow were conciliatory and friendly, and the general impression here is that the new Administration wants to begin its term with friendly gestures towards Russia. There is even widespread speculation here that President Kennedy might see Premier Khrushchev if the latter decides to attend the resumed session of the General Assembly.

I should like to conclude this report with a tribute to the general work of our delegation. All the members of the delegation attended to their duties with full consciousness of their responsibilities. H.E. U On Sein had to leave for Washington on September 24 to accompany the Hon'ble Thakin Tin and returned to his duties with the delegation on October 4. He then had to accompany the Hon'ble Thakin Tin to San Francisco. U Chan Tha, as reported earlier, utilised most of his stay here by discussions and consultations with prospective American investors. U Hla Maung did an outstanding job in the Second Committee where he led, on several occasions, the Asian-African group in sponsoring draft resolutions or coming out as their spokesman. His previous experience of the United Nations work and sharp intellect were of immense value to the delegation in its day to day work. U Tin Maung, as usual, discharged his responsibilities in the Fourth Committee with a keen sense of duty, and both Daw Mya Sein and U Maung Maung Gale put in very creditable work in their respective committees. Dr. U Bo Gyi made three interventions in the Sixth Committee and they were warmly received by many of his colleagues.

Entertainments

The delegation gave a reception at the United Nations on October 11 and it was attended by over three hundred people, mostly delegates and senior officers of the United Nations Secretariat. Two lunches were given by the delegation on September 30 and November 3. Besides the Permanent Representatives, among those who attended these functions were:

The Hon'ble Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia
 The Hon'ble Diogenes Taboada, Foreign Minister of Argentina
 The Hon'ble Behar Shtylla, Foreign Minister of Albania
 The Hon'ble Sir Garfield Barwick, Attorney-General of Australia
 The Hon'ble Bruno Kreisky, Foreign Minister of Austria
 The Hon'ble Milko Tarabanov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria
 The Hon'ble K. T. Kiselev, Foreign Minister of Byelorussian SSR.
 The Hon'ble Mr. Son Sann, Privy Councillor of the Chief of State, Cambodia
 The Hon'ble Howard C. Green, Foreign Secretary, Canada
 The Hon'ble Raul Roa, Foreign Minister of Cuba
 The Hon'ble Vaclav David, Foreign Minister, Czechoslovakia
 The Hon'ble Aklilou Abta Wold, Deputy Prime Minister, Ethiopia
 Mr. Mendes-France, Former Prime Minister of France
 The Hon'ble Ako Adjei, Foreign Minister, Ghana
 The Hon'ble V.K. Krishna Menon, Minister of Defence, India
 The Hon'ble Hashim Jawad, Foreign Minister, Iraq
 The Hon'ble Frank Aiken, Foreign Minister, Ireland
 The Hon'ble Khanking Souvanlasy, Foreign Secretary, Laos

The Hon'ble Jozef Winiewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister, ^{Poland.} ~~Romania~~
The Hon'ble Osten Unden, Foreign Minister, Sweden
The Hon'ble L.P. Palamarchuk, Foreign Minister, Ukrainian SSR.
The Hon'ble V.A. Zerin, Deputy Foreign Minister, USSR
The Rt. Hon'ble David Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
The Hon'ble Wayne Morse, Senator, United States of America
H.E. Mr. Frederick H. Boland, President of the General Assembly

U Thant
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(U Thant)
Leader.

The Permanent Secretary
Foreign Office
Rangoon

C O P Y

ANNEX I

Letter from the Asian-African Group

To: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

December 14, 1960

We, who are the members of the Asian-African Group, have the honour to draw your attention to the extreme gravity of events which have been taking place in Algeria during the last few days.

News from Algeria itself is censored but from authentic sources it has become known that the French Army has opened fire on defenceless civilians in various parts of Algeria, resulting in the death of men, women and children in Algeria.

We are of the opinion that such killings perpetrated on unarmed civilians in Algeria constitute a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention.

In view of the gravity of the situation, we have the honour to request you to take appropriate and effective measures and make an immediate representation to the Government of France, urging it to desist from these acts.

C O P Y

ANNEX II

Letter from the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld

To: H.E. U Thant, Chairman of the Standing
Committee on Algeria

31 December, 1960

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

You will remember that, together with the Chairman of the Afro-Asian group, you handed me on December 14, 1960 a memorandum regarding events in Algeria which had been taking place the days before you saw me.

I wish to inform you that I had a talk with the Permanent Representative of France regarding the matter about which you had approached me, explaining to the Representative the grave concern felt. Later, the French Representative, informally, provided me with detailed information on the recent unrest in Algeria. He also informed me about measures taken by the French Government in order to forestall further unrest of the same character.

Further steps from my side in line with the wishes expressed in your memorandum would have had to be taken in a purely personal capacity, within the limits imposed by that condition. I felt that I could not in the light of the information received usefully pursue the matter any further for the moment.

I do not believe what I have found possible to do merits your mentioning it to your colleagues in the group. Were you to be asked about the matter, I believe you may find it sufficient to say that you have been informed by me that I took the matter up with the Permanent Representative of France.

With all good wishes for 1961 and warm thanks for encouragement and assistance in the past year,

Dag Hammarskjöld

H.E. U Thant
Permanent Representative to
the United Nations
Permanent Mission of Burma to
the United Nations
888 Madison Avenue, New York

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNB. 584/20-02UN/60

23rd September, 1960

Sir,

I am directed to transmit herewith the report of H.E. U Thant, Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations on the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on the Congo situation.

I have the honour to be,

S i r,

Your obedient servant,

Sd/- (Aung Thant)
Secretary.

The Permanent Secretary
Foreign Office
Rangoon

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON CONGO SITUATION.

When the Security Council met on Wednesday, September 14, to take up the question of the Congo, the general feeling here was that it could not achieve anything, in view of opposite stands already taken by the East and the West in regard to the Secretary-General's handling of the situation. At the first session of the Security Council, Mr. V.A. Zorin of the Soviet Union implied that Mr. Hammarskjold had been aiding with "colonial powers" and with the United States to keep the Congo from true independence. Mr. Hammarskjold, obviously angry, struck back immediately. He said he would "leave it to the African peoples" to decide whether or not he was a "willing tool" of the West, as the Soviet representative had charged. si

After three days of acrimonious debate, Tunisia and Ceylon tabled a resolution that would have given Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold continuing authority in the Congo but would have instructed him to deal more closely with the Central Government. However, the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The United States moved immediately to take the Congo situation to the General Assembly under the "uniting for peace" provisions of the world organization. That clause of the United Nations, as is well-known, allows an appeal to the General Assembly against a veto in the Council. Thus the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly - fourth in the history of the United Nations - was convened at 8.00 p.m. on Saturday, 17th September, 1960.

At the commencement of the session, the United States delegate proposed that fourteen new African states be admitted to the United Nations immediately in order to enable them to cast their votes on the Congo. The move apparently was made to counter Soviet charges that the United States fears the discussion of the Congo situation at the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly after the admission of new African states to the United Nations. The United States' move, however, proved abortive since none of the representatives of the new African states was around and the Secretariat was unable to locate them immediately. The move was ridiculed by the representative of the Soviet Union and of Guinea, and at the request of the representatives of Ghana and of India, the United States did not press its proposal. The Soviet delegate, in an earlier memorandum to the Secretary-General, had moved that the whole Congo question be put before the regular General Assembly session, by asserting that it "would offer great possibilities for a comprehensive and thorough examination" of the Congo problem, because "heads of state or government of quite a number of countries including African countries" will be present after the 20th September.

In the course of the debate which lasted three days, the Soviet Union maintained that Mr. Hammarskjold had failed to consult sufficiently with the Central Congo government. These charges, the Secretary-General said, seemed to him to mean that he should have dealt only with Mr. Patrice Lumumba, whose position of Premier of the new Republic is in dispute. Mr. Hammarskjold said that if he

had used the United Nations' 18,000 man force in the Congo to put down the secessionist movements in Katanga and Kasai provinces, as the Soviet Union suggested, that would have indicated that he had completely misunderstood not only the directives of the Security Council but also the entire United Nations Charter.

To the surprise of the Soviet delegation, African states rallied to the support of Mr. Hammarskjold. Dr. Fekini of Libya told the Assembly that his Government had a "warm appreciation of the Secretary-General's attempts to bring order to the new African Republic". This and other similar statements by African, Latin-American and Western European delegates came after the Secretary-General's threat to resign during the Sunday night session. Mr. Hammarskjold, under severe attack by the Soviet Union, told the Assembly that he "would not wish to serve one day beyond the point that such continued service would be considered unnecessary".

The Asian-African group met at 6.30 p.m. on that night (18 September) to consider presenting a draft resolution. At 8.30 p.m. just when the night session of the Assembly was about to start, the draft received the approval of all African states except Ghana and Guinea which were still insisting on inserting certain paragraphs including "denial of arms and equipment to Katanga" and elimination of the operative paragraph "directing all military aid to the Congo through the United Nations". But the consensus of Asian opinion was with the majority of African states. Mr. Mongi Slim of Tunisia and I contacted the Secretary-General to ascertain his views informally on the draft approved by the majority of African delegates. Mr. Hammarskjold told us that the draft resolution was a good one but he was not very happy over the third operative paragraph. (In the original form the words "in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation" were omitted). We conveyed this reaction to a few African delegates and the group at meeting which was still in session.

By 9.00 p.m. Ghana and Guinea gave way and they did not insist on their amendments. In the third operative paragraph too, it was agreed to incorporate the above words to meet with the Secretary-General's wish. I had no means of ascertaining the Secretary-General's reaction to the wording of the new phrase as I had to rush to the airport to meet Dr. U Bogyi and party who were scheduled to arrive at 10.00 p.m. After leaving word to the group that our delegation would vote for the resolution - though not sponsor it - I left for the airport. The plane was about an hour delayed and when we reached the hotel after midnight we found that the General Assembly had adjourned and that 16 Asian-African states had tabled the draft resolution. Only on the next morning - September 19 - I knew that the Secretary-General was pleased with the resolution with the addition of the above-mentioned phrase in the third operative paragraph. On that day Ethiopia joined the sponsors. I am very grateful for the Foreign Office Cable BUN240/NA received on that morning.

On the night of September 19, Soviet Union presented its own resolution which in essence is a demand to the Assembly to pass judgment that the Secretary-General and the United Nations command had been remiss on the Congo. The Soviet resolution would condemn Belgium's "armed aggression", which it said was being carried out with the support of her allies in the North Atlantic Treaty organization. It would call for the withdrawal of "all their troops and military personnel".

When the 17 power Asian-African draft resolution was put to the vote, it was adopted by 70 against none, with 11 absentions. Nine Soviet Bloc countries, Union of South Africa and France abstained. A series of USSR amendments and the Soviet draft resolution were not pressed to the vote. I made a brief intervention at the afternoon session on September 19, and copies of the speech have been submitted to the Foreign Office. French absention in the voting delighted several Asian-Africans since it was likely to alienate several of French supporters when the Algerian issue came up for discussion in the regular session of the General Assembly. Mr. Armand Berard of France, while upholding Mr. Hammarskjold's Congo policy, expressed doubt about the voluntary fund for the Congo Government. Mr. Berard also criticized the third operative paragraph under which a committee, composed of Asian and African member nations, would be established "for the purpose of conciliation" of the Congo's internal disputes. He said it was essential "to avoid any interference by the United Nations" which would interfere with the "national and spontaneous character" of whatever government finally establishes its authority in the Congo.

The resolution was described by the Assembly President, Dr. Victor Belaunde, as "decisive" for the destiny of the Congo and a contribution to "one of the most important actions ever undertaken by the United Nations". Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, calling special attention to the appeal for financial aid, expressed hope for generous contributions to meet "the desperate needs" of the Congo.

The adoption of the resolution by an overwhelming vote of 70 to 0 represents the United Nations' complete confidence in its Secretary-General. When the member states, especially the Asian-African members, were faced with a choice between their fear of Moscow and their confidence in the Secretary-General, they opposed Moscow. In my view, the Emergency Special Session was more concerned with the Secretary-General's prestige than the actual question of the Congo itself. In fact it was more a demonstration of the United Nations' trust in its Secretary-General than any desire to antagonise the Soviet Union. The most hopeful part of the whole business was that Moscow abstained in the vote and withdrew its planes and technicians from the Congo rather than face the criticism of the world in the United Nations General Assembly which started on September 20.

As Burma was a Vice-President of the 14th Regular Session of the General Assembly, I had the honour of presiding over the afternoon session of the Emergency Special session on Monday, September 19.



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(U Thant)

The Permanent Secretary
Foreign Office
Rangoon

22nd September, 1960

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Report on the meeting of the Disarmament Commission.

On July 22, 1960 the United States requested Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo, chairman of the Disarmament Commission, to call a meeting early in August to take up the question of disarmament since the ten-nation talks in Geneva had collapsed. In a letter addressed to Dr. Nervo, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States delegate, said, "since disarmament is a matter of vital concern to all United Nations members, I believe that the Disarmament Commission, which includes representatives from all member states, should consider promptly the situation resulting from the Soviet decision to break off these negotiations."

It will be recalled that on June 27 when the ten-nation disarmament committee was meeting in Geneva, and when the United States had intended to submit a revised disarmament proposal to the group, the Soviet and four other Eastern European delegations, walked out of the meeting. On the same day the Soviet Union submitted the disarmament question for the agenda of the 1960 session of the General Assembly. Most of the five Western members represented at Geneva then tried to arrange for a meeting of the Disarmament Commission in the first half of July, but gave up because of the reluctance of other countries to take part.

It will also be recalled that the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly referred to the ten-nation group all disarmament proposals at the session, including Premier Khrushchev's proposal for general and complete disarmament. The resolution also provided that a report on the Geneva negotiations would be submitted to the Disarmament Commission, which would transmit it to the Fifteenth session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Vasily V. Kuznetsov, a Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, who happened to be in New York in connection with the Security Council meetings, at first declined to say whether the Soviet Union would support or oppose the United States' proposal, but on July 25 he told several "uncommitted" delegates including me that no useful purpose would be served by convening the Disarmament Commission meeting early in August since the item of disarmament is already in the agenda of the Fifteenth session of the General Assembly. If the consensus of opinion is in favour of the meeting, he said, it should limit itself to a purely procedural discussion and transmit a report to the General Assembly on the abortive ten-power negotiations. From the tone and content of Mr. Lodge's letter to the Chairman, he feared that the United States wanted to insist on a substantive discussion, putting the blame for the breakdown of negotiations to the Soviet Union. Several other delegates also did not believe that the Commission would have time to make a detailed examination of the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament and the Western proposals.

The United States wanted the Commission to meet in the first week of August, but most Asian-African and Latin-American delegates preferred the second week of September in the belief that disarmament experts of the Big Four would be more likely to attend if the meeting were held just before the Assembly convened.

On July 28, Dr. Padilla Nervo, Chairman of the Commission, suggested that the Commission should meet on August 15. His suggestion was a compromise between the United States' request for an early meeting and the Soviet Union's position that no meeting is necessary until a day or two before the General Assembly begins on September 20. Dr. Nervo told me on July 29 that he would issue a formal call for a meeting after receiving the response to his suggestion that it be held on August 15.

On August 1, Mr. P.D. Morozov, acting Soviet delegate, informed Dr. Nervo that a commission meeting "on the eve of the General Assembly would only aggravate the situation", and he proposed that President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev and other heads of governments attend the Fifteenth session of the General Assembly to discuss disarmament. The Soviet note called for participation by the heads of governments of all eighty-two members of the United Nations. However, it said, "states possessing the greatest military power should be especially invited" to the summit discussion. Several Eastern European delegates including Mr. Morozov informed me verbally that they would boycott the Disarmament Commission meeting if it was held on August 15, as suggested by Dr. Nervo. This was reported to the Foreign Office (vide UNB491 of August 5th).

The Soviet proposal for a United Nations summit to discuss disarmament was not received favourably not only by the Western delegates but also by delegates from small nations. It was considered unrealistic to expect 82 heads of governments to come to New York and stay six weeks, which is the stipulated period to take up the item of disarmament in the First Committee. The Western powers declined to consider seriously Premier Khrushchev's proposal for a United Nations' summit, but a State Department spokesman said on August 2 that if Premier Khrushchev "wants to attend a disarmament discussion in New York, he is always free to attend a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission", which has as its members all eighty-two members of the United Nations.

India was the first among the uncommitted countries to reply to Dr. Nervo. It said that no Disarmament Commission meeting was necessary, but that if one was to be called, it should be held just before the General Assembly begins. But most Western European delegates and many Latin-Americans endorsed Dr. Nervo's suggestion to convene the meeting on August 15. Among those who replied on similar lines as India's were Indonesia, Iraq, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Finland and Sweden. We did not reply as no instructions were received. On August 4, Mr. Kuznetsov told me again that the Soviet bloc would boycott the meeting irrespective of its date. He renewed the previous Soviet charges that the Eisenhower Administration was insisting upon a meeting to help the Nixon-Lodge Presidential ticket. Among the delegates thus informed were those from India, Ceylon, United Arab Republic, Finland and Afghanistan.

On August 5 the United States addressed a second letter to Dr. Nervo giving its approval to the Chairman's suggestion to convene the meeting on August 15. The very moderate tone of the statement, in contrast to the strongly-worded letter of July 22, was apparently meant to ensure full participation in view of the fact that the Soviet Union was threatening boycott and urging neutral nations to follow suit. In his letter Mr. Lodge explained that the United States had called the meeting "to provide opportunity to report on the discussions which took place in Geneva" at the ten-nation disarmament talks and of the United States' proposals made there. Mr. Lodge said that "the most constructive outcome of the Disarmament Commission meeting would be a resolution which registers a common desire for prompt resumption of negotiations". This was regarded as a considerably more moderate approach by the United States, whose original intention was to ask the Commission to adopt a resolution placing the blame on the Soviet Union for breaking up the Geneva talks in June. The softening of the United States' attitude was

due partly to the fact that some uncommitted delegates were privately working on a draft resolution expressing regret that the Geneva talks had failed, and calling for new efforts to negotiate. I was involved in most of these private discussions, and New York newspapers of August 5 and 6 (including The New York Times) stipulated that Burma would be among the sponsors of the draft resolution. Participants in the private discussions were Burma, India, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Ecuador, United Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Sweden and Finland.

On August 9, Dr. Nervo summoned the Commission to meet on August 16. He did not disclose the number and nature of replies received to his proposal for a meeting on August 15, but I learned that thirty-seven replies were received most of which endorsed the Chairman's proposal for a meeting in mid-August.

On August 12, five Western powers - Canada, France, Italy, Britain and the United States - addressed a note to the Chairman of the Commission charging that the Soviet Union had blocked almost certain progress towards a reduction of military strength. The five nations also told the Commission that their Governments were prepared at any time to resume the Geneva negotiations. The statement said, "The Western nations hope that the Disarmament Commission will be instrumental in reactivating disarmament negotiations without delay". On that day the Soviet delegate made plain to everyone he met that the Communist nations would not attend the Commission's meeting on August 16. He still held the view that a commission meeting now would be premature and that the issue should be considered by the General Assembly in September.

On August 15 a group of uncommitted delegates met in the office of the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to draw up a draft resolution "acceptable to all 82 nations". Representatives of Ecuador, India, Yugoslavia, United Arab Republic, Sweden and Burma were present. After the drafting was over, the question of sponsorship was discussed. Suggestions were made that all the representatives present should sponsor the resolution after obtaining the approval of their respective governments. Since I was instructed not to "take an active part" at the Disarmament Commission meeting (vide BUN187/DA of August 12th), I suggested that Burma should be left out and that two countries from each of the three groups: Asian-African, Latin-America and Europe should sponsor the draft resolution. At my suggestion, it was agreed that the following should cosponsor it: Ecuador, Mexico, India, United Arab Republic, Sweden and Yugoslavia. It was also agreed that the representatives of Ecuador and India should respectively see the delegates from the United States and the Soviet Union and get their approval before the draft resolution was tabled. The draft resolution was tabled on August 17 (DC/180).

At the meeting, opinion was also expressed that the news of several uncommitted countries presenting a draft resolution of a purely procedural character might cause the Soviet delegation to reverse its stand to boycott the meeting. Only two days earlier (August 13) the Soviet delegation addressed a note to the Chairman of the Commission, reiterating its stand that "the Soviet Government considers it inadvisable to convene the Disarmament Commission at the present time and is opposed to its being convened."

When the meeting was convened at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, August 16, all the nine Eastern European delegates were present.

The Commission met five times from August 16 through August 18.

On August 17 Mr. Kuznetsov of the Soviet Union met the sponsors of the draft resolution and suggested certain amendments, the most important of which being to insert the words "participated by heads of governments or of states" after the words "the General Assembly" in the first operative paragraph. Mr. Cabot Lodge of the United States also met the sponsors on the same day and dismissed the Soviet proposal as "fantastic and unrealistic". He also suggested two amendments. The first was to reverse the order of operative paragraphs (1) and (2). The intention was to give priority to the consideration of the view that the problem was urgent, at least more urgent than the projected consideration to be given at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. The second amendment was to inject the idea of "negotiations" in the resolution. On August 18 the sponsors met again with both the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada (which tabled a formal amendment) and presented a revised draft resolution (DC/180 Rev.1). I was present at all these informal meetings of the sponsors. The revised draft resolution (DC/180 Rev.1) was adopted unanimously on the evening of August 18, and Canada withdrew its own amendment.

Since the Verbatim Records of the meetings are submitted herewith I will mention only the highlights of the discussion.

On the first day of the meeting, the United States offered to close down gradually its production plants for uranium and plutonium if the Soviet Union would do the same. It offered also to set aside 66,000 pounds of fissionable materials for peaceful uses only if Moscow would match the offer. The Soviet Union rejected both proposals on the ground that they were not enough. He asserted that even with the transfer of this material and with closing of production plants, stockpiles of weapons of fearful power would still be left. Mr. Kuznetsov said the Soviet plan was preferable. It calls for a ban on all nuclear weapons, and the prohibition of production and delivery.

On the second day (August 17) the United States said that it would scrap "sizeable numbers" of its nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union would accept American proposals made the previous day. Mr. Cabot Lodge spoke "in clarification" of proposals he made earlier. He said, "should the United States transfer 66,000 pounds of enriched uranium to peaceful uses" as it promised to do if the Soviet Union would reciprocate, "the only place from which this material would come is from present weapons stockpiles. Therefore, this transfer would directly and immediately result in the dismantling of sizeable numbers of presently existing weapons."

Mr. Kuznetsov said that even if the United States' proposals were put into effect, enough atomic weapons would remain to wipe out most of humanity.

Several delegates who participated in the debate both on August 17 and August 18 suggested that closer participation by the United Nations in future talks among the more heavily armed powers might increase progress towards disarmament. A different composition of the ten-nation committee that met in Geneva, with some "uncommitted" countries present, might have produced more favourable results, it was suggested. Some delegates suggested that it might prove useful to have a commission of neutral nations, not signatories of military treaties on either side, explore the areas of agreement already reached by great powers. It was suggested that such a group could report back either to a negotiating committee or to the Commission, or both, on avenues along which progress appeared possible.

When the revised resolution was adopted by acclamation, Mr. Cabot Lodge said that the session had accomplished all that could have been desired. Mr. Kuznetsov declared that the resolution lacked only one thing. It made no mention, he noted, of the presence of heads of government or heads of state at the General Assembly.

Enclosures: Draft Resolution DC/180
Canadian Amendment DC/181
Revised Draft Resolution DC/180 Rev.1.

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(U Thant)

The Permanent Secretary
Foreign Office
Rangoon

REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO.

Developments in the Republic of Congo which gained independence on 30th June, 1960 are leaping from one crisis to another, and there are indications that the Security Council resolution of 22nd July, 1960 is not the final step that the United Nations has taken to resolve the crisis. There are also indications that the matter may come up for consideration in the Fifteenth session of the General Assembly, and in the circumstances I consider it appropriate to submit this report which may serve as background material for the formulation of policy when the matter comes up for discussion in the General Assembly.

The Congo became a Belgium colony in 1885, the year when the whole of Burma was annexed to the British Empire. The Belgians developed the country and modernized its landscape, but not its people. The Congo is enormously rich, endowed with half the world's uranium, three-quarters of its cobalt, and 70 per cent of its industrial diamonds. Belgium developed and exploited the economic resources of the country, built clean and modern cities with wide streets and multi-storied buildings, but segregated the blacks from the whites. Every city in the Congo has clearly demarcated white sections and black sections. No Congolese was permitted to leave the country and no effort was made to train the Congolese for self-government. After 75 years of Belgium rule when the country was given independence, there were no Congolese doctors, lawyers, engineers or army officers. In the administration the highest posts ever held by the Congolese were those of clerks in government departments.

In January, 1959 after France had offered freedom to its territory next to the Congo, the politically frustrated Congolese staged bloody riots in Leopoldville, the capital. The Congolese leaders demanded a definite time-table for independence. Belgium wavered, but at a round-table conference in Brussels between the Belgians and the Congolese, the former agreed to quit the Congo in six months, with the agreement that the Belgians would be permitted to continue to operate the industrial, mining and business concerns and to run the 25,000-man Congolese army with Belgian officers. On 30th June, 1960 when the Congo was granted independence, the highest posts that the natives held in the armed forces were those of sergeant-majors.

The problems of new freedom were further complicated by the fact that 14 million Congolese are divided into 200 tribes speaking 38 main languages. Most observers believe that the Congolese have a sense of affiliation with tribe rather than country. There are strong tribal rivalries and occasional wars.

The Government that took over the Congo on 30th June, 1960 was headed by President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba. Both belong to two different tribes and have two different outlooks. They and other Congolese leaders had been in sharp conflict for years, and among the latter the most prominent is Moise Tshombe, Premier of the provincial government of Katanga, one of the six provinces forming the Congo.

Mr. Tshombe is reputed to be an ardent secessionist as he has all along been a rival of both President Kasavubu and Premier Lumumba. Mr. Tshombe is known to be the most wealthy Congolese and very pro-Belgian. It is an open secret that his election campaign was financed by the Belgian industrial corporation of "Haut-Katanga Union Mines", one of the richest mining companies in the world. The Belgians had apparently banked on his prospect as either the President or the Premier of the new Republic. President Kasavubu is reputed to be a conservative, and Premier Lumumba a radical leftist. Both were at first rivals for premiership, but Mr. Kasavubu accepted the Presidency - an honorific post - as a compromise.

At the Independence celebrations, the United Nations was represented by Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, U.N. Under-Secretary. It may be mentioned in passing that Mr. Constantin Stavropoulos, United Nations General Counsel with the rank of Under-Secretary, represented the Secretary-General at Somalia Independence Celebrations. With uncanny foresight, Mr. Dag Hammerskjold sensed trouble not only in the Congo but also in Somalia, and the two U.N. diplomats were asked to remain in the two newly-independent countries until mid-August or the end of August "to report to the Secretary-General on the amount and kind of technical assistance the United Nations could supply to the two countries". It was Mr. Hammerskjold's intention to replace them with tested diplomats from Sweden and Burma, two countries which are very close to his heart and which he believes to be favoured by both power-blocs. I had several occasions to discuss with him, and his request for a Burmese diplomat and the Union Government's inability to spare his services for the moment were the subject of cable correspondence between our Foreign Office and our Mission here.

Although the Secretary-General's fears in regard to Somalia proved unfounded, they came true in regard to the Congo. Within hours after independence, the Congolese army mutinied against the Belgian officers. Throughout the country many Congolese people, who had been led to believe that independence would bring them immediate riches, staged riots and attacks on the whites. Tens of thousands of whites fled the country. The administration was paralysed and business came to a standstill. In the midst of mutiny, Katanga seceded and called on Belgium for military support. Under a treaty with the Congo, Belgium had left 2,000 troops at three bases, in Leopoldville and Katanga provinces. Under the terms of the treaty the Belgian troops were not to be used without the Congolese Government's permission, but in the face of rioting, Brussels ordered them into action in several provinces and dispatched additional troops to "protect Belgian citizens". The Belgian troops aggravated the situation and the riots intensified.

Premier Lumumba protested strongly, blamed the Belgians for the rioting and worsening situation, demanded their immediate withdrawal and asked the United Nations to intervene. Unless the United Nations acted, he said, the Congo would turn to Soviet Russia for help, both military and economic.

Meanwhile, Lumumba Government tried to appease the Congolese army mutineers by promising a general promotion in grade with an increase in pay and removal of some of the Belgian officers. As a result of this general promotion, the Congolese army became the only army in the world without a single private. On July 6th, the Belgian Commander of all Congolese armed forces General Janssens and his chief aides resigned. However on July 7th mutiny spread, and many cases of violence against the whites were reported. The Congolese government announced on that day that all white Belgian officers would be dismissed, and that a Congolese (a sergeant-major) would be raised to the rank of a general to take over the top command. This announcement brought an immediate relaxation of tension, and the situation calmed down, though law and order was not completely restored in many parts of the country.

On July 10th violence erupted in Katanga province whose premier had earlier announced secession from the Congo republic. Belgian troops and sailors went into action against Congolese mutineers and looters at Elizabethville, capital of Katanga, and news despatches reported that at least thirty-one persons, including six Europeans, were killed on that day. Premier Tshombe of Katanga requested the British government for the assistance of troops from Northern Rhodesia - which has a common frontier with Katanga - but the request was rejected by the British government. Prime Minister Macmillan announced that the request could not be entertained as "the request comes from a provincial government, which Britain does not recognize". The British Foreign Office notified the government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (of which the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia is a part) of its decision not to grant the request. The Federation in most respects is self-governing but the responsibility for Foreign Affairs is reserved by Britain. The use of the Federation's troops outside its borders would come under the heading of foreign affairs.

The situation elsewhere suddenly deteriorated, and many foreign observers on the spot felt that there was not so much a revolution or an insurrection as a collapse of authority. The rioting troops seemed to have no unified command and no specific objectives.

On July 11th, the Congo's richest province - Katanga - declared itself an independent state. Premier Tshombe of Katanga in the course of his announcement of secession declared that Katanga would retain an economic bond with Belgium. He also declared that Belgian troops in the province would remain and that he had asked for more of them.

On the same day, Dr. Ralph Bunche, Secretary-General's special representative in the Congo issued a statement saying he had assured Premier Lumumba and Chief of State Kasavubu that the United Nations would give the new Republic "as much assistance as possible".

The situation in the Congo was so confused that Secretary-General Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, who was in Geneva to submit his African aid programme to the Economic and Social Council, cut short his stay and left for New York on July 11th. On the next day (July 12th) he met the Permanent Representatives of nine African states and informed them that Premier Lumumba had requested the United Nations to provide "military assistance" to reorganize the Congolese army. The Secretary-General interpreted the request as within the context of an existing United Nations programme to supply governmental experts to under-developed countries. This programme is known as OPEX (Operational and Executive Personnel) and was started in 1959 on a modest scale. The Secretary-General submitted a report last month recommending that it be expanded and made permanent. At that time Mr. Hammarskjold said that thirty-five outside experts were on duty or being recruited and that they would exhaust the entire \$300,000 appropriated for OPEX this year.

The first reaction of the African representatives to Mr. Hammarskjold's revelation was one of doubt about the legality of Premier Lumumba's request for "military assistance". Their doubt was based on the following considerations:

- (1) The Congo is not yet a Member of the United Nations and cannot become a member until the General Assembly meets in September;
- (2) The United Nations' Charter prohibits interference in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

Anyhow, they assured Mr. Hammerskjold that a reference would be made to their respective governments for instructions, in view of the extraordinary situation prevailing in the Congo. Meanwhile, Mr. Antoine Cizenga, Deputy Premier of the Congo, asked for United States and Belgian troops to keep the country together and end bloodshed. President Eisenhower promptly ruled out the use of United States troops in the Congo. The United Nations circles were puzzled at the disclosure that the request for United States troops was made not by the Premier or the Head of State, but by the Deputy Premier. Evidently the request did not come from the entire Congolese government, but only from one or a few of its members.

While the African states were considering the Secretary-General's request for "military assistance", Belgian commandos occupied Leopoldville's airport on July 13th and then clashed with Congolese troops. After seizing the airport the paratroopers occupied the city without a shot being fired. Lumumba Government immediately declared a "state of war" with Belgium.

On July 13th the Soviet Union demanded the withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the Congo and asked the United Nations to halt what it called "armed aggression" by the Atlantic powers against the new African republic. It charged the West with seeking to return the Congo to a colonial status. The Soviet note apparently foreshadowed a formal call to the United Nations for condemnation of the Belgian military operations in the Congo. On the same day Belgian government made it plain that Belgian troops would continue to protect the lives of white persons.

The Security Council which met at 8.30 p.m. on July 13th and adjourned at 3.20 a.m. on the next morning decided to send United Nations troops to the Congo. The vote was 8 in favour, including the United States and the Soviet Union and 3 absentions.

On July 14th Dr. Ralph Bunche announced in Leopoldville that United Nations troops were expected to reach Leopoldville in two days. He also said that the first United Nations forces to arrive would be drawn from the African states of Ghana, Guinea, the Mali Federation, Morocco and Tunisia. It was also announced that Major General Carl Carisson von Horn of Sweden, head of the United Nations truce supervision organization in Jerusalem, would head the operation. Mr. Omar Loutfi, Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic told me that his country was not requested for military assistance, but only technical assistance was sought. The Secretary-General must have in mind the anti-French attitude of the U.A.R. (the two countries have no diplomatic relations) when he did not ask for U.A.R. military assistance, since France and Belgium are closely-knit allies. The same considerations must have prompted the Secretary-General to reject politely the Indonesian offer to send troops to the Congo, since Indonesia's hostility towards the Dutch would be a handicap in operations in a country where Belgian forces are still stationed.

On July 15th Mr. Hammerskjold began to mobilize United Nations' experts for the Republic of the Congo. He named a Swede, Mr. Sture Linner, to head the United Nations technical group in Leopoldville. Mr. Linner is reported to be familiar with African problems, having done extensive business operations in Liberia for two years. (He had in mind a Burmese diplomat for a similar assignment in Somalia, as mentioned earlier). He appointed Mr. Henry Labouisse, a former director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, to help him set up the new Congo force. Meanwhile, the first group of advisers and administrative officers left the United Nations headquarters. Twelve additional members of the Secretary-General's staff, including French speaking members

of the United Nations building's Security force, were scheduled to leave for the Congo in the next two days. Mr. Hammerskjold also announced that 600 troops had been sent to Leopoldville in United States Air Force planes. He said more would be sent over the week-end. The first to go are Tunisians and Ghanians. Mr. Hammerskjold said Moroccan and Ethiopian troops were standing by. The British notified the Secretary-General that they would also provide transportation starting with an airlift of 60 additional Ghanian soldiers.

Mr. Caba Sory, Guinea's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, called a meeting of African members to tell them that his Government had "suspended" diplomatic relations with Belgium. He suggested that they do the same. He also informed Mr. Hammerskjold that Guinea was prepared to contribute "all we have" to the United Nations Force. A number of nations announced during the day that they were responding to Mr. Hammerskjold's request for food and supplies. India said she was sending 1,000 tons of wheat. Italy was preparing to send a medical unit. Mr. Hammerskjold said twenty-one American planes had started an airlift of 300 tons of flour and that Britain would soon send \$28,000 worth of foodstuffs. It was also announced that a United Nations transport was flying to the Congo with blue helmets, United Nations flags and other material needed to designate the new United Nations force. The plane left from Gaza where the United Nations Emergency Force is stationed.

A sensation was caused in the United Nations circles on the same day (July 15th) when Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union disclosed the receipt of an appeal from Premier Lumumba and President Kasavubu of the Congo for Soviet intervention if the "West does not end its aggression" against the new African republic. Premier declared that the Soviet Government's demand to the West was "hands off the Republic of Congo". He went on, "If states which are directly carrying out imperialist aggression against the Congo and those who are pushing them to continue their criminal actions, the U.S.S.R. will not shrink from resolute measures to curb the aggression". In Washington the State Department promptly denounced Mr. Khrushchev's statements as "intemperate, misleading and irresponsible".

The Congolese appeal to Mr. Khrushchev dismayed Western diplomats in the United Nations for two reasons: the appeal did not take cognizance of the United Nations Security Council decision on the previous day to send an emergency force to the Congo to replace Belgian troops, and the appeal means a propaganda coup that would enhance the Soviet leader's efforts to pose as the guardian angel of the African peoples. On the same night, in a radio broadcast from Leopoldville, Premier Lumumba declared that the Congo was at war with Belgium.

On the next day (July 16th) news dispatches from Leopoldville carried alarming information that the Belgian forces were planning a major drive, including air strikes, in Bakongo, a strategic region south of Leopoldville. The objective of the Belgian drive was believed to be to gain control of two key cities, Matadi and Thysville from the Congolese army. Almost simultaneously the Soviet government promised to send 10,000 tons of food to help relieve shortages in the Congo.

In the midst of this confused situation, the Secretary-General appealed to non-African states to contribute military assistance. Permanent Representatives of Sweden, Ireland, Burma, Yugoslavia and Haiti received the appeal in the evening of Saturday, July 16th. The text of the appeal was immediately despatched to the Foreign Office by cable (UNB. 439).

On the next day (July 17th) a major sensation was caused here by newspaper reports of "a Polish vessel steaming to the Congo with 300 tons of arms and ammunition for the Congolese Government". The Belgian Government immediately approached the United Nations with a request that "something should be done" about the shipment. The news, however, later turned out to be false.

On Monday, July 18th, the Secretary-General reported that Belgian authorities in the Congo had agreed to abide by the orders of the United Nations Command there and would limit military intervention to protection of Belgian nationals. In his first report to the Security Council, Mr. Hammarskjold said that whatever security measures are taken by Belgian forces in cases of grave and imminent danger will be referred at once to the United Nations Command. In another development on the same day, nine African states jointly called on Belgium to withdraw her forces from the Congo "with immediate effect". The same group also opposed the secession of Katanga province from the Republic of Congo.

The Security Council meeting which was originally scheduled for Tuesday (July 19th) was postponed till Wednesday. The delay was prompted by the Congo Government's decision to send as representatives Mr. Thomas Kanza, delegate to the United Nations, and Mr. Andre Mandi, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Both arrived in New York on Tuesday night.

On the day Secretary-General submitted his first report to the Security Council (July 18th) he received an ultimatum from Premier Tshombe of Katanga province demanding recognition within 48 hours of Katanga independence which was said to have been proclaimed on July 10th. He said that he would not allow United Nations troops to set foot in Katanga where he has named a Belgian as head of the province's armed forces. Belgian men between the ages of 20 and 45 have been ordered mobilized.

On the next day (July 19th) signs were evident that the situation in the Congo itself began to improve. Mr. Hammarskjold reported to the Security Council that the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Leopoldville had begun and would be completed by Saturday (July 23rd). He also declared that the United Nations command was prepared to guarantee the safety of the entire population, and outlined new steps being taken to bolster the United Nations force. He also made known his intention to make an on-the-spot inspection that, conditions permitting, he would fly to Leopoldville, and "after a necessary stay" there go on to South Africa.

When the majority of the Belgian army pulled out of Leopoldville on the night of July 19th, Ghanaian and Tunisian soldiers took over the city without a hitch. Premier Lumumba apparently was not satisfied with the pace of withdrawal operations, because on that evening he was reported to have sent a message to the United Nations to get the Belgian troops out of the country by midnight. He warned that he would call in Soviet forces if the deadline were not met. But Dr. Ralph Bunche refused to accept it and told the Congolese Cabinet Ministers that the United Nations did not accept ultimatums.

On Wednesday, July 20th, Mr. Thomas Kanza, Representative of the Congo to the United Nations, addressed a meeting of the Asian-African group. Views were expressed by several members of the group, and at the close of the meeting, Mr. Omar Loutfi of U.A.R. (Chairman of the group for the month) made the following statement to the press:

"The Asian-African group met today and heard the statement made by the representative of the Republic of Congo. The general consensus of opinion in the group was in favour of the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the Republic of Congo which alone can restore peace and stability in the new Republic. The group is also convinced of the imperative necessity of maintaining the territorial integrity of the country and deplores the attempts by certain elements to endanger this integrity."

On Thursday, July 21st, the United States served notice that "we will do whatever may be necessary" in association with other United Nations members, to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge of the United States issued this warning in the Security Council which met for over four hours on the night of Wednesday, July 20th. At the same session Mr. Thomas Kenza, the Congolese representative, called on the Council to recommend the withdrawal of Belgian forces "as rapidly as possible". This demand was milder than the African states' demand for "immediate withdrawal" made three days earlier. The Belgian Foreign Minister Mr. Pierre Wigny, who participated in the Security Council debate, read a number of telegrams reporting assaults on Belgian women, and he repeated previous Belgian statements that the troops would be withdrawn when the United Nations forces were in a position to maintain order.

Mr. Hammarskjold, who was the first speaker at the meeting, indicated that the immediate military needs had been met, but he served notice that he would have to ask for "much, much more" from members of the United Nations both in the military and civilian fields. He concluded his speech with the observation, "There should not be any hesitation, because we are at a turn of the road where our attitude will be of decisive significance, I believe not only for the future of this organization but also for the future of Africa. And Africa may well in present circumstances, mean the world".

While the Security Council was in session, the Congo Cabinet decided "to appeal immediately to the Soviet Union or any other country of the African-Asian bloc to send troops to the Congo" unless the Security Council took effective action to expel the Belgian troops. It is not known whether the mention of "African-Asian bloc" was intended to include the Peoples' Republic of China which was represented at the Asian-African meeting at Bandung. It is however obvious that the members of the Congo Cabinet are not conversant with the functions and limitations of the United Nations and its principal organs. Premier Lumumba at least was not impressed with the extraordinary swiftness of Security Council action, for he accused the United Nations of "dragging its feet and deferring to the Belgians".

After a long night session on Friday, July 22nd, the Security Council, by unanimous vote, adopted a resolution requesting Belgium to proceed "speedily" with the evacuation of her troops from the Congo. Mr. V.M. Kuznetsov, a Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, did not press for a vote on his resolution calling for withdrawal within three days. The Soviet Union and Poland then joined the other nine members of the Security Council in adopting the milder resolution introduced by the two Asian-African members, Ceylon and Tunisia. The Soviet endorsement of the resolution, which did not set a time limit to the withdrawal of Belgian troops, was probably motivated by its interpretation of the word "speedy" as analogous to "immediate" which it attempted to put in its original resolution.

The unanimous vote, which is rare in Security Council proceedings gratified all the Permanent Representatives who watched the proceedings and won the thanks of the Secretary-General. He said that it would strengthen his efforts to build up the United Nations force now in the Congo as authorized by the resolution of July 14th. Mr. Thomas Kanza, the Congolese representative, thanked the Security Council and said that the decision would permit "the re-establishment of peace and calmness in the Congo". Mr. Pierre Wigny, the Belgian Foreign Minister, was silent on Belgian withdrawal plans, but he said he hoped that an independent Congo would now make "the necessary effort" to establish peace and order. Previously Mr. Wigny had confirmed to the Security Council Belgium's intention of withdrawing whenever the United Nations force could maintain order.

While the Security Council was in session, word reached here that Premier Lumumba was leaving Leopoldville for New York to discuss with the Secretary-General future help to his country from the United Nations. The Secretary-General accordingly had to delay his departure for the Congo to await the Premier's arrival. Premier Lumumba arrived in New York in the morning of July 24th and had a two hour conference with the Secretary-General the same day. On Monday, July 25th, he addressed the Asian-African group. On Tuesday, July 26th, he was the guest of honour at a lunch given by the group.

Although no statement was issued by him or the Secretary-General, he told the press that the meeting with the Secretary-General had been "fruitful". The Premier described the meeting as having dealt with "the general situation in the Congo". It was understood to have concentrated on economic and technical, rather than military aspects. At the Asian-African group gathering, Premier Lumumba spoke in general terms of the need for Asian-African solidarity and expressed thanks for the group's "support of Congolese cause".

At a news conference on July 25th, Premier Lumumba said that peace and order in the Congo would be restored "within five minutes" after the complete withdrawal of Belgian troops. The Premier emphasized that Belgian forces must be withdrawn from all of the Congo including the military bases at Kamina and Kitona - bases reserved by Belgium under the Congolese-Belgian treaty of friendship and cooperation. Mr. Lumumba said that Belgian troops must also be withdrawn from the province of Katanga, which has proclaimed its secession. He declared that there "is no Katanga problem" and that the secessionist movement had been created by the Belgians. He also expressed satisfaction over the two Security Council resolutions.

On the same day news reached here that Mr. Tshombe, Premier of Katanga province, said that any United Nations forces trying to enter Katanga would have to fight their way in. General Carl von Horn of Sweden, Commander of the United Nations forces in the Congo, said that Katanga was part of the Congo and came within the scope of the United Nations troop operation, but that Katanga had a "low priority" and he did not plan to send in troops at present.

On July 26th, after Premier Lumumba's final meeting with the Secretary-General, a joint communique was issued. It said that there was agreement on the "immediate" despatch to the Congo of administrative personnel and experts on internal and external security. It was understood that the United Nations would rush officials from outside to help take over governmental functions in the Congo.

Mr. Hammarskjold left New York on that night for Brussels where he planned to confer with Belgian officials before continuing his journey to Leopoldville to examine the situation on the spot. Premier Lumumba also left New York for Washington on the morning of July 27th in President Eisenhower's plane.

At the time of writing this report, an air of quiet confidence is evident among United Nations circles that the United Nations operation in the Congo will go off smoothly. This confidence is based on the amazingly rapid buildup of United Nations forces in the Congo. The speed and sure-footedness with which Mr. Hammarskjold has put the United Nations machinery in operation surprised most observers, and even the most consistent critics of the United Nations in this country concede for the first time that the world organization has performed and is performing a magnificent job. The United States has been pressing for the creation of a standby United Nations Force or at least the planning staff for such a force. The Secretary-General was not opposed to this, but doubted if the United Nations was ready for such action in the light of the opposition of the Soviet bloc. The past two weeks have dispelled this doubt. The Soviet Union, which had violently opposed all moves in the United Nations towards a standby force, confronted by a specific emergency, voted for the virtual creation of a United Nations force. And the Secretary-General was ready with the blue-prints and commitments. Cables poured out of the United Nations headquarters with machine-gun speed. Much depends on the success of the United Nations operation in the Congo. In the ultimate the aim of the United Nations operation is the historically momentous one of keeping the Continent of Africa from being sucked into the orbit of the Cold War. This is the wish of most Africans themselves.

Although Burma cannot respond to the Secretary-General's ^{call} ~~cable~~ for a battalion of armed forces, being herself faced with additional responsibilities, her ready compliance by sending the requested number of staff officers is deeply appreciated here. Our offer of one hundred tons of rice is also symbolic of our desire to contribute to the success of the United Nations' efforts in restoring economic stability in the strife-torn republic.

The United Nations has only begun on a tremendous task, and it is my firm conviction that we should throw every ounce of our moral and material support to help the organization bring order out of the Congo chaos. I wish to conclude this report by quoting Mr. Walter Lippmann, "In this situation the United Nations would have to be invented if it did not already exist." If the United Nations did not exist this past fortnight, I doubt if our civilization would either.


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U Thant

Permanent Secretary
Foreign Office
Rangoon

28th July, 1960

Confidential

Report on Elections to be held during the
15th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Presidency: ^{Mr.} H.E. Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia, H.E. Mr. Frederic H. Boland of Ireland and H.E. Mr. Thor Thors of Iceland are the three candidates for the ^{Presidency of the} UN General Assembly at its 15th session, and all three have approached our delegation for support. Under the accepted custom of the United Nations, it is the turn of a European to preside over the forthcoming session, and all three candidates are Europeans.

It will be recalled ^{last year} that Mr. Nosek presented his candidature for the Presidency of the 14th session of the General Assembly, but postponed his candidature in favor of Dr. Belaunde of Ceylon, until the 15th session. Eastern European delegations strongly hold the view that after fifteen years ~~of~~ since the inception of the United Nations, it is time that an Eastern European should preside over ^{its} deliberations. This view was reflected in a joint memorandum addressed to all members of the United Nations by the nine Soviet bloc countries in support of Mr. Jiri Nosek. Besides, Mr. Nosek has established his reputation as an able diplomat in the United Nations by ~~his~~ a series of offices held by him including the Chairmanship of the Second Committee of the 7th and 12th sessions of the General Assembly, and the Chairmanship of the Third Committee of the 9th Session of the General Assembly. He also served as a Vice-chairman of the Economic and Social Council at several sessions.

Mr. Boland has also had a long and distinguished

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service in the United Nations, and chaired the Fourth Committee of the 13th session of the General Assembly. To my knowledge he is the only delegate to the United Nations who had attended all the sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations from 1930 to 1935, as a member of the Irish delegation. This long record of service in international organizations has endowed him with an extraordinary degree of charm, tact and maturity which endears him to all who come in contact with him. So far, I understand that his candidature has been endorsed by the United States, United Kingdom and other Western European countries.

Mr. Thor Thors presented his candidature only on 15th March 1960. He has the unique distinction of representing his country at the United Nations, ^{uninterrupted} since Iceland became a member of ~~that~~ ^{this} organization in November 1946. He also served as Chairman of the Special Political Committee of the 9th session of the General Assembly in 1954. I understand that four other Scandinavian countries — Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark have decided to support his candidature.

It is easier to predict who will be elected than to recommend a candidate whom Denmark should support. My surmise is that all the Western Europeans (except the Scandinavians), a large majority of the Latin-Americans and more than half of the Asian-African countries will vote for Mr. Boland. It is possible that he will be elected at the first ballot. If the voting goes beyond the first ballot, and if Mr. Thor Thors is eliminated, then the Scandinavians and some Latin American supporters of Mr. Thors will vote for Mr. Boland in the second ballot. If Mr. Norck is eliminated in the first ballot, Eastern Europeans will switch round to

Mr. Thor Thors, but I don't see how he can outrun more votes than Mr. Boland. The fact that Ireland has no diplomatic relations with any of the Communist countries mitigates against his qualification as President of the UN General Assembly, but this consideration will not stand in the way of his election.

Some Asian-African countries like Guinea^{, United Arab Republic,} India, Indonesia and Iraq might support the candidature of Mr. Nossek. Their contention is that after 15 years it is time that an Eastern European presides over the world forum, and especially when that Eastern European happens to be an experienced and able diplomat like Mr. Nossek. Mr. C. S. Jha of India confides to me that his government "most probably" will vote for Mr. Nossek, but that Mr. Nossek does not stand any chance of election. This view is shared by other Asian-Africans who favor Mr. Nossek.

I would recommend that the Government of the Union of Burma should restrict its consideration to two candidates only: Mr. Boland and Mr. Nossek.

Vice-Presidents: Thirteen Vice-Presidents, including the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, have to be elected. So far only three candidates have come out from the Asian-African group which is entitled to four seats. The three candidates are Libya, Sudan and Japan. ^{So far} the only other candidate outside the Asian-African group is Canada. Greece, which presented its candidature earlier, withdrew in favour of Canada.

Chairmanship of Committees: The following are the announced candidates ^{for} chairmanship of committees:

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First Committee: Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon.

H.E. Mr. R. Shaha of Nepal.

Special Political Committee: H.E. Mr. M. Tarabanov of Bulgaria.

Second Committee: H.E. Mr. J. Stanovnik of Yugoslavia.

Third Committee: H.E. Mr. S.P. Lopez of the Philippines.

Fourth Committee: Mr. A. Pachachi of Iraq.

Fifth Committee: Nil.

Sixth Committee: Nil.

According to established convention, the offices of the Chairmen of Committees are distributed as follows:

Asian-African Group — 2

European Group — 2

Latin-American Group — 2

Eastern European Group — 1.

Now there are four Asia-African candidates for three posts of Chairmen, and the question is "who will withdraw?" Since the Asian-African group never discussed the question of candidature in group meetings, we are now faced with a very delicate problem.

It will be recalled that Iraq withdrew her candidature for a post of Vice-President last year, and the official withdrawal was accompanied by a statement that her representative Mr. Pachachi will be a candidate for the chairmanship of the Fourth Committee in the Fifteenth session. ~~But~~ Mr. Lopez of the Philippines was also a candidate for the chairmanship of the Third Committee in the Fourteenth session, but he withdrew in favour of Madame Cisarlet of Belgium, making known his intention to present his candidature for the same post in the Fifteenth session. The Philippines, accordingly, was elected one of the Vice-Presidents in the last session.

Privately, there has been some uneasiness in the Asian-African group regarding the Committee for the chairmanship of which two Asian-African candidates have come out. The First Committee is generally considered as the most important Committee among the seven, and this year it is the Asian-African turn to chair it, but the two Asian-African candidates offered their candidature for other Committees than the First.

As early as December 1959, before the termination of the Fourteenth session, Mr. Benhima, chairman of the Morocco delegation, expressed his hope in one of the Asian-African group meetings that I should be made available for chairmanship of the First Committee. I replied that I considered participation from the floor as more fruitful ^{and effective} than presiding over the Committee meetings. In February 1960 Mr. Mongi Slim of Tunisia asked me to present my candidature for the First Committee chairmanship. I declined on the same ground. The general Arab desire to see me in the chair of the Political Committee is perhaps motivated ^{partly} by the fact that I have chaired the Standing Committee ~~for~~ on Algeria for three successive years and they seem to be satisfied with my handling of the case. For different reasons the Israel delegates also expressed their desire to see me as Chairman of the First Committee. Among others who encouraged me to present my candidature are Mr. Jha of India, Mr. Plimsoll of Australia and Mr. King of Liberia (who has since left the UN). I held, and still hold, the view that I can participate in the deliberations more effectively from the floor than from the chair.

Sir Claude Luce of Ceylon asked me in May of this year if it was true that I was not interested in the chairmanship

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of the First Committee. When I replied in the affirmative, he told me that he would press his candidature. On 6th June, 1960 he came out officially with his candidature. Three days later Mr. Shaha of Nepal followed suit. Mr. Shaha's contention, privately of course, is that Ceylon is over-ambitious in regard to vacancies. Sir Claude was chairman of the Fifth Committee of the Thirteenth session; he attempted unsuccessfully to chair the Fourth Committee of the Fourteenth session when Ceylon got a Security Council seat, and Ceylon this year is interested in several vacancies including a judgeship in the International Court of Justice. I have a feeling that Mr. Shaha's intention in contesting Sir Claude's candidature is just to nullify the latter's chances. But I understand that Sir Claude has got the ^{obnoxious} ~~back~~ of Sir Pierson Dixon of Britain and a few other Commonwealth representatives. At this distance it is difficult to speculate which two out of the four Asian-African candidates will withdraw.

Security Council: So far, two Latin American countries - Cuba and Chile - have offered their candidature for the Security Council seat which will be vacated by Argentina in January 1961. The United Arab Republic has offered her candidature for the seat to be vacated by Tunisia, and Portugal is the only European candidate for the seat to be vacated by Italy, since the Netherlands has deferred her candidature until 1962. The problem, therefore, is to choose between Cuba and Chile for one Latin American seat.

Normally, the Latin American group used to present its nominee, but in the present case the opinion seems to be divided. ~~It~~ I presume that the majority of Latin Americans will support Chile, and the United States

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undoubtedly will do the same. I discussed informally with several members of the Asian-African group, and up till now no delegation has committed one way or the other. However, I have a feeling that the majority of Asian-Africans will vote for Chile while a few others including India, Indonesia, Iraq and United Arab Republic will support Cuba. In the context of the intensified cold war, I think that Chile will be elected.

Economic and Social Council: For elections to this Council, no

problem is posed as far as the Latin Americans are concerned, since El Salvador is the only ~~nominal~~ candidate for the seat to be vacated by Costa Rica. Nor is there a problem regarding the European seat to be vacated by the Netherlands, since Belgium is the only candidate. The struggle is now centered between ~~three~~ four Asian-African countries — Iraq, Ghana, Jordan and Ethiopia — for one seat to be vacated by Sudan. Jordan is reported to have received the endorsement of the League of Arab States and I think she will receive the support of the Western Europeans and the United States. The chances of Iraq are minimised by the fact that her representative Mr. Pachachi is a candidate for the Chairmanship of the Fourth Committee. Non-Arab members of the African states have not made up their minds, although some Asians prefer Ghana to Jordan. To my knowledge no commitment has been made by ^{any} Asian-African government to any candidate, except the League of Arab States which has endorsed Jordan.

Trusteeship Council: Composition of the Council is still to be

decided, and no election is called for in the forthcoming session. A separate report on the future of the Trusteeship Council will be submitted in due course.

International Court of Justice: Six vacancies will occur in the membership of the International Court of Justice when elections come up during the Fifteenth session. By then the terms of office of judges from the following countries will expire: Uruguay, Norway, Pakistan, United States and Soviet Union, and ^{one more} a vacancy has been caused by the death of ~~the late~~ Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Q.C., of the United Kingdom.

By established convention, the Big Powers nominate ^{their own} Candidates whenever the terms of incumbents expire, and the United Kingdom has nominated Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Q.C., as a candidate for the vacancy caused by the death of Sir Lauterpacht. The United States and the Soviet Union will also nominate their respective candidates for the vacancies caused by the expiring of the terms of members held by their nationals. Therefore, the actual vacancies for consideration will be only three; those caused by the expiring of terms of office by members from ~~the~~ Uruguay, Norway and Pakistan.

Up till now, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland have presented candidates ~~for the vacancy caused by the expiring of the term of~~ ^{to replace the} Norwegian member, and Paraguay and Peru have offered candidates ~~for the post vacated by~~ ^{to replace} Uruguay. Although the term of Sir Michael Zafulla Khan will expire, Pakistan has ~~re~~ nominated him again for re-election. Candidates ~~from other countries are~~ are also offered by India, Japan, Ceylon and Iran.

Among the European candidates Professor Morelli of Italy appears to be the favorite. Among the Latin American candidates, Paraguay is said to have the support of the majority of Latin American countries. It will be recalled that

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the Permanent Representative of Paraguay has been requested, on a reciprocal basis, to support our candidature for FAO Council, as the reply is being awaited. To us the Asian candidates pose the biggest problem. My personal feeling is that in principle we should not encourage the re-election of judges for a second term, although in the present case Sir Zafulla Khan is widely recognized as an outstanding jurist. The Indian candidate Dr. Radhakrishna Pal has also distinguished himself as Chairman of the International Law Commission and his famous dissenting judgment of the International Military Tribunal in Japan after World War II won him universal acclaim. I would recommend that our consideration should be restricted to these two candidates only.

Committee on Information on N. S. G. Territories: So far no candidates have been presented.

Committee on South West Africa: So far no candidates have been presented.

Committee of the Six: No candidates have been offered.

Advisory Committee on Administrative & Budgetary Questions:

Argentina and Chile have presented candidates for the vacancy which will be caused by the expiry of the term of the member from Colombia Mr. Eduardo Carrizosa who is also seeking re-election.

There have so far been no candidates for the ~~vacancy which will be caused by the expiry of~~ ^{to replace} terms of members from Greece and U.S.S.R.

Committee on Contributions: India and Peru offer their own candidates for re-election. No candidates so far have been presented for the vacancies which will be caused by the expiry of terms of members from U.S.S.R. and France.

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Board of Auditors: Mr. Ghulam Abbas of Pakistan is, so far,
the only candidate ~~for the vacancy which will~~
~~be caused by the expiry of term of the member from Norway.~~
to replace

Investment Committee: No candidates have been presented.

U.N. Administrative Tribunal: No candidates have been presented
to replace Sweden and Uruguay.

U.N. Staff Pension Committee: No candidates have been presented.

Permanent Secretary,
Foreign Office,
Rangoon.

Wes
P.R. of Burma to U.N.

14th July 1960.

**REPORT ON UNITED STATES' "SPY PLANE"
OVER RUSSIA.
(Part three)**

In my previous report I mentioned that Ceylon and other non-permanent members of the Security Council were working on a conciliatory resolution on the eve of the Security Council meeting which took place on Monday, 23 May, 1960. The original draft, according to Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon, which sought to ban future flights by planes for intelligence purposes over the territories of other countries, was not acceptable to the United States delegation. Therefore, on Monday morning they worked on a new draft which eliminates any reference to flights.

When the Security Council met on Monday afternoon, the Soviet Union came out with its own resolution by which the Council would "condemn" American overflights as "aggressive" and as "a threat to universal peace". It would request "an end to such actions". There was no mention of an apology or punishment for the guilty, both of which Premier Khrushchev had demanded in Paris. Copy of the draft resolution is submitted herewith. (S/4321).

On the same evening, the four small powers in the Security Council (Ceylon, Argentina, Ecuador and Tunisia) presented a draft resolution which urges the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union to take up at the United Nations and elsewhere, where they left off in Paris, current pressing problems. It calls for continued efforts to ban nuclear weapons tests, for renewed study of the technical aspects of surprise-attack prevention, and for other disarmament explorations. It also appeals to all United Nations members "to refrain from any action which might increase tensions" in the wake of the summit failure, which it officially "regrets". Diplomats noted particularly an obscure phrase which suggested the use of "the Security Council and other appropriate organs of the United Nations" as a substitute for summitry. This is something Mr. Hammarskjold has urged, and many believe the phrase "other appropriate organs" means the Secretary-General. He is technically a United Nations organ. I have good reasons to believe that the four-power draft resolution received the backing of the Secretary-General. Copy of the draft resolution is submitted herewith. (S/4323).

In his opening statement in the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, presented the following themes: (a) that the United States had been "perfidious" in sending U-2 planes over the Soviet Union while talking friendship; (b) that such flights could touch off atomic war by miscalculation; (c) that air space was inviolable under international law; and (d) that the Soviet Union would strike back at the United States and for its allies if incursions were repeated.

In reply, Mr. Cabot Lodge, United States representative, repeated President Eisenhower's Paris assurance that the flights already had been suspended and would not be resumed. He offered to make the suspension permanent in the only way available - by treaty, a treaty providing for open skies. Mr. Gromyko had strongly rejected this open-skies-plan in advance in his earlier speech. The United States delegate contrasted what he called "one single harmless observation flight" with repeated espionage efforts by Soviet agents.

When the Council session resumed on Tuesday, 24 May, Britain and France defended the United States against the Soviet charge that flights of American reconnaissance planes over Soviet territory constituted "aggressive acts". Ambassador Berard of France said that the direct cause of the present situation was "the menace revived from time to time by those who claim that they have the means of annihilating the rest of the world". Argentina, Nationalist China and Italy also told the Council that they would vote against the Soviet resolution.

The second day session of the Security Council was marked by a very impressive speech made by Mr. Michalowski of Poland upholding the Soviet charges. The New York Times described the speech as "effective", and almost all the United Nations diplomats I talked to agreed that his was the most convincing speech so far. Even the Associated Press correspondent covering the Council session confided to me that Mr. Michalowski's performance was "superb". In the course of his speech the Polish delegate pointed out that the Chicago convention on international civil aviation of 1944, which was signed by the United States, recognised "complete and exclusive sovereignty of states over their air space".

On Wednesday, 25 May, three uncommitted nations presented their viewpoints. While the general tenor of debate on the second day has been sympathetic to the United States, there was an undertone of dissatisfaction on the third day when the small nations spoke. Mr. Mongi Slim of Tunisia said that his country "could only regret sincerely" the U-2 flights, whatever the reasons for them. Dr. Jose Correa of Ecuador said, "We understand the annoyance felt by the Soviet Union with regard to flights of foreign planes over Soviet territory. The same annoyance would be felt by any state if such flights occurred". He then went on to object to Moscow's dramatization of the affair. Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon was even more outspoken. "It was bad in itself", he said, "to be detected in the act of violating the territorial integrity of another state, but it was made worse by the unhappy blunder of seeking not only to justify such violation but also to indicate that such violations would continue". He added that he "strongly deprecated and unequivocally disapproved" of the U-2 flights, though he objected to calling them aggression.

On that night (25 May) President Eisenhower addressed the nation by radio and television, and in the course of the address, said that in spite of the collapse of the Summit Conference "we must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders". The President also renewed his five-year old offer of an "open-skies" agreement with the Soviet Union and offered to donate United States reconnaissance aircraft for any such plan set up by the United Nations.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in the course of his speech in the Security Council on 26 May, said that President Eisenhower's address to the nation was "a demonstrative announcement" that the policy of military espionage and sabotage against the Soviet Union would continue. He asserted that the United States' policy of "dangerous provocations would place mankind on the brink of war".

When the Soviet resolution was put to the vote, only two Communist members of the Council (Soviet Union and Poland) voted in favour. Ceylon and Tunisia abstained. Members voting against the Soviet resolution were: Argentina, Britain, Ecuador, France, Italy, Nationalist China and the United States.

Many delegates privately expressed surprise that Mr. Gromyko had insisted upon a vote. It had become clear during the debate that the measure would be defeated. His persistence, therefore, was interpreted as a reflection of rigidity in his instructions from Moscow. Earlier in the debate Ceylon and Ecuador made pleas to the Soviet Union not to press for a vote on its resolution. After the vote had been taken, Mr. Gromyko told newsmen that the Soviet Union would submit its complaint to the General Assembly. He declined to say whether he would request a special session or would wait until the regular session begins. Mr. Cabot Lodge also told newsmen after the Council meeting that the United States' "open-skies" proposal would be submitted to the General Assembly in September.


When the Four-Power resolution came up for discussion on the last day of the Security Council session (27 May), the Soviet delegation insisted on the insertion of an amendment which would declare that "incursion of foreign military aircraft inside the borders of other states is incompatible with the principles and aims of the United Nations and constitutes a threat to peace and international Security". Copy of the amendment is submitted herewith (S/4326)

The proposed amendment was voted down, 6 to 2 (Soviet Union and Poland), with three absentions (Ceylon, Ecuador and Tunisia). The United States, Britain, France, Nationalist China, Italy and Argentina voted against the amendment on the ground that it represented an indirect move to condemn the United States for the U-2 incident.

Before the Four-Power resolution was put to the vote, the sponsors made a last-minute concession to the Soviet Union by announcing a revision of their resolution. Copy of the revised draft is submitted herewith. (S/4323/Rev.2). The new version inserted a phrase calling on member governments "to refrain from the use or threats of force in their international relations; to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence". It also picked up a passage of the proposed Soviet amendments calling on member governments to continue working for "general and complete disarmament under effective international control - and discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests under an appropriate international control system as well as negotiations on measures to prevent surprise attack".

But this did not go far enough to meet the demands of Mr. Gromyko who held out for specific condemnation.

The result of the voting on the Four-Power revised draft resolution was nine in favour, none against, with two absentions (Soviet Union and Poland).



(U Thant)

Permanent Representative of Burma
to the United Nations.

31st May, 1960

The Permanent Secretary
Foreign Office
Rangoon

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON UNITED STATES' "SPY PLANE" OVER
RUSSIA. (PART 2)

As anticipated in my first report submitted on the 16th May, the issue of the United States' "spy-plane" over Russia has come to the United Nations. The Big Four Summit Conference which was scheduled to meet in Paris on the 16th May broke up on the first day. On the second day Prime Minister MacMillan of Britain was reported to have made frantic efforts to save the situation but without success. On the next day (May 18) the Soviet Union requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to "examine the question of aggressive acts of the Air Force of the United States of America, creating a threat to universal peace."

The summit conference suffered a mortal blow at its opening session when Premier Krushchev demanded fulfillment of three conditions by President Eisenhower if there were to be summit talks: the Government of the United States to apologize to the Soviet Union for having sent planes over Soviet Territory, to promise never to do it again and to punish the persons responsible. President Eisenhower met one demand. He announced that the flights had been suspended after the recent incident "and are not to be resumed." Premier Krushchev's performance on the first and last day of the Summit Conference, by making impossible demands, was considered here even by representatives of uncommitted countries as a masterpiece of bad judgment, bad manners and bad diplomacy. His demand, for instance, to punish those responsible, appeared to be, in effect, a request that President Eisenhower punish himself.

On the morning of Tuesday, May 17, when the news of the summit collapse was reported in the press, there was more or less general agreement here that it was possible for the Soviet Union to equal what were widely condemned as the blunders of the United States in the last two weeks. It was also felt that the Soviet leader did not come to Paris to negotiate but to attack, not to remove difficulties with the United States but to exploit them.

As reported earlier, most diplomats in the United Nations privately condemned Washington for the clumsiness of the whole U-2 incident, but on Tuesday the mood changed. Premier Krushchev's savage attack was responsible for this transformation. Many felt that the Soviet leader had overplayed his hand, and had thrown away whatever propaganda advantage he had gained through the U-2 incident. The ultimatum he handed to President Eisenhower was widely dismissed as one that it would be impossible for the United States to accept. The President was praised for calling off reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union, but there was criticism because he had not announced this earlier.

The crisis at the summit coincided with the United States' global military commands conducting a pre-dawn combat readiness test on May 16. Orders for the test were reported to have been sent from Paris by Defence Secretary Thomas Gates. It was explained that Mr. Gates wanted to test high-speed military communications from overseas as well as "the alert status" of the military forces. However, questions were raised privately in some quarters about the timing of the exercise, coming as it did in the wake of the U-2 incident and in the midst of a tense international situation.

One aspect of Premier Krushchev's speech on May 16 which is likely to have serious repercussions in the United States is his belief that there is no point in negotiating with a lame-duck Administration in Washington. The key to his position was his statement that "if not this government of the United States then another, if not, another. The next one would understand that there

is no other way out but peaceful coexistence of the two systems, capitalist and socialist." He then added, "Therefore we would think that there is no better way out than to postpone the conference of the heads of government for approximately six to eight months." This would take it past the U.S. Presidential election.

At the time of writing this report, signs are already in evidence that foreign policy will be an issue in the forthcoming Presidential elections. Mr. Adlai Stevenson, whom many consider as the likely Democratic Presidential candidate, came out with a statement on May 19 that Premier Khrushchev had wrecked the summit conference but that the United States had handed him "the crowbar and sledgehammer" to do it. As the nation's responsible opposition, he said, the Democratic Party has an obligation to the country and to its allies to expose and criticize the Administration's "carelessness and mistakes." On May 20 several Democrats in the House of Representatives (including Mr. Chester Bowles) broke the week-old moratorium on criticism of the Administration's pre-summit conduct by publishing a list of eight questions that they want the President to answer for the country. The questions dealt with what these Democrats called the "series of tragic blunders" committed by the Administration. Republican sources are now predicting that there is going to be a big split in the Democratic Party's attitude towards backing President Eisenhower's international position. It may be mentioned that Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas and many other Democratic leaders are at great pains in emphasizing national unity "behind the President."

Against this background the Security Council will meet today (May 23) to debate the Soviet demand that it "take the necessary measures" to stop flights of United States aircraft over Soviet territory. The United States would have preferred to postpone the start of the debate until tomorrow (May 24) to provide more time for a discussion of its proposal for a United Nations aerial reconnaissance force. However, the Soviet Union wanted a meeting on Saturday (May 21). Monday was suggested as a compromise by Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon, President of the Security Council for May. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, United States representative told the press on May 20 that the United States would demonstrate to the Security Council "the complete falseness of the Soviet charge and do so in a way that will convince any impartial person."

It is difficult to predict the outcome of the Security Council session, but the general opinion here forecast the refusal by the Council to condemn or even to deplore the United States reconnaissance over the Soviet Union as "aggressive" acts that might lead to war. Since the adoption of a resolution would require seven votes including the Five Permanent members, there is practically no chance of a condemnatory resolution being passed. Even so, the West may not have a smooth sailing. Not only will a number of unpleasant facts be rehearsed, but support from some quarters may prove cautious and qualified. The Tunisians, for example, could be influenced in their attitude by the fact that they have recently brought to the attention of the Security Council the question of French violations of their air space. But, my own assessment is that in this particular case Tunisia will go along with the United States.

Argentina and Ecuador, two Latin American members of the Security Council, may bring to the issue Latin America's sensitivity to all problems having to do with national sovereignty, especially when they affect violations of national borders. However, it is a good bet that they will vote against any

resolution which seeks to condemn the United States. Ceylon is likely to abstain in such a resolution although of course no one at present has any idea of the nature of the resolution likely to come up.

Sir Claude Gerea of Ceylon (President of the Security Council for May) invited me, Ambassador Jha of India and Ambassador Omar Loutfi of the United Arab Republic on Saturday (May 21) to exchange views. Nothing substantial came out of the discussions since we were in the dark regarding the type of resolution Soviet Union has in mind. But there was a consensus of opinion that, as President of the Security Council, Sir Claude should express the opinion that it is vitally important that the deteriorating situation resulting from the summit collapse does not lead to a further worsening of the international situation. Opinion was also expressed that Sir Claude should indicate his deep concern over the failure of the summit conference which would lead to an intensification of the cold war and the armaments race. Sir Claude confided to me last night that he had had consultations with non-permanent members of the Security Council, and that they were working on a conciliatory resolution against future flights by planes for intelligence purposes over the territory of another country.

The tendency of the small nations in the United Nations is to blame both the United States and the Soviet Union for the worsening of the situation. At this moment it is not known whether the United States will submit a counter proposal in the Security Council. Shortly after the Soviet request for the convening of the Security Council was made known, Ambassador Cabot Lodge of the United States issued a statement urging that "instead of making such charges, we should all look for the cause of the trouble - which is the danger of sudden death due to surprise attack by nuclear weapons." He announced that "the United States will at the proper time make proposals to protect humanity against this danger." The United States representative was referring to a plan which renews President Eisenhower's offer to open the skies to aerial inspection.

Should the Soviet delegation decide to ask the Security Council only for a general recommendation against violations of airspace without a specific condemnation of the United States, it might get it. Should condemnation of the United States fail to pass the Council, the Soviet Union still would have open a call for the Special Session of the General Assembly. However, no one here believes that Premier Khrushchev will adopt that course. Even if the Special Session is not requested, I consider it a possibility that in one form or another both the Soviet complaint and the United States plan will be brought before the 15th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Jha

(U Thant)

Permanent Representative of Burma
to the United Nations.

23rd May, 1960.

The Permanent Secretary,
Foreign Office,
Rangoon.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON UNITED STATES "SPY PLANE"
OVER RUSSIA.

Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations, asked me on May 10, 1960, if I thought that the United States' "spy-plane" issue warrants a United Nations' action. Similar questions, put of course in a casual manner by the Eastern European delegates to several Asian-African and Latin American diplomats in the United Nations lobbies, have been widely interpreted here as unofficial soundings for a possible Soviet complaint to the Security Council. All the replies to such questions are of course non-committal.

This interpretation was reinforced on May 11 when Premier Krushchev was reported to have said at an impromptu press conference in Moscow Gorki Park that the Soviet Government intended to take to the Security Council the question of "the aggressive intrusion of an American plane within the confines of our country". He also made it clear that if the Security Council does not take the right decision his Government would raise the matter in the United Nations General Assembly.

In the light of these statements, it may be assumed that the matter will come up for discussion at the United Nations sooner or later. With this in mind I think it appropriate to submit this report.

I have no doubt that the facts of the incident have been fully reported in despatches by various news agencies and I feel that the marshalling of these facts in this Report is hardly called for. However, for the sake of providing a fair background to momentous developments, I shall venture on a brief resume of the relevant incidents.

On Wednesday, May 4, 1960, Premier Krushchev disclosed that the Russians had shot down a United States' plane and that the pilot, one Mr. Powers, had admitted that he was on an espionage mission deep inside Soviet territory. The Soviet leader warned against possible rocket retaliation if the United States persisted in its "aggressive" acts.

On Thursday, May 5, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in Washington issued a statement to the effect that a single-seater jet U-2 had been missing since May 1, that it was a high-altitude weather research plane and that it was unarmed. The statement further said that the pilot had difficulty with his oxygen equipment about one hour after take-off. It implied that he may have lost consciousness from lack of oxygen and that the plane may have strayed, pilotless, towards the Russian-Turkish border.

On Friday, May 6, Marshal Grechko told the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that the plane had been shot down by a "remarkable rocket" on a personal order of Premier Krushchev.

On Saturday, May 7, in a second speech to the Supreme Soviet, Premier Krushchev made the amazing revelation that Mr. Powers was "alive and kicking" in Moscow and had confessed he was on a espionage flight across the heart of Russia. He further revealed that the plane took off from Incirlik in Turkey, flew to Peshwar in Pakistan and then across Afghanistan and Central Russia bound for Norway. Its mission was reported to be to get information on Soviet guided missiles and radar

defences and to photograph military installations at Murmansk, Archangel and other places. The plane was shot down from an altitude of approximately twelve miles over Sverdlovsk in the Urals, some 1,300 miles inside Russia. Mr. Powers parachuted to safety. Photographic equipment with exposed shots of Soviet military installations were found aboard the plane. Mr. Powers was also reported to have in his possession a supply of Soviet rubles, French gold francs, West German marks and Italian lira as well as two gold watches besides his own, and several gold bracelets and rings.

M Mr. Krushchev called the American version of the flight a complete lie and said he had withheld details in his original announcement in order to see what kind of "fabrication" the State Department would issue. He again warned that "Turkey, Pakistan and Norway should become aware that they are participants in this hostile act."

On the same night (Saturday, May 7) the State Department admitted the essentials of the Soviet charge, but it reasoned that one of the things creating tension in the world today is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. The statement went on, "It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of the unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years."

At once charges of clumsy administration, bad judgment and bad faith were hurled at the United States Government. It is the charge of lying, rather than the charge of spying, that troubled most Americans. Another part of the Washington statement that came in for severe criticism by the American press is the following :-

"As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been established that in so far as the Authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights as described by Mr. Krushchev."

This was criticized on two grounds. First, it gave an impression that high officials in Washington knew nothing about any such flights. The second point of criticism was that the statement confirmed one of the main points of Communist propaganda - that some officials have the power to act independent of civilian control and even in opposition to the President's policy.

On Monday, May 9, although the United States and Western diplomats kept an uneasy silence in the United Nations lobbies, most delegates from uncommitted countries felt that the United States had blundered in dispatching a plane over Russia on the eve of the Paris summit talks and that the incident had strengthened the hand of Premier Krushchev for the Big Four meeting on May 16. From the newspaper reports I gather that the Congressional response to the United States Government statement was marked by anger and dismay, tempered, however, by some cautious expressions of opinion that operations of this sort were necessary to counter Soviet espionage and the danger of surprise attack. In any case, there was a consensus of opinion that the United States had suffered a massive setback in the international political war.

On the same day new developments took place. Secretary of State Herter indicated that the United States would continue intelligence-gathering flights unless there was a marked change in Moscow's attitude towards measures guaranteeing the world against Communist aggression. Almost simultaneously Premier Krushchev in Moscow warned that Soviet rockets would be used to retaliate against bases in countries that permitted United States planes to take off on intelligence missions over the Soviet Union. According to the New York Times reporter, Premier Krushchev's warning was delivered in measured words.

It was after Premier Krushchev's threat of rocket attack and Secretary Herter's firm stand on continuance of flights over Russia that Eastern European diplomats unofficially sounded out the views of certain delegates at the United Nations regarding the propriety of referring the matter to the world organization. What they had in mind was the application of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and the infringement of International Law.

On Wednesday, May 11, President Eisenhower, in the course of his press conference, defended the use of unarmed planes in espionage missions over Russia. On the same day Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told foreign correspondents in Moscow that the very idea of Russian planes having flown on spy missions over American or NATO territory, as charged by the United States, is alien to Soviet policy. Reporters referred to Secretary of State Herter's statement that espionage flights were necessary as long as there was no East-West agreement to prevent surprise attack. They asked if Russia considered such espionage work as normal practice. Gromyko replied, "Herter is using a Washington measure to gauge other countries. Now certainly that is a very crude mistake."

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On the same day (May 11) Premier Krushchev expressed doubt whether President Eisenhower could be welcomed to the Soviet Union next month. He said, "The Russian people would say I was mad to welcome a man who sends spy planes over here like that." Washington immediately made it known that President Eisenhower would not go to Moscow if it was clear that he would not be welcome. However, the general belief was that the President would make no final decision until he had talked with Mr. Krushchev in Paris at the Summit Conference.

On the next day, May 12, the United States Government sent a note to Moscow explaining that it had sent aerial survey flights over Soviet Territory for "purely defensive purposes." The note denied there had been any "aggressive intent" behind the flights. The note also denied that the flight of the ill-fated U-2 jet downed on the Soviet territory had been undertaken to worsen United States-Soviet relations. The United States said that Moscow's handling of the incident raised questions about its intentions with regard to the summit meeting and the propaganda war.

On the same day, Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson assailed the United States reconnaissance flight over the Soviet Union as a blunder in timing. He added, however, "No one questions the necessity of gathering intelligence for our security. This is no time for partisan criticism." On May 13, Mr. Stevenson in Chicago urged the nation to give President Eisenhower its whole-hearted support for his summit task in Paris. He said the President should go to Paris undeterred by any threat of party division.

Meanwhile Norway protested to the United States against the reported plan to use one of her airfields as the terminus of the flight of the U-2 observation plane shot down over Russia. The protest was made on May 13 a few hours before the Soviet Union sent a note to Norway, Pakistan and Turkey of involvement in "aggression" against the Soviet Union by the U-2 jet.

In London, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, who was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, said on May 13 that Pakistan would protest to the United States if she found that the U-2 plane shot down had used a Pakistani airfield as a base for spying. General Ayub said the protest would say that it should not have been done and should not be done in future.

So far Turkish authorities have been keeping silent over the whole incident. However, Afghanistan is reported to have protested to the United States against the alleged flight of the U-2 plane over her territory.

Up to the day of writing this Report (Monday, May 16) there are no definite indications that the Soviet Union will bring up the matter at the United Nations. Newspaper reports, however, indicate that Moscow appears convinced that for the first time on a major issue, it will be able to marshal a large majority of United Nations members to condemn the United States or at least to deplore its action and clumsy statements. After the summit conference, it is likely that the Soviet Union will request the Security Council to denounce the United States policy as a "threat to international peace."

At this stage it is difficult for me to make specific recommendations on the nature of our stand if the matter comes up at the General Assembly. An objective analysis of the whole episode may perhaps be useful as a basis for consideration.

Supporters of the United States' stand argue on such lines as these. Every nation in the world attempts, in peace as well as in war, to learn what it can about its potential enemies. It is not a question of morals, it is a matter of necessity. Facts must be looked in the face. Although the whole incident is distasteful and dangerous, it is necessary and inevitable. Any action carried out in response to Presidential directives "to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack" is justified. There is no doubt that the Americans have a "Pearl Harbour complex", but it is comparable to the security complex of the Russians. Both complexes are going to disturb peace from time to time until the East and West agree to a disarmament and inspection system. It was inexcusable for the American Government to have made the stupid and false statements that were made in the first days of this incident, but it would be equally stupid and false for the American Government at this stage to try to pretend that intelligence operations do not exist and will not continue to exist. The gathering of secret intelligence involves all sorts of violations of domestic and international law, as well as most moral codes. But since it is essential in a highly competitive world, governments tacitly agree to maintain a rule of silence on their own activities in this field and more or less accept the same rule when applied to others.

Critics of the United States' stand base their criticism on moral, psychological and juridical grounds. They maintain that there can be no security in a world in which a great nation, dedicated to the highest ideals, thus abandons all moral standards. They point out that Moscow will continue to exploit the incident for its own devious reasons, and already the United States has suffered a humiliating set back in the eyes of the world. It is a defeat both humiliating and unnecessary, and so plainly the result of gross negligence, confusion and inertia in high places. The most ominous element in the story is the indication that leaders of countries may be losing control of events, and that the destiny of the world may be shaped by the caprice of some military brass or some sour fanatic, operating in a world of its own. Besides, the flight was in clear violation of international law and infringement of the United Nations Charter. The sad thing about the whole business is that it comes at a time when President Eisenhower is to meet at the summit where it is essential that his integrity and ability to exercise control over events that might lead to war should be unquestioned. Yet, these critics argued, the President is in the position that he was willing to lie about the spy mission until it became known that the pilot was alive and that the facts could not be concealed. The whole episode also revealed that momentous decisions that may lead to war are being made without the President's knowledge.



(U Thant)

Permanent Representative of Burma

The Permanent Secretary,
Foreign Office,
Rangoon,

May 16, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON
"LARGE-SCALE KILLINGS" IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Since the Security Council is now seized of the item of "large-scale killings in South Africa" as a result of its resolution (S/4299) adopted on Friday, April 1st, 1960, I consider it appropriate to apprise the Foreign Office of the developments that led to the convening of the Council meeting on Wednesday, March 30th, 1960. The indications are that the Security Council will be called upon to meet again before the commencement of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly, and it is probable that this item will feature in the agenda of that session. It is hoped that this report will serve as background material for the formulation of the Government's policy towards this problem if it comes up for discussion in the next session of the General Assembly.

It is perhaps worth recalling that out of the total population of 14,500,000 in the Union of South Africa, the whites number 3,000,000. The Union's whites first settled in South Africa in the 17th century and now regard it as their homeland. To protect their position, they have adopted the most rigid racial policies some of which have already been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly. These policies are reflected in the various apartheid laws which require total separation of the two races: white and black. To the black Africans, one of the most humiliating apartheid laws is that which requires them to carry identification passes so that the whites can keep day-to-day check on them. The pass laws prevent the native Africans from moving freely about their own country; require them to live in specially allocated native areas and subject them to special curfews.

Early in March, 1960, the Pan-African Congress, which is run on similar lines as the Indian National Congress of pre-independent days, called for a massive non-violent protest against the pass-laws. All Africans were asked to leave their passes at home and to go to police stations to submit to arrest for not carrying them. Obviously the objective was to fill the prisons to overflowing and paralyze the economic life of the cities. On Monday, March 21st, 1960, the demonstrations began. At the town of Sharpeville, a small crowd gathered about the police station and was reported to have thrown some stones and was dispersed. Later on in the day, a big crowd, officially estimated at 20,000, began to gather again. News despatches from this area by foreign correspondents did not report violent activity on the part of the demonstrators. All that the reports said was that police opened fire with sub-machine guns. Next day, at Langa, near Cape Town, police again fired on demonstrators. The Union Government said that at both places a total of 72 persons were killed, and 184 wounded. Unofficial estimates put the casualties higher.

These killings, according to newspaper accounts, generated extraordinary tension in the country. The Magistrates' courts were soon filled with whites applying for permits to carry firearms. In all major cities the Government banned meetings of more than twelve persons until the end of June. The African National Congress called on all labour to stay home on Wednesday, March 23rd, to mourn the victims of the shootings. On Friday, March 25th, the Union Government announced that it would outlaw all African political organizations. However, it made one inevitable concession: henceforth, Africans will not be arrested for "petty offences" such as pass violations.

At first, Prime Minister Verwoerd attempted to shrug the incident off by saying that the riots and killings were a "periodic phenomenon" and had nothing to do with apartheid and pass laws. He also thanked the police for their courage, efficiency and exemplary control of themselves. Later, however, perhaps moved by the world-wide wave of condemnation, he announced that the two Supreme Court judges would inquire into the immediate circumstances of the riots.

At the United Nations, nine African delegations met on Wednesday, March 23rd, and called the action of the South African police "an inhuman massacre, a barbaric act and uncivilized conduct" which threatened the peace and security of Africa and the international community. This meeting was reported to the Foreign Office, vide our telegram No. UNB.199, dated the 23rd March, 1960.

At the request of the African delegations, the Asian-African Group met at the United Nations on Thursday, March 24th, and decided without objection to take up the question of South African violence at the Security Council, already reported to the Foreign Office vide our telegram No. UNB.207 dated the 24th March, 1960. Due to the extreme urgency of the situation, the Permanent Representative of Sudan (Group Chairman for the month) was requested to see the President of the Security Council (Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge of the United States) on the same day, and the group decided to request an urgent meeting of the Council.

On the 25th March, 1960, the group met again and the Chairman reported that the President of the Security Council would summon the Council meeting if requested. Twenty-eight delegations, including Burma, signed the request. Laos, which preferred to await its government's instruction, did not sign, vide our telegram No. UNB.212, dated the 25th March, 1960. Laos, however, joined others on the 26th March, and endorsed the request for the special session of the Security Council. It is the first instance in the history of the Asian-African group that all its members joined in a request for United Nations action on a specific item.

Among the factors responsible for this unanimity was the world-wide execration of the police brutalities. Even usually hesitant countries like Turkey and Thailand did not hesitate to append their signatures to the request for Security Council meeting. This attitude, I believe, was motivated by an unexpectedly outspoken reaction from Washington where the State Department sharply departed from custom by issuing a statement that while the Government did not normally comment on a friendly nation's internal affairs, "it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators," and hoped "that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain re-dress of their legitimate grievances by peaceful means." Ambassador Lodge confided to me on March 25th that he was responsible for advising the State Department to make such a declaration. He also hinted to me that the United States delegation would go along with any proposal which is "designed to restore peace and justice in South Africa."

Verbatim records of the Security Council meetings have already been pouched to the Foreign Office, and I believe I need not analyse them. However, I feel that certain highlights ought to be brought out to give perspective to the proceedings.


The resolution tabled by Ecuador on 31st March and adopted by the Security Council on the 1st April, was originally drafted by the delegation of India which continued to take a very keen interest in all South African affairs in the United Nations. Ambassador Jha of India discussed with me his first draft on 30th March and on that night Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon and Ambassador Mongi Slim of Tunisia (both members of the Security Council) joined in the discussions. We then decided to exchange views with the representatives of Ecuador and Argentina (two Latin-American members of the Security Council). According to the original draft, the Security Council would "Condemn" the policies and actions of the Government of the Union of South Africa, in operative paragraph three. This strong language was not acceptable to Ecuador and Argentina, and instead they suggested "Deplore." These two delegations also informed us that the United States would abstain on any resolution which seeks to condemn the South African government. Although at first the Tunisian delegate refused to accede to the Latin modification, he at last yielded. However, he made it clear that his delegation would not sponsor such a "mild" resolution, and he suggested that Ecuador should do so. Hence, the draft resolution was tabled in the name of Ecuador.

This arrangement was approved by the Asian-African group at its meeting on March 31st, and Sir Claude Corea was entrusted with the task of canvassing the Security Council members.

After six sessions, the Council adopted the resolution. The vote was 9 to 0 with two abstentions - Britain and France. The French representative, Ambassador Berard, told the Council that although France disapproved of racial segregation under South Africa's apartheid policy, he had "serious misgivings" that the Council had gone beyond the functions assigned it by the Charter. Sir Pierson Dixon of Britain raised the same objection. Ambassador Sobolev of the Soviet Union, in the course of his statement before voting took place, said that he found "one vulnerable point" in the resolution. He observed that the resolution tended to transfer the responsibility from the Security Council to the Secretary-General (Operative Paragraph 5). He would prefer to ask the Secretary-General to observe and report, rather than to consult with the South African Government. Ambassador Correa (Ecuador) replied that the particular operative paragraph in question closely paralleled that of a General Assembly resolution of August, 1958, requesting the Secretary-General to deal with the member governments in the Lebanese crisis. It will be recalled that the Soviet Union voted against that resolution.

The United Nations' attention is now focussed on the Secretary-General's move. South Africa has in the past ignored numerous U.N. appeals against her racial policies. In view of her objections to Security Council consideration of the current crisis, the prospects of a favourable South African response to the Security Council resolution are poor. However, I presume that something is likely to come out of the projected Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London on May 3rd. Except Britain and Australia, all Commonwealth governments have come out with criticism of South African violence. It will be noticed that India, Pakistan, Malaya, Ghana, New Zealand and Ceylon have reacted very strongly to events in South Africa. Even the

Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. John Diefenbaker declared in the Canadian House of Commons on March 23rd that his Government deploras the violence and loss of life in South Africa.


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(U Thant)
Permanent Representative
of Burma
to the United Nations

The Permanent Secretary,
Foreign Office,
Burma.

4th April, 1960

REPORT ON YUGOSLAVIA'S PROPOSAL REGARDING
ECONOMIC AID TO UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Ambassador Dobrivoje Vidic, Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, saw me on Wednesday, 23rd March, 1960, and verbally communicated to me certain views of his Government on Economic aid to under-developed countries. Ambassador Vidic also informed me that his Government had already instructed its Ambassador in Rangoon to transmit these views to the Government of the Union of Burma for favour of consideration and any action it deems fit to take.

The views of the Yugoslav Government, as conveyed to me verbally by Ambassador Vidic, are set out below:

Among the items to be discussed at the Big Four Summit Conference in Geneva in May, 1960, will be one of economic aid to under-developed countries, resulting from the possible reduction in the cost of armaments. In the view of the Yugoslav Government, the question of economic aid to under-developed countries is the most pressing problem after the question of disarmament, and the countries most directly involved should take the initiative in voicing their attitudes towards this problem. Such an initiative on the part of the under-developed countries will, in the opinion of the Yugoslav Government, go a long way in influencing the Big Four in formulating a concerted policy.

Ambassador Vidic pointed out the fact that Soviet Premier Khrushchev would clearly like to reduce the cost of Soviet armaments, and on New Year's eve he indicated that the Soviet Union would cut down its conventional armed forces unilaterally if the West did not agree to general disarmament. Ambassador Vidic also believed that President Eisenhower also could not permit an increase in the Defence Department appropriations, and might insist upon a reduction. Obviously, therefore, the President would welcome an agreement permitting a reduction in United States conventional forces. Besides, both the Soviet Union and the United States have made it abundantly clear that part of the savings resulting from reductions in armaments expenditure should go towards increased economic and technical aid to under-developed countries. The Yugoslav Government, therefore, considers that on the eve of the Big Four Summit Conference in Geneva, under-developed countries, should, through some appropriate means, voice their attitude towards this question, to help in contributing to the formulation of a concerted economic aid policy by the Big Powers.

The Yugoslav Government, Ambassador Vidic said, also believes that the Big Powers are now being converted to the doctrine that it would be better to channel all economic assistance, or at least a substantial portion of such assistance, to under-developed countries through an international organization like the United Nations than by entirely bilateral arrangements between the donor and the recipient. This new attitude, in the view of the Yugoslav Government, is in the right direction, and should be endorsed by all under-developed countries. The conversion of bilateral aid to one of channelling through the United Nations would be not only more economical, but would also be prima facie evidence that no political conditions are attached. Besides, such a procedure will certainly strengthen the influence and effectiveness of the United Nations which we all desire.

Bilateral assistance often arouses ill-will and suspicion rather than gratitude, and therefore, the recipient countries should clearly come out with their preference for economic aid being channelled through an international organisation like the United Nations. Such measures will expand the activities of various U.N. organs like Technical Assistance Board, WHO, ESCAPE, UNICEF and the like, and even contribute towards the establishment of a properly constituted SUNFED.

This, in brief, is the burden of Ambassador Vidic's message.

He reiterated the fact that the Yugoslav Ambassador in Burma had also been instructed to present these views to the Government of the Union of Burma, and he requested me to convey them to the Foreign Office to supplement or reinforce whatever the Yugoslav Ambassador might have communicated.

Regarding the means of projecting these viewpoints by the under-developed countries before the Big Four Summit Conference in Geneva, Ambassador Vidic suggested one or more of the following measures.

1. By making unilateral statements or issuing communiques.
2. By issuing joint statements with like-minded countries.
3. By incorporating these points in any public utterance by the Hon'ble Prime Minister or any other spokesman of the Government.
4. By communicating these views to the accredited representatives of the Big Four nations, who, in turn, will transmit them to their respective governments.

Ambassador Vidic was at great pains to bring home the fact that it was far from the intention of his Government to impose these views on any other Government, but that he was just offering them for the consideration of friendly countries like Burma. He also informed me that he had spoken to the Representatives of India, Indonesia, Ghana, United Arab Republic and Guinea whose reaction, he said, was sympathetic.



(U Thant)
Permanent Representative
of Burma
to the United Nations

The Permanent Secretary,
Foreign Office,
Rangoon.

4th April, 1960

FIFTH AND SIXTH FORTNIGHTLY REPORTS OF
HIS EXCELLENCY U THANT - FOR THE PERIOD
NOVEMBER 16 to DECEMBER 15, 1959.

Security Council Election:

On November 17 when balloting was resumed, Poland regained the lead over Turkey. After taking six more ballots, bringing the total to forty three, the voting was suspended until December 1. On the forty third ballot Poland received 42 votes to Turkey's 39. This voting therefore confirmed the belief of many delegations that a compromise would have to be found to break the deadlock.

On the day previous to the balloting, Turkey sent a message to all delegations declaring that Poland had rejected a compromise proposal to split the two year term between the two contestants. Under the compromise, which was suggested by Canada and other non-communist delegations that have voted either for Turkey or for Poland on thirty seven ballots, Poland was to serve on the Security Council for one year and Turkey for another. It was assumed that they would have to draw lots to determine which would have held the seat for the first year.

When voting was again resumed on December 1, Turkey regained the lead over Poland. On the last ballot of the day, forty-ninth in the series, Turkey got 42 and Poland 39. It was the reverse of the final one taken on November 17 when the Assembly decided to postpone the issue for two weeks. Although the vote was secret it appeared that there had been no change in the basic line-up. Since the prestige of the United States and the Soviet Union were committed to their respective candidates, neither was willing to discuss a compromise. When the President of the General Assembly suspended the voting, he did not fix a date for the next vote.

On December 11, just one day before the close of the General Assembly session, tense negotiations were held behind the scenes almost around the clock, aimed at a deal whereby the two-year term would be split between the two. Earlier on that day two secret ballots took place, the fiftieth and fifty-first since voting started. Poland led Turkey by 41 votes to 37 on both ballots. The meeting was adjourned at the suggestion of Mr. Wallace B. Nesbitt of Canada who said there was "reason to believe" some advantage could be gained by "exploring the possibilities of direct discussions between the parties concerned."

On the night of December 12, the last day of the General Assembly, a compromise agreement was reached. It was agreed that Poland and Turkey would split a two-year term. Poland will serve the first year. However, the effect of this compromise on the future composition of the Security Council was interpreted differently by the two sides. The delegates of the Soviet bloc conveyed the impression that as a result of the accord they counted on obtaining renewed representation among the non-permanent members of the Security Council after 1961. This expectation was voiced by Mr. Jerzy Michalowski of Poland who told the Assembly that "there is an agreement that discrimination against Eastern European countries will never again occur in the United Nations." Mr. Seyfullah Esin of Turkey immediately declared that his side was aware of Poland's extensive interpretation of the understanding, but did not share it. However, suggestions persisted that the United States had at least promised not to show "hostility" towards another candidate from the Soviet bloc for a non-permanent seat for

1962-63. This theory was countered with the statement that the present United States Administration was "simply not in a position to assume any such long-range foreign policy commitment." Mr. Cabot Lodge said that in future elections to the Security Council "we will examine each candidacy in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time." I personally feel that this sounded like a hint that the United States might consider the possibility of electing another Soviet-bloc non-permanent member for 1962-63.

French Nuclear Tests in the Sahara:

In my previous report on this subject, I have expressed my doubts about the adoption of the same resolution in the General Assembly, although it was passed by the Political Committee by 46 votes against 26. When the Assembly met on November 20, the resolution, however, was passed by 51 votes to 16, with 15 abstentions, after two paragraphs of the preamble were rejected. One would have had the Assembly declare that France "in creating conditions of danger in Africa" could not assume her claimed responsibility for the protection of the African states. The other would have declared a "special responsibility for the health, safety and well-being of the dependent peoples of Africa "allegedly threatened by the test.

The Assembly vote represented a considerable shift from that registered in the Political Committee. Some delegations apparently had resented M. Moch's remark that the Assembly vote would show "who are the friends of France." That statement was picked up by Mr. C.S. Jha of India and Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana. Mr. Jha said his nation would continue to oppose nuclear tests "by the Soviet Union, the United States or any other nation." The representative of Ghana, reversing M. Moch's phrase, challenged the Assembly members to show by their votes whether they were friends of a newly emerging Africa.

The adoption of this resolution on the proposed Sahara test came as a sharp defeat for France. Mr. Jules Moch, the French delegation's expert in matters of disarmament, had warned the Assembly that endorsement of the request would "give rise in France to a profound feeling of disaffection towards this organization." He intimated that nothing the Assembly might do would restrain France from her atomic programme. He called the resolution "totally unacceptable to France," "scientifically incorrect," "politically odious" and "deliberately offensive."

The vote on the Sahara resolution cut sharply across the lines of blocs and alliances. The United States and Britain voted consistently with France as ballots were taken paragraph after paragraph of the resolution.

General and Complete Disarmament:

On the same day, November 20, the Assembly took up the question of General and Complete Disarmament, and the resolution presented by the Political Committee was unanimously adopted. Just before the vote was taken, Mr. Cabot Lodge of the United States said that his country is "ready and eager" to join in an disarmament agreement. But, he insisted, assurances must be included that "as we lay down our weapons other nations will do the same." Without such assurances, he declared, disarmament declarations would be "only a mockery."

Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons:

As anticipated in my previous report, voting on draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2) took place in the Political Committee on November 16. It was adopted by 66 votes to none with 13 abstentions. Those abstained were the nine members of the Soviet bloc, France, China, Spain and Peru. The moderately worded resolution would have the ten-nation Disarmament Committee, which is to meet early next year in Geneva, consider ways of preventing an increasing number of States from acquiring nuclear weapons. It also asks for consideration of an international agreement whereby the nuclear powers would not hand over control of the weapons to others. The Irish resolution also would have countries not possessing nuclear weapons agree not to begin their manufacture.

Soviet opposition to the resolution was expressed by Mr. Vasily V. Kuznetsov who criticized the measure as "inadequate and likely to breed illusions dangerous for the ~~course~~ of peace." He also charged that the text tacitly approved the Western Powers' plans to supply nuclear weapons to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Before the vote, Mr. Frank Aiken, Ireland's Foreign Minister, told the Committee that the resolution had not been offered as a "cure-all for all the difficulties confronting humanity." He said its aim was to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons to small states and even to revolutionary forces. In introducing the resolution, Mr. Aiken said he had in mind "all the powers producing weapons at the time when the suggested agreements are ready for signature." It is known that France was assured by Mr. Aiken that she was included as a member of the nuclear club, although she had not tested atomic weapons.

When the resolution was taken up by the General Assembly on November 20, it was adopted by 70 votes to none with 12 abstentions. Spain, which abstained on it in the Committee, voted for it in the Assembly.

The Situation in Laos:

As reported previously, Mr. Sakari S. Tuomioja, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, joined the Secretary-General in Laos "to review the economic situation." He stayed behind when the Secretary-General left Laos. On November 16, a day after Mr. Hammarskjold's appointment of this special representative, the Soviet delegation issued a statement accusing the Secretary-General of using his office to advance Western designs in Laos.

Referring to Mr. Hammarskjold's visit to Laos and his decision to leave an aide in that country for a month, the Soviet declaration said, "whatever may be the pretext for them, these actions are designed to cover by the name of the United Nations further interference of the Western powers in Laos and can only make the existing situation still more complicated."

Mr. Tuomioja, who by the way is a former Premier and Finance Minister of Finland, arrived at Vientiane on November 17. Mr. Hammarskjold arrived back in New York on November 21. On November 23 he gave separate reports on his trip to Laotian and Soviet delegations, and on November 24 he saw the representatives of the United States, Britain, France and Canada jointly. It was reported that he was trying to work out a general plan for Laos that would be agreeable to Laos, the Soviet Union and the West and that would avoid the necessity for further formal action at the United Nations.

I saw the Secretary-General on November 25 and he confided to me that his visit to Laos was likely to achieve the desired results. For instance, the Laotian government had agreed to hold general parliamentary elections and that the announcement to that effect would be made in a few weeks. He also told me that Prime Minister Phoui had declared that Laos would remain neutral and not become a base for any foreign power bloc. He also got the assurance from the Laotian Premier that the trial of Prince Souvannavong, who was still under detention, would be indefinitely postponed. He gave me the impression that his visit had arrested undesirable developments in Laos.

On December 17, exactly one month after the arrival of Mr. Tuomioja in Vientiane, the Secretary-General's special representative reported that Laos requires coordinated assistance by the United Nations and its specialized agencies for its economic and social development. He also reported that such foreign aid as Laos has received (mainly from the United States) has not achieved significant results or strengthened the country's productive capacity.

Mr. Hammarskjöld announced on the same day that after a preliminary study of the report he had requested Mr. Roberto M. Heurtematte, Commissioner for Technical Assistance, to go immediately for Vientiane to confer with the authorities on ways of implementing Mr. Tuomioja's proposals. It is understood that Mr. Tuomioja recommended United Nations assistance to Laos in seven fields. These were:-

1. The development of natural resources,
2. Creation of a comprehensive transport and communications system,
3. Improvement of health conditions,
4. Creation of a sound educational system,
5. Development of rural communities,
6. Betterment of public administration, and
7. Expansion of communications with the outside world.

The Korean Question.

The question of unification and rehabilitation of Korea came up for discussion in the Political Committee on November 23. A seven-man delegation from South Korea, led by Foreign Minister Chung W. Cho, was present as the Committee started discussing this question. When the United States introduced a draft resolution inviting the South Korean delegation to sit, without the right to vote, Burma abstained as on previous resolutions on the same subject. However, the resolution was passed by 49 votes to ten with 15 abstentions. A Soviet resolution demanding that a representative of the North Korean regime also be admitted was defeated by 40 votes to 22 with 11 abstentions. Burma, as on previous occasions, voted for the Soviet resolution which was rejected. Copies of my speech in explanation of the vote have been submitted to the Foreign Office.

The debate that opened on that date was based on a report by the seven-nation United Nations Commission for the Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea. It described the prospect as "remote "

of merging the two Koreas into a single, independent and democratic state. The report said South Korea had made a remarkable economic come-back after the ravages of war, but suggested that "unification could immeasurably improve the prospects of economic viability."

Also before the Political Committee was a memorandum from North Korea. The document repeated the Communist version of the Korean War, including the charges that the United Nations forces used "bacteriological and chemical weapons." The message asserted that the United Nations "has from the beginning taken its one-sided position on the Korean question under the pressure of the United States and has become totally impotent and lost its moral authority as far as peaceful settlement of the Korean question is concerned."

Mr. Walter S. Robertson, the United States delegate, who initiated the debate, announced that his delegation would join in sponsoring a resolution restating United Nations principles with regard to Korea. He said that the United Nations' aims were to seek a just settlement in Korea and bring about free elections throughout the peninsula.

On November 24, fourteen nations that fought under the United Nations flag introduced a draft resolution which calls on "the Communist authorities" to accept previously declared United Nations objectives for the reunification of North and South Korea by United Nations action.

Speakers for the Soviet bloc immediately opposed the resolution. The Soviet delegate urged the Political Committee to recommend instead that the Assembly abolish the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. He said that the North Korean Communist regime "cannot agree and will never agree to elections foisted upon it" by the votes of nations that fought against it.

On November 25, Dr. Cho, Foreign Minister of South Korea suggested that the Soviet Union prove its willingness to relax world tensions by agreeing to free elections in North Korea and unification of the long-divided country. The main theme of his speech was South Korea's wish to have United Nations supervised elections held in the North and to have the country unified. Dr. Cho also demanded unconditional withdrawal of the "aggressive invading troops from Communist China." The Soviet bloc view, reiterated by the Byelorussian delegate, objects to the idea of elections held only in the North, and disputes the freedom of the elections already held in the South since "foreign" troops remain in the country.

On the fourth day of the debate, several uncommitted nations told the Political Committee that a settlement in Korea could not be brought about by repeated United Nations resolutions condemning the North Korean regime. The Indian representative (Harishwar Dayal) told the Committee that "no solution is likely to come out of a single reiteration of previous resolutions of the General Assembly." He said "some form of international supervision of elections, for instance, other than that now proposed to us, we think, can be devised." He suggested that the withdrawal of the remaining United Nations Forces from South Korea "might be helpful to progress towards political solutions."

On the next day (November 27) the Committee adopted the Fourteen-power resolution by 49 votes to 9 with 19 abstentions. Burma abstained as on previous occasions, and our delegation did not participate in the debate, as per Foreign Office brief. When the resolution came up at the General Assembly on December 9, it was adopted by 54 votes to 9 with 17 abstentions.

Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests:

This question was taken up by the Political Committee on November 18. Two draft resolutions were tabled, one introduced by India and cosponsored by several Asian-African States including Burma, would call on all countries - those now possessing nuclear arms and any that might later make them - to desist from testing. The second resolution was introduced by Austria, Japan and Sweden.

It would have the General Assembly call on the nuclear powers to "intensify their efforts to reach an agreement at an early date" in the Geneva meeting. It made no mention of other nations that acquire nuclear arms. It is obvious that the Asian-African draft resolution is an attempt to give further emphasis to the sponsors' contention that France should be dissuaded from her planned bomb tests in the Sahara.

Mr. C.S. Jha (India) who introduced the resolution, said that an agreement to stop nuclear testing might constitute "the first breakthrough" in the disarmament deadlock. Mr. V.V. Kusnetsov, the Soviet delegate, told the Committee that his country would not resume testing nuclear weapons as long as the west refrained from testing. He also said that "all the pre-requisites were at hand" for a speedy agreement among the three nuclear powers meeting in Geneva to negotiate a permanent ban on atomic bomb experiments. Mr. Cabot Lodge of the United States said that his country "is anxious to complete agreement regarding the cessation of nuclear weapons tests just as soon as the Soviet Union agrees on an effective international control system."

On November 24, both the draft resolutions were put to the vote. The Asian-African draft resolution was adopted by 60 votes against one with 17 abstentions. France cast the only negative vote. The seventeen abstainers include Britain and the United States. The three-power draft resolution was also adopted by 76 votes with none against and 2 abstentions. France and Afghanistan were the two which abstained. The Afghan delegate explained that since his delegation had cosponsored another resolution on the same item, he had to abstain on the second resolution.

Both resolutions came up at the General Assembly on November 21. The Asian-African draft resolution was adopted by 60 votes against 1 with 17 abstentions, and the three-power draft resolution was adopted by 78 votes against none, with 2 abstentions.

On the same day, the Assembly adopted without dissent and without roll-call the endorsement by the Political Committee of the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The report proposed that the Commission, consisting of all eighty-two United Nations members should continue in existence. It suggested also that all documents and transcripts of debate before the Assembly relating to disarmament be turned over to the Commission. The Commission will furnish records to the ten-power East-West Disarmament Commission scheduled to meet early next June in Geneva.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

Talks on the composition of the permanent United Nations body to regulate the peaceful uses of outer space were resumed between Mr. Kusnetsov of the Soviet Union and Mr. Cabot Lodge of the United States round about November 17. Sources in close touch with these negotiations revealed that the United States delegate, speaking on behalf of the West, suggested a membership of twenty four, with twelve Western Countries, six members of the Soviet bloc and six neutrals. These sources also said that the Soviet delegate counter-suggested a membership of six Western countries, six members of the Soviet bloc and three neutrals, including India and the

United Arab Republic. As an alternative, it was understood, Mr. Kuznetsov suggested a larger body consisting of seven Western countries, seven members of the Soviet bloc and two neutrals.

The Soviet proposals obviously were not acceptable to the West. The reasons given were said to be the following:

First, Western unwillingness to give the Soviet bloc an equal number of seats on the permanent space body. Second, all the formulas suggested by Mr. Kuznetsov would require the elimination from the permanent body of some of the twelve Western countries that are serving on the temporary Committee.

Informal negotiations between the two sides went on for over two weeks, and on December 3 reliable sources said that differences on the composition of the United Nations body governing the peaceful uses of outer space had narrowed. Mr. Kuznetsov, the Soviet negotiator, was reported to have accepted a membership of twenty four, with twelve seats for the Western block, seven for the Soviet bloc and five to be assigned to the neutrals. The Western delegates were reported to be still sticking to their original proposal of twelve: six: six:

After further negotiations, the United States agreed on December 8, that the Soviet bloc should be given seven of the twenty four seats. This accord was made conditional upon agreement on other provisions of a proposed joint Soviet-United States resolution that would be introduced in the General Assembly. The points still to be settled concern which neutrals are to serve on the permanent body and which seven of the Soviet bloc should serve on it. In any case, the decision of the United States to accept the Soviet proposal on composition was criticized by several Western delegates. They held that this would be entirely out of proportion to the numerical strength of the blocs in the United Nations. Apart from this question, Hungary, one of the seven Soviet bloc members, was not acceptable to the West. It was also understood that Britain would not agree to a seat for Albania, which had been found responsible by the International Court of Justice for damage to British warships traversing the Corfu Channel. Mr. Kuznetsov, however, took the position that the nine members of the Soviet bloc should decide which would be given seats on the outer-space body.

After further negotiations, the West accepted the Soviet proposals. On December 11 the United States and the Soviet Union jointly introduced a draft resolution which was cosponsored by ten Western, Soviet bloc and neutral countries. The resolution would instruct the permanent outer space committee to submit recommendations on the role that the United Nations could play in encouraging outer space research and studying legal problems. These provisions are virtually the same as those given the temporary committee which was established last year. The resolution was adopted unanimously on December 12.

The Question of Hungary.

Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, who was appointed by the General Assembly last year as its special representative to try to obtain compliance with previous Assembly resolutions calling on the Soviet Union and the Government of Hungary to hold free elections and respect human rights in Hungary, asked the Assembly on November 17 to put the Hungarian question on its agenda. Although the Western powers decided a week earlier that the question of Hungary must be taken up at this session, no member nation has so moved. The explanation was that any initiative by one of the Western powers would be considered a revival of the cold war and a blow to the improved atmosphere resulting from the talks at Camp David between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. Many Western

delegates believed that there would be less ground for such criticism if Sir Leslie himself requested that the item be placed on the agenda. Although Sir Leslie is no longer a member of the New Zealand delegation, he considers himself a "subsidiary organ" of the Assembly with the right to request consideration of his report.

Sir Leslie's request, even before it was taken up at the Steering Committee, generated arguments pro and con, in the lobbies. Many delegates feel that Sir Leslie is not competent to inscribe the item on the agenda. The rules of procedure limit the right to submit items for the agenda to member nations, "principal organs" of the United Nations and the Secretary-General. Sir Leslie considers himself a "subsidiary organ" of the Assembly, and even if his claim is valid, many delegates feel that a "subsidiary organ" is not a "principal organ."

I raised this point informally to several Western delegates and none of them seemed certain of Sir Leslie's competency to submit items for the agenda. On November 18, however, the United States cleared the air with its own official request for a discussion on Hungary. This put an end to the prospective procedural debate likely to crop up in the Steering Committee. When the Steering Committee met on November 23 I explained the position of my delegation and endorsed the inscription of the item. Copies of my speech have already been submitted to the Foreign Office.

Mr. Cabot Lodge said that the acceptance of the Hungarian question was necessary to permit the Assembly to consider a report by Sir Leslie Munro on present conditions in Hungary. Mr. Kuznetsov of the Soviet Union fought the inscription on the ground that the United Nations had no jurisdiction over what he called the internal affairs of Hungary. Mr. Kuznetsov asserted that the anti-Soviet revolt in Hungary in 1956 was an attempt to re-establish "the Fascist Horthy regime" which held power before World War II. The Hungarian people, he added, had promptly turned out the "monsters" who revolted three years ago.

The request for inscription was accepted with 15 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions. Those voting in favour were Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Britain, Burma, China, France, Guatemala, Liberia, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey and the United States. Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Romania opposed the inscription, while Indonesia and Morocco abstained.

Two days before the meeting of the Steering Committee, the United States drafted a resolution under which the General Assembly would "deplore" the refusal of the Soviet Union and Hungary to comply with previous Assembly resolutions on the Hungarian question. Rumours were also current that the United States asked other Western delegations to join in sponsoring the resolution, but had met a lukewarm response.

When the question of inscription came up at the General Assembly on November 25, it was endorsed by 51 votes to 10 with 15 abstentions. Discussions both in the Steering Committee and in the Plenary meeting led to clashes between the Soviet bloc and Western delegates. Strangely enough, Sir Leslie's report was still not yet made available when the question of inscription was discussed in the Plenary. The report was issued only on November 27, two days after the inscription.

Meanwhile, the United States delegation was busy getting more co-sponsors for its draft resolution. On the night of December 3 I heard from a reliable source that eighteen countries had agreed to join in sponsoring the resolution. Some Western delegates expressed concern over the fact that Spain had been invited to be a co-sponsor. They said that the inclusion of a Government that was condemned by the Assembly in 1946 as a "Franco

Fascist Government" would expose the resolution to added Soviet attack. Many delegations expressed the belief that the Assembly should name a successor to Sir Leslie who stated in his report that he had not been able to induce either the Soviet or the Hungarian Government to discuss the Hungarian situation with him. Other Western delegates (including Greece and New Zealand) had privately suggested that the resolution be amended to limit Sir Leslie's assignment to just one more year, and not indefinitely. These delegates hold that otherwise the Assembly would be confronted with the Hungarian question at each session. In their view the previous Assembly resolutions have had no effect, and no useful purpose would be served by continuing the discussion indefinitely. However, no move was made to amend the resolution to this effect.

On December 8, the United States delegate introduced in the General Assembly its draft resolution on Hungary cosponsored by 23 other delegations. The fact that the resolution was sponsored by 24 delegations, compared to 37 last year, is indicative of the absence of enthusiasm shown by several delegations in the question.

Before the resolution was put to the vote on December 9, Dr. Janos Peter of Hungary invited Mr. Cabot Lodge of the United States to go to Hungary and see for himself what goes on in that country.

The resolution was adopted by 53 votes to 10 with 17 abstentions. Burma, as on previous occasions, voted for the resolution. Among the "neutrals" which voted for the resolution were: Cambodia and Nepal; India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea and Yemen were among those which abstained.

The Question of Algeria:

The question of Algeria came up before the Political Committee on November 30. Mr. Mongi Slim of Tunisia opened the debate urging France to agree to negotiations with the Algerian rebel leaders on a cease-fire and arrangements for a referendum that would decide the fate of Algeria. He welcomed the statement on September 16 by President Charles de Gaulle offering the Algerian people the right "to decide freely its own destiny." Mr. Slim's language and presentation were moderate and conciliatory, and these characteristics marked the trend of the debate on this item.

It will be recalled that President de Gaulle offered three choices to the Algerians on September 16: integration with France, membership in the French Community or independence. The Algerian rebel leaders wanted to negotiate with France on such matters as the date of a referendum, the establishment of electoral districts, freedom of expression for the different sides and an amnesty for the leaders of the National Liberation Front. Mr. Slim reminded the Political Committee that the National Liberation Front had not asked for international supervision of Algerian elections. In addition he gave a strong hint that if France agreed to negotiate with the five Algerian leaders suggested by the National Liberation Front, "one or more" additional representatives would then be appointed. All five of the leaders are in French prisons. General de Gaulle has refused to accept them as spokesmen for the Algerians.

France has never admitted the United Nation's right to discuss Algeria and the French delegates boycotted the meetings both in the Political Committee and the General Assembly. Britain stood solidly behind the French, and Sir Pierson Dixon, British delegate, told the Political Committee on December 2 that his Government was

"very mindful of the danger that any resolution, however moderately worded, which sought to apply a formula, however reasonable it might seem, might set up new pressures which far from promoting a satisfactory solution would in practice retard and complicate it." Mr. Cabot Lodge of the United States said, "The United States continues to believe that in the interests of all concerned moderation, restraint and patience should be the watchwords."

Between November 16 and December 2 when the Asian-African draft resolution was introduced, the group met four times, and the Steering Committee on Algeria of which I continue to be the Chairman for the third consecutive year met three times. The draft resolution submitted by the Steering Committee was approved by the Asian-African group on November 30, and I was authorised to present the same to the Political Committee on December 2. The draft resolution was originally sponsored by 21 Asian-African countries. Malaya later on joined in sponsorship, raising the number of sponsors to 22. Copies of my speech made on that day have been submitted to the Foreign Office.

The resolution made no direct mention either of France or of the Algerian Provisional Government. It called for "pourparlers" between the two parties concerned. It did not use the word "independence" which was used in last year's resolution. Instead it only referred to "the right of the Algerian people to self determination" - a right which has been recognised by President de Gaulle himself.

On the day I introduced the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, the French delegation indicated to me outside the Committee room that it considered it unacceptable. According to a French spokesman the draft resolution was objectionable on two points. The first objection was its call for informal discussions between "the two parties concerned." This, the French source said, might be considered tantamount to recognition by France of the Provisional Government as the actual administration of Algeria. The second objection was that the draft resolution would have the General Assembly recommend talks "as early as possible" linking a cease-fire with the political conditions of Algeria's future status. The French representative recalled that President de Gaulle had offered to discuss the military framework of a cease-fire with the Provisional Government and members of the National Liberation Front. But General de Gaulle had stated that the terms of a later political settlement should be discussed with "all Algerians", not simply with the liberation front.

Throughout the debate on Algeria, Mohamed Yazid, Minister of Information of the Algerian Provisional Government, Dr. Ahmad Francis, Finance Minister and Abdel Hamid Mehri, Minister for North African Affairs, observed the proceedings from the distinguished visitors' seats. The issue of visas to these Algerian leaders by the United States Government was greatly resented by the French Government.

On December 4, while the debate was still going on, three ministers of the Algerian Provisional Government issued a statement here saying that the Algerian Provisional Government will not discuss a cease-fire with France without first having guarantees of an impartial referendum in Algeria. The statement said this organization "could not envisage a cessation of combat or a demobilisation of its troops short of guarantees for the organization of a free consultation of the Algerian people."

On December 7, at the conclusion of the debate and just

before voting took place, I made a second appeal to the Committee to endorse our joint draft resolution. Copies of this speech have been submitted to the Foreign Office. This speech received an unusually wide coverage in the American press. The New York Times of December 8 issue highlighted my intervention with quotations from my speech. The joint draft resolution was adopted by 38 votes to 26 with 17 abstentions. Of the Asian-African countries, only Iran, Japan, Laos, Thailand and Turkey abstained. All the rest of the group voted for the resolution. Since a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is required for passage by the Assembly, the above vote indicates that still further modification is called for if the resolution is to be adopted.

The Asian-African group met twice on December 9 and 10 to consider a new draft. The General Assembly was scheduled to take up this item on the afternoon of December 10, but the group was still unable to finalise a new draft at 3 p.m. on that day and I was asked by the group to request the adjournment of the Assembly meeting till the next afternoon. Accordingly, I appealed to the Assembly to adjourn the meeting till the next day. The Assembly adopted my motion by 45 votes to nil with 25 abstentions.

I was further requested by the Asian-African group to contact other friendly delegations outside the group with a view to enlisting their support to our new draft resolution which was tabled the next day in the name of Pakistan. The revised draft resolution is a much milder version and many delegations thought that the required two-thirds majority was assured. But when it was put to the vote 39 countries voted for it, 22 against and 20 abstained. I made a last minute appeal after the Pakistani representative had formally introduced the revised draft resolution. Copies of my speech have been submitted to the Foreign Office.

The significant features of the vote are outlined below:

The United States shifted from its previous stand in the Committee and abstained in the final vote, thus incurring the displeasure of the French.

Laos, which abstained in a previous vote in the Committee, voted against the revised draft resolution in the Assembly. It is the only Asian-African country which voted against the Asian-African resolution.

Cambodia, which earlier voted for the stronger resolution in the Committee, abstained in the Assembly vote. Mr. Nong Kimy of Cambodia confided to me that he had received fresh instructions from his Prime Minister who was at that time on an official visit to Paris to abstain in the vote.

Argentina and Sweden which earlier abstained in the Committee, voted for our resolution.

Voting on this resolution followed a very unusual pattern. Every individual paragraph was adopted by over two-thirds majority. Then the whole document was turned down for lack of a two-thirds majority. This surprising development was credited to a carefully and skilfully prepared strategy by France in collaboration with several countries. The French success surprised most of us who were not apprised of this strategy, because it came after separate votes on the two operative paragraphs had been carried by a two-thirds vote by a comfortable margin.

The first operative paragraph was approved by 58 to 1 with 21 abstentions.

The second and concluding operative paragraph was carried by 40 votes to 16 with 25 abstentions.

When the President called for a vote on the resolution as a whole, it was assumed that it would be carried by a similar vote. However, six countries switched their votes and snatched the victory out of the hands of the Asian-Africans and turned it over to the French, so to say. These countries were Australia, Ecuador, Honduras, Laos, Nicaragua and Paraguay.

Nicaragua, which was absent when the separate paragraph vote was taken, suddenly appeared to cast a vote against the resolution as a whole.

Paraguay, which had voted in favour of the operative paragraphs, performed one of the major feats of the current session by reversing itself and casting its vote against it when the resolution was taken as a whole.

The other countries which had abstained on the separate vote switched in the final vote in favour of France.

The aim obviously was to allow the second operative paragraph to secure a two-thirds majority. If this paragraph had been defeated on the separate vote, it would have been deleted and the sponsors would have been assured of a two-thirds majority victory when a vote was taken on the rest of the resolution as a whole.

In spite of this defeat, all the Arab delegations, including the Algerians, expressed their heartfelt thanks to the Burmese delegation for its untiring efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. The moderation and restraint shown by our delegation in interventions impressed several observers. The London Times of December 11 issue observed, "Certain Asian countries, headed by Burma, were known to favour the amendments, but there were differences of opinion in the Arab group, a pre-dominant argument being that no change should be made unless the Algerians were willing to accept it."

General Reflections:

Opinions are divided on the success or otherwise of the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly, but the majority view is that it was a very satisfactory session. Assembly President Dr. Belaunde of Peru went so far as to dub it an "Assembly of Peace" because of unanimous resolutions on disarmament, outer space and several trusteeship and economic matters. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld considered this characterisation "too magnificent." He preferred to call it "a peaceful Assembly" characterised in many ways by a new spirit, a new sense of responsibility, a new will to listen and a new will to find a common ground.

The United States undoubtedly merits credit along with the Soviet Union for the agreements on disarmament and outer space. Yet even in these two matters, I believe the United States satisfaction cannot be unmixed. In several other areas the United States policy gave an impression of uncertainty and, at times, even of being at odds with itself. Concerning disarmament Senator Humphrey (Democrat) recently observed that the United States had been "on the sidelines" in the Assembly debate. Such a position was, according to the Senator "a far cry from the position the leader of the free world" was expected to take.

The agreement on outer space was achieved, it must be pointed out, by a United States' retreat from its previous objections to "parity." It was certainly a far cry from the United States position taken last year and I had occasion to comment on it in my report on the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly. In the

FOURTH FORTNIGHTLY REPORT OF HIS EXCELLENCY
U THANT - FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER to
15 NOVEMBER, 1959.

Security Council Election:

As reported earlier, the General Assembly suspended voting for two weeks after the 31st ballot, and when voting was resumed on November 3, the deadlock still remained unresolved. Six ballots were conducted on that day, and in the last ballot Turkey had 42 votes and Poland 38. When the last ballot - the 37th since voting began - proved inconclusive, the President of the General Assembly called a halt since no important change appeared in prospect in the margin of support for either candidate. He proposed that further balloting be postponed for two weeks, until November 17. There was no objection from the floor.

General and Complete Disarmament:

As indicated in my previous report the Political Committee gave its unanimous endorsement on November 2 to the 82-power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.234), referring proposals for disarmament to the ten-nation disarmament group that will meet in Geneva early next year.

After the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Kuznetsov, leader of the Soviet delegation, and Mr. Cabot Lodge, leader of the United States delegation, put forward different interpretations of the meaning of the resolution. Mr. Kuznetsov said, "We expect that the Soviet proposals will be taken as a basis for the work of the Committee of ten powers." This was immediately challenged by Mr. Lodge who emphasised that the resolution called for thorough consideration of all the proposals, not just one. Mr. Lodge also declared that the United States might submit proposals of its own to the ten-nation group.

French Nuclear Tests in the Sahara:

The question of French Nuclear Tests in the Sahara which is the next item on the agenda of the Political Committee was taken up on November 4. On the opening day Mr. Jules Moch, French representative, announced that France was determined to hold a nuclear test explosion in the Sahara unless the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain renounce their nuclear armament. He said that France would forgo all military tests, but only on condition that the other great powers gave up nuclear weapons. Mr. Moch further explained that France would hold the test even if the three nuclear powers, which have been negotiating in Geneva, should reach an agreement on the prohibition of further tests. French sources said later that it would be "more than a month and less than a year", before the test took place.

Mr. Moch devoted most of his speech to an explanation of the precautions that the French are taking against injury to the African peoples from radiation. He revealed that the site of the proposed explosion would be in the Saoura Province of Algeria, 1000 kilometers (621 miles) southeast of Marrakesh in Morocco. He emphasised that the danger from radiation would be less than from the United States nuclear explosions in Nevada and the Soviet explosions in Siberia, which he said were similar in explosive power.

Mr. Moch indicated that France did not plan to follow up the coming nuclear test with another surface explosion. He indicated that France would conduct underground tests later but said that these would "throw off practically no radio-active particles."

Mr. Benhima of Morocco said that his government had brought the impending French test to the attention of the Assembly because all protests by the African countries had been in vain. "France wants its bomb," Mr. Benhima said. "It is a matter of prestige." He also charged that the tests would be held in the most fertile part of the Sahara, and emphasised the danger to the inhabitants from radiation. Referring to the precautionary measures announced by France, he asked whether these would involve the displacement of the entire population.

Dr. Zeineddine of the United Arab Republic, who was the only other speaker on that day, said that an Asian people had "known the effects of the bomb in Hiroshima" and that "now the dark people of Africa, at peace, are invited by France not to witness the bounties of the atomic age, but an explosion in their midst, on non-French territory and in opposition to the declared will of the Africans."

Asian-African delegates met three times to consider the question of tabling a draft resolution, and on November 5, twenty nations including Burma introduced a resolution (A/C.1/L.238). Actually twenty two Asian-African nations were to co-sponsor it, but Japan and the Federation of Malaya preferred to await instructions from their respective governments. These two countries joined others on November 9. For lack of time our delegation could not seek approval of the Foreign Office, but at the delegation meeting on November 4 it was agreed that the proposed draft resolution was in line with Burma's traditional stand on nuclear tests. Actually the approved draft was much milder than the original draft proposed by Morocco and other African countries, which wanted the Assembly to "deplore" the Sahara test. Many Asian countries refused to go that far.

Mr. Yakovlev, a Soviet delegate, warned on November 9 that France's plan to explode a nuclear bomb in the Sahara could jeopardise the present improvement in East-West relations. He supported the Asian-African resolution and urged France to call off the test. I made my intervention on that day, and several delegates including Sir Pierson Dixon of Britain, Ambassador (Mrs.) Rossel of Sweden and Ambassador Ritchie of Canada congratulated me on my "helpful" approach. Ambassador Araujo of Colombia, who later voted against the Asian-African resolution, publicly applauded me for my "sincere desire to see France great and to see Democracy win, although apprehensive of radiation effects." Communist delegates, strangely enough, did not comment even privately. Perhaps they took exception to my references to the competition between Democracy and Totalitarianism and my desire to see Democracy win. Copies of my speech have already been pouched to the Foreign Office. Perhaps press despatches by correspondents and covered by the Rangoon press did not give a balanced account of my speech which gave rise to considerable apprehension, as conveyed to me by Foreign Office Cable BUN.264/Wa dated 13 November.

On November 10, Britain and Italy tabled a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.239). This resolution, introduced by two of France's strong allies in the NATO, proposed that the French Government "take full account of views" expressed during the United Nations debate regarding the planned bomb test. Mr. Benhima of Morocco asked the British representative whether the views for which the resolution called would include those opposed to the test. Mr. Ormsby Gore (Britain) asserted that "all views" should be considered. On November 11, Peru joined the sponsors of that resolution.

On the same day (November 11) five Latin American nations introduced amendments (A/C.1/L.240/Rev.1) to the Asian-African resolution. The amendments in effect asked France "to reconsider" her proposed atomic bomb test in the Sahara instead of asking France "to refrain from such tests" as in the Asian-African draft. Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Panama sponsored the amendment, which also would modify the language of the Asian-African resolution.

On that day frantic efforts were made to reconcile the two drafts with a view to getting an overwhelming vote. Asian-African group was represented by Nepal, United Arab Republic and Burma at those negotiations with the Latin-American sponsors of the amendments. Negotiations, however, broke down since the Latins took exception to the words "to refrain from such tests." The Asian-Africans, therefore, for tactical reasons, decided to table sub-amendments to the Latin amendments. These sub-amendments were introduced on November 12 in the name of Ghana and Indonesia (A/C.1/L.241). It will be noticed that three of the preambular paragraphs of the Latin amendment were incorporated in these sub-amendments; several preambular paragraphs of our original draft were dropped; and the word "urges" was replaced by "Requests" in the second operative paragraph. When voting took place on November 12 the Asian-African draft resolution, incorporating our own sub-amendments was adopted by 46 votes against 26, with ten abstentions. When that item goes to the General Assembly, the resolution will fall two votes short of the necessary two-thirds.

It is significant that among those who joined the Asian-Africans in voting against the projected French test were Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Cuba and Venezuela. All the Asian-African countries except Thailand, Laos and Turkey voted for the resolution while these three abstained. The most significant fact relating to this item was the extreme caution taken by the United States. In his very brief intervention on November 9, Mr. Cabot Lodge neither endorsed nor opposed the French plans. He merely indicated that the United States does not believe the forthcoming French tests in the Sahara constitute a threat to neighbouring areas. Several delegations got the impression that the United States would abstain but it sided with France in the voting.

Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons:

This item was taken up on November 13, and Mr. Frank Aiken, Ireland's Foreign Minister, presented his country's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2). The resolution asked that the Assembly recommend to the ten-power disarmament committee a study of means to prevent "the wider dissemination of nuclear arms." A move somewhat similar to this resolution was made last year by the same country, but was withdrawn after representatives of various countries had complained that insufficient time had been allowed to consider all the implications of the proposal. The Irish draft resolution received prompt backing from Netherlands and Ceylon on the first day of introduction. I believe voting will take place either on Monday afternoon (November 16) or Tuesday (November 17).