UNAMIR

INCOMING CODE CABLES

7-22 APR 1994

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SRSG FC

CNR--142 P1/8

UNAMIR
94 APR 22 20 50

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, **ONLY** UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 22 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: 1240

1. For your information and comments, if any, please find attached the report prepared by Ms. Le Moal, UNDP Acting Designated Official, on the death of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, former Prime Minister of Rwanda.

2. Since at a later stage there may be a Commission of Enquiry, we suggest you keep this report confidential.

Best regards.

94 APR 22 P 4:08

(166)

MEMORANDUM

142 02

To: Mr Benon Sevan
United Nations Security Co-ordinator

Mr G. Speth
The Administrator, UNDP

Date: 20 April 1994

From: Yves Le Moal
Acting Designated Official
Rwanda

Tel:
Fax:

Subject: DEATH OF MRS AGATHE UWILINGIYIMANA
PRIME MINISTER, RWANDA

1. I am attaching herewith two eye witness accounts regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Prime Minister, Rwanda. These statements are self explanatory; however, there are a number of points which I would like to bring to your attention.

2. From the time of the arrival of the Prime Minister in the Compound of the United Nations Volunteers, both United Nations Headquarters (Ms Diana Russler) and UNAMIR Headquarters were kept informed of developments. Contact with UNAMIR Headquarters was through the UNAMIR staff member known as Hotel One on the UNAMIR radio system and Juliette on the UNDP Security Network.

3. The courage of the United Nations Volunteers throughout this tragic incident was exemplary and I believe that they should be commended both for their attempts to protect the Prime Minister and her family as well as for the manner in which they handled themselves.

4. I would like to reiterate here what is contained in the eye witness report, that the Prime Minister was forcibly removed from a house in the UNV Compound by soldiers and executed between the edge of the UNV Compound and her official residence which abuts the Compound.

5. The evacuation of the UN Volunteers and the children of the Prime Minister was possible thanks to the heroic efforts of the Field Security Officer, Mr Jean Francois Faivre, who, with the assistance of Messrs Tissot (UNDP) and Demargerie (WFP) was able to move the occupants of the Compound to the Hotel Mille Collines where, thanks to the assistance of the director of the Hotel Mille Collines, the entire group was able to be sheltered.

6. I trust that these comments will be useful in providing an understanding of events.

cc: Mr J Grant
Ms Ellen Sirleaf Johnson
Mr Kofi Annan

RAPPORT DES EVENEMENTS DU 07 AVRIL '94 AU COMPOUND UNV/KIGALI

PAR WILLY MPOYI
UNV/UNICEF

6.00: Debut des tirs et des explosions dans le voisinage immediat, du cote du domicile du Premier Ministre. Cette situation dure pendant 1 hr 30 a 2 hr, avec des explosions intermittentes.

Vers 7 hr 30 - 8 hr: Remue - ménage au sein du compound, je sors de ma maison pour m'enquérir de la situation, j'apprends que le Premier Ministre est venu chercher refuge dans une des maisons du compound, precisement dans la maison appartenant a Mr. DAFF. Elle y est rejointe quelques instant plus tard par son mari, et ses 5 enfants, qui eux ont ete places dans une autre maison, appartenant a Mr. BAMPIENG Maxime. Nous avons tenu un "briefing" rapide pour evaluer l'extreme gravite de la situation, étant donne que des militaires rwandais essayaient d'enfoncer le portail du Premier Ministre.

Tout de suite apres, je signale aux collegues qu'il etait imperieux qu' on puisse contacter Mr. LEMOAL et l'officier de securite pour les mettre au courant de la situation. Vers 8 hr 30, je contacte par radio Mr. LEMOAL, a qui j'annonce l'arrivée du Premier Ministre au compound et aupres de qui je demande la conduite à tenir. Mr. LEMOAL s'inquiète de notre securite et m'annonce qu' il va contacter NEW YORK pour l' informer et s'assurer de son soutien. Mr. LEMOAL m'annonce aussi qu'il s'engage a prevenir la MINUAR. A partir de ce moment, je pouvais suivre les efforts de contact avec la MINUAR a travers notre reseau avec le code 'Juliet' qui assure l' interface entre le PNUD et la MINUAR.

Vers 9 hr - 9 hr 30: Nous nosmes tous (5 volontaires dont DIAKITE, DAFF, KOUROUMA, BAMPIENG et MPOYI) dans la maison de DIAKITE, la seule maison du compound a avoir un téléphone pour contacter les responsables du PNUD et expliquer notre situation. Nous avons été rejointe par la femme de DAFF, et celle de BAMPIENG et ses 2 enfants.

Vers 9 hr 30 : J'ai recontacte Mr. LEMOAL par radio et par telephone pour signaler que les militaires prenaient position devant le compound en nous menaant de s'attaquer bientot a nous. D'apres nos gardiens, les militaires etaient convaincus que le Premier Ministre etait au compound et ils allaient chercher du renfort pour investir le compound. J'ai fait part de tout cela a Mr. LEMOAL. Nous avons alors convenu de garder un contact telephonique permanent. J'ai donc garde le telephone decroche, et je reportais fidelement l'evolution de la situation, jusqu'a l'irruption d'une demi-douzaine de militaires armés de fusils et grenades...

...2/

142 04

10 hr: Irruption des militaires au compound, j'etais en contact téléphonique avec Mr. LEMOAL, a qui je transmettais tout ce qui se passait. Plusieurs coups de feu sont tires dehors, et nous sommes tous couches par terre au salon de DIARITE, et 4 militaires font irruption, en nous menacant et en lancant des ordres en Kinyarwanda. Nous sommes tous tenus en joue, le telephone est decroche, et Mr. LEMOAL peut suivre les peripeties de ces evenements. Un officier survient et il nous explique en francais qu'ils cherchaient une seule personne, et si on la laissait partir, ils nous laisseraient en vie. Ils ont fouille rapidement la maison de DIARITE, puis ont demande les cles des autres maisons qu'ils ont fouillees egalement, jusqu 's decouvrir le Premier Ministre. D'apres les gardiens, celle-ci sera entrainee a la frontiere du compound et sa parcelle ou elle sera abattue a plusieurs coups de fusil. Les gardiens nous diront egalement que les militaires ont promis de revenir pour nous "regler notre compte". Pendant ce temps, nous etions tous couches sous la table de Mr. DIARITE, car les militaires tiraient dehors. Apres le depart des militaires, j'ai aussitot repris contact avec Mr. LEMOAL pour faire part de la situation. J'ai alors reclame, en accord avec mes collegues que nous soyons evacues d'urgence du compound. J'ai vu le sixieme VMU, FAY, qui était resté chez lui pendant tous ces evenements.

Vers 11 hr: L' epouse de BAMPIEMO, enceinte, se sentait mal. J'ai contacte Mr. FAIVRE, qui me conseillera de l'aider a respirer calmement et de faire venir FAY, qui est medecin, je suis alle voir FAY, lequel administrera un calmant a la patiente...

Entre-temps, je pouvais suivre les efforts de MM LEMOAL et FAIVRE pour convaincre la MINUAR de voler a notre secours...

Vers 12 hr 30: Le général DALLAIRE, accompagne d'un "casque bleu" observateur belge arrivant, ils examinent rapidement les lieux, me posent plusieurs questions. Le General laisse le casque-bleu et part "chercher des vehicules blindes pour nous tirer de la".

Vers 13 hr 30: quelques militaires rwandais circulent dans le compound.

Vers 14 hr 30: Le General Dallaire revient, avec un "casque bleu" observateur senegalais. Il explique que les militaires rwandais ne veulent pas les laisser franchir les barrieres. Il laisse le "casque bleu" observateur senegalais (sans armes) et repart avec le belge.

De 15 hr a 17 hr: Les discussions se poursuivent entre la MINUAR et les officiels FPRD pour nous evacuer du compound. Je contacte egalement Mr. LEMOAL et propose que nous soyons evacues vers les "mille collines" hotel.

...3/

17 hr 15 hr: Je contacte Mr. LEMOAL pour implorer qu'on nous tire d'urgence de la avant la nuit par crainte des represailles promises par les militaires. Mr. LEMOAL nous demande de nous tenir prets pour l'evacuation. 15 minutes plus tard, nous serons conduits a l'hotel des mille collines dans un convoi organise par Mr. LEMOAL et conduit par l'officier de securite, TISSOT et DEMARGERIE. A l'hôtel nous avons ete accueillis par le directeur qui nous a personellement amene a nos chambres . A ce moment, Mr. LEMOAL m'informera que NEW YORK et la MINUAR etaient informes de l'arrivee de tous les volontaires des Nations - Unies et leurs familles a l'hotel des mille collines. Apres 2 jours aux mille collines, ou j'ai continue a garder contact par radio avec les officiels PNUD, nous serons evacues dimanche 16 hr pour le bureau PNUD, puis vers Butare en route pour BUJUMBURA, que l'on quittera dimanche 17 hr pour Nairobi.

Je voudrais exprimer, au nom de tous mes collegues ma gratitude a MM LEMOAL et FAIVRE pour tout ce qu' ils ont accompli pendant ces evenements.

Fait a Nairobi, le 15/04/1994.

WILLY MPOYI WA MPOYI
UNV/UNSCOM

Compound des réfugiés de Jénine

(2)

* Tout d'abord, je commence par remercier les membres du Comité spécial pour leur visite du camp de réfugiés de Jénine.

* Il est bien connu que le camp de réfugiés de Jénine a souffert de graves violations des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire, y compris des violations graves des droits de l'enfant et des droits fondamentaux des réfugiés.

Q: Quel est le point de vue du Comité spécial sur la question du droit du peuple palestinien à un État souverain et indépendant ?

* Je tiens à remercier Monsieur le Président du Comité spécial pour son exposé et pour la présentation du point de vue du Comité spécial.

* Je tiens à remercier Madame Dalia Ismail, Ministre palestinienne des affaires sociales, pour son exposé.

* Je remercie également Madame Dalia Ismail, Ministre palestinienne des affaires sociales, pour son exposé.

* Je remercie également le Président du Comité spécial pour son exposé.

* Je remercie également le Président du Comité spécial pour son exposé.

* Je remercie également le Président du Comité spécial

142 07

(2)

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+ [illegible] the MOFL [illegible] telephone [illegible] demanded [illegible] DAFF
the [illegible] MINCAP [illegible] Minister [illegible] the
[illegible] the Kingdom [illegible] the PARTARE.

* [illegible] DAFF [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] PAKISTAN [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

* [illegible] [illegible]

142 08

- Nous avons entendu des cris, des plaintes, des bruits de pas et d'autres coups de feu pendant un ou deux une dizaine de minutes dans la concession du Premier Ministre avant qu'il y ait une accalmie. (3)

* Nous sommes sortis de notre refuge et avons raccroché le téléphone pour permettre la reprise des communications.

* Je suis allé vérifier chez moi et à ma grande surprise ma maison n'a pas été perquisitionné et les enfants étaient toujours là.

* Nous sommes tous reportés chez BIAKITO pour attendre l'arrivée hypothétique du Général DALLER pour nous évacuer.

* Pendant cette longue attente, nous enregistrions aussi des visites inopinées de la garde présidentielle

* L'évacuation à l'Hotel "Mille Collines" a eu lieu à 18 heures.

* Quelques minutes après qu'on est quitté le restaurant de l'Hotel où nous avons dîné qu'ils ont bombardé les lieux.

_Notons que l'Ugandan la véhicule qui a été attaqué à la sortie de Kigali comprenait également l'équipe du Compound.-

Biampong Mazolene

SRSG (FC)

UNAMIR
94 APR 22 04 15

ONR 141 P1/7

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 21 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1237**

SUBJECT: **Reduction of UNAMIR**

1. Many thanks your MIR 811 of today, received at approx. 2000 NY time. Attached is a copy of resolution no. 912 adopted by the Security Council at approx 2200 hours NY time.

2. We fully appreciate your concerns as presented in paras 6, 7, 8 and 11 of your cable.

3. You therefore are authorized to effect as speedily as feasible the reduction by approx 1,000 men, as proposed in para 13 of your cable.

4. This will result in your keeping in Rwanda approx 600 men, as proposed in paras 2 and 3 of your cable. How long we retain this strength, and when we reduce to the level of approx 270 earlier proposed by you will depend on your recommendations.

5. You may plan to hold the approx 1,000 men to be evacuated tomorrow in Nairobi for only 2-3 days. The question of whether we can hold them there for the duration of the Arusha talks will be examined with FOD, and specific instructions will be sent separately on Friday.

6. We send you wishes for the best of luck and our best regards.

CNR 141 P5/7

UNITED NATIONS

S

Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1994/488
21 April 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution 912 (1994)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Recalling its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 with a six-week review provision on the understanding that progress would be made in establishing the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front,

Recalling also its statement of 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) which, inter alia, reaffirmed its commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and urged all parties to implement it fully,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 April 1994 (S/1994/474),

Stressing that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains central to the peace process in Rwanda,

Expressing deep regret at the failure of the parties to implement fully the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement, particularly those provisions relating to the cease-fire,

Recognizing the initiatives made by the late Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi towards resolving the problems in their countries through peaceful means and in collaboration with regional leaders,

Shocked at the tragic incident that resulted in the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April 1994,

Appalled at the ensuing large-scale violence in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, the displacement of a significant number of the Rwandese population, including those who sought refuge with UNAMIR, and the significant increase in refugees to neighbouring countries,

and authorizes a force level as set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the Secretary-General's report of 20 April 1994 (S/1994/470) for that purpose;

9. Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda under constant review and states its readiness to consider promptly any recommendations which the Secretary-General may make concerning the force level and mandate of UNAMIR in the light of developments;

10. Reiterates the crucial importance of the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the settlement of the Rwandan conflict and invites the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations in this regard;

11. Commends the efforts made by the leaders of the subregion at finding a solution to the crisis in Rwanda and calls on the leaders of the region, especially the facilitator to the Arusha peace process, to persevere and intensify their efforts, in cooperation with the OAU and the United Nations;

12. Reaffirms that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwandan conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country and calls on the parties to renew their commitment to this agreement;

13. Calls also upon the parties to cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need throughout Rwanda and in this regard, appeals to the international community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda;

14. Affirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda;

15. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the events in Rwanda and to report fully to the Council on the evolving situation and not later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Deeply concerned by continuing fighting, looting, banditry and the breakdown of law and order, particularly in Kigali,

Stressing the need for all countries to avoid any action that might exacerbate the situation in Rwanda,

Expressing its deep concern for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel, and personnel of non-governmental organizations who are assisting in implementing the peace process and in distributing humanitarian relief,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 April 1994 (S/1994/474);

2. Expresses regret at the tragic incident in which the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi lost their lives, and reiterates its invitation to the Secretary-General to report to the Council as requested in its statement of 7 April 1994;

3. Expresses regret also at the ensuing violence which has claimed the lives of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Government officials and thousands of other civilians;

4. Condemns the ongoing violence in Rwanda, particularly in Kigali, which endangers the lives and safety of the civilian population;

5. Strongly condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel leading to the deaths of and injury to several UNAMIR personnel and calls upon all concerned to put an end to these acts of violence and to respect fully international humanitarian law;

6. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Rwanda Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front and for an end to the mindless violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda;

7. Commends the active role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the Force Commander to bring about a cease-fire and to mediate between the parties in order to bring about the earliest resolution of the Rwandan crisis;

8. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR as follows:

(a) to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire;

(b) to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and

(c) to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR,

/...

SRSG (FC)

UNAMIR
94 APR 22 04 15

ONR 141 P1/7

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

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Deeply concerned by continuing fighting, looting, banditry and the breakdown of law and order, particularly in Kigali,

Stressing the need for all countries to avoid any action that might exacerbate the situation in Rwanda,

Expressing its deep concern for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel, and personnel of non-governmental organizations who are assisting in implementing the peace process and in distributing humanitarian relief,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 April 1994 (S/1994/474);

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4. Condemns the ongoing violence in Rwanda, particularly in Kigali, which endangers the lives and safety of the civilian population;

5. Strongly condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel leading to the deaths of and injury to several UNAMIR personnel and calls upon all concerned to put an end to these acts of violence and to respect fully international humanitarian law;

6. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Rwanda Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front and for an end to the mindless violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda;

7. Commends the active role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the Force Commander to bring about a cease-fire and to mediate between the parties in order to bring about the earliest resolution of the Rwandan crisis;

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(c) to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR,

/...

and authorizes a force level as set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the Secretary-General's report of 20 April 1994 (S/1994/470) for that purpose;

9. Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda under constant review and states its readiness to consider promptly any recommendations which the Secretary-General may make concerning the force level and mandate of UNAMIR in the light of developments;

10. Reiterates the crucial importance of the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the settlement of the Rwandan conflict and invites the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations in this regard;

11. Commends the efforts made by the leaders of the subregion at finding a solution to the crisis in Rwanda and calls on the leaders of the region, especially the facilitator to the Arusha peace process, to persevere and intensify their efforts, in cooperation with the OAU and the United Nations;

12. Reaffirms that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwandan conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country and calls on the parties to renew their commitment to this agreement;

13. Calls also upon the parties to cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need throughout Rwanda and in this regard, appeals to the international community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda;

14. Affirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda;

15. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the events in Rwanda and to report fully to the Council on the evolving situation and not later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

SRSG (FC)

CNR 138 P1/1

UNAMIR 04 05 APR 22

(1)

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 21 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1234**

1994 APR 21 P 11 00

C

Following our 1205 of yesterday, the Spanish mission has now informed us that the two Hercules aircraft will only remain in Nairobi until Sunday, 24 April, since no other request for their assistance has been received. Baril has been kept informed.

Best regards.

C

C

(2) NTF
Passed to Mr Booh-Booh in Nairobi.
BMB
for
A/MA

SRSG (FC)

CNR 137 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

UNAMIR

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

1994 APR 22 04 15

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 21 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1233**

SUBJECT: **Safety of civilian population**

1. You already are aware that tonight or tomorrow Council is likely to approve Alternative II, proposed in SecGen's draft resolution (subject to change), attached for your advance information.

2. One question that arises is the safety of refugees in the Stadium and Hospital whom UNAMIR, acting on humanitarian grounds, has protected and even fed. Evidently, with the reduction of your strength to about 270, you will not be able to continue to shoulder this responsibility.

3. Humanitarian assistance team should be in Kigali in the next few days, as proposed by you. No doubt they will draw up plans in coordination with you for humanitarian assistance to be distributed to extent possible under conditions prevailing.

4. We would appreciate receiving some clarifications regarding the prospects for the safety of these civilian groups. Please let us know what assurances you have been able to extract in this respect from RPF and RGF. We understand you are in close contact with ICRC, and it would help us to know how ICRC plans to cope with this situation. What would be done in similar situations in other parts of Rwanda?

5. We await your response on this matter.
Best regards.

SRSG FC

CNR-135 P1/11

UNAMIR 1994 APR 21 19 50

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: for. ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 21 April 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1225

SUBJECT: Special report on UNAMIR

1994 APR 21 P 2:13

1. The special report on UNAMIR was approved by the Secretary-General this morning and distributed to members of the Security Council during informal consultations at 12:30 p.m. Copies in English and French are attached.

2. The members of the Council have agreed to begin consideration of the report in informal consultations at 3:00 p.m. this afternoon. They will also begin work on a draft resolution, in the hope that it can be finalized this evening and formally adopted tomorrow. We will keep you informed of the outcome of the discussions on the resolution to enable you to prepare, as appropriate, for the prompt implementation of the decisions to be taken by the Council. Regards.

NATIONS UNIES

CNR-135 P2

S

Conseil de sécurité

Distr.
GÉNÉRALE

S/1994/470
20 avril 1994
FRANÇAIS
ORIGINAL : ANGLAIS

RAPPORT SPÉCIAL DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL SUR LA MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Situation au Rwanda

1. Les membres du Conseil de sécurité sont pleinement conscients de la gravité de la situation qui règne au Rwanda depuis que l'avion transportant le Président du Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, et celui du Burundi, Cyprien Ntayamira, s'est écrasé à l'aéroport de Kigali, le 6 avril 1994, coûtant la vie à tous les passagers, y compris aux deux présidents. La cause de cet accident ne peut être déterminée sans une enquête approfondie que les circonstances ont jusqu'à présent rendue impossible.

2. Cet incident tragique a déclenché une tuerie généralisée, principalement à Kigali, mais également dans d'autres régions du pays. La violence semble avoir une dimension tant politique qu'ethnique. On n'a pas encore pu évaluer avec certitude le nombre des victimes, mais il pourrait être de l'ordre de dizaines de milliers.

3. Des rapports dignes de foi indiquent clairement que des éléments insubordonnés de la Garde présidentielle ont été à l'origine du massacre et que la violence s'est rapidement propagée à toute la ville. En dépit de tous les efforts déployés par la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), le bataillon des forces de sécurité du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) cantonné à l'intérieur du complexe du Conseil national de développement a fait une sortie et entrepris d'attaquer des troupes gouvernementales, notamment des éléments de la Garde. Des unités du FPR venant de la zone démilitarisée ont également gagné Kigali où elles sont venues grossir les rangs des combattants. Le pouvoir s'est effondré et on a assisté à la désintégration du gouvernement provisoire dont quelques membres ont été tués. Un gouvernement intérimaire a été proclamé le 8 avril 1994, mais s'est révélé incapable d'asseoir son autorité, et le 12 avril, il a quitté la capitale à la suite de l'intensification des combats entre forces armées et FPR. Depuis, il semble que, du côté du gouvernement, les seuls interlocuteurs soient le Ministre de la défense et le haut commandement des forces gouvernementales, dont la direction a récemment changé. La violence a eu pour conséquence particulièrement tragique l'assassinat sauvage par des éléments insubordonnés des forces gouvernementales d'Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Premier Ministre, d'autres membres du gouvernement et de 10 soldats du contingent belge de la MINUAR.

Efforts déployés par la MINUAR

4. Dans ces conditions, il était devenu impossible à la Mission de continuer à s'acquitter des tâches qui lui avaient été confiées. Pour faire face à cette situation de profonde insécurité et de crise humanitaire, la MINUAR, sous la direction du Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général et du commandant de la Force, s'est employée à :

a) Obtenir un accord sur un cessez-le-feu, devant être suivi de négociations politiques entre les deux parties afin de relancer le processus de paix prévu par l'Accord d'Arusha;

b) Protéger, dans la mesure du possible, le personnel civil des Nations Unies;

c) Protéger, dans la mesure du possible, le reste de la population civile, qu'il s'agisse d'étrangers ou de nationaux rwandais;

d) Négocier une trêve entre les deux parties afin de permettre l'évacuation des étrangers;

e) Faciliter l'évacuation des civils étrangers, qu'ils relèvent ou non de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, en fournissant des escortes aux convois d'évacuation organisés en direction des frontières ou de l'aéroport, et assurer la coordination avec les forces d'intervention belge et française dépêchées sur place à cet effet;

f) Secourir les particuliers et les groupes encerclés par les combats;

g) Fournir une assistance humanitaire à des groupes importants de personnes déplacées mises sous la protection de la MINUAR.

5. De toutes ces tâches, la première était la plus urgente : obtenir un accord de cessez-le-feu en se mettant en rapport avec des représentants des forces armées et du FPR, dans l'espoir que s'ensuivraient des initiatives politiques en vue de relancer le processus de paix prévu par l'Accord d'Arusha. Le Conseil de sécurité a été tenu dûment au fait de ces efforts et de l'évolution de la situation sur le terrain. La décision prise par le Gouvernement belge, à la suite de l'assassinat de 10 soldats de son contingent et de menaces prononcées à l'encontre de nationaux belges, de retirer son bataillon de la MINUAR a introduit un nouvel élément critique dans une situation qui continue de se détériorer. Le commandant de la Force a essayé d'obtenir des deux parties l'assurance que l'aéroport serait déclaré zone neutre, placée sous le contrôle de la MINUAR. De telles assurances lui ont initialement été données mais avant qu'elles puissent prendre un caractère officiel, les forces gouvernementales ont changé leur position, si bien que l'aéroport pourrait se transformer en zone de combat.

6. Les membres du Conseil savent que, en dépit des contacts directs établis entre les deux parties sous les auspices de la MINUAR, le 15 avril 1994, contacts qui avaient laissé espérer la possibilité d'un cessez-le-feu, les efforts de la Mission sont jusqu'à présent demeurés vains. Les deux parties ont

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adopté des positions rigides, le FPR posant des conditions préalables que les forces gouvernementales rejettent. Au vu de la situation, j'ai conclu à mon grand regret qu'il n'y a aucune chance d'obtenir un accord de cessez-le-feu dans les jours qui viennent. La violence continue de faire rage, tant dans les rues qu'entre le FPR et les forces gouvernementales, si bien que des civils déplacés qui s'étaient regroupés sous la protection de la MINUAR ont fait l'objet de tirs de mortier. Le quartier-général de la Mission a également été touché le 19 avril, par bonheur sans que l'on ait de victimes à déplorer.

7. Le personnel de la Mission, qui a fait preuve de courage et de dévouement dans des circonstances dangereuses, ne peut rester indéfiniment exposé à ces périls alors même qu'il lui est impossible de s'acquitter des tâches pour l'exécution desquelles il a été envoyé dans le pays. Avec le départ du contingent belge et du personnel non essentiel d'autres contingents, les effectifs militaires de la MINUAR se trouvaient ramenés, le 20 avril, de 2 165 à 1 515 hommes, et le nombre d'observateurs militaires de 321 à 190; l'effectif total de la Mission était donc réduit de 2 486 à 1 705 hommes.

Options proposées

8. Le Conseil se souviendra que j'ai présenté le 14 avril, comme suite à sa demande, deux grandes options pour faire face à cette situation extrêmement instable et imprévisible au Rwanda. Ces deux options avaient pour prémisse l'instauration d'un cessez-le-feu, sans lequel la MINUAR ne pourrait continuer à s'acquitter des responsabilités qui lui incombent en vertu de son mandat actuel.

9. La première option consistait à maintenir la MINUAR avec un effectif réduit (c'est-à-dire sans le contingent belge) pour une période limitée de trois ou quatre semaines après le cessez-le-feu. Les parties auraient été priées de s'entendre, au cours de cette période, sur le rétablissement du processus d'Arusha, auquel cas la MINUAR reprendrait le rôle qui lui est dévolu en vertu de son mandat. Dans le cas contraire, la MINUAR serait retirée dans sa totalité.

10. La deuxième option était de retirer, après le cessez-le-feu, l'essentiel du personnel de la MINUAR, en laissant mon Représentant spécial et le commandant de la Force à Kigali pour servir d'intermédiaire aux négociations politiques pendant une période indéfinie, sous réserve de réexamen par le Conseil de sécurité, plutôt que pendant la période limitée envisagée dans la première option. Afin d'assurer la sécurité de cette équipe des Nations Unies, environ 200 à 300 militaires des Nations Unies resteraient également à Kigali.

11. Les deux options ci-dessus ne s'excluent pas mutuellement. Si les efforts déployés dans le cadre de la première option s'avéraient infructueux à la fin de la période fixée, on pourrait passer au deuxième scénario au lieu de retirer les forces de la MINUAR dans leur totalité.

Observations

12. Étant donné que la situation demeure critique, il faut prendre une décision sur la question de savoir si l'Organisation des Nations Unies poursuivra ses efforts pour aider un peuple qui se trouve plongé dans une situation

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catastrophique et, dans l'affirmative, comment elle s'y prendra. Je propose au Conseil trois options.

13. Option I. La première possibilité se fonde sur la conclusion indiquée plus haut qu'on ne voit aucune perspective réaliste que les deux forces adverses s'entendent sur un cessez-le-feu véritable dans l'avenir immédiat. Sans un cessez-le-feu, les combats se poursuivront de même que les actes illégaux et les massacres de civils. Cette situation ne pourra changer que si l'on renforce immédiatement et massivement la MINUAR et si on modifie son mandat de façon qu'elle dispose des moyens d'obliger les forces adverses à un cessez-le-feu, de tenter de rétablir l'ordre public et de mettre fin aux tueries et qu'elle ait autorité pour le faire. Cela permettrait aussi aux organismes humanitaires et aux organisations non gouvernementales de fournir et de distribuer une assistance humanitaire non seulement dans la capitale, mais aussi dans d'autres parties du pays où la population a été déplacée ou soumise à des privations, par suite de la violence. En outre, en rétablissant la stabilité au Rwanda, on contribuerait à éviter que les répercussions de la violence ne s'étendent aux pays voisins et ne conduisent à l'instabilité régionale. Ce scénario nécessiterait plusieurs milliers de troupes supplémentaires et la MINUAR devrait peut-être être investie de pouvoirs de coercition au titre du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies.

14. Je dois mentionner à ce propos que le Représentant permanent du Rwanda auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies est venu me trouver le 19 avril pour me demander que l'on renforce la MINUAR pour lui permettre de mettre fin au chaos qui règne dans le pays. Lors d'une conversation téléphonique, le 20 avril, le Président Museweni de l'Ouganda m'a demandé instamment que la MINUAR soit renforcée et maintenue au Rwanda, en me priant de transmettre sa demande au Conseil de sécurité. Il a ajouté qu'il essayait d'obtenir des pays de la région qu'ils fournissent des troupes et qu'il présidait personnellement aux efforts visant à instituer un cessez-le-feu entre les forces gouvernementales rwandaises et celles du FPR.

15. Option II. La deuxième possibilité serait une forme modifiée de la deuxième option présentée au Conseil de sécurité le 14 avril. Dans ce scénario, un petit groupe dirigé par le commandant de la Force, accompagné du personnel nécessaire, resterait à Kigali pour servir d'intermédiaire entre les deux parties afin d'essayer de les amener à un accord de cessez-le-feu, cet effort devant se poursuivre pendant deux semaines au maximum, à moins que le Conseil ne préfère en prolonger la durée. Parmi les autres tâches qu'il accomplirait, ce groupe serait appelé à aider à la reprise des secours humanitaires, autant que faire se peut dans pareille situation. La MINUAR a reçu des deux parties l'assurance qu'elles coopéreraient à ces opérations, encore qu'on ne puisse en avoir la certitude.

16. Il faudrait que l'équipe soit appuyée par une compagnie d'infanterie pour assurer sa sécurité, ainsi que par un certain nombre d'observateurs militaires pour surveiller la situation, en dehors du personnel civil, le total étant estimé à 270 personnes environ. Le reste du personnel de la MINUAR serait retiré, mais la MINUAR en tant que mission serait maintenue. Le Représentant

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spécial, avec un personnel réduit, poursuivrait ses efforts pour reprendre son rôle d'intermédiaire dans les négociations politiques, le but étant de ramener les deux parties au processus de paix d'Arusha.

17. Il pourrait être mis fin à tous moments aux arrangements indiqués plus haut s'il s'avérait que les parties ne coopèrent pas au niveau politique ou si leurs activités compromettent la sécurité et la sûreté du groupe de la MINUAR demeuré à Kigali.

18. Il est rappelé aux parties que si le système des Nations Unies et les organismes humanitaires se préparent déjà à fournir des secours et une assistance humanitaires, le scénario indiqué plus haut ne permettrait d'apporter qu'une aide réduite. Sans cessez-le-feu, il serait impossible de fournir un effort d'assistance en règle.

19. Option III. Cette possibilité, que je n'appuie pas, serait le retrait total de la MINUAR. Si le Conseil de sécurité opte pour cette solution, la MINUAR devrait n'épargner aucun effort pour obtenir des deux parties qu'elles s'engagent à prendre des mesures pour assurer la sécurité des civils dans les zones relevant de leur contrôle respectif. Toutefois, étant donné la nature et les dimensions extrêmes de la violence et des assassinats de masse qui se sont produits dans les deux dernières semaines, on ne peut guère espérer obtenir d'engagements fermes à ce sujet. Il ne faut pas oublier que les conséquences d'un retrait total pourraient être extrêmement graves sur le plan de la perte en vies humaines, et que cette situation pourrait avoir des répercussions aussi tragiques dans des pays voisins dont certains citoyens appartiennent aux mêmes groupes ethniques que ceux qui peuplent le Rwanda.

20. En définitive, ce n'est qu'aux parties qui ont signé l'Accord d'Arusha, à savoir le Gouvernement rwandais (ou son successeur) et au FPR qu'incombe la responsabilité de décider si leur pays et leur peuple doivent trouver la paix ou continuer à souffrir de la violence.

21. En soumettant le présent rapport au Conseil de sécurité pour qu'il l'examine, je voudrais présenter mes sincères condoléances aux familles rwandaises qui ont perdu des parents au cours de cette période tragique que traverse leur pays. Je voudrais saisir cette occasion pour exprimer une fois de plus mes profondes condoléances au Gouvernement belge et aux familles des 10 Belges, membres des forces de maintien de la paix, qui ont payé de leur vie la recherche de la paix. Je voudrais aussi rendre un profond hommage au personnel de la MINUAR, en particulier à mon Représentant spécial et au commandant de la Force, pour le dévouement, le désintéressement et le courage avec lesquels il s'emploie à servir de son mieux les Nations Unies dans des circonstances extrêmement dangereuses.

UNITED NATIONS

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20 April 1994

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SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

Events in Rwanda

1. The members of the Security Council are fully aware of the critical situation in Rwanda following the crash of the plane at Kigali airport on 6 April 1994, which caused the deaths of all those on board, including President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntayamira of Burundi. The cause of the crash cannot be determined without a full investigation, which so far has not been feasible.

2. This tragic incident set off a torrent of widespread killings, mainly in Kigali but also in other parts of the country. The violence appears to have both political and ethnic dimensions. No reliable estimate of deaths has so far been available, but they could possibly number tens of thousands.

3. Reliable reports strongly indicate that the killings were started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, then spread quickly throughout the city. Despite the best efforts of UNAMIR, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) security battalion quartered at the National Development Council complex broke out and started to engage Government troops, including elements of the Presidential Guard. RPF units from the demilitarized zone also moved towards Kigali and joined the fighting. Authority collapsed, the provisional Government disintegrated and some of its members were killed in the violence. An interim Government was proclaimed on 8 April 1994, but could not establish authority, and on 12 April 1994, as fighting between the armed forces and the RPF intensified, left the capital. Since then, the Defence Minister and the high command of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), whose leadership has recently changed, appear to be the only interlocutors available on the Government side. The brutal murders by unruly RGF soldiers of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, of other members of the Government and of 10 members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR were particularly tragic consequences of the violence.

Efforts by UNAMIR

4. In this situation, it became impossible for UNAMIR to continue the tasks emanating from its mandate. Responding to the security and humanitarian crises,

UNAMIR, led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander, dedicated itself to the following efforts:

(a) Securing an agreement on a cease-fire, to be followed by political negotiations between the two sides to restore the peace process under the Arusha agreement;

(b) Protecting, as far as possible, United Nations civilian staff;

(c) Protecting, as far as possible, other civilians, both foreign and Rwandese nationals;

(d) Negotiating a truce with the two parties in order to enable the evacuation of expatriates to take place;

(e) Assisting in the evacuation of non-Rwandese civilians, both United Nations and non-United Nations, by providing escorts for convoys to land borders and to the airport, and coordinating with Belgian and French task forces sent for this purpose;

(f) Rescuing individuals and groups trapped in the fighting;

(g) Providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons under the protection of UNAMIR.

5. The most urgent of those tasks was the first, the effort to secure a cease-fire through contacts with representatives of the armed forces and the RPF, in the hope that this would lead to political efforts to return to the peace process under the Arusha agreement. The Security Council was kept fully informed of these efforts and other developments on the ground. The decision by the Government of Belgium, following the murder of its 10 soldiers in UNAMIR and threats to Belgian nationals, to withdraw its battalion from UNAMIR introduced a new critical element into the deteriorating situation. The Force Commander has been trying to obtain assurances from both sides to declare the airport a neutral zone under UNAMIR's control. He initially received such assurances, but before they could be formalized, RGF changed its stand, leaving open the possibility that the airport could become a combat zone.

6. The members of the Council are aware that, despite direct contacts between the two sides under the auspices of UNAMIR on 15 April 1994, which gave some hope for progress towards a cease-fire, the efforts of UNAMIR have so far been fruitless. Both sides have adopted rigid positions, with RPF presenting preconditions that RGF rejects. In this situation, I regretfully have concluded that there is no prospect of a cease-fire being agreed upon in the coming days. Both the violence in the streets and the fighting between RGF and RPF forces continue. This has brought mortar attacks on concentrations of displaced civilians under UNAMIR protection. UNAMIR headquarters also was hit on 19 April, although there were fortunately no casualties.

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7. The dedicated personnel of UNAMIR, who have performed courageously in dangerous circumstances, cannot be left at risk indefinitely when there is no possibility of their performing the tasks for which they were dispatched. With the departure of the Belgian contingent and non-essential personnel from other contingents, the reduced strength of military personnel in UNAMIR stood, on 20 April, at 1,515 (from 2,165) and Military Observers at 190 (from 321), for a total of 1,705 (from 2,486).

Options proposed

8. The Council will recall that in response to its request I presented, on 14 April, two broad alternatives for dealing with this highly unstable and unpredictable state of affairs in Rwanda. Both options were predicated on the establishment of a cease-fire, without which it would be impossible for UNAMIR to continue to perform its responsibilities under its present mandate.

9. The first option was to retain UNAMIR at a reduced strength (that is, without the Belgian contingent) for a limited period of three or four weeks following the cease-fire. The parties would have been required to reach agreement on the restoration of the Arusha process within this period, in which case UNAMIR would resume its role under its mandate. Otherwise, UNAMIR would be withdrawn in its totality.

10. The second option, following the cease-fire, was to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR, leaving my Special Representative and the Force Commander in Kigali to act as intermediaries for political negotiations for an indefinite period, subject to review by the Security Council, rather than the limited period envisaged in the first alternative. In order to ensure the security of this United Nations team, about 200 to 300 United Nations military personnel would also have remained in Kigali.

11. The two options above were not mutually exclusive. If the efforts under the first had failed to succeed by the end of the stipulated period, it would have been possible to move to the second scenario, instead of withdrawing UNAMIR in its totality.

Observations

12. In the critical situation that continues to prevail, a decision must be reached on whether, and if so, how, the United Nations will maintain its efforts to help a people who have fallen into calamitous circumstances. I offer three alternatives for the Council's consideration.

13. Alternative I. The first alternative is predicated on the conclusion, described above, that there is no realistic prospect of the two opposing forces agreeing on an effective cease-fire in the immediate future. Without a cease-fire, combat between them will continue and so will the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians. This situation could only be changed by the immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its mandate so that it would be equipped and authorized to coerce the opposing forces into a cease-fire, and to attempt to restore law and order and put an end to the killings. This also would make possible the provision and distribution of

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humanitarian assistance by humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations not only in the capital, but in other parts of the country where the population has been displaced or subjected to deprivation as a result of the violence. Further, the restoration of stability in Rwanda would assist in preventing the repercussions of the violence from spreading to neighbouring countries and leading to regional instability. This scenario would require several thousand additional troops and UNAMIR may have to be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

14. In this connection, I should report that the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations called on me on 19 April with a plea to reinforce UNAMIR to enable it to end the chaos in his country. In a telephone conversation on 20 April, President Museweni of Uganda urged that UNAMIR be reinforced and retained in Rwanda, and asked me to convey his request to the Security Council. He added that he was attempting to arrange for troop contributions from countries in the region, and that he personally was directing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between RGF and RPF.

15. Alternative II. The second alternative would be an amended form of the second option presented to the Security Council on 14 April. In this scenario, a small group headed by the Force Commander, with necessary staff, would remain in Kigali to act as intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on a cease-fire, this effort being maintained for a period of up to two weeks or longer, should the Council so prefer. Additional tasks would include assistance in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible in this situation. UNAMIR has received assurances from both sides that they will cooperate in such operations, though there can be no certainty that this will be done.

16. The team would require the support of an infantry company to provide security, as well as a number of military observers to monitor the situation, apart from civilian staff, the total being estimated at about 270. The remainder of UNAMIR personnel would be withdrawn, but UNAMIR, as a mission, would continue to exist. The Special Representative, with a small staff, would continue his efforts to resume his role as intermediary in the political negotiations, with the aim of bringing back the two sides to the Arusha peace process.

17. The arrangements outlined above could be terminated at any moment should it appear that the parties were not cooperating at a political level, or if their activities compromised the safety and security of the UNAMIR group in Kigali.

18. The parties are being reminded that, although the United Nations system and humanitarian agencies already have geared up to provide humanitarian relief and assistance, only a limited amount could be distributed in the scenario outlined above. A full relief effort would be impossible without a cease-fire.

19. Alternative III. The third alternative, which I do not favour, would be the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. If the Security Council were to decide on this option, every effort would be made by UNAMIR to obtain commitments from the two sides that they would take measures to ensure the safety of civilians in the areas under their respective control. However, in view of the extreme nature

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and dimensions of the violence and mass killings over the last two weeks, there is little ground for hope that effective commitments could be obtained and it must be kept in mind that the consequences of complete withdrawal, in terms of human lives lost, could be very severe indeed. There could also be similar repercussions in neighbouring countries where citizens of the ethnic groups found in Rwanda reside.

20. Ultimately, it is only the parties who signed the Arusha agreement, namely the Government of Rwanda (or its successor) and RPF, who must bear the responsibility for deciding whether their country and people find peace or continue to suffer violence.

21. In presenting this report to the Security Council for its consideration, I would like to express my deep sympathy to the Rwandan families who have lost their relatives in these sad times for their country. I would also like to take this opportunity once again to express my deep condolences to the Government of Belgium and to the families of the 10 Belgian peace-keepers who paid with their lives in the cause of peace. I also would like to record my high commendation to the personnel of UNAMIR, in particular my Special Representative and the Force Commander, for the selfless and courageous dedication with which they have devoted themselves to doing their best for the United Nations in extremely hazardous circumstances.

SRSG (FC)

CNR 133 P1/2

UNAMIR

1994 APR 21 04 41

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 20 April 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1222

SUBJECT: Sitrep Burundi

1994 APR 20 P 12 32

For your information, we are attaching copy of Ould-Abdallah's sitrep of today, ref. 025/94. Regards.

CNR 133 P2/2

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OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 20.4.94 Ref BU/SRSG/0156

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH RSSG BUJUMBURA AoA/
FAX No: 1-212-963-50 65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel)
ATTN:	CC: MR. K. ANNAN 1-212-963 92 22 MR. H. KITANNI 1-212-963 21 55
SUBJECT: SITREP No 025/94	No OF PAGES: 1

1. Capital northern neighbourhood - Hutus populated - were again sight of shootings most of last night. It seems that they were mostly by members of security forces trying to deter or provoke youth groups. Hutus think that shooting is part of a drive to push them away from Bujumbura including the last few northern neighbourhoods where they constitute the majority. Information gathered today confirm that there are a few casualties. It should be added that FRODEBU, the party with greater influence on these youth groups is said to have recommended to its followers not to respond to provocations. Today the city is as it has been for the last days tense, busy and quiet. Most talks in political and business circles are about Constitutional Court decision concerning amendment of article 85 of the Constitution.

2. National medias have not yet made it public or commented on it. As of today, Court decision seems to lag wide political backing. Most Hutus see it as a new effort, after October 1993 failed coup, to prevent them from enjoying the fruit of their June political victories (presidential and parliamentarian elections). A large majority of Tutsis do not agree with this "legal" guerilla against institutions and would support smooth presidential succession. Building on these perceptions and in consultation with various personalities, the mission is trying to strenghten and broaden Government political base in support of peaceful succession. If politically secured by Government, Army leadership could also bring its strength to this approach. Its non commissioned officers and privates are however targets to Tutsis political activists. Not surprisingly, these activits are considered to be close or even associates, to former President Bagaza toppled in 1987. He is said to be campaigning hard for a new party he plans to launch - Parti de la réconciliation nationale - soon in support of a comeback. Government and army leaders seem to be aware and concerned of these activities. The mission is trying to convince both to further joint their effort in their country and their own interest.

A. Ould Abdallah
SRSG - Burundi
20 April 1994 AoA/

SRSG FC Major Pazik

UNAMIR CNR 131 P1/9

1994 APR 21 03 59

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, FOR MAJOR PAZIK, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 20 April 1994
NUMBER: **1220**

1. Thank you very much for your MIR 798, providing us with an update on humanitarian cases. We are grateful for your prompt and clear response and we will endeavour from this end to follow your guidance on the pending cases.

2. The request made by the Libyan Foreign Minister was included in our MIR 1113 of 13 April, copy attached. We understand that the request is almost impossible to be acted upon, given the fact that no indication is provided as to names or whereabouts of Libyan Nationals in Rwanda. However, since the Foreign Minister had expressed his wish that UNAMIR provide protection to Libyan Nationals, we proceeded to inform you.

3. Today, Ms. Rivero advised the Tanzanian, Italian, Irish and Spanish Missions of your demarches. All expressed their appreciation for your efforts. The Irish Mission promised to get back to us soonest.

4. Regarding paragraph 4D, we would suggest that you contact the Zairean Embassy in Kigali and explain to them that UNAMIR does not have the capacity to evacuate 10,000 Zaireans out of Rwanda. The telephones of the Permanent Mission of Zaire in New York are disconnected and we therefore believe they have no direct communication with Kinshasa.

Best regards, and again many thanks for your prompt and comprehensive reply.

CNR 131 P2/9

Copy

UNITED NATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 13 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1113

---

1. The Permanent Mission of Spain has approached Rivero this morning regarding the evacuation of five Spanish nuns (Dominican Order), who are in Burehe near or close to Byumba. The Spanish Mission would be grateful for any assistance UNAMIR could provide for their safe evacuation:

a) Superior General, Rosario Yoldi Erro
b) Vicar General, Juana Maria Tirapu Murillo
c) Sister, Ana Maria Sainz de Murieta Zudaire
d) Sister, Adelaida Alguacil Agudo
e) Sister, Ina Erro Muro

2. The Permanent Mission of Libya has written the enclosed request dated 12 April 1993 "to protect Libyan nationals in Rwanda and endeavour to evacuate them to the closest safe location".

3. A request concerning the evacuation of 250 Tanzanian nationals was transmitted today to Omayad by the Acting UNDP Resident Representative in Dar Es Salaam. The magnitude of this request might require the Government of Tanzania to provide a plane or for ICRC to evacuate them. Since the Tanzanian Ambassador is still in Kigali, it might be helpful to contact him, it at all possible, to determine how UNAMIR could assist, within the present constraints, in their evacuation.

4. Finally, the status of three French nationals who were apparently killed in the proximity of Hotel Meridien is still pending a reply, as discussed by Rivero with Kabia yesterday.

Thank you and best regards.

CNR 131 P3/9

94-17600

Translated from Arabic

Permanent Mission of the Great Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations

No.: 9/2

Date: 12 April 1994

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter from Mr. Omar Mustafa Almuntasser, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, requesting the United Nations to protect Libyan nationals in Rwanda and endeavour to evacuate them to the closest safe location.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Ali Ahmed ELHOUDERI
Permanent Representative

His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York

Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison
and International Cooperation

The Secretary

Sir,

The current bloody events in Rwanda have forced States to evacuate their nationals from that country, but in view of the embargo imposed on Libyan aviation it is impossible for us to evacuate ours. We therefore call upon the United Nations to protect them and to endeavour to remove them to the closest safe location.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Omar Mustafa ALMUNTASSER
Secretary of the General People's Committee
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation

Tripoli, 11 April 1994

His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York

CRN 129

CNR 131 P5/9

UNAMIR PAGE 1 OF 5

U N A M I R 1994 APR 20 13 16

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 20 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR 798

SUBJECT: SITREP ON RESCUE MISSIONS

REFERENCE: 1196 DATED 18 APRIL 1994

1. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE REFERENCE AND THE FOLLOWING UPDATE IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WITH ICRC TO HANDOVER ANY CASES THAT ARE NOT COMPLETED IF WE THIN OUT.

3. STATUS REPORT OF CASES IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL WERE EVACUATED FROM THE HOTEL MERIDIEN TO THE AIRPORT ON 19 APRIL 1994.

B. FOUR ITALIAN NUNS LOCATED IN KABGAYI NEAR GITARAMA CANNOT BE EVACUATED WITHOUT A GENDARMERIE ESCORT FOR A UN TEAM. GENDARMERIE WILL NOT PROVIDE ESCORT AT THIS TIME. NEGOTIATIONS ON-GOING. NOTE: THREE CANADIAN PRIESTS ARE AT THE VILLAGE OF KABUYI 2 KM SOUTH OF GITARAMA. IF AN ESCORT IS PROVIDED THESE GROUPS WILL BE EVACUATED CONCURRENTLY ON THE SAME MISSION.

C. LYDIA ITELEBA CANNOT BE EVACUATED UNLESS WE RECEIVE IRISH PAPERS FOR HER. SHE IS IN THE MILLES COLLINES IN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY. PLEASE HAVE IRISH MISSION FORWARD WRITTEN GUARANTEE BY FAX TO UNAMIR SO WE CAN ARRANGE HER TRANSIT TO NAIROBI. PLEASE ACTION.

D. ABRAN UNDER THE CARE OF MOTHER, ELIZABETH AT 83141 CANNOT BE ACTIONED. TELEPHONES DO NOT WORK IN KIGALI. WHO IS MOTHER ELIZABETH AND WHERE DOES SHE LIVE? CHECK OF LISTS WE HAVE PREPARED HAVE NOT REVEALED HER LOCATION. WHICH NATION IS GOING TO PROVIDE PAPERS BY FAX TO UNAMIR FOR THIS CHILD? PLEASE ACTION.

E. CECILE MUKARUBUGA AND HER THREE CHILDREN ARE ALIVE AND WELL IN THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES. THEY CANNOT BE EVACUATED WITHOUT PAPERS. WHICH NATION IS GOING TO PROVIDE PAPERS BY FAX TO UNAMIR FOR THIS FAMILY. PLEASE ACTION

F. 11 SPANISH NUNS AND 16 UNMOs SHOULD BE EVACUATED BY BELGIAN HERCULES FROM BUTARE TODAY WITH RGF APPROVAL.

G. THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE GASSANA FAMILY ARE STILL UNKNOWN AND ARE BEING URGENTLY INVESTIGATED. THEY ARE NOT IN THE MERIDIEN OR THE MILLES COLLINES. ON 7 APRIL (THE MORNING AFTER THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS COMMENCED THEIR ROUNDUPS OF OPPOSITION LEADERS AND THEIR FAMILIES) THE GHANIAN GUARDS HELD OFF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS WHILE THE GENDARMERIE BODYGUARDS TOOK THE FAMILY OUT THE BACK OF THE HOUSE. THE WIFE OF MR GASSANA TOLD THE GHANIAN GUARDS SHE WAS GOING TO HIDE IN THE HOUSE OF HER SISTER WHO LIVED NEARBY. UNAMIR DOES NOT KNOW WHERE THE SISTER LIVES AND SEARCHES BY GHANIAN SOLDIERS HAVE PROVED FRUITLESS. PLEASE CONTACT MR GASSANA AT UNDP IN DAR-ES-SALEM FOR A MAP OF THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE HOUSE AND FAX IT TO US ASAP SO THAT A RESCUE MISSION CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN ADDITION PLEASE APPROACH A COUNTRY TO GRANT PAPERS FOR AIR EVACUATION AS THEIR SAFETY IN A REFUGEE CAMP CANNOT BE GUARANTEED AND THEY ARE MOST LIKELY STILL TARGETS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

H. MR FRANCOIS SOMAYIRE IS BEING RECHECKED TO SEE IF HE IS AT THE MILLES COLLINES.

I. LIBYAN NATIONALS UNKNOWN. WE HAVE NO RECORD OF A REQUEST FROM THE LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTRY.

J. THE TANZANIAN REQUEST WAS FORWARDED TO UNAMIR BY THE BELGIAN JOINT OPERATIONS STAFF. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO MESSAGE FROM TANZANIA. IT IS OUR INTENTION TODAY TO EVACUATE TWO EMBASSY OFFICIALS FROM THE RESIDENCE OF THE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO ASSIST US IN LOCATING THESE 250 INDIVIDUALS FOR EVACUATION. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THEY ARE AT THE TANZANIAN EMBASSY (GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED AREA)AND AT THE CUSTOMS CLEARING HOUSE IN GIKONDO (SCENE OF INTENSIVE FIGHTING). THIS RESCUE IS ON-GOING.

K. CHRISTINE MUHIGANA PARENTS AT 75084. TELEPHONES ARE OUT IN KIGALI. WE NEED NAMES AND AN EXACT LOCATION TO CONDUCT THIS RESCUE.

4. ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC ACTIONS WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO TAKE ARE:

A. UNDP LOCAL STAFF AT THE UNDP COMPOUND INCLUDING MR LYs SECRETARY DONNATELLA. THEY ARE RWANDESE AND WILL REQUIRE TRAVEL PAPERS. PLEASE ADVISE WHICH NATION WILL PROVIDE?

B. ONE CANADIAN CITIZEN WHO LOST HIS PAPERS HAS BEEN VERIFIED AS A CANADIAN, MR FRANCOIS SOMARYIRE AND SHOULD BE EXTRACTED TODAY.

C. MR NTAWIHA AND HIS FAMILY LOCATION WILL BE CHECKED BY UNMO TEAM AT ST MICHELS CATHEDRAL (ALONG WITH 10000 OTHER REFUGEES) TODAY.

D. THE EMBASSY OF ZAIRE HAS APPROACHED UNAMIR BY LETTER (ATTACHED) TO ASSIST IN THE EVACUATION OF 10,000 ZAIREAN CITIZENS. TO DATE WE HAVE EVACUATED OVER 300 ZAIREANS. HOWEVER, THIS TASK IS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR UNAMIR AT THIS TIME. ZAIRE ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE RGF. ZAIREANS ARE UNDER NO DANGER FROM THE RPF. THEREFORE WE RECOMMEND UNNY APPROACH THE ZAIREAN MISSION IN NEW YORK AND REQUEST THEIR GOVERNMENT ENTER INTO A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE RGF TO ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT A ZAIREAN EXPATRIATE EVACUATION TO ZAIRE. THIS IS A DESPERATE MATTER WHICH REQUIRES YOUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

C

4. TO DATE UNAMIR HAS ASSISTED IN THE EVACUATION OF OVER 4000 PERSONS. IN ADDITION WE NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY 14,000 REFUGEES SHELTERED ~~NEAR~~ OUR CAMPS. INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS EXCEPT ICRC HAVE ABANDONED RWANDA. RELIEF SUPPLIES ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTANT EXCEPT FOR LIMITED ICRC AMOUNTS. CAMPS ARE DESPERATELY SHORT OF WATER, FOOD, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, SANITATION FACILITIES ETC. UNAMIR STILL AWAITS THE ARRIVAL OF A DHA HUMANITARIAN ASSESSMENT TEAM TO ASSIST US IN THIS TASK. THE TEAM HAS BEEN IN NAIROBI FOR TWO DAYS AND IS STILL AWAITING CLEARANCE FROM SECURITY AT UNNY. PLEASE INTERVENE AND OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR THIS TEAM TO ARRIVE SO THAT THE ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE AND RELIEF SUPPLIES THAT ARE URGENTLY NEEDED CAN BE DELIVERED TO KIGALI AND DISTRIBUTED.

5. IN ADDITION PLEASE DO NOT PROVIDE OUR TELEPHONE NUMBER TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR AGENCY. UNAMIR IS SWAMPED WITH TELEPHONE CALLS FROM AROUND THE WORLD OF PERSONS LOOKING FOR FAMILY MEMBERS AND FRIENDS. THIS ONLY DELAYS THE EVACUATION PROCESS AND TIES UP OUR LINES WHICH ARE URGENTLY NEEDED FOR OPERATIONAL MATTERS. IN ADDITION PLEASE INFORM ALL PERMANENT MISSIONS TO PASS REQUESTS THROUGH YOU. WE ARE SWAMPED WITH REQUESTS FROM NATIONS AND AGENCIES. IN ADDITION WE REQUIRE FEEDBACK IF PEOPLE ARE FOUND BY OTHER MEANS THAN OURSELVES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WE HAVE SEARCHED FOR PERSONS WHO HAVE ALREADY LEFT RWANDA BY OTHER MEANS. THIS UNNECESSARILY IS ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF UNAMIR MILITARY PERSONNEL.

C

6. IN SEVERAL CASES YOU HAVE NOTED WHERE WE STATE "NEED PAPERS" OR "NOT AT THIS TIME". THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT KENYAN OFFICIALS HAVE VOICED INCREASED ANGER WITH UN PERSONNEL IN NAIROBI FOR EVACUATING RWANDESE REFUGEES TO KENYA WHICH WILL BECOME A KENYAN PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, VERBALLY ONLY, THEY HAVE STATED THEY MAY HAVE TO DEPORT REFUGEES BACK TO RWANDA. NATIONS MUST BE APPROACHED TO PROVIDE PAPERS FOR THESE PERSONS IF WE ARE TO EVACUATE THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY OR WE RISK LOSING THE WHOLE SYSTEM. "NOT AT THIS TIME" REFERS TO THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA OF THE REFUGEE. IF MILITIAS ARE RAMPANT IN THE AREA, TO REMOVE A RWANDESE FROM HIDING WOULD ONLY ENDANGER THEIR LIFE AND THE LIVES OF THE UNAMIR MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO ARE ATTEMPTING

TO EVACUATE THEM. IT IS BETTER TO STAY HIDDEN AND SAFE THAN TO RISK THEIR LIVES IN A FUTILE ESCAPE ATTEMPT WHICH ALSO ENDANGERS THE LIVES OF THE UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND COULD THREATEN OTHER OPERATIONS IF THE MILITIAS OR THE RGF STOP CONVOY RESCUE MISSIONS. EACH CASE IS CALCULATED AS TO THE RISK TO THE REFUGEES, TO THE UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND TO THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. IF THE RISK IS TOO GREAT THE MISSION IS DELAYED UNTIL THE SITUATION CHANGES AND REDUCES THE RISKS.

7. UNAMIR PERSONNEL, SINCE THE START OF THE WAR, HAVE ON A DAILY BASIS RISKED THEIR LIVES TO SAVE PEOPLE, WHETHER EXPATRIATES OR NATIONALS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN OUR ABILITIES AND WITHIN THE LEVEL OF RISK TO CONTINUE PERFORMING THESE TASKS. PLEASE ACTION THE REQUESTS ABOVE TO ASSIST US IN THIS HUMANITARIAN TASK.

8. REGARDS.

5/5

CNR 131 P9/9

COMMUNAUTE ZAIROISE DE KIGALI
C/O AMBASSADE DU ZAIRE
B.P: 169 KIGALI
TEL: 7 5026

Kigali, le 17 / 04 / 1994

DR KABIT

S.O.S Communauté zaïroise de Kigali

1 Cette page
2. 10,000
3 Pas autant de chef
4. Plus vers
5. Peuple en panne. Pas
6 Bien gouvernement
Interahamwe + RGF

Au Représentant Spécial de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda.-

COPIE POUR INFORMATION :

- A la Croix Rouge Internationale
- A Monsieur le Commandant en Chef des forces de la MINUAR
- Au Ministre de la défense de la République Rwandaise
- Au Représentant du H.C.R. au Rwanda.
- Au Ministre des affaires étrangère de la République Rwandaise
- Au Préfet de la Ville de Kigali.

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial de la MINUAR,

Nous, la Communauté zaïroise à Kig réfugiée dans l'enceinte de l'Ambassade du Zaïre depuis le 11 avril avons l'honneur de vous lancer cet ultime S.O.S de toute une populat en détresse et abandonnée à elle-même :

1°) Nous sommes une population de de dix mille (10.000) têtes humaines, exposées à la faim, à l'insalu brité due à l'absence des toilettes, d'eau potable, d'abri contre la pluie et le soleil, étouffée dans un espace vraiment étroit sans ass tance médicale (le cas des femmes qui accouchent, avortent, les béb qui suffoquent, ...)

2°) L'insécurité devient grandiss car nous craignons l'infiltration, les exécutions sommaires des réfu giés tel que cela s'est passé ailleurs, les obus qui sifflent au-des de nos têtes, tout cela après plus de deux semaines de traumatisme.

Pour éviter l'hécatombe de [illegible] population étrangère dans notre pays hôte, nous vous [illegible] loir faire diligence pour nous trouver de [illegible] en République du Zaïre. L'[illegible] nos compatriotes(300 [illegible] sacrifiés de 10.000 [illegible]

[illegible] l'initiative d'une [illegible] [illegible] MINUAR, [illegible] Crise [illegible]

A/MA

- Get aircraft for forum officials
- Get aircraft for SRSG
- Sent 1-9A to confirm departure place and time

21/4

SRSG FC

CNR 132 P1/2

UNAMIR

94 APR 21 04 04 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 20 April 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1221

SUBJECT: **Meeting of RGF and RPF - Arusha**

94 APR 20 P 3:32

1. Re our UNAMIR 1178 of 18 April and your MIR-802 of today on the above, we wish to confirm that the response of the RGF has been conveyed to the Permanent Mission of Tanzania.

2. We have noted that you have not yet received a reaction from the RPF. However, the Permanent Mission of Tanzania has advised us that the Vice-Chairman of RPF has just visited Dar-es-Salaam and indicated that RPF would be prepared to attend the proposed meeting in Arusha on Saturday, but wants to know who the RGF interlocutors will be before finalizing their decision.

3. The Permanent Mission of Tanzania has also addressed to us the attached letter requesting the assistance of UNAMIR to enable the representatives of the RGF to travel to Arusha in time for the meeting on Saturday. In addition, Tanzania would like other Rwandese political parties to participate in the meeting and is requesting that this message be conveyed to them by UNAMIR. Finally, Tanzania is also inviting you to attend the meeting.

4. We believe your participation in this meeting would be appropriate, but we will be guided by your advice. Please indicate asap what assistance UNAMIR could provide regarding the travel of RGF representatives to Tanzania and confirm to us that the invitation to the other political parties has been duly conveyed. Many thanks and best regards.

CNR 132 P2/2

UNITED REPUBLIC OF

TANZANIA

TZNY/D.60/93/70

DPA/OUSG
Rec'd 20-4-94
ACTION:
KA - IR
WdS
Infp:
Rcd NG

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
205 EAST 42ND STREET, ROOM 1300
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017
(212) 972-9160

20 April 1994

20/4 5:30 pm
SRC/CSNT
Ccd: HA
IR

Mr. Marrack I. Goulding
Director
Department of Political Affairs
United Nations
New York

Dear Mr. Goulding,

Further to Note Verbale TZNY/D.60/93/69 dated 18 April 1994 regarding Tanzania's intention to convene an urgent meeting between representatives of the interim Government of Rwanda, the Rwandese Patriotic Front and other parties to the conflict, with a view to assisting international efforts to reverse the tragic situation prevailing in Rwanda.

Upon further instruction from my Government I have the honour to request that UNAMIR should assist in airlifting representatives of the Government side, including Ministers, high-ranking officials and members of the armed forces currently at Gitarama. Considering that the situation in Kigali remains fluid, the only way out is through Goma, Zaire, offering the possibility for an airlift to Arusha.

Regarding RPF, arrangements are on hand to get their representatives to travel to Arusha in time for the meeting.

Tanzania also strongly feels that the presence of representatives from other political formations will be most helpful in finding a way out of the deteriorating situation in Rwanda. In this connection my Government requests that UNAMIR gets this message through to all parties concerned.

It was inadvertent on my part to omit in the Note Verbale referred to above to convey the invitation extended to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to attend the Arusha meeting. Tanzania recalls the excellent support afforded by the United Nations throughout the arduous Arusha Peace negotiation process and expects that this co-operation will continue at this difficult situation in Rwanda.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

U.K. Mwambutukutu
Charge d' Affaires, a.i.

cc: MFA, Dsm

United Nations
Development Programme

MKFT19

UNDP

UNAMIR World Development

'94 APR 21 05 52

FACSIMILIE TRANSMISSION FORM

FACSIMILIE REFERENCE NO. 1567 **DATE: 21 April 1994**

AGENCY/ACCOUNT TO CHARGE : UNDP **REF : ORG 130/1/UN**

TO : **NAME: Dr. J. Booh-Booh, SRSG, UNAMIR, KIGALI**
CITY/COUNTRY: Kigali, Rwanda
FAX NO : (212) 963 - 3090
c.c. Mr. Marrach Goulding, UNSG, DPA
FAX NO : (212) 963 - 4104
c.c. Dr. Ibrahim Msabaha, PS, Foreign Affairs, DSM
FAX No : 46748

(1)

(2)

FC

How do we provide Air Transport?

BMB
MG
N/MP

FROM: **Toon Vissers**
Resident Representative a.i.

This transmission consists of the following pages including this page : 2

Subject: **PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, ARUSHA 23 APRIL 1994**

1. We have been trying to ascertain the U.N. Secretariat's plans regarding its participation in the above talks. Furthermore, we transmitted request from Tanzania Government, to UN to provide air transport for Rwandese Government representatives from GOMA (ZAIRE) to Arusha. While New York was uncertain about these two issues because of lack of official invitation/request for transport, the Office of Mr. Marrack Goulding advised us that decision to participate/provide air transport has been left to your good self.

2. I just spoke to Dr. Ibrahim Msabaha, Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who confirmed their wish that United Nations, particularly yourself, attend the talks. The Principal Secretary mentioned they would try to get an official invitation to UN/yourself. As they (rightly) consider us part of UN, it will probably be faxed by this office.

UNDP Dar es Salaam has been invited to attend the talks and we will be in Arusha on Saturday after attending Friday meeting with USG Hansen (DHA) in Nairobi.

SRSG (FC) E/DIR

Matasalamat Mansion, Zanaki Street/Samora Avenue, P.O. Box 9182, Dar es Salaam, TANZANIA.
Telephone: (051) 46711/4 or 36834/5, Cable Address, UNDEVPRO, DAR ES SALAAM, Telex: 41284, Fax: (255 51) 46718

3. Principal Secretary Msabaha furthermore asked us to transmit the request that you provide your good offices to ensure that the Rwanda Government delegation include high-ranking military staff for cease-fire and other military aspects of the talks and also members of all political parties.

4. Your early reply on the three above matters will be greatly appreciated. Early advice on air transport for Government representatives is particularly appreciated. You can reach me on : telephone (255)(51) 46716 or 32475; fax 46718 Dr. Msabaha : telephone 68041 (home) 46207 (office) fax: 46748.

Approved by:Toon Vissers
Resident Representative a.i.

TV/asm

FC

CNR 128 P1/1

UNAMIR

1994 APR 21 03 53

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 20 April 1994
NUMBER: 1207

Reference paragraph 4 of MIR 798 of 20 April. As discussed with Baril on the phone, the Security Coordinator's Office will not provide the clearance for the DHA Team to visit and assess humanitarian assistance in Rwanda until we receive your answer to our Fax of 18 April 1994 (MIR 1170).

Best regards.

HAC
A/MA
Read this cable and let's sort it out.
21/4

SRSG (FC) CNR 127 P1/1

UNAMIR
'94 APR 20 10 46'

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 20 April 1994
NUMBER: 1205

1. We have been informed today by the Permanent Mission of Spain that since 13 April, two (2) Spanish Hercules aircraft are assisting in the evacuation of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent, in close cooperation with UNAMIR and Belgian Authorities.

2. These aircraft~~s~~ have flown between Nairobi and Kigali, and from 21 April they will be transporting personnel, together with military materiel, between Nairobi and Brussels and will return to Nairobi to continue evacuation tasks as necessary and when feasible.

3. The Permanent Mission indicates that Spanish Authorities are closely following the Rwanda Situation and will be examining very carefully the recommendations of the Secretary-General on the future of UNAMIR. They also indicate their satisfaction in contributing to and supporting the activities of UNAMIR.

Best regards.

Pierre Kalibutwa, please find attached a note of thanks from the Deputy High Commissioner. Please share with your colleagues.

Best regards.

UNAMIR
94 APR 20 03 13

SRSG
FC
Maj Pazik

CNR 125 P1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

94 APR 19 P 10:10

IMMEDIATE

A/MA
Can you prepare response?

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, FOR MAJOR PAZIK, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 18 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: **1196**

1. I would appreciate it if an update on the follow-up to these cases could be provided by your office prior to imminent thinning-out of UNAMIR.

a. Egyptian personnel at Embassy in Kigali.
b. Italian nuns four (4) located in Kabgayi near Gitarama.
c. Irish Mission referral of Lydia Iteleba.
d. UN/ECA, staff request for news of daughter Abran, under the care of mother, Elizabeth - at 83141.
e. Cecile Mukarubuga, Acord Regional Director for East Africa, and her three children, last heard of at Hotel Milles Collines.
f. Spanish Mission referral of Spanish nuns.
g. Gasana family, as referred by UNDP, Dar es Salaam.
h. Mr. Somayire, Francois, ITC Project Director in Kigali, last heard of at Hotel Milles Collines.
i. Libyan Nationals - request made by Foreign Minister.
j. Tanzanian Mission's request for assistance in the evacuation of 250 Tanzanians.
k. Christine Muhigana, parents in Kigali, telephone 75084.

2. Your urgent assistance will be appreciated.

3. Regarding the evacuation of UNHCR staff member Pierre Kalibutwa, please find attached a note of thanks from the Deputy High Commissioner. Please share with your colleagues.

Best regards.

NATIONS UNIES
LE HAUT COMMISSAIRE ADJOINT
POUR LES RÉFUGIÉS

UNITED NATIONS
THE DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES

Case postale 2500
CH-1211 Genève 2 Dépôt
Suisse

18 April 1994

Kofi,

Dear Mr. Annan,

I am writing on behalf of the High Commissioner, who is presently on mission in Tokyo.

On Friday evening, we learned with great relief of the successful evacuation of UNHCR staff member Pierre Kaliburwa from Kigali. The precarious situation of Mr. Kaliburwa had been a cause of considerable concern and we would like to thank you and all those involved in New York for your efforts in securing his safe evacuation.

We would be grateful if you would pass on our most sincere thanks and appreciation to all the UNAMIR staff who were instrumental in conducting the rescue operation. We are particularly indebted to General Dallaire and Colonel Pochet and their men for their commitment, bravery and professionalism in carrying out the evacuation of Mr. Kaliburwa. Their unfailing support undoubtedly saved the life of our UNHCR colleague.

Yours sincerely,

With kind regards,

Gerald Walzer

Mr. Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations
United Nations Headquarters
United Nations, N.Y. 10017

SRSG FC

CNR 124 P1/3

UNAMIR OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1994 APR 20 03 12

IMMEDIATE

1994 APR 19 P 18:10

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 19 April 1994
NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1195

SUBJECT: Security Council Consultations

1. Please find attached a summary of the informal consultations held yesterday by the Security Council on Rwanda.

2. Further informal consultations were held late this afternoon. Mr. Gharekhan briefed the Council on the basis of your latest sitreps, pointing out that the situation continues to deteriorate and that the prospects for an early cease-fire are bleak. He indicated that a cease-fire proposal submitted to the parties by UNAMIR had been welcomed by the RGF, but rejected by RPF, which was discouraging further contacts until its pre-conditions for a cease-fire are accepted in full.

3. Mr. Gharekhan stated that, under these circumstances, UNAMIR could no longer carry out its mandate. In this connection, he pointed out that the Secretary-General had received from the SRSG and FC of UNAMIR, recommendations which he was considering. Mr. Gharekhan added that it was the Secretary-General's intention to submit a special report to the Security Council tomorrow.

4. A copy of the draft report, submitted this evening to the Secretary-General for his approval, is being sent to you under separate cover. It is expected that the report will be issued tomorrow morning and that the Security Council will consider it in the afternoon. We will keep you informed. Regards.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Monday, 18 April 1994

Rwanda

The President reported that Permanent Representative of Bangladesh had called him by telephone that morning stressing the importance his Government attached to the participation of its forces in Rwanda. However, the gravity of the situation was causing his Government concern, and the Permanent Representative had asked for an assurance from the Council that it was monitoring the situation, that he would be advised if the threat increased and that if it did the Council would take action.

Referring to the Council's discussions of the previous Friday, he had conveyed to the Permanent Representative the Secretariat's advice that a premature withdrawal would be the worst of all possible solutions. The Permanent Representative of Bangladesh had indicated that he had already told his Government as much.

Nigeria reported that he had very recently spoken to the Secretary-General of the OAU on OAU efforts to achieve a cease-fire within the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement. In talks between the OAU and the Vice-President of the RPF, Dr. Salim had expressed the OAU's deep distress at the thousands of Rwandese who had been killed, and had called for an end to the killing and for a cease-fire. The RPF had replied that they must protect their own.

In calling for a cessation of hostilities between the Government forces and the RPF, the OAU had given its support for talks between the two parties under UN auspices. The OAU's long-term concern was to work towards the transitional institutions set out under the Arusha agreement.

He reported also that President Museveni had met with the RPF in Kampala three days ago, had called for a cease-fire, and had stressed that the OAU's role was both important and complementary to that of the UN.

Mr. Gharekhan said that UNAMIR's presence outside Kigali was very limited, and therefore so was his information. Fighting had continued in Kigali since the previous day, and the RPF was now in control of the north of the city. RPF troops were continuing to pour into Kigali, although their offensive had slowed. Whether the slow-down was deliberate or had resulted from increased resistance by Government forces was unknown. Ahead of the RPF advance, racial and ethnic killings were continuing and even increasing. The evacuation of foreign nationals was continuing. The Force Commander had called for a cease-fire, but the RPF had insisted that there would be no cease-fire unless and until the killings by Government forces ahead of the RPF's advance stopped, and had refused to engage in talks with the interim Government in the belief that such talks would imply recognition of that Government.

UNAMIR's forces were regrouping in Kigali, especially around the airport. The Belgian troops had already left, and Ghanaian troops would take over at the airport the following day. Three hundred Ghanaian troops were still falling back through the DMZ; some injuries, none serious, had been reported.

The Force Commander and the Special Representative were reviewing the situation, and would report to the Secretary-General in a few days. However, the humanitarian situation in Kigali was becoming very serious, and the Force Commander had set up a humanitarian assistance cell; the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was to send an advance team to Kigali to oversee the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, no delivery of humanitarian assistance would be possible in the absence of a cease-fire.

The President said that he had just received information that, within the context of attempts to arrange a cease-fire, the United Nations was trying to organize a meeting in Arusha between the Government and the RPF, and proposed that the Council should await further information on the situation in Rwanda before discussing the matter further.

SRSG FC.

CNR-122 P1/5

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 19 April 1994
NUMBER: **1187**

UNAMIR 19 APR 17 12

We have been requested by the Rwandese Ambassador Bizimana to have the attached message from his counterpart in Kampala transmitted to Government Authorities in Kigali. No other communications into Rwanda seem to be working. Please kindly expedite.

Best regards.

19/4

SRSG FC

CNR 118 P1/1

UNAMIR

94 APR 19 02:59

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 18 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: 1176

1. Ould Abdallah, SRSG Burundi, has relayed a message to my office from the Egyptian Ambassador in Bujumbura, who has expressed concern about the fate of Egyptian embassy personnel in Kigali.

2. I believe you have been in touch with the Egyptian Ambassador in Kigali. Nevertheless, I thought it would be pertinent to relay the information.

Best regards.

(2) A/MA Send them an answer plse
ORS 12c 19/4

(3) FC Dist. Deputed Colleagues.
BM
MM
A/MA

SRSG

FC

CNR-114 P1/2

UNAMIR

1994 APR 18 17 181

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1994 APR 18 P 12 58

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 18 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: 1171

1. For your information, attached is a copy of a note verbale received from the Embassy of the Democratic and People's Republic of Algeria in Dar es Salaam, thanking the United Nations for its assistance in the evacuation of three (3) Algerian Nationals.

Best regards.

FC

BOB
may
AIMA

EMBASSY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA

DAR ES SALAAM

سفارة الجزائر
دار السلام

DAR/AMB/82/94

The Embassy of the Democratic and People's Republic of Algeria in Dar es salaam presents its compliments to the United Nations Development Programme and has the honour to inform it that the three (3) Algerians Nationals, who were teaching at the "Institut Africain et Mauricien de Statistiques et d'Economie Appliquee" of Kigali, arrived safely in Nairobi on Wednesday evening, April 13,1994.

The Embassy of Algeria sincerely thanks the United Nations for the assistance provided with a view to their evacuation from the Rwandese capitale and avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Development Programme the assurances of its highest consideration.

Dar es salaam, April 15,1994

United Nations Development Programme
Matasalamat Mansion
P.O. Box 9182
DAR ES SALAAM.

SRSG (FC)

CNR-113 P1/5

UNAMIR
1994 APR 18 17 15

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

(1)

IMMEDIATE
APR 18 P12 58

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 18 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1170**

1. The attached memorandum from the UN Security Coordinator is self-explanatory and requires your immediate comments on (b) and (c).

2. In the meantime, Dallaire's fax of 17 April recommending that a humanitarian assistance advance team be deployed to Kigali has been brought to the attention of DHA and the Security Coordinator.

3. Given the catastrophic situation developing in Kigali, we concur with your request subject to the clarifications requested by the Security Coordinator.

Best regards.

(2) FC
Done.

(3) HAC
Prepare fax answer ASAP.
1/4

CNR-113 P2/5

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. S. Iqbal Riza
Assistant Secretary General
Department of Peace Keeping Operations

Date: 17 April 1994

Ref:

From: Benon V. Sevan
United Nations Security Co-ordinator

Subject: UN Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Team for Rwanda

With reference to the attached memorandum dated 17 April just received from Mr. Fareed, Officer-in-Charge of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, I wish to state that in principle I welcome the initiative taken by DHA and the agencies concerned.

Nevertheless, because of the prevailing situation in Kigali, before granting security clearance to the mission, I should like to receive in writing confirmation that the following conditions would be met:

✓ (a) UNAMIR is in full agreement with the arrival of the mission at this time, as well as its objectives;

(b) UNAMIR assumes responsibility for the security and safety of the members of the mission throughout the entire duration of their stay;

OK

(c) UNAMIR is in a position to ensure that the distribution of relief supplies as envisaged in paragraph 1 (d) of Mr. Fareed's memorandum could be carried out in conditions of safety and security.

To be strictly decided on a

I would be most grateful if you could kindly transmit this request to UNAMIR urgently in order to enable me to act on the request made by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Unless I receive confirmation from UNAMIR, I will not be in a position to authorize the mission to proceed to Kigali.

team is one the Jean

I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for all the assistance and cooperation received from your Department and UNAMIR.

c.c. Mr. Aimé
Mr. Annan
Mr. Goulding
Mr. Hansen
Mr. Fareed

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: A: Mr. Benon Sevan, Assistant-Secretary-General
Security Coordinator

DATE: 17 April 1994

REFERENCE:

THROUGH: S/C DE:

FROM: DE: Q. Shaukat Fareed, Officer-in-Charge
Department of Humanitarian Affairs

SUBJECT: OBJET: **UN Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Team for Rwanda**

1. Given the critical humanitarian situation in Rwanda, Under-Secretary-General Peter Hansen, following discussions with humanitarian agencies, and in response to requests from SRSG and the Force Commander UNAMIR, has decided to despatch a Humanitarian Assistance Team to Rwanda as quickly as may be feasible. Mr. Grant has also discussed this matter with you. The following elements may be considered:

(a) Mission Objective

To provide urgently needed relief assistance including the distribution of relief supplies already available or enroute.

(b) Timing of Mission

In view of the necessary preparatory work that is required to be completed, the mission could leave for Kigali as soon as possible, possibly within 36 hours. The despatch of the mission will depend on confirmation that UNAMIR will provide the necessary security and protection.

(c) Composition of Mission

Mr. Lance Clarke - DHA senior official currently in Nairobi will lead the mission, of a maximum of ten persons. The mission will comprise of representatives from UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, (UNDP) and WHO.

(d) Distribution of Supplies

Supplies will be distributed to the needy beleaguered populations in Kigali through the functioning hospitals and the football stadium. This will be in support of UNAMIR, ICRC and other NGOs operational on the ground.

(e) DHA Coordination

DHA will coordinate these efforts through its senior staff now in Nairobi. Additionally as appropriate it will deploy staff in the UNAMIR Force Commander's office in Kigali to ensure effective liaison between the humanitarian and peacekeeping aspects of the operation.

2. I trust the information provided above will allow you to issue a security clearance for the mission to proceed. Participation in the mission will be entirely voluntary.

cc: Mr. M. Goulding, USG
Department of Political Affairs

Mr. K. Annan, USG
Department of Peace-Keeping Operations

SRSG FC CNR - 111 P1/2

UNAMIR

1994 APR 17 21 58

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH - BOOH/DALLAIRE/UNAMIR

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEWYORK

DATE : 17 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1168**

1. Ref. your MIR 777 to Kittani and subsequent telephone conversation Dallaire/Baril.

2. Your approach regarding cease fire negotiations with the two parties, especially as outlined in discussions with Baril, has our full endorsement on the following lines:

a/ It should be made clear to the RPF that the Security Council and some troop contributing countries are leaning heavily on the Secretary-General to withdraw UNAMIR. Unless there is a cease fire, there will be no chance of UNAMIR staying on.

b/ The RPF should be told that to insist on all four conditions simultaneously will not be conducive in establishing a cease fire, but that what emerges as an acceptable precondition is the massacres to stop - RGF must give assurance that they will make every effort to this end.

c/ The other three conditions namely, to condemn the Republican Guard, to condemn and arrest the paramilitary and other militia, and to denounce the interim President and Cabinet, can be subject of negotiations during the cease fire.

3. Therefore, our advice to RPF should be to accept the RGF offer of a cease-fire subject only to the precondition at "b" above. This could even be a limited cease-fire of, say, 72 hours for discussions to establish a durable cease-fire beyond that period, during which the issues at "c" above can be raised.

4. It should be impressed upon RPF that without some quick agreement on a cease-fire - even a limited one - by Wednesday at the latest, the Security Council can be expected to decide to withdraw UNAMIR from Rwanda. At that time, RPF could be blamed for not accepting cease-fire to allow discussions to begin.

5. Once a durable cease-fire has been established, the creation of a framework for the resumption of the Arusha Peace process can take place within an agreed timetable (3-4 weeks). Only in this scenario will it be possible to anticipate the continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda.

6. To recapitulate, it is essential to establish a limited cease-fire (possibly extendable) to agree on conditions for a durable cease-fire and for political negotiations (limited in time) for resumption of the Arusha process. Please also stress that without a cease-fire, humanitarian assistance operations cannot begin.

7. Your plans to start sharp staged reduction of UNAMIR personnel approved. This also will demonstrate imminence of withdrawal of UNAMIR if cease-fire is not achieved.

8. Once again, our high commendation to both of you and your staffs for your dedicated efforts to restore stability to Rwanda.

Best regards.

CNR - 110 P1/3

UNAMIR

1994 APR 17 21 56

SRSG FC.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE/UNAMIR/KIGALI

FROM K. ANNAN/DPKO/NEW YORK

DATE 17 APRIL 1994

NUMBER **1167**

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I AM COPYING A COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM OULD ABDALLAH IN BUJUMBURA DATED 14 APRIL 1994.

DFC

17/4

For DFC
Seen
19/4
MA

FL
Info.

BMB
pay
A/MA

OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 14.4.94 Ref BU/SRSG/0148

TO: MR. MARRACK GOULDING USG/DPA UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH RSSG BUJUMBURA AoA
FAX No: 1-212-963-50 65	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel)
ATTN:	CC: MR. K. ANNAN 1-212-963 92 22 MR. H. KITANNI 1-212-963 21 55
SUBJECT: SITREP No 022/94	No OF PAGES: 2

1. Situation remains calm. Yesterday field visits by official groups (see previous SITREPS) were very successful. Impact of fallouts from Rwanda continues to be our major preoccupation. In this connection the sensitive case of 187 Rwandese refugees blocked at Bujumbura airport is now solved. They start leaving on a French plane at 2:00 p.m. local time for Bukavu (Zaire). Two or three rotations will be needed to complete the operation. Politically their departure is a great relief.

2. On one of its return to Bujumbura the plane will bring back 6 UNAMIR officers presently in Bukavu: 2 Congoleses (1 major, 1 captain), 3 Zimbabweans (1 major, 2 captains) and 1 Togolese (captain). Their arrival has been negociated with local authorities. The agreement is that they will arrive in civilian cloths and will be under our mission control. In this connection HCR delegate has been very active for the all operation of Rwandese repatriation from Bujumbura to Bukavu.

3. As you may recall, US Government decided in the aftermath of Rwanda crisis to repatriate families and non necessary staff in Burundi. A number of these persons will leave this week-end. Today Germany recommended to German wives and children to leave Burundi. It is not excluded that other countries might follow. It seems however that in both cases concerned persons have made it known to their governement that they prefer to stay for the time being.

4. In connection to Rwanda situation, please find for your information attached non official list of provisional Government of that country.

A. Ould Abdallah
SRSG - Burundi
14 April 1994 AoA

"GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE" DU RWANDA

Président and Head of State : M. SINDIKUBWABO Théodore

1. M. Jean KAMBANDA , Premier Ministre : (M D R)
2. M. Jérôme BICAMUMPAKA, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères (MDR)
3. M. Prosper MUGIRANJA, Ministre de la Fonction Publique (MRND)
4. M. Emmanuel NKUNDABAHIZI, Ministre des Finances (P S D)
5. M. Justin MUKIENZI, Ministre du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat (P L)
6. Mme Andrée RWAMAKUHA, Ministre de l'Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire (M D R)
7. Mme Pauline NYIRAMASERU, Ministre de la Famille et de la Promotion Féminine (MRND)
8. Mme Agnés NTAMAVYARINO, Ministre de la Justice (P L)
9. M. Rafiki Yacinthe NSENGIYUMVA, Ministre des Travaux Publics (P S D)
10. M. Straton HARUMUKUNZI, Ministre de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage (P S D)
11. M. Augustin NYIRABATMARI, Ministre de la Planification (MRND)
12. M. Daniel MBANCURA, Ministre de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique (MRND)
13. M. Chiezel MITEGEKA, Ministre de l'Information (M D R)
14. M. Augustin BIZIMANA, Ministre de la Défense (MRND)
15. M. André NTACERURA, Ministre des Transports et des Télécommunications (MRND)
16. M. Casimir BIZIMUMCE, Ministre de la Santé (MRND)

CUN 003

NYK PLS PROTECT UNAMIR

UNOMUR MONUOR

94 APR 15 07 58

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

CODE CABLE VIA NEWYORK CNR 101

OUTGOING FAX NO. 559
15 APRIL 1994

PAGE 1 OF 2

TO: MGEN R. DALLAIRE FC UNAMIR KIGALI MISC 509	FROM: COL ASRAR ACTING CMO UNOMUR KABALE
FAX NO: (07) 84266	FAX NO: 256 488-23816
SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPORT	

1. AREA WEST REPORTED THE FOLLOWING:

A. ON 12 APRIL 1994, IN THE AFTERNOON, NEAR CYANIKA CP/OP, A MEETING WAS HELD BETWEEN THE COMMANDER OF THE 25TH NRA BN (KISORO) AND SOME RPF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHICH LASTED ABOUT 45 MINUTES.

B. LATE IN THE EVENING, 2250 HRS, A PATROL AT CYANIKA SAW A GROUP OF SEVEN RPF SOLDIERS CAME TO THE BORDER, TRANSPORTED BY A PICK-UP AND AFTER DEPLOYING, THEY APPROACHED THE UGANDA BORDER ON FOOT. OUR PATROL KEPT OBSERVING THEM WITH THE NIGHT VISION DEVICES. AFTER 10 MINUTES THE BN COMMANDER OF THE 25TH NRA BRI ARRIVED ALSO WITH A PICK-UP, AND UNLOADED SOME "MATERIAL", WHICH WAS

CHR-101 CHN 003

CODE CABLE

STOCKED AT CYANIKA NRA'S COMPOUND. THE PATROL CHANGED THEIR POSITION TO OBSERVE BETTER AND COULD SEE AT THE BACK SIDE OF THE BARRACKS SOME "PEOPLE" CARRYING OUT FEW BOXES AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE BUSH. THE NRA BARRACKS/CAMP ARE LOCATED 100 METERS FROM THE BORDER.

2. LOCAL NRA AUTHORITY HAS BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THE ABOVE SUSPICIOUS TIVITY. THIS INCIDENT ALSO REINFORCES OUR APPREHENSION ABOUT THE COVERT ASSISTANCE EXTENDED TO RPF BY NRA.

3. AREA WEST HAS INFORMED YET THAT 268 RWANDAN REFUGEES WERE SETTLED BY UGANDAN AUTHORITIES IN A NEW REFUGEE CAMP AT KISORO. THE REFUGEES CROSSED MAINLY THROUGH LAKE CHAHAFFY AREA, SE OF KISORO.

4. BEST REGARDS.

UNAMIR
1994 APR 16 03 42

FC SRSG

CNR 107 P1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

(1)

TO: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 15 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1160**

SUBJECT: **Troop Contributing Countries**

1. This is to inform you that, with effect from today, we have instituted a daily briefing by the Situation Centre to troop-contributing countries. Please keep this in mind when preparing sitreps which should include information on troop movements, casualties etc.

2. A copy of a note verbale from the Mission of Ghana is attached for your information. One of the points it raises is that of communication between the Ghanaian contingent commander and his national capital. We brought this to your attention some days ago in relation to another contingent. In our view, these are legitimate requests and should be accommodated to the extent possible in the prevailing abnormal circumstances.

3. Please note the Ghanaian Government's reiteration of participation in UNAMIR. We shall be replying to this note on Monday and will include any points you might wish to send us.

Best regards.

(2)
DFC/1105

For DFC
Seen. GBA 18/4 MA

1. Already actioned. 2. I have put prop to info N.Y.
BOB
MA
A/MA

RECEIVED
OASG/DPKO
ACTION:
CO: ~~POL-10/10~~

APR 1 4 1994

PERMANENT MISSION OF GHANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
19 EAST 47TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
Tel. No. 832-1332

The Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secrtary-General of the United Nations and with regard to the situation concerning Rwanda, has the honour, on instructions from my Government, to request the following:

(a) An up-to-date information regarding the safety and security of Ghanaian troops serving with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).

(b) The granting of access to the Commander of the Ghanaian contingent in Rwanda to enable him, through the local UN centre in Kigali, inform his headquarters on matters relating to the safety and security of his troops, in the midst of media reports of death, kidnapping and threats of attack.

The Government of Ghana views with deep concern the tragic events of 6th April, 1994 which caused the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda, Juvenal HABYARIMANA, and the President of Burundi, Cyprien NTARYAMIRA, and the ensuing violence resulting in the senseless deaths of innocent civilian population, including those of some of the UNAMIR troops.

To date, much of the reports regarding the deaths, kidnappings and threats of attacks on U.N. personnel and peacekeeping troops have come from the mass media. As one of the largest troop countributing countries, these reports are of major concern to my Government.

While we are appreciative that at the request of a member of the Council, some information was received regarding the fate of the two Ghanaian soldiers alleged to have been kidnapped by rebel elements of the Rwandan force, no official information from UN sources has been received up to date. We would welcome regular official reports on the situation in the field.

SEP 10 '93

In view of the precarious situation in that country, I would appreciate it, if channels of communication could be established to keep troop contributors at the UN Headquarters informed on regular basis as the situation unfolds.

My Government strongly shares the view that the international community should not abandon Rwanda in these critical moments. We therefore stand ready to continue offering our services now and in the event of a renewed mandate for UNAMIR.

The Permanent Representative of Ghana avails himself of the opportunity to renew to the General-Secretary of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York

13th April, 1994

SRSG (FC)

CNR 106 P1/4

UNAMIR
1994 APR 16 03 40

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 15 April 1994

NUMBER: **1159**

SUBJECT: Security Council consultations

C 1. The Security Council held two rounds of informal consultations today on the situation in Rwanda. Riza briefed Council members on the latest developments on the ground, pointing out while fighting was continuing, UNAMIR was not being targetted and had taken effective control of Kigali airport where the situation was basically quiet. He also informed the Council that an initial meeting between military representatives of the two parties had been held today under the auspices of UNAMIR. Feedback from the parties was expected, with a view to arranging further dicussions on a cessation of hostilities.

C 2. Riza also recalled the two options presented to the Council yesterday on behalf of the Secretary-General and stressed that a decision to pull out or scale down UNAMIR in the absence of a cease-fire could create serious risks for the extrication of our personnel. He pointed out, however, that it was for the Security Council to take the appropriate decisions.

3. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that members of the Council had diverging views on the course of action which ought to be followed at this time. On behalf of the non-aligned caucus, Nigeria, supported by China, proposed that option A be adopted. The United States stressed that, if members of the Council insisted on taking a decision to day, it would

only accept a withdrawal of UNAMIR, as it believed that there was no useful role for a peace-keeping operation in Rwanda under the present circumstances.

4. The United Kingdom expressed a preference for option B. Russia took a similar position and, during the discussions held this afternoon, the United States modified its initial stance and indicated that it would be prepared to accept option B. The non-aligned group, however, maintained its position in favour of option A.

5. It was finally decided not to take any action this time, on the understanding that the Council President would make the attached remarks to the press.

Best regards.

President of the Council – Remarks to the Press after consultations of the whole

15 April 1994
1930

- The members of the Council have had a thorough discussion today about the situation in Rwanda and its implications for UNAMIR.

- They took carefully into consideration information provided by the Secretariat, as forwarded by the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the UNAMIR Force Commander, as well as that provided by the Foreign Minister of Belgium.

- Council members took note of and fully understood Belgium's decision to withdraw its troops in UNAMIR at the same time that it is repatriating the troops that have been providing security for the evacuation of foreign nationals.

- They also took into consideration the willingness of other major troop contributing countries to maintain their troops with UNAMIR as long as there is a useful role for them to perform.

- In the members' view, the immediate priority in Rwanda is the establishment of a ceasefire between the Government forces and the RPF. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Force Commander have been in contact with both parties to try to secure this objective.

- Council members urge the Special Representative to make every effort to facilitate a ceasefire. In this regard, the Council members welcomed the willingness of the Organisation of African Unity to promote a ceasefire in Rwanda.

- Council members demand that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to the negotiating table.

- The members reaffirmed that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country.

- Council Members commend the efforts made by the leaders of the sub-region at finding a solution to the crisis in Rwanda and urge the leaders of the region to persevere and intensify their efforts for peace, in cooperation with the United Nations and the OAU.

- But, the situation is grave and Council members are determined not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk.

- Council Members intend to keep under constant review the force levels and activities of UNAMIR and to take decisions in this regard at the appropriate time.

SRSG (FC)

UNAMIR

CNR 100 P1/9

1994 APR 15 04 31

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 14 April 1994

NUMBER: **1140**

SUBJECT: **Security Council Consultations**

1994 APR 14 P 11:20

1. During informal consultations held this afternoon, Riza briefed the Security Council on the latest developments of the situation on the ground and presented orally, on behalf of the Secretary General, the two options mentioned in our UNAMIR-1115 of 13 April. He added that a possible third option would be to move into option two after the expiration of the three week period foreseen under option one. *

2. France expressed a preference for option one, pointing out that the Security Council should review the situation after five or six days and perhaps consider adopting option two if a cease fire is not agreed upon by that time. The United States suggested that the Security Council should adopt a resolution providing for an "orderly evacuation" of UNAMIR, since it was unlikely that a cease fire would be established in the near future. The United Kingdom expressed a preference for option one, on the understanding that option two would be considered if and when a cease fire was achieved. The representative of the United Kingdom added, however, that he was not opposed to the French suggestion that the situation be reviewed by the Council within five to six days.

3. The representative of Nigeria felt that the two options did not meet the concerns of the non-aligned members of the Council. He believed that the consideration of a possible withdrawal of UNAMIR under the present circumstances would send the wrong message to the parties. He therefore requested that the non-aligned members of the Council be given time to consider the proposed options and take a position on them.

4. Accordingly, it was agreed that the Council would resume its consideration of the situation in Rwanda tomorrow. In the meantime, the President circulated the revised version of the draft resolution which was discussed by a working group of the Council this morning. The language in square brackets is not yet agreed upon. Copies of a letter received from the OAU Secretary General and of a press release by the ICRC were also distributed. These documents are attached for your information.

Regards.

14 April 1994
5.00 p.m.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNMIR),

Noting its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 with a six-week review provision on the understanding that progress would be made in establishing the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front,

Recalling its statement of 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16 which, inter alia, reaffirmed its commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and urged all parties to implement it fully,

Stressing that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains central to the peace process in Rwanda,

Expressing deep regret at the failure of the parties to implement fully the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement, particularly those provisions relating to the cease-fire,

Welcoming the initiatives of the late Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi to work towards resolving the problems in their countries through peaceful means and in collaboration with regional leaders,

Shocked at the tragic incident that resulted in the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April 1994,

Appalled at the ensuing large scale violence in Rwanda which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, the displacement of a significant number of the Rwandese population, and the significant increase in refugees to neighbouring countries,

Deeply concerned by continuing fighting, looting, banditry and the breakdown of law and order, particularly in Kigali,

Expressing its deep concern also for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel, and personnel of

Non-Govenmental Organizations, who are assisting in implementing the peace process and in distributing humanitarian relief,

[Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security,]

1. Expresses regret at the tragic incident in which the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi lost their lives, **and reiterates its invitation to** the Secretary-General to report to the Council **as requested in its statement of 7 April 1994**;

2. Expresses regret also at the ensuing violence which has claimed the lives of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Government Officials and thousands of other civilians;

3. Condemns the ongoing violence in Rwanda, particularly in Kigali, which endangers the lives and safety of the civilian population;

4. Strongly condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel leading to the deaths of **and injury to** several UNAMIR personnel and calls upon all concerned to put an end to these acts of violence and to respect fully international humanitarian law;

5. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an end to the violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda; and in this connection, [demands that the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) agree without delay to an effective cease-fire] and that both parties return to the positions held by them before the present hostilities;

6. Commends the active role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of the Force Commander to bring about a cease-fire and to mediate between the parties in order to bring about the earliest resolution of the Rwandan crisis;

[7. Decides, in the light of the current security situation in Rwanda, to increase the strength of UNAMIR and to revise its mandate to enable it to contribute to the restoration of law and order and the establishment of the transitional institutions within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;]

8. Reiterates the crucial importance of the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the settlement of the Rwandan conflict and **invites** the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to **continue to cooperate fully with** the United Nations in this regard;

[9. Urges all countries, in particular those of the region, to refrain from any action that would further exacerbate the situation in Rwanda;]

[9. Calls on all Member States, in particular neighbouring countries, acting individually or through regional organisations, to cooperate fully with the efforts of the United Nations and the OAU to bring about an end to the crisis in Rwanda;]

10. Calls upon the parties [in particular the Rwandese Patriotic Front] to renew their commitment to [the peace process in Rwanda on the basis of] the Arusha Peace Agreement, and to accept the futility of a military solution to the political problem;

11. Calls also upon the parties to cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need throughout Rwanda and in this regard, appeals to the international community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda;

12. Affirms its commitment to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda;

13. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the events in Rwanda and to report fully to the Council on the evolving situation and at least, not later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Organization of African Unity
The Secretary General

Ref: CAB/CONT/36/VOL.XII
Addis-Ababa, 14 April, 1994

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to forward herewith, a Statement by the Organization of African Unity on the situation in Rwanda adopted after a meeting today, 14 April 1994, of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

I should be most grateful if you could kindly arrange to have this Statement circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

SALIM AHMED SALIM

H.E. Mr. Colin KEATING
President
United Nations Security Council
NEWYORK

SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE AUX NATIONS UNIES

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO THE UNITED NATIONS

346 EAST 50TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
TELEPHONE (212) 319-5490 TELEX 425084 ORGA UI
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PRESS RELEASE No. 46/94

STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE OAU MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION (AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL)

1. The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution met today, 14 April 1994, in Addis Ababa at Ambassadorial level, to consider the grave situation now prevailing in Rwanda. In this connection, it heard and considered the Report of the Secretary General of the Organization.

2. The Central Organ expressed shock and profound sadness, over the tragic accident in suspicious circumstances in Kigali, on 6 April 1994, which resulted in the immediate death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi as well as senior Government officials of the two countries.

3. The Central Organ while expressing its outrage and indignation at this development, calls for the immediate institution of an independent, thorough and impartial investigation into the circumstances leading to the air crash.

4. The Central Organ is equally concerned and shocked by the ensuing spate of killings and massacres, including those of the Prime Minister, Mme Agathe UWILINGIYIMANA, some of her Ministers, Senior Government Officials, UN peace keepers as well as thousands of ordinary Rwandese Nationals including women and children, which has taken place and continues to be carried out in Rwanda. It condemns, without reservation, this carnage and blood letting which have brought death and untold suffering to the Rwandese people.

5. The Central Organ is gravely concerned over the resumption of armed hostilities between the forces of the Rwanda Government and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

6. It calls for an immediate end of the massacres, wanton killings and senseless violence still taking palce in the country.

.../.

7. The Central Organ calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Rwanda Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. This will, inter alia, enable humanitarian relief and medical assistnace to be provided to the wounded and the internally displaced people. In this connection, the Central Organ appeals to the international community to focus attention on the Rwandese civilian drama and to provide increase and adequate resources to cater for the urgent humanitarian needs of the Rwandese people.

8. The Central Organ calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations leading to the establishment, without any further delay, of the transitional institutions as provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement, namely the Presidency, the Transitional National Assembly and the broad-based Transitional Government. In this connection, the Central Organ reaffirms that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the only viable framework for the resolution of the Rwanda Conflict and serves as the basis for peace, national unity and reconciliation in the country.

9. The Central Organ considers the continued involvement of the United Nations including in particular, the role of UNAMIR (United Nations Mission for Rwanda) as an essential element in the restoration of peace in the country and the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. In this respect, the Central Organ appeals to the United Nations Security Council to ensure the continued and effective functioning of UNAMIR.

10. The Central Organ is conscious of the security and humanitarian implications of events in Rwanda for the sub-region. In this connection, it commends the efforts made by the leaders of the sub-region at finding a solution to the crisis in both Rwanda and Burundi, as exemplified in the Dar es Salaam Summit of April 6th, 1994, convened by President Mwinyi of Tanzania and in which both President Habyarimana and Ntaryamira had attended and made invaluable contribution. It calls on the leaders of the region and especially President Mwinyi, in his capacity as facilitator to the Arusha Peace Talks, to persevere and intensify their efforts, particularly considering the present tragic situation which prevails in Rwanda.

11. The Central Organ requests the Secretary General to continue to follow very closely, the developments in Rwanda and make whatever contribution within the Organization's means to assist in the efforts towards the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Addis Ababa, 14th April 1994

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Information Department

19, avenue de la Paix
1202 Geneva
Switzerland
Tel. 41 22 734-6001
Fax 41 22 734-6290

Post-it™ brand fax transmittal memo 7671 | # of pages ▸ 1

To Ms. Riveso	From ICRC-NYC
Co. UN	Co.
Dept. DPKO	Phone # 212-371-0770
Fax # 963-6460	Fax #

Delegation to the United Nations
760 Third Avenue - Suite 2602
New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel. (212) 371-0770
Fax (212) 838-5397

Aurora Bauer

PRESS RELEASE

Communication to the press No 94/16

14 April 1994

RWANDA : SIX WOUNDED KILLED IN A RED CROSS AMBULANCE

Geneva (ICRC) - Early this afternoon in Kigali armed militiamen shot to death, in the presence of members of the armed forces, six wounded people who were being taken by Rwandese Red Cross volunteers to a field hospital set up yesterday by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

This outrageous act has compelled the ICRC and the Rwandese Red Cross to suspend the collection of casualties in the capital, where the most elementary rules of humanity are being flouted.

The ICRC strongly appeals to all combatants, in particular the armed militia and their leaders, to put a stop to the carnage both in Kigali and in the provinces affected by the violence, and to allow the Red Cross to assist the wounded without discrimination.

+ + + +

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), together with the International Federation of the Red Cross Societies and the recognized National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, is one of the three components of the International Red Cross.
An independent humanitarian institution, the ICRC is the founding body of the Red Cross. As a neutral intermediary in case of armed conflicts or disturbances, it endeavours on its own initiative or on the basis of the Geneva Conventions to protect and assist the victims of international and civil wars and of internal troubles and tensions, thereby contributing to peace in the world.

UNAMIR

SRSG (FC)

CNR 099 P1/2

1994 APR 15 04 30

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 14 April 1994
NUMBER: **1139**
SUBJECT: **Humanitarian Assistance**

A/MA Pass to DCOO separately with copy of reply requested.

1. Thank you for your KYF657 of today.

2. Please be assured that we are very conscious of the extremely difficult conditions under which you are operating, and that requests for humanitarian assistance sent from here are an added burden.

3. At the same time you no doubt will understand that, since UNAMIR is the only UNations presence in Rwanda, requests are directed to us for onward transmission for your assistance. Clearly it is not possible to reject these requests here in New York.

4. When we send you such requests, it is on the clear understanding that you are to decide on their feasibility and priority in the context of your operational situation. Where there is a special importance from our side, we indicate this to you, but again the priority for action must be decided by you.

5. Standing UNations orders are drafted for and applicable under normal conditions. In the abnormal circumstances prevailing, these orders may be overridden at the discretion of the SRSG and FC, for humanitarian reasons.

6. We are most appreciative of you informing us of the cases evacuated by UNAMIR (A and B) and by other means (C). As for the case in D, while it has urgency for reasons explained to you,

DCOO Reference attached. Please return to me. BB 14/4

only you can decide its priority and which is the safer option. According to UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva, who are in radio contact with this person, he has been without food for some days.

7. We are in full agreement with the position in para 2 of your cable and confirm its validity.

8. We are disturbed to note the national orders mentioned in para 3 of your cable and will look into this matter at this end.

Best regards.

MESSAGE

FOR: POUR :	FC - C
FROM: DE :	MA to FC

TELEPHONE NO.: NO DE TÉLÉPHONE :	EXTENSION: POSTE :	ROOM NO.: NO DE BUREAU :

RETURNED YOUR CALL		VOUS A RAPPELÉ(E)
WILL CALL YOU AGAIN		VOUS RAPPELLERA
WOULD LIKE YOU TO CALL		VOUDRAIT QUE VOUS L'APPELIEZ
CAME TO SEE YOU		EST VENU(E) VOUS VOIR
WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU		VOUDRAIT VOUS VOIR

Draft reply of fax no. 1125 dated 14 Apr 1994 is put up for your approval pls.

ADC

pl file

MA

MA 15/4/94.

RECEIVED BY - REÇU PAR	DATE	TIME - HEURE

15/4

15/4

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 14 April 1994
NUMBER: **1125**
SUBJECT: **Attack on Presidential Aircraft**

1. You have been receiving copies of press articles from here. You might have noticed from the reports in the Daily Telegraph of 12 April that UNAMIR officers were quoted as saying that they witnessed the attack on the aircraft (paras sidelined).

2. Will you kindly let us have immediately whatever reports or information you can send on this critical point. Since the article mentions Belgian officers who might be leaving soon, it would be essential to identify them immediately and obtain a full report/debriefing to be sent to Headquarters.

Many thanks and best regards.

MA
Please go over this ASAP
15/4

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH - 12 April 1994 CNR 095 P2/6

Violence lurks round every corner – it is random and inescapable

Scott Peterson in Kigali, Rwanda, joins evacuees on their journey through a widespread carnage that the world is powerless to prevent

A CROWD of Rwandans lining the muddy road were silent, stopping momentarily from their bloody work like children caught stealing from a biscuit tin, as we passed with a French military convoy.

Armed with cudgels and machetes and long knives, their handiwork was nearby — three corpses, bleeding in the dirt.

An hour later, when we returned with a group of Belgian evacuees, the number of those killed by the silent crowd had risen to 11.

One Belgian woman peered over the edge of the lorry and grimaced with fear: "Oh God," she gasped. "Is it like that everywhere?"

Despite the arrival of hundreds of Belgian and French troops to evacuate foreigners — and more than 2,000 United Nations "peacekeepers" already in Rwanda — the savage killing continues in the capital.

The brutality among the lush green hills is inescapable. No one is safe and violence is random, lurking around corners along muddy trails and behind thick undergrowth.

A short ceasefire came into effect late on Sunday night so that expatriates could be evacuated, but it is no one's mandate to end the tribal bloodshed that has already cost tens of thousands of lives in Kigali.

Two mass graves are being dug. Witnesses say that rooms at the hospital are stuffed full with hundreds of bodies.

The ceasefire ended towards dusk when government mortars blasted positions of the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front in the north of the city.

UN forces are in Rwanda to monitor peace accords signed between rebels and the government last August.

But they and other forces can do nothing to stop the slaughter which erupted when President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated last week.

"We can't do anything for the civilians. We must stay neutral," said Belgian UN 1st Lieut Oliver Cariens. "I've seen women and children massacred there, in front of our compound, but we cannot intervene."

Members of the International Committee of the Red Cross move each morning around the city to collect the wounded, but theirs is the only emblem respected by those who control the streets.

Belgian forces who arrived on Sunday night dug into position around the airport yesterday. They and the French are expected to depart when all foreigners have been evacuated.

More than 300 non-essential UN staff were evacuated yesterday, including most of the UN military police contingent.

French military escorts have been collecting traumatised expatriates at the French school, where each relates horrible tales of killing and looting. Marie Helene Adot, a Spanish nun from the Life and Peace Order, said that seven Presidential Guard soldiers — whose units are blamed for beginning the carnage — came to her mission on Thursday near Kigali stadium and separated Rwandans from the foreigners and herded them into a room.

One of the black berets then said "There are people who wanted to see a bloodbath in this country. Now we are going to do it."

The soldiers tossed a grenade into the room, killing 17 sisters, Jesuit priests and monks. The victims were from both Hutu and Tutsi tribes.

Fighting began between three factions in the military, vying to take control in the anarchy, and then spread to include attacks on a 600-strong rebel garrison, stationed in the capital as part of the earlier peace accords.

Confirmation that President Habyarimana's plane was shot down by his own airborne units — and not the mainly-Tutsi rebels — came yesterday from Belgian UN officers who witnessed the attack on the plane.

Two rockets were fired at the presidential jet from the main airborne base at Kanombe, bringing it down three miles of the airport.

No one knew when the plane was landing or that it carried the President — except Rwanda's most elite units.

Government radio had linked Belgian UN troops to the plane crash, stirring up bad blood towards the Belgians — the former colonial rulers of Rwanda. A guard unit disarmed a 10-man Belgian UN military escort of the Prime Minister, and executed each one of them.

They were found, Belgian evacuees say, badly mutilated.

However, the Belgian and other forces have held their fire, and allowed the violence between Rwandans to rage on.

They will leave when the expatriates are gone, and with relief agencies pulling out, there will be few independent eyes to witness — and describe — the daily carnage.

With the rebels set to advance at any moment to assist their embattled garrison in the city, there seems little immediate hope of peace.

A Red Cross worker among the evacuees predicted: "The worst is yet to come."

al rebels of destroying the plane with rockets and launched attacks on Tutsis in the capital.

But foreign specialists today said it seemed at least as likely that Habyarimana's plane was downed by Hutu hard-liners opposed to his recent efforts at peacemaking with the Tutsis. Rwanda's estimated 7.5 million people are 85 percent Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi, and the tribes' rivalry has defined—and bloodied—the nation's history.

Rwanda, a region of grassy uplands and hills, was long a Tutsi-ruled feudal monarchy, but, after decades of German and Belgian colonial rule, the Hutu majority revolted and established a Hutu-dominated state in 1961. Since then, the two tribes have periodically fought vicious wars that forced hundreds of thousands of Tutsis into exile.

In recent years, the Rwanda Patriotic Front has built a guerrilla army estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 people, which independent analysts have rated better organised than the Hutu-dominated army. After the rebels seized parts of northern Rwanda in 1990, Habyarimana opened talks with them and a range of opposition parties—an effort that met resistance in his own Hutu-dominated party.

Habyarimana was returning to Kigali from Hutu-Tutsi peace talks in Tanzania when his plane crashed, killing him and the president of neighboring Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. Burundi has the same ethnic makeup as Rwanda but is calm.

A truce negotiated by Habyarimana had permitted the Rwanda Patriotic Front to base 600 of its fighters in Kigali. It is this force that has been battling the government army—in particular the elite, Hutu-led Presidential Guard—in the city since Thursday. The front's reinforcements have moved south from its northern stronghold to join the battle.

Some of the opposition parties said Sunday that Hutu hard-liners in the government and military were using Habyarimana's death as a pretext to hunt down all opponents—especially Tutsis. Foreigners interviewed in the last two days agreed.

"At the heart of this it was a coup d'etat" by Hutu hard-liners, said Alison Desforges, a human rights analyst who monitors Rwanda. She noted that top political leaders executed in the first days of violence—including the supreme court chief and the prime minister—had been those who favored accommodation with the opposition.

THE WASHINGTON POST - 12 April 1994 CNR 095 P5/6

Rebels Advance in Rwanda, Vow to Take Over Capital

More Foreigners Flee Central African Nation's Tribal Slaughter

By Jennifer Parmelee
Special to The Washington Post

BUJUMBURA, Burundi, April 11—Rebels advanced to the edge of Rwanda's capital today and vowed to take power as fighting between the central African country's two main tribes raged for a fifth day, news reports and evacuees reported.

As artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire pounded neighborhoods of the capital, Kigali, Belgian and French troop convoys snaked through the city to evacuate foreign residents. Many foreigners, as well as Rwandans, were reported still in hiding from the chaos that has killed thousands.

A brief lull in the fighting this morning allowed some people to go out into the blood-stained streets to look for food, a BBC reporter said. But later, the government army, dominated by the majority Hutu tribe, and the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front, formed largely from the country's Tutsi tribal minority, fought what appeared to be the heaviest battles in several days. Gangs of Hutu men and youths, some drunk, were reported continuing to rampage through neighborhoods, bludgeoning and stabbing Tutsis.

The rebels said part of a force of 2,400 fighters had reached Kigali's outskirts to relieve a smaller rebel unit in the city's center. The few foreign reporters in Kigali said the rebels appeared to have pushed the fighting closer to government strongholds today—and Western military officers there suggested that their advance was likely to continue, advising reporters to leave the city. A French commander told the Reuter news agency that the rebels were 1½ miles from a French school in central Kigali where foreigners were assembling for evacuation.

At Mulindi, 45 miles north of Kigali, Rwanda Patriotic Front officials told reporters they intend to seize the capital, restore order and hold talks with other groups on a new government. The front's chairman, Alexis Kanyarengwe, declared: "Our forces are advancing. . . . Government soldiers do not have the will to put up resistance."

Amid mist and rain, French and Belgian convoys drove through muddy streets, evacuating hundreds of terrified foreigners to the airport, which is under the control of French troops. To avoid heavy fighting on the main road to the airport, "a Belgian convoy wound through . . . side streets littered with bodies and echoing to the moans of . . . the wounded," Reuter correspondent Peter Smerdon reported. "A woman, both her legs sliced off at the thigh but still alive, cried out for help. None came."



Sketchy reports said fighting has spread to Rwanda's countryside. A Spanish radio station interviewed Spanish nuns in the western town of Kibuye, who said gangs there also were rampaging and "killing all over the place."

Here in Bujumbura, 100 miles southwest of Kigali, evacuees arrived in shock at the slaughter, much of it by gangs armed with clubs and kitchen knives. "We saw people go out and grab their victims and slash them with knives," said Arnold Deschartsen, a worker with a French aid group who had brought 13 Rwandan orphans out with him. The children gathered around him, wide-eyed and holding hands as he described their escape from Kigali. On one 2½-mile stretch of road to the airport, he said, he had counted 100 bodies.

The gangs "would go into a house and [if they] didn't get what they wanted, they started hacking people to death," said Tony Wood, a British businessman and honorary consul who has lived in Kigali for 25 years.

Rwanda's plunge into anarchy has killed as many as 10,000 people, aid workers there have estimated. It began Wednesday night, when President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was killed in the crash of his plane at Kigali's airport. Hutu officials accused Tut-

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THE TIMES (LONDON) - 12 April 1994 CNR 095 P6/6

Rebels advance as Kigali slaughter goes on

FROM CATHERINE BOND IN KIGALI

REBEL troops were on the verge of taking Kigali, the Rwandan capital, last night but a rebel victory is unlikely to bring an end to the killing.

There was no slackening in the acts of brutality in the city yesterday. Rwandan soldiers bayoneted to death two patients at Kigali's central hospital on Monday amid the dying. The attack took place in full view of hospital staff and people waiting for treatment. At the back of the hospital compound about 40 bodies were piled high, rotting in the drizzle. A young naked woman lay on the top of the fly-covered pile, her limbs stiff. Most of the dead were men but there were also several children — boys and girls with knife wounds.

Returning to the airport in a convoy of Belgian evacuees, we witnessed a scene of a type that has become horrifyingly normal. French paratroopers halted the convoy to wait for gangs carrying kitchen knives, machetes, hammers and clubs to finish killing a number of adults on the road ahead. We waited for perhaps ten minutes.

On our departure from the airport an hour earlier, we had seen the bleeding corpses of two people — a man and a woman — the woman with her legs cut off, a mutilation witnessed in massacres 30 years ago and sometimes described as a Hutu form of contempt for the taller Tutsi tribe. On our return, four more women had been butchered just ahead of our convoy in the same place outside a mud hut. Four men had also been killed with machetes and their bodies were lying in grassy ditches by the road.

The event produced in me a mixture of nausea and tears. Seemingly unmoved, however, the French paratroopers I was travelling with turned up the volume of the disco music on their car cassette. The attackers lined the road, cheering the French troops and heckling the Belgians.

Nick Hughes, a British cameraman for World Television News, filmed a similar scene from the French school. Half a mile away, men were beating women to death. "They brought women, old or middle-aged women, out of the houses and on to the street and made them sit in a pile of bodies, wounded and dying people," he said. "For about 20 minutes the women pleaded for their lives with a group of men who walked up and down the street chatting. They clubbed one woman to death, then the other. It was the most horrific thing I have ever seen."

Soldiers of the Rwandan army passed the school in lorries looking as if they were heading to prepare a mass grave with the help of a road digger. Rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, who are mainly from the minority Tutsi tribe, claimed that resistance from government forces was crumbling. The rebels regard as their main enemy, the 2,000-strong presidential guard, which they blame for most of the killing in Kigali since the death of President Habyarimana, a Hutu, in a plane crash last Wednesday.

Yesterday two European officers serving with the United Nations said 89 Tutsis who sought sanctuary in a church near the UN compound were killed on Thursday by Hutu civilians brought to the church by government soldiers. They died in the presence of the UN officers.

Other religious institutions, for decades considered a refuge for educated Tutsis, have become a target for members of the presidential guard, soldiers and Hutu youths. A Spanish nun, Sister Mary Helene Adot, told a Belgian reporter that 17 people, whom she described as mostly Tutsi and including eight nuns, had been killed in their compound in the heart of the capital by the presidential guard. The killings take place casually, under the noses of UN, French and Belgian troops, within the range of television cameras, and just yards from expatriates being evacuated. Although it is impossible for outsiders to identify who is murdering who, most of the killing is probably not random but carried out along ethnic and political lines. The victims are likely to be Tutsi as well Hutu, who made the now-fatal mistake of openly supporting opposition parties. The rebels are probably mindful of the fact that a 48-hour ceasefire may help the evacuation of foreigners. But it is possible that by stalling a rebel advance, the killing has been prolonged.

The military rebel leader, Paul Kagame, has announced that two battalions are advancing to reinforce a 600-strong battalion in the city. However, for most of the day the ceasefire seemed irrelevant. Gunfire could be heard, apparently by government troops at rebel positions.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 15 April 1994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX NO: (1-212) 963-4879	FAX NO: (250)-84265
SUBJECT: ATTACK ON PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT	
	ROOM NO: 2035 TEL NO: (250)-84271
NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 8	

REFERENCE YOUR FAX NO 1125 DATED 14 APRIL 1994. THERE WERE THREE BELGIAN OFFICERS AND ONE NCO WHO SAW THE SHOOTING INCIDENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT. NONE OF THESE WITNESSES SAID WHO WERE BEHIND THE SHOOTING AS MENTIONED IN THE DAILY TELEGRAPH. NEITHER THESE WITNESSES NOR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF UNAMIR ARE AWARE OF WHO ALL HAD THE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE ARIVAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT. STATEMENTS OF THESE FOUR WITNESSES ARE SENT HEREWITH FOR YOUR FIRST HAND INFORMATION PLEASE.

REGARDS.

AUDITORAT MILITAIRE
près le Conseil de guerre
DE BRUXELLES

PRO JUSTITIA

L'an mil neuf cent nonante-quatre
le 13 avril à 17.45

Devant Nous, . Peeraer , 1er Substitut de l'Auditeur militaire, agissant en qualité d'officier de police judiciaire, comparaît :

nom **DAUBRESSE** , prénoms Daniel Louis Ghislain

né(e) à Louvain , le 13 février 195.

demeurant à Avenue des Cardiliens, 1, 1150 Bruxelles

profession médecin

grade, qualité militaire, unité
major, médecin major - 41 de Colonne - Cond ACP KIBAT -

n° [illegible] de la matricule,

qui, sur interpellation, déclare en français ce qui suit :
Lorsque vous me demandez les faits dont vous m'interrogez, savoir l'assassinat du président de la République de la Rwanda, le 06 avril 1994, vers 19.30 hrs selon moi, je veux vous déclarer ce qui suit :
Ce jour-là, après le briefing du Bn Cdo, KIBAT II, je me suis rendu en compagnie du médecin Cdt Van Denen à la résidence du médecin-LtCol Bosuch à Kanombe. Notre intention était de coordonner avec lui la visite de l'ASP qu'il avait souhaité voir. D'autre part, l'anesthésiste Van Deren souhaitait lui faire part des difficultés liées à son relogement. Nous sommes arrivés à Kanombe vers 19.5 hrs et le Dr Bosuch et son épouse nous ont retenus à souper. Nous étions à table quand nous avons entendu vers 19.30 hrs un bruit évoquant le départ d'un missile léger. J'ai vu, regardant en direction de l'est, monter de la droite vers la gauche, un projectile propulsé par une flamme rouge-orange. A une première idée, il s'est agi d'un tir accidentel de RPG-7. Sortant de la maison, nous avons entendu le moteur d'un avion à réaction qui s'est arrêté après une explosion de faible intensité. Une à deux secondes après l'arrêt du moteur, le ciel s'est violemment éclairé au nord-est de notre position et j'ai compris que l'avion avait été abattu. Les coordonnées de l'endroit où on se trouvait sont les suivantes carte Topographique de la Rwanda 1: 50.000, région de Kigali série Z721 feuille 16-17-23-24- : environ 192812. Direction du tir entre 190800 et 190820 du sud-sud-est vers nord-nord-ouest, Distance maximale 5 km de notre location. La distance minimale très difficile à apprécier de l'ordre de un km. - - -
J'ai immédiatement contacté le PC du Bn par la radio de ma jeep et j'ai confirmé les observations faites par Alfa 6 qui se trouvait alors sur la piste de l'aéroport de Kanombe (cantonnement TOP GUN). J'ai eu contact avec Sierra 3, qui a demandé de libérer le réseau et qui a déclaré que selon leurs renseignements, il s'agissait de l'explosion d'un dépôt de munition. La chute de l'avion a été immédiatement suivie d'un intense tir de mitrailleuse lourde en direction de l'est. Après avoir signalé les tirs, j'ai reçu instruction de rester sur place. J'ai pu entendre, sur le réseau du Bn que la réaction des militaires Rwandais était très rapide et que les itinéraires en direction de la ville étaient bloqués par la troupe.

.../...

C 9.2.1/7/79/500

./...

rs [illegible].00 hrs, j'ai demandé des instructions à la Cie Alfa
ur savoir s'il était possible de circuler. Il m'a été répondu
e tout était bloqué, y compris la colonne logistique venue ac-
eillir le C130 attendu vers [illegible].30 hrs. Je suis donc resté sur place
: ai contacté régulièrement le Bn pour obtenir de instructions.
ous avons passé la nuit dans la maison et au matin du 3ème jour
nous a été demandé s'il nous était possible de rejoindre le
Force ou l'ACP à ETO Don Bosco pour y soigner un blessé grave.
estimé qu'il était impossible de se déplacer en véhicule UN
nous avons été conduit à l'ETO Don Bosco par des parachutistes
vandais. Pour le reste, je n'ai plus rien à déclarer en ce qui
oncerne cette affaire. - - -

ecture faite, persiste et signe avec nous.

AUDITORAT MILITAIRE
près le Conseil de guerre
DE BRUXELLES

PRO JUSTITIA

L'an mil neuf cent nonante-quatre
le 14 avril à 16.45 hrs

Devant Nous, [illegible], 1er Substitut de l'Auditeur militaire, agissant en qualité d'officier de police judiciaire, comparaît :

nom PASUCH , prénoms assimo

né(e) à Kinshasa (Z) , le 03 août 1 4[illegible]

demeurant à 6, Avenue de la Dilligence, 1300 Wavre (Limal)

profession médecin anesthésiste

grade, qualité militaire, unité
médecin LtCol d'active (anesthésiste) CTIB - Rwanda

n° 1[illegible]594 de la matricule,

qui, sur interpellation, déclare en français ce qui suit :

Je suis entièrement d'accord avec la déclaration du médecin major maubresse (chirurgien). - - -
Je voudrais signaler en plus que : - - -
1) juste après l'explosion de l'avion, j'ai contacté via le réseau radio de la CTIB le sous-officier de permanence, pendant que le Dr Maubresse contactait de son côté le PC du Bn KIBAT.
2) J'ai conseillé vivement, en attendant les ordres, aux 4 médecins en visite chez moi, de ne pas bouger vu la rapidité de la médication prise.
3) Le LtCol Nyez a contacté rapidement par téléphone pour me signaler qu'à leur niveau on retenait 2 hypothèses :
a) l'explosion d'un dépôt dans le Kanombé;
b) un accident d'avion.
Je lui ai répondu qu'il pouvait laisser tomber la 1ère hypothèse.
Il confirme alors la décision de garder les 4 médecins spécialiste KIBAT dans sa résidence.
4) Le Général d'Italie a téléphoné directement pour confirmation sur les événements.
5) Le lendemain, se passe à établir des communications et à faire office de relais entièrement pour les CTB, enclavés à Nyarutarama, et sans téléphone.
6) Le surlendemain, le Lt Col Nyez signale la nécessité de faire face à une situation médicale urgente, qui rendait indispensable la présence des 4 médecins KIBAT hors de Kanombé. Le Coord français de la cellule des parachutistes français de Kanombé, nous servit d'un véhicule auprès du Coord rwandais des parachutistes. Ce dernier escorta fort aimablement nos médecins jusqu'à Don Bosco, aidé de sa section parachutistes, de même que par les parachutistes français de Kanombé.
7) Les tirs de grenades et d'armes [illegible] n'ont jamais cessé aux alentours de la maison [illegible] venant du nord et voulant vers le [illegible] français nous contacta [illegible] encores dans cette zone. [illegible] responsables de l'assa- [illegible] escortés hors du camp par [illegible] que vers le Haut vers le [illegible] 2 enfants cadets.

[illegible] 9.2.1/7/79/500

.../...

8) Lorsque on l'enterre : le lendemain de l'assassinat, un belge de Gysenyi, en vacance à Butar, le nommé Thierry Jost, enseignant à Butare le belge à Gysenyi, nous tel bonne pour nous signaler que lui le expatrié français de Butaré avaient reçu un coup de l'Ambassade de France, que l'histoire était sur le dos des belges. Le soir même de l'assassinat, l'adjudant-chef assistant médical anesthésiste rwandais NGEREZA Clément, a téléphoné on domicile pour me faire part de l'assassinat. Pour le reste, je n'ai plus rien à clarer dans cette affaire. - - -

Lecture faite, persiste et signe avec nous.

13/4/94

Dr Mazzi

AUDITORAT MILITAIRE
près le Conseil de guerre
DE BRUXELLES

PRO JUSTITIA

L'an mil neuf cent nonante-quatre
le 13 avril à 09.20 hrs

Devant Nous, . cencer ier, substitut de l'auditeur militaire, agissant en qualité d'officier de police judiciaire, comparaît :

nom VAN DEENEN , prénoms Denise Thérèse G.

né(e) à Uccle , le 11 janvier 195

demeurant à 1500 St- Pieters-Leeuw, Heliefjeslaan, 10

Profession : médecin anesthésiste

grade, qualité militaire, unité
médecin Cdt - 3 RA à Bruxelles - Centre des brûlés

n° 5419 de la matricule,

qui, sur interpellation, déclare en français de qui suit :

Je suis entièrement d'accord avec les déclarations des Drs Pasuch et Daubresse, en ce qui concerne la durée de notre présence au domicile du Dr Pasuch. Je voudrais tout de même ~~signaler~~ (1) préciser ce qui suit : 3
Ceci concerne l'heure ~~exacte~~ de l'incident, d'après moi il était entre 19.45 et 20.00 hrs. J'ai eu l'impression qu'il y a eu deux tirs (je n'ai rien vu mais simplement entendu, me trouvant à table dos à la fenêtre). Je confirme que lors de notre départ du domicile du Dr Pasuch, nous avons été escortés jusqu'à KTO Don Bosco par des parachutistes rwandais et français. - - -
Pour le reste, je n'ai plus rien à déclarer dans cet entretien. -

Lecture faite, persiste et signe avec nous, approuvant trois mots rayés.

PRO JUSTITIA

Ce jourd'hui treize avril mil neuf cent nonante-quatre, à 08.00 heures ;

Nous soussigné(s) CULOT, Alain, MDLChef, OPJ et

DRILJEUX, Guillaume, 1MDL, APJ de Gendarmerie,

en résidence à Det Jud UNAMIR - KIGALI (RWANDA), porteur(s) de notre carte d'identité de service et revêtu(s) de notre uniforme,

nous référant aux instructions verbales de Monsieur le Premier Substitut de l'Auditeur Militaire PEERAER près l'UNAMIR-KIGALI-RWANDA, informons Monsieur l'Auditeur Militaire qu'aux date et heure susmentionnées, dans le cadre de l'enquête relative à la destruction de l'avion tranportant Monsieur le Président du Rwanda Juvénal HABYARIMANA, nous entendons à titre de témoin le nommé :

GERLACHE, Mathieu, Jean, Jacques,
belge, né à NAMUR le 13 juillet 1965,
époux de Sonia DUMONCEAU,
domicilié à 5020 NAMUR (Vedrin), avenue du Transvaal No 7,
CI No 574 0109222 71 valable jusqu'au 31.12.00,
grade : Cpl VC,
matricule : R/59385,
unité : 2 Cdo - 12 Cie à FLAWINNE,
temporairement affecté près l'UNAMIR-KIBAT à KIGALI (Rwanda),
CI UN No B1746 valable jusqu'au 31 Jul 94,

qui nous déclare :

"Je désire m'exprimer en français et fais choix de cette langue en procédure judiciaire. J'ai connaissance de votre qualité et des motifs de la présente audition.

"Je suis arrivé au Rwanda en date du 27 mars 1994. La compagnie dont je fais partie est cantonnée sur l'aéroport international Grégoire KAYIBANDA, soit à proximité du camp de KANOMBE où sont stationnées diverses unités de la FAR (Force Armée Rwandaise). Ma compagnie s'est installée à l'ancienne tour de contrôle de cet aéroport.

"Le 06 avril 1994, de 19.00 à 21.00 heures, j'étais commandé de service à la permanence radio. Cette permanence s'exécute depuis le sommet de cette ancienne tour de contrôle.

"Vers 20.30 heures, j'ai été témoin des faits suivants.

"J'ai constaté que l'éclairage de la piste venait de s'illimuner. J'ai d'abord cru qu'un de nos C130, devant arriver incessamment, allait atterrir. Je suis sorti de la tour de contrôle, je me suis appuyé contre la rambarde et je voulais regarder ce C130 atterrir.

"5 à 10 plus tard, j'ai vu un avion qui approchait ; il m'était difficile de savoir de quel avion il s'agissait. Je ne voyais encore que ces feux de signalisation.

"Soudain, j'ai vu un point lumineux partir du sol, soit de la droite de l'avion lorsque je le regardais. J'ai suivi ce point lumineux. Un impact a dû avoir lieu entre ce point lumineux et l'avion, car au moment où le point lumineux arrivait sur l'avion, les feux de signalisation de ce dernier se sont éteints.

.../...

Une dizaine de secondes (il m'est difficile de préciser cette durée) après le départ de ce premier point lumineux, un deuxième point lumineux est parti depuis le sol, selon moi, toujours du même endroit. Ce point lumineux a à nouveau pris la direction de cet avion. Il a finalement rencontré l'avion ; une boule de feu a alors illuminé le ciel. La boule de feu est tombée vers le sol et il y a eu une forte explosion. Après cette explosion, j'ai pu voir dans le ciel un champignon de couleur rouge ; celui-ci était relativement important.

"Immédiatement après cette explosion, des coups de feu d'armes automatiques (avec traçantes) ont été tirés de part et d'autre de la piste, soit dans la direction générale nord-sud et vice-verça.

"J'ai immédiatement annoncé cet incident à mon Comd Cie, le Capt VANDRIESSCHE. Cet incident a ensuite été rapporté à l'Officier S3 du KIBAT. Le Comd Cie s'est encore rendu à la tour de contrôle de l'aéroport ; je ne sais combien de temps après. Là, il a reçu la confirmation que l'avion présidentiel avait été abattu.

"La trajectoire décrite par ces points lumineux était nette et précise ; selon moi, il devait donc s'agir de missiles sol-air. Je ne me souviens pas de la couleur de ces points lumineux.

Selon moi, cesdits missiles ont été tirés à droite de la piste, soit dans la direction générale sud-nord. Je ne saurais pas vous dire à quelle distance ils ont été tirés ; je peux encore juste dire que je n'ai pas entendu d'éventuels bruits produits par le départ de cesdits missiles.

"Il n'y a pas eu de réactions immédiates des FAR ou de la Garde Présidentielle. Ce n'est que bien plus tard (une à deux heures) qu'une section a été envoyée à l'aérogare et que nous nous sommes rendus compte que l'aéroport avait été bouclé. C'est du moins ce que nous avons pu contater.

"Je ne pense pas que quelqu'un d'autre de la Cie ait été témoin des faits. Les autres membres de la Cie n'ont en fait qu'entendu le bruit de l'explosion au sol de l'avion présidentiel.

"Je ne vois rien d'autre à déclarer."

(Le 13 avril 1994 à 08.40 heures, après lecture, persiste et signe.)

RENSEIGNEMENTS

Informons Monsieur l'Auditeur Militaire que nous poursuivrons la présente enquête et que tout devoir ultérieur fera l'objet d'un procès-verbal subséquent.

Clos le 13 avril 1994.

Dont acte,

SRSG FC

CNR 094 P1/4

UNAMIR

1994 APR 14 21

UNITED NATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 14 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1124

ATTACHED COMMUNICATION FROM ACORD DATED 14 APRIL 1994 IS SELF-EXPLANATORY. IT IS HOPED THAT MS. MUKARUBUGA STILL MAY BE ABLE TO BE EVACUATED AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED BY HER HOME OFFICE IN LONDON. FURTHER INFORMATION MIGHT BE OBTAINED DIRECTLY FROM MOYNE REGARDING THE APPARENT CONFUSION WITH THE EVACUATION LISTS. YOU MAY NOTE THAT MS. MUKARUBUGA IS ACCOMPANIED BY HER THREE CHILDREN.

BEST REGARDS.

Pass to Ops.

CNR 91 P1/8

SRSG (FC)

UNAMIR

1994 APR 14 06 121

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1115**

SUBJECT: **UNAMIR**

1. Many thanks for your MIR 754 of today and for your detailed answers on telephone to our continued questioning. We are grateful for your patience and professionalism.

2. After consultations in the Security Council, we are required to present two outline alternatives based on the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR.

3. One approach (resting upon the strong possibility that direct talks between the two sides are due to start tomorrow) would be to inform both sides at the start of the talks that the Secretary-General would consider retaining UNAMIR at a reduced strength (i.e., after the withdrawal of the Belgian battalion, which would leave essential equipment behind, along with trainers for a short period) in Rwanda for three weeks in order to give them an opportunity to resume the Arusha process. This would depend on the following conditions:

(a) Effective cease-fire in place by both sides during the entire period;

(b) Each side to accept responsibility for maintaining order and security of civilians in the areas under their control, and discipline of their troops;

(c) Each side to assure the security of UNAMIR personnel;

(d) Declaring the airport and its approaches neutral territory under the control of UNAMIR, with only civilian Rwandan personnel to enter for technical duties;

(e) Concentration of UNAMIR personnel in airport and in selected locations in Kigali;

(f) Opening of airport for humanitarian purposes (entry of relief supplies, exit of remaining foreign nationals);

(g) Return to their homes of displaced persons concentrated in such points as stadia and hospitals;

(h) Freedom of movement for UNAMIR including patrolling wherever decided by UNAMIR.

All talks between the two sides would be held under the auspices of SRSG/FC, who would warn them on 30 April that if complete agreement was not finalized by 6 May, UNAMIR would start withdrawing by 7 May and complete withdrawal by 11 May. Contingency preparations would be made by UNAMIR for such withdrawals, including further regrouping as required between 30 April and 6 May.

Under this approach, the goal would be the establishment of the transitional institutions envisaged under the Arusha agreements, and the formation of a transitional coalition government if both sides were to agree. The goal would be the resumption of the Arusha process, failing which UNAMIR would be withdrawn in toto.

4. The second alternative would be based on the assumption that a return to the Arusha process is an impractical proposition and that negotiations for another approach might be required. This would

involve prolonged negotiations making the retention of UNAMIR, even in a reduced form, unsustainable. The UNAMIR presence then would be essentially political, to act as a mediator between the two sides for negotiations broadly along the lines of the Arusha agreements. This political presence (SRSG and staff with advisers and a small group of UNMOs) would need security support of about one company group (approximately 150 men).

5. In the first alternative, UNOMUR would remain in Uganda, while the UNAMIR battalion in the DMZ would have been redeployed to the Kigali area. In the second alternative, UNOMUR either could be retained to continue monitoring the border or its suspension could be considered.

6. Further elaborations of options follow:

Who is putting this arrangement in place? On the egypt.

Option 1. Reduced UNAMIR remains in Rwanda after departure of the Belgian contingent. UN observers and civilian police are reduced to number required for the new tasks. Major part of Belgian equipment would remain to be used by UNAMIR, possibly with some Belgian instructors to familiarize new utilizers. UNOMUR remains intact.

We understand that you initially favoured this option but the deteriorating situation in Kigali, including the overall state of the troops may have led to reconsideration. If you believe that such an option remains valid, please elaborate the concept and plan, including shortfalls requiring immediate attention, to allow us to brief the Secretary-General and Security Council.

Option 2. Immediate reduction (simultaneously with the Belgian departure) of the force to a functional political nucleus with some protection for troops. This protected UN presence would facilitate and mediate a return to situation on the broad lines of the Arusha peace process. Such a reduced force would include a HQ with the SRSG

and FC, communications, administrative, medical etc., some MILOBs and a security company for a total of 200-250 all ranks and civilian staff.

For the above option, we would appreciate your views and your concept and plan to reduce the force to a structure of 200-250 all members.

7. Considering that the Belgian contingent will remain only for four days in the case of both options, reorganization would have to be completed by Monday, 18 April. For both options, we must inform Belgians precisely of the number and type of equipment you would wish to be left behind in your care.

8. We are asking you for an extraordinary effort during a most difficult time. Working on several plans simultaneously will strain your limited capabilities at a turning point in the mission.

9. Once again, we reiterate our deep appreciation for your efforts which were reported to the Council where they received commendation.

10. We request a response by 9.00 am New York time.

Best regards.

Ann. I

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Wednesday, 13 April 1994

P5/8

Rwanda

Mr. Riza gave an extensive briefing to members on the recent political and military situation in Rwanda and answered questions. The Belgian force expected to complete its evacuation tomorrow, there was no effective cease-fire, the RPF had brought troops into the city from the north and south and some units of the government forces were putting up resistance. There was no significant political contact between the two sides, although UNAMIR was trying to transmit messages between the two sides. Instability had been exacerbated by the news of the Belgian decision to withdraw from UNAMIR and rumours that the rest of UNAMIR would depart; this had led to hostility from people who felt they were being abandoned. The Force Commander felt that if the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR left, then the security of the rest of the force could not be guaranteed, nor could the airport remain secure.

UNAMIR was not capable of performing the tasks under its present mandate. However, it was trying to ensure the safety of UN personnel, evacuating people and escort convoys to Burundi and the airport, carrying out some humanitarian functions, protecting civilians where possible, undertaking specific missions to take people to safety, trying to bring about a cease-fire and truce, and facilitating communications between the two sides. Mr. Riza commended the remarkable performance of the Force Commander in such difficult circumstances (a commendation that was reiterated by France).

ONUMUR was carrying out its patrolling duties and had not reported the introduction of arms supplies across the border. It was directly linked to UNAMIR, and if the latter force was withdrawn, there would be little reason for ONUMUR to remain.

After delegations had spoken, Mr. Riza raised the question of protecting civilian nationals in the long term, and referred to the critical situation at the stadium and hospital. The protection of civilians would require more resources, and the

Council should consider whether PKOs should be assigned such tasks.

Mr. Riza ~~also~~ Later reported on a cable just received that the RPF and the Rwandan armed forces had agreed to a meeting tomorrow at the request of the latter with the Special Representative and the Force Commander.

* * * * *

Almost all delegations spoke on the question of UNAMIR's future. Generally speaking, the consensus was that neither of the two "extreme" options were acceptable (referring to a "Somalia-type" peace-enforcement operation and total withdrawal). Delegations were also insistent that the Secretariat should come up by tomorrow with a number of feasible options that came between the two unacceptable options.

Nigeria, on behalf of the NAM Caucus, presented a draft resolution (text attached), encouraging a cease-fire and deciding to increase the strength of UNAMIR and revise its mandate. Nigeria stressed that the concern of the Council should not be limited to the fate of UN personnel and foreigners but should also include the innocent civilians of Rwanda.

Arguments presented against a complete withdrawal of the force, presented by Nigeria, France and others, included: that only the Belgians had so far expressed this intention; that it would be a bad signal to send to the Rwandan parties and people; that the UN's credibility would suffer (in fact, said Djibouti, it had already suffered when the Prime Minister and others were seized from UN property); that the carnage would spread to the rest of the country and also to Burundi.

France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain referred to the Secretary-General's letter of today, and disagreed, with varying degrees of indignation, with the apparent implication that the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent was a cause of further instability and a reason for UNAMIR's ceasing to exist in future. The UK said the letter was not an adequate reply to the questions posed by the Council, nor an adequate

basis for moving forward. It was a "great pity" that the letter seemed to blame the Belgians rather than the Rwandans, and particularly unfortunate when the accusation was levelled at a contingent that had just lost ten of its nationals. "Even more bizarre" was the implication that everything would be fine if the Belgians remained, when this was palpably not the case.

In response, Mr. de Soto said it had certainly not been the intention of the Secretary-General to blame the Belgians; in fact, his remarks in some way represented a compliment to them by stressing their indispensability. The problem for the immediate future lay in "the tenability of UNAMIR's capacity to discharge its present mandate".

France stressed the need to exert pressure on the RPF, in Kigali, New York and (implicitly) through Uganda. The RPF should be informed of the importance attached by the Council to the UN's continued presence in Kigali. The intervention of the OAU and neighbouring countries could be very important. The UK agreed that the OAU should reinforce the UN's political role, but felt Tanzania and Uganda should be invited "more positively" to help these efforts.

The US was troubled by the difficulty of maintaining UNAMIR at its present level in such circumstances, and suggested leaving a "small skeletal" operation to show the will of the international community. Later, the Council might see what could be done about giving an effective mandate. Russia also approvingly spoke of what it called the "Angolan option", although Djibouti was certainly not in favour of this. New Zealand felt there would need to be a serious security detail left behind if the Special Representative was asked to remain.

Brazil said UNAMIR should be given a "very short and precise" mandate, including the protection of civilians and the promotion of a cease-fire and political dialogue. The UK declared there was no evidence, either now or in the foreseeable future, that UNAMIR would be in a position to protect civilians; the Council should not lend itself to a "tragic fiction" whereby it merely declared that something would be done. New Zealand also had reservations about the feasibility of protecting

civilians, given the possibility of revenge attacks by the minority ethnic group. Much depended on how the RPF would behave after its imminent take-over of Kigali.

A number of delegations, including France and China, expressed their satisfaction with the efforts of UNAMIR so far.

Most delegations reiterated that there was an urgent need for a report (oral if necessary) from the Secretariat tomorrow, with concrete recommendations on where UNAMIR could be deployed and what would be the scope of the operation. Mr. Riza assured members that the Secretariat would do its best, while pointing out the problems of communicating both with the UN representatives in the field and with the Secretary-General in Madrid.

Somalia Commission of Enquiry

It was agreed that if no member had any comment to make to the President on the report of the Commission of Enquiry by tomorrow, there would be no discussion of the subject.

Libya and Chad

A draft technical resolution was introduced by the President (text attached), and the UK hoped it would be voted on tomorrow. Russia and China were very doubtful about the reference to Chapter VII, but the UK and the US insisted that it was legally necessary. The Chinese suggestion to use its usual favourite phrase about relevant resolutions would not work since there were no relevant resolutions in this case.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

Thursday, 14 April 1994

4.30 pm Informal consultations on Rwanda and other matters.

→ Demining

	(A) Nearly Sand	(B) 1000 (Burg)	(C) Politics
Engen → out			
Moncon → Passed			
MP → Keep			
Log Cay →			unacceptable
BYUBAT →		1/2 BYUBAT	●
RUTBAT →		RUTBAT	
Kigali Sect →			
DMZ Sect →			
MILOBGp ITA →			
MED PL →			
UNMOS → stay (humanitarian)			

↓

Reset

→ D

(D) → Civ Pol

CNR 090 P1/9

UNAMIR 94 APR 14 04 41

UNITED NATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

1994 APR 13 P 10:00

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 13 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1113

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1. The Permanent Mission of Spain has approached Rivero this morning regarding the evacuation of five Spanish nuns (Dominican Order), who are in Burehe near or close to Byumba. The Spanish Mission would be grateful for any assistance UNAMIR could provide for their safe evacuation:

a) Superior General, Rosario Yoldi Erro
b) Vicar General, Juana Maria Tirapu Murillo
c) Sister, Ana Maria Sainz de Murieta Zudaire
d) Sister, Adelaida Alguacil Agudo
e) Sister, Ina Erro Muro

2. The Permanent Mission of Libya has written the enclosed request dated 12 April 1993 "to protect Libyan nationals in Rwanda and endeavour to evacuate them to the closest safe location".

3. A request concerning the evacuation of 250 Tanzanian nationals was transmitted today to Omayad by the Acting UNDP Resident Representative in Dar Es Salaam. The magnitude of this request might require the Government of Tanzania to provide a plane or for ICRC to evacuate them. Since the Tanzanian Ambassador is still in Kigali, it might be helpful to contact him, it at all possible, to determine how UNAMIR could assist, within the present constraints, in their evacuation.

4. Finally, the status of three French nationals who were apparently killed in the proximity of Hotel Meridien is still pending a reply, as discussed by Rivero with Kabia yesterday.

Thank you and best regards.

SRSG (FC)

CNR 088 P1/3

UNAMIR

94 APR 14 04 08

UNITED NATIONS

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

94 APR 13 P 4:31

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 13 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : **1111**

ATTACHED PLEASE FIND, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, A COPY OF A LETTER FROM THE RFP TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TODAY.

REGARDS.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



New York, 13 April 1994

H.E. Ambassador Colin Keating
President of The UN Security Council
United Nations
New York

Mr. President,

A crime of genocide has been committed against the Rwandese people, in the presence of a United nations International force, and the International Community has stood by and only watched.

Efforts have been mobilized to rescue foreign nationals from the horrifying events in Rwanda, but there has been no concrete action on the part of the International Community to protect innocent Rwandese children, women and men who have been crying for help.

In the absence of International action to save innocent Rwandan people, the Rwandese Patriotic Front is obliged and has a moral responsibility to protect Rwandese people from barbaric and savage criminals. It is the intention of the Rwandese Patriotic Front to neutralize elements of the Rwandese army that are responsible for these massacres, bring an end to the senseless killing of innocent Rwandans, opposition politicians as well as UN peacekeepers, and restore law and order. The International Community should mobilize all its efforts to support this noble task, instead of calling for ceasefires that would only allow the criminals in Rwanda to continue committing atrocities.

We wish to request the International Community, through you Mr. President, to immediately set up a UN war crimes tribunal, apprehend those who have committed crimes against humanity in Rwanda and bring them to justice. Mr. President, the perpetrators of these atrocities in Rwanda are known and with UN assistance they can be brought to justice. By doing this, Mr. President, the UN will have rendered a noble service to the Rwandan people, who deserve it as members of this world community.

../

Mr. President, the Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to confirm to members of the Security Council its commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and as soon as the situation in Rwanda is stabilized, the Rwandese Patriotic Front will cooperate with UNAMIR, to set up broad-based institutions in the spirit of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Please accept Mr. President, my highest regards.

Yours sincerely,

Claude Dusaidi
Director for External Relations and,
RPF Representative at the UN

SRSG (FC)

CNR 087 P1/3

UNAMIR

1994 APR 13 21 45 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: **1103**

SUBJECT: **UNAMIR**

1994 APR 13 P 5:31

1. Many thanks your MIR 753 of today with draft report. On the basis of our telephone conversations with you on Tuesday evening, your views were conveyed to SG in Germany.

2. After considering your views, he has addressed the attached self-explanatory letter to the President of the Security Council. Baril already has discussed with Dallaire the plans required by the last para of the letter.

Best regards.

DISC

14/4

RECEIVED
OASG/DPKO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ACTION:
1 3 1994
INFO:

13 April 1994

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to inform you that H.E. Mr. Willy Claes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, held a meeting with me in Bonn on 12 April 1994 during which we reviewed the situation in Rwanda. On behalf of the United Nations, I took the opportunity to reiterate to the Minister sincere condolences on the death of ten Belgian soldiers serving with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) as well as deep gratitude and appreciation for Belgium's contribution to UNAMIR.

The Minister conveyed to me his assessment of the situation in Rwanda which, according to him, has deteriorated drastically in recent days and continues to grow rapidly worse. He informed me that the Government of Belgium has decided to withdraw its contingent serving with UNAMIR at the earliest possible date. The Minister assured me that his Government would like the withdrawal of its contingent to take place in a coordinated manner.

In the light of this decision by the Government of Belgium, it is my assessment that it will be extremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its tasks effectively. The continued discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate will become untenable unless the Belgian contingent is replaced by another, equally well equipped contingent or unless the Government of Belgium reconsiders its decision to withdraw its contingent.

His Excellency
Mr. Colin Keating
President of the Security Council
New York

In these circumstances, I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare plans for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, should this prove necessary, and send their recommendations to me in this regard. I shall keep the Council informed.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

CNR-84 P1/5

UNAMIR
1994 APR 12 20 UNITED NATIONS
SRSG FC
1994 APR 12 P 3:52

Passed to Ops.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 12 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1085

SUBJECT: Case of Mr. Somayire Francois, ITC project director in Kigali

1. Following Rivero's conversation with Kabia this morning, we have now received the attached correspondence regarding the evacuation of Mr. Somayire Francois, Director of an ITC project in Rwanda.

2. Rivero has expressed to Grieco the difficulties in obtaining access to Hotel Mille Collines and that UNAMIR will be ready to assist as soon as access to the area is obtained or a cease-fire is declared in Kigali.

Best regards.

CNR-83 P1/2

UNAMIR
94 APR 12 19 46

UNITED NATIONS

94 APR 12 P 3:52

SRSG
FC

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 12 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1084

The attached communication from the Norwegian Mission is self-explanatory. Would appreciate your informing us if Mr. Sandnesmoen's whereabouts are known and whether, if possible, he could be evacuated in any future flight available.

Best regards.

Passed to Ops.

SRSG (FC)

CNR-82 P1/3

UNAMIR

IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE 1994 APR 12 02 44

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 11 April 1994
NUMBER: **1081**
SUBJECT: **SecCo Consultations**

As discussed with Rivero, please find attached the notes on the SecCo informal consultations this afternoon.

Best regards.

UNAMIR PO 545

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Monday, 11 April

Angola

At the request of Brazil, Mr. de Soto provided a short briefing to members on the positions of the two Angolan parties, the gap between whom was very narrow. Once agreement was reached on national reconciliation, agreement on other points would soon be within grasp. The most critical point remained the level of UNITA's participation in the government. The Secretary-General would be writing to both leaders.

It was decided to postpone consideration of the Secretary-General's report on Angola (S/1994/374) until tomorrow.

Rwanda

Mr. Riza reported that there was still fighting and disorder in Kigali. UNAMIR was attempting to obtain a truce (rather than a cease-fire) and both sides had delivered on their promises to cooperate with the evacuations. UNAMIR had been providing escorts to convoys. At the political level, the interim government seemed to be exerting more authority, although the RPF was still opposed to it. In the DMZ, UNAMIR was still holding its position. It was also guarding areas in Kigali where displaced people were concentrated (such as the stadium and a hospital); although it was not in the mandate to protect civilians, the force was taking some actions in that regard. It may be necessary to wait for a day or so before presenting a definite assessment of UNAMIR's future to the Council. There were two alternatives: if there was a political agreement and some stability, UNAMIR might be able to resume its functions; if the situation deteriorated, it may be necessary to review its mandate and presence.

France said the one hope lay in the parties seeing that there was no possibility of a military solution. France was pleased that UNAMIR had not withdrawn from the DMZ.

The President hoped the Secretariat would provide another briefing on the latest situation tomorrow.

Bosnia

Russia began by saying that the President had been informed too late by Mr. Annan yesterday about the incident in Gorazde. In future, the Council should be informed by the Secretariat not after the event but before. The situation in Gorazde, which had been further complicated by the "air strikes", was a cause of great concern. The delegation "officially" demanded to hear a report from the Secretary-General as promptly as possible on all circumstances of the incident, in particular: how the procedure of bringing out the aircraft had worked in practice; how consultations had been carried out with members of the Secretariat; what were the precise targets and the results of the air strikes; had there been civilian casualties.

The Russian delegation also wondered about the decision of Mr. Akashi to authorise air actions still being in force 14 days after it was first taken. Where did this provision come from, who authorised it (it certainly was not the Council), and why was it for 14 days? Russia had no intention of allowing the conflict to escalate (and actions such as yesterday's represented an escalation). The Ukrainian battalion needed to be deployed in Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs should withdraw from their current positions, and the safe area should be demilitarized (including the "Muslim elements"). The Secretary-General had reported (in S/1994/291) that the Muslims were using the safe areas to launch provocative acts, and the Council had to bear this in mind.

In conclusion, the Secretariat channel of information to the Council should be as smooth and effective as the NATO channel of information. As far as air action was concerned, there was a need to draw a distinction between support for UN personnel on the ground and "broader actions" that were tantamount to support for one side. The fact that permission to authorise air actions was for two weeks may well mean that such actions were indeed taken on behalf of one side.

CYCY

SRSG (FC)

CNR-80 P1/3

UNAMIR

94 APR 12 02 42

IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 11 April 1994
NUMBER: 1079
SUBJECT: **Situation in Rwanda**

1. First, our high commendations to you and your mission, particularly to the Force Commander, UNMOs and military and police personnel, in your response to the very complicated and dangerous situation in Rwanda. You have brought credit to the UNations.

2. Your reports by cable and over the telephone have provided the basis for abbreviated verbal reports to the SecCo and summary cables to the SecGen. However, the Council awaits a more comprehensive report which only UNAMIR can prepare.

3. Accordingly, you are requested to draft, with the assistance of your political/military staff, a report of about 6-8 pages concisely covering the following:

(a) Any sustainable comments on the possible cause of the crash;

(b) An overview of the sequence of the repercussions, i.e. who started the killing first, who were the major targets, who retaliated and when and how;

(c) The preceding point should touch upon the roles of the RGF, the Gendarmerie and Presidential Guard on the one hand and RPF forces on the other. (This could include the exit of the RPF from the CMD complex and their move from DMZ).

(d) Some picture of the disorder and dislocation caused by the fighting by the armed units, i.e. ethnic killings, banditry, lootings. Additionally, any reliable estimate of the loss of life (separately for civilians and armed units if possible);

(e) UNAMIR's activities as follows:

- Attempts to minimize initial violence against civilians;

- Efforts to negotiate a cease-fire/truce and to restrain RPF and RGF from escalating violence;

- UNAMIR's assistance to evacuation of UNations/UNAMIR civilian staff and foreign nationals;

- Portrayal of UNAMIR's role as intermediary at both political and military levels;

- UNAMIR's redeployments with reasons (covering DMZ also);

(f) Observations on UNAMIR's position in present situation and recommendations for UNAMIR's role in the future in:

- An optimistic scenario with possible re-establishment of stable political authority, firm cease-fire and prospects of resumption of peace process under Arusha agreements;

- A pessimistic scenario with no political authority, continued fighting and instability and failure of both sides to resume Arusha peace process.

4. We realize that we are asking you to undertake the drafting of this report under very difficult circumstances. We trust that you will appreciate that the Council is awaiting an overview in a report by the SecGen, including his assessment and recommendations.

Best regards.

CNR-79 P1/1

SRSG
FC

UNAMIR
UNITED NATIONS
1994 APR 11 19 591

1994 APR 11 P 3:45

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 11 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1064

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1. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING URGENTLY A REPORT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ABDUCTION AND DEATH OF TRANSITIONAL PM AGATHA UWILINGIMANA WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE, ACCORDING TO YOUR REPORT OF 7 APRIL 1994 TO BARIL, IN A UNDP COMPOUND. THIS AND OTHER REPORTS DO NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EVENTS, AFTER THE FORCE COMMANDER'S ATTEMPT TO RESCUE MS. UWILINGIMANA.

2. IN ADDITION, A REPORT ON THE KILLING OF TEN BELGIAN SOLDIERS KILLED WHILE ON DUTY HAS NOT REACHED US. WE UNDERSTAND FROM YOUR REPORT OF 7 APRIL THAT UNAMIR WAS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION. HOWEVER, IT IS NOW URGENTLY REQUESTED THAT INFORMATION BE RECEIVED HERE ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR KILLINGS.

3. PLEASE ALSO GIVE US A FULL STATUS REPORT ON DETAINED OR MISSING UNAMIR PERSONNEL - HAVE THE BELGIANS AND GHANAIANS RETURNED SAFE?

BEST REGARDS.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 12 April 1994

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX NO: (1-212) 963-4879	FAX NO: (250)-84265
SUBJECT: CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEATH OF TRANSITIONAL PM AGATHA UWILINGIMANA AND TEN BELGIAN SOLDIERS	
	ROOM NO: 2035 TEL NO: (250)-84271
NO OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 2	

REFERENCE YOUR CODE CABLE 1064 DATED 11 APRIL 1994. THE RESIDENCE OF THE LATE TRANSITIONAL PRIME MINISTER MRS. AGATHA UWILINGIMANA WAS BEING PROVIDED WITH HOUSE GUARD FOR QUITE SOME TIME. DURING THE NIGHT OF 06/07 APRIL 1994 THERE WAS SUCH A UNAMIR HOUSE GUARD COMPRISING 05 GHANIAN SOLDIERS AT HER RESIDENCE. THE INNER PERIMETER OF THIS HOUSE USED TO BE GUARDED BY UNAMIR GUARD AND OUTER PERIMETER (OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARY WALL/FENCE) BY THE GENDARMERIE. AT AROUND 0430 (LT) HOURS 07 APRIL 1994 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS UNDER COMMAND ONE LIEUTENANT CAME WITH 04 VEHICLES AND JOINED WITH THE HOUSE GUARD. AFTER ABOUT AN HOUR BETWEEN 0530-0600 HOURS THE PM WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF GENDARMERIE ESCAPED THROUGH THE REAR FENCE WITH HER FAMILY WHEN IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE RGF WERE GOING TO ATTACK HER. AROUND 0700 HOURS MANY RGF SOLDIERS SUDDENLY CAME IN THE HOUSE AND ORDERED THE GUARD TO SURRENDER. THE ASSAILANTS SNATCHED THEIR RIFLES, WIRELESS SETS AND OTHER EQUIPMENTS AND DROVE THEM IN A MINI BUS TO CAMP KIGALI.

NOT FINDING HER IN HER RESIDENCE THE RGF SOLDIERS SEARCHED THE SURROUNDING AREAS AND FOUND HER HIDING WITH HER FAMILY IN THE HOUSE OF ONE UNDP PERSONNEL LIVING IN THE UNDP RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND. THIS COMPOUND IS JUST ADJACENT TO THE PM'S RESIDENCE. THE ASSAILANTS FIRED INSIDE THE ROOM WHERE THE PM WAS HIDING. THE PM, HER HUSBAND AND TWO OF HER CHILDREN WERE TAKEN AWAY BY THE RGF FROM THIS HOUSE. AFTER RECEIVING CALL FOR ASSISTANCE TWO UNAMIR APCS WERE DISPATCHED BUT THE APCS COULD NOT REACH THE SPOT BECAUSE OF ROAD BLOCKS. AT THIS STAGE THE FORCE COMMANDER MANAGED HIS WAY TO THE SPOT BUT BY THIS TIME THE ASSAILANTS HAD LEFT THE SPOT. THE PM'S DEAD BODY WAS LATER FOUND IN CAMP KANOMBE. HER HUSBAND HAS ALSO BEEN KILLED. ALL THE CHILDREN,HOWEVER, ARE ALIVE AND UNHURT.

AT ABOUT 0730 HOURS ON 07 APRIL 1994, AN RGF OFFICER BY THE NAME OF MAJ BERNARD NTUYAHAGA ALONG WITH SOME RGF SOLDIERS BROUGHT THESE 05 GHANIAN SOLDIERS AND 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS IN FRONT OF MT5 OFFICE OF CAMP KIGALI. FIVE MINUTES AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL, THE RGF OF CAMP KIGALI WHO WERE IN THE FORMATION (MORNING FALL IN) CAME TO THE MT5 OFFICE AND STARTED BEATING THEM WITH WEAPON BUTT AND STONES AND SOME TRIED TO KILL THEM WITH BAYONET. THE MILOB ON DUTY (AN OFFICER FROM TOGO) OPENED THE OFFICE AND SOME OF THE UNAMIR SOLDIERS GOT IN AND FOUR OF THE BELGIAN SOLDIERS COULDN'T GET INSIDE WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. THE MILOB ON DUTY AT CAMP KIGALI TRIED TO PREVENT THE RGF SOLDIERS GETTING INSIDE THAT ROOM BUT WAS THREATENED THAT IF THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED, THEY WOULD THROW GRENADES INSIDE THE ROOM. THEN THE MILOB WAS FORCED IN ANOTHER ROOM. FEW MINUTES LATER, SOME RGF SENIOR OFFICERS CAME THERE AND TRIED VAINLY TO DISPERSE THEM. AFTER ANOTHER FEW MINUTES THE COLONEL COMMANDING CAMP KIGALI HQ COY ARRIVED ON THE SPOT AND TRIED TO EVACUATE THE WOUNDED TO THE HOSPITAL BUT THE SOLDIERS REFUSED AND WAS ABOUT TO BEAT HIM.

AT THIS POINT THE COLONEL COMMANDANT'S ESCORTS SENT HIM AND THE MILOB TO THE ESM (OFFICERS ACADEMY) WHICH IS NEAR BY. THE MILOB MANAGED TO PERSUADE THE COLONEL'S ESCORTS TO GO TO MT5 OFFICE AND BRING AT LEAST THE GHANA SOLDIERS IF NOT ALL. THIS HE DID BECAUSE HE FOUND THE RGF SOLDIERS WERE TOTALLY AGITATED AGAINST THE BELGIANS AND THE RGF BELIEVED THAT IT WAS THE BELGIAN SOLDIERS WHO SHOT DOWN THEIR PRESIDENT. ONE OF THE ESCORTS MANAGED TO BRING THE 05 GHANIANS SOLDIERS TO THE ESM. AFTER ANOTHER ABOUT 5 MINUTES RGF SOLDIERS SHOT FOR A LONG TIME AT CAMP KIGALI. SOLDIERS AT ESM SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN THE BELGIAN SOLDIERS WHO WERE KILLED. ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER THE FORCE COMMANDER ARRIVED AT ESM WHERE THE MILOB BRIEFED HIM ABOUT THE INCIDENT. THE FORCE COMMANDER HAVING FOUND OUT THAT HE HAD VERY LITTLE TO DO AT THAT STAGE PROCEEDED FOR A MEETING AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

THE DEAD BODIES OF THESE 10 BELGIAN SOLDIERS WERE RECOVERED ON 09 APRIL 94 AND FLOWN BACK HOME ON 10 APRIL 94. LIST OF THOSE KILLED HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT TO YOU VIDE OUR FAX NO KYF 642 DATED 11 APRIL 1994.

THIS IS A FIRST HAND INVESTIGATION REPORT. DETAIL INVESTIGATION WILL SURELY BE CONDUCTED WHEN THE SITUATION COOLS DOWN.

THERE IS NO OTHER UNAMIR PERSONNEL,CIVIL OR MILITARY, UNDER DETENTION OR MISSING. THE ONLY GHANA SOLDIER WHO WAS MISSING FOR SOMETIME IN ANOTHER INCIDENT HAS BEEN RECOVERED. ALL UNAMIR CIVILIAN STAFFS(LESS 14 ESSENTIAL STAFFS) HAVE LEFT KIGALI SAFELY. MOST OF THE CIVPOL HAVE ALSO LEFT KIGALI SAFELY. THE MILITARY COMPONENT IS ALSO FINE TILL NOW.

REGARDS.

SRSG

FC

CNR-78 P1/1

UNAMIR

11 APR 11 19 55

UNITED NATIONS

APR 11 P 3:45 LT

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 11 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1063

1. AS DISCUSSED THIS MORNING WITH FC DALLAIRE, THIS IS TO CONFIRM THAT UNAMIR CANNOT BE A PARTY TO A TRUCE AGREEMENT.

2. UNAMIR, HOWEVER, CAN BE A WITNESS TO IT, SO THAT PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DRAFT SHOULD READ:

"IL EST CONVENU ENTRE LE FPR ET LE COMMANDEMENT DES FAR ... EN PRESENCE DE LA MINUAR ..."

AND APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS IN THE REMAINDER OF THE TEXT.

3. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CONDITIONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 CANNOT BE GUARANTEED BY UNAMIR, THOUGH UNAMIR CAN CONTINUE ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE COMMANDERS OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN UNITS CONCERNED REGARDING THE TIMING FOR THEIR DEPARTURE. HOWEVER, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, GUARANTEES SHOULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE TWO PARTIES THAT EVACUATION OF UN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL NOT BE HINDERED OR ENDANGERED.

Regards

SRSG

CNR-77 P1/2

UNAMIR FC

APR 11 19

APR 11 P 3:30

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE : 11 APRIL 1994

NUMBER : 1062

AS A FOLLOW UP TO MS. RIVERO'S DISCUSSION WITH MR. KABIA THIS MORNING, PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE FORMAL REQUEST OF THE GERMAN MISSION TO UN ON BEHALF OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER REGARDING TWO EVACUATION CASES. WILL APPRECIATE YOUR KEEPING US INFORMED ON THIS MATTER.

BEST REGARDS.

FC

Both actioned & NY informed. For act. please review.

A/1/11

CNR-77 P2/2

T E L E F A X	DATE	PAGES (INCL. COVER)
No.:	»11 April, 1994	»1

From: Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations
600 Third Ave, 41st Fl., New York, NY 10016
- Peter Wolff -
Telephone: (212) 856-6200
(212) 856-6256 (direct)
Fax: (212) 856-6280

To: United Nations
DPKO
Ms Riveira

Fax: 963-6460

Object/Message:

Dear Ms Riveira,

with reference to our phone conversation concerning the request made by the German Foreign Minister to kindly rescue some German nationals in Rwanda, I would like to provide you the details in writing:

1. Mrs. RUPP - Location of her house:

from "Rond-point" in direction of airport;
at the level of the new CND (Parliament); turn right ointo a good unpaved road;
Mrs Rupp's house is in that street, after 130 meters on left side.
The house has three red roofs and a big red gate.
UNAMIR personnel picking up Mrs Rupp should call "Heidi".
If necessary, force may be used to have access to Mrs Rupp's house.

1 actual

2. German Radio station ("Deutsche Welle") on Mont Kininia:

11 or 12 Germans trapped there, unable to leave because of mined areas surrounding the radio station.
Request to be picked up by helicopter.

2 actual

3. Telephone No of German Ambassador (Mr Hoelscher) in Kigali: 75221.

Thanking you and UNAMIR for their valuable help,

(Christian Much)

PS: Reference person in German Mission continues to be Mr. Wolff (see above).

TOTAL P 01

NYK, PLS RELAY TO UNAMIR KIGALI, TKS CNR076 P1/2

UNOMUR

UNAMIR

1994 APR 10 12 46

MONUOR

CUN-002

1994 APR 10 11 52

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
La Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda/Rwanda

MKF779

PAGE 1/2

CODE CABLE

OUTGOING FAX NO. 524
10 APRIL 1994

TO: MAJ GEN R. DALLAIRE, FC UNAMIR KIGALI MISC 477	FROM: COL ASRAR ACTING CMO UNOMUR KABALE
FAX NO: (07) 84266	FAX NO: 256 486-23816
SUBJECT: UNOMUR INFOSUM/16 PERIOD 04 TO 10 APR 94	

1. THE SITUATION IN UNOMUR AREA IS STILL CALM.

2. VIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS, THE NRM FROM PRESIDENT MUSEVENI GOT A VICTORY WHICH IS BIGGER THAN THAT ANNOUNCED BY THE PREVIOUS POLLS. THE NRM SEEMS TO HAVE LOST ONLY IN NORTHERN UGANDA, AS EXPECTED. THE WINNING OF NRM, EXPRESSED BY FAIR ELECTIONS, BRINGS SOME TRANQUILITY TO THE INTERNAL POLITICS IN THE FOLLOWING MONTHS, AT LEAST UNTIL THE C.A IS INSTALLED. THIS SITUATION IS FAVORABLE TO UNOMUR MANDATE AND TO THE SMOOTHLY CONDUCT OF OUR OPERATIONS.

FC

CNR 076- P2/2

CUN-002

3. FOLLOWING THE EVENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RWANDA, THE NRA STARTED TO REINFORCE SOME OF THEIR POSITIONS NEAR THE BORDER LINE AS THE RPF STARTED TO FIGHT AGAIN, NEW BATCHES OF AMMUNITION WOULD BE REQUIRED SOON, IF THE FIGHT REMAINS TOO LONG. SURVEILLANCE OF THE BORDERLINE HAS BEEN INTENSIFIED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING OUR AERIAL MEANS AND NEW STATIC OPs.

4. REGARDS

SRSG

CNR 075 P1/7

UNAMIR FC

'94 APR 10 00 38

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 9 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: 1060

SUBJECT: **Franco-Belgian Evacuation Operation/Security Council Consultations**

1. First, thank you for your very prompt notification of French landings at Kigali. You already are aware of impending Belgian landings.

2. French Ambassador informed Security Council in consultations that this operation, and separate coordinated evacuation of US citizens are national operations outside the framework of UNAMIR. He insisted that they required no Security Council endorsement or authorization (summary of Security Council discussions attached).

3. As was clarified to you on the telephone, you are to deal with the present situation on the basis of these two separate operations - one international, and the other national - being conducted concurrently in Kigali, centered at the airport. You are requested to cooperate with both the French and Belgian commanders to facilitate the evacuation of their nationals, and other foreign nationals requesting evacuation. You may exchange liaison officers for this purpose. You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate but may exercise your discretion to do so should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to participating in possible combat, except in self-defence.

4. We would hope that the operation would be completed in 48-72 hours. You are requested to use your contacts with RGF and RPF military commanders to persuade them not to hinder evacuation operation, as this would be to their disadvantage in the long term, and probably in the short term also. Here at UN Headquarters, Rwandese Ambassador has given assurance that Government forces will present no hindrance and RPF representative separately has given similar assurances.

5. In this context, please note that your civilian personnel are an integral part of the mission and are expected to stay on until instructions otherwise are issued. However, non-essential personnel may be evacuated at your discretion. Also, we understand that there are a number of unauthorized dependants, whose evacuation may also be effected. There are three possibilities for evacuation: (a) as part of Franco-Belgian airlift; (b) by UNOSOM aircraft which could bring in supplies; (c) by UNDP Antonov (capacity: 100) on standby in Tanzania (through UNDP Deputy ResRep in Kigali). (For the first option, French Mission has transmitted our request to Paris; you may raise the possibility with the French/Belgian commanders.)

6. The essential question that arises is the position of UNAMIR in the present situation and its future following the completion of the Franco-Belgian (and US) evacuations. Clearly it is impossible for UNAMIR to implement its mandate in the prevailing circumstances in Kigali. Therefore, for the next few days it can only concentrate on the security of UN personnel, of members of the transitional government, providing security to embassies and displaced persons to the extent possible, and facilitating the Franco-Belgian evacuation.

7. Following this evacuation operation, it will be essential to assess the viability of UNAMIR in the longer term which will depend on the reaction to evacuation by RGF and RPF, as well as by political parties and the populace in general. Should the Interim Government

consolidate some authority, should a cease-fire take effective hold and, consequently, should there be tangible prospects of the resumption of the peace process under the Arusha agreements, the continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda may be viable. However, should the unfolding of events be in the opposite direction, with no established authority, with continued combat, insecurity and possible hostility against a foreign presence being deflected toward UNAMIR, we may regretfully have to conclude that UNAMIR must withdraw from Rwanda. Your assessment and recommendations will be decisive factors in this evaluation to be presented to the Secretary-General for his decision on what action will be taken and how this will be transmitted to the Security Council. The timing of your assessment and recommendations is left to you to determine in the light of the situation in Kigali and in the country, and the security situation of UNAMIR.

Best regards.

P.S. Your MIR-727 of today just received; it does not affect sense of this cable prepared in response to our telephone conversations.

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Saturday, 9 April 1994

Rwanda

The President announced that he had called these consultations following talks with the French and Rwandese Ambassadors early this morning. The Rwandan Ambassador had felt things were reasonably encouraging, with progress on an interim government and a cease-fire. On the other hand, the RPF was taking action on three fronts and ONUMUR should step up its activities to monitor the situation; meanwhile UNAMIR should maintain its efforts to reach a cease-fire.

Mr. Riza said he had spoken to the Force Commander at 3 am (NY time), who had told him that there had been a very serious deterioration in Kigali, with widespread fighting and disorder. Almost all the RPF in the compound were now fighting the Presidential guard, while the RPF from the DMZ was moving towards Kigali. The hopeful expectations of yesterday had been dashed, although the Force Commander was still trying to broker an agreement. The RPF was disavowing the new interim government. The airport was under the control of French troops, and UNAMIR had been ordered to cooperate with them, but not go beyond its mandate or impartiality.

France told members that 190 of its troops (out of 400) had taken control of the airport, in a joint Franco-Belgian operation to which "members of the Rwandan government in Kigali" had given their consent. The objective was to evacuate their nationals (and other nationals who requested evacuation). It was a purely humanitarian operation with a strictly limited time-frame. The evacuation would begin as soon as the necessary arrangements had been made. It had been felt that French lives were in danger, with two having been killed already, hostile comments being broadcast by radio, and the RPF moving on Kigali. The evacuation in no way implied that UNAMIR must leave Rwanda. The United States said that this operation had been carried out in close coordination with its own government, and confirmed that the evacuation had nothing to do with the decisions that the Council must take on UNAMIR.

Several delegations, including Argentina, Spain, and the UK said that the operation was fully justified under Article 51 of the Charter. Russia also expressed understanding.

Others were slightly more guarded, Nigeria asking how limited in time the operation really would be. China said it understood that it had been carried out in exceptional circumstances (with chaos and no government) and emphasised that it must be strictly limited in time and mandate and not compromise any principles of sovereignty and domestic laws. Brazil hinted at similar concerns and asked for (and received) confirmation that two types of Belgian troops were in Rwanda, some in UNAMIR and some in their national capacity.

Pakistan, the UK and others said that the Council's main responsibility was for the security and effectiveness of UNAMIR. Any decision taken would be based almost entirely on the reports from the Force Commander and Special Representative.

Nigeria also stressed that wider political concerns must be addressed, including how to rebuild peace and political institutions. The role of the OAU could be crucial in this, and the Council must find a way of involving it. Pakistan agreed, saying the present situation in Rwanda was largely internal, but it could easily threaten the region.

In answer to questions, Mr. Annan said the possibility of UNAMIR being withdrawn could not be ruled out. If, on the other hand, it proved possible for UNAMIR to remain, it might well be necessary to reassess the mandate as well as its capability to carry out its current functions.

Summing up (the first time round), the President pointed out that the letter of the Secretary-General had indirectly asked whether the Council wished to change the mandate of (and reinforce) UNAMIR to effect any necessary evacuations. It seemed that nobody in the Council was proposing that UNAMIR take responsibility for the evacuation. The US asked the President to "reserve on that comment" for the time being (rather oddly, seeing that yesterday it had been the same delegation that had

been most hesitant about evacuations being carried out under anything other than national capacities].

Nigeria said that the Council should schedule another meeting, once more facts were known, to discuss broader issues: the relationship between UNAMIR and the national troops; and the UN role in establishing authority in Kigali.

While there was little dissension on the actual fact of the national interventions to carry out evacuations, there was much more on how the President should present these consultations (with their lack of dissension) to the press.

Nigeria said the President should announce to the press that the Council a) took note of the evacuations in these exceptional circumstances, b) emphasized that their rationale was purely humanitarian and limited in time, and c) stressed its determination to protect UNAMIR personnel.

France, backed by Argentina and later the UK and the US, said it preferred fewer details (particularly on the motives and justification for sending national forces). Nigeria pointed out that the history of foreign intervention in African crises was one that was long and not always very happy. The situation in Rwanda might turn messy like others. Since France had explained that its intervention was humanitarian and limited in time, then people outside the Council should know this too.

France said it understood the historical background, but regretted that it must insist. Of course the motivation was humanitarian (and the Ambassador himself had said this to the press). But if the Council gave out too many details to this effect (e.g. that the intervention was to be limited in time), this might look as if the Council was placing limits on the actions of the French government, and on a matter which it held very dear (i.e. the right to intervene to protect its nationals).

China felt that being open with the press (a comment that France later picked up with irony) might help matters inside Rwanda, allaying people's concerns and thereby helping the French and Belgian operations. The US said it was up to France, which

had committed its troops in this national operation to decide what would help it, and not up to the Council.

Brazil and Nigeria felt that if the President was not allowed to mention these matters, he should limit himself to saying that there had been a discussion on the evacuation; he should not even say that the Council "took note" of the French Ambassador's briefing. On the matter of UNAMIR, the President was authorized to say that discussions had begun.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

Monday, 11 April 1994

11 am Informal consultations on **Rwanda, Angola** and **Cyprus.**

SRSG
FC

CNR-74 P1/2

UNAMIR
IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI FOR DALLAIRE
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 7 April 1994
NUMBER: 1054
SUBJECT: Situation in Rwanda

1. Many thanks for your cable 001 of today and subsequent information on telephone.

2. Please be aware that this information is the basis for our reports to SecGen and SecCo. Therefore we depend on its authenticity and accuracy when received from you.

3. We trust that you now have established co-ordination between UNAMIR and UNations Security Co-ordinator to ensure that coherent reports are sent to headquarters (earlier conflicting reports on fate on security situation of Interim Prime Minister are case in point). Also please ensure that your Contingent Commanders do not give to media statements that contradict your reports to us (Belgian Commander's statement denying killing of three Belgian soldiers is an example).

4. We had informed Belgian Mission and SecCo of the deaths of the three soldiers. Belgians informed us (1730 New York time) that the death toll of Belgian soldiers is now ten, which we have confirmed to them after last conversation with Dallaire. (At the same time, radio is quoting Mokhtar Gaye as saying that the three Belgian soldiers thought killed have been found alive but that another eleven have been killed).

5. Please be assured that we are conscious of the desperately confused even chaotic situation in which you are operating, but please try and co-ordinate your sources and lines of

communication. Your primary reporting responsibility is to UNations headquarters which in turn informs SecGen and SecCo. We are aware that you must be under pressure from media but please ensure that we are informed either by telephone or cable <u>before</u> statements are given - by Mokhtar Gaye or others - to reporters. This is imperative to avoid presenting a picture of incoherent communications.

Best wishes and best regards.